Date of Original Version
We test how fast and slow thought processes affect cooperation for sustainability by manipulating time pressure in a dynamic common-pool resource experiment. Sustainable management of shared resources critically depends on decisions in the current period to leave enough stock so that future generations are able to draw on the remaining limited natural resources. An intertemporal common-pool resource game represents a typical dynamic for social dilemmas involving natural resources. Using one such game, we analyse decisions throughout time. We find that people in this context deplete the common resource to a greater extent under time pressure, which leads to greater likelihood of stock collapse. Preventing resource collapse while managing natural resources requires actively creating decision environments that facilitate the cognitive capacity needed to support sustainable cooperation.
Brozyna, C., Guilfoos, T., & Atlas, A. (2018). Slow and deliberate cooperation in the commons. Nature Sustainability, 1, 184-189. doi: 10.1038/s41893-018-0050-z
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-018-0050-z