Document Type
Article
Date of Original Version
2020
Department
Philosophy
Abstract
Plato seems to have been pessimistic about how most people stand with regard to virtue. However, unlike the Stoics, he did not conclude that most people are vicious. Rather, as we know from discussions across several dialogues, he countenanced decent ethical conditions that fall short of genuine virtue, which he limited to the philosopher. Despite Plato's obvious interest in this issue, commentators rarely follow his lead by investigating in detail such conditions in the dialogues. When scholars do investigate what kind of virtue, if any, Plato thinks is open to non-philosophers, they typically look to the Republic. But in the Republic Plato sets out an ideal city; therefore, the virtue available to non-philosophers there is likely different from what he thinks is available to them in the real world. If we want to determine Plato's thoughts about the virtue of actual non-philosophers, we must look elsewhere. In this paper, I set my sights on the Phaedo.
Publication Title, e.g., Journal
Classical Quarterly
Volume
70
Issue
1
Citation/Publisher Attribution
Reed, D. (2020). Deficient virtue in the Phaedo. Classical Quarterly, 70(1), 119-130. https://doi.org/10.1017/s000983882000052x
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/s000983882000052x
Author Manuscript
This is a pre-publication author manuscript of the final, published article.
Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable
towards Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth in our Terms of Use.
