Date of Award
Master of Arts in Political Science
Daniel H. Thomas
The India-Pakistan dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir has been before the Security Council of the United Nations intermittently for some ten years. In all the attempts at settlement the only accomplishment of this body has been to effect a cease-fire agreement between the two disputants. The writer's objective in this paper is to investigate American policy in the dispute before the United Nations in an effort to discover the official position taken by the United States government.
In making a study of this type it was necessary for the writer to investigate the primary records of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. Greater emphasis was placed upon the verbatim records of the Security Council, for it was in this organ that American policy is most evident. The main body of the thesis has been developed from these records. Other primary records examined were the State Department Bulletins which expressed broad American policy in regard to South Asia and its effect on the Kashmir issue. The New York Times proved an invaluable source of information for statements and actions taken by the United States and the Security Council which were not yet published in the official records of the U. N. The writer was able to obtain valuable primary and secondary material from the embassies of India and Pakistan in Washington, D. C. These were examined in order to ascertain the official policy of the two disputants. Secondary source material was found in the reports and bulletins of the Foreign Policy Association and various books. These were examined for interpretation and application of facts obtained from the primary sources.
The results of the study seem to indicate that the United States continually urged the two parties to use peaceful means of settlement and to abstain from any use of force. This was a policy consistent with Chapter I, Article 2, Section 3, of the United Nations Charter.
Second, Washington placed great emphasis upon a plebiscite in Kashmir under United Nations auspices. The plebiscite alone would determine the final accession of the state to either India or Pakistan. This principle of self determination has been a traditional policy of the United States.
Third, the United States denied the validity of the original accession instrument signed by the Maharaja of Kashmir and the Indian government. Furthermore, the State Department viewed Indian control over Kashmir as temporary.
Fourth, the United States refused to condemn Pakistan as an aggressor in Kashmir. This was a charge that India had sought from the Security Council since the introduction of the dispute in 1948.
Fifth, Washington sponsored jointly with other Council members nine resolutions seeking to bring the parties to a settlement. Both disputants for various reasons were unable to accept the recommendations and suggestions made in the resolutions.
Sixth, the United States has maintained that military aid to Pakistan has not changed the Kashmir issue, nor altered the facts of the deadlock. Later military pacts, such as the SEATO and Bagdad treaties between the United States and Pakistan, are consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
Wrigley, Ronald Leach, "American Policy in the Kashmir-Jammu Dispute Before the United Nations 1948-1957" (1958). Open Access Master's Theses. Paper 1785.