Towards Secure and Resilient Synchrophasor Networks Using P4 Programmable Switches
Document Type
Conference Proceeding
Date of Original Version
1-1-2024
Abstract
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) enable high-speed and high-precision power quality measurements, but their vulnerability to cyber-attacks poses substantial risks to the stability and reliability of power systems. This paper explores the application of programmable networks, specifically P4 switches, to enhance the cybersecurity of PMU systems. These switches can be programmed to enable the creation of custom forwarding and processing logic at the data plane level. We analyze PMU-specific attacks through attack trees, propose effective mitigation strategies using programmable switches, and present a case study demonstrating the recovery of missing synchrophasor data by implementing a matrix completion algorithm on the switch data plane. The recovery scheme is evaluated in a container-based P4 network emulator using real PMU data from a campus microgrid. For instance, in the 10% missing data scenario, the recovery scheme can achieve a mean absolute percentage error of 0.038% for voltage magnitude and a phase angle error discrepancy of around 0.08 degrees.
Publication Title, e.g., Journal
IEEE Green Technologies Conference
Citation/Publisher Attribution
He, Zhiyao, Yanfeng Qu, Gong Chen, Reuben Samson Raj, Hui Lin, and Dong Jin. "Towards Secure and Resilient Synchrophasor Networks Using P4 Programmable Switches." IEEE Green Technologies Conference (2024). doi: 10.1109/GreenTech58819.2024.10520393.