CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives and earnings guidance
Date of Original Version
Extending recent studies on chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs), we investigate the impact of CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives on earnings guidance. We find that firms with high CEO risk-taking incentives are more likely to issue earnings guidance and issue more guidance. We also find that firms with high CFO risk-taking incentives are associated with less precise guidance, narrower forecast range, and earlier forecasts.
Publication Title, e.g., Journal
Applied Economics Letters
Jiang, Tianqi, Zhao Wang, Shingo Goto, and Fan Zhang. "CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives and earnings guidance." Applied Economics Letters 27, 15 (2020): 1256-1259. doi: 10.1080/13504851.2019.1676865.