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United States Annexation of the Philippines: A Reinterpretation

William P. Connor Jr.
University of Rhode Island

UNITED STATES ANNEXATION OF THE PHILIPPINES:
A REINTERPRETATION

BY

WILLIAM P. CONNON, JR.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis critically examines the traditional historical interpretation of the events leading to American annexation of the Philippine Islands, the acquisition itself, and the debate which followed the Spanish-American War concerning the fate of the Philippines. The major topics of investigation comprise the extent of American economic interest in the Pacific area prior to the war, the writings and activities of American officials and business leaders, both in the Pacific and in the United States, the way in which the United States actually came to possess the islands, the basic beliefs of the anti-imperialists concerning foreign policy, and the debate which followed the signing of the treaty of peace in Paris.

Several methods were used to conduct the investigation into the above topics. Leading business journals and periodicals and government statistical bulletins were researched to determine the amount and extent of American foreign trade and investment, especially in the Pacific area. Primary sources, such as articles in periodicals, autobiographies, newspapers and letters, were researched to determine the beliefs and activities of American leaders, political, economic, and social. This method as well as an extensive reading of secondary sources was also employed in the investigation of the anti-imperialists, their beliefs and activities. Secondary sources as well as official government documents and some primary material were read to aid in the reconstruc-

tion of the manner by which the United States came to actually physically possess the Philippine Islands. The debate which occurred after the signing of the peace treaty in Paris was studied through examining the official record of debate in the Congress in the Congressional Record. The debate was also carried on in the public press and contemporary periodicals were researched extensively to better understand the feelings of the imperialists and anti-imperailists.

The inquiry resulted in the disclosure of several serious failings of the traditional interpretation of American foreign policy during this period. The United States did have extensive economic interests in the Pacific prior to the Spanish-American War and was second only to Great Britain in the amount of trade with the Philippines. More important, most American officials viewed the economic potential of the area as unlimited. Various public figures were aware of the Philippines and some actually called for American acquisition before the war. Most important, the anti-imperialists were as expansionist as the imperialists. The debate which followed, then, was one of methods not of basic policy.

In all areas examined, therefore, the traditional interpretation was found inadequate. This thesis presents a new interpretation of the subject which is more valid and makes a unified whole of American foreign policy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Traditional diplomatic historians have viewed the annexation of the Philippine Islands as an important turning point in the development of American Foreign policy. According to this thesis the United States was not concerned with world affairs or empire until it entered the war with Spain.[1] The United States went to war not for any self-serving motives but to liberate the oppressed Cuban people from their tyrannical rulers, the Spanish. In order to accomplish this the United States had to defeat the Spanish military force wherever it existed, and one area of Spanish military presence was the Philippines. Attacking the Spanish fleet in Manila and occupying the city was, then, a valid strategical military move. The motivating factor was the same humanitarian ideal that was responsible for the liberation of Cuba.

Due to Dewey's victory and the occupation of the Harbor of Manila, the United States had no acceptable alternative to the demand that Spain cede the islands to the United States. Acquisition of them was an accidental product of a war fought for lofty ideals.

1. See, for example, Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of The United States (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), Dexter Perkins, The American Approach to Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).

Acquisition of the islands marked a major turning point in American foreign policy. Heretofore the United States had adhered to the principles of Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine. Now, with the acquisition of non-contiguous territory, which formerly belonged to a European power, America was forced to play a larger role in world politics. This she did by building the Panama Canal, offering her services in settling the Russo-Japanese war, intervening in internal Mexican politics, paying closer attention to Latin-American development in general, and finally entering the first World War.

After the signing of the treaty of peace, which stipulated that the United States would purchase the Philippines for a sum of twenty million dollars, the traditional approach holds that a meaningful debate occurred concerning the fate of the Philippines and the future course of American foreign policy.[2]

The imperialists, like traditional historians, or adherents of the "large policy", argued that the United States must assume the responsibilities inherent in being a world power, which status America had achieved through its victory over Spain. These responsibilities included acquiring territory in order to expand American influence and spreading American civilization to inferior peoples. The United States should essentially imitate the actions of the European coun-

2. See, for example Robert Beisner, Twelve Against Empire The Anti-Imperialists 1898-1900 (New York, McGraw Hill, 1968).

tries in earning world power status, especially the example of Great Britain.

The anti-imperialists, who believed that America did not have to acquire any non-contiguous possession to become a world power, were opposed to this type of future for the United States. Even if this assumption of the imperialists was true, the anti-imperialists argued that the American Constitution did not provide for ruling territory that was not destined for eventual statehood. To govern foreign peoples would be illegal, and if the government attempted to make it legal by admitting foreign lands to statehood, it would destroy the character of the American system through an amalgamation of inferior racial stocks. The attempt to achieve world power status would be doomed to failure.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine critically the basic points of the traditional approach. The assumptions for this thesis are taken from William Appleman Williams and the group of historians who expanded upon his work. Pivotal in particular to this thesis is the work done by Walter LaFeber and Thomas J. McCormick.[3] Essentially this approach attempts to make a unified and coherent whole of American foreign policy in which annexation of the Philip-

3. Walter LaFeber, The New Empire An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963) and Thomas J. McCormick, China Market America's Quest for Informal Empire 1893-1901 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967).

pines was neither unexpected nor accidental but rather became another step in consolidating and increasing the economic and commercial expansion of the United States.

The commercial and economic expansion (or "informal empire" as McCormick and LaFeber call it) of the United States, and how best to perpetuate it, was the basic concern of the economic and political leaders of the country. This was not a new issue which arose only after the war with Spain, as traditional historians claim; rather it developed in stages, insignificant when viewed by themselves, from the birth of the republic until the 1890's, when the issue occupied a preeminant position in the thinking of nearly all American leaders.

According to this thesis, the annexation of the Philippine Islands was no accident but instead was part of a conscious policy of expansion and consolidation of gains. Primarily this expansion was of the commercial, economic, and non-territorial type, but as the annexation of the Philippines and other areas indicate, expansion could also follow the pattern of European colonialism.

Since the annexation of the Philippines represented no fundamental change in the policy pursued by the American government, this acquisition of territory does not play an exceptional role in American History. It does not represent a major turning point in American foreign policy but rather reinforces and brings into clearer focus those tendencies toward expansion which had been observable in our foreign policy for many years. The United States, through the

strength of its economic system, had been a world power with influence in foreign lands for decades. It did not take a war with Spain to awaken American interest in world affairs.

Moreover, since the "great debate" over the fate of the Philippines and the future of America's foreign policy centered around only the political superstructure into which commercial and economic expansion was to be placed, it was not really a debate but only a discussion of the means through which the policies of the United States could best be implemented. It was largely an excursion into rhetorical irrelevancies. As LaFeber phrased it, "the principal antiannexationist argument, that the Constitution and traditional American society would be ruined by expanding to noncontiguous areas, was, in fact, quite irrelevant granted the common assumption of the need for commercial expansion."[4]

On all major points, then, this thesis disagrees with the traditional approach. Due to the nature of this approach, major emphasis will be placed upon the necessity for economic expansion and how that necessity was viewed by the leaders of the time. In order to illustrate the extent of the expansion, this thesis will deal with the amount of economic interest in and penetration of the Pacific area prior to the annexation. The political and strategical interest in the area will also be explored. Finally, the arguments and

4.LaFeber, The New Empire op. cit. p. 415 .

beliefs of both the imperialists and the anti-imperialists will be reduced to their most basic assumptions to illustrate the theory that there was no disagreement over the basic issue, expansion.

I

1870 - 1890 BACKGROUND TO EXPANSION

The concensus of opinion concerning expansion did not develop with the war with Spain. The feeling that overseas expansion was necessary to the continued health of the country grew with the development, integration, and rationalization of the economy during the period 1870-1890. This era represents the background to expansion and illustrates the expansionary tendencies already incubating.

Early in its history, the United States pursued a conscious policy of expansion, but one whose primary emphasis was on contiguous territorial or continental expansion. The primary method of this policy was first to undermine the influence of a foreign power in a particular area through trade and settlement, with the attendant benefit of economic penetration, and then to acquire the land through treaty as with Great Britain or through war as with Mexico.

One example of this policy was the acquisition of Texas from Mexico. According to the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819 with Mexico, Texas was excluded from the United States. American interest in the area, however, remained high. John Quincy Adams offered Mexico $1 million for the territory, but Mexico refused to sell.

This fact became unimportant, for by 1821 Americans, led by Stephen F. Austin, began settling the region in large numbers, bringing with them their slaves and other property. By 1830 there were 20,000 American farmers with 2,000 slaves. Alarmed by these numbers, Mexico in 1830 prohibited further immigration from the United States, but the law was

unenforceable and Americans continued their appropriation of the land.

Because the major crop of the American farmers was cotton and slavery was used in its cultivation, Texas developed close ties with the American South. Southern leaders, including President John Tyler of Virginia, viewed it as a valuable addition to the United States. When war broke out in 1835 between Texas and Mexico, American "volunteers" aided Texas in breaking away from Mexico. Less than a month after the Republic of Texas was declared, a plebiscite was taken and annexation to the United States was approved by an overwhelming majority.

Tyler pushed hard for annexation through his Secretary of State, Abel P. Upshur, but upon Upshur's sudden death Tyler appointed John C. Calhoun to the office. This appointment alienated many northern supporters of the annexation treaty and it failed in the Senate. It was only a question of time, however, and after the election of James K. Polk as President the treaty was resubmitted. In December 1845, Texas became a state.

This pattern of expansion, settlement, trade, and acquisition, is evident in other areas such as California and Oregon. By the end of the Civil War, this type of expansion was no longer possible without a full-scale invasion of Canada or Mexico, which few people seriously considered. Expansion had to meet the needs of a growing economy whose

production was increasing by phenomenal amounts,[1] and yet the policy pursued could not disrupt this economic growth or its purpose would be undermined. Moreover, it was during the period 1870-1890 that the domestic market for manufactures and agricultural products approached saturation due to the increasing output of the American factories and farms and the relatively decreasing purchasing power of the American consumer.

The policy that would best satisfy all these needs was a policy of expansion, but one different from that pursued in the early years of the Republic. The emphasis would not be on territorial acquisition but rather upon economic and commercial expansion. The objective of this expansion was to open new markets to American goods and thus to increase trade and maintain and expand production levels. At the same time, profits would be reinvested through capital exportation and would penetrate the native economy, although penetration could not occur until there was an accumulation of surplus capital in the United States which did not take place until the end of the period under discussion.

Trade and capital investment were not the only objectives of expansion, for the United States was lacking in several important raw materials, such as antimony, chromium, Manila fiber, quinine, rubber, silk, and tin, which could only be

1. See appendix.

had from foreign countries, notably those of the Far East.[2] Expansion of trade with these countries, therefore, was a necessity.

It must be emphasized that although the United States was primarily interested in commercial and economic expansion, it did not exclude the possibility of some territorial acquisition. If the trade of a particular area could only be exploited through ownership of that area, or if the land could be used as a naval or coaling station on the way to greater markets, then it would be profitable for the United States to acquire the area. In some cases it made such acquisitions, as future examples will indicate. In fact, in many cases the United States actually sought non-contiguous territory for use as bases for further expansion.

The policy of acquiring island bases for such purposes derived primarily from the arguments of Captain Alfred T. Mahan. He represents the intellectual formulation of the new foreign policy well and, through his friendship with Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Brooks Adams, and others, he was influential in urging the government toward more active expansion.

Basing his theories on a study of the world powers in both the mercantilist period and the industrial age, Mahan

2. For a good discussion of the importance of raw materials to the United States see Ethel B. Dietrich, Far Eastern Trade of the United States (New York: Institute of Pacific Affairs, 1940).

concluded that trade and sea power were instrumental in the growth of a nation's power.[3] He realized that America's growth in economic power coincided with westward expansion across the continent, and he saw that the days of the western frontier were nearly ended. At the same time, Mahan believed that the productive output of the American economic system was much greater than the ability of American consumers to purchase the produced goods, and that difference was growing greater each year.

Mahan was correct in both these assessments. Although land was still available, the period 1870-1890 witnessed the disappearance of a western frontier. The land left unsettled lay behind the settlement line and was generally of a poorer quality of agricultural capacity than that already settled.

The period 1870-1890 also witnessed a tremendous growth in the physical output of the American industrial system. For example, the production of steel ingots and castings increased from 68,750 long tons in 1870 to 4,277,071 long tons in 1890. The value of industrial machinery and equipment was $112,685,000 in 1870. By 1890 it was $195,358,000. The value of locomotive and railroad cars increased from $41,645,000 to $85,943,000 in the same period. The increases in other in-

3. See Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1890).

dustries were even greater. Between 1860-1900 the production of crude petroleum increased 9,000 per cent and the mileage of railroads in the country increased 500 per cent.[4]

Partly because demand simply could not keep pace with supply, the period was one of constant deflation. Falling prices were one indication that the domestic market was becoming saturated. Real wages did increase during the period, due to the fact that wages did not fall nearly as quickly as prices, but the increase in purchasing power was not as great as the increase in production. The result was overproduction and eventually economic depression.

If the United States could find a method of utilizing profitably the surplus endemic to overproduction, then depressions could be avoided and any potential discontent stifled. Mahan saw the problem in these terms and argued that the best way to solve it was to open new markets to American products. In this way production would not have to be curtailed, the economic system would not have to be tampered with, and depressions could be avoided.

In order to accomplish the objective of increased foreign trade, two courses of action were necessary. The United States must acquire a large navy to protect its commerce.[5]

4. See appendix.

5. Originally Mahan emphasized an enlarged merchant marine, but he later played down the idea. See LaFeber op. cit. pp. 89-90

In addition, the United States must acquire colonies, but a particular type of colony to be used for a particular purpose. Mahan did not view colonies in the traditional imperialistic way, that is, as markets for finished products and sources of raw materials. Rather he saw the importance of colonies in the potential utilization of them as strategic naval bases, although he did not exclude the traditional imperialistic use of them.

Mahan and his associates, including Theodore Roosevelt, Henry C. Lodge, Albert Beveridge, and even William McKinley, were not traditional imperialists. They were expansionists who favored American economic exploitation of various areas of the world, most notably Asia and Latin America. In order to achieve this objective, they favored the acquisition of non-contiguous territory, not as colonies to be exploited but instead as stepping stones to the greater prize of exploiting Asia and Latin America.

Mahan stated that commercial and economic imperialism would greatly lessen the chances of political entanglement with other world powers, but since the chance of such an occurance did exist, a large navy would be required. American trade and island possessions had to be protected from any possible attack.

Those who disagreed with the followers of the "large policy" did not disagree with its basic aim, namely, economic expansion. What they questioned was the method of achieving the goal, for they did not see the necessity for island bases

and thus for a large navy to protect those bases. They believed trade and penetration of undeveloped areas could be increased with no political involvements because trade and penetration were economic issues not political ones. The question of colonies and an enlarged navy were therefore irrelevant.[6]

The period 1870-1890 saw not only the preparation of the intellectual formulation of the developing foreign policy of the United States, but also the first attempts at implementing this policy. It was during these years that the balance of trade shifted to a favorable one for the United States. In fact, from 1874 to 1898 the United States had an unfavorable balance of trade only thrice; in 1875, 1888, and 1893, and this includes the depression years of 1893-1897.

In 1860 the total exports of the United States were valued at $316,242,000. By 1898 the value of exports had more than tripled to $1,210,292,000. Imports for 1898 totaled only $616,050,000, leaving the United States with a net benefit of $594,242,000, more than the total exports for 1860.[7] This favorable balance helped the United States pay the interest on its outstanding foreign debt chiefly in the form of European investments in the American economy. By the end of the period business journals, such as the Commercial and Financial

6. For a more complete discussion of the anti-imperialists and their beliefs, see chapter four.

7. See table on imports and exports in appendix.

Chronicle, were stating that the United States would not long remain a debtor nation if the balance of trade continued favorably.

The favorable balance of trade was important in another way, for it allowed an accumulation of surplus capital which was necessary before the United States could invest in other economies. By 1900 articles were appearing in various Journals discussing the need to export this accumulated capital.[8]

Even if the amount of trade with certain areas appeared to be small, it often gave the United States a great influence in the native economy. For example, in 1885 trade with all of Latin America comprised only 3.74 per cent of the total American trade. Yet even this small percentage dominated the trade of several Latin American countries. In terms of total exports and imports, the United States accounted for 64.5 per cent of Guatamala's trade, 41.6 per cent of Venezuela's, 39.4 per cent of Mexico's, and 36.6 per cent of Columbia's.[9]

These statistics actually underrate the role played by Latin America and the Far East in the thinking of businessmen and politicians. The potentiality of these unexploited areas, both in terms of trade and investment opportunities, excited the imagination and stirred the interest of both business journals, such as The Commercial and Financial Chronicle and

8. See, for example, Charles A. Conant, "Can New Openings Be Found for Capital?" Atlantic Monthly, LXXXIV November 1899, 600.

9. LaFeber The New Empire op. cit. pp. 42-43.

The American Banker, and American Secretaries of State, including William Evarts, James G. Blaine, and Frederick Frelinghuysen.

Blaine and Frelinghuysen centered their attention upon finding Latin American markets for American goods. The primary method they used was one that Mahan later recommended, the reciprocity treaty, through which American manufactured goods gained advantage over those of Europe. At the same time, the United States lowered duties on the raw materials of several Latin American countries, most of which were not produced in the United States. There was, therefore, no competition with American products. Thus, the United States garnered a double advantage through these treaties: markets were found for American goods and a source of cheap but necessary raw materials was insured.

Under Frelinghuysen, pacts were negotiated with Spain for Cuba and Puerto Rico. These treaties, according to the Secretary of State, accomplished nearly the same objective as would the war with Spain, for they brought "the islands into close commercial connection with the United States [and] confer upon them all benefits which would result from annexation were that possible."[10]

With the advent of the first Cleveland administration and the appointment of Thomas Bayard as Secretary of State,

10. Quoted in Ibid. p. 49.

interest was shifted to the Pacific area and examples of an expansionary foreign policy became more numerous. Bayard negotiated a new reciprocity treaty with Hawaii which was beneficial both to American sugar growers in Hawaii and to American businessmen (excluding sugar growers) in the United States. To this treaty the Senate Foreign Relations Committee added an amendment which gave the United States the right to use Pearl Harbor as a naval base and a coaling station. This would greatly benefit the Pacific commerce of the United States, and a clearer example of the policy advocated by Mahan cannot be found.

Bayard proved important for future Pacific policy in another way, for he appointed Charles Denby as the new Minister to China. Denby was an avid expansionist who firmly believed that American Foreign trade must penetrate the markets of the world. As will be noted in the next chapter, he was instrumental in gaining advantages for American businessmen in China.

American foreign policy did not change with changing administrations regardless of political party. The Republicans again assumed power in 1888 under the leadership of Benjamin Harrison, who immediately recognized the growing need for expansion. He appointed James G. Blaine as Secretary of State and Blaine made the thoughts of the administration clear in a speech given in August 1890:

> Our great demand is expansion. I mean expansion of trade with countries where we can find profitable exchanges. We are not seeking

annexation of territory

> .... At the same time I think we should be unwisely content if we did not seek to engage in what the younger Pitt so well termed annexation of trade.[11]

An opportunity for this expansion came with the Haitian revolution. When the Legitime government in 1889 refused Blaine's demands for a naval station and American representation of Haiti in the European capitals, American aid began flowing more heavily to the opposing forces led by Hyppolite. Although Hyppolite was eventually successful in gaining control of the island, the United States did not achieve its objective of expansion into the Caribbean, for Hyppolite refused the American demands for Mole St. Nicolas and a steamship monopoly. If the American demands had been met, the results would have been similar to those of American policy toward Hawaii.

American policy in the Pacific remained unchanged. What Bayard had accomplished in Hawaii, Blaine attempted to achieve in Samoa. Samoa had been a problem since the United States had become officially involved in 1878 through treaties with the native chiefs. Germany and Great Britain also had economic interest in the islands and were not about to leave. The United States did not want to annex the islands, but it did want the rights to Pago Pago in order

11. New York Tribune, August 30, 1890.

that it could be used as a naval way station. When negotiations among Great Britain, Germany, and the United States took place in 1889, Blaine's principal instructions to his commissioners were to obtain Pago Pago. Meanwhile, that January Congress appropriated $100,000 for the purpose of strengthening the American position there.[12]

Blaine did obtain Pago Pago but at the cost of a three-power protectorate over Samoa. This was something he had hoped to avoid, but he had no alternative to offer Germany and Great Britain. The United States still did not want political responsibility for non-contiguous territory, but it did want harbors to be used to further American trade in the Far East and Latin America.

Throughout the years 1870-1890, then, United States foreign policy was neither static nor isolationist. Instead the United States was pursuing a consistant policy of expansion through treaty and trade. The policy would reach maturity in the 1890's when domestic pressures would force increasing numbers of Americans to believe that economic and commercial expansion was the key to success.

Foreign affairs would henceforth become inextricably intertwined with domestic well-being in the minds of nearly

12. For a more detailed account of the United States interests and actions in Samoa see George H. Ryden, The Foreign Policy of the United States in Relation to Samoa (New Haven, Conn: Yale University, 1933).

all American leaders because they would view expansion as the best method of achieving stability within the United States. The contradictions within the American politico-economic system would be successfully externalized so that any assumed evil would be beyond the control of domestic reformers.

During the 1890's the contradictions would no longer lie hidden and the evils would no longer be assumed. The most severe depression the country had yet faced would bring with it labor strikes and violence. Discontented agrarians would form a political party calling for radical reforms. A growing feeling that something was amiss in the economic and political system would spread across the country.

To all these growing challenges, the leaders of the country would respond in unison that expansion through trade and investment was the solution. Ultimately they would define anything that stood in the way of this expansion as evil.

II

CRISIS IN THE 1890's

By 1890, a crisis in domestic policies was developing in the United States. A complex set of interrelated factors caused many spokesmen of the American system to question seriously the efficacy of the laissez-faire method of production and distribution of goods. Although interest soon turned to foreign outlets as the only hope of survival, most of the causes for the crisis lay at home.

This thesis has described the years 1870-1890 as years of economic rationalization, integration, and growth. This meant simply that for the economy as a whole productive capacity increased greatly due to the increased efficiency inherent in an organized economic system. Consumer purchasing power, however, could not keep pace with increased production because the marketplace was not organized by and for consumers but by the manufacturers, and because the disparity of wealth between those who owned the means of production and those who operated them had not been overcome.

As a result, manufacturing firms were forced to accept a lower profit per product in order to maintain a satisfactory level of sales. In many cases, however, this tactic was not sufficient to stave off the inevitable surplus or glut of products. Many firms, including Carnegie Steel, reinvested higher percentages of gross profit in plant and equipment. This served the double purpose of providing an accessible outlet for surplus capital and stimulating the economy by providing a market for the manufacturers of the equipment.

Unfortunately this tactic was limited, for the domestic

market was becoming saturated and high rates of reinvestment in plant and equipment could not be maintained profitably. With less demand and less profit, firms often could not meet interest requirements on their loans. When this occurred in a substantial number of cases, banks were forced to call in outstanding loans in order to avoid a shortage of working capital. This liquidity crisis increased the speed of the downward spiral, for businesses that could not meet these obligations along with banks that lost their loan capital went into bankruptcy. In the year 1893, 500 banks and 16,000 businesses failed. In the words of the Commercial and Financial Chronicle,

> The month of August will long remain memorable...in our industrial history. Never before has there been such a sudden and striking cessation of industrial activity. Nor was any section of the country exempt from the paralysis. Mills, factories, furnaces, mines nearly everywhere shut down in large numbers, and commerce and enterprise were arrested in an extraordinary degree...and hundreds of thousands of men thrown out employment.[1]

Just how many workingmen were unemployed cannot be determined, but Bradstreet's put the figure at 850,000 in August, 1893 while Samuel Gompers claimed in December that it was three million. Whatever the exact figure, it was obvious that this was the worst economic dislocation that had occurred in the history of the United States.

1. Quoted in Harold U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform, and Expansion (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), p. 141.

Ironically, it was the increasing rationalization of the economy that made the depression so severe. The interdependency of the economy worked against it in bad times. For example, when the rate of expansion of railroad slowed the demand for steel fell, and this in turn led to cutbacks in manpower in those industries which were peripheral to steel. The depression was adequate in itself to force the capitalists and politicians interested in preserving the system and their position within it to think seriously of reformative action. But the reaction of workers to their increasingly poor position within the economic system compelled labor leaders to move even more quickly with their plans.

The years immediately preceding and during the depression were studded with violent and bloody strikes in which labor made little if any gain against capital. Yet, as Eugene V. Debs wrote, strikes were the only recourse of labor. "The strike is the weapon of the oppressed, of men capable of appreciating justice and having the courage to resist wrong and contend for principle."[2]

In late June, 1892 a strike broke out at the Homestead plant of Carnegie Steel. Henry Frisk, with Carnegie's tacit approval, planned to reopen the mine on July 6 with the aid of 300 armed Pinkerton agents. When the agents arrived, however, they were met by the armed strikers. A pitched battle

2. Quoted in Ray Ginger, Age of Excess (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 124.

occurred in which three Pinkerton men and ten strikers were killed. The union was also a casualty, for out of 2,000 men working in October only 400 were former employees.

In the spring of 1894 the United Mine Workers struck, demanding that their wage rates, which had been cut during the depression, be restored to the levels of May, 1893. The strikers succeeded in stopping nearly all production of bituminous coal and cutting the production of pig iron in half. Yet their own monetary gains were minimal. In fact, the pay scales in 1897 fell below those of early 1893.

The railroad industry, which was interrelated with the steel and coal industries, did not have much better working conditions for its laborers. In April, 1894, after three successive pay cuts, the American Railway Union, led by Eugene Debs, went out on strike. This strike ended in apparent success for the union; arbitration was established and the workers won most of their demands, but eventually the strike led to defeat of the union in the Pullman strike.

Debs became involved with the Pullman Company after listening to a report of conditions in the factory towns from delegates to the national convention of the union. He first asked for arbitration and was refused whereupon he called for a boycott of all Pullman cars and trains that carried Pullman cars. This tactic brought the union into direct confrontation with the General Manager's Association which represented all the railroads originating or terminating in Chicago. As time passed and no trains moved,

Attorney General Richard Olney decided to intervene.

With the help of President Cleveland, troops were sent to Chicago on the pretext that the United States mails were being obstructed. Upon the arrival of federal troops violence broke out. The union had no control over the violence and according to nearly all reports, few (if any) of its members were involved with the violence. The violence, however, escalated and traincars were set afire, but the federal intervention broke the strike and the union. Debs and other union leaders were arrested and eventually convicted of contempt for disobeying the injunction against the strike.

These strikes, and others like them caused near hysterical reactions among the non-laboring public. Business leaders took Marx at his word and believed that a revolution was brewing. In fact, discontent was also brewing within another segment of society, although it did not follow the violent course of labor. Farmers, especially those on the plains in the midwest, had never made easy profits, but during the 1880's and 1890's their situation was barely tolerable. As Fred A. Shannon stated:

> Competition for markets made necessary large acreages of land and a continuous process of increased mechanization. This called for capital and, therefore, for reliance on Eastern money-leaders. Interest rates for ventures in new areas were, as usual, high, and farmers with slender resources could make little progress without going into debt. Then, in periods of depression, it was next to impossible to get out of debt again, and in the rare years of farm prosperity

> there was always the human impulse to expand operations as long as new loans could be procured.3

One indication of the farmer's declining status was that his share of the national income dropped from 30.8 per cent in 1859 to 15.8 per cent in 1889. His portion of the total wealth also declined drastically from 39.9 per cent in 1860 to 20.5 per cent in 1890.4 The farmer's reaction to his ever-worsening condition did not parallel that of labor. He did see a root cause in the concentration of certain key industries such as the railroads and grain warehouses, but he tended to advocate expansion of the money supply as a solution. When the panic of 1893 struck, many foreign investors withdrew from the American market, taking with them a large portion of the gold reserves of the United States. President Grover Cleveland saw this as a cause rather than an effect of the panic and ensuing depression, and thereupon used all the patronage at his disposal to repeal the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890.

The farmers, as well as the silver mining interests of the western states, had for many years favored the free coinage of silver at a ratio of 16 to 1 with gold. With the repeal of the Sherman Act, a compromise measure at best, the money issue became a basic platform of a radical agricultural political movement known as the People's or Populist Party.

3. Fred A. Shannon, The Farmer's Last Frontier (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 303.

4. See Appendix.

Although not radical by European standards, the Populist Party demands for nationalization of the railroads and utilities, for more popular control of political processes through the Australian ballot, the initiative, referendum, recall and the direct election of United States Senators, and for the unlimited coinage of silver all constituted, in the eyes of eastern capitalists and politicians, a direct attack upon the existing politico-economic structure.

In spite of the fact that the Populists used the traditional American method of achieving their aims, namely an attempt to win control of the political apparatus through the electoral process, their program and the individuals involved agitated the monied interests more than any previous reform movement. The depression and its agricultural and labor unrest forced liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, to rethink the basic assumptions of the American system. Actually those in control of government and business had only two choices: they could totally revamp the politico-economic system to bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth and power or they could enlarge the markets for American products overseas which would not require any reform and would perpetuate the leadership and control of those in power. The first choice involved giving labor a greater share of the national income and wealth so that it could purchase the increasing output of America's factories and farms. This, naturally, would shift political power and would necessitate some change in the composition of the business and political leadership. The second choice necessitated

no major change in the status quo, only a more active pursuit of economic expansion.

Nearly everyone agreed expansion of some sort was the best solution to the crisis. Businessmen explained the cause of the depression as the lack of markets for their particular products. Politicians saw the previous years of growth and prosperity as years of expansion westward across the continent and came to equate expansion with prosperity. Senator William Frye of Maine stated this contention quite clearly. "We must have the market [illegible] or we shall have revolution".[5]

Throughout the decade, articles by labor, business, government, and academic leaders appeared in numerous periodicals stating in unequivocal terms the need for overseas expansion. The agreement was so totally complete that one commentator wrote:

> Both parties, then, agree in the necessity of an expansion of commerce. Indeed, in this country no party could exist, even for a day, which would curb the increase of business by law or enactment. The question, then, narrows to the discussion if [sic] territorial expansion is absolutely necessary to allow full swing to the spirit of enterprise of the people.[6]

5. Quoted in William A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1959), p. 26 and Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin, March 21, 1899.

6. R. Van Bergen, "Expansion Unavoidable" Harper's Weekly, XLVI (September 22, 1900), p. 885.

Another observer of the political scene noticed the same trend, which he chose to call the "national temper." What he saw was an instinctive desire of Americans to own the world in some form. "We want the earth - not consciously as a formulated program, but instinctively, with a desire that is toodeep for consciousness, too constant and too regular to be questioned or thought of."[7]

The burgeoning radical revolt occurring during this decade was one pivotal aspect that helped to shape the idea of informal imperialism. During the Venezuelan crisis of 1895, one Texas Congressman stormed,

> Why, Mr. Secretary, just think how angry the anarchistic, socialistic, and populistic boil appears on our political surface and who knows how deep its roots extend or ramify? One cannon shot across the bow of a British boat in defense of this principle will knock more pus out of it than would suffice to inoculate and corrupt our people for the next two centuries.[8]

The other major impetus for expansion came from leading business interests, which were crucial in determining the form of expansion and the specific areas that would be most profitable for American firms to penetrate.

7. H. H. Powers, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 12(September, 1898), p. 180.

8. Quoted in Richard Hofstadter, "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines" in Daniel Aaron, America in Crisis (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 176.

As early as 1893 the New York Tribune was calling for expansion in order to meet "the necessities of our increasing commerce."[9] The form this would take would be trade expansion:

> The next era of expansion, which we are almost in the midst of, is the great era of industrial expansion, manufacturing expansion, - an era of expansion which will bring the United States into very important relations with the trade of the world. The people of the United States will be driven to seek the widest possible outside market for their productions; they must be able to buy raw material in outside market....[10]

Prominent intellectuals agreed with other segments of society that expansion was necessary at this time. David Starr Jordan, President of Stanford University, favored economic imperialism, but not territorial acquisition. Brooks Adams, however, thought the issue too important to argue over the means. "The United States thus stands face to face with the gravest conjuncture that can confront a people. She must protect the outlets of her trade, or run the risk of suffocation."[11]

The United States did more than just talk of trade expansion in this period, for the decade witnessed a large growth in exports while imports decreased. The net result

9. New York Tribune, January 29, 1893.

10. Benjamin Kidd, "The United States and the Control of the Tropics" Atlantic Monthly, LXXXII (December, 1898), p. 725.

11. Brooks Adams, America's Economic Supremacy (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1900), p. 19.

was a favorable balance of trade for the United States, as the following table indicates.

TEXT TABLE 1

IMPORTS, EXPORTS, AND BALANCE OF TRADE 1893-1898
(IN DOLLARS)

YEAR	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	BALANCE
1893	$866,400,922	$ 847,665,194	- $ 18,735,728
1894	$654,994,622	$ 892,40,572	+ $ 237,145,950
1895	$731,969,965	$ 807,538,165	+ $ 75,568,200
1896	$779,724,674	$ 882,606,932	+ $ 102,882,264
1897	$764,730,412	$1,050,993,556	+$ 286,263,144
1898	$616,049,654	$1,231,482,330	+$ 615,432,676

Source: Annual Review of the Foreign Commerce of the United States, and Summary Tables of Commerce for the Year Ending June 30, 1911 (Washington: 1912) p. 44

The Commercial and Financial Chronicle noted the growing amount of exports each month and speculated that the United States would be a debtor nation for only a short time longer. For the calendar year 1896, they exclaimed happily, "It appears that the merchandise balance in favor of the United States for the 12 months ending with December is $325,322,184,

the largest balance ever recorded within a similar period."[12]

In July, 1897 the same paper stated that foreign trade had greatly reduced the debt of the United States to other countries and that "we appear to be on the eve of a revival in business...."[13]

Even more important for the purpose of this paper than the total growth of trade was the areas to which this trade was directed. It is in these statistics that one can read where the future interests of the United States would lie.

TEXT TABLE 2

UNITED STATES EXPORTS, BY AREA OF DESTINATION, 1890-1900

	EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES	
TO	1890	1900
EUROPE	$682,585,856	$1,111,456,000
NO. AMERICA	$ 95,517,863	$ 202,486,000
SO. AMERICA	$ 34,722,122	$ 41,384,000
ASIA	$ 22,854,026	$ 60,598,000
OCEANIA	$ 17,375,745	$ 39,956,000
AFRICA	$ 4,446,934	$ 22,170,000
TOTAL	$857,502,548	$1,478,050,000

Source: Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries During the Year 1900 (2 Vols. Washington: 1900) I, p. 37.

12. Commercial and Financial Chronicle January 16, 1897, p. 100. The discrepancy in these figures and those in Text Table 1 is due to the fact that the Chronicle was speaking of the calendar year 1896 (ending in December 1896) while the figures in the table are for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1896.

13. Ibid. July 24, 1897, p. 134.

The greatest proportional increases recorded were in the trade with Africa and Asia. The trade with Africa, however, was still insignificant relative to other areas, but trade with Asia ranked behind only Europe and North America and was increasing faster than either of those areas. Moreover, these figures probably underestimate the trade with Asia, for any product transshipped at Hong Kong was credited as an export from Hong Kong. "It is believed that fully 30 per cent of the exportations from Hong Kong (exclusive of rice) originate in the United States, although they are not so credited in computing these ratios."[14] In any case, the Pacific area was looming larger in the minds and pocketbooks of capitalists. The area was totally undeveloped industrially and had not yet been carved up by European powers as had Africa.

Most important in the Pacific area was China, for it was a fabled land of 400,000,000 potential consumers. Brooks Adams grasped the possibilities immediately observing that "the expansion of any country must depend on the market for its surplus product; and China is the only region which now promises almost boundless possibilities of absorption...."[15] The Banker and Tradesman was even more enthusiastic. "In

14. Clarence R. Edwards "Our Trade with Cuba and the Philippines", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 19(May, 1902), 373-34.

15. Brooks Adams, America's Economic Supremacy, op. cit. p. 20.

China there are nearly four hundred millions of people, more than five times as many as exist in the United States. The wants of those four hundred millions are increasing every year. What a market!"[16]

China was indeed a great market, for American goods and trade there increased threefold between 1895-1900.

TEXT TABLE 3

EXPORTS TO CHINA, 1895 - 1900
(In Dollars)

YEAR	VALUE OF EXPORTS TO CHINA
1895	$ 7,856,880
1896	$11,613,134
1897	$17,984,472
1898	$16,258,094
1899	$22,222,965
1900	$23,745,000

Source: Commercial Relations of the United States op. cit. I 37

Because the United States was a relative newcomer to world trade, the American share of China's trade was still small

16. Banker and Tradesman and Massachusetts Law Reporter, 24(1898) 776.

although growing rapidly. But in certain industries the United States was capturing more than its share of the market. Imports of American cotton goods, for example, increased from 1½ per cent of the total cotton imports in China in 1888 to 29½ per cent by 1897.[17]

The American textile industry was deeply involved in China, for one-half of all exports went to the China market and many firms could not have remained solvent without the China trade. The railroad industry, along with its peripheral interests such as iron, was also attempting to invest in China.

Charles Denby, the American minister to China, was a forceful backer of American economic interests there. With the consent of Richard Olney he applied considerable pressure to obtain rights for the American-China Development Company to build a railroad across the heart of China. But when John Sherman became Secretary of State his philosophical outlook concerning private enterprise and government would not allow Denby to put the American government behind private business ventures in foreign countries. Consequently, a Belgian firm received the contract.[18]

17. See Charles S. Campbell, Special Business Interests and the Open Door Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951).

18. For a more complete treatment of the subject of American business firms in China see Charles S. Campbell, Special Business Interests and the Open Door Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951).

The American-China Development Company proved important to American foreign policy in two respects. First, it was a powerful lobbying force in favor of government policy which eventually became known as the Open Door. Second, the list of its shareholders revealed the interrelationship between businessmen and government officials. On the list were Thomas C. Platt, Senator from New York, Levi P. Morton, who had been vice-president under Benjamin Harrison, Frederic P. Olcott, president of the Central Trust Company of New York, James Stillman, president of the National City Bank, and E. H. Harriman of the Union Pacific railroad.[19] This sampling indicates that there was no distinct line between business interests and government interests, because in many cases the same people were involved in each area.

When it appeared that the government would not support these economic interests in China as forcefully as possible, Americans with real or potential interests in China formed The Committee on American Interests in China to pressure the government into positive action.[20] The Committee drew up a petition and obtained 68 firms to sign it. It then sent

19. Ibid.

20. Although space does not permit a complete treatment of the China market, some mention must be made of activities because they were a potent force in shaping foreign policy. Moreover, the China market was crucial both in the immediate reaction to Dewey's victory (Chapter 3) and in the debates over annexation (Chapter 5). Muchof the information comes from Campbell, Special Business Interests op. cit. and Thomas J. McCormick, China Market op. cit.

copies to the Chambers of Commerce in New York, Boston, Cleveland, San Francisco, and the Philadelphia Board of Trade, all of which (except the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce) drafted similar petitions and sent them to Washington. The New York petition of February 3, 1898 was typical:

> In view of the changes threatening to future trade development of the United States in China, the Chamber of Commerce....respectfully and earnestly urges that such proper steps be taken as will commend themselves to your wisdom for the prompt and energetic defence [sic] of the existing treaty rights of our citizens in China, and for the preservation and protection of their important commercial interests in that Empire.[21]

Less than three months later Secretary Sherman was replaced by William Day, who proved more receptive to the business interests. Soon afterward the Committee dissolved to form the American Asiatic Association which increased its effectiveness by employing a full-time staff. One honorary member of the AAA was John Barrett, who was American minister to Siam until the outbreak of war with Spain when he resigned and was appointed special diplomatic advisor to Dewey. An important figure in Far Eastern policies, Barrett felt that American trade must expand. In his own words,

> I have hammered away in reports to the Government, letters to Chambers of Commerce, and contributions to newspapers, magazines, and reviews...

21. Department of State Miscellaneous Letters, February 18, 1898 Part I, New York Chamber of Commerce to McKinley. February 3, 1898 also quoted in Campbell, Special Business Interests op. cit., p. 35.

> with the hope of thus awakening our Government, as well as our manufacturers and exporters, to an appreciation of the splendid field awaiting their best efforts.[22]

Although a career politician and government official, Barrett represented the needs and wants of business as well as any businessman, and nearly all business opinion favored a much enlarged trade with China. The United States Investor declared,

> We say with a full conviction of the seriousness of our words, that no policy, however drastic, which our Government finds it necessary to pursue in order to guarantee equal trade rights to everybody in China, should be neglected.[23]

The China market must not be viewed only in terms of the actual trade that it afforded and the efforts to enlarge upon that trade, but also as the potentially greatest market that existed for American agriculture and manufacturers. Thus, to the American businessman, "there arose before their eyes the magnificent vision of millions of Asiatic people eagerly waiting for Western manufactured goods to be brought to their doors."[24]

The effect this vision of the China Market had upon

22. North American Review, 169 (1899), pp. 166-167.

23. United States Investor, 9 (1898), p. 1177.

24. Ethel B. Dietrich, Far Eastern Trade of the United States (New York: Institute of Pacific Affairs, 1940) p. 4.

leaders of the American system cannot be overestimated. The problems which beset the Republic could all be solved by expansion into this area, and "as never before in our history the markets of Asia seemed to represent the one outlet for a country hard upon the heels of prosperity, but faced with a mounting surplus of manufactured goods."[25] Charles Denby felt that if the United States became interested, "the trade that would spring into existence would surpass all the records in history."[26] As to the potentiality of the market, Denby stated that "it is a market which the writer candidly believes to be, for the American manufacturer, the most important in the world."[27]

Admittedly United States economic penetration of the China market never assumed the proportions it did in European countries, "but the mirage of almost limitless markets persisted as a major stimulus to American, as to European, interest in the Far East."[28] Although China was the primary region of interest for expansion it was not the only area, even in the Pacific. The Hawaiian Islands had been penetrated

25. Foster Rhea Dulles, America in the Pacific (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1932), p. 8.

26. Charles Denby, Jr., "America's Opportunity in Asia" North American Review, 166 (1898), p. 36.

27. Ibid. P. 37.

28. Ethel B. Dietrich, Far Eastern Trade op. cit. p. 4.

by American capital for many years, and by 1890 they were virtually owned by American investors and capitalists.

The Hawaiian sugar industry, dominated by Americans, constantly fought for favorable trade agreements with the United States in order that their product could compete on an equal footing with American sugar and Cuban sugar. When the United States began giving bounties to American sugar producers and foreign sugar was put on the free tariff list, the land owners began to favor annexation strongly. Harrison and Blaine agreed with the land owners but could not move Congress into action at this time.[29] Queen Liliokalani was aware that she was losing what nominal power she exercised over her country and she did not favor annexation to the United States. In January 1893 a vote to oust the "Reform Ministry," composed chiefly of white businessmen, was taken in the legislature. Liliokalani took the opportunity to name ministers favorable to her. She then proclaimed a new constitution by royal edict, which greatly broadened her power within the government and weakened that of the businessmen.

The businessmen met quickly and decided to use this illegal act by the Queen as the pretext for a revolution and eventual annexation to the United States. The Committee of

29. See Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936) Chapter 2.

Safety, formed after the Queen's action, of thirteen white businessmen (all members of the Annexation Club), planned to form a provisional government and asked the American minister, John L. Stevens, to send troops from the gunboat Boston to protect American lives and property. Stevens complied and sent the troops immediately. With American troops guarding key government buildings, a provisional government headed by Sanford B. Dole, a large American landowner, was proclaimed. The Provisional Government asked for recognition and "the United States minister accorded prompt recognition to the Provisional Government and upon inquiry informed the Queen's ministers that he had done so."[30] Stevens took this step as an individual act and in spite of the fact that the Queen and her supporters possessed superior forces.

The American businessmen and Minister Stevens did not gain their objectives immediately, however, for the Cleveland Administration came to power shortly after the revolution. James H. Blount was sent to investigate the situation and his report to Cleveland precluded annexation by the United States. Blount's report stated that the Provisional (Dole) Government was weak and existed illegally through the armed force of the United States Marines. Further, "The undoubted sentiment of the people is for the Queen, against the Provisional Government, and against annexation. A majority of the whites, especially Americans, are for annexation."[31] Because of

30. Ibid. p. 92.

31. Quoted in Ibid. p. 136.

Blount's report, Hawaiian annexation was deferred, but for only five years. Many American business and literary journals and newspapers, including the Commercial Advertiser, the Journal of Finance, and the Literary Digest, favored annexation.

The debate over Hawaii paralleled that over the Philippines. Those who favored annexation based their argument on the need for commercial expansion and the strategic value of the islands in increasing trade. Those who opposed annexation, such as the New York Times, opposed it on moral, religious, and racial grounds. They recognized the need for economic expansion and even favored it, but they did not favor inclusion of an "inferior" racially-mixed people in the American system.

The Philippines themselves were another area of some American interest during the years preceding the Spanish-American war. Although much was written immediately after Dewey's victory at Manila concerning the lack of knowledge about the Philippines, they were not unknown to American businessmen and politicians. In fact, the United States was second only to Great Britain in total trade with the Philippines. In 1893 the United States exported $154,378 worth of goods to the Philippines. By 1899 the figure was $401,258.[32] Although these figures appear small, the total

32. Carroll D. Wright, "The Commercial Ascendancy of the United States." Century Magazine LX(July, 1900), p. 422.

trade with the United States was not. In 1896, this figure was $5,145,303, which was exceeded only by Great Britain. The United States bought 24.6 per cent of all exports from the Philippines.[33]

The United States, on the eve of the war with Spain, was the chief purchaser of the most important Philippine exports such as sugar and hemp. America imported 36,473 tons of hemp in 1896, still second to England, but by 1898 the United States bought more hemp than all other countries combined.[34] In the words of Frank A. Vanderlip, Assistant Secretary of Treasury,

> To the Philippine Islands we send but little over one two-hundredth part of their imports, while we take one-fifth of their entire exports, and more than one-half of their exports of sugar and hemp.[35]

These figures do not imply either that American business interests conspired to drag the United States into war with Spain or that they agitated in any way for annexation prior to Dewey's victory. What these figures do mean is that there was an American economic interest in the Philippines.

33. John Hyde, "Commerce of the Philippine Islands" National Geographic, X(February, 1899) p. 33.

34. Max L. Tornow, "The Economic Condition of the Philippines" National Geographic, X(February, 1899) p. 33.

35. Frank A. Vanderlip, "Facts About the Philippines". Century Magazine LVI(August, 1898) p. 558.

and some businessmen and government officials were calling for greater trade there. Moreover, various politicians, including McKinley, were aware of the Philippines and considered them a legitimate target in the event of war with Spain.

III

THE "ACCIDENTAL" ACQUISITION of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Back of every political complication of today, are trade considerations. Wars, treaties, colonization schemes and all the intricacies of diplomacy are really, in the final analysis, but means...of acquiring wealth.

United States Investor 9(1898) 593.

By September, 1897, various members of the government felt assured that war with Spain over Cuba was nearly inevitable and some began to discuss the Philippines, both as a strategic area for attack on Spanish forces and as a possible acquisition by the United States.

Admiral George Dewey, for example, had discussed attacking the Philippines as early as 1873 during the Virginius affair when he was stationed in the Gulf of California. Replying to fellow officers who felt that they would see no action should war be declared, he said, "On the contrary, we shall be very much in it....If war with Spain is declared, the Narragansett will take Manila."[1]

Dewey's appointment as commander of the Asiatic Squadron was arranged by another member of the administration concerned in the Philippines, Theodore Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Dewey made no secret of his interest in the Philippines. He stated during the Virginius affair,

> I had always been interested in the Philippine Islands and had read whatever books I could find relating to them, and my familiarity with the subject immediately suggested them as a logical point of attack.[2]

Roosevelt suggested to Dewey that he see a senator and

1. George Dewey, Autobiography of George Dewey Admiral of the Navy, p. 145.

2. Ibid., pp. 145-146.

have him speak to McKinley on behalf of Dewey. Dewey thereupon visited Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont who spoke favorably of Dewey. Dewey was appointed Commander of the Asiatic Squadron. Although Dewey did not like the way in which he achieved his position, he wanted it as much as Roosevelt wanted him to have it and he accepted it with the Philippines in mind:

> It seemed to me that we were inevitably drifting into a war with Spain. In command of an efficient force in the Far East, with a free hand to act in consequence of being so far away from Washington, I could strike promptly and successfully at the Spanish force in the Philippines.[3]

Dewey's interest was primarily a military one and he set about his task seriously and studied and read every piece of information concerning the Philippines that he was able to acquire. In addition, he moved his fleet from Tokyo, his original point of arrival in the Far East, to Hong Kong for the purpose of being better able to attack the Philippines. "It was evident that in case of emergency Hong Kong was the most advantageous position from which to move to the attack."[4]

Dewey was not the only American in the Far East interested in the Philippines. Other officials, realizing that war with Spain was probable, attempted to raise the interest of

3. Ibid., p. 168.

4. Ibid., p. 178.

Americans, both government personnel and the general public, in the Philippines and their potential for increasing the American economic presence in Asia. John Barrett, American minister to Siam at the time, did this through published articles and press conferences. As early as February, 1897, Barrett was stating that the Philippines would be a fine addition to the United States and that if the American people knew the richness of the islands they would be more interested in them than in Cuba. "The lack of general knowledge in America regarding this Asiatic group is to be regretted when we consider that, according to the best authorities, it forms the richest archipelago in the world."[5] Barrett went on to say that the Philippines were located in a strategic trade position with easy access to Hong Kong and thus to China.

Barrett was more explicit in another article which assumed war would be declared and the United States would take and hold the Philippines.[6] He avered that the United States must keep the islands and anticipated the anti-imperialist reaction by stating that if annexation could not be accomplished under American law, then the laws must be changed. Barrett's reasons for favoring annexation are illustrative of

5. John Barrett, "The Cuba of the Far East" North American Review CLXIV (February 1897) 173.

6. John Barrett, "The Problem of the Philippines" North American Review CLXVII (September 1898) 259, in Barrett's own words, "In conclusion, it behoves me to state that these opinions and arguments are written before war is declared between Spain and the United States, but when the announcement is momentarily expected."

the feelings of many Americans in the Far East.

> (1) We would have an unsurpassed point in the Far East from which to extend our commerce and trade and gain our share in the immense distribution of material prizes that must follow the opening of China...
>
> (2) We would have, in the Philippines themselves one of the greatest undeveloped opportunities in all the world - a group of islands with numberless riches and resources awaiting exploitation, and capable of providing a market for a large quantity of our own manufactured products.[7]

Barrett's enthusiasm concerning the economic benefits of annexation of the Philippines was exceeded only by his zeal in working for that result. In April, 1898, he held a press interview in Bangkok and stated, "It is of the greatest importance that the United States should take the Philippine Islands. Their value is not realized at home. They are richer and far larger than Cuba, and in the hands of a strong power would be the key to the Far East."[8]

Barrett was supported in his feelings and actions by other American officials in the area such as E. Spencer Pratt, consul general at Singapore, and Charles Denby, minister to China. Denby, in particular, was an avid expansionist who believed that the future for America lay in Asia. "It is a familiar statement that Asia is...the greatest unexploited field, the

7. Barrett, "The Problem of the Philippines" op. cit. p. 264.

8. Quoted in Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit A Study of Our War with Spain (New York: The Viking Press, 1965) p. 182.

last prize to conquer for the commerce of the West."[9] Denby also demanded that the government take greater action to protect and foster American economic penetration of Asia, for "the productiveness of American industry has outstripped the demand of the American market, and the manufacturer begins to look abroad."[10] Indeed, "for the manufacturer of the United States the export trade has become a necessity, and it should be fostered with a jealous care."[11] Denby, Barrett, and others viewed the Philippines as a giant step toward American economic domination of Asia.

In Washington, meanwhile, Roosevelt was gathering support for his expansionist designs on the Philippines. In September he wrote to Henry Cabot Lodge that if and when war with Spain was declared, "our Asiatic Squadron should blocade (sic) and if possible, take Manila."[12] Roosevelt also attempted to exert his influence with President McKinley. At one dinner in the Fall of 1897, McKinley and Roosevelt discussed "the Yellow Peril". A day or two later, on a ride with the President, Roosevelt suggested that Manila would be a logical point of attack for the Asiatic Squadron.[13]

Although McKinley did not immediately concur in

9. Charles Denby Jr., "America's Opportunity in Asia" North American Review CLXVI (January, 1898) 32.

10. Ibid., p. 33.

11. Ibid.

12. Roosevelt to Lodge September 11, 1897 from Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925) I 278.

13. See Millis, The Martial Spirit op. cit. pp. 77-83.

Roosevelt's judgment, he did not rule out the possibility and the simple fact of these conversations with Roosevelt concerning the fate of the Philippines belies McKinley's later statements that he did not even know where the Islands were situated. Moreover, he did not countermand Roosevelt's February 25 instructions to Dewey, which committed the United States to a course of action the results of which would almost certainly be annexation of the Philippines.

On February 25, 1898, while Secretary of the Navy John D. Long was away for the afternoon, Roosevelt, acting in Long's place, fired off a cable to his commander in the Pacific.

> Order the squadron except the Monocacy to Hong Kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war with Spain (sic), your duty will be to see that the Spanish Squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in the Philippine Islands. Keep the Olympic until further orders.[14]

The order to begin "offensive operations in the Philippine Islands" went beyond the necessities of war, for Spain only had a small force in Manila and did not even control many of the islands in the archipelago. In addition, this small force of men could in no way menace or threaten American forces anywhere. If Dewey was successful in carrying out these orders, the United States would, de facto, possess the

14. Quoted in Dewey, Autobiography op. cit. p. 179.

Philippines, a situation which would be nearly impossible to reverse.

Once the United States militarily controlled the Islands, the alternatives to annexation were limited. The belief of most American leaders in the cultural superiority of America in addition to the fear that a hostile foreign power would acquire the archipelago and impede American economic penetration of Asia would preclude self-determination for the Islands. Spanish governmental mismanagement would not allow the United States to seriously consider returning them to Spain. The final alternative, ceding the Islands to a foreign power or establishing a protectorate (as in Samoa), would destroy the trade advantages that the United States had won in the war. Thus the only alternative most leaders would agree upon would be annexation.

Yet neither Long, who learned of Roosevelt's action when he returned to his office the following day, nor McKinley, who learned of it shortly thereafter, thought it necessary to countermand these orders or to send new instructions to Dewey. Thus was the United States committed to the Philippines.

Other factors were involved in helping to shape American policy vis - vis Spain and the Philippines. As the war drew closer business opinion underwent a change. At first most business journals editorialized that a war would disrupt the economy just at the time it was beginning to recover from a severe depression. The reaction of the Commercial and Financial Chronicle was typical. "Situated as our currency, the Government revenue and business affairs are, no course war

with Spain [] could be more unwise or reckless..."[15] The Chronicle's position was supported by such influential journals as Iron Age, Age of Steel, Railroad Gazette, and the Journal of Commerce.[16]

By the end of 1897, however, business opinion began to change, and by the time war was declared nearly all business spokesmen favored both the war and retention of the Philippines. One of the factors instrumental in this change of opinion was a growing unhappy realization in Europe that the United States was winning the race for markets. As the Banker and Tradesman stated, "There is no question that the world, generally, is looking more and more to the United States as the source of its supply for very many of the staple commodities of life."[17] Some members of the industrial powers of Europe began to discuss methods to combat the increasing American percentage of world trade, and this discussion brought a response from American business leaders that more governmental action to protect American foreign economic interests was necessary.

15. Commercial and Financial Chronicle LXVI (May 22, 1897) 974.

16. Not all business magazines opposed the idea of war with Spain. Some thought that a war would stimulate the home industries still in a slump. See, for example, Rand McNally's Banker's Monthly, Dunn's Review, and the Financial Record. For a concise treatment of business opinion and the war see Julius W. Pratt, "American Business and the Spanish-American War" Hispanic American Historical Review XIV (May 1934) 163.

17. Banker and Tradesman XXVI (April 20, 1898) 297.

Public discussion of the American threat began in Austria where, for the year ending September 1897, American exports increased over 90 per cent.[18] On November 20, 1897 the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Goluchowski, gave a speech in which he warned Europe about the greatly increasing percentage of American exports, both in markets that had once been the private reserve of the European powers and in Europe itself. He called for a union of the European powers against this new threat to their hegemony in world trade.

Althought the Count never explicitly mentioned the United States as an enemy, most American businessmen understood the somewhat veiled threat. According to one spokesman for business, "the only plausible explanation is in some measure connected with the recent well-known increase of manufactured exports from the United States."[20]

Following Goluchowski's speech, Baron von Theilmann, Secretary of the German Treasury and ex-Ambassador to the United States, spoke out against the Dingley tariff rates and he also called for union in Europe against the developing American threat.[21] These speeches, combined with Germany's

18. Commercial and Financial Chronicle LXV (December 18, 1897) 1147.

19. For the text of the speech see Literary Digest XV (December 11, 1897) 964.

20. Commercial and Financial Chronicle LXV (December 18, 1897) 1147.

21. See Charles S. Campbell, Special Business Interests and The Open Door Policy op. cit. pp. 8-9.

taking of Kiachow Bay in China, were enough to change the editorial policy of many business journals.[22] Those business spokesmen who did not yet support a war with Spain for its economic benefits (and they were many) did support a more active role on the part of the American government to secure the Open Door in China and elsewhere. From this position it was but a small step, after Dewey's victory, to demand the retention of the Philippines as one method of keeping the door open in China.

In addition to the change in thinking on the part of many business journals, other organizations were pressing the government for more vigorous action in protecting American economic interests in the Orient. The American-China Development Company and the American Asiatic Association organized petitions and memorials to the government.[23] Sugar interests were also demanding protection and further asked for government intervention in Cuba to settle the situation so that business could continue as usual.[24]

22. See, for example, the Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin December 28, 1897. It now supported the annexation of Hawaii, which it had previously opposed and was active in efforts, including memorials to Congress, to ensure American trading rights in China, because it feared that European action in China and the possibility of a European union against the United States would deprive America of its share of the China market. To overcome the possibility the government had to act.

23. See Chapter 2.

24. Two memorials were presented to Congress in behalf of the sugar interests. See Miscellaneous Letters (Department of State) May 1897, II; February 1898, 1.

By March 1898, then, stronger governmental action was being demanded by both government personnel and business leaders. This does not imply that all these groups were demanding war as an instrument of national policy. All, however, were demanding some action that would protect and extend American overseas economic interests. Professor Franklin H. Giddings stated at the time, "the warlike spirit existed long before the destruction of the Maine; and the demand for new outlets for both commercial enterprise and political ingenuity was already insistent many years before the battle of Manila Bay."[25]

The forces calling for increased government activity to ensure stability in foreign affairs and increased American economic participation in world affairs made the decision of the United States government quite compelling. The situation in Cuba prevented stability, and the absence of an American base of operations in Asia hindered American economic growth there. The demands for action by the administration to solve the problems made the situation barely tolerable for many of those in decision-making positions. In spite of Spain's somewhat slow acceptance of American demands to settle the issues in Cuba, McKinley sent his declaration of war to Congress and the Congress ratified it. Secretary Day called Dewey to proceed at once to the Philippines and to commence operations

25. Franklin H. Giddings, "Imperialism?" Political Science Quarterly XIII (1898) 593.

there, especially those designed to destroy the Spanish fleet.

Dewey arrived in the Philippines on May 1, and in a battle lasting all morning totally destroyed the Spanish squadron. The complete American losses were one man dead from a heart attack due to the heat, not from a wound inflicted in battle. With the benefit of hindsight one can say that Dewey's easy victory was not unexpected. The American fleet, in terms of size and strength, far outmatched that of Spain. After Dewey achieved his lopsided victory, however, he was unable to proceed with any further action against the Philippines, for he had no troops with which to attack and occupy Manila or any other part of the archipelago.

Troops that could be used for a seizure of Manila were available, but Americans in the area hesitated to use them because they were not American. The revolt against Spanish authority had begun years before and was originally led by Dr. Jose Rizal, a native Filipino intellectual. He, however, initiated very little action to bring about desired reforms and in 1892 another Filipino leader, Andres Bonafacio, founded the Katipunan, an organization dedicated to independence and the destruction of the dominance of the Catholic Church in Filipino life. Emilo Aguinaldo joined the organization in 1894 and in 1896 a convention of the revolutionists elected him president, whereupon Bonafacio left with his supporters to carry on guerrilla warfare from the mountains. He was killed in the mountains of Luzon by Spanish forces in March 1897.

Aguinaldo and his supporters made peace with Spain in December 1897. According to the terms of the treaty, Spain promised to enact almost every reform that the rebels had demanded, exclusive of outright independence. Aguinaldo received from Spain a settlement of nearly one half of a million dollars and he left the Islands for Hong Kong. Two months later, it became obvious to the rebels that Spain had no intention of abiding by the terms of the peace treaty and the insurrection began anew.[26]

In April, E. Spencer Pratt, consul at Singapore, learned that Aguinaldo was in that city. Mr. H. W. Bray, an Englishman and one of the largest landowners in the Philippines, arranged a meeting between the two, at which he would act as interpreter.[27] At this conference, Pratt "on his own responsibility, sought and secured Aguinaldo's approval for joint American and insurgent attack upon Spain...."[28] Aguinaldo inquired as to the benefits to his cause that would

26. See Charles Edward Russell and E. B. Rogriques, The Hero of the Philippines (New York: The Century Co., 1923) Chapter XVII.

27. See Senate Document 62, 55th Congress, 3rd Session pp. 321 ff, Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia op. cit. p. 617 ff, Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezy, The Philippines and the United States (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951) pp. 19-20, Foster Rhea Dulles, The Imperial Years (New York: Thomas W. Crowell Company, 1956) pp. 175-176 Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1961) pp. 46-54.

28. Grunder and Livezy, The Philippines and the United States op. cit. p. 19.

result from his aid to the Americans. Pratt, replied that he had no authority to discuss the question of Philippine independence or any other political settlement.[29] Other accounts of Pratt's dusoussion of the issue differ. Leon Wolff, for example, states that Pratt told Aguinaldo that "independence" would result from his cooperation with American forces.[30]

Whatever Pratt's reply, Aguinaldo believed he would be fighting for Philippine independence while the Secretary of State cautioned Pratt "to avoid unauthorized negotiations with Philippine insurgents."[32] Pratt next arranged a meeting between Aguinaldo and Dewey at which the details of the military cooperation between the two leaders would be discussed. The conference, however, never materialized, for Aguinaldo did not arrive at Hong Kong until May 1 by which date Dewey was already in the Philippines. Pratt communicated his actions to the State Department and Day's reply pointed out that the United States wanted a totally free hand in the Philippines.

> The Department observes that you informed General Aguinaldo that you had no authority to speak for the United States; and in the absence of the fuller report which you promise, it is assured that

29. Senate Document 62, 55th Congress, 3rd Session, p. 343.

30. Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother, op. cit., p. 48. He does not, however, cite the source of his quotation.

31. Senate Document 62, 55th Congress, 3rd Session, p. 341.

> you did not attempt to commit this Government to any alliance with the Philippine insurgents. To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to gratify.
>
> ...If, in the course of your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you acted upon the assumption that this Government would cooperate with him for the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting his cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he may put forward, your actions were unauthorized and can not be approved.[32]

Pratt was not the only American official who allegedly assured the Filipinos of independence. When Aguinaldo arrived at Hong Kong on May 1 he was met by Consul Rounseville Wildman, who explained Dewey's absence. With Wildman's help, Aguinaldo purchased a steam launch, two thousand Mauser rifles, and ammunition, all for the purpose of liberating the Philippines from Spanish rule. According to the London Daily Mail, however, Wildman did more than help Aguinaldo buy arms; he also assured the rebel leader that the United States would recognize Philippine independence. The State Department was noticeably upset.

Wildman, Consul, Hong Kong:

> If you wrote Aguinaldo, as reported by Hong Kong correspondent Daily Mail (sic), your action is disapproved, and you are forbidden to make pledges or discuss policy.[33]

32. Ibid., p. 354.

33. Ibid., p. 338.

Wildman denied that he made any pledges to Aguinaldo, although he admitted that he wrote the Filipino a personal letter, in which he told Aguinaldo "do not forget that the United States undertook this war for the sole purpose of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties under which they were suffering and not for the love of conquest or the hope of gain." Whatever the United States did it would do with "honor and justice" and he exhorted Aguinaldo "the first thing is to throw off the Spanish yoke. Do not let anything interfere with this."[34]

Although all American officials denied assuring Aguinaldo of independence, other sources related different accounts. A writer, A. H. Myers, there at the time, stated that Dewey told Aguinaldo "there is no doubt if you cooperate with and assist us by fighting the common enemy, that you will be granted your freedom the same as the Cubans will be." [35] Dewey denied making this or any other similar statement before the Senate Committee on the Philippines.[36] Further evidence, however, exists which casts doubt on Dewey's state-

34. Ibid., p. 338-339.

35. Quoted in Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother op. cit., p. 46 Wolff states that Myers does not cite the source of his quotation. Wolff, himself, does not indicate the source of his information on Myers nor does he explain the circumstances which alled Myers to receive such a quotation.

36. See Senate Document 331, 3 Volumes, 57th Congress 1st Session. Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Philippines.

ments. General Thomas Anderson, Commander of the First Contingent of American Troops to arrive in the Philippines, said "every American citizen who came in contact with the Filipinos at the inception of the Spanish War, or at any time within a few months after hostilities began probably told those he talked with...that we intended to free them from Spanish pppression." 37

Proceeding under the assumption that he would be fighting for Philippine independence, Aguinaldo arrived at Manila on May 19 aboard the "McCullock", a United States dispatch boat. Events, however, did not wait for the native leader. The United States had decided to send its own troops before word of Dewey's victory was even received.

> It was on May 4 that he President McKinley directed in writing that the troops should be assembled in accordance with 'verbal instructions heretofore given'. The occupation of the Philippine Islands was thus determined before any reliable news whatever that Dewey had even succeeded in carrying out his mission of destroying the Spanish Squadron. It is difficult to conclude that our annexation of the Philippines was a wholly accidental proceeding.38

The news of Dewey's victory did not arrive until May 7 and he did not ask for troops until May 15, when he cabled

37. Quoted in Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia op. cit., p. 618.

38. Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit op. cit., p. 174.

"I can take Manila at any moment. To retain possession and thus control the Philippine Islands would require, in my best judgment, well-equipped force of 5,000 men."[39] Yet President McKinley had already decided to send more men, and he dispatched 11,000.

There is other evidence that the administration had no intention of allowing the Philippines to be controlled by any other power. For example, on July 30, before the United States had even "captured" Manila, terms for American occupation were transmitted to Spain. "The United States is entitled to occupy and will hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines."[40] Moreover, Dewey was negotiating with the Spanish force at Manila so that no lives would be lost and so that the insurgents could be kept out of the city. If successful, this tactic would make occupation of the city a totally American venture. Yet, it was Aguinaldo's forces that liberated all of Luzon, except Manila, and several of the other larger islands, such as Mindinao.

Meanwhile the forces favoring annexation were gathering strength. The Chicago Times-Herald exclaimed, even before

39. Quoted in ibid., p. 221.

40. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1898 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1899) pp. 819-820.

the occupation of Manila, "we find that we want the Philippines....The commercial and industrial interests of America, learning that the Islands lie in the gateway of the vast and undeveloped markets of the Orient, say 'Keep the Philippines.'[41] The New York Tribune felt that the United States now had a moral obligation to the Philippines for good government. McKinley himself said "while we are conducting war and until its conclusion we must keep all we get; when the war is over we must keep what we want."[42] The American Consul at Manila, Oscar F. Williams, had even more grandiose dreams. "Each American concern will be a commercial center and school for tractable natives conducive to good government on United States lines. Spanish or native language not essential....Let natives learn English."[43]

With these expansionist forces behind him, Dewey completed negotiations with the Spanish for the occupation of Manila. On August 7 Spain accepted the terms of the American peace protocol, and on August 13 the city was occupied by American forces but not Filipino insurgents. In the words of Leon Wolff, "that afternoon the mock battle was arranged. The Navy would assume positions opposite Fort San Antonio Abad at nine the following morning, August 13, and would shell

41. Chicago Times-Herald July 6, 1898.

42. Quoted in Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit op. cit., p. 175.

43. Quoted in ibid., p. 330.

only that structure and the impregnable walls of the Old City. Simultaneously the Spaniards would withdraw, the insurrectos would be checked, and the Americans would advance."[44] Aguinaldo was not informed of the terms of the occupation and his troops proceeded as if the battle was a real one. The terms, however, forbade entrance to the city to the rebels and Aguinaldo was forced to retreat to the mountains.

Once the United States controlled at least a portion of the Islands, those who wanted the opportunity to increase American influence in the area began to gather support and to make their feelings known. Dewey recognized the significance of his victory. "The effect of the victory precipitated a new element in the mastery of the Pacific and in the international rivalry for trade advantage in the populous Orient."[45]

The evidence that the administration would keep at least a portion of the archipelago is compelling. Marcus Hanna, McKinley's close and trusted advisor, was emphatic on the point. "If it is commercialism to want the possession of a strategic point giving the American people an opportunity to maintain a foothold in the markets of that

44. Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother op. cit., p. 119.

45. Quoted in W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1928) p. 63. The feelings including the immediate reaction of other expansionist forces will be discussed in Chapter 5.

great eastern country, for God's sake let us have commercialism."[46]

Moreover, the President's selection of a peace commission almost precluded any action other than at least a partial annexation of territory. McKinley chose Secretary of State William Day to go as President of the Commission. Not only was Day completely loyal to McKinley, but he was also a supporter of expansion. In fact, Day had replaced John Sherman as Secretary of State partly for that reason. In addition to Day, McKinley chose Whitelaw Reid, publisher of the New York Tribune, who supported annexation even before Manila was "captured". The third member of the Commission was Maine's Senator William Frye, who had previously stated that revolution would occur if we did not capture the China market and who was an avid expansionist.[47] Cushman K. Davis, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, an expansionist much like Frye, was also selected. Senator George Gray of Delaware, the lone dissenter on the Commission, had little chance to persuade his fellows to follow an anti-imperialist tack. Further, Reid, Davis, and Frye thought "it would be a naval, political, and commercial mistake to divide the archipelago."[48]

46. New York Tribune, October 20, 1900.

47. See Chapter II.

48. Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezy, The Philippines and the United States (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951) p. 33.

McKinley's statement of purpose to the Peace Commission on September 16, 1898 left no doubt as to where his feelings lay.

> Incidental to our tenure of the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the open door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to others. The commercial opportunity which is naturally and inevitably associated with this new opening depends less on large territorial possessions than upon an adequate commercial basis and upon broad and equal privileges.[49]

McKinley viewed the Island as a "commercial opportunity" and he could not allow the opportunity to fail to "enlarge American trade." In order to take advantage of the opportunity, he had to demand at least a portion of the archipelago, which he did in his first instructions to the Peace Commission. American trade could be better protected and enlarged from a strategic base in the Philippines. Although McKinley did not ask for the whole archipelago at first, by October, when he made a tour of the country to sound out sentiment for annexation, he had changed his mind. On October 26 Hay, Day's replacement at the State Department, telegraphed the change to the Commission in Paris. "The

49. Quoted in Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia op. cit. p. 622.

cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissable and the former must therefore be required."[50]

The demand was presented to Spain on October 31 and rejected on November 4. Senator Frye thought it might be more palatable for Spain if a twenty million dollar indemnity was paid for the Philippines, and it was in this form that the treaty was finally accepted by Spain on December 10, 1898.

While these negotiations were being conducted, anti-imperialists were rallying forces and organizing groups to prevent the annexation. Their basic assumptions, however, differed little from those favoring annexation, and partly for this reason they were defeated. Their thoughts merit a closer investigation to determine just how they differed from those of the imperialists.

50. Quoted in Alfred L. P. Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy 1896-1906 (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1928) p. 84.

IV

THE LOYAL OPPOSITION

> The inconveniences resulting from the possession of its colonies, every country has engrossed to itself completely. The advantages resulting from their trade it has been obliged to share with many other countries.
>
> -Adam Smith-
>
> An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations p. 592.

Those who came to form the opposition to the formal annexation of the Philippine archipelago called themselves anti-imperialists, a term which did not imply anti-expansionism. Many of the most unlikely persons considered themselves sincere and dedicated anti-imperialists. The organization which finally evolved was a group only in a broad sense because its constituency had diffuse and divergent backgrounds and interests. The difference within the membership of the anti-imperialist movement must be explored in order to understand their ineffective and at times ludicrous attempts to prevent the United States government from formally annexing a large non-contiguous tract of land peopled by another culture.

The diversity inherent in the anti-imperialist movement is amply illustrated by a brief sampling of the people involved with the issue. Carl Schurz, the immigrant leader, who had spoken out consistently against annexation of foreign territory beginning with President Ulysses Grant's attempt to acquire Santo Domingo in 1868, continued opposing formal imperialism during the debate over the fate of the Philippines. Andrew Carnegie, a capitalist entrepreneur, gave both money and support to the anti-imperialist cause, although his opposition did not have the logical consistency of Schurz's opposition. William Jennings Bryan, who had campaigned vigorously against Carnegie and other eastern capitalists in 1896, now belonged to the same club as did some of his supporters, such as Champ Clark and August Bacon.

Although they had walked out of the 1896 Democratic Convention after the nomination of Bryan, gold Democrats such as Grover Cleveland and Richard Olney now supported the Commoner in his efforts to halt expansion of the American system. Joining with the two Democratic factions were several members of the old wing of the Republican Party: George Hoar, Thomas B. Reed, George S. Boutwell, and John Sherman all contributed to the anti-imperialist cause, although only Reed as Speaker of the House still occupied a position of political power. Allied with these old Republicans, once their despised opponents, were Mugwumps like Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Charles Eliot Norton, and E. L. Godkin.

Many others, best classified as independents, joined the movement. These included David Starr Jordan, academician and president of Stanford University, Henry W. Rogers of Northwestern University, Edward Atkinson, business executive, William James, sociologist and philosopher, and William Graham Sumner, professor of political economy and social Darwinist theorist.

The greatest obstacle that the anti-imperialists faced was their own indecision and lack of cohesion. This was caused not only by their diversity of backgrounds but also by differences of opinion over what constituted imperialism and what was the best program to defeat it. The differences among anti-imperialists are important to this thesis only in that they prevented the anti-imperialist organizations from

conducting effective political action against the policies of the imperialists in power. These political differences also serve to underscore my contention that expansionism was embraced as an ideology by a wide and nearly all-encompassing segment of American society. The differences among the anti-imperialists are best explored through a brief detailing of the political background and activities of representative figures from the major political and social groups which formed anti-imperialist organizations.

Carl Schurz is best typified as a liberal reformer. Forced to flee his native Prussia in 1848 due to his political activities there, he finally emigrated to the United States and almost immediately became politically active. In 1860, only a few years after his arrival, he was a member of the national Republican Convention, which nominated Abraham Lincoln for president. After the Civil War he became dissatisfied with Ulysses Grant's policies, including his attempt to annex Santo Domingo, and presided over the convention which nominated Horace Greeley, the editor of the New York Tribune, for president. In 1876, Schurz returned to regular Republican organization and supported Rutherford B. Hayes. As a result, he was appointed Secretary of the Interior. Schurz had been a leader of the civil service reform movement, and in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior he introduced competitive examinations for positions in the service.

Andrew Carnegie, on the other hand, was anything but a reformer. Carnegie can be considered representative of those businessmen who opposed annexation. He was a staunch Republican who supported Grant in opposition to Schurz, and many of his policies toward labor were less than enlightened. In 1890 he introduced the system of paying for labor on a sliding scale based upon productivity. This policy legislated heavily against those workers whose physical stamina and emotional tolerance were less than their peers. In 1892 he at least tacitly agreed to the violent measures which his cohort, Henry Frisk, used to crush the homestead strike. A traditional Republican and a capitalist entrepreneur, Carnegie was indeed a strange bedfellow for Carl Schurz.

Although Carnegie was a regular Republican, the old guard of that party is best represented by John Sherman. A delegate to the Whig convention of 1848, Sherman was president of the first Ohio state Republican convention and participated in the formation of the national Republican party. He opposed the extension of slavery but did not favor its abolition and therefore supported John Frémont in 1856. He opposed the tax bills of the Civil War on principle but supported them in fact. After the war he was prominent in the fight to repeal the internal revenue taxes. A Republican conservative on all other policies, he nevertheless wrote the Sherman Silver Purchase Act in order to spare President Harrison the political embarrassment of vetoing a free silver bill.

Free silver was important to another group of anti-

imperialists, the silver Democrats led by William Jennings Bryan. Bryan's status as a Democrat was enough in itself to alienate some Republican anti-imperialists, and his position on many issues made reconciliation even more difficult. In 1890 he was nominated as a Democratic candidate for Congress on a platform that called for a reduced tariff and the free coinage of silver. In his fight for these programs he was opposed by the very men who became his cohorts in the anti-imperialist Leagues. The issue which best shows the vast chasm between Bryan and many Republicans was the income tax. John Sherman, for example, opposed nearly all taxes even during the Civil War (although he supported them during that conflict) and did his best to either repeal them or reduce them to extremely low levels. Bryan, however, studied the income taxes existing in Europe and assisted in the preparation of the income tax provision of the Wilson tariff bill. After serving two terms in the House of Representatives, Bryan became editor of the Omaha World-Herald and consistantly spoke out in favor of reform, especially monetary reforms.

Although a Democrat, Bryan did not enjoy the support of all Democrats. The old-line or gold Democrats did not support Bryan, yet they formed another group of anti-imperialists. Their politics and policies are amply illustrated by Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama. His father was a merchant and planter in the old South and Morgan was an elector in 1860 for John C. Breckinridge. He was also a delegate from Dallas county to the Alabama state convention which passed the or-

nance of secession from the Union, and during the Civil War he served both as an officer and recruiter for the Confederate Army. In direct contrast to Schurz and Sherman, Morgan was a vigorous champion of white supremacy during the era of Reconstruction in the South. Morgan was one of the first men in the Senate to argue for an isthmian canal through Nicaragua, and after the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands he was appointed to draft a code of laws for the islands.

This conglomerate of individuals and groups was not conducive to the formation of a stable, coherent organization of any type. Yet, with all their differences the anti-imperialists did manage to erect some semblance of an organization. The first step was taken by Gamaliel Bradford and Moorfield Storey in Boston immediately following the war. They formed a Committee of Correspondence, whose duties were similar to those of the Committee of Correspondence formed previous to the Revolutionary War; to keep open channels of communication with other anti-imperialists.

The first meeting of prospective anti-imperialists took place on June 15, 1898, before the war was even concluded, at Faneiul Hall in Boston. It was at this first meeting that the Committee of Correspondence was formed to contact politicians and other influential members of society in order to gain allies against annexation of foreign territory. On November 19, 1898, the anti-imperialist League was founded. Its vice-presidents included Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Edward Atkinson, Andrew Carnegie, Grover Cleveland, Samuel

Gompers, Carl Schurz and Senator John Sherman. More vice-presidents were added during 1899, including David Starr Jordan, William Graham Sumner, Benjamin Tillman, and Hermann von Holst.

The first act of this organization was the publishing of the "Address to the People of the United States". Two articles are of particular importance in explaining the position of the anti-imperialists:

> "Fourth, 'expansion by natural growth in thinly-settled contiguous territory, acquired by purchase for the express purpose of ultimate statehood, cannot be confounded with, or made analogous to, foreign territory conquered by war and wrested by force from a weak enemy.'"
>
> "Seventh, imperialism 'must result in foreign complications which will imperil and delay the settlement of pressing financial, labor, and administrative questions at home.'"[1]

Four days after the presentation of the "Address to the People of the United States" the League issued a chain letter to influential people throughout the United States. "Among them, are governors and ex-governors, Republicans, Democrats, goldbugs, silverites, capitalists, labor reformers, trade unionists and Grangers."[2] In addition, the League used other forms of public suasion to swell the ranks of the anti-

1. Quoted in E. Berkeley Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890, 1920 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970) p. 129.

2. Boston Evening Transcript, November 26, 1898.

imperialists. It published many pamphlets and propaganda tracts explaining its position on the issue and also utilized public meetings as a method of increasing its support.

Those men who were involved with the formal activities of the anti-imperialist League did possess certain common characteristics.[3] Chief among these was the age of most officers and members. Most were in the last years of their lives. This fact made effective action in favor of change in foreign policy much more difficult because these men were now cut off from the avenues to power. The only Republican anti-imperialist still in a position commanding a degree of authority was Thomas B. Reed, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, but even his influence was limited by his age and his own political philosophy, which would not allow him to impose his will on the majority of his colleagues.

Most members of the League were well-educated, having studied at the best universities in the country. A large majority of them were professional men, including a representative sample from the intellectual community. Hermann E. von Holst, Chairman of the History Department at the University of Chicago, Felix Adler from Columbia, Yale's leading social scientist, William Graham Sumner, and Henry W. Rogers, president of Northwestern University, were all

3. For a more complete exposition of the similarities of the anti-imperialists, see E. Berkeley Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism in the United States: op. cit. Chapter 10.

among the active members of the "League".

The similarities of the anti-imperialists which have been mentioned were primarily superficial, encompassing age and educational achievement. The one basic trait which nearly all anti-imperialists had in common was their belief in the necessity for economic expansion. The difference among the anti-imperialists in their definitions of just what constituted imperialism can be traced directly to their belief in economic expansion. This belief was shared with the imperialists and helps explain the overall ineffectiveness of the anti-imperialists. Because the idea that imperialists and anti-imperialists were basically the same is central to this thesis, the thoughts of the anti-imperialists concerning economic expansion deserve a closer inspection.

Carl Schurz was perhaps the most consistent and outspoken leader of the anti-imperialist forces. Yet Schurz also exemplifies the basic agreement between imperialists and anti-imperialists concerning the necessity for economic (especially market) expansion. The agreement with the imperialists over economic expansion was the most basic difficulty which the anti-imperialists had to overcome in order to effectively influence United States policy in the Philippine Islands.

After opposing the annexation of Santo Domingo, Schurz headed an organization whose purpose was to expand trade overseas through the publication of the United States Export Almanac and even offered the State Department 20,000 free

copies of the first issue in order to increase its effect.[4] In 1913 he wrote an article titled "Manifest Destiny" in which he discussed the benefits of "enlarging our commercial advantages". The only difficulty was the method, or "how this end can be most surely" achieved.[5] He did not believe that colonialism of any kind could be helpful in effectively and efficiently expanding the American economy abroad.

Thus, Carl Schurz believed implicitly in the tenets soon to be embodied in the Open Door Notes, namely that all nations and states should be open to American economic penetration, which included the export of surplus capital and goods. This required that each nation be free to make its own trading arrangements with the United States. He opposed the war with Spain because it would burden the United States with the task, at best difficult, of securing "the future peace and orderly conduct" of the Cuban people. Formal imperialism would only saddle the United States with unnecessary responsibilities. "All the advantages we might gain by it can be secured without irrevocably abandoning the safe, time honored tradition of our government."[6]

4. See William Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire (New York: Vintage Books, 1969) p. 303.

5. Carl Schurz, "Manifest Destiny" Harpers (October, 1893) pp. 737-746.

6. Quoted in Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire, op. cit. p. 356.

Schurz did not oppose expansion. Rather, he said the United States should "build and control railroads:...purchase mines and have them worked for our benefit" in the area of the Caribbean "without assuming any responsibilities for them which would oblige us to forego the inestimable privilege of being secure in our possessions without large and burdensome armaments."[7]

Furthermore, Schurz, like other anti-imperialists, did not oppose the acquisition of "coaling stations and naval depots". In this way, he believed, America would not become entangled with other imperialist countries over foreign territory and the United States would become "the great neutral Power of the World."[8] Schurz was, therefore, an anti-imperialist expansionist. He wanted American economic interests to expand for the benefits such a policy would bestow on workers in the form of greater job security, but he did not want the United States to assume the political and military responsibilities inherent in the annexation of large tracts of foreign land.

Schurz's faith in economic expansion and his misgivings about distant possessions were shared by many other anti-

7. Frederick Bancroft (ed.), Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz 6 vol. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913) p. 213.

8. Ibid. pp. 472-473.

imperialists. Andrew Carnegie, capitalist par excellence, was no less opposed to the annexation of the Philippines and was even more in favor of economic expansion. Carnegie did not oppose the acquisition of foreign territory per se. He supported the annexation of Hawaii and the retention of Cuba and Puerto Rico, but he could not support "imperialism" and drew the line between trade acquisitions and imperialism at the Philippine issue.

Carnegie judged the propriety of annexing foreign territory on the basis of two factors. First, he established a somewhat nebulous distinction between "colonies" and "dependencies". Colonies were acceptable additions to the American system for the simple reason that they (by Carnegie's definition) could be peopled by the advanced American civilization and thus would not constitute a great additional expense of administration. Dependencies, on the other hand, were by definition populated by inferior races and would constitute an added expense due to the fact that an administration and an apparatus for indoctrinating the natives in the American way of life would have to be formed. The monies that would have to be spent for these new governmental agencies could better be spent on stimulating growth within the United States.[9]

In addition to this distinction, Carnegie valued extra-

9. See Andrew Carnegie, "Distant Possessions The Parting of the Ways" North American Review CLXVII (August 1898) 239.

continental territory according to geographical position. He envisioned the United States as eventually controlling and dominating the entire Western Hemisphere. In order to achieve this status, America must own island bases, especially in the Caribbean, from which it could extend its penetration of other western countries.[10]

For these reasons Carnegie supported American acquisition of Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and other "coaling stations" that would be required for the continued growth of American production, but the Philippines would become an unnecessary and expensive addition to a growing America. They were unnecessary because the United States was growing rapidly without them. "In international affairs her influence grows so fast and foreshadows so much, that one of the foremost statesmen has recently warned Europe that it must combine against her if it is to hold her own in the industrial world."[11]

Carnegie proceeded from the premise that the United States was outstripping Europe in the race for markets and was expanding through penetration of foreign economies to the conclusion that it could continue to expand without ac-

10. See Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, op. cit. Chapter 8 and

11. Andrew Carnegie, "Distant Possessions - The Parting of the Ways", op. cit. p. 240.

quiring formal colonies or dependencies: "The fact that the United States has none [colonies or dependencies] does not prevent her products and manufactures from invading Japan, China, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and all parts of the world in competition with those of Britain. 'Possession' of colonies or dependencies is not necessary for trade reasons."[12]

Thus Carnegie did not oppose the basic aims of a foreign policy designed to foster continued economic growth at home through increased exportation of goods and capital abroad; nor did he oppose the acquisition of small tracts of land to aid in the expansion of American industry overseas. Rather he believed that large areas of non-contiguous territory peopled by "inferior" civilizations were economically unproductive and simply unnecessary for economic growth. Like those of Schurz, Carnegie's principles closely parallel the Open Door Policy.

Alabama's Senator John T. Morgan, although of different background, political party, temperment, and section of the country than Carnegie, supported the Republican entrepreneur in both his feelings concerning annexation of an Asian archipelago and in his thoughts concerning economic expansion. Morgan was concerned about the problem of cotton overproduction, and his solution was to open more foreign markets to

12. Ibid. p. 241, see also Andrew Carnegie, "Americanism versus Imperialism" North American Review CLXVIII (January, 1899) 1.

American penetration. In 1882 he stated that "doubtless there was overproduction....Our home market is not equal to the demand....We have outgrown the home market, and must seek markets abroad if we would continue to prosper."[13]

Yet Morgan was a definite anti-imperialist who did not want the United States to rule the Philippines in any way and who opposed the annexation of the entire archipelago. He did, however, want the United States to acquire military harbors and coaling stations. In this he went one step further than Carnegie, for he wanted such stations not only in Cuba and Puerto Rico, but also in the Philippines.

> It would be extreme folly to omit such provisions for the security of our ships and the protection of our commerce in both the great oceans. If any of these islands are transferred to any government, local or foreign, such governments should be bound by treaty stipulation to guarantee to the United States, against all comers, and with arms if necessary, the full and uninterrupted possession and control of suitable military reservations.[14]

Morgan justified his position of acquiring naval harbors in both oceans with military and economic arguments in several ways. The military arguments were based on Morgan's faith in

13. Quoted in Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire, op. cit. p. 292.

14. John T. Morgan, "What Shall We Do With the Conquered Islands?" North American Review CLXVII (June, 1898) 643.

free trade and "the liberty of commerce." Essentially his thoughts paralleled those of Alfred T. Mahan: "A military post in the Philippines, connecting with these other islands and with Asia, would form a strategic situation of immense value in time of war, and would place us on an equal footing with all other powers in control of the commerce of the Southern Pacific Ocean."[15] Moreover, with the United States in control of Hawaii, America could also control the Northern Pacific. Thus, the largest ocean in the world would become an American lake with American firms penetrating the markets and economies of all the surrounding areas.

Although Morgan's vision would stud the ocean with American bases, they would only be used for defensive purposes and to protect American commerce. Although he spoke of controlling areas of the globe, this would not be imperialism because such control would be established through "free trade" rather than colonization: "Wheresoever any power may extend beyond our continental boundaries, it will be confined to the protection of the interests of our own people, by establishing such military outposts as will secure to them the full enjoyment of all their rights, and the liberty of commerce. The policy of colonization by conquest, or coercion, is repugnant to our national creed...."[16]

Morgan's ideas concerning expansion and imperialism were

15. Ibid. p. 644.

16. Ibid.

not unusual and were shared by most other anti-imperialists. One faction, strongly anti-imperialist yet expansionist, was the old wing of the Republican party comprised of men such as Benjamin Harrison and John Sherman. Harrison's activities in behalf of expansion have already been discussed to some extent. Sherman, former senator from Ohio and secretary of state under McKinley, supported expansion, though not avidly enough for many businessmen. He spoke out against annexation of the Philippines as he had done against Grant's plan for Santo Domingo.

Long an important member of the Republican party, Sherman had always been interested in economic expansion. He agreed with most other anti-imperialists in that he did not believe that the United States had to possess foreign territory to "become the ruler of other dominions". Rather, this same goal could be achieved "by extending our steamboat lines into South America, by making all the Caribbean Sea one vast American ocean; by planting our influence among the sister republics...."[17]

Sherman, then, did not oppose the economic penetration of other countries but only the formal annexation of them. Because of this basic agreement with the objectives of the imperialists, he found it difficult to debate the drawbacks that would derive from a policy of formal imperialism. Like

17. Winfield S. Kern, John Sherman: His Life and Public Services (Boston: Sherman, French & Company 1908) Vol. II p. 158 and Beisner, Twelve Against Empire op. cit. p. 198.

other anti-imperialists, he decided to center his opposition to government policy on other grounds: "The only trouble is it is better not always to say the truth. It is better not always to speak of money and property and property interests....Let is be placed upon some higher ground."[18] This tactic had the effect of making the "debate" over the fate of the Philippines meaningless and irrelevant, but it also suggested the insecurity present in the minds of the anti-imperialists.

Sherman's specific interest in the Cuban and Spanish problems was logically based upon its potential effect on American growth and enterprise. He wanted the problems settled so that the American economy could get on with the job of expansion. "The extraordinary, because direct and not merely theoretical or sentimental, interest of the United States in the Cuban situation cannot be ignored....The chronic condition of trouble...injuriously affects the normal functions of business, and tends to delay the condition of prosperity to which this country is entitled."[19]

Sherman's informal imperialism was not only applicable to Latin America but to the whole world. Richard Olney, also an expansionist secretary of state, agreed with Sherman

18. Quoted in Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire op. cit. p. 3[illegible].

19. Ibid. p. 406.

that the Cuban situation had to be settled in order for American interests there and elsewhere to expand. Olney realized that domestic consumption was not enough to ensure the growth of American industry. "They had begun to realize that their industrial and commercial development should not be checked by limitation to the demands of the home market but must be furthered by free access to all markets...."[20] Even with this realization Olney did not favor the annexation of the Philippines. Basically he agreed with Carnegie and other anti-imperialists that the islands would not be profitable due to the primitive needs and desires of the population. Furthermore, he contended, if the United States demanded the Open Door in China it had to expect that others would demand the same privileges in the Philippines, and if this occurred the value of the archipelago as a colony would be lost. The China market was more important, and the United States was in a better position to capture that market without possession of the Philippines.

The man who best represented the basic similiarities between imperialists and anti-imperialists was Edward Atkinson, because he carried the logic of Carnegie, Olney, and others to its conclusion. He praised the accumulation of capital and considered "commercialism" a virtue: "Commerce

20. Richard Olney, "Growth of Our Foreign Policy" Atlantic Monthly LXXXV (March, 1900) 290.

stands for all that is good in modern society, and in the progress of human welfare so far as human welfare rests upon the supply of physical wants."[21]

Yet Atkinson consistently opposed all schemes of colonization or annexation. He thought that the United States should take any steps necessary to gain world economic supremacy and to control the "commerce of the world" without acquiring in the process a political or military empire that would require great expenditures to rule. What Atkinson really favored was the Open Door policy:

> ...each nation desires a coaling station; the open door to commerce, the development of the wants of the Filipino's through commerce to the end that their demand for manufactures may increase; the development of their own products correspondingly. The necessities of war, of military occupation, of defense against agression, increase the burden and diminish the commerce; and whereas if by agreement it were ordained that all fortifications should be destroyed, that no naval warfare should be permitted within the waters of the Philippine Islands, that all nations might buy coaling stations, land commodities and enjoy commerce under the same system of collecting the revenue, called the open door, -all interests would be promoted, oppressions would end; the Philippine Islands would become first in the history of the world a sanctuary of commerce, like the Cathedrals of old where God's peace was kept while all around was violence, rapine and war.[22]

21. Edward Atkinson, "Commercialism" Atlantic Monthly XC (October 1902) 517.

22. Quoted in Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, op. cit. P. 96.

Atkinson's feeling that "this country never needed the world for a market as much as it does now" was shared by most other leading anti-imperialists. This fact in addition to the fact, as Senator Sherman noted, that many anti-imperialists were reluctant to discuss the economic benefits of imperialism made the debate over the fate of the Philippines one of means and not ends.

The future of the Philippines and American foreign policy was debated in the Congress, in the press, and on the hustings. The issues raised in that debate must be reviewed with the understanding that nearly all parties were agreed upon a basic policy of American economic expansion. That understanding makes the "Great Debate" less of a debate, but more consistant with the flow of American foreign policy. It also explains that the annexation of the Philippine archipelago was not a departure from basic traditional American policy, but only an attempt to use a new method to achieve the same desired goal: economic expansion.

V

THE "GREAT DEBATE"

> The booming guns of Dewey's battleships sounded a new note on the Pacific shores, a note that has echoed and re-echoed around the world, and that note is that we are on the Pacific, that we are there to stay, and that we are there to protect our rights, promote our interests, and get our share of the trade and commerce of the opulent Orient.
>
> Senator William Sulzer

The major thrust of the anti-imperialist opposition to the annexation of the Philippines came when, after the war had ended, the government had to decide the disposition of the territory that had belonged to Spain but that now was partly occupied by American military forces. The major weapon the anti-imperialists used was moral suasion through presentation of their belief in the national press and the Congress. The anti-imperialist's organizations were of little help in this tactic because of the individualistic nature of the anti-imperialist Leagues.[1]

Chapter Four has explored the basic assumptions about foreign policy that imperialists and anti-imperialists shared in common. Because of this basic agreement it appeared at times during the debate that the two sides were debating different issues. Most anti-imperialists were forced to hinge their opposition to annexation upon some principle other than those that drove the United States into the Pacific. These

1. The actual organization of the anti-imperialists is not central to this thesis, but their conceptualizations about anti-imperialism are. For a more complete treatment of the anti-imperialist organization and activities, see E. Berkeley Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1896-1926 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), Fred H. Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States 1898-1900" Mississippi Valley Historical Review XXII (September, 1935) 211, Richard E. Welch, Jr., "Senator George Frisbie Hoar and the Defeat of Anti-Imperialism 1898-1900" The Historian XXVI (May, 1964) 362. Another article which deals briefly with the character and make-up of the anti-imperialists is William E. Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916" Mississippi Valley Historical Review XXXIX (December, 1952) 483.

principles were articulated by farmers, businessmen, labor leaders, government officials, and academicians, both imperialist and anti-imperialist. The last chapter illustrated the anti-imperialist support for the most basic of the principles, namely, unbounded economic growth, especially overseas economic growth. Thus, as Senator Sherman indicated, the anti-imperialists had to find issues other than economic expansion, upon which all were agreed. Even if the anti-imperialists could somehow deny their own support of expansionist policies, the overwhelming support that these policies enjoyed from other segments of the society would have led to the easy and immediate defeat of anti-imperialist programs.

One of the most basic arguments used by many anti-imperialists was that the annexation of foreign territory was not provided for in the Constitution of the United States. According to these anti-imperialists, the Constitution allowed only for the acquisition of territory that was destined for eventual statehood.

This argument had a corollary which stated that because the government could not legally annex foreign territory not destined for statehood, it could not legally govern such territory and its population as a colony in perpetuity.

On December 10, 1898, the date of the signing of the Treaty of Paris, Senator George Vest introduced a resolution which stated the constitutional arguments of the anti-imperialists:

> That under the Constitution of the United States no power is given to the Federal Government to acquire

> territory acquired by the Government, except such small amount as may be necessary for scaling stations, connection of boundaries, and similar governmental purposes, must be acquired and governed with the purpose of ultimately organising such territory into States suitable for admission into the Union.[2]

In support of his resolution, Vest brought forth decisions of the Supreme Court as diverse as the Dred Scott case and the Alaska case. He argued that "to say that the citizens of a territory under the jurisdiction of the United States are excluded from the provisions of the Bill of Rights is to say that they are at the mercy of Congress without limitation".[3]

Vest tied his constitutional argument to another which he considered complementary and actually part of the first one. This was his own moral view of the effects of imperialism upon the country which colonizes. Vest averred that the United States could not possess colonies because "it uproots and eliminates the basis of all republican institutions, that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed."[4]

These appeals to constitutional principles and the moral traditions of America were made by many other anti-

2. Quoted in Marion Mills Miller (ed.) Great Debates in American History 14 vols. (New York: Current Literature Publishing Co., 1913) p. 248.

3. Ibid. p. 251.

4. Ibid. p. 253.

imperialists. Senator George F. Hoar, for example, echoed the constitutional argument of Vest and logically supported his resolution. He added the thought that the very reasons for the American War for Independence would be present if the United States annexed the Philippine Islands.

Carl Schurz also based his public opposition to formal imperialism on America's political principles, and to support his contentions he formulated "Schurz's Law". In the words of Robert L. Beisner, "the law went briefly as follows: the United States, in order to remain true to her political principles, could never rule other peoples undemocratically; thus, if Santo Domingo (for which in 1898 read 'Hawaii', 'the Philippines', or 'Puerto Rico') was to be annexed, it should by rights be made a state and be placed upon a footing of equality with Massachusetts, Georgia, California, and so forth; but, since the incorporation of a tropical people into the Union would destroy the very framework of American government, such a merger must at all costs be prevented...."[5]

Colonization should be "prevented" because the first duty of the American government must be to preserve freedom in the United States. War and conquest of territory presented the greatest danger to the United States because it

5. Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, The Anti-Imperialists 1898-1900 op. cit. pp. 22-23.

was a democracy and colonization would undermine the basis of its republican form of government.[6]

Schurz, however, did not confine himself to constitution and moral arguments against imperialism. To these he added his view of the racial attributes of the Filipino. He believed that the Islands were the habitat of inferior peoples of mixed racial heritage who were unable to be Americanized. Schurz did not feel that it was America's duty to "uplift" the Filipinos. Rather he believed that the Filipinos expected independence and deserved it, but the conquest of the Islands "was deliberately planned with a cool calculation of profit."[7]

The argument that America's tradition, heritage, and civilization were threatened by imperialism was most tenaciously held by Republican anti-imperialists, especially former Mugwumps. Both E. L. Godkin and Charles Eliot Norton decried the fall of American civilization. To them imperialism represented the final proof that their traditions were being crushed by a tide of crass materialism. Godkin stated that the Spanish-American War was "the most savage war ever known in the history of our republic."[8]

6. See Carl Schurz, "Thoughts on American Imperialism" The Century Magazine LVI (September, 1898) 781.

7. See "The Issue of Imperialism," editorial, Nation LXX (March 1, 1900) 156.

8. See Nation LXVIII (April 20, 1899) 288.

These legal and moral arguments of the anti-imperialists gained some support from the press, although most periodicals and newspapers favored annexation of the archipelago. Newspapers such as the Springfield Republican, the Boston Herald, and the Baltimore Herald editorialized that the United States was pursuing the wrong policy. The one periodical that was consistent in its opposition to plans for annexation was the Nation.

As early as May 19, 1898 the Nation protested the possible acquisition of a group of Asian Islands. The editor saw no constitutional obstacle to such a course of action but doubted that an efficient, uncorrupt colonial service could be formed. They feared the government of the Philippines would become much like the agency governing the American Indians, with all its attendant scandal.[9]

To this argument, the Nation later added some held by many other anti-imperialists. First, it stated that the United States entered the war with a moral purpose and to annex territory after the war would be to overthrow those principles for which the war was fought.[10] Furthermore, the acquisition of foreign territory would result in "a radical departure from all our traditions and our methods."[11]

9. Nation LXVI (May 19, 1898) 376.
10. Nation LXVI (June 9, 1898) 438.
11. Nation LXVII (November 3, 1898) 323.

Not all anti-imperialists attempted to avoid the real issues involved in the annexation of the Philippines, and some revealed great insight into problems inherent in attempting to rule a foreign country. William James, for example, opposed annexation for a novel reason. He felt that America's continued intervention in the Philippines would destroy "the one sacred thing in the world, the spontaneous budding of a national life". This would leave the Philippines a hollow nation, for "we can destroy their own ideals, but we can't give them ours."[12]

Andrew Carnegie, too, showed great foresight in his anti-imperialism. As early as August, 1898 he predicted that American men whose purpose was "to fight the oppressor" would eventually be "shooting down the oppressed" if an imperialistic course was followed.[13]

A few anti-imperialists attacked the economic arguments of the imperialists, but even fewer questioned the imperialists' assumptions. Those who criticised the economic arguments of the imperialists did so within the framework of Open Door psychology. To them the question was whether annexation of the Philippines would be beneficial in the overall program of American economic growth and expansion into foreign markets and economies.

12. Quoted in Beisner, Twelve Against Empire The Anti-Imperialists 1898-1900 op. cit. p. 41.

13. New York Times, October 28, 1898.

The Nation attacked the strongest and most-widely held imperialist belief that the Philippines would provide a way station to the enormous untapped market of China. In a bitter editorial it warned that, "hence we must have the Philippines, not because we want them for themselves, but as a basis for more extended conquests."[14] Going further, the editorial questioned the very idea of a China market. "To spend $50,000,000 a year with the idea of capturing a mythical trade, the profits of which can never repay the expenditure, is not what Americans, in conducting their private affairs, would call a 'business proposition.'"[15] Furthermore, if expansion is necessary, the Nation contended, there were still available markets in the civilized world for both goods and capital, such as Italy, and thus to trade with "barbarians" was unnecessary.[16]

Other anti-imperialists, such as Edward Atkinson, Carl Schurz, and Richard Olney, disputed the claims of the imperialists that great economic benefit would derive from the ownership of the Philippine Islands. Atkinson pointed out that colonies were expensive and unnecessary. The United States economy could grow faster without them. Thus, he felt

14. "The Philippines as a Fulcrum" Nation LXVII (September 1, 1898) 161.

15. Ibid.

16. "Expansionists, Attention!" Nation LXVII (November 3, 1898) 328.

that neutrality for the archipelago was the best course of action for America. "These Islands can be neutralized; their commerce can be extended; the peace of God can be kept in all their parts...."[17]

Richard Olney opposed the annexation of the Philippines for many of the reasons Atkinson did. He believed the United States had to expand and recognized "the present crying need of our commercial interests. What is it? It is more markets and larger markets for the consumption of the products of the industry and inventive genius of the American people."[18] But formal colonies would only add to the burden through the necessary additional governmental apparatus.

Although during the debate few anti-imperialists argued from economic premises, many of them recognized that the basic rationale for taking the Philippines was economic. Senator William E. Mason of Illinois stated, "my distinguished friend suggested this morning that we ought to rake those Islands with our guns and compel their people to wear shirts - not that they need the shirts, but to increase the demand for calico."[19]

Senator James H. Berry of Arkansas saw the same forces

17. Anti-Imperialist I (May 27, 1899) 23.

18. Richard Olney "International Isolation of the United States" Atlantic Monthly LXXXI (May 1898) 588.

19. Quoted in Marion Miller (ed.), Great Debates in American History op. cit. p. 272.

behind the movement for annexation. "No, Mr. President, the plea of humanity is not the true cause of this movement. It doubtless has controlled the judgment of some, but the all-powerful force behind it is the desire of extending trade and commerce."[20]

Although most of the opposition to the Treaty of Paris was based upon legal, moral, and racial theories, few imperialists chose to debate these fine points. Instead imperialists, both in Congress and the press, hammered away at the basic issue of expansion, which blurred whatever differences existed between them and the anti-imperialists. The anti-imperialists had continually and consistantly stated throughout their public careers that the solution to many of America's social and economic ills, especially those brought about by the depression of 1893-1897, was economic expansion which would mean greater profits for capitalists and more jobs for workers. The imperialists now argued that they were following this very course of action through annexation of foreign territory.

Those few imperialists who did answer the issues raised by the anti-imperialists did so in the Congressional debate over the Treaty of Paris. Senator Orville Platt of Connecticut spoke on the issues in the Vest amendment by quoting from the Constitution, "The Congress shall have the power to dis-

20. Ibid. p. 311.

pose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States."[21] Although Platt felt compelled to deal with the Constitutional problems raised by annexation, the basis of his thought was expressed in another speech given in Congress in which he stated that "the future of this country, so far as growth, development, progress, and civilization are concerned, lies outside of us largely."[22]

On January 11, Senator Joseph Foraker of Ohio also spoke against the Vest resolution. He argued that the United States did have the constitutional power to acquire and rule foreign territory. He also believed that the consent of the people was irrelevent if this course of action was in the national interest, which he obviously believed was the case.

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, on January 24, also answered the legal implications of annexation by simply stating that he supported the Declaration of Independence as much as any man, but that the only viable alternative was to accept the peace treaty. If the treaty was blocked by the Senate, the United States would remain at war with Spain with all the consequences. He felt that the United States would follow the "right" course in the Philippines, because the treaty "is wisely and skillfully drawn. It commits us to no policy, no course of action whatever in

21. Ibid. p. 254.

22. Congressional Record, 53rd Cong., 3rd Sess., 3045.

regard to the Philippines."[23]

Before and during the Congressional debate a much more wide ranging debate was taking place in the press. It was in the media that the imperialists used their strongest argument in favor of annexation; the necessity of economic growth, especially overseas economic growth. Here government officials, business leaders, and social commentators all spoke out in favor of an enlarged sphere of interest for the United States. Many of their pronouncements closely paralleled those of the anti-imperialists in this regard, the difference being that the imperialists favored annexation as one method to increase the rate of expansion while anti-imperialists felt that annexation would, due to various factors, slow the rate of growth. Several government officials spoke in favor of retaining the Philippine Islands, and most based their feelings on assumptions about the growing American capitalist economy. Even Richard Olney, who opposed annexation of the Islands, stated that "it is as open to America as to Europe to undertake the colonization of uninhabited and unappropriated portions of the globe...."[24] Olney defined imperialism in a very narrow sense, as did many others who opposed annexation, but there were others

23. Quoted in Marion Miller (ed.), Great Debates in American History op. cit. p. 303.

24. Richard Olney, "International Isolation of the United States" Atlantic Monthly XXXI (May, 1898) 579.

in the government who did not concern themselves with the idea of imperialism at all, only with its potential results. The most powerful politician to speak of America's economic necessities and methods to meet them was President William McKinley himself: "Our diversified productions, however, are increasing in such unprecedented volume as to admonish us of the necessity of still further enlarging our foreign markets by broader commercial relations."[25] In view of statements like this, McKinley's professed difficulty in determining the fate of the Philippines is even more difficult to comprehend.

Other members of the government were more avid than McKinley in their support for annexation. John Barrett, former minister to Siam and special advisor to Commodore Dewey, for example, hammered away in article after article at the theme of economic expansion and delineated the ways in which possession of the Philippines would help toward this goal. Like most other imperialists Barrett wanted the Philippines not only for their own value to the American economy, but primarily for the advantage they would afford the United States in trade with and penetration of the China market.

According to Barrett, "the Philippines, being the geographical and strategical centre by reason of physical location, will become under American influence the commercial

25. William McKinley, Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1901.

centre of the transpacific coast, seas, and millions of people."[26] "The annual trade comprehended in this 2000-mile circle approaches $1,000,000,000 per annum, of which America's share now is hardly one-tenth or $100,000,000, but can be in time one-third or one-half."[27] Barrett was ecstatic when considering the possibilities of the China market. "What opportunities for American manufacturers, for American capital, and for American engineers, and for American labor at home providing what is wanted in China."[28]

In another article Barrett explained his vision for the future of American relations with China and the Pacific. Although written after the debate over annexation, it is concise and lucid and represents Barrett's thoughts and writings during the debate.

> Before closing my references to China, I cannot refrain from emphasizing the importance of our Government's efforts to maintain the 'open door' of trade and preserve the integrity of the Chinese Empire. The 'open door' simply means that we shall have the same rights of commerce throughout all China as are possessed by any other country and as guaranteed by the treaties. We have everything to lose and nothing to gain by the division of the Chinese Empire. Now, (after annexation) we can look forward to controlling the larger portion of her trade in successful competition with other

26. John Barrett, "The Philippines: Our Approach to Asia" Harpers Weekly XLIV (July 28, 1900) 702.

27. Ibid. p. 702.

28. Ibid.

> nations; but if China is divided or the door is closed, whatever country has the predominant influence in a certain portion of China will establish such regulations, directly or indirectly, as well as prevent our exports from competing successfully with its own."[29]

As for the Philippines themselves, "American capital will also find a ready and safe investment of $200,000,000 in railroads, industries, mines, and general development in the next five years."[30]

Other government officials and bureaucrats spoke out in the press during the debate and most spoke of the economic benefits of annexation. Worthington C. Ford, Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, began discussing the issue as early as September, 1898. "At the moment when, conscious of their own strength, the industries of the United States are realising the inadequacy of the home market, and the necessity of other vents to permit a continuance of growth, or even a continuance of actual production, a continent swings into view as a possible market, and many islands, of unknown because untried capacity, are placed within reach of our commercial influence, if not of political accession."[31]

Ford joined other imperialists in viewing the Philippines as one necessary link of a much larger commercial do-

29. John Barrett, "The Philippine Islands and Their Environment" National Geographic XI (January 1900) 7.

30. John Barrett, "The Philippines: Our Approach to Asia" op. cit. p. 703.

31. Worthington C. Ford, "New Opportunities for American Commerce" Atlantic Monthly LXXXII (September, 1898) 321.

main: that of the Pacific and in particular China. He recognized the opportunity this 'new' land offered to the United States as a market for both goods and capital. Moreover, Ford spoke in favor of exploiting China's huge and untapped source of cheap labor. This labor could profitably be used to build and expand an American industrial base in the Philippine Islands.

China played such a large part in the thinking of most imperialists that it is difficult to find leading spokesmen who talked only of the value of the Philippine Islands in themselves. Truxton Beale was a former member of the diplomatic corps as minister to Persia in 1891 and minister to Greece in 1892. He argued almost exclusively that the Philippines were of immense value to the United States as a stepping stone to China. "On the other hand, the coast of China... is practically at our back door. If we guard it properly, nature will assure us almost a monopoly of trade with the greatest part of the continent of Asia."32 The Philippines fit into this scheme as Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan would have it. "The Philippine Islands possess for the protection of our trade the three great essentials laid down by Captain Mahan for a strategic point at sea: first, position; second,

32. Truxton Beale, "Strategical Value of the Philippines" North American Review CLXVI (June, 1898) 759.

strength; third, resources."[33] Beale averred that their importance would not be overestimated.

Some pro-imperialist politicians, while debating the question of annexation, spoke in terms of American foreign policy in general. One of these was Horace Henry Powers, a Congressman from Vermont. In his article he discussed not only the basis for the decision to annex the Philippines, but more importantly basic tenets that would guide American foreign policy for years to come. He believed that the United States had to expand economically if it was not to stagnate, and the best fields for investment and growth were overseas. This was to be accomplished not through war and conquest but through trade and commerce: "Our expansion must be a commercial expansion, and as a late comer we must trade by sufferance in other people's preserves. The whole expanding energy of our national life will assert itself in a demand for the two conditions necessary to its further growth, access and order."[34] (italics added).

Not only politicians and government officials spoke out during the debate. Intellectuals, social commentators, businessmen, and journalists also delineated the economic benefits of annexation. Few answered the moral and legal questions

33. Ibid. p. 760.

34. H. H. Powers, Untitled Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science XII (September, 1898) 187.

raised in desperation by the anti-imperialists. Most were content to use the issue of economic expansion as the raison d'etre of annexation; a position with which the anti-imperialists found it difficult, if not impossible, to disagree. It would be glaringly apparent to all concerned if the anti-imperialists suddenly began denouncing overseas economic expansion. Many of them had written articles and spoken publicly in favor of just such a policy. Although the method used by the government to implement that policy was not one which they had recommended, they could not and did not argue or disagree with the policy itself. But politics and logic did not force the anti-imperialists to support expansion. They sincerely believed that this was the best course for America and consequently they worked in various capacities to achieve expansion.

Many intellectuals argued that the United States did not have the moral or legal right to acquire an overseas formal empire. A. Lawrence Lowell, however, supported annexation. Lowell, President of Harvard University from 1909 to 1933, based his case upon the thesis that the domestic frontier was now closed and that the United States must still continue to expand. Thus the problem was a larger one than just annexation of the Philippines, for the future of the United States was dependent upon continued growth. "It seems altogether probable, therefore, that if the war with Spain had not broken out, the question of expansion would have arisen in some concrete form before many

decades had passed, and that it would ultimately have been answered in the affirmative."[35]

Lowell was supported by other commentators on the social scene, such as Horace N. Fisher. Fisher believed that the policies of George Washington no longer were useful to an industrially mature United States. America had now reached the point at which it had to expand overseas. "The opening of this group of islands as a foreign market of increasing purchasing power, as a goal for our commerce and navigation on the Pacific, comes when a large and increasing foreign market seems to this country, as it has seemed to European powers, an absolute necessity not only for industrial prosperity, but for mitigating the conflict between labor and capital."[36]

Most businessmen, including many of those who originally opposed the war with Spain, were now speaking in favor of retaining the Philippines for much the same reasons as other imperialists put forward. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, for example, had consistently editorialized against the advent of war with Spain because of the supposed disastrous effects it would have upon the economic recovery of the United States. By May, 1898 the editors recognized the

35. A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Colonial Expansion of the United States" Atlantic Monthly LXXXIII (February, 1899) 148.

36. Horace N. Fisher, "The Development of Our Foreign Policy" Atlantic Monthly LXXXII (October, 1898) 558.

potential for commercial growth that the Philippines represented.[37] During the debate the Chronicle argued for the necessity of annexation: "The single alternative, in Hawaii as in Cuba and Porto Rico (sic) and the Philippines, is colonial administration."[38]

Banker Charles A. Conant was representative of the thought of most businessmen, especially those with capital to export. To him, the Philippines offered "a field for the enterprises and capital of the nation."[39] As previously stated, Conant viewed the American market as glutted, but his market was not one of goods but of capital. To him, high rates of return on invested capital were no longer available in the United States and he feared a crisis. The surplus of capital did eventually develop into a crisis but it did not occur until nearly a generation later.

The imperialists, then, spent little time discussing the moral and legal niceties of the question of annexation. To them the issue was economic and the future of the United States was at stake. This fact, in addition to the fact

37. See Commercial and Financial Chronicle LXVI (May 14, 1898) 922.

38. Ibid. LXVII (November 26, 1898) 1082.

39. Charles A. Conant, "The Economic Future of the Philippines" Atlantic Monthly LXXXIX (March, 1902) 371.

that both pro- and anti-imperialists shared the same economic assumptions, made the debate less than important. The two antagonists were discussing different topics. The same economic forces which had led the United States into the Philippines were now determining policy there. To speak of the events preceding the ratification of the Treaty of Paris as a debate in any meaningful sense of the word is not warranted by the facts. American foreign policy was predicated upon increasing commercial and economic expansion and annexation of the Philippine Islands was part of that expansion. The anti-imperialist would not disagree with the assumptions of this policy but only with the specific conclusion of annexation. Largely for this reason their cause was a lost one. Annexation was not an aberration but rather only one logical outgrowth of a policy of economic expansion, a policy which still deeply influences American foreign policy.

VI

CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to critically examine several important theories and assumptions of the traditional interpretation of the United States annexation of the Philippine Islands. In order to do this several areas were explored. The American economic investment in the Pacific area was delineated. More important for policy decisions was the potential that this area exhibited to those in power in the United States and this, through the writings and speeches of various American leaders, was clearly defined. The actual method of acquisition was examined to determine whether it was an accidental acquisition. Finally, the basic assumptions of the anti-imperialists were detailed to determine what differences existed between them and the imperialists.

The inquiry resulted in the disclosure of several failings in the traditional interpretation of the Philippine incident. These shortcomings of the traditional approach are important not only in relation to the specific question of American relations with the Philippines, but also are integral to a complete understanding of American foreign policy, past and present.

The theory that American interest in world affairs was awakened only with the Spanish-American war and the acquisition of Puerto Rico and the Philippines is not accurate. The United States was expansionist-minded from its birth. When continental boundaries were reached interest ran high among government officials, labor and business leaders, and farmers in markets for goods and capital abroad.

Examples were presented in Chapter II which document the American interest in foreign lands long before 1898. As these examples show, the interest in expansion was not confined to any one group, sect, party, or class, but was widespread throughout American society. Expansion in the minds of American leaders meant economic expansion, and statistics were used to detail the extent of American economic interest in foreign lands.

Although economic expansion was the primary purpose of business and government policy, the early chapters pointed out statements and actions of various officials that show that annexation of small tracts of foreign territory was not ruled out as one method of increasing economic penetration of a given area. In fact, many people favored the acquisition of naval depots and coaling stations as a means to accelerate American growth. Thus, America had an interest and a growing one in world affairs decades before the Spanish-American War.

The second major contention of the traditional interpretation, that United States annexation of the Philippines represented a turning point in American foreign policy, is logically linked to the first point. This thesis has shown that annexation of extra-continental territory was viewed as one method of expansion. This does not imply that the United States followed a European colonial policy, but American actions in Samoa, Hawaii, and Haiti illustrate that small insular possessions were viewed as valuable additions to the American system. American officials did not,

however, believe that acquisition of large foreign nations or territory was economically feasible, primarily because they thought that the cost of administering a colony would not be offset by its worth as a colony. Islands and harbors were seen as valuable, because the cost of governing and operating them was small and the economic advantages they could offer through expanded trade and investment in the surrounding area was great.

On these major points both imperialists and anti-imperialists were agreed. This theory that was dealt with in Chapter IV strikes at another traditional contention; namely that the imperialists and anti-imperialists had basic differences in their views of American foreign policy. The anti-imperialists in their public pronouncements and their activities were as expansionist as the imperialists. They differed only in the methods they were willing to employ to achieve expansion, and many of the anti-imperialists even favored retaining some naval depots and coaling stations as was shown in the fourth chapter. The difference between them, then, was primarily one of degree not of substance.

Based upon these facts this thesis contends that the "debate" which occurred over the fate of the Philippine Islands was not meaningful. The anti-imperialists had supported the basic American policy of expansion and in some cases had even helped to implement it. Thus their opposition had to deal with subjects other than expansion. This considerably weakened their position, for while anti-

imperialists were debating the racial qualities of the Filipino and the niceties of American constitutional law, the imperialists were discussing the economic benefits that would derive from American possession of the Philippines. The two factions were not even discussing the same issue and this is the major reason why the "debate" was less than a debate and why the anti-imperialists were doomed to failure.

In order to better understand American foreign policy as it existed in the nineteenth century and as it exists in the twentieth century, considerable revision of the traditional historical approach is needed. This thesis has dealt primarily with American actions toward the Philippine Islands during the 1890's and has shown that the traditional interpretation falls far short of an adequate explanation of that particular subject. More work must be done to determine if traditional historical interpretation has these serious shortcomings in other areas as well.

A P P E N D I X I

INCREASE IN PRODUCTION OF BASIC RAW MATERIALS

TABLE 1

Commodity	1860, millions	1900, millions	Increase %
Anthracite coal (short tons)	11.0	57.4	422
Bituminous coal (short tons)	9.0	212.3	2,260
Crude Petroleum (barrels)	0.5	45.8	9,060
Pig Iron (short tons)	0.9	15.4	1,600
Crude Steel (long tons)	0.01	10.2	10,190
Wheat (bushels)	173.1	559.3	223
Wheat exported (bushels)	4.0	102.0	2,700
Corn (bushels)	838.8	2,662.0	217
Cotton (bales)	3.8	10.1	170

Source: Louis M. Hacker, The World of Andrew Carnegie 1865-1901 (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1968) p. XXXI.

PHYSICAL OUTPUT

TABLE 2

Year	Total-steel ingots and Castings (Long tons)	Rolled Iron and Steel (1,000 Long tons)
1870	68,750	-
1875	389,799	-
1880	1,247,335	-
1885	1,711,920	3,101
1890	4,277,071	6,023
1895	6,114,834	6,190
1900	10,188,329	9,487

Source: Historical Statistics of the United States (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949).

VALUE OF OUTPUT - FINISHED COMMODITIES AND CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS AT PRODUCERS CURRENT PRICES (THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

TABLE 3

Year	Clothing and Personal Furnishings	Industrial Machinery and Equipment	Farm Equipment	Locomotive and Railroad cars
1869	$ 214,072	$ 112,685	$ 51,084	$ 41,645
1879	343,607	102,746	69,930	37,548
1889	525,921	192,229	88,479	90,814
1890	546,361	195,358	92,701	85,943
1891	570,082	195,477	79,091	91,466
1892	597,341	206,408	80,123	92,994
1893	533,079	195,374	76,907	107,820
1894	453,609	169,817	64,110	49,698
1895	501,417	206,170	65,337	56,836
1896	507,092	228,752	52,177	79,023
1897	555,880	204,955	64,906	72,042
1898	582,882	223,085	96,194	89,317
1899	719,035	302,428	115,756	121,414

Source: Historical Statistics of the United States op. cit. pp. 183-185.

DISTRIBUTION OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION AMONG THREE LEADING COUNTRIES (IN PERCENTAGES)

TABLE 4

Year	World	U. S.	U. K.	Germany	Rest
1870	100	23.3	31.8	13.2	31.7
1881-1885	100	28.6	26.6	13.9	30.9
1896-1900	100	30.1	19.5	16.6	33.8
1906-1910	100	35.3	14.7	15.9	34.1

Source: Louis H. Haaker, The World of Andrew Carnegie 1865-1901 op. cit. p. 55.

GROSS AND NET NATIONAL PRODUCT - AVERAGES PER YEAR BY DECADES (CURRENT PRICES IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

TABLE 5

Year	Flow of Goods to Consumers	Capital Formation		National Product	
		Gross	Net	Gross	Net
1869-1878	$ 5,706	$ 1,328	$ 784	$ 7,033	$ 6,489
1874-1883	7,230	1,694	1,082	8,924	8,312
1879-1888	8,632	2,056	1,309	10,688	9,941
1884-1893	9,410	2,472	1,543	11,883	10,953
1889-1898	10,021	2,709	1,650	12,730	11,671

Source: Historical Statistics of the United States op. cit. p. 15.

NATIONAL WEALTH (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

TABLE 6

Year	
1870	$ 26,460
1871	27,851
1872	29,306
1873	30,831
1874	32,420
1875	34,074
1876	35,794
1877	37,579
1878	39,430
1879	41,347
1880	43,300

Source: Historical Statistics of the United States op. cit. p. 9.

SHARE OF WAGES IN NET PRODUCT (VALUE ADDED)

TABLE 7

Year	%
1880	48.1
1890	45.0
1899	40.0
1909	39.3

Source: Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory 2 vols. (New York: The Merlin Press, 1968) I, p. 153.

WHOLESALE PRICE INDEXES (WARREN AND PEARSON),

1910 - 1914 = 100

TABLE 8

Year	General Price Index	All Commodities	30 Basic Commodities	11 Major Product Groups: Farm Products	11 Major Product Groups: Foods
	1	2	3	4	5
1900--	79	82	86	71	79
1899--	77	77	76	64	74
1898--	73	71	67	63	74
1897--	72	68	64	60	71
1896--	71	68	65	56	68
1895--	72	71	69	62	73
1894--	71	70	67	63	75
1893--	75	78	77	72	85
1892--	76	76	75	69	79
1891--	77	82	82	76	85
1890--	78	82	83	71	86
1889--	77	81	83	67	79
1888--	78	86	87	75	86
1887--	77	85	85	71	86
1886--	76	82	82	68	78
1885--	77	85	86	72	84
1884--	79	93	94	82	93
1883--	84	101	102	87	103
1882--	87	108	112	99	114
1881--	85	103	106	89	106
1880--	82	100	104	80	96
1879--	77	90	93	72	90
1878--	78	91	92	72	93
1877--	84	106	108	89	115
1876--	87	110	112	89	113
1875--	92	118	124	99	120
1874--	96	126	131	102	126
1873--	100	133	140	103	122
1872--	102	136	145	108	121
1871--	99	130	135	102	130

Source: Historical Statistics of the United States op. cit. p. 231.

WHOLESALE PRICE INDEXES (WARREN AND PEARSON),

1910 - 1914 = 100

TABLE 8 - Page 2

Year	11 Major Products (cont.)				
	Hides and Leather	Textile Products	Fuel and Lighting	Metals and Metal Products	Building Materials
	6	7	8	9	10
1900--	77	95	88	115	84
1899--	77	85	78	117	79
1898--	75	80	65	77	72
1897--	71	76	64	76	68
1896--	70	77	75	83	70
1895--	77	79	76	83	70
1894--	67	82	65	77	72
1893--	70	96	67	90	75
1892--	73	98	66	98	76
1891--	74	97	70	108	80
1890--	74	103	72	123	84
1889--	80	99	71	116	81
1888--	86	98	72	121	80
1887--	92	98	70	119	81
1886--	101	100	70	110	82
1885--	105	105	72	109	81
1884--	111	109	77	124	84
1883--	107	116	89	144	85
1882--	108	119	92	157	88
1881--	109	119	91	150	83
1880--	113	128	92	166	81
1879--	100	114	80	134	74
1878--	95	115	93	126	72
1877--	109	125	108	141	80
1876--	104	138	127	157	84
1875--	123	141	128	175	90
1874--	128	151	135	194	101
1873--	132	175	148	243	106
1872--	130	177	153	257	107
1871--	126	170	152	203	102

Source: Historical Statistics of the United States op. cit. p. 231.

WHOLESALE PRICE INDEXES (WARREN AND PEARSON),

1910 - 1914 = 100

TABLE 8 - Page 3

Year	11 Major Products (cont.)			
	Chemicals and Drugs	House Furnishings Goods	Spirits	Miscellaneous
	11	12	13	14
1900--	101	90	------	93
1899--	100	82	------	88
1898--	95	81	------	85
1897--	87	78	------	84
1896--	80	80	------	82
1895--	80	80	------	81
1894--	81	83	------	78
1893--	90	88	------	81
1892--	92	88	------	79
1891--	91	92	------	86
1890--	90	91	------	89
1889--	101	94	74	80
1888--	103	94	80	73
1887--	97	92	[illegible]	75
1886--	99	94	79	74
1885--	100	99	79	78
1884--	105	105	81	78
1883--	110	110	83	93
1882--	114	109	80	93
1881--	120	109	81	90
1880--	120	117	83	91
1879--	120	105	82	90
1878--	127	109	82	88
1877--	136	118	86	95
1876--	140	123	86	98
1875--	149	134	88	98
1874--	176	149	78	111
1873--	181	160	75	115
1872--	175	159	73	125
1871--	177	154	74	120

Source: Historical Statistics of the United States op. cit. p. 231.

COST OF LIVING INDEXES FEDERAL RESERVE (N. Y.)

HANSEN, BURGESS, DOUGLAS 1871 to 1900

TABLE 9

Year	Federal Reserve Bank of New York	1913=100 Hansen	Burgess	Douglas 1890-99=100
	36	37	38	39
1900	80	76	67.7	106
1899	77	72	66.1	102
1898	75	69	65.9	100
1897	75	67	63.9	99
1896	74	69	62.0	
1895	73	70	64.2	97
1894	73	71	65.3	97
1893	75	76	69.9	100
1892	77	75	67.5	102
1891	76	76	68.8	101
1890	78	77	67.8	
1889	78	81	67.8	
1888	78	79	67.5	
1887	76	78	65.4	
1886	76	77	65.3	
1885	75	77	64.6	
1884	77	84	66.4	
1883	81	88	71.7	
1882	86	90	76.1	
1881	83	89	73.8	
1880	80	86	71.3	
1879	79	78	68.8	
1878	80	86	69.6	
1877	80	93	77.2	
1876	81	101	78.0	
1875	86	106	81.2	
1874	88	107	83.1	
1873	88	106	84.7	
1872	90	109	86.3	
1871	89	112	86.9	

AVERAGE MARKET PRICES OF THREE CROPS, 1870 - 1897

TABLE 10

Years	Wheat (per bushel)	Corn (per bushel)	Cotton (per pound)
1870 - 1873	106.7	43.1	15.1
1874 - 1877	94.4	40.9	11.1
1878 - 1881	100.6	43.1	9.5
1882 - 1885	80.2	39.8	9.1
1886 - 1889	74.8	35.9	8.3
1890 - 1893	70.9	41.7	7.8
1894 - 1897	63.3	29.7	5.8

Source: John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt (University of Nebraska Press, 1961) p. 56.

DEBT APPRECIATION 1865 - 1890

TABLE 11

Average Five Year Debt Contracted in	Appreciation (in terms of dollars purchasing power)
1865 - 1869	35.2 %
1870 - 1874	19.7
1875 - 1879	4.5
1880 - 1884	11.7
1885 - 1890	11.6

Source: ibid. p. 90.
General Price Index and Wholesale Price Indexes

AGRICULTURE'S SHARE OF NATIONAL INCOME BY DECADES, 1859-1899, AND IN 1900 (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

TABLE 12

Census Year	National Income	Agriculture Income	
		Amount	Per Cent of National
1859	$ 4,098	$ 1,264	30.8
1869	6,288	1,517	24.1
1879	6,617	1,371	20.7
1889	9,578	1,517	15.8
1899	13,836	2,933	21.2
1900	14,550	3,034	20.9

Source: Fred A. Shannon, The Farmer's Last Frontier: Agriculture 1860 - 1897 (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1968) p. 354.

AGRICULTURE'S SHARE OF NATIONAL WEALTH, BY DECADES,

1860 - 1900 (IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

TABLE 13

Census Year	National Wealth	Agriculture	Wealth
		Amount	Per Cent of National
1860	$ 19.8	$ 7.9	39.9
1870	30.4	8.9	29.3
1880	49.9	12.2	24.4
1890	78.5	16.1	20.5
1900	126.7	20.4	16.1

Source: Ibid. p. 354.

AGRICULTURE'S SHARE OF TOTAL EXPORTS, BY YEARS 1860 - 1900

TABLE 14



Source: Fred A. Shannon, The Farmer's Last Frontier op. cit. p. 356.

FOREIGN TRADE - VALUE OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, BY ECONOMIC CLASSES: 1871 to 1900

TABLE 15

Year	EXPORTS OF U. S. MERCHANDISE			
	Total	Crude Materials	Crude Foodstuffs	Manufactured Foodstuffs
	56	57	58	59
1900	$1,370,764	$340,139	$225,906	$319,696
1899	1,203,931	285,887	232,903	304,755
1898	1,210,292	295,775	305,109	284,880
1897	1,032,008	304,291	181,421	235,052
1896	863,201	257,227	128,551	219,413
1895	793,393	269,294	99,145	219,090
1894	869,205	283,357	133,197	249,846
1893	831,031	251,669	153,278	247,975
1892	1,015,732	319,761	262,456	250,439
1891	872,270	351,355	106,156	226,448
1890	845,294	309,482	132,073	224,757
1889	730,282	291,034	98,847	174,504
1888	603,862	273,553	86,368	169,872
1887	703,023	252,634	125,454	175,785
1886	665,965	256,811	100,300	162,689
1885	726,683	251,299	123,327	201,801
1884	724,965	243,892	130,396	194,703
1883	804,223	291,190	163,196	186,393
1882	733,240	238,228	155,009	176,003
1881	883,926	280,618	241,642	226,387
1880	823,946	242,666	266,109	193,353
1879	698,341	202,160	188,527	174,231
1878	680,709	216,496	154,810	170,277
1877	589,670	204,745	90,637	150,101
1876	525,582	203,875	94,182	121,616
1875	499,284	207,952	79,078	110,293
1874	569,433	229,101	119,143	114,039
1873	505,043	233,287	69,853	100,858
1872	428,487	198,379	59,357	84,358
1871	428,399	223,526	48,601	66,863

Source: Historical Statistics of the United States op. cit. p. 246.

FOREIGN TRADE - VALUE OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, BY ECONOMIC CLASSES: 1871 to 1900

TABLE 15 - Page 2

Year	EXPORTS OF U.S. MERCHANDISE			
	Semi-Manufactures	Finished Manufactures	Total	Crude Materials
	60	61	62	63
1900	$153,276	$231,747	$849,941	$281,649
1899	117,730	262,657	697,148	213,297
1898	101,991	222,537	616,050	193,660
1897	98,284	212,959	764,730	200,771
1896	76,220	181,789	779,725	203,205
1895	62,254	143,610	731,970	187,537
1894	67,145	135,659	654,995	134,643
1893	49,071	129,938	866,401	216,624
1892	50,284	132,792	827,401	194,776
1891	47,961	140,350	844,916	192,531
1890	46,455	132,527	789,310	179,889
1889	42,713	123,184	745,132	172,184
1888	40,176	113,893	723,957	163,998
1887	36,732	112,418	692,320	151,363
1886	34,038	111,627	635,436	144,745
1885	39,437	110,819	577,527	120,446
1884	37,801	118,173	667,698	131,439
1883	37,996	122,448	723,181	146,261
1882	37,165	124,835	724,640	142,913
1881	32,821	102,458	642,665	125,281
1880	29,044	92,774	667,955	142,166
1879	30,169	103,254	445,778	80,996
1878	20,685	110,441	437,052	79,331
1877	31,514	12,673	451,323	76,423
1876	31,459	74,451	460,741	77,848
1875	27,458	74,503	533,005	88,538
1874	26,026	81,125	567,406	89,178
1873	24,977	76,059	642,136	107,959
1872	21,087	65,307	626,595	102,568
1871	13,858	75,551	520,224	77,668

Source: Historical Statistics of the United States op. cit. p. 296.

FOREIGN TRADE - VALUE OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, BY ECONOMIC CLASSES: 1871 to 1900

TABLE 15- Page 3

Year	EXPORTS OF U. S. MERCHANDISE			
	Crude Foodstuffs	Manufactured Foodstuffs	Semi-Manufactures	Finished Manufactures
	64	65	66	67
1900	$ 97,916	$133,028	$134,222	$203,126
1899	98,933	123,448	91,954	169,516
1898	103,985	86,091	79,289	153,025
1897	128,380	129,245	188,490	217,844
1896	130,002	118,806	101,071	226,640
1895	141,377	107,026	96,487	199,543
1894	133,310	155,349	82,895	148,798
1893	131,664	153,739	135,609	228,765
1892	175,559	139,795	112,729	204,544
1891	150,639	147,722	136,446	217,578
1890	128,480	133,332	116,924	230,686
1889	123,131	122,254	115,080	212,483
1888	116,087	111,048	121,605	211,219
1887	106,362	111,715	120,080	202,800
1886	91,589	112,771	91,539	194,792
1885	93,346	102,938	78,255	182,543
1884	103,011	130,778	94,698	207.771
1883	93,091	142,128	98,755	242,946
1882	104,948	139,438	98,624	238,717
1881	102,487	123,380	87,791	203,726
1880	100,297	118,125	110,780	196,587
1879	82,284	102,660	49,692	130,146
1878	84,400	102,035	46,501	124,765
1877	86,134	114,579	48,532	125,655
1876	94,187	91,927	51,087	145,692
1875	90,019	113,146	63,412	177,891
1874	94,264	119,618	71,913	192,432
1873	83,364	122,004	96,642	232,108
1872	76,745	121,747	87,607	237,929
1871	63,618	103,226	72,228	203,483

Source: Historical Statistics of the United States op. cit. p. 246.

FOREIGN TRADE - VALUE OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY DESTINATION AND ORIGIN: 1850 to 1900
(In Thousands of Dollars)

TABLE 16

Year	Exports including reexports				
	Total	To North America		To South America	To Europe
		Northern	Southern		
	87	88	89	90	91
1900---	1,394,483	97,517	90,078	38,946	1,040,168
1899---	1,227,023	89,765	68,167	35,660	936,602
1898---	1,231,482	85,095	54,533	33,822	973,806
1897---	1,050,994	66,196	58,762	33,769	813,386
1896---	882,607	61,231	55,536	36,298	673,040
1895---	807,538	54,152	54,424	33,526	627,928
1894---	892,141	58,470	61,223	33,212	700,871
1893---	847,665	48,826	70,963	32,639	661,977
1892---	1,030,278	45,260	60,306	33,148	850,623
1891---	884,481	39,834	56,705	33,708	704,798
1890---	857,829	41,967	52,133	38,753	683,736
1889---	742,401	42,528	47,023	35,021	578,903
1888---	695,955	37,637	42,359	29,579	549,093
1887---	716,183	36,475	36,951	30,744	575,300
1886---	679,525	35,184	36,797	26,132	541,373
1885---	742,190	40,539	36,225	27,735	599,241
1884---	740,514	46,861	45,356	31,227	583,795
1883---	823,839	47,032	52,396	29,571	659,867
1882---	750,542	38,905	46,888	27,225	600,100
1876-80---	676,761	33,714	36,303	22,087	562,202
1871-75---	501,841	32,034	36,188	20,235	402,268
1870---	392,772	21,703	31,100	15,188	313,315
1865---	166,029	16,618	34,003	12,026	95,744
1860---	333,576	22,883	29,273	15,706	249,425
1850---	144,376	9,519	14,284	7,730	108,638

Source: Ibid. pp. 250-51

FOREIGN TRADE - VALUE OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY DESTINATION AND ORIGIN: 1850 to 1900
(In Thousands of Dollars)

TABLE 16. Page 2

Year	exports including reexports			
	To Asia	To Oceania	To Africa	Total
	92	93	94	95
1900---	67,554	40,751	19,470	849,941
1899---	48,764	29,471	18,594	697,148
1898---	44,836	21,875	17,516	616,050
1897---	39,370	22,558	16,953	764,730
1896---	25,792	17,035	13,871	779,725
1895---	18,134	12,997	6,378	731,970
1894---	21,668	11,772	4,924	654,995
1893---	17,017	11,046	5,196	866,401
1892---	20,368	15,512	5,061	827,402
1891---	26,170	18,497	4,758	844,916
1890---	20,279	16,346	4,614	789,310
1889---	19,371	16,060	3,497	745,132
1888---	19,584	14,580	3,123	723,957
1887---	20,106	13,720	2,877	692,320
1886---	22,594	14,644	2,801	635,436
1885---	21,444	13,818	3,187	577,527
1884---	17,371	13,347	2,555	667,698
1883---	16,785	14,011	4,177	723,181
1882---	18,774	12,875	5,775	724,640
1876-80---	11,236	7,437	3,782	492,570
1871-75---	5,029	3,969	2,117	577,873
1870---	5,773	3,873	1,820	435,958
1865---	2,350	4,016	1,273	238,746
1860---	8,100	4,962	3,227	353,616
1850---	3,028	190	987	173,509

Source: Ibid. pp. 250-251

FOREIGN TRADE - VALUE OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY DESTINATION AND ORIGIN: 1850 to 1900
(In Thousands of Dollars)

TABLE 16- Page 3

Year	GENERAL IMPORTS			
	From North America		To South America	To Europe
	Northern	Southern		
	96	97	98	99
1900--	39,999	90,037	93,667	440,567
1899--	31,690	80,460	86,588	353,885
1898--	32,404	58,973	92,090	305,934
1897--	40,863	65,061	107,389	430,192
1896--	41,376	85,501	108,828	418,639
1895--	37,191	96,724	112,167	383,646
1894--	31,444	135,519	100,147	295,078
1893--	38,254	145,479	102,208	458,450
1892--	35,335	138,719	150,728	391,628
1891--	39,450	123,776	118,737	459,305
1890--	39,434	108,934	90,006	449,987
1889--	43,039	107,826	92,135	403,421
1888--	43,116	96,703	84,356	407,052
1887--	38,087	92,704	79,764	390,728
1886--	37,505	87,927	65,875	357,538
1885--	36,979	80,471	65,390	318,723
1884--	39,016	97,305	75,754	370,957
1883--	44,758	102,139	76,737	409,713
1882--	51,132	105,491	81,292	397,581
1876-80--	27,600	86,646	68,185	247,520
1871-75--	33,840	96,124	63,357	321,067
1870--	36,265	74,435	42,964	240,187
1865--	35,007	46,663	23,221	115,002
1860--	23,730	44,180	34,929	216,661
1850--	5,180	16,116	16,038	123,115

Source: Ibid, pp. 250-251

FOREIGN TRADE - VALUE OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY DESTINATION AND ORIGIN: 1850 to 1909
(In Thousands of Dollars)

TABLE 16 - Page 4

Year	GENERAL IMPORTS		
	To Asia	To Oceania	To Africa
	100	101	102
1900--	145,814	28,640	11,218
1899--	111,501	22,588	10,436
1898--	96,425	23,029	7,194
1897--	91,670	20,017	9,530
1896--	94,575	19,632	11,173
1895--	83,813	12,720	5,709
1894--	74,878	14,450	3,479
1893--	99,316	16,838	5,857
1892--	88,850	16,824	5,318
1891--	78,987	20,454	4,207
1890--	80,863	16,764	3,321
1889--	75,846	19,253	3,610
1888--	73,213	16,205	3,312
1887--	72,875	14,604	3,557
1886--	69,398	13,964	3,228
1885--	60,854	12,069	3,131
1884--	67,844	12,708	4,114
1883--	72,752	12,550	4,531
1882--	72,790	11,507	4,846
1876-80--	55,635	4,619	2,365
1871-75--	55,574	3,955	3,736
1870--	37,773	1,612	2,722
1865--	14,449	1,124	3,279
1860--	29,239	1,170	3,706
1850--	12,434	9	618

Source: Ibid. pp. 250-251

PRODUCTION, VALUE, AND EXPORTS OF COTTON IN THE UNITED STATES, 1871-1898

TABLE 17

Year	Production (bales)	Value (dollars)	Domestic exports, fiscal years beginning July 1 (bales of 500 pounds)
1871	2,974,351	242,672,804	1,867,074
1872	3,930,508	280,552,629	2,400,127
1873	4,170,388	289,053,486	2,717,204
1874	3,832,991	228,113,080	2,520,837
1875	4,632,313	233,190,945	2,982,801
1876	4,474,069	211,655,041	2,890,738
1877	4,773,865	235,721,194	3,215,067
1878	5,074,155	193,467,706	3,256,745
1879	5,761,252	242,140,987	3,604,122
1880	6,605,750	280,266,242	4,381,857
1881	5,456,048	294,135,547	3,479,951
1882	6,949,756	309,696,500	4,576,150
1883	5,713,200	250,594,750	3,725,145
1884	5,706,165	253,993,385	3,783,318
1885	6,575,691	269,989,812	4,116,074
1886	6,505,087	309,381,938	4,338,914
1887	7,046,833	337,972,453	4,528,241
1888	6,938,290	354,454,340	4,769,633
1889	7,311,322	402,951,814	4,943,599
1890	8,652,597	369,568,858	5,814,717
1891	9,035,379	326,513,298	5,870,439
1892	6,700,365	262,252,286	4,424,230
1893	7,549,817	274,479,637	5,366,564
1894	9,901,251	287,120,818	7,034,866
1895	7,161,094	260,338,096	4,670,452
1896	8,532,705	291,811,564	6,207,509
1897	10,897,857	319,491,412	7,700,528
1898	11,189,205	305,467,041	7,546,820

Source: Ibid.

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