CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives and earnings guidance

Authors

Tianqi Jiang, University of Rhode Island
Zhao Wang, Capital University of EcoNomics and Business
Shingo Goto, University of Rhode Island
Fan Zhang, Arizona State University

Document Type

Article

Date of Original Version

9-1-2020

Abstract

Extending recent studies on chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs), we investigate the impact of CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives on earnings guidance. We find that firms with high CEO risk-taking incentives are more likely to issue earnings guidance and issue more guidance. We also find that firms with high CFO risk-taking incentives are associated with less precise guidance, narrower forecast range, and earlier forecasts.

Publication Title, e.g., Journal

Applied Economics Letters

Volume

27

Issue

15

Citation/Publisher Attribution

Jiang, Tianqi, Zhao Wang, Shingo Goto, and Fan Zhang. "CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives and earnings guidance." Applied Economics Letters 27, 15 (2020): 1256-1259. doi: 10.1080/13504851.2019.1676865.