REFRAMING THE ENGLISH CONQUEST OF JAMAICA IN THE ATLANTIC CONTEXT

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REFRAMING THE ENGLISH CONQUEST OF JAMAICA
IN THE ATLANTIC CONTEXT

BY

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Abstract

The following thesis confronts pre-existing histories of the English conquest of Jamaica which primarily write about it within either the Caribbean context or the more narrow European context. These prior histories tend to misinterpret the central causes of why Spain was unable to successfully dislodge the English between 1655 to 1660. Previous histories typically cite it as evidence for a broader Spanish or Habsburg decline. By reframing this conquest within a broader Atlantic context, which takes into account both the Caribbean and European perspectives, the reader will come to see why Jamaica was lost by the Spanish to the English. This was primarily because Iberian forces were heavily involved in European conflicts and thus unable to traverse the Atlantic. Meanwhile, Spanish Caribbean forces were instructed to, and primarily focused on, the defense of their ports and territories to ensure that the wealth of the ‘Indies’ made it safely to Spain proper. The thesis relies on primary source documents from both Spanish and English authors to show what the priorities of the Spanish were at the time and in doing so show that Jamaica was not one of those priorities.
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Introduction: Paradise Lost?

Without question, 1655 and the English seizure of Jamaica marked a turning point in the history of the Atlantic world. To many, this event definitively commenced the decline of Spain as a world power and the rise of the English in their place. This 'conquest' of Jamaica is said to be the first English capture of American territory previously held by another European power.¹ As such, it is lauded prominently as a milestone in the development of the 'first' British Empire. To many historians, it represents the rise of this empire at the explicit expense of the Spanish. While it can be tempting to be swept up in the drama of such a narrative, it may be largely untrue. While it was the first capture of Spanish land by the English using force, it was far from being their first settlement in the Americas; Jamestown and Plymouth in North America, along with 8 islands in the Caribbean were permanently settled by the English before the conquest of Jamaica. Moreover, the Western Design which led to an English Jamaica took place within the chaos of the civil war era in England. In addition, the loss of Jamaica by the Spanish did not signify an empire in decline. The Spanish Empire was dynamic, vibrant, and even resurgent in the following century. To fully grasp how invalid such histories are, we must come to understand this conquest within the context of the Atlantic world in the middle of the 17th century. This requires an understanding of Habsburg notions of monarchy, actual English strength, and the effects of ongoing conflicts in

Western Europe on the Caribbean.

First, it must be clearly understood that the Habsburg Monarchy was composite in nature. This meant that the King of “Spain” ruled over a variety of dominions, each with their own customs, government, and taxes. King Philip IV Habsburg had an exceptionally long title in which he was king of Castile, Aragon, the Two Sicilies, and the Indies, as well as a prince, count, or duke of a variety of other locations across Flanders, Burgundy, and Italy. Most importantly, the kings of “Spain” had been kings of Portugal since the time of Philip IV’s grandfather, Philip II. However, starting in 1640, the Portuguese nobility revolted against the Habsburgs in favor of the native Duke of Braganza. This revolt was extremely dear to Philip IV’s heart because the central goal of a Habsburg Monarch was ensuring the inheritance remained intact for the succeeding heir. Having already lost the northern part of the Spanish Netherlands, the United Provinces, Philip IV adamantly refused to see any further damage to the reputación of the Habsburgs. In the Atlantic context, the situation was somewhat different, as Philip’s title called him ‘King of the Indies’ rather than King, Prince, Duke, or Count of Jamaica, or any other specific territory or island. It meant that, in a way not unlike the loss of the United Provinces, the loss of a portion rather than the whole could be rationalized and accepted.

In a similar manner, England was grappling with the turmoil caused in part by the nature of composite monarchy. Starting in the second quarter of the

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2 Silvia Z. Mitchell, Queen, Mother, and Stateswoman: Mariana of Austria and the Government of Spain, Penn State University Press, 2019, 86.
seventeenth century England had found itself embroiled in the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, England, Scotland, and Ireland. Charles I had been the composite monarch of all three but his personal rule of 11 years had led to rebellion and then civil war. The increasing reliance on military force to resolve political disputes had found power concentrated in the hands of Oliver Cromwell by 1655. Cromwell desired a transition to a civilian government as well as the spread and triumph of the Protestant cause. His ‘Western Design’ to capture a piece of the Spanish Empire was a key step in achieving both those goals. Its subsequent failure, despite the acquisition of Jamaica, meant that new methods needed to be employed to ensure his political aims. What followed in the wake of the ‘Western Design’ was the continuation of the civil war albeit on the continent rather than in the British Isles. Despite the conflict’s relocation, it was still a disruption for England which threatened the project of pacifying and settling Jamaica, and eventually the Three Kingdoms themselves.

This continuation of the civil war on the European continent was part of the larger Franco-Spanish War, itself an offshoot of the larger Thirty Years War and smaller War of the Mantuan Succession. The casus belli of this conflict is largely unimportant as the war is really the start of the French expansionism which culminated during the long reign of Louis XIV. As such, there were open fronts in Flanders, Italy, and Catalonia. Spain also had to contend with the Portuguese rebellion which annually saw campaigns around where Portugal

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borders Galicia and Extremadura. Meanwhile, the Portuguese were engaged in an ongoing conflict with the Dutch which mostly took place in each belligerent’s respective colonial possessions. These conflicts were expressed in the larger Atlantic context in the form of privateering. In an effort to cut the costs of maintaining several navies deployed across the globe, early modern states granted ‘commissions’ to private men-of-war to harass and capture enemy merchant ships. The state received a portion of the plunder as well as the knowledge that their enemy’s wealth or supplies were not reaching them. The privateer, of course, enjoyed the plunder and perhaps even the satisfaction of serving their country or king. Less scrupulous English privateers could choose between English or French commissions in the Caribbean or even Portuguese commissions depending on whomever Spain happened to be at war within the continent. This created a highly suspicious atmosphere in the Caribbean which was only heightened by the long-standing idea of “No peace beyond the line” which effectively meant that a permanent state of war existed in the Americas.  

Naturally, Spanish-American officials had to be vigilant when foreign ships sailed into their ports. Despite whatever peace might exist in Europe, those ships might still intend harm.

As we have already seen then, Spanish power and legal claim to land in the Americas were far from inviolable by 1655. In addition to an English presence in the Americas and Caribbean, were French, Dutch, Swedish, Danish, and

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Portuguese colonies. Spain maintained her claim to a New World monopoly, but the Reformation, Dutch Revolt, Thirty Years War, and its successor wars, had made enforcement of those claims increasingly difficult. Unsurprisingly, most of the aforementioned powers first established permanent colonies towards the start of the 17th century when Spanish forces were heavily concentrated on the European Continent. The Dutch Revolt was acutely damaging to Spain and exacerbated the long-lasting Thirty Years War during which a truce between Spain and the United Provinces expired. To forget that the non-Spanish European colonization of the Americas was closely linked to the wars and crises of Europe is to forget half of the history. The English seizure of Jamaica, despite occurring after the cessation of pan-European conflict in 1648, still took place at a time in which Spain was engaged in conflict across 4 European fronts.

Therefore the conflicts within Europe at this time heavily shaped Spanish policies. Worsening the problem was the fact that they came at a time when Habsburg Spanish revenues began to decline. The beginning of the 17th century had wreaked havoc on Spain and her colonial possessions, including those in Europe. As previously mentioned the most important by 1655 was the rebellion in Portugal. Overseeing the dissolution of the Iberian Union undeniably marked his reign as a failure. Thus, by the time of the English conquest of Jamaica, the Spanish could ill-afford further catastrophes. Another protracted European war was far too costly, and the disruption of the galeones and flotas’ journeys back to

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Spain from America were equally undesirable.

Consequently, we must understand that the Spanish were seeking peace with England to ensure that American wealth crossed the Atlantic. Spanish foreign policy at this moment had two primary objectives: secure an unbroken Habsburg inheritance in Europe, and utilize the wealth of the Indies to fund the campaigns which the former required. The first objective necessarily meant peace with expansionist France and squashing the Portuguese rebellion. Meanwhile the English sought to establish more colonies in the Americas, and after first failing to capture Hispaniola, they settled on Jamaica and built it upon foundations as shaky as the sands of Port Royal. The narrative of the Spanish loss of Jamaica hastening their irreversible decline at the hands of a surging England must be reconciled with these facts. By the time the Godolphin Treaty was signed in 1670, the Spanish had ensured peace on the English front and promoted the further pacification of the Caribbean. Likewise, the English had secured free trade with the Spanish in America, and an internationally recognized Caribbean island by treaty. We must not let this honorable outcome distract from the fact that there was a 5-year long struggle for control of Jamaica between the Spanish and English on the island.

The ultimate failure of the group that retreated into the Blue Mountains in May 1655 to recapture Jamaica is the primary focus of what follows. The goal is to answer the oft-asked question of why the Spanish were unable to reconquer Jamaica. As mentioned, past explanations have centered on the weakness and
decline of ‘Spain’ or the rise of England as the most important factor. However, by analyzing Jamaica within the Atlantic context, it becomes clear that the inability to reconquer Jamaica was not inevitable but part of two conscious decisions and one fatal assumption. First, Iberian-Spain chose not to dispatch a relief fleet nor alter the route of the silver fleets to secure the island as a consequence of European warfare. Second, Spanish American officials chose to prioritize the defense of their dominions over the reconquest of Jamaica. In addition, some officials even chose to engage in illicit trade with the English around Jamaica. These decisions ensured that an external force did not play a decisive role in recapturing Jamaica.

Finally, the Spanish Resistance assumed that the Black inhabitants of the island were as loyal to King Philip as they were, when in fact the priorities of that group lay elsewhere. So when the initial resistance began, it began with a retreat into areas best known to the formerly enslaved Blacks or the descendants of the formerly enslaved Blacks. These groups, supplemented by slaves that ran away during the English invasion, formed what can be deemed the ‘Black Resistance.’ It must be said that the Black Resistance was separate from and independent of, the Spanish Resistance. The Spaniards on the island failed to meaningfully incorporate the Black Resistance into their ranks. This proved to be the fatal error which doomed their cause. Again, the Spanish Jamaicans chose to base their resistance in the areas best known to the Black Resistance. For 4 years then, the Spanish Resistance relied on the knowledge, expertise, and strength of this
community to make such resistance viable. Lulled into thinking the cooperation between the Spanish Jamaicans and Black Jamaicans was the obedience of the latter to the former, the Spanish were shocked when the Black Resistance was at the head of the final English push to evict them.

_Jamaica up to 1655_

Before the end of Spanish control of Jamaica can be understood, its time as a Habsburg possession must be explained. Jamaica's European experience dates back to Columbus' second voyage in 1494 and was linked with Columbus' descendants to the present through its creation as a Marquisate of that family. The first Marquis of Jamaica was Columbus' grandson, Luis Colón and the final marquis to hold real power on the island was Don Pedro Nuño Colón de Portugal, who went on to serve as Viceroy of New Spain and could only lament the loss of his "ancestral" lands.\(^7\) It was the personal dominion of the Columbus family and while a component of the Habsburg Monarchy, it was not subject to its direct oversight. The administration of Jamaica as a largely autonomous marquisate helps to explain the neglected state of the island when the English conquered it, and which it remained in throughout the resistance to that conquest.

The Marquisate of Jamaica was, therefore, cut-off from direct _control_ of the Habsburgs from 1557 on, and for a quarter-century prior the arrival of Penn

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and Venables, it had been cut-off from direct contact with the Crown. The administrative situation of Jamaica coupled with Crown regulations regarding the flow of commerce surrounding the island created the political and economic conditions on the island. Compounding the island’s isolation was the Crown’s strict shipping regulations for the annual galeones and flotas. Those shipping regulations centered on the need to effectively protect Spanish vessels during the trans-Atlantic journey.

There had been plans for an Armada de Barlovento permanently stationed in the West Indies tasked with protecting Spanish merchants. However, the situation in Europe effectively tied the Crown’s hands and prevented serious attempts at such a fleet until the 1660s. The desire to protect the merchant ships remained though, and developed into the system of galeones and flotas. The galeones delivered supplies to the Province of Tierra Firme and the flotas conducted affairs with the Province of New Spain. Both fleets did in fact pass by Jamaica: the galeones on their way to Cartagena, and the flotas on their way to Veracruz. Before reaching those ports the ships conducted trade with important centers in the Caribbean such as Santo Domingo. Once anchored at their respective ports-of-call, they continued to sell goods to the residents of those provinces while loading up those provinces’ treasures, mostly in the form of silver. What must be recognized is that when the galeones and flotas passed by Jamaica, they were not laden with bullion; this fact is often forgotten when

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scholars exaggerate the threat created by the English in Jamaica.

In any case, the two fleets would ideally rendezvous in la Habana, whereupon they make their return as one fleet to Sevilla. The carefully proscribed route and schedule effectively denied Jamaica any participation in the Spanish Atlantic economy. The residents of the island could not afford the heavily taxed items aboard the fleets, and the ships too often appeared at times where the residents’ goods either weren’t ready or had spoiled. The result, as Padrón puts it, was that, "no one dared to despatch a ship to Jamaica for the purposes of trade." This predicament required the residents of Jamaica to find alternative methods to meet their needs.

One way of meeting those needs was through illicit trading with foreign smugglers. The composite nature of the Habsburg monarchy meant that taxation was asymmetrically applied in early modern Spain, with Castilleshouldering most of that burden. This tax burden was transferred to the Indies through export and import duties. A tax was levied on goods leaving Seville, and a second on goods entering an American port. The result was a severe markup on essentially all goods. Jamaicans were unable and unwilling to pay those prices. Although tax breaks were granted by the Crown, the population still did not have access to those goods for the reasons mentioned above. This pushed the Jamaicans into the arms of smugglers who could provide necessary supplies at cheaper prices. The governors of Jamaica often tacitly allowed the trade because

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they received the lowest salary of all officials in the Antilles. This meant the governors could supplement their meager salary with bribes, or direct involvement in the trade. While these smugglers played a vital role in sustaining the population of an island like Jamaica, they were called *rescatadores*, or pirates by the Crown. There was a good reason for this. The smugglers who plied the Caribbean were often the same vessels and crews who had forcibly stolen the goods in the first place.

Thus, Spanish Jamaica was only ever theoretically Spanish. To better reflect this material truth, Jamaica should be understood as an island that was predominantly settled by Spaniards who recognized the authority of the King. However, that kingly authority had been delegated to the Marquis of Jamaica, and was rarely submitted to by those inhabitants. The ties that bound Jamaica to Spain existed on paper and could be broken as easily as that paper which created the Marquisate.

Jamaica was a thinly populated, forgotten frontier of an island. An island on the margins of the periphery. Lack of direct control from the Crown resulted in a severely undefended island; requests to fortify the island had to go through the Marquis rather than the King. There was knowledge of possible attacks forthcoming at Hispaniola and Jamaica for over a decade before the Western Design. In a letter from 1644, King Philip made it known that Jamaica is at great risk of attack. To defend the island, and the whole of the Indies he asked the

\[10 \text{ Ibid, 70.} \]
\[11 \text{ Kathleen Deagan, “The Archaeology of the Spanish Contact Period in the Caribbean,” Journal of World Prehistory 2, no. 2 (1988): 198.} \]
vicerey to, “assist and aid the fortresses and ports of the Windward Islands with the gunpowder munitions and other necessary things for its defense and preservation, because of the impossibility that there is of doing it from these Kingdoms with respect to how much they consume themselves in the small armies and present wars.” When in 1655 there was another imminent threat, the situation in Europe had not improved at all. This meant that essentially the same wars which prevented Spain from sending direct military assistance to the Americas in 1644 prevented military assistance in 1655. The ongoing war with France, the continued rebellion in Portugal, and the additional outbreak of war with England in Europe all hindered whatever desire there may have been to set out from Spain to recapture Jamaica, the final possession of the Columbian Dynasty.

Therefore, in 1670 when the Spanish officially recognized English possession of the island, they were giving up an island that they never fully possessed and which brought them no direct income. Past histories too often rely on English accounts which amplify the importance and value of Spanish Jamaica so as to amplify the importance and value of its conquest.

**Historiography**

A major obstacle to overcoming such an understanding is the prior scholarship of the 'English conquest' or 'Spanish loss' of Jamaica. Those descriptions alone necessarily assume the power of the former or the weakness of

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the latter. Both suffer from a teleological approach in which a profitable English Jamaica is assumed and the reduction of Spain to the Iberian peninsula, is taken for granted. How could Spain permit such an egregious loss of such rich territory? Would they not have dispatched all available resources to immediately secure the island? These answers to these questions depend on whether the historian places this event within either the American or Jamaican contexts. In the former context, scholarship tends to favor an explanation wherein England conquers Spanish Jamaica, paving the route for the ‘first’ British Empire. In the latter context, Spain is an empire in decline under the leadership of the penultimate Habsburg monarch. By favoring one context over the other rather than placing them in an Atlantic context, Jamaica represents either the unstoppable rise of England or an inexcusable breakdown of imperial authority. It obfuscates the material conditions which existed on the island, as well as overstating the actual importance of the island with the larger scheme of Habsburg Monarchy and Empire. However, this false dichotomy of contexts has persisted because historians have only recently pursued Atlantic history as a methodology, despite the immediate firsthand accounts of the actual events written by firmly Atlantic characters.

The inescapable fact is that within 5 years of the English arrival in Jamaica, the home government had seen the Restoration of Charles II. The new regime had to square the Protectorate’s ill-gotten gains and looked suspiciously on ‘popery’ and puritanism alike. Oddly enough they even feared that the last
bastion of English Puritanism in America, Massachusetts Bay, would declare itself in favor of the King of Spain, despite the vast ideological gulf between them. Naturally then, the explanations offered from that early point reduced the Spanish presence on the island as a foreign other with a sort of ‘proto-orientalist' gaze. Spanish dominion over the island had to exemplify all they found abhorrent in Catholicism so as to further justify Jamaica’s acquisition. Or its acquisition needed to align with the triumph of the unique Anglican Protestant Church. It is with this understanding which I will analyze the earliest histories of Jamaica and how the English came to possess the island.

Highlighting that perspective are some of the earliest accounts created to explain the English conquest of the island. They paint the picture of an encounter with a completely alien civilization, almost like the interactions between Spaniards and Native Americans a century prior. Underscoring the ‘otherness’ of Spanish Jamaica is an account in which the Western Design comes to the shores of Jamaica to find it governed by a woman who tried to defend the island through seduction and bribery. In creating an account like this, the story of Jamaica becomes divorced from the disaster which preceded it in Hispaniola and distanced further still from the hard-fought guerilla campaign which followed it. Dangerous, it is upon this foundation that all other scholarship was based. The emasculation of the Spanish government in Jamaica in this literal sense was

never fully refuted by later scholars who, finding no records of a female Spanish governor, perpetuated her myth in the character of the actual officials on the island in 1655. The female governor became the weakness of Spanish military resistance in the face of overwhelmingly strong Englishmen.

Any earnest historiography of Jamaican history, and especially the beginnings of the English occupation of that island, must begin with Edward Long’s *The History of Jamaica*. Written in 1774, Long provides one of the most comprehensive accounts of the island up to that point in time. It is also deeply embedded within notions of English superiority engaging with an inferior Spanish counterpart. Therefore Long’s narrative is firmly within the Jamaican context, and he often gives precedence to English decisions and actions. Long’s account is slightly more complex though as he acknowledges that there were moments when the English were barely maintaining the island. Notable too, is that Long includes an account of the disastrous attempt to take Hispaniola. However, he puts much of the blame at the feet of the commissioners of the expedition, again making the English the undisputed center of events. The Commissioners were some of the most severe puritans in the expedition, and from his late 18th-century perspective, they were prime targets for a scathing critique. Long’s account is so filled with critiques of the orders of the commissioners that it’s not until eight pages into his recounting of the Hispaniolan campaign that he actually mentions the Spanish repelling the
English on the island.\textsuperscript{15}

Once the English moved onto Jamaica, Long appears to provide a balanced account of the events as they unfolded in 1655. He includes explicit explanations of the poor situation of the English troops on the island, but he refuses to recognize any role which the Spanish played in bringing their misery about. According to Long, there was a conspiracy amongst some of the officers who sought to force Cromwell to call for their return to England or redeployment in Flanders. As evidence Long cites the poor supplies which the army endured in the first two years in Jamaica.\textsuperscript{16} Rather than a conspiracy, this was probably more indicative of embezzlement on the part of the victualers. It was quite common at that time for them to augment their salary by inflating their purchases to match the money which they had received.

As the narrative continues into the 5-year guerilla campaign, Long wholeheartedly disavows the notion that the Spanish were interested in, or actually trying to bring about the restitution of the island. When recounting the battles of Las Chorreras and Rio Nuevo, Long attributes the English victory to their “gallantry” and the Spanish defeat was chalked up to their “cowardice.”\textsuperscript{17} Long is also deeply critical of Christobal Arnaldo Isassi, whom he portrays as a self-interested villain only seeking his own survival and vainglory. He writes that

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, 242.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, 267, 274-275.
Don Christobal was the first to retreat, was convinced of his own heroism, and eager to remove himself to Cuba. These accusations don’t stand up to the evidence which exists in Spanish archives which show that Isassi had been in Jamaica for the duration of the 1655-1660 resistance, had refused to leave the island, and was engaged in proposing a return to the island after he was forced to leave. In Long’s defense, he did not have the archival resources at his disposal which a modern historian does. Moreover, Long was an 18th Century Englishman writing during the zenith of the ‘First British Empire,’ it was incredibly difficult to avoid narratives which highlighted the triumph of Englishmen when he could point to a century of such triumphs. Unsurprisingly, his work was incredibly influential in perpetuating the myth of the Jamaican conquest which still persists in some circles.

Another history from roughly a century later and within the Caribbean context claims that Spanish wealth and decadence so softened them that they were neither productive nor proactive. This perspective comes from “Jamaica: its History, Constitution, and Topographical Description” by John Jarrett Wood written in 1884. Wood appears to have been an educator in Jamaica and wrote the book for educational purposes. When writing on the English conquest of Jamaica, Wood spends little time on the failure of the Hispaniola expedition (all of one sentence). Of pre-conquest Jamaica, he writes, “All accounts, however, agree in representing the Hidalgos of Jamaica as leading a life of slothful luxuriousness.”

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Most later historians disagree with this assessment of the island and the most recent scholarship greatly diminishes the validity of that statement. His account of the conquest does acknowledge the difficulty in fully removing the Spanish from the island as well as the difficulty in persuading English soldiers to actually settle the island. On the whole though, Wood presents a highly biased account of the English conquest.

It must be noted though, that Wood appears to have been writing with the purpose of educating the young minds of late 19th century Jamaica. The audience of his piece is particularly relevant when analyzing passages such as this,

Spain in 1658 vainly endeavoured to recover Jamaica...the rapid acquirement of wealth without the aid of industry, and almost solely by means of violence and craft, is as fatal to the strength and happiness of a nation as it is to that of an individual, and the Spanish government, after several unsuccessful efforts, abandoned all further prospects of repossessing themselves of the island.\(^{20}\)

This passage seems to be more directed at teaching a lesson about the merits of wealth through hard-work than any attempt at actual historical work. While Wood’s assessment may have some validity when looking at particular people in other parts of the Spanish Empire, it is wholly inadequate in describing the actual conditions of Jamaica. Later historians recognize and understand that Jamaica was a frontier island; it was not uninhabited like Barbados, but it was a far cry from Santo Domingo or Cuba. When Jamaica is understood in this manner, as a frontier removed from Spanish wealth, it becomes possible to understand why the Spanish surrendered the island in a formal treaty.

\(^{20}\) Ibid, 10.
Another perspective on this topic that firmly places the events in question within the Jamaican context only is Irene Wright’s “The Spanish Resistance to the English Occupation of Jamaica, 1655-1660.” Wright seems largely uninterested in making any arguments regarding why the Spanish were unable to remove the English from Jamaica. However, Wright portrayed the Spanish troops, under the leadership of Isassi, as inexperienced and the Spanish leaders as incompetent and petty. On the failure of the first relief expedition she wrote, “Captain Juan de los Reyes was occupied in furnishing history with a fine example of what envy and personal animosity can accomplish toward defeating a cause.”\(^{21}\) Despite being one of the most capable translators of Spanish archival documents, Wright limited this article to one collection of documents aptly entitled, ‘Documents about the loss of the island of Jamaica’ in the Archivo General de Indias. This ensured that Wright did not utilize the existing English translation of de los Reyes’ orders which question the characterization that he was purely fueled by petty jealousy. Furthering this case, she wrote that, “surer sources of certain failure lay in the petty jealousies existing among the Spanish officials, civil and military alike.”\(^{22}\) For Wright, the success of the English lay in large part with the incompetence and weakness of the Spanish who were unable to muster a whole-hearted effort to remove the English from the island.

Wright made frequent use of Spanish archival sources in formulating her argument about the weak but irritating Spanish-American attempts to reclaim


\(^{22}\) Ibid, 126.
Jamaica. The balance Wright strikes in primary sources strengthens the overall narrative, despite the aforementioned errors. She utilizes documents from Don Pedro Bayona de Villanueva, the Spanish-born governor of Cuba at the time, Don Cristobal Arnaldo de Isassi, the Basque governor of Jamaica, and the Duke of Alburquerque, the viceroy of New Spain at the time. These men were the key figures tasked with *la reconquista* of Jamaica and it was largely up to them to decide how to accomplish the task. Wright is able to effectively utilize these sources when she discusses the infighting amongst the Spanish-American officials that hindered their ability to take Jamaica. Each man’s account of what went wrong and who is to blame furthers Wright’s claim that Spanish-American leadership was weakened by rivalry. Wright skillfully weaves this into her overall narrative of Spanish-American resistance. While these rivalries amongst Spanish-American leadership did exist, and while those rivalries hampered the Spanish in this instance, they were neither unique nor as petty as presented. One need look no further than the immediate fate of Penn and Venables. These men raced back to England to present the other as the primary factor in the failure at Hispaniola. As such, her use of English sources is troubling.

On the English side, she mainly relies on the diary and correspondence of Colonel Edward D’Oyley, the man in charge of repelling Spanish assaults on Jamaica. The conclusions she comes to about English strength come predominantly from this English soldier. One passage illustrates this bias,

But D’oyley, with his reorganised army into which courage had returned, had pressed the Spaniard hard, and lack of consistent support had so diminished Ysassi’s strength that now, in the summer of 1657, far from
remaining penned within their defences in the town, as he had described them in the spring of 1656, the English were reported to sleep abroad tranquilly, even in the parties pursuing him, their horses picketed-so great was their confidence in Ysassi’s inability to disturb.\textsuperscript{23}

Her use of the phrase, “his reorganised army into which courage had returned,” clearly indicates a bias in favor of the idea of English strength. Although she is an American historian, Wright seems to display a favor towards the idea that the English had superior strength and fortitude. This is exacerbated by the fact that she does not directly cite D’Oyley’s diary or correspondence, leading the reader to believe that this idea is her own. While Wright is successful in using Spanish documents, she is less effective in utilizing English sources. This diminishes the overall validity of her narrative that Spanish resistance was mired due to the strength of the English and the weakness and incompetence of the Spanish.

Wright is correct in citing rivalries among Spanish-American leaders as a handicap but does not recognize that their counterparts, the English were negatively impacted by the same impulses. The English forces were also little more than a ragtag group of outlaws and misfits cast out of England proper to serve as at worst, cannon fodder, and at best colonists. Wright also fails to look beyond the immediate Jamaican context when considering concepts like ‘strength’ and ‘weakness.’ Wright’s argument is weakened by this lack of the Atlantic context. This is even though Wright urged students of this history to consider this broader context explicitly,

\begin{quote}
The wisdom of the policy which, to the dominion of Jamaica, preferred the immediate delivery even of three years’ "plate" from Peru plus one year's profit from Mexico must be judged in the light of European, rather than
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid, 128.
American history. The relative importance of these alternatives does not appear to the student who confines his consideration to the Jamaican enterprise alone.\textsuperscript{24}

Unfortunately, Wright does little in that article to elucidate exactly what made such a policy so wise. This present scholarship intends to do just that.

Meanwhile, the main Spanish authority on the subject is Francisco Morales Padrón, whose book, \textit{Spanish Jamaica} provides one of the fullest accounts of the entire history of the island. Of particular note are his chapters regarding the loss of Jamaica to the English. In the book, Padrón builds a case that sufficiently shows that Jamaica's value to Spain had long since peaked by the time the English washed upon the shore. On no less than 3 separate occasions Padrón writes that Jamaica was an unimportant island in the larger Habsburg scheme. He wrote of the lack of mineral wealth on the island, "This was the reason and none other that caused the island to be relegated to oblivion for a number of years."\textsuperscript{25} Additionally, Padrón analyzed the absence of Jamaica in significant trans-Atlantic commerce, stating that "no one dared to despatch a ship to Jamaica for the purpose of trade." and "few ships arrived in the island from Spain, and all European products had to be purchased at exploitative prices in the market of Cartagena de Indias."\textsuperscript{26}

Despite fundamentally understanding the diminished role of Jamaica within contemporary imperial aims and pursuits, Padrón descends into a

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, 139-140.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, 159 and 177.
teleological approach when explaining how the Spanish lost the island. Best summarizing his position is what follows, “Jamaica, an integral part of the Spanish Empire, became the hub of the English West Indies.” It is puzzling how the description of Jamaica as an ‘integral part’ of the Spanish Empire is juxtaposed with overwhelming evidence he provided on the contrary. This unhelpful assumption deeply alters Padrón’s analysis of the guerilla campaign which followed the initial invasion. It places his narrative within a firmly Caribbean context and leads to two substantial flaws. First, in working back from the knowledge that Jamaica was going to become an immensely profitable colony for England, and second in assuming that 17th Century Spain had been able to extract similar profit, or even had the knowledge that such profit was possible.

These core assumptions necessarily color his analysis of Spanish attempts to recover the island. Summed up, the energy expended to recover the island was never commensurate with what one might expect given the assumed wealth at stake. Momentous orders like Philip IV’s decision not to dispatch a fleet from Spain to the island seem deeply misguided when framed with the potential for profit Padrón assumes they were aware of. On the contrary (and in Padrón’s history), we see that very recently Philip had made a conscious decision not to engage further with Jamaica on any meaningful level. Because the importance placed on Jamaica was never very high, the resources gained from it little, and the population small, the effort to recover it matched in nearly every way. Small

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27 Ibid, 185.
numbers of reinforcements were sent, little funding and material allocated for the cause, and references to the island only briefly and in the context of larger issues. Padrón’s history of Jamaica reads like a response to the generation of 1898 and a return to the defeatism which they objected to. While his book is the definitive Spanish language history of the island, it is not the only non-English source of information.

There is also a French history of the island written by Thibault Ehrengardt, *The History of Jamaica from 1494 to 1838*. The sweeping survey style of this single-volume book means that there is only so much detail regarding the English invasion of the island. However, given that this account comes to us in the French language, it is important in getting a broader view of the perspectives which exist on this event. Being both a Black and Francophone author, Ehrengardt offers one of the more unique perspectives on the events of the island. Ehrengardt at times relies too heavily on Padrón’s work but still manages to come to some important original conclusions. Chief among those is the emphasis which Ehrengardt places on the maroon community in determining the outcome of the Spanish resistance to the English invasion. On the subject, he writes,

> Ysassi did his best to make sure they remained loyal—when they shifted allegiance, the Spaniards definitively lost Jamaica. But some of the Spanish slaves sided the invaders like Juan de bolas. Others took advantage of the chaotic situation to stay on their own; they started to roam the island in small groups, and, knowing no friends, attacked everyone.\(^{29}\)

The gravity which Ehrengardt attributes to the decisions of the maroon

community in determining the larger outcome is entirely justified. However, conceptions of loyalty viz a vis the Black community are deeply speculative. While the actions of someone like Juan de Bolas, who handed the Spaniards their last defeat, might appear to signify a change of allegiance, we have no sources from de Bolas himself to elucidate his motivations. From strictly his actions though, it seems more likely that he was steadfastly loyal to the independence of his community from Spanish and English interference alike.

A more recent history of the conquest of Jamaica is Carla Gardina Pestana's book, *The English Conquest of Jamaica, Oliver Cromwell's Bid for Empire* in which she presents the conquest within the context of English raiding in the Caribbean. However, her central argument is to show that the apparatus which supported future Restoration colonization was created by Cromwell and embodied in his Western Design. The central narrative is that the experience of pacifying and settling Jamaica, which was carried out under both Cromwell and Charles II, required a strong central government that could adequately govern colonial affairs. While it does not presuppose any inherent English strength, it does fall into the idea of the Spanish ‘losing’ Jamaica. Though not the central figures of this history, the Spanish are presented as being unable to grasp the dire situation in which they found themselves.

Pestana argues that the Spanish authorities gave up Jamaica because they had mistakenly assumed that the English did not intend to settle permanently on the island. She writes, “The Spanish, having mounted no resistance initially,
claimed that they stumbled in that they were caught off guard by their own conviction that the English meant only to rob them. With a long history in the region of such visits by English (and other) ‘piratas,’ the Jamaicans might be forgiven for expecting more of the same.” In addition to justifying the Spanish response, Pestana criticizes General Venables’ actions, or rather inaction. Pestana cites Venables’ delay in marching his troops to Santiago de la Vega as a key setback to a complete English conquest of Jamaica. It is also clear that Pestana does not view the English conquest as a show of strength. Earlier in the book, Pestana writes about the decision to move on Jamaica,

> The Design planners in England and its leaders in America all envisioned a more substantial prize, either a larger island such as Hispaniola or Cuba, or Cartagena, a major city on the mainland. Only on leaving Hispaniola did the Commissioners settle on this more modest initial object...Jamaica served no particular purpose within the Spanish Empire...The English initially considered Jamaica too minor to satisfy the expedition’s goals. But once the campaign began to go awry, the smaller island looked more attractive.

Far from narratives of English exceptionalism, Pestana presents the English conquest as an effort to rescue the Design from the complete failure it had been up to that point.

Pestana’s book represents the most recent scholarship on the subject of the English conquest of Jamaica and continues in the tradition of balanced sources. Like earlier historians, Pestana utilizes the accounts of Admiral William

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31 Ibid, 133.
32 Ibid, 132.
33 Ibid, 132.
Penn, Robert Venables, and Edward D'Oyley. Unlike those historians, Pestana uses some sources and accounts from unnamed Englishmen. She also introduces a new Spanish source into this history. Pestana describes the account of Captain Julian de Castilla as “the most-detailed Spanish version” of the English conquest of Jamaica.\textsuperscript{34} It is notable though that Pestana makes use of Wright’s translation of that account, for better or worse. As stated before, this balance of sources from the men participating in the conquest or loss of Jamaica is praiseworthy. The addition of de Castilla’s account is especially crucial as his writings illuminate the Spanish perspective of the negotiated surrender of the island of Jamaica. Pestana uses de Castilla to illustrate that the Spanish were caught off-guard by English desires to settle the island while still looking down upon the English.\textsuperscript{35}

While Pestana’s book furthers historical knowledge on this important event, she fails to fully recognize the insignificance of Jamaica to the Spanish at this time. She writes, “Fulfilling no specific need, Jamaica nonetheless had to be kept out of the hands of others.”\textsuperscript{36} Her citation here is misleading, as one might assume it leads the reader to archival Spanish documents. Instead, it leads the readers to a few sources from previous historians discussing population estimates for Jamaica at this time.\textsuperscript{37} While that information is useful in its own right, I believe that actually gathering and reading available archival Spanish evidence will show that the loss of Jamaica was insignificant and to a certain extent

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\textsuperscript{34} Ibid, 135.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, 138.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, 131.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, 311.
\end{flushleft}
beneficial to the Spanish. The Spanish became willing to surrender Jamaica to the English once it became clear that it meant gaining safer passage for their flotas, in and out of the Caribbean. I agree in many ways with Pestana and her argument, but I feel that it falls short to fully explain the conquest of Jamaica.

The final key piece in the historiography comes via Casey Schmitt’s article, “Centering Spanish Jamaica” from 2019. Despite disavowing the Atlantic perspective in favor of a Caribbean context, “Squaring a weak and undersupplied resistance with the relative strength of surrounding Spanish kingdoms, especially the Viceroyalty of New Spain, requires analyzing Spanish Jamaica from a regional perspective” it provides a worthwhile analysis that moves away from traditional assumptions. Schmitt’s central argument is that an English controlled Jamaica provided economic opportunity to other Spanish colonies in the vicinity through illicit trade. The economics-driven policy of non-intervention which Schmitt develops in the article is wholly new in the scholarship of Jamaica. Recognizing this, Schmitt provides numerous examples of Spanish-American officials profiting from illicit trade and then those same officials acting against the interests of the Spanish Resistance in Jamaica. Schmitt specifically targets Eastern Cuba or Santiago de Cuba, which was under the leadership of Bayona y Villanueva for most of the guerilla resistance in Jamaica.

Honing in on Bayona y Villanueva and Santiago de Cuba provides the best evidence in support of Schmitt’s argument. Of Santiago de Cuba she writes that

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they were excluded from “official circuits of Spanish imperial trade” and “limited access to official trade networks and administrative postings led residents in... eastern Cuba... to cultivate commercial ties with European traders involved in informal, or unauthorized, commerce.” 39 The conclusion from this evidence is that governors like Bayona y Villanueva were reluctant to give up on the access to illicit trade they enjoyed by giving aid to the Spanish Jamaicans. Strengthening the argument is that Schmitt views it as a structural problem rather than a personal one, which is supported by the fact that Isassi had trouble with both Bayona y Villanueva and his successor Pedro de Morales. Schmitt writes, “In deciding between coming to the aid of neighboring Jamaica or guaranteeing the regular traffic of informal trade and using the supplies sent for Jamaica to bolster his port’s defenses against a possible English attack, the governor of Santiago de Cuba chose the latter.” 40 This analysis of the two governors of Santiago de Cuba is critical in understanding that their actions were not the result of petty rivalries but based on a consistent economic policy. However, it does not fully explain the ultimate failure of the Spanish Resistance.

If one were to ‘zoom out’ from the small window between northern Jamaica and eastern Cuba, Schmitt’s argument starts to unravel. Even just looking at New Spain itself undermines the argument. Schmitt tries to incorporate New Spain into the article as evidence of a relatively strong location which nonetheless felt that it was more important to shore up their ports rather

39 Ibid, 703-704.
40 Ibid, 724.
than assist Jamaica. While this is true, Schmitt’s own refusal to engage in an Atlantic perspective prevents the reader from understanding why exactly the Duke of Alburquerque would pursue such a policy if his dominions were immersed in the Spanish imperial economy. It was not related to Alburquerque’s involvement in illicit trade, so why then did he pursue such a course. By shifting to an Atlantic perspective it’s clear that this was done with an eye towards ensuring the delivery of the *galeones* and *flotas* to Spain. Despite this failing of the article, Schmitt’s analysis is still invaluable in offering new explanations that avoid unquantifiable judgments on moral fiber or shifting definitions of strong and weak. Rather, her scholarship is based on solid foundations that rely on more simple cost-benefit analyses done by Spanish-American officials. This is not without its own flaws though, as it assumes a capitalist outlook that was wholly foreign to those officials. In that case, then, scholarship should try to grapple with how these officials rationalized their role within the maxims of the day. Ideas like *reputacion*, *obedezco pero no cumple* (I obey but I do not comply), and the position of honor and faith in Spanish society, all informed the decision making of Spanish-American officials. Even the more shrewd among them.

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41 Ibid, 723.
The Invasion and Some Early Successes

After Admiral Penn and General Venables' failed to seize Hispaniola, their main objective, it was decided that they should pursue an alternative conquest. While Cuba, Veracruz, Porto Bello, and Cartagena de Indies all lay to the windward, they decided on Jamaica as their prey. Cromwell's instructions had given him and Penn such freedom to make these decisions and at least Venables was willing to exercise it. This of course begs the question as to why they believed Jamaica was within their grasp. Perhaps it was because previous forays in the Caribbean had successfully besieged Jamaica and made off with "plunder," though it in fact amounted to little more than stolen supplies. That probably played a role, but the degree of their failure on Hispaniola convinced Venables that those aforementioned cities lay beyond their capabilities at this moment.^{42}

Jamaica offered a means to avoid certain punishment back in England and seemed to be in a desirable location. Even though Jamaica geographically sat at the crossroads of the *galeoness* and *flotas* as they made their way from Spain to the West Indies and back again, Jamaica occupied a far less important role both politically and economically.

Therefore, we should understand that when Venables and his men stormed the island in 1655, they set foot on a backwater. Understanding this fact is critical to understanding the events of the five years following the English invasion of Jamaica. The neglected state of Jamaica meant that coordinated

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action between colonial governors was a prerequisite to defending the island. When word was sent ahead to Santo Domingo warning of an English invasion, those colonial governors utilized all available resources to strengthen Hispaniola, Cuba, and New Spain. The same could not be said for Jamaica. Again any fortification had to be approved by the Marquis of Jamaica first. The contemporary Marquis of Jamaica believed that his island was undesirable to other European powers because of its small port, and could be defended from its mountains without requiring additional fortifications. Needless to say, he elected not to reinforce the island.

Thus, on May 16th, 1655, when the English landed their men at Caguaya they faced little resistance. Accounts from soldiers there or in the fleet covering them recorded that, "the [Spanish] seeing our resolution did not stand to give any resistance, But run, leaving 3 guns mounted." At first glance, such an account may seem to suggest Spanish Jamaican cowardice or weakness and therefore serve the narrative of a Spain in decline. However, one must take into account the lived experience of the Spanish Jamaicans. A decade prior, William Jackson and his men had raided Jamaica for supplies, received them, and then sailed off to complete their otherwise disastrous voyage. The inhabitants of Jamaica, then, had little reason to expect different from this particular group of marauders.

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43 Ibid, 132.
From this perspective, their lack of resistance is not cowardice or inherent weakness of spirit, it was a rational decision based on the protection of their self-interest. The defensive force was little more than a diversion to allow the rest of the island's inhabitants to flee into the mountains and the quick retreat allowed that force to join their family members there.

With this frame of mind, the Spanish Jamaicans sent emissaries to the English camp to discern their demands, that is what hides, meat, or produce they desired. It was quite clear from these opening interactions that the Spanish Jamaicans assumed these men to be of the familiar buccaneering sort. As Venables' narrative goes, "A priest and a Major came to us to desire a treaty, and that they would give us what in Reason we could desire." The General claims to have indicated that they wished to settle, but his immediate demands betrayed that claim and fell more in line with raids these Spanish Jamaicans had experienced. In desperate need of provisions, he demanded cattle and bread; the former was readily available and delivered, the latter was not. Needing a quick peace after their failure on Santo Domingo, Venables chose to overlook the lack of bread and laid out his terms which he proudly based on the terms imposed on the evicted Englishmen of Santa Catalina. It was at this point that it became clear to the Spanish delegation that the English truly did intend to settle and colonize the island.47

47 Frank Cundall and Joseph Luckert Pietersz, Jamaica under the Spaniards, Abstracted from the Archives of Seville, Kingston: Jamaica, Institute of Jamaica, 1919, 51.
The terms required that those who did not wish to submit to the laws of England should turn in their weapons and any slaves they may have. Afterward, arrangements were made to transport them to New Spain. Those that did wish to remain were also forced to turn over their slaves, but could keep their other possessions, which for the elite of the island included their rapiers. These provisions had clearly indicated that the English intended to colonize this island with or without Spanish cooperation. What followed then, was an elaborate diversion created by the Spanish Jamaicans to decide on a guerilla resistance to defend the island. They complained that they needed time to decide on Venables’ terms, and when that time expired they next explained that their governor was going to come and acquiesce to the terms within ten days’ time. In all, about a week was gained through Spanish pretension. During this time they were able to gather what supplies and equipment they had and disappear into the mountains. Ironically, when on May 26th, Governor Ramírez de Arellano signed the surrender of the island, the conflict for its control actually began.

There are three central figures in the Spanish Jamaican resistance to the English invasion, only one of which actually fought on the island. The man with that distinction is Don Cristobal Arnaldo Isassi (or Ysassi), the last Spanish governor of Jamaica. His resistance campaign was aided from New Spain by its Viceroy, Don Francisco Fernández de la Cueva, a grandee from an illustrious Spanish family. Lastly, there was the governor of Santiago de Cuba, Don Pedro de Bayona y Villanueva; a man who lost that position as a result of his efforts, or
lack thereof. Around these central figures were the other governors and high ranking officials in the Americas, the Council of the Indies, and of course King Philip IV himself.

Don Cristobal Arnaldo Isassi was a native of Jamaica of Basque descent and his family came from what could be considered Jamaica’s ‘upper class.’ He had no formal military training but his nobler birth, age, and most importantly, health thrust him into the Governorship of the island, which from the "surrender" of the island onwards, was essentially a military post. Isassi was either deeply devoted to the King’s service or more than happy to play that part when requesting further support. More likely than not, he was some of both. His letters reveal a man who understood his duty and was able to recognize his faults. They also indicate that he was deeply suspicious of other governors who did not come to his aid. At first, Isassi was deferential in accosting others, but as the situation unfolded, he dropped the veil of humility and preferred more outright attacks on other officials. Such attacks were largely reserved for the governors of Santiago de Cuba, whom he felt undermined his efforts at every turn.

The first such governor was Don Pedro Bayona y Villanueva, who is often cast as Isassi’s greatest rival and enemy. It is unfortunately not so simple. While the case has been made that Bayona y Villanueva disdained Isassi and allowed petty jealousies to hamper the relief effort, it might not be that straightforward or trivial. Historians like Casey Schmitt in "Centering Spanish Jamaica" have offered explanations that place Bayona’s actions within the context of colonial
Caribbean competition for illicit trade.

As previously mentioned, this "informal" trade thrived in Jamaica as official channels regularly passed the island by. Schmitt argues that Bayona, and his successor de Morales, was distinctly aware of this fact and sought to divert forms of illegal trade to Santiago de Cuba; if for no other reason than to ensure that the proper taxes were paid. Bayona's Lieutenant Governor even accused him of actively courting this trade, as did Isassi. His Lieutenant Governor may have been biased though, as he was Don Francisco Leiva Isassi, Cristobal's own brother. Schmitt claims that an English controlled Jamaica, therefore, presented an economical opportunity for Santiago de Cuba, as it brought that illicit trade to their doorstep and granted easier access to the slave trade. This certainly helps to explain the jealousy earlier authors have noted, and give it credibility. Schmitt believes this explains why the Spanish were unable to retake Jamaica. The staging area for all relief efforts was Santiago de Cuba, and a self-interested Governor could and did interfere with those efforts.

This argument is convincing but could be brought further. Schmitt sees this action as exemplary of Colonial conditions not reflecting European contexts. However, I argue that these jealousies, arguments, and selfish officials fit within the European context as well. Where Schmitt is lacking, is in framing it within the terms of the Habsburg Monarchy as a composite monarchy. The "Habsburg Crown" in the singular, was actually several all sat atop one head. Each kingdom,

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principality, duchy, county, and margravate had different tax burdens. Recall that Castille bore the largest burden of taxes. It is not unthinkable that an official in Castille might look upon untaxed trade in Barcelona or Santander with envy and seek to siphon it off for themself. What was different in the Caribbean context was the opportunity, not the motivation. A landlocked grandee in Spain could never hope to direct trade away from a major port city. In order to do so, they had to obtain the king's favor for a better posting in one of those cities, and perhaps could resort to besmirching the current occupant of the desired post. This was unlike the letters that Bayona, Francisco Leiva Isassi, and Cristobal Arnaldo Isassi sent to the king.

However, one should not forget that genuine disagreements over best practices could also be an important factor. Colonial governors have their unique personal histories which must be accounted for when analyzing the decisions they made. While it is tempting to strictly think of these men as privileged, but inexperienced recipients of great honors, that was often untrue in the Americas. Hardened war veterans transitioned from soldiers to statesmen in the Americas, and Bayona y Villanueva is only one such case. It is with this perspective that we must interpret their actions to follow, and the steps taken by the colonial official directly above them.

Of course, that official was the Viceroy of New Spain, Francisco Fernández de la Cueva, Duke of Alburquerque. Alburquerque eventually became *mayordomo* for Charles II, but at present, he served his father, Philip IV.
Alburquerque in many ways was the quintessential Spanish noble. Devout, loyal, and honorable, he served the King first and foremost and expected others to do the same. As Viceroy he held tremendous power as the head of the Spanish Government in the New World. His power assisted Isassi’s efforts, but the corresponding responsibility Alburquerque had also harmed Isassi’s recovery. He had to attend to matters of the Church, both physical and spiritual. The Cathedral of Mexico City was not yet complete, and Alburquerque put considerable energy into hastening its completion. Moreover, the conversion and subjugation of indigenous people continued to be an ongoing drain on the Viceroy’s focus. As the highest-ranking official in that part of the world, he was also responsible for coordinating relief to the Philippines. New Spain was a vital link between Spain and the East Indies and as viceroy, he had to embody that link. A look through the documents from his reign as viceroy in the Archivo General de la Nación in Mexico City, along with his predecessor and successors, indicates a daunting position with a myriad of problems requiring at least some level of attention. This meant that he was spread exceptionally thin on any single issue, so he could only designate so much time and energy in overseeing the reconquest of Jamaica.

As viceroy, his actions carried the same weight as if the king himself had been present in the Indies. This meant that he was also bound by Habsburg belief.

Francisco Fernández de la Cueva, Duque de Alburquerque, “Carta Del Duque de Alburquerque,” Indiferente Virreinal, September 5, 1653, Caja-exp.: 6350-03,. Archivo General de la Nacion, Mexico D.F., Mexico.
in keeping all the kingdoms part of the Monarchy. Understanding that duty was what compelled him to act as he did. Unlike the King though, he could lose his position and honors should he fail in upholding that central goal of the Habsburg monarchy. That added further pressure to ensure that not only domains under his control remained so, but that his own realm of New Spain did not fall prey to foreign invasion. As many letters between the viceroy and the king indicated, it was imperative that Albuquerque kept his coasts safe from English predators. For a monarchy often deprived of reserves of gold and silver, these two responsibilities: recapturing Jamaica and preserving New Spain, threatened to utterly ruin their treasuries.

However, Albuquerque committed himself to disavow money from the King's estate to fund or manage the defense, and from incurring higher than normal costs for the King. He, therefore, had two goals of seemingly equal importance: preserve these provinces for Spain, and preserve her treasury. This significantly shackled his ability to act decisively and in the end, Albuquerque came to the conclusion that his most important responsibility was keeping royal debts to a minimum. He eventually decided to pay for arms on his own accord to defend New Spain but made no such effort for Jamaica. Moreover, he also shared the belief of the Duke of Veragua that the land could provide for defense. Albuquerque believed that a scorched earth guerrilla-style campaign could work

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51 Ibid.
to defend his dominion of New Spain, by cutting off the enemy from supplies and harassing them constantly. He also believed that other European forces at this time did not possess a pilot skilled enough to land at Veracruz. This tactic was both cheap and effective at protecting New Spain. This thinking was music to King Philip IV’s ears. It allowed Philip IV to rationalize not dispatching assistance from Spain because his viceroy had assured him it was unnecessary.

Of course, any serious resistance first came from those on the island itself. Under Isassi’s command and, as the Duke of Veragua had predicted, such resistance was centered on a guerrilla campaign in the mountains. One of Venables’ orders during his brief stay on the island highlights the style of fighting that the Spanish were carrying out, and continued to carry out during their 5-year resistance. He ordered "that no private Soldier should hence-forward go forth to kill cows alone, but that commanded parties should constantly be sent forth to fetch in cows for the Army’s necessary supply" because "the Men [were] sometimes slain by stragling [sic]." From fairly early on then, the Spanish were willing and able to participate in small scale ambushes on small numbers of Englishmen. While not devastating to the thousands-strong English force, it was both demoralizing and fear-inducing. It is noteworthy that these English were the same troops who, while on Santo Domingo, had been startled by crabs and fireflies fearing they were Spanish defenders. Moreover, the state of the English

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53 Henry Whistler, "Extracts from Henry Whistler’s Journey of the West India Expedition." in Venables, Robert. The Narrative of General Venables: With an Appendix of Papers Relating to the
forces could not afford more death. Disease, mostly in the form of dysentery, and famine were killing off large numbers of English troops. Venables himself left the island on account of illness on 15 July 1655, leaving command to Major-General Fortescue. Worse still for the English, diseases did not respect rank, and so Fortescue himself had passed not long after Venables' departure. From that point forward, the English forces were led intermittently by Edward D'Oyley, formerly a colonel in Venables' command. His command was interrupted by the occasional arrival of a more 'republican' general from England. In any event, the English were only strong in number at this point. It's hard from the sources available to ascertain what the actual fighting capacity of the English was but it was far less than reported amounts. The best estimate was that they numbered around 2,500 men in total, bolstered by a fluctuating number of ships off the coast.

Despite the debilitating effects of sickness running through their men, the English were able to realize a great fear of Spanish officials. Once the English had established themselves in Jamaica, some Spanish-American officials feared that this was going to directly result in attacks on their cities and towns. In October 1655, the Vice-Admiral and Commander of the Jamaica Station, William Goodson was authorized by Cromwell to attack Spanish shipping in the region and capture or sink any ships he encountered. He went a bit further than those orders and laid siege to Santa Marta, which lies in present-day Colombia. On
October 3rd Goodson and his ships approached the city alerting the inhabitants of their presence. What followed was the stereotypical English raid. After an exchange of cannon fire between the English ships and Spanish ramparts the English were able to sail into the port. A brief skirmish (no longer than a half-hour according to one participant), gave the people of Santa Marta time to withdraw into the surrounding hills and forest along with their valuables. Goodson demanded a ransom of 2000 pounds for the city, however, after 14 days the promised sum was not delivered. Fearing that staying any longer increased the chances of a Spanish relief force arriving, Goodson and his men departed Santa Marta. Before doing so, they burnt some buildings in the town for good measure.

The raid produced little material gain for the English aside from 32 pieces of ordinance and as such was met with apathy from Cromwell and the Protectorate. It made Major Robert Sedgwick question the validity of this style of attack in the West Indies. Sent to take up command after Fortescue’s death, he remarked to the Admiralty, "this kind of marooning cruising West India trade of plundering and burning of towns, though it hath been long practised in these parts, yet is not honorable for a princely navy..." While dishonorable, this small raid and others like it, were tremendously effective in keeping Spanish forces...

56 Noël W. Sainsbury, Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, Preserved In... the Public Record Office...: America and West Indies, 1675-1676, Also Addenda, 1574-1674, HM Stationery Office, 1893, 103.
contained to their cities and ports. So, Major Sedgwick continued in that letter, “...perhaps it may be tolerated at present.” Ever unsure about when the next attack was coming and how large a force was being assembled for that purpose, Spanish governors felt uneasy about dispatching men across the Caribbean to assist people they had never come in contact with and had no relationship with outside of their allegiance to the same king. The safer choice was to consolidate their defense and dig in. What was cast as Spanish cowardice and later Spanish weakness was actually a conscious Spanish-American defense policy. If it meant leaving Isassi and the other Spanish Jamaicans to their own devices, the other Spanish-American officials were willing to pay that price.

All the while, Isassi established his base of operations in the mountain of Manatines. Initially, he withdrew to Caobana in the southwest of the island near the modern-day Black River but decided a more central location better served his purpose. Once there he claimed that the English pursued him. In the ensuing battle, one of very few on the island, the Spanish were able to hold their ground, but at the loss of a substantial number of men. Given the trouble of sending reinforcements, losses like these were particularly devastating for the Spanish Resistance. Isassi’s brother, Francisco Leiva Isassi, the Lieutenant Governor of Santiago de Cuba, noted in 1659 the apparent ease with which the English resupplied and reinforced their numbers from the Leeward Islands, New England, and Virginia.

However it should have been just as easy for the Spanish to send such
reinforcements given their numerous possessions in the areas. Recognizing this, Isassi wrote voraciously demanding such supplies. The response came in the form of the first relief sent from Cartagena de Indies in October of 1655. Despite claims by historians that colonial leaders were sluggish and lacked any agency to operate outside of royal orders, Governor Pedro Zapata was able to coordinate and send: powder, balls, cord, lances, hoes, machetes, spades, salt, cassava, maize, wine, and vinegar. Notably, the aid was delivered to Isassi at the south of the island. Isassi felt that resupplying in the south offered the best chances of success, though it was not a widely held belief. Zapata’s actions stood out as an example for colonial officials elsewhere to follow.

As for the makeup of his men at the start of the resistance, he notified the king in 1656 that he was in charge of the naturales, the Spanish born and raised in Jamaica, as well as the blacks on the island. This included free-blacks, the maroons, and still enslaved Africans. While these were all Blacks of African birth or descent, they represented different social groups and identities. However, as the guerilla campaign continued, they can all be considered groups of the Black Resistance. Often when Isassi took an account of his forces he recorded these groups separately from the Euro-American/Spanish-Jamaicans but assured other authorities that he was, nonetheless, in firm command of them. Isassi may not have been intentionally lying, but it is quite clear that the Black Resistance was made up of three autonomous communities, each with their own interests. While these interests were often pro-Spanish and anti-English, one should not mistake
this for obedience to Isassi. Their chief interest was the preservation of their autonomous communities. Isassi’s depiction of them as a separate unit in his command, along with English hopes that they would ‘turn on their former masters’ relegates them to secondary figures in this history. However, threats on their autonomy thrust the Black Resistance to the frontlines of the conquest of Jamaica. In short, they were the deciding factor in Isassi’s reconquest of Jamaica. The very plausibility of success depended on them.

While still in the south of Jamaica, Isassi was also able to secure more small victories over the English. According to Francisco Leiva Isassi, they had burnt English fortifications at Anaya and Guanabacoa. However successful Isassi’s guerilla raids were in demoralizing a sick English force, they were never enough to totally recover the island. Documentary evidence and the historiography all acknowledge that a fleet was needed to completely retake the island. Moreover, they were not sustainable. They relied on two shaky foundations. One was the local knowledge of the terrain; the longer the English spent on the island, the less of an advantage it was for him. The second foundation was the support of the Black Resistance. Whatever ‘control’ Isassi claimed over that group was voluntary and could at any point be withdrawn. So while he may have had success early on, from the end of 1655 onwards, his role on the island dramatically changed. Going forward Isassi was confirmed as a resistance leader, not a reconquistador; a change welcomed by King Philip IV.

One of the issues regarding the study of this subject is that
mistranslations and omissions, intentional or not, become regarded as truth in its history. Worse still, in their acceptance as truth, they are repeated without a second thought of further investigation. In this vein, it has been understood that when King Philip received word that the English seized Jamaica he was gripped with anguish. Hume, in *The Court of Philip IV*, claimed that the King wrote that this occasion was, "the final ruin of this monarchy."\(^{57}\) Latimer, in *Buccaneers of the Caribbean*, cites this quote along with other claims by Hume that people were cursing in the streets, though Hume provided no such citation for that claim. For the above quote however, Hume cited the letters of King Philip IV to Sor Maria, a miraculous nun and his confidant. Further inspection of those letters reveals that, as of the date of that letter (30 June 1655), the king did not have news that the English seized Jamaica. That portion of the letter goes as follows, "England wants war with us, because, although there is no certainty so far, the great clues that we have are of two large armadas which they bring in the seas, One has gone into the Indies to infest them, and the other is kept in these coasts waiting for the galleons; a matter which if it happens would be the final ruin of this Monarchy."\(^{58}\)

In its full form, one sees the reality behind the quote. Yes, Philip IV was concerned, however, his concern was that the English may capture the silver galleons returning from America. Not yet aware of the English presence on the island, the King feared the possible loss of income which the *galeones* brought.

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\(^{57}\) Martin Hume and Andrew Sharp, *The Court of Philip IV: Spain in Decadence*, Eveleigh Nash, 1907, 439.

\(^{58}\) María de Jesús de Ágreda, Francisco Silvela, y Felipe IV, Rey de España. *Cartas de La Venerable Madre Sor María de Ágreda Y Del Señor Rey Don Felipe IV*, Est. tipográfico “Sucesores de Rivadeneyra,” 2013, 371.
This fear guided the Monarchy throughout the remainder of the decade, and not unfoundedly. Blake, the admiral of the fleet waiting for the *galeones* mentioned above, eventually delayed the return of those ships in his daring 1657 attack on Santa Cruz de Tenerife. King Philip IV’s response, or lack thereof, to the English invasion of Jamaica, must be viewed through this perspective; he feared for and desired the safety of the *flotas* and *galeones*. Control of Jamaica was thus subsumed into this larger fear. With this fear in mind, we must come to better understand King Philip’s, as well as the royal apparatus surrounding him, role in reconquering Jamaica.
The Failure of the First Relief

King Philip’s letters during 1656 to Isassi, Alburquerque, and Pedro Zapata elucidate in no uncertain terms his approach to the developing situation in Jamaica. As for Isassi, King Philip expected his role to be that of a thorn in the English side, and one that prevented the military occupation from becoming a colonial settlement. His order to Isassi was, "not only to make a very rigorous diversion against the English to keep them continually with arms in hand, but...attempt to dislodge them...compelling them to embark on their ships and leave Jamaica..." While it may appear from this letter that King Philip expected Isassi to completely evict the English from the island, he qualified that expectation by asking only that Isassi “attempt” to evict them. He did fully expect Isassi to act as a diversion, and Isassi’s subsequent actions indicate that this was what he understood his role to be, even if that meant shirking attempts at completely evicting the English. The belief went that if a presence could be maintained on the island, a fleet could be dispatched once the European situation had improved.

In his letters from the same year to the Duke of Alburquerque, King Philip IV explained both the purpose of Isassi’s resistance and his incoming relief, as well as where that relief must come from. Echoing his letter to Isassi, King Philip explained to Alburquerque that the relief was sufficient to maintain a presence on the island, "since [they] cannot dislodge them from all the ports and land that

they occupy in Jamaica, at least in the meantime [they] can maintain war until the
appropriate time for another force executing it with the greatest rigor.”

Again, from the perspective of the Crown, it was the best use of resources to keep a
force capable of harassing the English until a more opportune time came along to
root them out entirely. This perspective also reinforced the notion that it was
unnecessary for the mother country to send direct relief at this juncture.

In a follow-up letter, King Philip ordered the governors of all the
Windward Islands to send infantry and supplies to Jamaica. Each island was
ordered to send varying amounts of men depending on the population of the
island and the risk of attack on their doorstep. Places like Santiago de Cuba, the
closest to Jamaica, were not expected to send as many men as they were at great
risk and could ill afford to do so. Even more notable was the exclusion of
Cartagena. Fairly close to Jamaica, but more important to the Crown than
Santiago de Cuba, Cartagena de Indies was no longer expected nor required to
send aid of any kind to Jamaica. In fact, it was undesirable for them to do so. The
varying requirements again illustrate the Iberian and Spanish-American
priorities; protect the important ports first, recover Jamaica second. Of course,
there was perhaps no more important location than Spain itself. Also exempt
from sending aid at this time, the King summarized it as such “the relief from
[Spain], is for a total lack of means, because in the present state what is cared
most about in the Indies, is to find the English, with feet on Jamaica, impeding

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60 Felipe IV, “Carta Del Rey Al Duque de Alburquerque,” Real Cedulas Originales Y Duplicados,
October 30, 1656, AGN/IC/RCO y Dup/RCO/Vol.5/4071/152/Exp.152, Archivo General de la
Nacion, Mexico D.F., Mexico.
the commerce of all the Windward Islands with the coasts of [South America] and New Spain and running great risk to the Spanish fleets and galleons around Jamaica." With very limited means at his disposal due to incessant continental conflict, King Philip was primarily focused on the protection of commerce. Any relief from Spain needed to be directed towards that purpose, rather than direct intervention on Jamaica itself. Thus, the English presence on Jamaica was a problem insofar as it was a threat to the Spanish silver fleets and the commerce they carried:

the utmost importance and convenience would be followed by restoring it by expelling the English to ensure the passage of the fleets and galleons that so fervently have to go through one and another part of that island and also to ensure the passage of the merchant frigates between the Windward Islands and of the coasts of the mainland that are really [emphasis added] oppressed with the English ships having their fortified ports on Jamaica.61

For the Spanish (both Iberian and American), recovering Jamaica was never about Jamaica, it was about the threat to their commerce that the English posed by being there. The Monarchy searched for any possible means to circumvent that problem without expending energy on direct reconquest. Philip IV explained that, by ordering that the relief came from the Indies, it was more expedient to accomplish the recovery of that island.62 If Isassi and his men could cause a significant enough distraction, the English were forced to stay in Jamaica and

unable to attack other Caribbean ports. In that same letter, he complained that it was going to take a year to get relief from Spain to Jamaica by utilizing the *galeones* and *flotas*. Such a long investment of time, with so uncertain a return, was out of the question. King Philip had far too many more urgent matters closer to home to attend to at that time.

Meanwhile, it appeared that Isassi was not providing enough of a distraction for the English. Vice-Admiral Goodson was once again fulfilling his orders to go on the offensive and attack the Spanish. He dispatched 5 ships to loiter about Portobelo and Cartagena de Indias to await the *flota* carrying silver between the two cities. He also dispatched 10 ships to Hispaniola to capture the *galeones*. However, these ships failed to find the *galeones* and were instead forced to pursue a stationary target. Eventually, they settled on Rio de la Hacha. Much like the raid on Santa Marta a year earlier, it accomplished very little in terms of plunder. Undeterred, the ships passed by Santa Marta, and eventually made their way to the great city of Cartagena. Upon seeing six ships in the harbor there, the English feared that a force was being assembled to recover Jamaica and beat a hasty retreat to the island. While they were mistaken in this assumption, their actions reveal two things; one, that Spanish fears of increased English raids were not unfounded, and two, that the English still respected Spanish forces in the region.

As for the Spanish, they are often criticized for appearing to be lethargic when refusing to move quickly to defend and recover Jamaica. Yet, when the
Spanish received reports from captives that the English were preparing for a raid, they were not foolish for believing those reports and acting on them. Raids like Goodson’s and later Myngs' justified the fear which kept Spanish ships docked or otherwise close to home. Likewise, the English, despite having 10 ships of their own, still felt they were no match for the six Spanish ships and their forces within the city. Though the English themselves preached that the Spaniards were no match for them, that laziness had made them ineffective fighters, and that God was on their side, they recognized there was still some might left in Spanish guns. Furthermore, the English reacted in the same way as the Spanish when they thought an enemy invasion was imminent. They also sought to protect their colony and the opportunity it provided.

So while raids on Spanish ports may have been an effective defense through offense, they were not the means by which Jamaica eventually became a profitable island. The English did have experience in setting up profitable colonies in the Caribbean though. By the 1640s colonies like Barbados were becoming economic engines through the production of sugar, linked to the Transatlantic Slave Trade. Leadership in London and Jamaica sought to replicate that success in Jamaica as soon as possible, even if the island was not entirely pacified. The threat which they posed to the Spanish was not sufficient enough justification for their presence in Jamaica. A colony modeled on Barbados was the desired future for Jamaica. However, this proved extraordinarily difficult to do in the 1650s, the Spanish resistance notwithstanding.
First, as has been mentioned, the English did not have the technological nor biological means to fight off tropical diseases. The eventual commander on the island, Colonel D’Oyley was himself sick in 1655.\textsuperscript{63} Compounding the issue was the fact that the English troops on the island were constantly fighting off starvation. In one letter to Cromwell, Major Sedgwick sums up the problems facing the English as such,

> it is certain we have enemies both of Spaniards and Blacks in the island, and they watch for an opportunity of our men; as for planters we have not above one family settled, if one amongst us, neither do I expect any from our English colonies, till God give health amongst us. Here hath come down to us from many of the windward islands divers people, with intentions of sitting down with us, but at their coming hither, either fall sick and die, or are so affrighted and dismayed, as that although to their much impoverishing, yet will not be persuaded to stay with us.

Jamaica was struggling to draw in honest planting families for those reasons mentioned above. If diseases did not wipe out a family, then the Spanish or Black population on the island would. At this point, all news coming from the island was negative and life on the island was seen as more of a punishment than an opportunity. In that letter, Sedgwick also gets at another key component in this history, that of the Black communities on the island.

Isassi had indicated that same year that he was in control of the whole populous which had existed before English occupation. Yet, English accounts of the time indicate that, at least from their perspective, this was not the case. Two Spanish prisoners were reported to have stated: “that the negroes, that are not of

\textsuperscript{63} “Letter from Major Sedgwick to the Protector, 5 November 1655” in “State Papers, 1655: November (1 of 8),” in A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, Volume 4, Sept 1655 - May 1656, ed. Thomas Birch (London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), 138-155, British History Online, 143.
the Spanish party, are some 200; but knoweth not in what part of the island they are.” Unfortunately, no primary evidence exists which was created by the Black Resistance, so we can only speculate what their motives were, but it seems likely that the preservation of their freedom was chief among them. The Maroons, which made up part of such Resistance, had already established their own settlements before the English occupation of Jamaica and had even erected a fortress in the northwest of the island. From a base of operations like that, they were able to swiftly attack Englishmen searching for Spaniards and then vanish back into the landscape. This was an advantage which they maintained well into the 18th century.

**1656 in Europe**

If the Spanish position in the Caribbean could be described as defensive, much the same could be said for their position in Europe. Ongoing war with France in Flanders and Italy, rebellions in Catalonia and Portugal, and an English fleet off the coast of Cadiz required King Philip's full attention. Fully aware that there were more open battlefronts than could be managed, the Monarchy knew it needed to seek peace somewhere. The Duke of Medina de las Torres, Ramiro Núñez de Guzmán, felt that Austria and England provided natural and traditional allies for Spain. However, he was at that time in the opposition, and the ruling clique headed by Luis de Haro supported a cessation of hostilities with France. A successful defense of Valenciennes in the Spanish Netherlands in July, led by the

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64 “The examination of two Spanish prisoners taken the 20th of March 1656.” in Ibid, 131.
King's son Juan de Austria is believed to have convinced Philip IV that he may prevail over France. His letters with Sor Maria betray that sentiment as it appears Philip IV felt the situation remained quite hopeless, or at least, still requiring divine intervention. Nonetheless, the ruling faction at court felt the need to maintain the war with France until they had a clear advantage and then join in league with them as the dominant Catholic powers in Europe. In 1656 then, peace was not sought after on the French front, but as always, it was desired on the Portuguese front.

That ongoing rebellion, part of the general crisis of the 1640s, was acutely damaging to the Habsburg reputation. Recall that the House of Habsburg called on its monarchs to defend all its constituent realms in perpetuity. Independence, or the concession of a kingdom, principality, duchy, or county, was severely disparaged by the Habsburgs. Therefore, Philip felt it was his duty to preserve Portugal as a dominion of Spain for the good of his heir and his people. However, the King also recognized that as of 1656, Spain was unable to squash the rebellion in Portugal without external aid. Enter Charles Stuart, exiled King of England, Scotland and Ireland.

From King Philip IV’s perspective, there were two Englands to bargain with. One led by Cromwell in London, and the other led by Charles Stuart in his mobile court-in-exile. Earlier, Spain had sided with Parliamentary England. In April of 1652, Alonso de Cárdenas had been authorized by King Philip to treat

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65 María de Jesús de Ágreda, Francisco Silvela, Felipe IV, Rey de España, *Cartas de La Venerable Madre Sor María de Ágreda Y Del Señor Rey Don Felipe IV*, Est. tipográfico “Sucesores de Rivadeneyra,” 2013, 456.
with the Parliament of England to ensure that peace treaties made with the monarchy continued to be upheld by whichever form of government came next. Indeed, the following year Spain recognized the Protectorate of Cromwell, becoming the first nation to do so. However, by 1656 the situation was drastically different. Cromwell’s provocation, embodied in the Western Design, and the ongoing persecution of Catholics, had pushed Spain towards the restoration of Charles. The former ambassador to England, Alonso de Cardenas circulated a book around the court in which he laid out just how duplicitous Cromwell had been in planning and carrying out the attack on Hispaniola and Jamaica. No further agreements could be reached between these two nations in light of such information. Thus, foreign policy was directed sharply away from Cromwell and towards his opposite number, Charles. As for Charles, he found that his family in the Netherlands and France were unwilling to shelter and support him and so he was pushed into the arms of Spain. Consequently, the two monarchs agreed to the Treaty of Brussels in April of 1656.

Among its provisions and secret articles regarding religion, the treaty centered on an exchange of services. Spain’s major assistance to Charles was an article requiring 4,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and an unclear sum of money to be

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66 Consejo de Estados, “Copia de La Plenipotencia Conferida Por El Rey Felipe IV a Alonso de Cárdenas Para Tratar Con El Parlamento de Inglaterra,” Tratado de Madrid Firmado Por España E Inglaterra El 23 de Mayo de 1667, April 27, 1652, ESTADO,2778,Parte 1a,Exp.7, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, España.

used to restore him to the Crown of England. In exchange for this aid, Charles was expected to enlist men and ships to fight for a term of 5 years against Portugal and renounce his alliance with the Braganzas. This was not all that Charles promised Spain in this treaty though. Most critically to the evolving situation in Jamaica, Charles, "promise[d] and oblige[d] that he [would] not consent to his subjects making new plantations in the West Indies, nor occupy islands in them, nor ports in Tierra Firme, and that he will restore everything the English have occupied from the year 1630 onwards, so in America as in any other part of the world, and particularly in the time that Oliver Cromwell has governed with the title of Protector." Of course this is an obvious allusion to Jamaica without outright admittance of the fact. This article is therefore critical to understanding the Iberian perspective on reclaiming Jamaica.

Most scholarship regards this treaty as one driven by the singular vision of a monarch in exile, and as such inherently duplicitous. At this time though, the Crown had no reason to suspect that King Charles was going to be peacefully asked to reclaim his throne and subsequently, renege on the treaty. They, therefore, approached colonial policy with an understanding that regardless of their efforts, they could achieve their desired ends by restoring Charles II to the throne of England. Why expend desperately needed arms, munitions, and men to reclaim an island across an ocean when a diplomatic treaty can ensure the same

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68 Consejo de Estado, "Tratado Secreto de Paz Y Alianza Ajustado Entre Los Reyes Felipe IV de España Y Carlos II de Inglaterra Firmado En Bruselas Con Un Artículo Secreto Tocante a La Religión," Tratado de Madrid Firmado Por España E Inglaterra El 23 de Mayo de 1667, April 12, 1656, ESTADO,2778,Parte 1ª,Exp.12, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, España.
result? The more prudent use of those same resources was to focus on King Charles II’s restoration. This offered the potential to secure a useful ally against France, the return of Jamaica, the subjugation of Portugal, and of course, peace with England. If we look back at the letters from King Philip to the colonial officials through the lens of this treaty, it’s clear that he was of this mindset. In his letters with Sor Maria, King Philip often emphasizes how thinly stretched he believed Spanish forces to be. Dispatching soldiers so far from home was too abstract for a king so bound to the reality of a kingdom constantly at war with its neighbors and itself. Through the restoration of Charles II, King Philip IV could alleviate problems both near and far. This outlook colors all of Philip IV’s subsequent decisions regarding Jamaica up until his own death in 1665. Only within the context of Atlantic history does the Treaty of Brussels take a tremendously important role in the ultimate failure of the Spanish to reclaim Jamaica.

1657 in the Caribbean

Until the ultimate return of Charles II to the throne of England, a presence needed to be maintained in Jamaica. This message was reiterated by numerous Caribbean officials including the Duke of Albuquerque in a letter to Cristobal Arnaldo Isassi in March of 1657. In that same letter, Albuquerque also informed Isassi of the threat which the English posed to Santiago de Cuba, "[The English] are hourly awaiting their fleet which they say is bringing orders to
invade this fortress of Santiago de Cuba.”69 The threat which the English posed in 1656 and which had resulted in much paralysis on the part of the Spanish showed no signs of going away in 1657. However, the Spanish were able to shake off the sluggishness which had plagued them a year earlier, and, in late July 1657, the relief force which King Philip IV had ordered in 1656 finally arrived in Jamaica. This force of roughly 400 men and supplies played a defining role not just in 1657 but in the remaining years of Spanish efforts to recover the island. They supposedly represented the combined might of Hispaniola, Havana, Puerto Rico, and New Spain. Ultimately, their defeat at Las Chorreras in the north of Jamaica effectively marked the end of large, full-scale conflict between the English and Spanish. In a sense, it heralded the endgame.

Organizing such a force from the scattered dominions of the Caribbean required a rendezvous point before continuing on towards Jamaica. For better or worse, and really for worse, that point was Santiago de Cuba, the city controlled by Don Pedro Bayona y Villanueva. As previously mentioned, Bayona was less than keen on rapidly assembling and deploying forces that could undermine other lucrative endeavors. He was even less enthusiastic about sending away detachments that could provide defense for Cuba. Unsurprisingly, when the men from across the Caribbean landed in Santiago de Cuba they were delayed for a period of time which Isassi considered unacceptable. Moreover, he felt that Bayona y Villanueva had kept the strongest men and that his ally Albuquerque

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69"Letter from the Duke of Albuquerque to Cristobal Arnaldo Isassi, March 1657," in Frank Cundall, and Joseph Luckert Pietersz, Jamaica under the Spaniards, Abstracted from the Archives of Seville, Kingston: Jamaica, Institute of Jamaica, 1919, 55.
had not even bothered to send fit men for his cause. Isassi had significant
grounds to lodge such a complaint against Bayona, as roughly 570 men had been
assembled at Santiago de Cuba, and only 400 of those men made it to Jamaica. As
a last insult to Isassi, Bayona y Villanueva appointed Juan de los Reyes as the
head of this contingent on dubious authority.

To say that Juan de los Reyes cut a divisive figure is an understatement.
First, his introduction as leader of the relief force came as a surprise to Isassi as
Bayona y Villanueva had not sent prior word to Isassi. According to Cundall in
Jamaica Under the Spaniards, upon meeting this supposed commander, Isassi
informed Reyes that he should turn over command to his nephew. This is said to
be the catalyst for the deterioration of their relationship if such a thing existed at
all between the two men, and the breakdown of Isassi’s resistance campaign.
However, Cundall provides no evidence to support such a claim and seems to be
relating a commonly used excuse for the coming dissension between Isassi and
Reyes. Its prevalence in English historiography is likely due in part to its role in
furthering the broader narrative of Spanish incompetence. What appears more
likely is that Bayona y Villanueva always intended for Reyes to be antagonistic
towards Isassi and to challenge his authority. The man who should have been
commander of these forces, one Captain Salinas, sent by Albuquerque, was not
permitted to leave Santiago de Cuba.70 Bayona y Villanueva did not respect Isassi
as a governor and especially not as a soldier. By sending Reyes as head of the

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70 "Inquiry of the Council of Indies, 1659," in Frank Cundall, and Joseph Luckert Pietersz, Jamaica
under the Spaniards, Abstracted from the Archives of Seville, Kingston: Jamaica, Institute of Jamaica,
1919, 86.
relief force, he attempted to neutralize Isassi’s authority and thus validate his disrespect.\textsuperscript{71}

More recent scholarship, such as Schmitt’s aforementioned article, has shifted discourse away from petty jealousies as the source of conflict. However, it still essentially maintains that jealousy, in this case, jealousy of profitable illicit trade relationships, was responsible for the failure to retake Jamaica. Neither Schmitt nor Cundall make use of what may have been the actual source of conflict; the orders Bayona y Villanueva gave to Reyes before his departure to Jamaica. In these orders, confiscated by the English after the defeat at Las Chorreras, Bayona y Villanueva first orders that Reyes obeys Isassi in all things that relate to the service of the king (i.e. combatting the English). If Bayona y Villanueva truly wanted that to be the case though, the document should end there. As it is though, that is the first of many orders Reyes was supposed to follow. Bayona y Villanueva continues specifically commanding that Reyes should avoid long marches before conflict so as to avoid tiring his own men, “and to be sure, that it be at such a distance from the enemy, that you may be able to make war with him without making of long marches...And the governor and serjeant-major are to have special care, that the soldiers be not weary with marching when they come to fight...”\textsuperscript{72} It is clear that Bayona y Villanueva felt such orders were imperative based on his own experience as a soldier in


\textsuperscript{72} John Thurloe, \textit{A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe...: 1658 to 1660}, executor of F. Gyles, 1742, 540-541.
Catalonia and Italy. Later in the document he orders Reyes to treat the English civilly to induce mass surrenders, something he noted had worked in Catalonia.\textsuperscript{73} Notably, Bayona y Villanueva did not provide Reyes with a course of action should his orders conflict with those of Isassi.

Thus, the relief that arrived on the island found itself consumed by the dispute between the two men. Isassi does deserve some credit in attempting to blunt the effects of the argument becoming either a full-scale civil war between the two factions, or a complete mutiny. Beyond their personal differences, Isassi and Reyes disagreed about the best course of action and the purpose of this relief force on the island. When the contingent arrived in La Maguana (near present-day Ocho Rios) some men remained there to guard the provisions that accompanied them. The rest of the force was intended to accompany Isassi and his men towards the interior of the island to camp and create ambushes. This was Isassi's preferred method of attack and one that, recall, brought him success in the early days of resistance. Reyes on the other hand sternly disagreed with this course of action. Bayona y Villanueva had warned him to avoid such marches. He wrote to Isassi that success in the interior of the island was, "impossible."\textsuperscript{74} The issue was further compounded by the hardships which the men experienced in marching from La Maguana towards points inland. In testimony given to the Council of Indies two years later, Isassi's brother indicated that the relief force

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid. 541.
\textsuperscript{74} "Letter from Juan de los Reyes to Cristobal Arnaldo Isassi, 1657," in Cundall, Frank, and Joseph Luckert Pietersz, \textit{Jamaica under the Spanish}, \textit{Abstracted from the Archives of Seville}, Kingston: Jamaica, Institute of Jamaica, 1919, 59-60.
did not have enough food to last them fifteen days in Jamaica.

Taking advantage of the disgruntled state of the men, Reyes demanded a Council of War to permit his return to the supplies at La Maguana. Isassi, wanting to avoid mutiny while still accomplishing his central mission, agreed to allow Reyes and some of the men to return to La Maguana. Isassi continued towards the interior and south of the island while ordering that Reyes move the supplies to Baycani (in the vicinity of Ocho Rios). However, Bayona y Villanueva had instructed Reyes to “to choose out a place upon that coast, from whence correspondency may be kept with this city, and to fortify it very well, and leave a guard of soldiers therein, and to make huts for the sick and wounded.”75 Reyes therefore ignored Isassi’s orders and instead constructed a stockade around the supplies at La Maguana.

Meanwhile, the English were trying to consolidate the villages and areas in their control. Under D'Oyley’s command and with the Lord Protector’s aid, they attempted to make Jamaica a profitable settlement. While Cromwell tried to convince settlers from other Caribbean islands and New England to move to Jamaica, D'Oyley attempted to induce the soldiers into settling down and planting. That endeavor was paused when the word was received through a captured Portuguese sailor that the Spanish relief had indeed landed in the north of the island. D'Oyley himself boarded the Indian to lead the forces which departed from Cagway on October 24th. 6 days later, they landed two miles from

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75 John Thurloe, A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe...: 1658 to 1660, executor of F. Gyles, 1742, 541.
the Spanish camp at La Maguana near Las Chorreras and began to march
towards the Spanish position. Along the way, they encountered one of the famous
Spanish *ambuscados* which, despite past success, was ineffective that day. Isassi
later bemoaned the futility of Reyes’ ambush and subsequent abandonment of all
defensive trenches between the English and their stockade.\(^{76}\)

Despite not actually having been present at the battle, Isassi believed that
those earthwork defenses could have held out against the advancing English and
prevented the disaster to come. Whether or not that was true became irrelevant
as the English made their way to the stockade protecting the Spanish provisions.
Understanding the tenuous situation in which they found themselves, Isassi
ordered that should the English find the Spanish provisions and defeat seem
imminent, the provisions should be burnt. This was an unfortunate necessity to
prevent the English from becoming stronger at direct Spanish expense. Once
again Reyes dismissed that order and determined to stand his ground at Las
Chorreras. According to D’Oyley’s account of the battle, the English forces were
able to breach the fortification after a 45-minute gunfight along the walls by
using their hatchets. In addition to seizing the munitions there, the English were
also able to capture the former governor, Don Francisco de Proenanza.
Unfortunately, while en route to New Spain, he died aboard the ship upon which
the English had placed him. With the death of the last pre-English governor,
Spanish control of Jamaica was truly no more.

\(^{76}\) “Letter from Cristobal Arnaldo Isassi to Don Pedro Bayona y Villanueva, February 1658,” in
Cundall, Frank, and Joseph Luckert Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards, Abstracted from the
Archives of Seville*, Kingston: Jamaica, Institute of Jamaica, 1919, 65.
While Spanish control of the island had ceased to exist, the Spanish presence on the island remained, though greatly reduced. In light of his blatant insubordination, Reyes and a large majority of the Spanish forces on the island returned to Cuba. Isassi asked that he be kept there in some form of confinement or as an outright prisoner. Unsurprisingly, Bayona did not honor this request and instead sent Reyes to Madrid to explain the devastating defeat. Isassi was understandably incensed upon hearing this news as it meant that Reyes' account of events reached the king before his own depiction of 30 October could. As these officials saw 1657 draw to a close, they well understood that a herculean task awaited them the following year.

Now while the Spanish had suffered a catastrophic defeat, they were still succeeding in preventing the English from effectively settling the island and making it profitable. Uncooperative governors in the Leeward Islands, Virginia and New England refused to send planter families to settle the island, so it remained little more than a military outpost. In February of 1657 D'Oyley had remarked that the Spanish presence on the island, coupled with reinforcements from New Spain, “interrupt[s] our work of planting, to attend them.”

Additionally, D'Oyley was also cautious about engaging in or endorsing privateering at this time, displaying an unusual amount of caution. He appeared to be preparing the island for the end of martial law and seeking to transition to a peaceful civilian government. Moreover, the constantly fluctuating situation of

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78 Ibid, 834.
English politics meant that the soldiers who were ‘expendable’ in 1654-55 and thus shipped off on the Western Design, were suddenly very much in need back in Europe.

1657: The European Perspective

While the Spanish forces were largely crushed at Las Chorreras, events on the continent provided opportunities for optimism. For Spain, and King Philip IV in particular, 1657 was a complicated year punctuated by victories, defeats, miracles, and foreboding. While the main theaters of his attention continued to be Portugal, Catalonia, Flanders, and Italy, new ones opened up in the Canary Islands, Central Europe, and his own Court. In the Canaries, the English raid on Santa Cruz de Tenerife posed the greatest threat to the Spanish silver fleet since Piet Hein three decades earlier while the death of Ferdinand III, Holy Roman Emperor, had implications which resounded far beyond 1657. Finally, after the campaign season of 1657 had drawn to a close, King Philip celebrated the birth of his first son in twenty-eight years and the first viable heir in over a decade.

To understand the complexities which colored 1657, a brief overview of that year's campaign season of the Franco-Spanish war is necessary, as it continued to be the main source of conflict. In February 1657 King Philip considered Italy most important and most in need of relief. To his surprise and benefit, the French army started slowly despite the return of warm weather.

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79 María de Jesús de Ágreda, Francisco Silvela, y Felipe IV, Rey de España, Cartas de La Venerable Madre Sor María de Ágreda Y Del Señor Rey Don Felipe IV, Est. tipográfico” Sucesores de Rivadeneyra,” 2013, 465.
Indeed, it was actually the Spanish forces which mobilized first and left their winter camp. The French did eventually get moving and put the city of Alessandria to siege. Lying roughly midway between Turin and Milan, Alessandria in French hands could provide a launchpad for future strikes both in the Duchy of Milan, and the city itself. King Philip seemed keenly aware of this fact and wrote that its loss could result in, "the loss of all the State."\(^{80}\) Possibly because they had been on the move first, the Spanish army was in the same area and able to come to the relief of the city. The region which had so plagued Philip IV managed to resist French domination for another year.

Portugal meanwhile continued to be a knife in Spain’s figurative, and geographically literal, back. Despite a campaign season cut short due to heat, Spanish forces were dealt a significant blow with the loss of Olivenza. While they achieved victory and secured Mourao, the trade-off was imbalanced. Philip IV still held out hope that through prayer and arms he could make the Portuguese resubmit and rejoin the Crown of Spain. Such adherence to what scholars considered a lost cause, while not disastrous in 1657, was distracting. Firmly upholding the Habsburg belief in the union of all dominions in perpetuity, Philip IV continued to siphon valuable men and supplies to this fool’s errand. This became all the more pressing as events unfolded in Flanders and the Canaries.

In 1656, Spain and the exiled King Charles II had reached an agreement in which Charles provided immediate men-at-arms to fight in Flanders, and Spain

\(^{80}\) Ibid, 494.
was to return the favor at a later date to assist Charles in reclaiming his throne. Meanwhile, through his Western Design, Cromwell had removed himself from Spanish favor and the Treaty of Brussels had propelled him further into the orbit of France. The result was the Treaty of Paris which reads as a mirror of the Brussels treaty a year prior. Cromwell's England was tasked with supplying ships to France and in turn, France was meant to help ensure that Charles never regained his throne. The key component of the treaty was that the combined Franco-Protectorate forces go on campaign in Flanders with the goal of capturing Dunkirk. This was intended to drive Charles from his exile in Flanders, cut off the logical staging ground for any Royalist invasion, and to cease the predation of the Dunkirker privateers on English shipping. Thus, 1657 should be considered a resumption of the English Civil War. Royalist and Parliamentarian forces once again squared off on the battlefield, contributing considerably to their allied causes.

The weight of English forces on both sides impacted the larger conflict in the years to come. In 1657, it was Charles II's forces who carried the day and brought success to the court of Philip IV. At St. Ghislain, English and Irish forces under the command of James, Duke of York, and the Army of Flanders led by Don Juan secured victory in that city thereby blocking a path to Brussels. Meanwhile, the Condé was able to successfully relieve Cambrai from the Comte de Turenne and prevent a hasty collapse of Spanish power there. However, there were losses at Montmedy and Mardyck which the King lamented over. The latter came to be
particularly disastrous as it placed Anglo-French troops in striking distance of
the all-important Dunkirk. As with so much of the Franco-Spanish War, and
conflicts involving Spain, the campaigns of 1657 were inconclusive.

Furthering this theme of inconclusive results was the English raid on
Santa Cruz de Tenerife, led by Admiral Robert Blake. Numerous historians, when
supplying evidence for the decline of Spain, describe this event as Blake's capture
of the Spanish Silver Fleet. This, however, is deeply misleading. First, Blake did
very little capturing and far more destroying. It was certainly an unwelcome
outcome for Spain but not as abysmal, all things considered. Secondly, his fleet
did not carry off the silver of the Indies. Despite the over-simplified and
condensed narrative presented by past historians, the battle of Santa Cruz de
Tenerife was far more inconclusive when considering the larger strategy of the
belligerents. Around April 28th Blake's fleet appeared within sight of the silver
fleet stationed at Santa Cruz. On the following day, Don Diego Egues y
Beaumont, admiral of the fleet received notice of Blake's fleet and immediately
ordered that the silver be disembarked and secured on Tenerife itself. This quick
action meant that the impending assault was thus prevented from reaching the
silver and causing fatal harm to the Spanish monarchy.

In any case, Blake approached the silver fleet with roughly 30 ships (the
number ranges from 28-36 depending on the account) on the morning of 30 April.
When asked for his surrender, Egues is reported to have said “Let [Blake] try to
come here if he wishes.” When the English ships did come, the seventeen Spanish ships under Egues attempted to fight off the English but by mid-morning Egues knew that his cause was lost. His ship and the Vice-Admiral continued the fight into the afternoon before he ordered that the ships be burnt to avoid becoming English trophies. The English account of events respects those two ships for their “considerable resistance” and Spanish pride was spared by not losing such large warships to Cromwell’s Navy. More than pride was spared though, as critically the English sailed off with far fewer prizes than they had hoped. Whatever cargo from the Indies had not yet been brought onshore was wrested off Spanish ships by Blake’s men. In his report to King Philip, Egues highlights that the loss of material goods was not so great. Moreover, he claimed that in looking over the records of the voyage, he discovered and corrected fraud which has netted the royal treasury more than what Blake escaped with. This was no more than evidence of an officer attempting to save their own neck; however, King Philip’s response to these events indicated that he felt it to be something more.

Recall that in 1655 when King Philip IV first received word of Blake’s fleet stationed off Cadiz he feared that their capture of the silver fleet would bring about the ultimate ruin of the Monarchy. When news reached him that Blake had

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81 Cesáreo Fernández Duro, Bosquejo biográfico del almirante D. Diego de Egues y Beaumont y relación del combate naval que sostuvo con ingleses en Santa Cruz de Tenerife, año 1657, La Andalucía, 1892, 16.
83 Cesáreo Fernández Duro, Bosquejo biográfico del almirante D. Diego de Egues y Beaumont y relación del combate naval que sostuvo con ingleses en Santa Cruz de Tenerife, año 1657, Andalucía, 1892, 18.
indeed attacked the fleet he wrote to Sor Maria, "[the silver fleet] fought with [the English], but as they were few they were forced to burn them, so that the enemy did not take them; but as what they brought was already disembarked on land, it was only the loss of the vessels." Clearly, King Philip IV did not consider this to be the death blow to the Monarchy. In a body of letters brimming with the lamentation of a man who believed himself cursed by God, this remark stands out as a mere half-hearted shrug in the face of the event. Moreover, he awarded Egues with an encomendero in a location of his choosing, as well as further government appointments. This should have been entirely out of place had the King felt Egues had behaved dishonorably or was deserving of punishment. Instead, it further indicates that the Monarchy was singularly concerned with ensuring the silver reached Spain, without much thought as to how, nor how quickly.

While they were primarily interested in the idea of American silver reaching Spain, it was not because it was contributing significantly to enriching their coffers. By this time, the wealth of the Americas was not directed to the Crown treasuries, rather it was often directed to foreign bankers to continue paying off loans which were in considerable arrears. Some historians have attempted to use Santa Cruz as an explanation for Spanish defeats in Flanders, or an abandoned invasion of Portugal, yet such an explanation is destroyed by the

84 María de Jesús de Ágreda, Francisco Silvela, y Felipe IV, Rey de España, Cartas de La Venerable Madre Sor María de Ágreda Y Del Señor Rey Don Felipe IV, Est. tipográfico" Sucesores de Rivadeneyra," 2013, 484.
paper trail. Silver from the Americas was rarely able to go from Veracruz or Lima to Cadiz, to Madrid, and then back out to the average soldier. First, because the currency in the Spanish Empire fundamentally did not operate like that. A number of different coins existed as intermediaries of exchange which gave finance ministers considerable manipulation of the currency. Then, there existed the considerable foreign interest, in the form of bankers, who essentially could lay claim to the silver at Cadiz as recompense for the loans which the Spanish Monarchy had taken from them. An inability to arm troops in the campaign season of 1657 had more to do with financial trouble in years prior than it did with any singular event that occurred during that campaign season. To suggest otherwise demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of Spanish finances, and gives undue credit to the speed at which they operated.

Additionally as was so often the case, King Philip was more interested in, and more disheartened by events and concerns in Portugal and Flanders. Whether the battle be in Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Southern Italy, or Jamaica, King Philip, and by extension the royal apparatus he headed, ranked it below the concerns of Portugal and Flanders. Indeed one observer noted that “It is resolved in Spain to invade Portugal by land with a formidable army, and to send a fleet to the Indies to beat the English out of Jamaica; but there being care to be had for Catalonia for these parts and for Italy, I know not how the king of Spain will be able to supply all places, where his assistance is required.”

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succinctly represents the divided attention of Philip IV, and the need to prioritize certain places over others. In a similar vein, from 1657 through 1658 King Philip was deeply invested in the forthcoming election of Holy Roman Emperor. The relationship to the Austrian Habsburgs was understood to be the bedrock of Spanish foreign policy at this time so it was critical that Philip’s desired candidate sit on the throne as Emperor. In this particular election, he favored his nephew Leopold over Archduke Leopold Wilhelm. Mazarin pushed both the unlikely election of Louis XIV himself or the somewhat more likely Ferdinand Maria of Bavaria from the house of Wittelsbach. That Philip IV helped in securing Leopold’s elevation to the Holy Roman Emperor was not sufficient to secure Leopold’s full support in the future.

Meanwhile, the domestic situation in England in 1657 was colored by the question involving Cromwell and the Crown. It was not the only issue causing concern in the country, but it was certainly one that informed much of the discourse at this time. Agents of all the major European powers wrote letters and reports indicating that they expected Cromwell to accept the crown and begin a new dynasty in England. The move seemed surprising to some, as the republic appeared well embraced by many in England. It also frightened the newly allied French who believed that a newly crowned ‘King Oliver I’ was going to seek a separate peace with Spain to ensure domestic tranquility after securing his throne.\(^{87}\) The basis of such a treaty held that Cromwell was satisfied with his

\(^{87}\) Ibid, 176.
gains thus far and was willing to work towards peace at home and abroad. Such thinking had little grounding in fact as it was unlikely that either side would entertain a treaty at that point. Spain surely was not able to consent to a peace wherein England retained Jamaica, and the English desire underlying the Treaty of Paris was the capture of Dunkirk, a feat which was as yet unaccomplished.

There was also internal opposition to the coronation of Cromwell. Loudest amongst the dissenters was the Army which had more or less been ruling the country in the period now referred to as the Rule of the Major Generals. The calling of the Second Protectorate Parliament had largely ended that period, but the influence of the army was still strong. Leading this faction was General John Lambert, who felt that a return to monarchy betrayed the central purpose of the revolution. Considering that Cromwell and his Protectorate were in the midst of war, it behooved the government to avoid antagonizing the army if it could be avoided. The “Humble Petition and Advice” as it was, already upset the military by reducing their budget to a still staggering million pounds per annum. Such outspoken dissent was watched intently by foreign observers and royalists abroad, who felt the instability it created was detrimental and beneficial, respectively. To assuage such fears of internal turmoil, and perhaps to quiet his own conscience, Cromwell responded to the Humble Petition in a speech before Parliament saying, “I am perswaded [sic] to return this answer, That I cannot undertake this government with the title of king; and this is my answer to this
weighty affair." Cromwell’s rejection was not just of the crown but of the entire Humble Petition and Advice which meant turmoil was avoided, but stability was unachieved. General Monck wrote to Secretary Thurloe that month imploring both Cromwell and Parliament to reach an agreement for such stability’s sake, indicating perhaps his chief desire. It appeared that stability was achieved later that same month when Parliament agreed to reinstate Cromwell as Lord Protector while Cromwell accepted the remainder of the Humble Petition, including its call for the “Other” House. While the Humble Petition and Advice in its modified form retained the republican government, the monarchist thinking which produced it remained active in English political life beyond 1657.

Twilight of the Franco-Spanish War and its Effect on Jamaica

Despite fundamentally seeing Jamaica’s cause as less important, in 1657 King Philip claimed to be sending the Armada to the island. However, he rescinded that offer by April of 1658 because, "it is so important that the galleons depart later to bring the treasure of silver that one hopes with all abundance those of the kingdoms of Peru and Tierra Firme, as well as that New Spain have."

Still dealing with the fallout of the attack on Santa Cruz, which finally ended with the silver reaching Cadiz in May 1658, King Philip could ill afford to risk his galleons on a mission that did not enrich his needy Royal Treasury. It was more important that the galeones and flotas proceeded along their set course without making dangerous detours to engage English vessels eager to plunder the richly laden ships. Clearly Philip IV subsumed the recovery of Jamaica to his immediate need to get the treasure from the Indies. That need was the Crown's driving policy governing the Indies at this time. It is important to recognize that the Court in Madrid viewed the Indies as a source of silver and little else. The Spanish monarchy had not yet reached a point where it viewed its colonial empire as a source of income through investment in agriculture and industry. It was still very much a distant place from which mineral wealth was to be obtained. Again, there had been little need to seek alternative revenue streams at this point in time.

Thus by 1658, the government in Madrid had well and truly come to believe that the reconquest of Jamaica had to be carried out by local force. That is
to say, by arms, money, and leadership which was already located in the surrounding area. 1657 marked the end of real open warfare for the island, and 1658 can be seen as the end of Peninsular interest in recovering the island through military force. With that mentality in mind, King Philip was greatly displeased with the performance of local forces before, during, and after the defeat at Las Chorreras. In particular, the king was enraged by the lack of coordination between his officials.

having increased the relief that all the Windward Islands have sent to that island for its defense, and more particularly what you, with all abundance and providence, had sent, all have rotted, not only fruitless, but with disgrace to my arms because of the disobedience and vileness of Captains, corporals, and soldiers from which the failures resulted.

Apparently, Reyes had not made enough of an impression on the king and did not merit the praise which Egues had received a year earlier. It was imperative that officials in the Caribbean work together if the Crown was going to successfully recover Jamaica without dispatching aid from the peninsula. The insubordination of Reyes’ caliber contributed heavily to the “rotten” status of Jamaica.

The disorder and disagreement between local officials was simultaneously resolved and exacerbated by the defeat at Las Chorreras. In 1657 there had been disagreement between Isassi and Bayona y Villanueva about where to land relief troops and supplies on Jamaica. Isassi had favored the southern portion of the island as there was looser English control and less naval presence. Bayona y Villanueva on the other hand, favored the north of the island, as it was an easier journey to make; all it required was a simple channel crossing. A demoralized and
desperate Isassi conceded to Bayona y Villanueva’s northern plan to ensure that supplies could reach him. However, he did so while scolding Bayona y Villanueva and criticising de los Reyes’ actions before, during, and after the defeat at Las Chorreras. While Bayona y Villanueva may have won that issue, it did not mean that he was in the right. Far from it, as his superior in the Americas, the viceroy Duke of Albuquerque rebuked him in a letter from 21 March 1658. Albuquerque wrote:

I do not know this man nor have I ever seen him in my life, but I know that the King and the Council have appointed and elected him and all whom the King and Council appoint and elect represent Him in the place where they are, and subjects have no right to oppositions, competitions or slander but only blind obedience, which is the best road by which to merit the favor of the King and of his Council...I also find in Don Cristobal that, being a native of the island...he must know them better than any other.

This accostment of Bayona y Villanueva was truly indicative of how Castilian nobility viewed themselves, their role in government, and how that role served them.

Albuquerque demanded blind obedience from Bayona y Villanueva and reminded him that such obedience is imperative to advancement within the Crown hierarchy. It is a poignant reminder of the constraints which bound colonial officials. Blind obedience to orders which came either infrequently or in dizzying succession coupled with other orders which were out of date by the time they arrived, without a doubt created frozen colonial governments which struggled to keep up with the rapidly evolving situation created by strong English

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91 Ibid, 72.
naval presence around Jamaica. The constant threat of English attack was, as has been shown, paralyzing, but fear of losing one’s position, power, and reputation were also powerful reasons for inaction. The case of don Pedro Zapata provides a powerful example. Zapata had been one of the first colonial officials to send aid to Jamaica and had sent it on three occasions. In February of 1658, 3 years after having sent that aid, he had to justify doing so to the King. He informed the king that “help...sent to Jamaica in no way deprived Cartagena of anything necessary for the safety of that port.” He had no orders to send such relief and if he had done so while exposing Cartagena to damage or capture he faced severe reprimand that could have cost him his position. His case highlights the lag in communication and the severity of acting without, or outside of, clear orders. It also shows that actions were taken without prior orders to do so when the ability and opportunity presented itself and that perhaps colonial administrators were not drones awaiting orders from the hive. Taken in combination, it’s quite apparent why colonial officials chose to fortify their ports and strengthen their defenses.

At the core, King Philip did not want colonial governors, presidents, or even the viceroys to risk their domains for the recuperation of Jamaica. To that end, King Philip did authorize relief from Spain to New Spain on 22 September 1658. This showed that while there was an ability to mobilize arms and relief in Spain and get it to the Indies, it is just that it was not intended for Jamaica.

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92 Ibid, 70.
Despite earlier assuaging the king by stating that New Spain could withstand any invasion by resorting to scorched earth policies (assuming an enemy had a skilled enough pilot to land troops in New Spain), Albuquerque had later come to the realization that he required some assistance. King Philip heard Albuquerque and was able to authorize arms be sent there. There was however, a large fuss over the costs and how those arms were to be delivered, by whom, and in what quantities. It also appears that this aid was to be paid for by two Basque men from San Sebastian rather than the Crown directly. This made sense considering that the Crown had supplemented taxes through *donativos* or voluntary donations to the Crown by the nobility.  

It hardly bears repeating, but this is yet another clear example of the Crown’s priorities; the defense of the colonial centers came before any organized attempts at the recovery of the colonial periphery. Since Jamaica was not producing steady Crown income for generations, a concerted effort to maintain the island was not considered.

Meanwhile, the president of the audience of Panama had obtained information from a former prisoner of Jamaica who explained all the best places to enter the island. These positions could be used to resupply the people and recover the island. Guzman decided that the information should go to Don Pedro Zapata, the governor of Cartagena so that he could arrange the dispatch of a ship to those spots. This made sense since Cartagena is closest to the southern part of Jamaica and satisfied Isassi’s desire to have provisions land there. Guzman also

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notified Albuquerque of this information as a matter of course. It is not clear if Guzman was aware of Bayona y Villanueva's incorrigibility and sought to circumvent his authority. It could just have been that from the information given to him he came to the same conclusion as Isassi that the southern part of the island made for the best landing spot. The former prisoner had, as many other prisoners had before, informed Guzman that the English were planning further attacks. Guzman, like Albuquerque and Bayona y Villanueva, took measures to secure his own dominion first and foremost before seeking to recover Jamaica. His aid was in forwarding pertinent information along the chain of command. He could not and did not send material aid.

Moreover, from Isassi’s perspective, sending further men to Jamaica only intensified his difficulty in supplying those men. In May 1658, a second relief force from New Spain under Alvaro de Raspuru arrived in Jamaica to assist Isassi. However, this force proved no more successful than the last force, albeit for different reasons. After he received news of the disaster at Las Chorreras, Isassi returned to the North of Jamaica and established a camp at Rio Nuevo. Meanwhile, the contingent from New Spain landed on the island. Their journey was not far from direct though. Like the relief force a year prior, they had been routed through Santiago de Cuba and the hands of its infamous governor. Bayona y Villanueva had been instructed to notify Isassi after eight days if he was not going to be sending that force immediately. Instead, Bayona y Villanueva delayed sending the force for fifty days. Isassi accused Bayona y Villanueva in August
1658 of using that time to siphon off the best supplies, troops, and most of the money destined for Jamaica. The 550 men sent compared to the roughly 400 that landed in Jamaica support this, though it was also believed at the time that some men had simply deserted while in Jamaica. In either case, the force that arrived in Jamaica had already run through most of their supplies of food. Additionally, they did not join forces with Isassi for eight days after landing. Once they had met up, the combined force of roughly 520 men was soon challenged by English forces.

As the men from New Spain were disembarking, a small scouting party of English ships encountered them. In the ensuing naval skirmish, Raspuru remarked, “Each little frigate of ours seemed a galleon of the royal fleet, the way they fought and palpably damaged them.” After the brief engagement, the English ships sailed off under the cover of night. According to D’Oyley, the ships were not driven off due to Spanish resistance; rather, they were becalmed and thus unable to engage further and board the Spanish ships. In any event, the English were now aware of the presence and location of Spanish troops in the north of the island. No sooner had Isassi and Raspuru met than they found themselves engaged in combat.

Having resolved on 21 June to attack the Spanish, the English returned at Rio Nuevo with 10 ships and over two thousand men (according to Isassi) on the following day. The amphibious assault landed men on the beach where they were

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94 Frank Cundall and Joseph Luckert Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards, Abstracted from the Archives of Seville*, Kingston: Jamaica, Institute of Jamaica, 1919, 75.
able to vanquish 23 Spaniards and take more than that number prisoner. In the English account, this forlorn hope had managed to secure the beach under a consistent, though futile, Spanish artillery barrage. Before continuing onto the fort which the Spanish had constructed, the English opened fire from aboard their ships. However, as D’Oyley himself noted, their cannon shot was as successful as the Spanish. As D’Oyley indicated in his account, he believed that he was outnumbered, though if Isassi’s estimation is to be believed the English outnumbered the Spanish roughly 4 to 1.66 D’Oyley’s calculation had convinced him to halt for the day and attempt an assault the following day.

Having resolved to make such an attempt, D’Oyley nevertheless offered Isassi terms the night before. These terms were slightly but critically different from those offered in 1655 in that they made no provision for these men to stay. Surrender now meant a departure from the island. English controlled Jamaica no longer tolerated a Spanish presence on the island. Isassi, who had orders from the King to remain in Jamaica, and who was resolved to blindly obey them, refused D’Oyley kindly and stated that Spanish troops would not surrender so easily.67 So, a confrontation was had the following day. Isassi utilized a mixed defense of his fortification. Some of his troops lay in wait for the advancing English and fired from the woods before retreating back towards the fort. This was the style of fighting which Isassi was known to have preferred, but the fact that the main

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66 Frank Cundall, and Joseph Luckert Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards, Abstracted from the Archives of Seville*, Kingston: Jamaica, Institute of Jamaica, 1919, 79.
force was in the fort showed he was capable of more traditional fighting. In actuality, it was not very much unlike the type of defense which the Spanish forces in Santo Domingo had mustered against the Western Design. However, as the English forces soon discovered, the flanks of the Spanish fortification were not yet complete. The result of the hasty fortification was foreseeable disaster. The English were able to pour into the fort from the flanks while those Spanish not already dead or wounded attempted to flee into the woods. Isassi, in his own report to King Philip, claimed to have lost over 300 men. 98 Put another way, three-quarters of the poorly armed, poorly equipped men who arrived on 18 May were dead by 26 June.

The similarities between the defeats at Las Chorreras and Rio Nuevo are not purely coincidental. They are indicative of the enormous disruption which Pedro de Bayona y Villanueva represented in coordinated attempts at relieving and recovering the island. His intransigence twice resulted in less men, supplies, arms, and money reaching Jamaica, and reaching the island later than intended. It is not impossible to imagine a scenario in which a different governor immediately sent relief to Jamaica, that relief was not spotted by the English, and was, therefore, able to complete a fortification before any imminent assault. Moreover, he need not be seen as some traitorous conspirator, only a governor interested in maintaining a fruitful partnership with nearby merchants. He is not the sole reason why the Spanish were unable to retake Jamaica, but he was the

98 Frank Cundall and Joseph Luckert Pietersz, Jamaica under the Spaniards, Abstracted from the Archives of Seville, Kingston: Jamaica, Institute of Jamaica, 1919, 78.
primary reason why Spanish Caribbean forces were unable to do so. Towards the end of the year, Isassi was able to report on English forces in Jamaica. According to his report, they now had 3,000 armed men on the island, 8 merchant ships, 7 Dutch vessels, a flagship with 54 guns, 200 men spread across two forts on the future Port Royal, at Morante Point: 100 soldiers, ten pieces of infantry, and most importantly, 300 farmers. Even before his defeat at Rio Nuevo Isassi had bemoaned, “that [the English] know the island so well that they make war on me all over it.” Nearly all possible Spanish advantages were erased by 1658. The only thing remaining, and barely so, was the support of the maroon community.

1658: The European Perspective

Although it occurred in the final quarter of the year, the death of Oliver Cromwell could claim to surpass any other event from that year in importance. The only other possible event to rival it was the English seizure of Dunkirk. In combination, these two events mark the end of the Protectorate and the English experiment with republicanism; the beleaguered rule of Richard Cromwell being its unfortunate epilogue. While the death of Cromwell hastened Charles’ return to the throne, the capture of Dunkirk came to color that monarch’s foreign policy. For Spain, and the ever pious Philip, Dunkirk’s fate represented the realization of the worst-case scenario.

Philip had been concerned about the precarious situation of Dunkirk since the combined Anglo-French forces had captured Montmedy and Mardyck in

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99 Frank Cundall and Joseph Luckert Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards, Abstracted from the Archives of Seville*, Kingston: Jamaica, Institute of Jamaica, 1919, 75.
1657. Anyone with a map in front of them came to a similar conclusion, as they lay so close to Dunkirk. Despite such knowledge, resupplying and refortifying Flanders had been challenging for the Spanish monarchy since the closing of the so-called “Spanish Road” from Italy to the Low Countries in the 1630s, and the rampant piracy harassing the sea route. As such, the most Philip IV felt he could do was pray for deliverance. This should not be mistaken for complete helplessness, as the army of Flanders was typically the largest Spanish army, larger than any on the Iberian or the Italian Peninsula. Moreover, early modern conflict favored the defenders in a siege, so for whatever despair Philip may have felt, he was not staring down an inevitably grim situation.

While it may not have been inevitable, Dunkirk did of course, fall. The siege began on 25 March, and was supported by the Protectorate Navy blockading the port and assisting in the landing of French troops. Indeed, history often credits the English with playing the decisive role at Dunkirk. According to one estimate, 30,000 French troops were assisted by 40 English warships and men preventing relief from reaching Dunkirk by sea (the reality was that 15,000 French troops were augmented by 6,000 Englishmen). However, it was also possible that another English force could have turned the tide for the Spanish side. James, Duke of York, and Henry, Duke of Gloucester, were commanding the 2,000 Royalist forces alongside Don Juan and the Prince of Condé. Their plan was to cut through Flanders amassing men and supplies along the way, expecting to

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rally as much as 40,000 men to their banner. Clearly there existed in the Spanish imagination the idea that there were as yet untapped human resources spread about the empire. Regrettably for the Spanish, this relief force managed to gather up to 15,000 men before approaching Dunkirk. At Valenciennes, the Spanish relief commanded by that same Don Juan had been able to overrun Turenne’s forces and successfully lift the siege. At Dunkirk however, Turenne seized the initiative and attacked the Spanish, leaving 6,000 men to maintain the siege. What caused this defeat in the ensuing battle and its narrative is not nearly as what it signified in the European and American contexts.

First, we can see in the Battle of the Dunes the central struggle of the second half of the 17th century. The “Spanish” forces were extremely diverse, as already noted, English forces made up a noteworthy component of this army. There were also German, Walloon, Irish, and French troops in this force. Yes, these men were mercenaries, but the rise of France ensured that men from across Europe found themselves lining up against the armies of France. In time they were joined by Dutch forces, and the Restoration brought still more English troops. What once cost Spain a considerable fortune, amassing an army in Flanders, was now to be given voluntarily out of self-interest. The latter half of the 17th Century marked the incorporation of north-western Europe in the Spanish project through commercial interests. Fearing Louis XIV on their doorstep, the Dutch, English, and German princes came to the defense of

Flanders to prevent outcomes that threatened the commerce they maintained with Spain. Part of the traditional ‘decline of Spain’ narrative is their inability to come to the defense of Flanders. However, the need to do so outright actually dissipated after this defeat. The Dutch and Holy Roman Empire supplied the force while lax Spanish rule fostered the loyalty to the Crown. This outsourcing of military might was part of the ingenious durability of the Spanish Monarchy and was replicated in Jamaica, as will be shown.

From the Protectorate perspective, Dunkirk marked the apex of Cromwell’s foreign policy. The Dunkirker threat had been removed, an alliance with a major continental power had been established, and the colonial American Empire had been expanded through the capture of Jamaica. The Anglo-Spanish War had thus fulfilled its purpose, and not a moment too soon. The war itself was never completely popular and at the onset was rather unpopular. Parliament often struggled to allocate funds to properly fight the war, and was usually more concerned with domestic affairs and creating a more ‘rightly ordered society.’ It must be remembered that mid-17th century England was a revolutionary state and that the domestic political situation was constantly evolving. The letters, House of Commons Journal, and other contemporaneous documents span a breadth of concerns for the English government. Not least among these was funding such a government.

Problems with taxation were not a uniquely Spanish problem; England too suffered from a lack of funds flowing to the government. The budget which the
Humble Petition and Advice put forward set aside one million pounds for the military and only 300,000 for all other expenses of government. That same article established that such funds were not to be collected through the hated land tax, but the reality forced them to ignore that provision. With such tension regarding funding an adequate government, the Protectorate could ill afford economic collapse. Financial ruin called into question the regime’s legitimacy. For this reason, they had to reconcile the Spanish war to the economic hardship felt by English merchants

It was devastating to merchants for two main reasons. Despite blockades at Cadiz and the seizure of Jamaica, trade with England had been embargoed by Spain, a move which was felt harshly by the English merchants in Madrid and London. The English found markets closed to them and goods no longer available. If the financial pressure was not enough, the second mechanism which Spain deployed to target the English economy was privateering. Indeed, the military threat to all English shipping presented by the Dunkirk privateers was also devastating. Although history tends to favor the exploits of English, French, and Dutch privateers in the Caribbean, these Spanish-backed Flemish privateers were equally successful. Having finally rid themselves of that threat, the Protectorate now needed to turn towards peace with Spain to lift the embargo on English shipping. Had Cromwell survived 1658, perhaps the English could have had a seat at the table for the coming treaty in 1659 and shaped a peace to their

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liking. However, the reality was that Cromwell did indeed die. For the next
decade war without conflict and peace without a treaty marked the
Anglo-Spanish relationship. The failure to conclude a treaty in 1658 or 1659
created an opportunity for Spain to win the peace in 1670.

Cromwell’s death, despite his refusal of the crown in May of 1657, was
akin to the death of a monarch. Despite numerous meetings and motions in
Parliament in 1657, the issue of succession had never truly been resolved. Thus,
while Cromwell lay dying, members of the government rushed to his side to
extract his successor from him. The choice was unsurprising if not disappointing;
his eldest son Richard assumed the title of Lord Protector. Now, although
Cromwell had refused monarchy in 1657, its specter had been raised again in
1658 ahead of calls for a new Parliament. It was believed by some to be the only
means to ensure further stability within the nation and to consolidate the
progress which they had made. Before his death, Cromwell had asked General
Monck to serve in the ‘Other’ house of Parliament which was understood to be a
de facto House of Lords. Monck’s coy refusal to do so, and to remain at his power
base in Scotland reveals that Monck may have already been preparing for his role
in the Restoration. According to historian C.H. Firth’s reading of Secretary
Thurloe, Cromwell had made up his mind in 1658 to accept the position of king.
In that context, his naming of Richard as successor was all too certain. It allowed

for the possibility of revising history and naming Cromwell as king
posthumously, and Richard his heir. However, the persistence of a political
climate which favored monarchy was dangerous considering there was already an
English monarch across the channel.

Indeed, almost immediately following the death of Cromwell, Thurloe
notified Cromwell’s son Henry of rumors about a conspiracy within the army.
Secretary Thurloe feared that “there are some secret murmurings in the army, as
if his highnes were not generall of the army, as his father was; and would looke
upon him and the army as divided.” Thurloe admitted that he did not know what
such thinking could lead to, but that it did not bode well for stability in the
country.105 The year prior, Henry Cromwell was concerned about the growing
intimacy between General Lambert, who had opposed monarchy the year before,
General Desborough, and General Fleetwood.106 If the connivance of 3
Major-Generals was an alarming internal problem, the Fleet’s letter to Richard in
October was indicative of a growing external threat. The Officers of Fleet wrote
to the new Protector swearing “to stand by you to the hazard of life and estate,
and to defend you against Charles Stuart and his adherents, and all who
endeavour to place the legislative authority otherwise than in a single person and

105 "State Papers, 1658: September (1 of 4)," in A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe,
British History Online.
106 “Letter from Henry Cromwell to Lord Broghill” in "State Papers, 1658: March (2 of 3)," in A
Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, Volume 6, January 1657 - March 1658, ed. Thomas Birch
(London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), 851-863, British History Online.
2 houses of Parliament.”\textsuperscript{107} Clearly the Fleet understood the vulnerability of the Protectorate following the death of its first Protector. Indeed Royalists abroad felt that their moment was nearing, as the Earl of Norwich wrote in December 1658, “We hear of great disorders in England, and... Letters from Brussels say our master’s business in England was never in so fair a way as now...I am confident that before 3 months we shall hear of strange changes.”\textsuperscript{108} Indeed strange changes came to pass in 1659.


The End of Spanish Resistance

The most important development of the Spanish position in Jamaica actually took place far from the island in the chamber of the Council of the Indies. It was in 1659 that they finally decided to hold a formal inquiry into the situation in Jamaica and what steps could be taken to recover the island. The main testimony before the council was given by Francisco de Leiva Isassi, don Cristobal’s brother. The questions asked and responses given indicate the fundamental disconnect between the ministers of the council and the situation on the island. Technically though, the Council had no authority or jurisdiction over the island and never had. Recall that it was the personal domain of the descendants of Christopher Columbus. From 1494 on, the council had rarely made any inquiries about Jamaica and had little knowledge of the island.

The report created by the Council inquiry began with a recollection of the events on the island before 1659. The defeats at Las Chorreras and Rio Nuevo are accounted for, and significant blame is placed at the feet of Bayona y Villanueva and de los Reyes. This is unsurprising considering that the Governor of Jamaica’s brother was giving the testimony, but still it does represent an important acknowledgment of their guilt. Where Francisco de Leiva Isassi perhaps went too far is in claiming that had Bayona y Villanueva complied with the orders given to him, Jamaica would undoubtedly have been reclaimed. At Las Chorreras that may have been true, but by Rio Nuevo his mere compliance was not enough. The knowledge that such a situation was true was evidenced by the council’s pressing
of Leiva Isassi to indicate what size force was necessary to reclaim the island. Leiva Isassi dodged giving a direct answer and only stated that what was needed was the assembling of a strong naval force in that endeavor. He seemed keenly aware of the King and Council’s reluctance to commit too many men to the undertaking. Instead, Leiva Isassi proposed a plan which was not unlike the Western Design. Some men and ships were to be outfitted in Spain, and they were to be substantially augmented by troops and supplies already located in the Caribbean before making for Jamaica. Perhaps a small detachment could break off from the already scheduled flotas and perform such a task. When presented with this plan, the Council chose instead to counter with one of their own which required a different investment of resources.

Their plan, or hope really, was embodied in one of the questions they posed to Leiva Isassi. They wondered if the English could be paid to abandoned Jamaica. While the question was likely an honest inquiry, it demonstrated that the Council of Indies placed the English control over Jamaica within the context of piratical English raids. Underscoring their unwillingness to risk manpower and naval power from Spain directly to reclaim the island was this fundamental misunderstanding of the long term intentions and consequences of the English seizure of Jamaica. It was hard for these council members to conceive of an immediate need to dispatch the armada to reclaim the island if they believed that the English might just as well abandon it once they recovered whatever plunder they sought.
Moreover, such a perspective makes plain that they believed the island to lack any foreseeable value either to themselves or to the English. Historians who seek to argue that the loss of Jamaica was immediately recognized as a crushing blow must reckon with the persistence of these perspectives four years after the initial conquest of the island. Because they did not view the English presence on the island as anything more than an existential threat to hegemony over the Indies they were not prepared to risk more to remove that threat.

They simply did not recognize or fully understand the potential disruption the English in Jamaica could cause. This Council of the Indies was the same council which notified Philip IV of growing English, Dutch, and French presence in the Lesser Antilles without recommending any measures to reverse this trend. The hegemony over the Western Hemisphere which Spain claimed was not understood to be as indefatigable as their claim over Portugal. Its loss was neither as bitterly felt, nor as fiercely pursued. So while the English on Jamaica once again threatened that supposed Spanish monopoly of the Americas, Spanish men were not to be sacrificed for that cause alone. Men like Leiva Isassi resorted to sounding alarms that such a presence posed a threat to shipping, in particular the silver fleets. Yet, anyone aware of the route of the fleets understood that the fleet only passed Jamaica on its way to pick up silver, not after. Moreover, many believed that the ‘miracle’ of Santa Cruz could be repeated should the fleets come under attack again.

Despite all this, Leiva Isassi declined to answer the question about if the English could be bribed to give up Jamaica. Yet he clearly understood what the Council members wanted to hear; he responded,

since they have sown in the island and are reaping its fruits and carrying on general trade it seems to this declarant that they will not evacuate it for any inducement on account of the many interests and concerns they have there, but that with the death of Cromwell it may be that the Commanders have been changed and some negotiation can be attempted with them.  

By 1659, it was clear to colonial officials that the English were setting up a stable colony on the island, much like their islands in the Lesser Antilles. However, there was still some hope that a change in government might produce the return of Jamaica to Spanish control. After all, the Treaty of Brussels established that should Charles return to the throne of England, Jamaica was to be Spanish again. Most scholarship only considers that treaty in how it shaped Anglo-Spanish relations after the Restoration, but fails to consider its impact on those same relations before that time. Such failures in the scholarship leave one perplexed as to why the death of Cromwell made waiting the preferred method of ‘reconquering’ Jamaica. For reasons that will become clearer in the next section, the conclusion of peace with France in 1659 did mean Spanish attention was directed towards another enemy. However, Portugal came into the Spanish crosshairs, not the English, and certainly not English Jamaica.

Meanwhile, Isassi’s position on Jamaica was becoming completely untenable. Isassi found himself desperately low on many necessities. In letters to

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110 Frank Cundall and Joseph Luckert Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards, Abstracted from the Archives of Seville*, Kingston: Jamaica, Institute of Jamaica, 1919, 94.
Bayona y Villanueva, he demands beef in an almost childlike manner, perhaps as a sign of in what regard he held Bayona y Villanueva. He wrote, “I have very little beef, so you will supply me for I have not enough for six days. If you do not help me, we shall be in a bad state for beef is what is needed. Supply me with beef.”

As usual any aid was going to be slow coming and records indicate that for the first time in 3 years no relief entered the island. Having committed himself to small-scale guerilla-style warfare, Isassi went to the southern portion of Jamaica to harass the heavily fortified English presence there. He claimed to the King to have had some success but there appears to be no such evidence of these attacks in the English sources. So, with his small band of fifty men, Isassi could still claim to fulfill his orders in maintaining a presence on the island. However, it was clear to anyone with authority that only with a change of the English government could control of the island change hands.

As was mentioned, by 1659 the English had truly established their presence on the island. It is in this year that we see the central internal tension that defined the next decade in Jamaica, take root. On the one hand, the planting interest was on the rise as evidenced by new requests for wives to join their husbands on the island. This demonstrated that there was a belief in England at the time, at least among some people, that the island was both safe and respectable enough for these women to desire to go there. This is further

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111 Ibid, 78.
demonstrated by increased interest in the creation of a West India Trading Company amongst government officials in London. While the creation of this company did not come to fruition, it was still an important indicator of the change occurring on the island. What many had previously been seen as a thorny consolation prize of a failed military expedition was becoming an opportunity worthy of investment. It should come as no surprise then that the first officially documented slave importation under English occupation was in 1659.  

Directly opposed to the planting interest was the privateer or buccaneering interest in the colony. The ongoing guerrilla resistance of the Spanish, as well as the maroon and free-blacks, meant that substantial military resources congregated around Jamaica. There were also the persistent rumors of an impending Spanish invasion of the island which required a constant patrol of ships circulating around the island. Crewing these ships and manning the forts were men often found wanting by their commanding officers. Moreover, as early as 1657, Jamaican commanders such as Lt. General Brayne had to send out soldiers to ‘make their own way’ as it were by engaging in activities like hunting. However, his predecessor, Major Sedgwick, had also described these men as lazy. It was well-known that these soldiers were generally uninterested in planting, and occasionally deserted rather than work on a plantation.

It is thus not difficult to comprehend why such men preferred to be a

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113 David Eltis and Martin Halbert, Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Databas., Emory University, 2008.
privateer or buccaneer. These would-be privateers found a receptive ear in the
person of Captain Christopher Myngs, the captain of the Marston Moor, who had
arrived to command the Jamaica station in 1656. Much like the relationship
between Isassi and Bayona y Villanueva, Myngs and D’Oyley were men at odds
with one another. While they both sought to make Jamaica safe and profitable,
Myngs was more interested in securing profit first and foremost. In 1659 he
chartered a course towards the Spanish Main much like Vice-Admiral Goodson’s
4 years earlier.

Myngs’ resulting raids on the towns of Cumaná and Coro on the northern
part of South America were materially far more successful than Goodson’s had
been and ushered in the creation of Jamaica’s reputation as a haven for the
privateering sort. Although the inhabitants in these towns had fled into the bush
at the sight of the ships, taking their valuables with them, 2 Dutch ships flying
Spanish flags were unable to escape Myngs’ fleet. Estimates of the haul state that
Myngs’ raids captured between £200,000-£300,000 with the majority coming from
silver ingots inside two chests seized aboard the Dutch vessels. It may be
tempting to suggest that this was another devastating blow to royal coffers, but it
must be remembered that silver destined for Spanish ports did not mean it was
destined for Spanish hands. In any event though, it marked a huge success for the
privateering interest in Jamaica and London and proved that significant gains
could be achieved through this policy. However, the raid was not without

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115 Jon Latimer, Buccaneers of the Caribbean: How Piracy Forged an Empire, Cambridge,
controversy, and though it has never been conclusively proven it is believed Myngs divvied up the spoils with his officers and crew before returning to Jamaica. D’Oyley condemned the action and sent Myngs back to London. This was not the end of the now infamous Captain, and he returned to plague the Spanish Caribbean.

But perhaps the most critical development in Jamaica was the English discovery of a Black Resistance community in the center of Jamaica. It is hypothesized that during the previous 4 years, these communities had supplied needed food to Isassi’s men on their way to ambush English forces. As evidence for this, historians cite the settlement, or pelinco, of Juan de Bolas. Covering roughly 200 acres of farmland, it is not unreasonable to think that it provided food for more than just the inhabitants surrounding it. Crucially, it was this settlement that English forces under the command of Lt. Col. Tyson stumbled upon in late 1659. They had known that there were 3 main settlements that made up the Black Resistance in Jamaica, and now, having discovered one, the English were ready to find the other two. To do so they brought the leader of that particular community, de Bolas, to Port Cagway to parlay. With their greatest advantage now neutralized, de Bolas recognized the need to join forces with the English to ensure his community’s survival and autonomy. The English promised to respect the sovereignty of that community under Juan de Bolas in exchange for de Bolas leading his men against the other two communities. In the coming year, 

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116 Noël W. Sainsbury, Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, Preserved In... the Public Record Office...: America and West Indies, 1675-1676, Also Addenda, 1574-1674, HM Stationery Office, 1893, 133.
his faction of the Black Resistance definitively turned the tide for England and helped determine the next phase of Jamaican history.

**1659: the European Context**

Similar period-defining events occurred in Europe as well in 1659, whose effects only entered the Caribbean context in the next decade, if at all. 1659 harkened the end of Richard Cromwell and hastened the Restoration. This year also saw the conclusion of the Franco-Spanish War with the Treaty of the Pyrenees. The fact that these two processes occurred independently of each other had explicit consequences for Anglo-Spanish relations especially in regard to Jamaica. The domestic situation in England was running its own course, surprisingly independent of foreign intervention which ensured that Spain did not play a decisive role in restoring Charles to the throne. In their Treaty of Brussels, Spain was called to militarily support Charles’ restoration and afterward, King Charles II was to renounce the English presence in the Americas. In previous years, military intervention in domestic English affairs was deemed impossible due to the war with France. In 1659, that war was concluded with the Treaty of the Pyrenees and intervention was plausible. However, events within England seemed to make that intervention neither necessary nor desirable.

The political situation in England became volatile almost upon the ascension of Richard Cromwell to the title of Lord Protector. As has been explained, Richard represented the logical choice for succession from a monarchical perspective. If that perspective is changed though, other options
were quite viable. For example, Henry Cromwell was undoubtedly the better Cromwellian candidate for a hereditary Protectorate. His experience governing in Ireland made him an appealing option. However, he was in Ireland, had almost no base of support in England, and did not desire the position himself. There was a relative of Oliver Cromwell who may have coveted the title, that person being Major-General Charles Fleetwood. He too had experience governing Ireland, was located in England, and had the respect of the army. Naming Fleetwood his successor could have ensured the stability of the Protectorate, but it could have just as easily cost it its legitimacy. It would essentially solidify the Protectorate as a military rather than a civilian government. Indeed, both he and Henry were not satisfactory candidates; the political tide had turned away from the military towards the civilian since the end of the ‘Rule of the Major-Generals’ and the adoption of the *Humble Petition and Advice*.

Sensing and fearing this turn, Fleetwood moved towards the end of 1658 to solidify his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Even though Richard had not shown any indication to replace him or place anyone above him, Fleetwood wanted to consolidate his place in the political system.¹¹⁷ Fleetwood claimed that his maneuvering was not in defiance or opposition to Richard, but those in the army, supposedly his army, saw the opportunity to question Richard’s legitimacy. In one of several letters to Henry Cromwell at this time, Secretary Thurloe wrote,

“Sometymes the fire seemes to be out; then it kindles againe.” That “fire,” was the ‘Good Old Cause’ and it came roaring back in 1659.

Ambiguously defined, the so-called ‘Good Old Cause’ was associated with the sovereignty of Parliament in a ‘Free-State’ and the rejection of the arbitrary power represented by kings, lords, and bishops. Army officers like Fleetwood and John Lambert, alongside political figures like Arthur Haselrig, felt that the Humble Petition and Advice had thrust such arbitrary power back to the fore. As evidence, they cited the creation of the ‘Other House,’ which was the House of Lords in all but name, and the debate of Cromwell taking the crown.

Underscoring this tension was the fact that payments for the army and navy were both well in arrears, and new revenue was a necessity, revenue which could only be called for by Parliament. The need then, was for a Parliament that ensured the payment of those arrears without using any arbitrary powers. Richard as Protector and the ‘Other House’ were thus cast as impediments to securing this end.

Thus, once Parliament was convened at the end of January 1659, the process of stripping Richard Cromwell of power and dismantling the Protectorate along with him began. First, was the call to reaffirm Richard as Lord Protector. Though the vote passed and he retained his title, the debates served to seriously undermine his authority and legitimacy. Moreover, it branched out into debates which called into question the organization of the Parliament with

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regard to the ‘Other House.’ Essentially, a faction within Parliament dedicated itself at the start of 1659 to the repudiation and destruction of the Government of the Three Nations under the *Humble Petition and Advice*. Finding themselves numerous but not the majority, their attempts at using the House of Commons to control the entirety of government were unsuccessful.

Their allies in the Army were, therefore, necessary to enact their vision for the future of the Three Nations, that is the Three Nations organized under the sovereignty of the Commons. In April then, Fleetwood called for a meeting of army officers to air their grievances with the current state of the nation. The officers petitioned Richard, asserting that they were for the ‘Good Old Cause,’ which they consciously associated with the payment of their arrears.\(^{119}\) Fearing that he was losing his grip on the nation, Richard called a general muster later that same month. Unfortunately, the nation did not rally to Richard’s banner and he was from then on, effectively neutralized in politics. The uneasy alliance of Fleetwood and Haselrig reinstated the Rump Parliament, which had last met in April of 1653, on 6 May 1659. While many a true republican might have been overjoyed, the move did not produce the desired outcome. Agents of the would-be King watched the affairs intently and reported back to Charles that the nation was divided to their benefit. A royalist minister by the name of John Barwick observed that what once appeared as one party was, in fact, three; there

were the senior officers which preferred the Protectorate and Richard as ‘puppet’, the junior officers in support of the Long Parliament, and the MPs in favor of that same Parliament but without the interference of the Army.\textsuperscript{120}

So when Fleetwood found the Rump not to his liking, he disbanded Parliament in the Autumn. The decision was fatal to English Republicanism. To simplify the political landscape at the time, it might be helpful to consider four key factions. One being the former cavaliers and royalists who supported the restoration of Charles Stuart. Another group supporting the Protectorate, with some supporting its evolution into a new Cromwellian Monarchy. Then there were those who were in the Rump, or who supported it, and believed in the ‘Good Old Cause’ and looked to the United Provinces as their model.\textsuperscript{121} Finally, there was the army; being such a massive group, they naturally found themselves also spread out amongst the other three factions but generally threw their support to whomever could pay their long-overdue salaries. Fleetwood’s dismissal of the Rump shattered this political scene sending the fractured pieces into new camps.

Whereas in May, the Army and Rump were allies, and the army itself united, by November no such unity existed. The Senior Army Officers, like Lambert and Fleetwood, sought to foster stability through the creation of a Committee of Public Safety headed by themselves. This drew a stern rebuke from


\textsuperscript{121} Lyon Freeman, The Common-Wealths Catechism. Published to Inform the Good and Plain People of This Common-Wealth, in Arms, and out of Arms, and to Prevent the Designes of Hypocritical Ambition. Humbly Dedicated to the Members of Parliament, and Their General Monck, London, Printed by John Clowes, 1659.
junior officers as well as the Army of Scotland, led by General Monck. Indeed, Monck indicated that while he did not want continued civil war, he was prepared to engage in it if the Long Parliament was not restored. Adding to the uncertainty were members of the general public who pleaded with Fleetwood to restore the Rump and avoid exercising arbitrary power. There were even those who questioned what right he, or Lambert, had to call any such Parliaments going forward. Those people recognized that an army general calling Parliament to order was a military government with the trappings of the ‘Good Old Cause.’ This situation had made the more monarchical side of the spectrum bolder in their public appearance, both Cromwellian and Royalist.

By the end of 1659, Richard tried to reinsert himself into the political scene as Lord Protector by invoking one of Aesop’s fables, that of Zeus and the Frogs. Richard deliberately and explicitly cast himself as ‘King Log’ thus resurrecting the specter of a Cromwellian dynasty, albeit a far less frightening prospect. However, the analogy and the earnest attempt it represented failed to lead to the desired outcome. This was probably because Richard was appealing to the Stork, not the Frogs. The failure of his ‘Humble Petition’ was truly Richard’s exit and the ultimate end of the Protectorate as a model of government. With Richard, and therefore the Protectorate, no longer a viable option for the Three Nations, General Monck had precious few options when he began his march to

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122 George Monck, Duke Of Albemarle, *Three Letters from the Lord General Monck, Commander in Chief of the Forces in Scotland, and One of the Commissioners by Act of Parliament for the Government of the Army of This Commonwealth, Viz. to Mr. Speaker, to the Lord Fleetwood, to the Lord Lambert*, Edinburgh, printed by Christopher Higgins, in Harts Close, over against the Trone Church, 1659.
London. Many desired his intervention though, as they saw their cause reflected in his personage.

This destabilization was naturally viewed by Charles and his supporters as extremely favorable to their cause, but not without its own perils. There was a fear that the internal turmoil could cause England to seek a peace with Spain, thus stripping Charles of a key ally. Indeed there was an ambassador sent for just such a purpose. Meanwhile, within England, speculators worried how their current political situation alienated their French allies, or any other foreign powers interested in partnering with them.¹²³ Lockhart, the English ambassador to France, traveled to Dunkirk and then requested to leave his post and return to England upon hearing of the restoration of the Rump. The Dutch meanwhile, sought to reaffirm their friendship with England, despite a period of rising tensions, due primarily to the Dutch relationship with Spain. After Fleetwood’s dismissal of the Rump though, the famous Admiral De Ruyter angrily notified Ambassador Nieuport not to trust any further treaties or alliances with England, “till I see some effects of those conventions, which we have already made with that state.”¹²⁴

At the same time, the French had turned their attention from England towards the all-important peace with Spain. The internal English situation meant that Spain, for the first time since 1656, could afford to look at affairs in England

as a distant concern. Looking back on 1659, King Philip remarked, “the affairs of that Kingdom are in such turmoil with each other, that while their unrest lasts they will not bother us much...”\textsuperscript{125} The turmoil which Philip IV cited provided a convenient excuse to avoid dispatching relief from Spain to Jamaica. Furthermore, it led Philip IV to believe that the bargain he struck with Charles II was about to come to fruition. Also, both Spain and France were ready to negotiate with each other without worrying so much about England’s place in the treaty. For France, the simmering conflict between England and Spain to France’s west freed them up to pursue their own interests on their eastern border.

Spain pursued the end of 24 years of war for much the same reason as France, in a sense. Peace with France was essential to pursuing Philip IV’s ultimate aims in Europe and his obligations as a Habsburg Monarch. Peace on their eastern border gave them a free hand to pursue the final thrust for Iberian unification. The 24 years of inconclusive warfare in which they had been engaged had fundamentally sunk Spain. The French war had destabilized Spain domestically (i.e. Castilla and Aragon) and threatened to separate her from her important European possessions in Italy and Flanders. However, the greatest and most enduring losses that Spain suffered as a result of this war were dealt to them by England and Portugal. Dunkirk, Jamaica, and the whole of Portugal were lost forever to Spain. At the time though, the permanence of these losses was not imminently apparent. Rather, from the Spanish perspective, it all seemed to be

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid, 607.
within reach through peace with France In September 1659, with the Treaty of the Pyrenees nearing its completion, France broke off its military commitments to England. In Madrid it was rumored that in the coming days the Spanish Governor of Flanders was going to enter Dunkirk and see it peacefully returned to Spain.\textsuperscript{126}

The appeal of recovering from the greatest losses to Spanish prestige and power was too strong to be denied. Therefore it was imperative for Spain to seize the opportunity offered by Mazarin and France. To such an end, King Philip offered his daughter, the Infanta Maria Theresa, as the bride of Louis XIV. King Philip, in being so eager for peace, had ordered his ambassador in Paris to agree to much of the treaty as early as the end of April.\textsuperscript{127} The territorial losses of Artois and Roussillon, while major, were far more palatable when seen in the larger context. From the perspective of traditional Habsburg policy, King Philip could claim to still be preserving the territorial integrity of the Habsburg monarchy by not losing the entirety of the dominions which those cities were a part of. By concluding a peace now, in 1659, King Philip was ensuring that the bleeding stopped there and that losses stopped on other fronts, namely Portugal. The centrality of Portugal in King Philip’s domestic and foreign policy should not be forgotten. In the secret articles of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, France agreed to cut off aid to Portugal, and to cease harboring Portuguese ‘rebels.’ France also

\textsuperscript{126} Jerónimo de Barrionuevo, Avisos de D. Jerónimo de Barrionuevo (1654-1658): precede una noticia de la vida y escritos del autor, M. Tello, 1893, 248.

\textsuperscript{127} María de Jesús de Ágreda, Francisco Silvela, y Felipe IV Rey de España, Cartas de La Venerable Madre Sor Maria de Agreda Y Del Señor Rey Don Felipe IV, Est. tipográfico” Sucesores de Rivadeneyra,” 2013, 576.
agreed to stop supporting England in its war against Spain. These secret articles should have therefore provided Spain with the free hand it needed to deal with both kingdoms swiftly and definitively. First Portugal would be retaken, then Dunkirk and finally even Jamaica.

However, the Treaty of the Pyrenees is often regarded as unimportant primarily because it did not provide the long term peace which it should have. Despite the centrality of the Habsburg-Bourbon marriage, France proved unmoved to respect the sovereignty and borders of their new in-laws. Moreover, the impending Restoration did not usher in swift peace with England as it should have. As will be seen, once Charles was given control of Great Britain he charted a political course that matched his new role as king better than his former role of exile. What this meant for Jamaica was that the promise of having it handed over on behalf of Charles II had to be abandoned. The difficult work of planning, preparing, and executing a reinvasion of the island had to be carried out. This could only take place once Portugal had been reunited with Spain. The English and French both continued to work against Spain on the Portuguese front effectively keeping Spanish power from crossing the Atlantic.

**1660 Prior to the Restoration**

Back in Jamaica, the turbulence of England and the resolution between France and Spain had little impact on the internal conflict still gripping the island. King Philip’s relief at the political situation of England was indicative of how little he factored Jamaica into his vision. When King Philip thought of
Jamaica at all, it was inextricably linked to his treaty with Charles II and his restoration. This in part explains why 1660 was not the year in which we see a Spanish armada outfitted to rendezvous with Governor Isassi and retake the island. The restoration of Jamaica to Spain could be worked out by diplomats, not generals. As a result, this year marks the anticlimactic end of Isassi’s resistance.

Isassi was steadfastly committed to the idea that he could lead and execute a guerrilla resistance until a larger sea-borne force relieved him. To that end, he remained on the island with his men, including a special military advisor named Juan de Tovar, also committed to the cause. These two leaders found themselves completely outmatched by Juan de Bolas by midyear. Recall that in 1659, de Bolas and his pelinco had been stumbled upon by the English. As part of his arrangement with the English, de Bolas agreed to pursue and destroy the other Black Resistance communities as well as the Spanish Resistance. Unfortunately for the other two main Black Resistance communities and the Spaniards, de Bolas had all the information necessary to rapidly carry that out.

It’s unclear when exactly the two other Black settlements were attacked by de Bolas, but by February 1660, word of his alliance reached the Spaniards. Although they had not yet met de Bolas in open conflict, the Spaniards were well aware they were doomed. On 22 February they resolved to leave Jamaica stating,

...in view of the news that had been received that the settlement of Juan Lubolo had joined the enemy. All the Captains present were of the opinion that the island should be abandoned for the reason that the negroes are so experienced and acquainted with the mountains that no success could be obtained there but that we were all exposed to the known risk of being murdered
without escape.\textsuperscript{128} Just the mere fact that the Black Resistance had allied with English was enough to make the Spanish surrender. It was at this point that the leadership understood well that these communities were not, and had never truly been, under their command. With that support withdrawn, they knew their cause was lost and their choice was between death or departure. Just four days later, their fear came to fruition as they were routed by de Bolas with the loss of roughly 140 men. At this point, Lt. Col. Tyson offered terms to Isassi and the process of evacuating the island began. The importance of the Black Resistance in the overall schema of Spanish Resistance is evidenced by just how quickly the Spanish surrendered upon hearing of their defection to the English. Isassi and the fifty or so men who remained with him after the defeats of Las Chorreras and Rio Nuevo were loyal to King Philip IV and believed in the righteousness of their cause. Jamaica was their home and had been the home of their respective families for generations. They refused to leave the island time and again and were willing to withstand malnutrition and English attacks. Yet, they were decidedly unwilling to endure attacks from the Black community of Jamaica. Isassi’s final official surrender was drawn out over the course of the next 3 months due to the difficulty of communicating quickly and arguments over prisoner exchanges. But, in May of 1660, an important channel crossing was made. Don Cristobal Arnaldo Isassi looked back from his small boat towards the island he had fiercely

\textsuperscript{128} Frank Cundall and Joseph Luckert Pietersz. *Jamaica under the Spaniards, Abstracted from the Archives of Seville*, Kingston: Jamaica, Institute of Jamaica, 1919, 98.
defended for 5 years and which he never returned to again.

The Spanish-American effort to reconquer Jamaica failed for two basic reasons: the first was external in that other officials pursued the preservation of their islands and colonies first and foremost, leaving Jamaicans on their own. While scholars point to the two failed relief expeditions as evidence of Spanish inability and inadequacy, they are more indicative of Spanish apathy towards Jamaica. It was well understood in Jamaica that the best men were not dispatched to assist them, and that food and other supplies were often withheld. With stubborn governors like Pedro de Bayona y Villanueva, who needed enemies like Colonel D’Oyley? The advantage of keeping their best men at home to defend against further English raids and the advantage which further English trade presented was overwhelming in ensuring that the Jamaican effort was poorly supplied. The second reason was internal; it lay with the Spanish inability to fully understand the Black Resistance. This failure ensured that they did very little to court or entice their support throughout the entirety of their resistance. By misunderstanding the Black desire for freedom and independence as loyalty to their King, the Spanish did nothing to solidify or create common cause with what was arguably the island’s most powerful force. Indeed, the development of these groups into the Maroon communities ensured that Jamaica was not fully pacified until the middle of the next century.

Simultaneously, the Peninsular Spanish effort to retain Jamaica was oxymoronic; there was never going to be any real effort coming from Spain
proper. If the *galeones* and *flotas* were able to complete roundtrip voyages, Philip IV saw no issue. The European theater was always more pressing, with Portugal becoming particularly acute. King Philip’s obsession with an Iberian Union continued to rob the Americas of a consistent and effective Spanish naval presence. The Franco-Spanish war ended in 1659, and a truce was declared with England in 1660. Rather than utilizing those mobilized forces in the Caribbean theater, Philip IV deployed those forces and more in returning Portugal to Habsburg control. The same pre-occupation which prevented the silver fleet from making a detour to Jamaica in 1658 continued to prevent such action following Charles II’s Restoration. In the absence of significant naval opposition to Restoration Buccaneering, Spain relied on her diplomats to defend Spanish Imperial interests from the capitals of Western Europe.
Conclusion: Jamaica and the Dowry of Charles II

While Isassi was crossing the small channel between Jamaica and Cuba, Charles II was making a far better known channel-crossing. The Treaty of Brussels should have meant that Charles’ restoration resulted in the restoration of Spanish territory lost to the Protectorate. That this did not happen is worth investigating to conclude the present history. One of the main concerns of the restored monarchy was funding itself. The Convention Parliament of Charles’ restoration managed to limit the power of the monarch through the power of the purse so as to not outwardly be seen as constraining the King. They settled on £1,200,000 for his annual revenue, a sum which had Charles II begging before Parliament to resolve his dire situation. He pleaded saying, “I come to put you in mind of the crying Debts which do every day call upon me for some necessary Provision.” To satisfy those debts and continue to pay for what was needed to ‘defend the kingdom,’ Charles had to look beyond Parliament. One of the most promising avenues for the 33 year old king was through marriage. A dowry could provide a quick and substantial influx of money to his royal coffers. The only questions then, was how much and whom?

For the next two years, King Philip sought to provide the answer to these questions. The marriage of Charles II was a matter of the peace and security of Spain because Charles was the missing piece in Philip IV’s diplomatic isolation of Portugal. Marrying Charles into his family, and away from the Braganzas, 

offered him a free hand with which to crush that rebellion. Critically missing from this plan though was a daughter; Maria Theresa had just married Louis XIV and carried an unpaid dowry. His younger daughter Margarita was both 10 and already betrothed her uncle and cousin, Leopold, the Holy Roman Emperor. To solve this problem, the desperate Philip IV offered to adopt a Princess of Charles II’s choosing. He first offered the Princess of Parma, along with a dowry equivalent to whatever the Portuguese were offering. When the Princess of Parma was no longer a viable option, Philip continued to offer Princesses to Charles, even sacrificing his firm religious stance. To assuage anti-Catholic sentiment in England, Philip IV offered the Princess of Denmark, Saxony, and Orange to Charles. However earnest and competitive these offers were, they were also fundamentally flawed, and therefore unacceptable to Charles.

Two key factors prohibited the union of Spain and England through marriage, both regarding the proposed dowry and directly affected by Jamaica. As far as the ‘cash’ involved in the dowry, the Portuguese were offering England roughly £500,000 in various trade goods. Even though Spain was prepared to match that amount, the prevailing opinion was that Spain was offering an empty promise. In 1659, they had agreed to a sum of 500,000 écus as the dowry for Maria Theresa. As Charles was considering marriage proposals, that sum was not yet paid to Louis XIV. It, in fact, was never paid and hungover Spain until 1714.

Charles needed money as soon as possible and even the current delay of Maria Theresa’s dowry was too long for him. Moreover, as another historian has put it, “if [Philip] denied the payment of the dowry to a true infanta of Spain, no guarantee existed that a surrogate would get hers.” Even if King Philip were to offer more cash as part of the dowry, his credit was literally too low to be able to pay it and Charles was acutely aware of this. Their treaty of Brussels should have guaranteed Charles roughly £100,000 to support his restoration, but Spain’s actual payments never matched that promise. The difference between the Portuguese and Spanish proposals becomes even greater when the territories offered are considered.

In addition to the £500,000, Portugal offered the territories of Tangier in North Africa, and Bombay in India. If Charles accepted the Spanish match, he had to restore both Dunkirk and Jamaica. Just on this surface level, it is stunningly obvious why he never agreed to any marriage proposals offered by Spain. It’s tempting to ask why Philip didn’t offer those two places as part of the dowry: it helped Philip rationalize their loss within his role as a Habsburg, and it could have actually secured the match. However, as has been stated, the prevailing belief at the court was that both places were to be returned shortly. The Marquis of Carecena, governor of the Spanish Netherlands, was preparing to reincorporate Dunkirk into his fortifications budget. Meanwhile, news came that

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an English ship had been stopped by Spaniards and told them they were headed to Jamaica to inform the English there to surrender it back to Spain. Moreover, the Spanish tended to misunderstand the importance of Spanish trade in England. When presenting potential matches to Charles, the Spanish ambassador to England, Baron de Batteville, opened by stating that was necessary to England. It wasn’t entirely false, as the unpopularity of the war among the merchants showed, but it was exaggerated. Philip IV fundamentally believed he was owed Jamaica through his treaty from 1656 and should receive Dunkirk through the pressure of the English merchants.

On the contrary, English merchants were actually pressuring Charles to keep Jamaica despite what seemed like the end of the conflict. Almost immediately upon Charles II’s restoration, a truce was agreed between the two powers. The Restoration government found this war too much at such a critical juncture. For one thing, it was unpopular and had been started by his hated predecessor. Even D’Oyley, who was on one of the front lines of the war, called it in 1660, “the unsuccessful war with Spain.” Unsurprisingly he greeted the news of the truce with joy publicly, but with confusion privately. When notification of the truce reached him in February 1661, it was not accompanied by marching orders. In a letter to a distant cousin, Secretary Edward Nicholas, D’Oyley wrote that he, “Has impatiently expected orders from his Majesty, how to carry himself

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in this great and happy change, but in their absence has pursued his former instructions.\footnote{\textit{Col. Edward D’Oyley, Governor of Jamaica, to his kinsman, Sec. Nicholas,} in “America and West Indies: March 1661,” in \textit{Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 5, 1661-1668}, ed. W Noel Sainsbury (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1880), 14-21, \textit{British History Online}.
} By ‘former instructions,’ D’Oyley meant hostile action against Spain in the form of privateering. Continuing the war in the Caribbean was both acceptable in contemporary diplomatic thinking, and in line with Charles II’s intentions to keep Jamaica and make it profitable.

While the English goal was peaceful free trade in the Indies, they utilized the commonly held belief of ‘No peace beyond the line’ to obtain that goal. So while in February 1661 D’Oyley ordered the cessation of hostilities, the very next month he reversed course and held that the truce with Spain did not apply to this side of the line.\footnote{\textit{Col. Edward D’Oyley, Governor of Jamaica, to his kinsman, Sec. Nicholas,} in “America and West Indies: March 1661,” in \textit{Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 5, 1661-1668}, ed. W Noel Sainsbury (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1880), 14-21, \textit{British History Online}.
} In addition to profit through privateering, the English in Jamaica were encouraged to pursue trade with the Spanish, specifically in Cuba. But Royal Officials understood well that there might be Spanish resistance to English merchant activity. In 1662, the new governor Thomas Windsor was ordered,

\begin{quote}
To endeavour to obtain and preserve good correspondence and free commerce with the plantations belonging to the King of Spain, but if the Governors of said King refuse, to endeavour to \textit{settle such trade by force}, and by doing such acts as the Council shall judge most proper to \textit{oblige the Spaniards to admit them to a free trade}” (emphasis added).\footnote{\textit{Additional instruction to Thomas Lord Windsor, Governor of Jamaica,” in "America and West Indies: April 1662,” in Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 5, 1661-1668, ed. W Noel Sainsbury (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1880), 84-89, \textit{British History Online}.}
\end{quote}
Herein lies the central double standard of English policy in the Caribbean at this time. England was attempting to violently pry open the jaws of the Spanish monopoly of the Indies while engaging in diplomatic negotiations in Madrid. By 1664, the policy failed and Charles II’s ministry actively distanced itself from the actions of buccaneers that claimed to be serving the same monarch.

So despite false reports they were preparing to return the island, all the documentary evidence shows that the English were planning to consolidate their control over the island. While officials in Jamaica were told to treat Spaniards like stubborn hoarders, wresting anything of value from their hands, they were also ordered to cultivate a peaceful domestic atmosphere. The goal very early on was to replicate the success of Barbados in Jamaica in nearly every way. One of the cornerstones of that plan included sending colonists from Barbados itself to rapidly build the plantation economy in Jamaica. This included the promise of 30 acres of land to any settlers that quickly relocated there. To ensure speedy settlement, the Governor of Barbados was ordered to promote, rather than inhibit, the movement of settlers from his island to Jamaica. Moreover, as early as November 1660, England sought to transform Jamaica into a slave hub in the West Indies. James, Earl of Marlborough advised Charles, “To persuade the Royal [African] Company to make Jamaica the staple for the sale of blacks. The King to

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contract with that Company for 100 negroes to be delivered at the island.”

They also wanted Jamaica to serve as a gateway for slave trading into Spanish cities and ports. In 1662 some 200 enslaved Africans had officially been sold from English ships to Spanish cities, to make no mention of those illegally smuggled into Spanish ports. In June 1661 D’Oyley himself was accused of having sold 140 slaves to a Spanish ship which had passed by. That same year, the President of the Audience of Panama detained an English ship that had entered the port on the pretense of trying to catch English pirates. The claim was believable enough but President Aguero felt they were lying and that “the truth is that his principal care was to see if there is a way to introduce the blacks and merchandise which were brought in the vessel.” In this particular case, Aguero chose to deny these men entry and relay the information to Madrid rather than engage in the illicit trade.

While the appearance of English sails in his port was tense, it still ended peacefully, a marked difference from similar moments both before and after. Less than a year after this affair was Christopher Myngs’ raid on Santiago de Cuba in October 1662. A raid like this was undeniably foreseeable given the likemindedness of officials in London and Port Royal. In April officials in London had given Windsor permission to force open free trade. By August he had

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140 Fernando de la Riva Agüero, “Carta Del Presidente Fernando de La Riva Agüero,” Cartas Y Expedientes Del Presidente, Oidores Y Fiscal de La Audiencia de Panamá, PANAMÁ,22,R.6,N.124, Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla, España.
received word from the governors of Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico that they were resolved not to engage in trade. From that point forward, Windsor had all the justification necessary to order a raid on a Spanish city. In September, the council approved a ‘design by the sea’ led by the Centurion commanded by Myngs.

Myngs’ justified the decision to sack Santiago de Cuba by highlighting its role in resupplying the Spanish resistance before 1660. This may have been due in part to the fact that he found Isassi leading part of the defense to his raid, whom he described as a “great friend.” To ‘revenge’ the harm which Santiago de Cuba had done to the English for 5 years, Myngs allowed the complete destruction of the town. According to one Spanish official there, “they burnt and blew up the Holy Church Cathedral, some hermitages and most of the houses of this said City...demolished the Castillo del Morro and ruined some platforms at the mouth of this port.” Clearly then, there was no peace beyond the line in 1662. In Europe too, the situation seemed to be on the brink.

In 1662, despite the attempts and protests of Philip IV, Charles married Catherine of Braganza. The marriage alliance called for Charles to provide soldiers for the rebel cause, an article which alone should have caused war between the two. If that wasn’t enough, the Spanish feared that the English

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142 C. H. Firth, “THE CAPTURE OF SANTIAGO, IN CUBA, BY CAPTAIN MYNGS, 1662,” The English Historical Review XIV, no. LV (July 1, 1899): 539.
squadron sent to take command of Tangier was secretly planning an attack on that year’s *flota*. Highlighting Spanish precariousness and importance, a Dutch convoy led by Admiral De Ruyter offered to protect the fleet and saw it safely delivered to Cadiz.\(^{144}\) Further compounding the calamities was another English insult, namely their sale of Dunkirk. Charles decided to sell the city for much the same reason he chose Catherine of Braganza, ready money. While again the Spanish had made a competitive offer, Charles chose to sell it to France. In combination, these events led many in London and Madrid to believe that war was imminent. In his diary, Pepys’ remarked,

I am sorry to hear that the news of the selling of Dunkirk is taken so generally ill, as I find it is among the merchants...Indeed I do find everybody’s spirit very full of trouble; and the things of the Court and Council very ill taken; so as to be apt to appear in bad colours, if there should ever be a beginning of trouble, which God forbid!

The prevailing feeling was that this action was enough to cause war with Spain and that merchants were going to once again lose out on the Spanish trade. However, that same month Philip explained to Sister Maria that he refused to fight any new wars unless violently provoked first; Philip was firmly on the defensive.\(^{145}\)

What this meant was that England and Spain essentially found themselves staring at each other waiting for the other one to officially declare war. Neither side actually wanted open conflict in Europe so each stopped short of actual

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\(^{145}\) María de Jesús de Ágreda, Francisco Silvela, and Felipe IV Rey de España, *Cartas de La Venerable Madre Sor María de Agreda Y Del Señor Rey Don Felipe IV*, Est. tipográfico “Sucesores de Rivadeneyra,” 2013, 689.
outright violence. England wanted to maintain and strengthen their trade partnership, and Spain was committing all military efforts to Portugal. This is not to say that there wasn’t conflict by proxy. The military assistance from England to Portugal certainly constituted one example of this kind of low-scale conflict but it was far from the only example. When Portugal handed Tangier over to the English, the Spanish were not the only ones to feel slighted by the transaction. North African forces under the leadership of Abd Allah al-Ghailan were engaged in besieging English forces in the area on and off until his death in 1673. During this time, he was sponsored by Philip IV and received assistance from Spain. At court, the meticulous letter-writer Jéronimo de Barrionuevo went so far as to refer to al-Ghailan as “a friend and our supporter.” Spanish support of al-Ghailan was more effective but far less intriguing than their attempts to create another revolution in England.

As Robert Stradling alleges, Spain was allocating funds and fostering contacts in England who could lead and manage an uprising against Charles’ government. They had even identified a potential leader in Edmund Ludlow and were utilizing the services of Ignatius White as their chief spy. In a letter written by one of his assistants, the Spanish cause was explicitly identified as a response to the sack of Santiago de Cuba. He wrote, “The Spaniards are greatly incensed because some English went ashore in the West Indies, killed several

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Spaniards, and plundered the country; they will try to raise a mutiny..."\textsuperscript{148} The recipient of the letter promptly notified the Earl of Clarendon and the plot was snuffed out in Ireland. However, efforts like this show that rather than meekly accepting the insults laid upon them by England, Spain was able to instead wage covert warfare and back-off when it suited them. The contemporary thinking which allowed Charles to commit hostile acts in the West Indies without breaking a truce forced Philip to use underhanded techniques in Great Britain. In certain respects these actions form the core ‘playbook’ of the hegemon; sowing discord secretly and then disavowing it publicly continues to be a tactic used to create favorable outcomes for powerful nations seeking to protect their reputation.

The reason why Spain was trying to refrain from appearing as an aggressive power was because they could not afford to lose the support of the Dutch, who had maintained a good relationship with the English. Dutch protection of the flotas was absolutely critical, as was their construction of warships for Spain.\textsuperscript{149} Despite this close relationship, the Dutch sought to conclude a long and ongoing war of their own, one borne out of their struggle for independence from Spain. Unfortunately for Spain, this meant that the Dutch were entering into negotiations with the Portuguese. Seeing the favorable terms which the marriage to Catherine had brought England, the Dutch sought to also


\textsuperscript{149} Francisco Martín Sanz, La Política Internacional de Felipe IV: Guerra y Diplomacia en el Siglo XVII, Segovia: Francisco Martín Sanz, 2003.
‘cash in’ on the Portuguese desire for allies. The resulting Treaty of the Hague secured all Portuguese colonies except Guinea and granted the Dutch the same trading privileges as the English, along with a four million *reis* indemnity for the parts of Brazil which the Dutch had captured. The Dutch did not completely sever ties with the Spanish as a result of the treaty, but they were neutral going forward and sold crucial supplies to the Portuguese until the war’s end.

Philip thus had to fully commit himself and subjects to the Portuguese rebellion if there was any hope of success. To this end, Philip pressed hard for a naval blockade of Lisbon and a patrol of the Portuguese coast. The naval build-up that accompanied this spread contracts across Spanish possessions to build warships and outfit them. In March 1661, the council of war had ordered 50 warships to be prepared for use against Portugal. This was in addition to the 30,000 man army they were trying to gather. The annual sentiment regarding Portugal was that this was the ‘last year’ or the ‘last thrust’ and that the current campaign season was going to result in the successful invasion of Portugal and the final flames of the Braganza pretense smothered. Perhaps the highest cruelty for Philip was that each campaign season brought a wave of hope only to end in some sort of despair. In 1661, the despair was due to the death of his prime minister, Don Luis de Haro. The news was greeted on the Portuguese front by his illegitimate son Don Juan de Austria with glad tidings. He is said to have remarked, “The king has lost a Great Minister, my Lord; but let’s go hunting”

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clearly feeling that with de Haro gone, the king was about to allocate more resources to Portugal.  

Even though the king absolutely wanted to put all the remaining strength of Spain into the campaign, his highest remaining officials saw the writing on the wall. Philip reorganized his bureaucracy after de Haro’s death and left matters of Spain and the Indies to him alone. Meanwhile, he left affairs to the West and North to the Duke of Medina de las Torres, one of the key figures of influence going forward. The Duke had been mentored by Count-Duke Olivares, but had come into his own as viceroy of Naples. He was seen by many and still is, as pragmatic when confronting the numerous challenges faced by the beleaguered monarchy. For years, he had advocated for a truce with Portugal as a prelude to an honorable and satisfactory peace with the rebels. Now, finally realizing the influence which Olivares desired for him, Medina de las Torres could actively try to bring that about. He was not alone in this thinking though, the Count of Peñaranda, one of the delegates at Westphalia and one of Medina de las Torres’ rivals, also felt that a truce with the Braganzas was necessary. However, Peñaranda believed that a truce should necessarily be followed by a regrouping and renewed hostilities. Given that, it is less surprising that the two statesmen often disagreed on a course for the House of Austria.

With mounting pressure to put an end to the fighting, however temporarily, Philip had to find ways to fund the annual campaigns. Having

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151 Ibid, 409.
already reduced the salaries of those ministers holding multiple offices to the one of their choosing, Philip resolved to utilize the full wealth of the Indies. He believed that there was still an abundance of silver and gold which they need only scoop up onto their fleets and bring back to Spain. He was cautioned against burdening the Indies too heavily though, as the fear was that in doing so, he was allowing smuggling to flourish.\textsuperscript{152} Indeed the leadership in Tierra Firme had seen illegal trade start to flourish around Maracaibo, effectively cutting the governor off from that port.\textsuperscript{153}

The thinking on display by Philip IV showed exactly where his priorities were at the start of the 1660s and where they had always been. At a time when there was a flurry of Spanish naval activity, so much so that the English were awaiting an invasion of Jamaica, Philip IV directed it to the familiar Portuguese coasts rather than remote Jamaica.\textsuperscript{154} When that invasion did not come, Governor Windsor was ordered to disband the army and allow for the fullest development of a civilian, planter society within the island. Facilitating this transition was the nearly 1,400 enslaved Africans sent across the Atlantic to the island between 1661-1663.\textsuperscript{155} Another critical moment had slipped through Philip IV’s fingers, yet he did not see it that way. For in his mind he was fulfilling his ultimate duty

\textsuperscript{152} Jerónimo de Barrionuevo, Avisos de D. Jerónimo de Barrionuevo (1654-1658): precede una noticia de la vida y escritos del autor, M. Tello, 1893, 501.
\textsuperscript{155} David Eltis and Martin Halbert, “Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database,” Emory University, 2008.
and pursuing the reunion of Portugal will the fullest rigor possible. Jamaica was an insult to his honor, yes, but so was the sale of Dunkirk, the marriage to Catherine, and deference shown to French ambassadors over his own. He had tolerated all of these because they were nothing but distractions from what had become his only obsession. In 1659, the diplomatic isolation of Portugal was nearly complete and all that was left was the dispatch of a triumphant army across the border.

Yet by 1663, the Portuguese were receiving Dutch war materiel, found their forces augmented by English veterans, at the head of which was a former French Marshal. This utter reversal in such a short time meant that the force necessary to recapture Jamaica wasn’t even a consideration in civil discourse. In any case, as far as the Indies were concerned, there was little to complain about. In this same timeframe, the *galeones* and *flotas* had each made 2 successful roundtrip journeys to the Indies, something which had not been done since 1653. So despite the hardship and suffering felt at Santiago de Cuba and the more immediate threat of the English in Tangier, Philip IV’s primary hopes for his New World possessions were coming to fruition. His ministry, and the ministers that outlived him, were going to be responsible for discovering how best to engage with the English of Jamaica and their attempts to ‘force a free trade.’

Meanwhile, Charles II’s ministry dispatched Ambassador Richard Fanshawe to Madrid to begin work on the treaty of peace and commerce which

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156 Bartolomé Antonio Garrote, *Manifiesto... En Que Demuestra Que Las Armadas Y Flotas de Nueva España Y Tierrafirme Han Salido de Estas Reynos Para La América Todos Los Años Successivamente, Desde El de 1580 Hasta El de 1699*, Sevilla, 1699.
eventually became the Treaty of Madrid in 1670. They sent over a new governor to Jamaica who was explicitly instructed on numerous occasions to refuse commissions to privateers. As the ambassadors Fanshawe, Sandwich, and finally William Godolphin worked on securing peace beyond the line with Spain, the Jamaican Governor Thomas Modyford found carrying out his orders difficult. Modyford found himself at the mercy of the privateers and buccaneers that called Jamaica their home. With limited Royal Navy presence in Jamaica, it was easier for Modyford to issue commissions rather than risk the buccaneers turning on Jamaica. While privateering raids largely failed to make the Spanish receptive to trade, Modyford continued to pursue the policy until he was removed from office in 1668. For that reason, the Treaty of Madrid was a protracted negotiation of 6 years because it was stalled whenever word reached Madrid of English depredation in the Caribbean. When it was finally completed in 1667, and then explicitly revised to its final form in 1670, it called on England to repudiate and crack down on piracy and privateering and opened up Spanish-American ports to English merchants. Crucially, it explicitly recognized Jamaica as an English possession in the Caribbean. The breakdown in the Spanish monopolization of the Americas suffered, but the commerce and wealth which the Americas brought to Spain did not. Instead, the most profitable years of the Empire lay ahead. The sun had not yet set on the Spanish Empire.
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