Document Type
Article
Date of Original Version
2017
Department
Philosophy
Abstract
The Stoics claim that the sage is free from emotions, experiencing instead εὐπάθειαι (‘good feelings’). It is, however, unclear whether the sage experiences εὐπάθειαι about virtue/vice only, indifferents only, or both. Here, I argue that εὐπάθειαι are exclusively about virtue/vice by showing that this reading alone accommodates the Stoic claim that there is not a εὐπάθειαι corresponding to emotional pain. I close by considering the consequences of this view for the coherence and viability of Stoic ethics.
Citation/Publisher Attribution
Reed, Doug (2017). The Objects of Stoic Eupatheiai. History of Philosophy Quarterly 34(3):195-212.
Available at: https://philpapers.org/rec/REETOO-8
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