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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FAR EAST
AS REVEALED IN THE MACARTHUR HEARINGS

BY

SARA STAUFFER WHALEY

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
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UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND

1962

ABSTRACT

The hearings on General Douglas MacArthur's dismissal conducted by the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on the Armed Services were concerned with the relationship between the civil and the military, the comparable importance of Europe and Asia, and the validity of the concept of limited war. This thesis is an examination of the general's actions and statements which caused President Truman to doubt the effectiveness with which the general could carry out the policies of the United States and the United Nations. It also examines American policy toward postwar China and actions taken during the Korean War as they were discussed in the hearings. The effects of American relations with its allies, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations on the Korean action are also discussed.

After reading articles in the Congressional Record, The General and the President by Rovere and Schlesinger, and other general works, the writer of this thesis studied the published committee hearings which supplied the main part of the material used in the thesis. When additional clarification was needed, books such as Walter Millis' Arms and the State or Truman's Memoirs were helpful.

From the testimony given before the Senate committees, it is concluded that the President had justifiable reasons for dismissing Douglas MacArthur, although in deference to the general's past service to the country, he might have asked the general to resign.

President Truman acted in the interest of the free world when he committed American troops to save South Korea from the Communists, although the necessity for such action might have been avoided had the administration, Congress, and the country been willing to spend more money for deterrent arms and forces in areas of probable conflict. Under the conditions existing at the time Truman's efforts to limit the war action to Korea and to give priority to Europe as the area where it was most important to maintain strength for the containment of Soviet expansionism were commendable.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On April 17, 1951, General Douglas MacArthur returned to the United States after an absence of fourteen years. Six days earlier the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, had dismissed him with the explanation, "General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties."¹

Vociferous denunciations of and arguments against the President's action immediately burst forth. Republicans demanded permission for the General to speak before a joint session of Congress. In caucus, they discussed the possibility of impeaching Mr. Truman. Senator Richard Nixon suggested a Senate censure of the President and pressure on him to restore MacArthur to his command. Senator Kenneth Wherry introduced a resolution providing for an investigation of the General's removal. In short, most Republicans were out to make as much political capital as possible out of this abrupt dismissal,

¹Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956), p. 449. See page 107 of appendix for excerpts from Truman's address to the nation.

although a few Eastern Republicans, James Duff and Leverett Saltonstall, for example, supported Truman.¹

Meanwhile, Democrats were seeking to identify MacArthur and the conservative Republicans with a plan for forcing a major war with China, although Southern Democrats were, in many cases, less than enthusiastic in their support of Truman. Senator Tom Connolly, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Richard Russell, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, both supported Truman. Senator Russell soon announced an investigation by his committee of the facts behind MacArthur's dismissal.² When it became obvious that the country was interested in more than the military aspects of the question, the Foreign Relations Committee expressed an interest in participating in the hearings. A unanimous consent decree was introduced by Senator Russell on April 25 and the hearings began on May 3.³

¹New York Times, April 12, 1951.

²Ibid., April 16, 1951.

³Members of the Committee on Armed Services were Richard B. Russell, chairman, Harry F. Byrd, Lyndon B. Johnson, Estes Kefauver, Lester C. Hunt, John C. Stennis, Russell B. Long, Styles Bridges, Leverett Saltonstall, Wayne Morse, William F. Knowland, Harry Cain, Ralph Flanders. On the Committee on Foreign Relations were Tom Connolly, chairman, Walter F. George, Theodore Francis Green, Brien McMahon, J. William Fulbright, John J. Sparkman, Guy Gillette, Alexander Wiley, H. Alexander Smith, Bourke Hickenlooper, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and Charles Tobey.

On April 19 General MacArthur appeared before a joint meeting of Congress and forcefully presented his views to the world. In this speech and in the opening days of the hearings, it became evident that there were three main issues to be aired before the committees. These were the old argument of civil versus military control, the comparable importance of Europe and Asia, and the extent to which a limited war, as compared to a large-scale war, could achieve American objectives.¹

One of the main problems connected with the hearings and the one which prevented them from being held in public was that of revealing classified information. Transcripts of the sessions were reviewed and censored by a military officer and by a legal adviser to the State Department before being turned over to the press. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was the first witness, followed by Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, and then by General of the Army Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The committees next questioned the Chiefs of Staff of the services: Army General J. Lawton Collins; Air Force General Hoyt S. Vandenberg; and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. Secretary of State Dean Acheson appeared to answer political questions. Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Former Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, Vice Admiral Oscar C. Badger, Major General

¹New York Times, April 15, 1951 (see page 108 of appendix for excerpts from address).

Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., and Major General David C. Barr were the other witnesses.

CHAPTER II

POSTWAR RELATIONS IN THE FAR EAST

Victory over Japan

Although the general purpose of the hearings was supposed to be the weighing of General MacArthur's removal, Republicans eagerly took the occasion to berate the administration for allegedly losing China after World War II. Democrats joined the Republicans in questioning George Marshall, Dean Acheson, Albert Wedemeyer, and Patrick Hurley to ascertain whether our post-war policy was justifiable under conditions existing at the time. The questions ranged from the contributions of Communist China in the struggle against Japan through the "concessions" of Yalta and the American role in the formation of a coalition government of Nationalists and Communists in China.

Upon taking the stand, Secretary of State Dean Acheson spent several hours explaining the administration's policy in Asia after 1945, including an outline of the historical background of the Crimean Conference at Yalta. After it was seen that there was insufficient time in the hearings for one of the participants of the conference, W. Averell Harriman, to testify orally, Senator Brian McMahon called for a written report by Mr. Harriman.

Because the sworn statement which he submitted to the committee is a good summary of the administration's position on post-war events, it will be used in this paper, together with Dean Acheson's testimony, as a basis for explaining the official policy of the United States.¹

Russian soldiers and civilians had fought the German invader with courage and perseverance. By keeping approximately 199 German divisions and 50 divisions of the other Axis countries engaged in the East, the Soviet Union had eased the dangers of the Normandy invasion. This invasion might, indeed, have been impossible without this other front in the East.² Because of the strength of the Soviet Union, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill realized the importance of maintaining good relations with this nation during the war.³

In February 1945 the administration believed that Russian participation in the struggle against the Japanese would be necessary to ensure victory. Because of their ambition to maintain influence over Manchuria, the Russians would have attacked the Japanese there in any event. The

¹U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The Military Situation in the Far East, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, pp. 3328-42. Hereafter noted as Military Situation in the Far East.

²Ibid., p. 3329.

³Ibid., pp. 1878-79, Acheson's testimony. According to Senator Wayne Morse this would account for communications which might seem overconciliatory in the light of later events.

important question at Yalta was whether they would do so soon enough to save American lives, a question which could only be decided by assessing the costs of a victory over Japan.¹

In support of his thesis of the uncertainty of victory in Japan, Acheson referred to the entrance of American troops in Manila on the first day of the Yalta Conference, with the decisive battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa still ahead. Information available showed that the Japanese still had a fighting force of five million men. Planned strategy for an assault on Kyushu in the fall of 1945 and a landing on Honshu as late as the spring of 1946 would have involved an American force of approximately five million men, of which it had been estimated that casualties might be as high as a million.²

Harriman pointed out that the primary source of information which Roosevelt had at the Yalta Conference was a memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of January 23, 1945, that "Russia's entry at as early a date as possible consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations is necessary to provide maximum assistance to our Pacific

¹Ibid., pp. 1875-76 and 3332.

²Ibid., p. 1985. In an article on this part of the hearings in the New York Times of June 21, 1951, the correspondent stated that the figure of a million casualties mentioned by Acheson as necessary to subdue Japan was fantastic, that this would have exceeded all American casualties in the war. Later in the hearings, Patrick Hurley blamed Acheson for the figure, although it had been published by Secretary of War Stimson on the basis of military advice given him.

operations."¹ The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in the belief that a Russian committal in the Far East was a "very essential factor" in bringing the war to an early end; as military leaders, they considered that a campaign by the Soviet Union against the Japanese in Manchuria and Korea was necessary.² Also, General MacArthur had very strongly urged a landing on Japan as a means of concluding the war, and according to General Marshall, such an action would have required support from Russia.³

In support of the need for Russian intervention, Marshall emphasized the determination of the Japanese to fight until the end. When Japanese representatives in Axis and neutral countries of Europe had appealed to the Prime Minister of Japan to work for an armistice, he had mentioned the difficulties of formulating surrender proposals in view of the intransigence of the Japanese army. It was the opinion of the Joint Chiefs that only a tremendous pressure or an extraordinary shock offered any hope of ending the army's rule in Tokyo.⁴

Some witnesses, e. g., Patrick Hurley, testified that it was known or should have been known at the time of Yalta that the atomic bomb should produce the shock needed to topple the enemy army from power. Senator McMahon, chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee, immediately refuted Hurley's statement and quoted a remark of General Leslie

¹Ibid., p. 3332. ²Ibid., p. 563. ³Ibid., p. 564.

⁴Ibid., pp. 560-62.

Groves, wartime administrative head of the atomic bomb project, that the scientists had often felt on the brink of failure.¹ Administration officials held that not until five months after Yalta did the first explosion take place in New Mexico, and scientists even then were not sure that the bomb would be successful.² It would thus seem that although one might well agree with a statement by MacArthur that the United States did not need Russian support after the bomb was dropped and that the Soviet Union's contribution in Asia was negligible, it was by no means evident at the time of Yalta that the bomb would be of any practical use.

In support of the view that the belief in the need for Russian intervention was widespread, Senator McMahon read a speech by Republican Alexander Wiley which was given on July 25, 1945, long after Yalta, in which Wiley decidedly advocated Russian intervention.³

¹Ibid., p. 2895. In an answer to a letter from Sen. Hickenlooper on this subject, Lt. Gen. Groves asserted that Stimson had informed Roosevelt of a ninety-nine per cent certainty on the part of the scientists that the atomic bomb would be successful and very powerful. (ibid., p. 3119).

²Ibid., p. 229. In an article in the New York Times of June 30, 1951, William L. Laurence agreed with the administration on these points: few scientists thought the bomb would be powerful and effective; most believed that the explosion at Alamogordo would have little force; and with only three bombs in existence, it was unlikely that one of them would have been wasted if there was certainty of the success of the experiment.

³Ibid., pp. 2060-62.

The Yalta Agreement

This belief in the need for Russian help against the Japanese led to the inclusion of those controversial provisions of the Yalta Agreement concerning areas in the Far East in which Russia claimed an interest. In his explanation to the Committees, Harriman explained that Stalin outlined the Soviet political objective in the Far East in 1944 as the reestablishment of the approximate situation which had existed before the 1905 Russo-Japanese War. The proposals which Stalin then made formed the basis for the discussion at Yalta.¹

Much criticism has been leveled at the failure to invite Chiang Kai-shek to take part in the conference and to the stipulations in the treaty that he was not even to be informed of the terms dealing with China. Acheson explained his absence as necessary, due to Stalin's insistence that the Yalta Conference would deal mainly with the war in Europe. Keeping Chiang in ignorance was based on prior experience, for whatever was known in Chungking eventually reached the Japanese; Stalin was unwilling to risk disclosure of his plans to Tokyo before his Asian forces were strengthened.²

¹Ibid., p. 3611. The only difference between Stalin's first proposals and the final agreement was that Dairen was made an international port rather than being leased to Russia. The day after Roosevelt and Stalin agreed to the terms, Churchill concurred.

²Ibid., p. 882.

After quoting from a book by Edward Stettinius relating how Roosevelt's death prevented him from reporting the Yalta terms to Chiang, Senator H. Alexander Smith asserted that "we did not play fair with our own ally" and made China pay the price for Russia's entrance into the war. Again Acheson countered that Russian help was believed necessary before an attack could be made on Honshu.¹ Although the clause that claims of the Soviet Union in the Far East should be "unquestionably fulfilled" seemed to some to be a betrayal of China, Roosevelt had been convinced that the requirement of China's eventual concurrence had qualified this phrase. According to Acheson, the terms of the agreement (which were, in his opinion, in the long-term interest of China) had never been contested by Chiang.² When the Generalissimo was notified of the Yalta Agreement on June 15, 1945, he proceeded to draw up an arrangement with the Soviet Union.

General Wedemeyer painted a different picture of Chiang's reaction to Yalta. From personal conversations with Chiang he knew the shock and hurt felt by him because of the Crimean arrangements.³ When questioned on the subject of Chiang losing face, especially in Manchuria, because of Yalta, Acheson said he did not believe that this was so. He pointed to the long time which it took Chiang's forces to

¹Ibid., p. 1871. ²Ibid., pp. 1924 and 1881.

³New York Times, June 13, 1951.

reach Manchuria after the armistice; he believed it would have been impossible for the Nationalists to have reached Manchuria at the end of the war to administer the surrender of 700,000 armed Japanese and prevent the territory from falling into the hands of the Russians.¹

A controversial provision of the agreement was the control given to Russia over Dairen and Port Arthur. When Senator Hickenlooper spoke of this as granting extraterritorial rights in violation of the Atlantic Charter, Acheson admitted that we had had to use our efforts to obtain Chiang's concurrence on this question.² When questioned by Hickenlooper on this subject again later in the hearings, Acheson replied that he did not believe that China was deprived of the use of these ports at Yalta and that a cooperative relationship might have been formed as it was in the case of Dairen.³

When Patrick Hurley spoke before the investigating committees, he aroused further controversy by maintaining that Roosevelt was sick at Yalta and that the Agreement did not represent his beliefs. According to Hurley, Roosevelt had commissioned him to try to soften or even set aside the Yalta Agreement, and to do this, had sent him to London and Moscow. By the time he reached Teheran, Roosevelt had died. Under orders from President Truman to continue, he met Stalin and discussed the Yalta Agreement with him. Admitting

¹Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 1871-72.

²Ibid., p. 1885. ³Ibid., p. 2229.

that he left these meetings with the Russian leader over-optimistic about the possibility of warding off ill effects resulting from a possible increase in Russian power, Hurley claimed that he might have been able to do something if the State Department had not intervened. He had made a dent in the armor of the British and Russians, but could not persuade the State Department of any changes needed in the Agreement.¹

Stilwell and Hurley in China

Much of the hearings was concerned with the Communist conquest of China. In 1944 General Joseph Stilwell, principal American officer in China, became convinced that if the forces of General Chiang Kai-shek were to be effective against the Japanese, they would have to be brought under American direction. He also believed that Nationalist forces which had been withdrawn from the struggle against the Japanese to fight the Communists should once again take the offensive against the foreign enemy.² General Patrick Hurley was appointed personal representative of President Roosevelt in August 1944 to adjust differences between General Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek.

¹Ibid., pp. 2885-88.

²According to General Wedemeyer, the actual contribution of the Chinese Communists in the struggle against Japan was limited. On the other hand, neither was the number of Nationalist troops occupied in fighting the Communists very large (ibid., pp. 2298-99). Secretary Marshall gave a different interpretation of Nationalist contributions; he thought the record showed Stilwell's belief in too great an involvement of the Nationalists against the Communists to be true (ibid., p. 460).

According to Hurley, just as Chiang was about to accept the American proposals, he received a telegram from Roosevelt. Considering this message an ultimatum, the Generalissimo wrote an aide-memoire to the American president pointing out his differences with Stilwell and stating his belief that the American lacked military judgment, as was evident from his refusal to conduct a full campaign in Burma.¹ He soon requested Stilwell's recall.

After a visit to Molotov in Moscow, Hurley was much impressed with Russian sincerity and reported to Washington not only that the Soviets would welcome United States aid in the unification of China, but also that the Soviet Government was not responsible for the internal developments of China. While discussing the problem of Russo-Chinese relations with Chiang, Hurley gave the Chinese leader the impression that Russia would leave Chinese affairs alone. The Nationalists could even negotiate with the Chinese Communist Party, since it was a group without foreign entanglements.² Because of this information on the independence of the Chinese Communists from Moscow, Chiang did not feel it necessary to adjust greatly his program to please the Communists; without Russian support they would have had to accept his terms.

After a meeting with Mao Tse-tung, chief of the Chinese Communist Party, General Hurley brought back to

¹Ibid., pp. 2863-72. ²Ibid., pp. 2864-65.

Chungking a five-point program for settlement with the Communists. The Communists evidently hoped to use these negotiations to political advantage before consenting to military integration. The struggles between the Nationalists and the Communists for control of territory surrendered by the Japanese began after August 15, 1945. With American assistance, the Nationalists moved into Manchuria and were able to take over many cities and railroads. They were not, however, able to gain complete control of the countryside. They had asked the Russians to delay their departure from Manchuria to enable Chiang's forces to gather in the area. Later, when General Marshall was discussing an agreement for a cease-fire between the Nationalists and Communists in 1946, it was decided that the Nationalists were to move into Manchuria. However, the Communists took advantage of the first opportunity they had to move into the vacuum.¹

In his testimony General Marshall spoke of rumors that Soviet troops were removed from Manchuria in such a way that the domination by the Communists was assured.² In discussing ways in which the growth of Chinese Communism could have been halted, General Wedemeyer testified that at the end of World War II he had wanted to put United States divisions in Manchuria to set up a barrier against the Soviet Union, but that MacArthur had refused to make them available because of a probable need for them in the occupation of Japan.³

¹Ibid., p. 1918. ²Ibid., pp. 696-97.

³New York Times, June 13, 1951.

State Department Officials in China

Meanwhile some Foreign Service officers and others in China were reporting to the Department of State that the Kuomintang was becoming steadily weaker, while the Communists were increasing in strength and receiving more and more popular support. The sharpest criticism of State Department personnel was read by Senator Smith from Hurley's letter of resignation in 1945 in which he alleged:

While these objectives had the support of the President and the Secretary of State it is no secret that the American policy in China did not have the support of all the career men in the State Department. The professional Foreign Service men sided with the Chinese Communist armed party and the imperialist bloc of nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against herself.¹

In his testimony General Wedemeyer agreed that his four political advisers--John Davies, John Emerson, Raymond Ludden, and John Service--submitted memoranda which invariably criticised the Nationalist Government and praised the Communist regime.² He admitted, however, that the career men seemed to be very intelligent and experienced, and when questioned on this point by Senator Russell, conceded that they were not any more critical of the Chinese Nationalists than he had been in a speech in 1947 before a Senate committee.³

In his testimony before the Committees, General Hurley reported finding the career men actually passing

¹Military Situation in the Far East, p. 1875.

²Ibid., pp. 2401 and 2496.

³Ibid., p. 2524.

secret information to the armed Chinese Communists. He quoted a report of John Service to General Stilwell, which Hurley had obtained from a Chinese Communist, in which the Foreign Service officer had expressed the opinion that the United States should take a more realistic line in China and realize that the Kuomintang was in a crisis with its prestige at its lowest point. Nevertheless, Service's most extreme statement in this report seems to have been that the "Kuomintang is dependent upon America for survival, but we are in no ways dependent on the Kuomintang."¹

When confronted with Hurley's statements on the Communist leanings of those in the State Department's service in China, Dean Acheson recalled extended hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on this question. He remarked that he thought the view then put forward was that General Hurley was mistaken in what he said.²

Were American personnel aware of the nature of the Chinese Communists during and after the war? Senator Knowland maintained that they were not; he quoted from a report of Raymond Ludden that "the so-called Communists are

¹Ibid., pp. 2911-12. General Hurley later accused Service of being pro-Communist and of delivering important State Department documents to Philip Jaffe, editor of the magazine Amerasia and allegedly a Communist. Service had once suggested that America be prepared to arm any Chinese forces which could be used effectively, since the American purpose was to maintain a degree of flexibility which would permit cooperation with anyone furthering a "united, democratic, friendly China (ibid., pp. 2929-30)."

²Ibid., p. 1875.

agrarian reformers of a mild democratic stripe more than anything else. . . ."¹ Acheson maintained that the first concern of the American personnel in China was in serving United States interests and that during the war their first effort had been to try to bring all forces in China together to fight the Japanese. He knew of no State Department people who considered the Communists merely agrarian reformers; on the contrary, in their reports they referred to Moscow training and to the Marxist rigidity of the Chinese Communists.² General Barr testified that he did not find any State Department personnel dealing with the Communists, at least when he was in China.³

After General Hurley's diatribe against the "Communists" in the State Department and his avowal that he had always realized the dangers of Communism, Senator McMahon pointed to several instances when Hurley had advocated appeasement. In a speech on November 29, 1945, the General had stated that the "only difference between the Chinese Communists and Oklahoma Republicans is that the Oklahoma Republicans

¹Ibid., p. 892. ²Ibid., pp. 1858 and 1873-74.

³Ibid., pp. 2971-72. All those appearing before the two committees maintained that they had always known the nature of Chinese Communism. Answering Sen. Bridges' query on whether the War Dept. had not reported in 1945 that the Communists were definitely not agrarian reformers, Sec. Marshall testified that when he went to China and looked over the situation, he had no doubt but that the leadership of the group was Marxian Communist, especially after seeing a huge picture of Lenin and Stalin at Yennan. He recalled Chou-En-lai protesting in 1946 against some Chinese dragging Stalin's portrait through the mud (ibid., pp. 377-78).

aren't armed." Hurley defended himself by saying that McMahon had quoted out of context; what he had said referred to a period while the war was still going on and when it was necessary to get the Chinese Communists and Nationalists together against Japan.¹ However, the war and the need for uniting against Japan were over at the time Hurley made this speech in the latter half of 1945.

The Marshall and Wedemeyer Reports

In a general statement on China at the beginning of his testimony, Secretary of State Acheson stressed the fact that American aid could not of itself insure the survival of a recipient government, that the power of decision rested with the government and with the people. In pointing out moments of decision in China after the war, he spoke first of the task of extending the authority of the Chinese throughout the nation. In his report of November 1945 General Wedemeyer protested that the staff of the Generalissimo had not fully appreciated the importance of logistic and transportation support of the troops in Manchuria. Wedemeyer had also advised Chiang to concentrate on stabilizing the situation in South China through reform and, with the assistance of foreign administrators and technicians, to try to concentrate his military efforts in North China, not Manchuria, reaching an agreement with the Communists in the area.² Reporting that the Nationalist Government was

¹New York Times, June 22, 1951.

²Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 1840-42.

completely unprepared for the occupation of Manchuria in the face of Communist opposition, General Wedemeyer further suggested that the Nationalists would have to come to an agreement with the Russians on their respective positions in Manchuria.¹

When open civil war broke out between the Communists and Nationalists in North China in 1945, there were several positions the United States could have taken. In his testimony Dean Acheson said that one action could have been for America to pull out completely. However, this might have permitted the Japanese, who still had considerable influence and strength in the area, to take over the divided country. The alternative of contributing unlimited aid to help the Nationalists was contrary to the wishes of the American people. Thus Washington chose a compromise position of giving important economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists, and offering assistance in working out an agreement.²

General Marshall was to go to China to implement the American policy as it had been outlined in a memorandum to the War Department by Secretary of State Byrnes. The memorandum stated that our long-range goal was "the development of a strong, united, and democratic China." In order to further this development, dissident elements in the country should "approach the settlement of their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise." Chiang Kai-shek's

¹Ibid., p. 461. This was on November 20, 1945.

²Ibid., p. 1842.

government afforded the most satisfactory base for a democracy, although it should be broadened to include representatives of other organized groups in China.¹

In his instructions, Truman asked Marshall to try to persuade the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of major political elements to bring about the unification of China. He mentioned that a People's Consultative Council (PCC) which included the Chinese Communists was already in session in Chungking. The President gave Marshall permission to speak with the utmost frankness to Chiang Kai-shek and other leaders to the effect that "a China disunited and torn by civil strife could not be considered realistically as a proper place for American assistance along the lines enumerated."²

Coalition Government in China

During his testimony Marshall admitted that he had had only a vague concept of the changes of government in China or of the single party as conceived by Sun Yat-sen. He acquired most of his working knowledge on these subjects during his flight to China.³ Soon after his arrival, the American representative was successful in securing an agreement calling for the cessation of hostilities. To supervise the execution of this Truce Agreement of January 1,

¹Ibid., pp. 3184-85. Marshall testified that Byrnes, Undersecretary of State Acheson and John Carter Vincent, head of the China group in the State Department, had probably drawn up this report.

²Ibid., p. 3185. ³Ibid., p. 548.

1946, representatives of the Chinese Communist Party, the Nationalist Government, and of the United States set up headquarters in Peiping. Truce teams composed of the three groups were also to be sent into the field to make sure the terms were carried out. The People's Consultative Council adopted resolutions calling for the reconstruction of the State Council and for the convocation on May 4, 1946, of a National Assembly to adopt a permanent constitution.¹

Much discussion in the hearings centered about who exactly had advocated the formation of a coalition government. Marshall said that the first United States suggestion for Communist participation in the Government was made by Ambassador Clarence Gauss when in 1944 he suggested to Chiang the possibility of a war council.² In November of that year General Hurley took active measures to help form the coalition.³

One minor argument of the hearings was whether a telegram approved by MacArthur, Wedemeyer, and Raymond A. Spruance, commander of the 5th Fleet, indicated support of a coalition government. Acheson read the telegram, which outlined moves the military advocated in China and then suggested that American assistance to China "be made available as basis for negotiation [sic] by the American Ambassador to

¹Harold Vinacke, Far Eastern Politics in the Post-war Period, (New York: Appleton, Century-Crofts, Inc., 1956), pp. 108-09.

²Military Situation in the Far East, p. 544.

³Ibid., p. 1919. Testimony of Dean Acheson.

bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a united, democratic China."¹ MacArthur responded that it was beyond belief to infer support of a coalition government from one small paragraph attached to a technical report. As proof that this telegram was not viewed in 1946 as a support of a coalition government, MacArthur telegraphed the Committees that Marshall had not mentioned the telegram when the two met soon thereafter. According to MacArthur, the effect of the Marshall mission (to use American assistance as a weapon to force an alliance with the Communists) was the exact opposite of the ideas of the MacArthur-Wedemeyer-Spruance telegram.²

General Wedemeyer also asserted that the paragraph was taken out of context from a message attempting to strengthen the position of the Nationalist Government, especially in enabling it to fill any vacuum left by the withdrawal of Japanese troops.³ Under further examination by Democratic Senators, Wedemeyer acknowledged that he had wanted some kind of arrangement between the Communists and Nationalists to rehabilitate the country. Although this was almost exactly the purpose which the administration gave as Marshall's mission, it would seem that the President's directive to Marshall went much further, especially in advocating the use of economic persuasion.

¹Ibid., pp. 2247-48. ²Ibid., p. 2249.

³Ibid., pp. 2297-98.

Did Russia favor a rapprochement of the Nationalists and the Communists? Senator Bridges read part of a military intelligence report of 1945 which stated that there were reports of Russia wanting a coalition government established in order that North China and Manchuria might eventually become the exclusive terrain of the Chinese Communists, who could gain the upper hand. Considering the methods which might be used to bring the Kuomintang and the Communists together after the war, the report mentioned the Nationalist-sponsored General Assembly idea and the Communist-sponsored idea of a coalition government, an idea which Chiang had already rejected. The American military report concluded, however, that peace in the Far East depended on the unity of China to keep it out of Russian control. When previously questioned on this report in 1949, Dean Acheson had stated that this version had been written as a summary of the complete report by an officer who had worked on the original. The summary did not reflect the tenor of the report as a whole and had been withdrawn by the military intelligence division. Nevertheless, in the meantime it had been circulated among Congressmen by Representative Judd.¹

According to Dean Acheson, military men assented to Marshall's effort at mediation as the only hope for Nationalist control over North China and Manchuria. When the Nationalists attempted to maintain and improve their

¹Ibid., pp. 2270-74.

position in Manchuria by force, the American view was that they would fail. The only question was how disastrous the failure would be. To mitigate the effects of military defeat, the United States advised them not to take indefensible positions.¹

In July 1947 General Albert Wedemeyer was sent to China to advise the Nationalists. In a report to Washington, he stressed the danger of Manchuria falling into Soviet hands, which would lead ultimately to a Communist-dominated China. He suggested that China should promptly request United Nations action to bring about a cessation of hostilities and the creation of a collective trusteeship composed of, perhaps, China, the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France.² Marshall pointed out that Wedemeyer proposed to place the Chinese problem before the United Nations; however, the United States was not convinced that United Nations jurisdiction extended to events within a particular country. Also, the proposal for a trusteeship would have greatly embarrassed Chiang, who had stated many times that he would have nothing to do with any settlement which included the Russians or British as trustees.³ In his testimony General Wedemeyer asserted that he had made these proposals to save as much as possible for China, since at the time of his report the United States had just

¹Ibid., p. 2029. ²Ibid., pp. 2295-2308.

³Ibid., pp. 372 and 547.

played down the capabilities of the Nationalists and thus had hurt them deeply.¹

American Aid to the Nationalists

During the hearings there were many arguments on the question of aid to China. Acheson asserted that the United States sent considerable equipment to the Chinese Nationalists after the Japanese surrender; a large part of this consisted of ammunition and arms left by the marines when they withdrew from the mainland. When Senator Hickenlooper suggested that much of the equipment was useless for military operations, Acheson said that this was not correct; nevertheless, he did admit that some of the planes turned over might have been cargo planes rather than military ones.²

Wedemeyer suggested that after his mission he had advocated sending military and economic advisers to China, as well as moral and material aid. He did not believe, however, that the Nationalists lost China because of lack of equipment.³ Kefauver pointed out that the Wedemeyer paper had recommended that China inform the United Nations of its request for increased materials and advisers. To the Senator this did not seem to be a direct recommendation for aid.⁴ Acheson had earlier said that although Wedemeyer had not positively suggested sending aid, it was possible to read that into his report.

¹New York Times, June 12, 1951.

²Military Situation in the Far East, p. 1887.

³Ibid., p. 2329. ⁴Ibid., pp. 2044-45.

In speaking of assistance sent up to the time of the Marshall mission, Senator Knowland read a paragraph written on October 11, 1945, which stipulated that no weapons were to be used in fighting a civil war. Acheson's answer was that there was a strong belief that the Nationalists were too weak to settle their problems by force and that it was preferable to negotiate. When questioned on a statement made by President Truman in December of 1946 that material given to China did not include war material, Acheson explained that this was during a time when an embargo against sending war goods to China was in effect (from August 1946 to May 1947).¹

Congress later appropriated \$400,000,000 for military support. When Senator Bridges charged the State Department with opposing a larger appropriation by the Eightieth Congress, Marshall replied that the Administration had actually requested \$575,000,000.² The former Secretary of State had earlier explained that much of the difficulty was in getting support from the various financial agencies with which he had to deal. As he recalled Wedemeyer's estimate of about 10,000 officers and technicians needed to oversee and direct the operation in China, Marshall asserted that the Government could not have committed itself to sending so many men. An indication of why it was impossible for the military to send a large force to the Far East was that

¹Ibid., pp. 1896-97. ²Ibid., p. 689.

there were only one and a third divisions in the entire United States.¹

Several times Senator Hickenlooper brought up a statement by Marshall in 1947 that troops were sent to North China with only two rounds of ammunition per gun. Acheson replied that this statement indicated only that troops went to North China with little ammunition, not that they had literally two rounds per gun. Even if more equipment had been supplied, it is not certain that it would have been effectively used. One of the great weaknesses of the Chinese Nationalists was their complete ignorance of logistics and supply. According to General Collins, the United States had fully equipped ten Chinese divisions with American equipment, all of which was lost.²

Toward the end of the hearings there were two opposing points of view presented on the adequacy of American aid in 1948. Vice Admiral Badger, Naval Commander in the Far East after World War II, asserted that the Truman administration's efforts to aid China were haphazard, although generous. Refusing to accuse any specific person, he observed that what had earlier been an even chance of saving North China was lost in 1948 by a five-month delay in sending American arms.³ He also proclaimed that the ten per cent of our equipment which did reach Chiang was of little

¹Ibid., p. 465. ²Ibid., pp. 1888 and 1223.

³New York Times, June 20, 1951.

or no use.¹ In the same vein, General Wedemeyer testified that much of the equipment was of no more value than scrap iron because the Chinese had no use at that time for such things as road graders.²

General Barr, head of our military mission to China in 1948, refuted Badger. Alleging that no amount of weapons could have saved the Chinese Commander, he believed that the Nationalist Government lost to the Communists because of its own ineptitude and corruption. The Nationalists had exaggerated the ineffectiveness of weapons sent them, while missing parts were quickly replaced within two or three days. General Barr even accused Badger of contributing to the delay in shipping arms by failing to make requisitions. What arms the Nationalists did receive, they forfeited whenever they lost a battle, in the end leaving the Communists with a greater supply of American-made weapons than they themselves had.³

China White Paper

When it became evident in 1949 that the Nationalists were going to lose China, the Department of State prepared a paper explaining the situation, known as the China White Paper.⁴ Acheson testified that he recommended the

¹Ibid., June 21, 1951.

²Military Situation in the Far East, p. 2330.

³William S. White, "General Barr Defends U.S. China Policy," New York Times, June 23, 1951.

⁴United States Relations with China, Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30, 1949.

publication of this paper to let the American people know the facts. In this way they would not be so thoroughly shocked should the Nationalist Government fall. The necessity of preparing the public for this possibility outweighed any harm which might result for the Nationalists if their weaknesses were revealed. Acheson pointed out that Chiang had already been driven out of Northern China to Canton, which was also about to fall; consequently, publication of the White Paper could no longer have had a great effect on Chiang's fate.¹

Former Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson testified that he had argued in vain against the issuance of the report, since it seemed to be a deliberate effort by Acheson to destroy the Nationalist regime. He also asserted that the paper had originally contained military inaccuracies, later corrected, and other shortcomings which remained in the paper. He asked what the purpose of the paper was if not to destroy the Nationalist Government.² Acheson maintained, however, that nothing short of unlimited American economic and military aid, including the use of our own troops, could have maintained the Nationalists in South China in 1949. In a letter of that year the Secretary of State had asserted that this country had tried to influence the forces bringing the Communists to power, but could not do so. He denied Senator Knowland's accusation that this

¹Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 1769-70.

²Ibid., p. 1867.

was a defeatist attitude compared with our stand in Greece, for the circumstances in China were quite different.¹

In reporting the discussion on the "China White Paper," James Reston noted that the outcry which followed its publication led us to maintain relations with the Formosan Government and to consider sending a military mission to it.² Nevertheless, when the "dust settled" in China in 1949, Communists were in power and the scene was set for conflict in the nearby Korean peninsula.³

From the discussions on China in the hearings, the writer of this paper concludes that it was easy enough for the Republicans to point out in retrospect supposed inadequacies in the administration's policies. At the end of World War II, the American people were in no mood to send more troops to China. If, as Marshall had suggested, Chiang had initiated reforms, Mao Tse-tung's program of land reforms would not have won him such powerful support from the peasants. When the cabinet decided to send Marshall to

¹Ibid., p. 1803. In his testimony Marshall agreed with Acheson on the difficulty of supporting Chiang (ibid., p. 487). Wedemeyer testified that the Nationalists could have held the Yangtze with broomsticks if they had had more spirit and less corruption, although he complained that our lack of moral support and our overemphasis on his weakness harmed Chiang (ibid., pp. 2327-28).

²New York Times, June 5, 1951.

³Acheson explained his use in 1949 of the "dust settling" term as meaning that he could not see what the outcome in China would be until the situation had become clear (Military Situation in the Far East, p. 1726).

conciliate the warring factions in China, it was because there seemed no other alternative to those of complete withdrawal or all-out help for a full-scale war.

Few saw the importance of the Communist Chinese at the end of the war. Indeed, Republicans could have attacked Wedemeyer or Hurley, who had no effective solution in 1946, although this would not have had the impact on the public which criticizing the State Department did. In short, post-war China was an area where neither the military nor the civilian could formulate a policy which would work to our advantage, because they could not work together with the knowledge that the American people would back any decision, whatever it might be.

CHAPTER III

THE KOREAN WAR

Postwar Korea

After World War II both the Republic of Korea, established in the South under the sponsorship of the United Nations, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the North claimed to be the sovereign government of all of Korea. At a conference in 1945 a four-power international trusteeship was seen as a solution to the problem of Korea. The Joint Commission established in 1946 to set up a government could find no way to operate, since the Russians would not agree to the full democracy advocated by the Americans. When no way could be found out of the ensuing impasse, the United States took the question of Korean independence to the United Nations. The Soviet Union proposed the simultaneous withdrawal of military forces of the occupying powers. This idea was opposed by the United States, which knew that the Russians had formed a solidly Communist government and army in North Korea. The General Assembly rejected the Soviet proposal, but passed a resolution authorizing a Commission on Korea to use its good offices to bring about unification of the country and an integration of Korean forces. However, when the Commission

decided to contact leading persons in North Korea to try to effectuate a settlement, it was unsuccessful, and in the South Syngman Rhee was unwilling that the United Nations group make suggestions on the development of a more representative government.¹

The United Nations requested Americans and Russians to evacuate their troops from Korea. The Americans agreed to do so. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the troops were needed elsewhere,² and some officers, including General MacArthur, did not consider the situation in Korea particularly threatening at this time.³ By removing

¹Leland Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U. S. Policy in the United Nations, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1956, pp. 72-76.

²Military Situation in the Far East, p. 1811. Testimony of Dean Acheson. George Marshall testified that the Joint Chiefs of Staff found it difficult to fully guard the airstrips in Alaska, while the U. S. occupation force in Japan was at only sixty per cent of strength (ibid., p. 382).

³Ibid., pp. 2167-68. Some warnings were given, nevertheless, of the danger in Korea. According to Sen. Harry F. Byrd, Lt. Gen. John Hodges, commander of the occupation forces, had declared before the Armed Services Committee in February 1947 that under conditions existing at the time the North Koreans would dominate South Koreans if the U. S. troops were to withdraw (ibid., p. 2008). After his 1947 trip to China, General Wedemeyer was instructed to proceed to Korea and to report on conditions there. He recommended that the United States organize and equip a South Korean scout force to resist any attack from the North, for unless America gave assistance, a North Korean occupation of the whole peninsula could be predicted (ibid., p. 1988). This part of the 1947 Wedemeyer report was not made public, according to Secretary of State Acheson, because certain statements therein might have caused a break of harmony in certain quarters (ibid., p. 1987). Acheson maintained, however, that General Wedemeyer had agreed to the decision to withdraw on the basis of a need for economy.

our army we could hope to prevent a struggle in the peninsula, which was strategically a poor place to fight.¹

Also, pressure for a speedy withdrawal was exerted by South Korea.²

The United Nations Commission reported an evacuation of all United States forces by July 27, 1949, except for a Military Advisory Group of about five hundred men and officers. The Commission was unable to verify whether the Soviet Union had carried out its announced withdrawal by the end of 1948. To lessen the possibility of military conflict between the two sections of the country, the United Nations planned the use of trained observers along the frontier between the North and the South.³

The United States was more interested in strengthening South Korea economically than militarily. According to General MacArthur, American troops had left sufficient equipment behind to stop North Korean security forces; it was not, however, sufficient to stop a well-equipped attacking force.⁴ In January 1950 our military mission signed an agreement with Korea for almost \$11,000,000 worth of military goods, and at the time of the June invasion a large part of the equipment was being shipped. Still, since the equipment had to come from new procurement

¹Ibid., p. 753, General Bradley's testimony.

²Ibid., p. 243, MacArthur's testimony.

³Goodrich, pp. 78-79.

⁴Military Situation in the Far East, p. 243.

or from partly depleted stocks, there was some difficulty in getting the program under way, and neither of these sources could have been satisfactorily tapped in the ninety days between the working out of the program in March and the June invasion.¹

The United States had been criticized both for not making clear what it would do if an attack from North Korea occurred and also for its failure to give adequate military support to the President of South Korea.² Secretary of State Dean Acheson was accused of revealing the indecision of the United States in reference to the protection of Korea in a speech before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950. Mr. Acheson emphasized that in this speech he had been speaking mainly of areas where United States troops were stationed and which they had to defend. In referring to other regions of the Pacific, he had stated that no one could guarantee these areas against military attack, but that the initial reliance for defence must rest on the indigenous people. These areas could then count on "the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed

¹Ibid., pp. 1837 and 1993-34, Acheson's testimony.

²In view of the poor training and morale of the South Koreans, it remained questionable from evidence presented in the hearings whether more aid would have helped the Koreans (ibid., pp. 243, 2114-15, 3384-85). Senator Greene pointed to the fear of some authorities that President Rhee would use armaments to amount an attack against North Korea as a reason for not tendering more aid (ibid., p. 2114).

to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression."¹

Dean Acheson quoted parts of a speech by John Foster Dulles, then Consultant to the Secretary of State, before the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea on June 19, 1950, to show that we never adopted a policy of abandoning Korea. After telling the Koreans that "the American people give you their support, both moral and material, consistent with your own respect and primary dependence upon your own efforts," Dulles emphasized that the United Nations "requires all nations to refrain from any threat or use of force against your territorial integrity or political independence."² It is probable, however, that North Koreans were already preparing to attack and that this speech came too late to be a deterrent factor.

Invasion of South Korea

It was five days after Dulles' speech that the North Koreans attacked. What evidence had there been that this invasion would occur? The Far Eastern Command, the Central

¹Ibid., pp. 1740-41 and 1811-12. In their book The General and the President and the Future of American Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Young, 1951) p. 101, Richard H. Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. express the opinion that Acheson's statements were foolish in inviting aggression. On the other hand, Walter Millis thinks that Acheson could hardly have stated otherwise, since American troops had been withdrawn from Korea (Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy). New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 260.

²Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 2020-22.

Intelligence Agency, and other groups had reported the possibility of an offensive, but one did not seem imminent. The administration believed that since the Communists had far from exhausted the possibilities of guerilla and psychological warfare, political pressure, and intimidation as means of obtaining their objectives, they would probably continue these methods instead of undertaking overt military action. Secretary Acheson quoted a report of March 10, 1950, from General MacArthur. According to this report, the Soviet Union would probably attempt to take over parts of Southeast Asia which were less well guarded before moving against South Korea. The report did state, however, that if checked in these areas, Russia might divert a large share of its attention to South Korea and might even invade this territory. When Senator Bridges claimed that this was a definite warning of the coming attack, Acheson responded that the Far East Command had not believed the statement and had reported that there would be no civil war in Korea that summer. Also, previous unfulfilled reports of invasion had been received as early as October 1949.¹

About 9:30 P.M. on June 24 Ambassador John Muccio informed Washington that North Korean forces had invaded South Korea. On the morning of the twenty-fifth, Ambassador to the United Nations Ernest Gross requested a meeting of the Security Council. With Russia absent in protest

¹Ibid., pp. 230-31.

over United Nations refusal to recognize a representative of Communist China, the Council adopted a resolution declaring that a breach of the peace had occurred and calling for the North Koreans to cease hostilities.¹ The resolution also called on all members to render every assistance to the United Nations and to refrain from assisting the North Koreans.²

Some Senators tried to determine whether President Truman had made the decision to commit ground troops to enter the Korean fighting only after careful deliberations with his advisers. Testimony showed that the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others were present at the Blair House meetings when decisions on how to meet the threat in Korea were made.³ As Secretary of Defense Johnson testified, the military did not recommend going into Korea, but neither did any of the officials oppose doing so when they had the chance.⁴ Neither did members of Congress when they knew what American action would be.

At a Blair House meeting on June 26 it was decided to move the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Straits, to use naval and air forces to protect the evacuation of American nationals, and to furnish arms to the Republic of Korea. The

¹Goodrich, p. 106, and Military Situation in the Far East, p. 1211. Marshall read this resolution to the Senators.

²Ibid., p. 361. ³Ibid., pp. 2572-76.

⁴Ibid., p. 2585; cf. Bradley's testimony, pp. 933-34.

next day President Truman reported to Congress that following the Security Council call upon members to render every assistance in stopping the aggression, he had ordered United States air and sea units to give Korean troops cover and support.¹ On the twenty-ninth of June authorization was given to extend operations to North Korea, but only if this were necessary to complete the mission of clearing the South of North Koreans and of retaining a port and air base in the area of Pusan.²

General MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the confusion of the South Korean Army, which he observed on a reconnaissance of the Korean battle area. Much equipment had been abandoned or lost. It was possible that the North Koreans could break through. In fact, the holding of the Han River line could be assured only by using ground troops.³ Therefore, General MacArthur advised the

¹Ibid., pp. 933-34, 991-92. In reality, the Security Council did not meet until several hours after Truman's announcement, and it was still later when it adopted a U.S. draft resolution recommending assistance.

²Ibid., p. 536, Marshall's testimony; also, p. 934, Bradley's testimony.

³Ibid., p. 1112 and 235. General Wedemeyer testified that he would not have sent ground troops into Korea; nevertheless, he is careful to point out that he might not be able to pass a competent judgment on this question, as he had not been in Korea and did not know all the details (ibid., pp. 2307-08). On the other hand, he maintained that the government was "absolutely correct in taking affirmative steps against the advance of communism. We had to do it some place and the time was already overdue, (ibid. p. 2315)." Admiral Sherman also stated that he thought the decision to commit ground troops was sound, although he had had apprehensions at the time (ibid., p. 1651).

Joint Chiefs, if so authorized, that he intended to move an American regimental combat team to the combat area as the nucleus for a possible build up of two divisions from Japan. This would make an early offensive feasible in accordance with his mission of clearing South Korea of Northern troops.¹

Collective Action in Korea

On July 7 the action of sending ground troops into Korea was affirmed by the United Nations Security Council. It recommended that members of the United Nations make forces available to a unified command under American direction to carry out the June 25 and 27 resolutions. MacArthur was designated as the military leader. Although his position was created by the world body, the appointee considered his connection with the United Nations as largely nominal, since the entire control of his command came from the Chiefs of Staff and even his reports were sent to the State and Defense Departments before being forwarded to the United Nations. According to MacArthur, he had no direct connection with the United Nations.²

In outlining military strategy at the beginning of the Korean War, MacArthur mentioned that it was problematic at first whether any remnants of the South Korean Army could be saved. At the time of the invasion, the

¹Ibid., p. 1112, Bradley's testimony.

²Ibid., p. 10.

Joint Chiefs had underestimated the number, equipment, and ability of the North Koreans.¹ While South Koreans were burdened because of logistic mistakes in the arrangement of supplies and equipment close to the thirty-eighth parallel, the invaders had been trained and disciplined well.² To aid the South Koreans, America could contribute immediately only the four divisions of the Eighth Army in Japan. MacArthur believed these troops to be as good as any without combat experience, in spite of some defects in organization, which could be blamed on efforts at economy.³

Although many problems were encountered in establishing a beachhead near Pusan, MacArthur managed to put in two battalions of infantry. These troops put up a "magnificent resistance" before being destroyed. After an amphibious landing at Inchon surprised the North Koreans on September 15, the United Nations forces were able to advance.⁴ A few weeks later they neared the thirty-eighth parallel, and the question of crossing into North Korea confronted the Allied leaders.

General MacArthur submitted his plan for operations north of the parallel. The Eighth Army was to attack along the western coastal area while the United States Tenth Corps at Wonsan was to make an amphibious landing on the

¹Ibid., p. 948. Bradley's testimony.

²Ibid., pp. 230-31. ³Ibid., p. 237.

⁴Ibid., pp. 231-32. The Inchon landing was MacArthur's idea. Louis Johnson testified that Collins had opposed the idea, and Admiral Sherman had had reservations. (ibid., p. 2661).

eastern coast of North Korea.¹ On September 29 the Joint Chiefs approved MacArthur's plan, including, however, some restrictions on just how violent the attack against North Korea should be.² Because of serious political implications of such an action, no all-out bomb attack, nor any attack against Pyongyang and similar targets, should be authorized without prior clearance with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. According to General Collins, this was because we wished to avoid bombing cities which would later have to be rebuilt.³ We had also assured other countries that in carrying out military efforts north of the parallel, caution would be taken not to do anything likely to extend the conflict. For this reason orders had been sent that United Nations troops were not to cross the Manchurian border under any circumstances and that no non-Korean forces should be used in the provinces bordering the Soviet Union and Manchuria.⁴

On October 7, United Nations support of the crossing of the parallel was obtained when Great Britain introduced a resolution that the forces in Korea should proceed with the pacification and unification of all of Korea.⁵ The JCS were then authorized to direct General MacArthur to

¹Ibid., p. 719. ²Ibid., pp. 245 and 340.

³Ibid., pp. 1362-63.

⁴Ibid., p. 1230, testimony of General Collins.

⁵Ibid., pp. 2698 and 3171. According to the New York Times of October 8, 1950, troops crossed the parallel at

plan for the possible occupation of North Korea, but to execute such plans only with the approval of the President. In the event of occupation of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, General MacArthur should undertake no ground operations north of the parallel; however, air and naval operations should not be discontinued. Final decisions would have to be made in view of possible actions by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists. If Chinese troops came south of the parallel, the United States would not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China. General MacArthur was authorized to continue military action as long as there was a reasonable chance of successful resistance.¹

On October 24, General MacArthur informed the field commanders that he was lifting restrictions on movement of the forces in North Korea and was authorizing them to capture all of the territory. He cautioned, nevertheless, that United Nations forces other than South Korean should

3:14 A.M. EST on October 7. This was before the General Assembly had approved the resolution. MacArthur stated that on the basis of this resolution he had ample justification for crossing the border between North and South Korea (ibid., p. 245; cf. General Bradley's testimony, ibid., p. 987).

¹Ibid., p. 718. Read by Senator Morse from the document "Joint Chiefs of Staff Report for Senate Committees on Korean Operations." According to Millis, p. 27, this directive placed responsibility for decisions on MacArthur which should have been made in Washington. If Washington was ready to send troops into North Korea, it should have been prepared to meet possible consequences. And yet orders failed to provide specifically for the possibility of Chinese intervention.

be withdrawn as soon as feasible and be supplanted by Korean units. On the same day the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the Far East Commander of the inconsistency of this order with their policy of not allowing non-Koreans in the area close to the Yalu. As General Collins pointed out, there had been plenty of time for MacArthur to wire and inform Washington of his opinion on the disposition of troops before giving these orders.¹

The Communist Chinese Invasion

Did General MacArthur have adequate warning of the Chinese invasion into North Korea? Why did he, during a lull in the fighting, launch an offensive on November 24 which was to end the war, but which instead led to mass Chinese intervention? At a conference on Wake Island in mid-October between President Truman and the General, the Commander-in-Chief had requested MacArthur's opinion of the possibility of Chinese or Soviet intervention. His answer had been that they might be able to send in fifty or sixty thousand Chinese troops, but without air force support "there would be the greatest slaughter" if they tried to drive south to Pyongyang. He could not picture Russian planes effectively working with Chinese ground troops.²

¹Military Situation in the Far East, p. 1240. When questioned by Morse on whether the JCS were in a good position to pass judgment on military tactics with the aid of terrain maps, Collins answered in the affirmative (ibid., pp. 1300 and 1312-13).

²Truman, p. 366.

During the hearings MacArthur spoke of some knowledge of Chinese power when he stated that, "the Chinese Communists had collected large forces along the Yalu River. My own reconnaissance, you understand, was limited entirely to Korea; but the general information which was available, from China and other places, indicated large accumulations of troops."¹ He had certainly known of a Chinese troop movement up the coast of China in the direction of Korea in September. From about the twenty-seventh of that month more and more evidence of possible Communist intervention came in. However, some of these reports came from Chinese Nationalist sources, previously mistaken in their estimate.²

Other nations gave warnings. On October 3 the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister informed the Indian Ambassador at Peiping of China's threat to send troops into Korea if the United Nations forces crossed the parallel. Nevertheless, the threatened action was not to be carried out if only South Korean troops crossed into North Korea. This warning could have well been viewed with scepticism by American officials. First, the Communists might have been interested primarily in influencing the United Nations, for on

¹Military Situation in the Far East, p. 18. While speaking of the difficulty of knowing in Washington what happened between November 6 and the full invasion of the twenty-sixth, General Bradley said that much of the intelligence lacking to the JCS should have come from MacArthur's own field command. Even though the ground was heavily wooded and troops were difficult to see, a concentration of forces on the right flank of the Eighth Army should have been picked up by air and naval reconnaissance (ibid., p. 1036).

²Ibid., p. 1234; testimony of General Collins.

October 4 the Political Committee of the General Assembly was to vote on a resolution calling for steps to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea.¹ Second, the Indian Ambassador had before warned of attacks which had never materialized.²

Although the first Chinese prisoner was captured on October 26, as late as November 4 MacArthur reported that while Chinese intervention was a distinct possibility, there was not sufficient evidence to be positive of it. However, the very next day the General submitted a special report to the United Nations reporting his forces "in hostile contact with Chinese Communist military units."³ On November 24, when a mass movement across the parallel occurred, it was still the view in Washington that the Chinese objective was to obtain a United Nations withdrawal by intimidation and diplomatic means, and that only if these failed would there be increasing intervention.⁴ During the hearings, Acheson spoke of the lack of real advantage to China in becoming involved and the loss she would sustain in her international position in doing so as reasons why it was thought the Chinese Communists would not intervene.⁵

¹Ibid., p. 1833.

²Rovere and Schlesinger, p. 148. During the hearings, MacArthur claimed that he had received no official notification of this warning by the Chinese, that all he knew was gleaned from reading the newspapers (Military Situation in the Far East, p. 109).

³Ibid., p. 1833. ⁴Ibid., pp. 1834-35.

⁵Ibid., p. 2101.

The authors of The General and the President are quite severe on General MacArthur for not making better use of the intelligence he had. After showing the number of Chinese encountered in late October and early November, the authors accused the general of making light of the Chinese intervention, even reporting from Tokyo on the day eight Chinese divisions were identified in Korea that there was insufficient evidence to accept the invasion as a fact.¹ According to the authors, it was still a puzzle after the hearings just why General MacArthur launched an offensive on November 24 with forces he knew to be inferior in numbers to the Communists.² Perhaps he believed that the Chinese would back down if he were firm, and, too, he might have considered a holding back under the circumstances as a sign of weakness.³

In supporting his advance at the end of November, MacArthur explained:

Now what we actually did was to move forward to ascertain in strength of the enemy's forces.

When we moved forward, I had already prepared, and the troops had in their hands, the order for retreat if we found the enemy in force. What we did was really a reconnaissance in force. It was the only way we had to find out what the enemy had and what his intentions were.⁴

This assertion conflicts with MacArthur's communiqué of November 24 describing the coming campaign and ending with the

¹Rovere and Schlesinger, pp. 135-36.

²Ibid., p. 152. ³Ibid., p. 140.

⁴Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 20-21.

sentence: "If successful, this should for all practical purposes end the war. . . ." During the hearings, Collins declared that MacArthur was "bent upon the destruction of the North Korean forces."¹

Had the Far East commander used poor judgment in the deployment of his troops in November? MacArthur spoke of complete coordination of the Eighth Army and the Xth Corps under his direction. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs had evidently been somewhat worried about the disposition of the forces before the Chinese invasion and had asked MacArthur politely if he needed additional directives. When he answered in the negative, Washington did not pursue the matter, for strategy was considered the responsibility of a theater commander.² When after the first Chinese blows, the Far East commander supported the separation of the Xth Corps from the Eighth Army with the assertion that the terrain was too rugged for the enemy to be able to take advantage of any delay in coordinating activities, the JCS demanded the extrication of the advanced units of the Marines. The Far East commander soon afterwards told Collins

¹Ibid., p. 1369.

²Ibid., p. 246. From hindsight, Bradley would have deployed troops a little differently, although, he admitted MacArthur might have had some additional information which made him deploy the troops as he did (ibid., p. 972). If MacArthur had had this information, it is surprising he had not mentioned it. As it was, he stated during the hearings that "the disposition of those troops, in my opinion, could not have been improved upon, had I known the Chinese were going to attack (ibid., p. 19)."

that if the restrictions on air reconnaissance were removed, maximum use made of the Chinese Nationalists, Manchuria bombarded, and a naval blockade mounted, he would be willing to recombine the Xth Corps with the Eighth Army to hold a line across Korea. This was the same line which he had considered impractical on November 30 when questioned by his superiors.¹

An Entirely New War

When it became obvious that the Chinese were invading in large numbers and had initiated "an entirely new war," as the leader of the United Nations forces called it, what courses were open to the administration? Before the congressional committees General MacArthur stated that China should have been warned "that if she did not within a reasonable time discuss a cease-fire order, . . . the entire force of the United Nations would be utilized to bring to an end the predatory attack of her forces on ours."² In spite of this declaration, Collins could not recall the Far East commander ever making a recommendation to the Joint Chiefs that an ultimatum be issued to the Chinese.³ On the other hand, they gave him no new directive to replace the one of clearing North Korea of enemy troops.⁴

¹Millis, pp. 296-97.

²Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 29-30.

³Ibid., p. 1261. ⁴Ibid., p. 30.

Nevertheless, the general did have his own program to solve the Korean problem. His reports to Washington at this time were very pessimistic. On December 3 he described his army as "facing the entire Chinese nation in an undeclared war." "Unless some positive and immediate action is taken," he continued, "hope for success cannot be justified and steady attrition leading to final destruction can reasonably be contemplated."¹ In light of this report, the President sent General Collins to Korea to view the situation. The Far East commander explained to the Army Chief of Staff three courses of action which he saw as possible. One of these was to continue the fight with the existing limitations on action (no air attacks on Manchurian bases, no naval blockade of China, no use of Nationalist Chinese troops, and no great increase in the number of United Nations troops in Korea). By doing this, however, the United Nations would be forced out of Korea. A second choice could be to continue the fight without the above restrictions. This was the course of action preferred by the United Nations' commander. An armistice in which the Chinese Communists agreed to remain north of the thirty-eighth parallel was the third possible action.²

¹In the following month the idea of evacuation was considered by the military in Washington. However, in view of pessimistic reports MacArthur was sending the JCS there seems little basis for his later statement that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not sure we could stick in Korea. It was my opinion that we could." Quoted by Sen. Smith (ibid., p. 1108.

²Truman, p. 415.

President Truman was concerned at the distance between the administration's policy and these ideas advocated by the United Nations' commander.¹ This difference in outlook became more obvious in the exchanges which occurred between Tokyo and Washington in December and January. In mid-December the United States supported a resolution introduced in the United Nations by India which advocated setting up a three-man committee to explore the basis for a cease-fire. The Communists kept advancing, however, and on December 29 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent MacArthur a new directive, thus replacing his basic orders of September 15. After mentioning that Chinese Communist forces appeared capable of forcing evacuation and after stressing the impossibility of providing more troops, the Joint Chiefs told MacArthur that his basic directive was henceforth to be "to defend in successive positions, subject to safety of your troops as your primary consideration, inflicting as much damage to hostile forces in Korea as possible." The directive then went on to state that he was to "make advanced determination of [the] last reasonable opportunity for orderly evacuation."²

In his reply of December 30 General MacArthur held that a forced evacuation of Korea would have an adverse effect upon the peoples of Asia and that the eventual results of such action would call for even greater forces in the Far

¹Ibid., p. 416.

²Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 1469, 2179-80.

East. He did not want to evacuate his troops, but intimated that he might be forced to do so if he were not given reinforcements and if one or more of the restrictions placed on him were not removed.

On January 9 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the general that these restrictions, amounting to retaliatory measures which might enlarge the conflict, could not be removed. He should, therefore, defend the peninsula in successive positions, inflicting maximum damages on the enemy. He should continually keep in mind the safety of his troops and his basic mission of protecting Japan. Only if it became evident that evacuation was essential to avoid severe losses of men and material was he to withdraw from the peninsula.¹

On January 10 General MacArthur reported the military advisability of withdrawing from Korea, although he mentioned that political considerations might make it impractical to do so.² Two days later Tokyo headquarters received a report from the JCS which General MacArthur interpreted as a possible change in American policy and an agreement in

¹Ibid., p. 331.

²His report stated that "in the absence of overriding political considerations . . . the command should be withdrawn from the peninsula just as rapidly as it is feasible tactically to do so. If, on the other hand, the primary political interests of the United States in the Far East lies in holding a position in Korea and thus pinning down a large segment of the Chinese military potential, the military course is implicit in political policy and we should be prepared to accept any attendant hazard to Japan's security and whatever casualties result. (ibid., p. 906)."

principle to his proposals on action against the Chinese. Faced with the possibility of evacuation, the Joint Chiefs had made several studies and had finally drawn up a list of sixteen actions which might be taken to prevent the loss of Korea. Included in the sixteen were the four suggestions made by General MacArthur to Collins in Korea and again in the December 30 report to the Joint Chiefs. Unfortunately, the copy of the study sent to MacArthur did not indicate how it had been devised and started off with the statement "it has been tentatively agreed. . . ." ¹ Although Bradley suggested that the sixteen steps were to be taken in case of all-out war with China, ² General Marshall indicated the opposite, evacuation from Korea, would call up these points for consideration. In addition, a low level of morale among the troops might necessitate the use of some of the actions, even if the situation in Korea were stabilized. ³

Pointing to the ambiguity contained in the stated purpose of the study, General Sherman characterized MacArthur's interpretation that the Joint Chiefs favored these measures as not unreasonable. However, any doubt in the mind of the Far East commander should have been removed shortly after this when Generals Hoyt Vandenberg and Collins went to Korea. Collins tried to make clear to General MacArthur that the proposals were only part of a study, a

¹Ibid., p. 106. During the hearings MacArthur admitted that the paper had been sent to him only for his information.

²Ibid., p. 736. ³Ibid., p. 334.

name which MacArthur himself had used when referring to them in the hearings.¹

On January 13 President Truman sent a message to Tokyo outlining important political factors purposely omitted from the message of the previous day. He wrote of the necessity for prudence in taking any actions which might alienate the allies or extend the area of hostilities. After writing of the deterrent to communism which a successful resistance in Korea would be, he maintained that although it might be necessary to withdraw from Korean soil, it should be made clear that the course was being forced on us by military necessity and that we planned to rectify the situation.² Understandably, neither MacArthur nor the administration wanted to be blamed for a withdrawal from the peninsula.

Fortunately, evacuation was soon deemed unnecessary. According to Collins, both he and MacArthur reviewed the situation and found United Nations forces capable of maintaining their position. On January 17 General Collins found the Eighth Army in good shape with its morale improving.³ At a meeting on this same day the National Security Council agreed to the inadvisability of putting all the recommendations into effect since conditions in Korea had changed in the preceding week. The military situation was

¹Ibid., pp. 737, 1220, and 2111.

²Ibid., p. 503. General Marshall read a paraphrase of the message.

³Ibid., p. 324; testimony of General Marshall.

beginning to improve, and during the latter half of January the enemy was on the defensive. When during February and March United Nations forces maintained the initiative, it was fortunately unnecessary to carry out any of the courses of action outlined in the Joint Chiefs' study.¹

As the military situation improved, the administration conferred with other governments to establish a basis for a possible cease-fire. Without clearance from Washington, General MacArthur issued a statement on March 24 offering to confer with the enemy and inferring that the war might be enlarged if the Communists did not come to terms. When other statements of the general continued to reveal his disagreement with the administration on military and political strategy, President Truman decided to remove him from his commands in the Far East.

¹Ibid., pp. 324 and 336.

CHAPTER IV

THE RECALL

MacArthur's Return to the United States

When in April 1951 Douglas MacArthur returned to the United States, Americans accorded him an acclaim greater than any citizen had received since Lindbergh's flight across the Atlantic and subsequent reception. A storm of protest against the removal arose immediately. During the Senate hearings in May and June, Senators questioned administrative officials to pinpoint reasons for the President's action. Republican Senators tried to prove that Truman had acted precipitously and because of personal prejudice. Nevertheless, from testimony of both military and political officers, it soon became clear that all had agreed to the wisdom of Truman's move.

On April 6, 1951, the President had called for a meeting to discuss a letter from MacArthur to Republican Congressman Joseph Martin. The chief executive had already made up his mind to dismiss the general, but wanted the opinions of his chief advisers before making any announcement. Present at the meeting were Dean Acheson, George Marshall, Omar Bradley, and Averell Harriman. The decision

to relieve the commander was unanimous. In fact, Averell Harriman thought that he should have been relieved two years earlier, an opinion shared by Marshall after he had read MacArthur's communications with Washington.¹ When the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked if it was militarily feasible to leave the general in charge of the occupation of Japan while removing him from his Korean post, they agreed that it was not.²

News of the dismissal reached MacArthur over a commercial broadcast, taking him by surprise. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, who was then in Korea, was to have delivered the President's message to the general. Because of the breakdown of a power unit in Pusan, Pace could not be reached. Hearing of a possible leak, administration officials then announced the dismissal. The action came as a surprise both to the American public and to the person most involved.³

Issues involved in dismissing General MacArthur were of the greatest importance, ranging from the power of the President as Commander in Chief, American security, the situation in Japan, reaction abroad, to the possibility of a public controversy in the United States.⁴ In his testimony before the committees, General Bradley pointed to

¹Ibid., pp. 344-45. ²Ibid., pp. 345 and 740.

³Ibid., pp. 421 and 1773.

⁴Ibid., p. 1776; testimony of Marshall.

three military reasons for which the Joint Chiefs believed MacArthur should be relieved. The first of these was that by public statements and official communications he had indicated a lack of sympathy with the decision to try to limit the war to Korea. This would make it more difficult for him to carry out directives. Second, he had failed to comply with a directive of December 6, 1950, to clear policy statements with Washington before publishing them. Also, he had taken independent action in proposing to negotiate directly with the enemy and had made that proposal public even though he knew that the government was already considering negotiations. Third, the Joint Chiefs felt that the civilian authority of the country must control the military.¹

Differing Views on Formosa

Although his public announcements were the main reason for MacArthur's dismissal, his first rift with the administration came over an interpretation which the world put on a visit he made. After the June invasion from North Korea, the Soviet Union accused the United States of aggression and of designs on Formosa. In July MacArthur

¹Ibid., pp. 878-79. Marshall also emphasized the responsibility of the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, and the President, who have an overall view of the objectives of the nation, to determine where the main threat lies, where we must fight holding actions, and where we must gain time to grow stronger. He added, "What is new and what has brought about the necessity for General MacArthur's removal is the wholly unprecedented situation of a local theater commander publicly expressing his displeasure at and his disagreement with the foreign and military policy of the United States, (ibid., p. 325)."

let Washington know of his plan to inspect Formosa, now under his command. Because other countries might interpret this visit as a preparation to help the Formosans in an attack against the mainland, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested to the Far East commander that he might want to send a subordinate to view the situation on the island.¹ In spite of this suggestion, the general went himself. His visit received much publicity in the world press and was interpreted as possibly foreshadowing a change in United States policy. In view of this, Louis Johnson dispatched a directive to MacArthur reminding him of the United States policy of preventing the Generalissimo from attacking the mainland. Although the general answered that he understood and would be obedient to the directive, the administration sent Averell Harriman to the Far East to ensure his compliance. After conferring with the general, Harriman remained dubious of MacArthur's full acceptance of administrative policy. The general even advanced his readiness to deal with policy problems, but only if given further orders from the President permitting him to do so.² Truman soon issued a statement that he and the general saw "eye to eye" on Formosa.³ It was quickly seen that this was not so when on August 12 the Far East commander issued a statement attacking those who "invariably in the past have propagandized

¹Ibid., p. 173.

²Millis, pp. 268-69.

³Truman, p. 354.

a policy of defeatism and appeasement in the Pacific" and who were now misrepresenting his trip to Formosa. He hoped the American people would not "be misled by sly insinuation, brash speculations, and bold misstatements invariably attributed to anonymous sources."¹ Many saw this as an attack against the Truman administration.

His disagreement with the administration appeared again in August in a message he prepared for delivery to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Allies in the United Nations were still nervous over the possibility that the Korean conflict might spread. This fear would certainly not be alleviated by MacArthur alleging, as he did in this message, that there existed an island chain, supposedly including Formosa, from which "we can dominate with air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore. . . ." ² The belligerent tenor of the speech surprised and disturbed the President. He thus requested the general to withdraw it. Unfortunately, the office of the Far East Commander had already submitted a copy to the press which subsequently appeared in two popular magazines.³

The December 6 Directive

No dissonance between MacArthur and the President was discernible from August to November, during which time they

¹ Millis, p. 270.

² Military Situation in the Far East, p. 2002.

³ Ibid., pp. 1217 and 2003. Testimony of General Collins and Dean Acheson.

met on the island of Wake. However, after the massive Chinese Communist attack at the end of November, General MacArthur made several statements attempting to justify his recent strategy. Arthur Krock of the New York Times had sent a telegram to MacArthur requesting his comment on statements by officials that he had refused to accept responsibility for the security of his command if any halt were made short of the Yalu. MacArthur's remarkable reply was, "There is no validity whatsoever to the anonymous gossip to which you refer."¹ Yet only six days previously the JCS had suggested limiting contact with the Chinese and the possibility of a neutral zone.

In an exchange with the editors of United States News and World Report, MacArthur was asked, "Are the limitations which prevent unlimited pursuit of Chinese large forces and unlimited attack on their bases regarded by you as a handicap to effective military operations?"

"An enormous handicap, without precedent in history," was MacArthur's frank answer.²

These statements appeared in the press at a time when Prime Minister Attlee was in Washington speaking in favor of a limited war. MacArthur's statements calling for a more active campaign thus greatly embarrassed the administration. Consequently, on December 6, 1950, the Joint Chiefs issued a directive to all theater commanders

¹Ibid., p. 3493. ²Ibid., p. 880.

ordering them to exercise caution in their public statements. They should clear any message concerning foreign policy with the Department of State and statements concerning military policy with the Department of Defense before releasing them.¹

When General MacArthur pointedly submitted his next routine announcement for approval, Washington informed him that such communiques need not be cleared. General Whitney later asserted that the December 6 directive was interpreted at Far East headquarters as applying solely to formal public statements and not to communiques, correspondence, and conversation.² It was not until several months later that MacArthur actually released statements contrary to administration policy. Meanwhile, he had been trying to change the policy of holding the line in Korea by stating in reports to the Joint Chiefs that he might not be able to withstand the Chinese hordes unless given permission to use greater force against them.³

Differences of Opinion on Military Matters

General MacArthur declared in his testimony that there never was a more subordinate soldier than himself. As Bradley would stress, this was true in the military sphere. However, the Joint Chiefs did not believe this to

¹Ibid., p. 442 (see appendix).

²Ibid., p. 417; from a quotation read by Senator Wiley.

³Supra, pp. 50-53.

true in the realm of public announcements and in the announced policy of containing the war in Korea.¹ General Collins alluded to MacArthur's disregard of a directive when he sent American troops to the front near the Yalu without so advising the Joint Chiefs. During the hearings, MacArthur asserted the necessity of doing this because of the military impracticability of drawing a line on the territory short of the Yalu.² The difference of opinion between headquarters in Japan and the administration burst abruptly into print on February 14 when the New York Times quoted the Far East Commander as stating:

The concept advanced by some that we should establish a line across Korea and enter into positional warfare is wholly unrealistic and illusory. It fails completely to take into account the length of such a line at the narrowest lateral, the rugged terrain which is involved and the relatively small force which could be committed for the purpose.³

This was a definite criticism of a plan which the administration might advance as an official solution of the Korean problem.

According to administration officials, MacArthur's next controversial statement actually amounted to a nullification of the effect of measures which the United Nations might have taken to ensure an armistice. On March 20 the Joint Chiefs advised the Far East Commander of United

¹Ibid., p. 1095. ²Ibid., p. 1216.

³Ibid., p. 475; quoted by Senator Johnson.

Nations preparedness to discuss "conditions of settlement" with the enemy. It was believed in Washington that a further attempt at negotiations should be made before the parallel was crossed again. The military chiefs did not, however, want to restrict operations and requested information on what authority MacArthur needed in the next few weeks to provide security for his forces and maintain contact with the enemy.¹ They had already instructed MacArthur to report any request by the Communists for an armistice in the field. This was to be sure that political questions might be considered in any agreement.²

On March 21 MacArthur responded that the existing inhibitions should not be increased. Indeed, he continued, because of the military disadvantages arising from these restrictions upon air and naval operations, in addition to the disparity in the size of the opposing forces, it would be practically impossible to clear North Korea of the enemy.

President Truman and his advisers were shocked when General MacArthur issued a public statement that:

the enemy, therefore, must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through an expansion of our military operations to its coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse. These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty in arriving at decisions on the Korean problems if the

¹Ibid., p. 411.

²Ibid., p. 1197; testimony of General Collins.

issues are resolved on their own merits, without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa or China's seat in the United Nations.¹

The Korean nation and people, which have been so cruelly ravaged, must not be sacrificed. This is a paramount concern. Apart from the military area of the problem where issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere. Within the area of my authority as the military commander, however, it would be needless to say that I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander-in-chief of the enemy forces in the earnest effort to find any military means whereby realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exception, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.²

Secretary of Defense Marshall was the most emphatic of the witnesses in enunciating the damage done by MacArthur in making this statement. He asserted that proposals the President had planned to make and which had a chance of terminating the fighting were dropped when "we had spoken again with two voices. . . ."³

¹Ibid., p. 1031. ²Ibid., pp. 70-72.

³Ibid., pp. 344 and 429. See also Acheson's testimony (ibid., pp. 1774-75). According to James Reston, this statement by MacArthur did not upset the administrative applecart. Because the Chinese offensive was well organized by this time and the draft of the President's statement actually offered less than Peiping had rejected in January, when the United States had specifically mentioned discussion of Formosa and of Chinese admission to the United Nations, the Chinese Communists would not have accepted Truman's terms (New York Times, May 9, 1951).

Letter to Joseph Martin

After this statement of March 24 Truman began to make plans for the removal of Douglas MacArthur. An excuse for doing so was offered on April 5. House minority leader Joseph Martin had requested MacArthur's views on the importance of Asia versus Europe in the world struggle and on the use of Formosan troops to open a second front to relieve the pressure on Korea. He enclosed the text of a speech he had made advocating Formosan action against the mainland. In his answer to the Congressman, General MacArthur wrote:

My views and recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China's entry into the war against us in Korea have been submitted to Washington in most complete detail. Generally these views are well known and generally understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counterforce as we have never failed to do in the past. Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition.¹

On the respective importance of Europe and Asia, General MacArthur wrote, "Here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words. . . . As you pointed out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory."² This letter indicated again that MacArthur did not agree with administrative policy; it criticized what MacArthur always considered the Europe

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, 3280.

²Military Situation in the Far East, p. 412.

first policy of the Democrats and approved of a policy in regard to the Chinese Nationalists which the administration feared might lead to a world war. Also, these paragraphs definitely involved foreign policy and should have been cleared under the December 6 directive. The Far East commander did not request Martin to keep his letter confidential, even after he had received a reminder from Washington to clear policy statements. Thus, on April 5 Representative Martin read the letter before the House.¹

On March 31 Henry Hazlitt, editor of The Freeman sent MacArthur the following telegram:

Why do we fail or refuse arms to 400,000 South Korean draftees as reported New York Times, March 31, dispatch from Taegu? Previous statements President Rhee reported request for such arms.

MacArthur's answer was:

I have delayed reply to your message of the 31st pending receipt here of the referenced New York Times dispatch. There is nothing I can add to the information therein contained. The issue is one determined by the Republic of Korea and the United States Government, and involves basic political decisions beyond my authority.²

When in January the JCS had proposed providing arms for these same South Korean troops, it had been MacArthur who had recommended giving the arms instead to the Japanese national police. To make effective use of additional equipment, the Koreans needed more training. Between this suggestion of January 6 and the writing of his letter to

¹Ibid., p. 3544. ²Ibid., p. 3543.

Martin, MacArthur had not made any different recommendation to Washington on this question. General Matthew B. Ridgway and Admiral James A. Van Fleet still recommended that no additional units be equipped. Besides, according to General Bradley, the 400,000 Koreans mentioned in the telegram were not trained reserves. Many were physically unfit; others were suffering from malnutrition. Also, it had been the policy of both MacArthur and Ridgway to use any additional manpower available to keep the units they had up to strength rather than to form new units.¹

¹Ibid., pp. 1105-06 and 1117.

CHAPTER V

POLICY AND TACTICS IN KOREA

Differing Aims of MacArthur and Truman

While questioning Secretary of Defense Marshall, Senator Saltonstall formulated in plain terms the divergent aims of MacArthur and the President in Korea. The Senator spoke of MacArthur's advocacy of "policies of action on our part that might lead us to be able to tell them, 'Now we are going to continue to go on unless you say you have had enough.'" He pictured administration policy as aiming "to try to kill off enough Red Chinese, when they come on us, so that they say they have had enough. . . ." When he asked Marshall if that was not about the difference, the Secretary's reply was "I think that is about it." Marshall added that if we inflicted losses on the Chinese, we could take the initiative in asking for a cease-fire. Above all, we were seeking a solution which would stop the sacrifice of our soldiers and prevent a spread of the struggle.¹

MacArthur accused the administration of needlessly sacrificing American lives by not taking the sterner measures against the Chinese which he advocated. Americans

¹Ibid., pp. 435-36.

were horrified at the idea of thousands of their countrymen being killed when the result would not be a total victory, but the prevention of Communist gains.¹ MacArthur held that if the United States continued the war indefinitely, the fighting would spread and increase the probability of World War III.² He urged putting all forces possible into a definite campaign to win. According to General MacArthur, the Chinese ability to wage war had been greatly exaggerated. A blockade would disrupt their economy and thus make a victory for the West possible.³

This was certainly not the administration's viewpoint. Washington felt that carrying out MacArthur's proposals might well lead to Russian intervention and a tragic extension of the war. In the words of General Bradley, a war with Red China would be a tragic one "at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."⁴ Marshall considered MacArthur willing to risk war with Communist China or the Soviet Union at the expense of losing allies and wrecking the "coalition of free peoples throughout the world."⁵

According to General Marshall, the situation in Korea was not a stalemate as long as the United Nations had certain powers of maneuver and was inflicting severe punishment.⁶ Dean Acheson went further than this, asserting that

¹MacArthur referred to casualty lists often.

²Ibid., p. 145. ³Ibid., p. 58. ⁴Ibid., p. 732.

⁵Ibid., p. 1007. ⁶Ibid., p. 1716.

the operation in Korea was a success, for the enemy had been prevented from accomplishing its declared objective of driving the United Nations out of Korea and imposing Communist rule on the peninsula.¹ The attainment of a unified, free, and democratic Korea could no longer be the military aim of Korea, but should be accomplished by peaceful means.²

During General Collins' visit to Korea after the Chinese invasion, General MacArthur proposed the lifting of four restrictions; in his speech before Congress in April he again made four proposals for the amelioration of the United Nations' position. These were:

First, the intensification of our economic blockade against China.

Second, the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast.

Third, removal of restriction on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria.

Fourth, removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with logistical support to contribute to their effective operation against the Chinese mainland.³

The most drastic of the recommendations was modified from the bombing of Manchuria--although the general still undoubtedly preferred such action--to a reconnaissance of China's coastal area and Manchuria. The general advocated carrying out these proposals, even if the United Nations did not agree to them.⁴

¹Ibid., p. 1716.

²Ibid., p. 1729; cf. Bradley's testimony (ibid., p. 955).

³Ibid., p. 3556. ⁴Ibid., p. 198.

Economic and Naval Blockades

MacArthur's first suggestion before Congress was to impose an economic blockade on China, thus depriving her of needed materials from the Western nations. Administration witnesses agreed on the advisability of this measure. In fact, other countries had already taken measures to make sure that Peiping did not receive strategic materials.¹ There had been a general embargo by Western countries on the export of munitions to the Communist Chinese ever since they had been in power. Embargoes had been placed on other products by the United States until, by December of 1950, no exports from America to Peiping were allowed. By the end of 1949 European allies had embargoed shipments to the Soviet bloc of about two-thirds of the industrial items which our experts regarded as of prime importance. The list of forbidden articles was expanded in 1950 and 1951,² although, as General Marshall testified, the blockade had been effective only to a limited extent.³ The British had not been willing to go as far in ensuring this blockade as had Americans. As Senator Wiley pointed out, the Colonial Office had reported a sale of 120,000 tons of natural rubber by British Malaya to China in the nine months preceding May 1951.⁴ This controversy over an economic blockade was eased somewhat during the hearings when on May 18, 1951, a

¹Ibid., p. 1726. ²Ibid., pp. 1724-25 and 386.

³Ibid., p. 328. ⁴Ibid., p. 424.

United Nations resolution called for an embargo on strategic exports to Communist China.¹

Although MacArthur and the administration agreed on the importance of an economic blockade, there was a difference of opinion on whether a naval blockade of the Chinese mainland should be mounted. MacArthur pictured an actual blockade as threatening the destruction of millions of Chinese through starvation.² Like MacArthur, Generals Wedemeyer and Chennault favored a naval blockade, even over United Nations' objections.³ General Marshall believed that a blockade might eventually have a serious effect on the Chinese Communist government.⁴ Nevertheless, he saw the danger of an early Russian entrance into the war if the Navy ventured as far as Port Arthur.⁵

General Collins believed that a naval blockade would have to include Dairen and possibly Vladivostok.⁶ Bradley opposed a naval blockade as an act of war which would affect

¹When a group of Republicans presented their views of the hearings, they accused the United Nations of taking hesitant steps toward ensuring an embargo. As an appendix to the report they included summaries of the steps different countries had taken to carry out the May 18 resolution (ibid., pp. 3587 and 3625-55).

²Ibid., p. 179. Admiral Sherman agreed with MacArthur's estimation that the Navy had enough ships to carry through a blockade (ibid., p. 1527).

³Ibid., pp. 2314 and 3342. ⁴Ibid., pp. 355 and 359.

⁵Ibid., p. 482. According to Rovere and Schlesinger, Japan under MacArthur had sent over 19.5 million dollars worth of materials to China, 85% of which was iron and steel sheet, machine tools, etc. (Rovere and Schlesinger, p. 222).

not only China but also Russian Port Arthur and British Hong Kong.¹ According to Secretary of State Acheson, the success of a naval blockade would depend on certain circumstances; a discussion of these circumstances was deleted from the record of the hearings.² While the blockade of North Korea did not involve any extension of hostilities or the possible prejudicing of the security of other countries, the imposition of a naval blockade of China might raise these questions.³ In fact, if the United Nations could get an effective economic blockade, there would be less necessity for a naval hindrance of ships entering Chinese ports.⁴

Bombing Manchuria

Among the four proposals made to General Collins, General MacArthur included the bombing of Manchuria. When he appeared before Congress in April, he modified this suggestion to an advocacy of air reconnaissance over Manchuria, a mild measure in comparison to bombing. During the hearings he returned to the idea of bombing Chinese territory and asserted that bombing the Chinese Eastern Railway would not cause a general war.⁵ To take care of the Chinese hordes which were then swooping down into Korea, MacArthur had been given permission to bomb the Korean end of the bridges over the Yalu.⁶ The JCS had also proposed

¹Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 742 and 924.

²Ibid., p. 1865. ³Ibid., p. 1831. ⁴Ibid., p. 1727.

⁵Ibid., p. 252. ⁶Ibid., p. 741.

permitting American planes to engage in "hot pursuit" over Chinese territory whenever enemy planes were caught in Korea. Acheson and Truman concurred in the advisability of doing this, since, as General Vandenburg had suggested, it would greatly improve the morale of the pilots.¹ The Secretary of State requested the other nations engaged in Korea to submit their reaction to the question of hot pursuit, although reserving the right of the United States to go against the general opinion.² When Acheson reported to the Defense Department the consensus of the allies that United Nations planes should stay away from Manchuria, any immediate plans for continuing flights over Manchuria were dropped.³

By the time this disapproval was received, the United Nations forces were about two hundred miles south of the Yalu River, thus leaving plenty of room for chasing Communist planes without going into Manchuria.⁴ According to General Vandenburg, although hot pursuit would have been good for morale, with the limited air power available it would not have been decisive in winning the campaign.⁵

¹Ibid., pp. 1132 and 1388. ²Ibid., p. 328.

³Ibid., pp. 2278-79.

⁴Ibid., p. 507. MacArthur had told Truman at Wake Island that if the Chinese Communists attacked United Nations forces, the air force would "slaughter" them (supra, p. 45). When the Chinese did counterattack, the air force did not halt them (New York Times, May 13, 1951).

⁵Ibid., p. 1388. O'Donnell's testimony showed that U. S. airmen in Korea had long felt a sense of frustration at the limitations imposed by the policy of limiting the war; in his opinion, never had so many "inordinate" advantages gone to an enemy in a great conflict (ibid., p. 3105).

Washington even forbade the Air Force to bomb the North Korean port of Racin. However, one raid had already been carried out when this order was given and a second had been diverted because of weather. The State Department objected to any further action against the port because of its location only seventeen miles from the Russian border.¹ The Joint Chiefs agreed to the validity of this objection; in addition, they saw the port's usefulness to the North Koreans as being somewhat limited, since a railroad from Racin down the coast of Korea had not been completed and since Racin was not as good a supply point for the North Koreans as was Chongjin. Supplies could be stopped by cutting rail and road lines at a point farther from Russia.²

As for the question of bombing Manchuria itself, General Collins could discover no specific request from MacArthur to do so, although the Far East commander had raised the possibility of such action as early as November 7 when stating that restrictions on United Nations forces had provided a sanctuary for the enemy.³ Shortly after this he indicated his belief in the feasibility of carrying out operations in Korea to prevent reinforcements from crossing the Yalu. It was when Collins visited him in December that MacArthur requested that he be allowed to bomb Manchuria.⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 750 and 1063. ²Ibid., pp. 750 and 2275.

³Ibid., p. 1288. According to Bradley, this was after MacArthur had been given permission to bomb the Korean end of the bridges over the Yalu (ibid., p. 741).

⁴Ibid., p. 1290.

Administration officials would not admit that the United Nations could have attained any great advantage by bombing beyond the Yalu. According to Marshall, ground forces may have suffered in a rather remote way from Air Force inability to bomb lines of supply and arsenals at Mukden and Harbin.¹ Although American air power could have destroyed many Chinese planes; these planes had really not been very effective in action and had not attacked Allied ground troops.² General Collins maintained that for such action to be effective, the Air Force would have to bomb not only airfields but also warehouses and other buildings which were often in towns.³

Bradley pointed out the necessity of using the available air and naval forces within Korea. Sufficient planes and sea craft could be gathered for MacArthur's projects only by stripping other operations.⁴ Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg spoke of the "shoe-string" Air Force when it was viewed in its world-wide commitments.⁵ Even MacArthur admitted that the air power was not strong enough to defend both the United States and American troops in Europe.⁶ According to Vandenberg, all-out use of the air forces would not defeat Communist China, although it might make the Chinese negotiate.⁷ At the time of the hearings,

¹Ibid., p. 492. ²Ibid., pp. 492 and 886.

³Ibid., p. 1246. ⁴Ibid., p. 882. ⁵Ibid., p. 1393.

⁶Ibid., p. 2874. ⁷Ibid., p. 1389.

the Air Force had a Korean supply line of about two hundred miles to work on, and bombing Manchuria would be inadvisable strictly from a military viewpoint because of the danger of extending the war. Furthermore, in the advent that Russia should enter the war, it would be very difficult to supply troops in Korea or to get them out.¹

According to Marshall, the effectiveness of bombing supply depots in China would be less than sometimes asserted because the Chinese had certainly dispersed supply depots against the possibility of air attack.² As strategic bombing consists normally of attempting to destroy sources of production, it could not be applied to China, for equipment in Chinese possession came mostly from Russia. Furthermore, the Chinese would be able to repair rapidly any damage done.³

Several witnesses before the committees were not so adamantly against bombing Manchuria as were Generals Marshall and Bradley. General Wedemeyer agreed with MacArthur that bombing Manchuria was a calculated risk the allies should have taken. He also believed that the decision on whether to do so or not was rightfully MacArthur's, since a "commander in the field should be given no restrictions whatsoever in carrying out his mission. . . ." ⁴ General

¹Ibid., pp. 888-90. ²Ibid., p. 617.

³Ibid., pp. 744 and 965; testimony of General Bradley.

⁴Ibid., pp. 2315 and 2516. Generals Badger and Barr agreed with General Wedemeyer (ibid., pp. 2798 and 2958).

O'Donnell believed that we should have bombed Manchuria in November 1950, but could not answer whether bombing was still feasible in view of the primary duty of maintaining a strong Strategic Air Command in a position to guard against Russia.¹

Formosa

The Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed MacArthur's proposal for removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China with misgivings. Expressing the belief that "the interests of the United States of America coincide with anyone who is opposed to Communism," MacArthur advocated complete support of the regime. He maintained that although parts of the Formosan government could be criticized, it had no more defects than some other democracies did.²

One must look back to 1949 to see the origins of the argument over the importance of Formosa and the role it could play in the struggle against Red China. Two studies in September and October of that year had indicated that economic and diplomatic methods might not be successful in keeping the island in friendly hands. In view of these reports General Wedemeyer suggested minimizing the damage from the fall of Formosa by explaining the situation over the Voice of America.³ On January 3, 1950, the United

¹Ibid., p. 3072. ²Ibid., pp. 111-12.

³Ibid., p. 1672. General Wedemeyer asserted that the final policy memorandum had never been referred to him and he doubted that it had ever been submitted to the Department of Defense (ibid., pp. 2296-97). Acheson held that

Press published an article beginning:

The United States State Department has notified its attachés that the loss of Formosa, island redoubt of the Chinese Nationalists, to the Communists was to be anticipated.

The Department said the public must be sold on the idea that the island is of no strategic value in order to prevent the loss of prestige at home and abroad.

Referring to this article, Senator Knowland accused certain representatives on Formosa of following a course meant to undermine the Nationalists and of repeatedly sending false reports that the island would fall. He requested the names of those who had drawn up the Formosan Document. Acheson refused to give them, however, on the grounds that all responsibility rested with him as Secretary of State and because releasing the names would increase the reluctance of officers in the State Department to work in certain controversial areas where they might be accused of unorthodox ideas.¹ As a justification for putting forth the Formosan Document, Acheson spoke of a necessity of minimizing the importance of a territory which might be lost.² He attempted to explain the meaning behind several controversial statements in the document. Referring to the phrase "largely because of a mistaken importance to the United States defense in the Pacific," Acheson denied that this meant that the island was of no strategic importance. It

the Interdepartment Coordinating Staff, including representatives of the Army, CIA, and ECA, had seen the document without making any suggestions to alter it (ibid., p. 1828).

¹Ibid., pp. 1675-77 and 1683. ²Ibid., p. 1673.

was intended to counteract the effect of talk that the loss of Formosa would be catastrophic to the security of the United States and would throw the defense line back to the California coast. In reality, all means short of employing American troops would have been used to prevent the fall of Formosa.¹ Acheson summarized American policy toward Taiwan from 1948 until the invasion of South Korea: (1) Formosa had strategic importance for America, (2) the island should be kept out of the hands of a hostile power, and (3) under existing conditions it was not possible to promise to commit United States forces to Formosa.²

Official policy changed in June 1950. On the twenty-fifth of that month President Truman announced our determination to prevent an invasion of Formosa from the mainland.³ He ordered the Seventh Fleet to Formosan waters to "neutralize" the island and called on Chinese Nationalist forces to cease air and sea operations against the mainland. On the other hand, the State Department informed MacArthur that if Chiang Kai-shek offered troops, he should refuse them. The army of Taiwan was needed on the island

¹Ibid., pp. 1804-05. A debate over whether the Formosan Document should be published ended with Acheson losing his fight against publication. Maintaining that he had furnished the document to the committees with the understanding that it would not go into the public record, Acheson pointed to the possibility of Russia using the official document as a way of discrediting the Voice of America. Since a summary had already been released, it appears that Acheson was thinking of the damage an official release would do to the administration.

²Ibid., pp. 1671-72. ³Ibid., p. 1000.

to defend it against the Chinese Reds in the event that they should attack.¹

After General MacArthur visited the island of Formosa in July,² he made several recommendations on arms and equipment needed by the Formosans. He did not recommend using the troops in Korea. After the Chinese invasion of Korea, nevertheless, he began to blame failures in the peninsula on the fact that Chinese Nationalist troops were not being used. According to MacArthur, Chiang Kai-shek's forces had improved, and, with so many Chinese Communists in Korea, it was unlikely that Peiping would mount an offensive against Taiwan.³

There were several reasons advanced by the Joint Chiefs for their opposition to using Formosan troops in Korea. According to Marshall, there was a continued need for armed protection of the Formosan island. As late as March 1951 a mission sent to Formosa had pictured the troops as ill-prepared for battle. Since some of our allies no longer recognized the Nationalist government, they might well not welcome the idea of this government's troops fighting in Korea or engaging in diversionary activities from Indo-China. If the Chinese went to the mainland in junks, as MacArthur suggested,⁴ the United States might

¹Goodrich, pp. 110-11, questions the wisdom of sending the Seventh Fleet to patrol the waters between the island and the mainland when many of the countries in the UN did not recognize the Nationalist regime.

²Supra, pp. 59-61. ³Ibid., pp. 84-85.

⁴Ibid., p. 24.

well become involved in fighting in China, for the Nationalist army would require more logistical support and better trained troops to carry out a successful campaign on the mainland.¹ One had to consider, too, the possibility that the Russians would picture any return of the Nationalists to the mainland as a causus belli and would more actively support the Red Chinese.

The Military and the Civilian

If the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to take more factors into consideration when making a decision than did MacArthur, so did the President and the State Department have to weigh other interests when making and carrying out policies. The proper roles of the Departments of Defense and State in making decisions were important subjects discussed during the hearings. The role of Congress in declaring war and in sending troops abroad raised partisan debate, as did the state of preparedness of the country and the question of universal military training.

Although General MacArthur agreed that "at no time in our system of government is there any question of the civil administration being in complete control," he also asserted that "there should be no non-professional interference in the handling of troops in a campaign."² If this hands-off

¹Ibid., p. 164; testimony of Bradley; cf. pp. 337 and 619.

²Ibid., p. 289; cf. Wedemeyer's statement on a commanding officer's role in carrying out his mission (supra, p. 79).

attitude on the part of civilians were carried out in a war, the role of the President as chief of state would be infringed upon. The idea that military plans can be carried out without being adapted to the diplomatic situation ignores the political connotations of some military actions, such as the bombing of cities.

Before the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued definite orders on any problem which might lead to political repercussions, they asked the opinion of the State Department on the question at hand.¹ Louis Johnson had found his predecessor as Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, concerned about the domination of the State Department over Defense. However, after a system of liaison between the two departments had been set up, Acheson was, in Johnson's opinion, very cooperative in carrying out joint planning.² As a result of consultations, the political factor might be the determinant, for instance in the decision not to bomb near the Manchurian border,³ but this was decided before an order was given, not by changing directives.⁴ In questions where there was a difference of opinion between State and

¹Ibid., p. 898; testimony of General Bradley. A directive to MacArthur from the JCS was supposed to contain only military material. When political reasonings entered the picture, it was the President who communicated with MacArthur; thus, Truman included political decisions in his note to the general on January 13, 1951, which had been excluded from the January 12 message (ibid., p. 905).

²Ibid., pp. 2577 and 2594. ³Ibid., p. 502.

⁴Ibid., pp. 740 and 1760; testimony of Bradley and Acheson.

Defense, Marshall could not recall any instance where the Commander in Chief had acted adversely to the Department of Defense in relation to the State Department.¹

"War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory." In these words, General MacArthur expressed the military strategist's view that one side or the other must win a war. The concept of limited war in which the armed forces attempt only to prevent the enemy from making advances was alien to the American idea of success, notwithstanding the fact that the War of 1812 was one in which neither side won. Although Republicans often stated that a cessation of hostilities with the Communists in control of territory north of the thirty-eighth parallel would be a victory for the enemy,² and some people still state that we lost the war in Korea, it seems to many others, including this writer, that by preventing the Communists from making territorial gains, the West achieved a victory.

¹Ibid., p. 384.

²See conclusion of Republican Senators to this effect (ibid., p. 3605).

CHAPTER VI

OTHER NATIONS AND KOREA

Russia and the Korean War

In deciding what measures should be taken against Communist China, the allies had to consider what Russia would do, especially in view of a 1950 Sino-Russian treaty. In this pact Russia and China promised to prevent the "repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression."¹ Russia might construe this treaty to denounce even the flying of airplanes from Japan to carry on the struggle against China as an aggressive act, if she so wanted.²

Douglas MacArthur refused to speculate on whether bombing Manchuria would require Russia to carry out the assistance called for by the alliance. He countered by declaring that losses in Korea could not go on forever. There was no certainty that Russia would stay out or come in; on these things the country had to take a certain risk.³ Indeed, the Soviet Union seemed to be less and less

¹Ibid., p. 993. ²Ibid., p. 406; testimony of Marshall.

³Ibid., p. 66; cf. p. 40 where MacArthur states his recommendations might not confine the conflict to Korea, but

linked with the Korean War.¹ Moreover, even while receiving air assistance and supplies, the Chinese might not want Soviet forces in their country.² For one thing, China wanted Manchuria to remain part of her territory, a status which might be endangered if Russians were admitted on a large scale to China proper. As for American designs on Manchuria, MacArthur did not believe that a bombing of that territory would alter the fact that Russia knew that we had no imperialist designs there.³

The administration did not agree with MacArthur's rather sanguine view of the possibility of Russian entrance into the war. President Truman had decided that the risk of war from bombing Manchuria was too great. The Soviet Union and Communist China had called attention to the treaty between them in connection with Korea and the alleged re-armament of Japan. Also, if Russia failed to live up to the terms of the treaty, her influence in the Far East would possibly be threatened. This was true even if the terms of the treaty were vague enough for the Russians to interpret it as they wished.⁴

That Russia would not necessarily respond to action on the part of the United States was, according to Acheson, one of two assumptions made by MacArthur in drawing up his

that they would give us an opportunity to hit the enemy before he hit us.

¹Ibid., p. 250. ²Ibid., p. 249. ³Ibid., p. 252.

⁴Ibid., p. 480; testimony of Marshall; cf. p. 741, testimony of Bradley.

program. The administration, however, was aware of three actions which the Kremlin might initiate: (1) turning over to the Chinese large numbers of planes with crews for retaliatory action, (2) intervening in Korea with a half million or more ground "volunteers," and (3) precipitation of an all-out war.¹ MacArthur's second assumption was that time was not necessarily on our side in the building up of armed strength. In contrast to this idea, the administration did believe that time was on our side, not that we would match the Soviet Union "man for man and tank for tank," but that we could build an effective deterrent force.²

The hearings brought forth some comments on Russian aid in the Korean War. Many of the statements on this subject were deleted on security grounds from the published testimony. Nevertheless, General MacArthur did state that the attack on South Korea could not have been launched by the North Koreans without supplies furnished by the Soviets.³ Bradley answered questions of Senator Harry Byrd with statements that MIG 15's, fast Russian-built jets, were used to combat United Nations approaches to the Yalu and that tanks and most of the artillery were of Russian manufacture.⁴

Both General MacArthur and General Bradley spoke of the difficulty of discovering exactly how much influence

¹Ibid., pp. 1718-19. General Bradley testified to Russian willingness to go to war on pp. 751 and 942.

²Ibid., p. 1720. ³Ibid., p. 173.

⁴Ibid., p. 995; cf. testimony of Marshall, p. 623.

Russia had on China in 1950 and 1951.¹ Marshall was more positive on this point when he stated, "I have gone on the assumption that she [China] was operating not only in conjunction with but literally under the direction of the Soviet Union."² Although Russia and China were acting together in Korea, Acheson mentioned the continued State Department consideration of a possible split between the two powerful countries.³ Indeed, as Bradley pointed out, no country had been able to dominate China very long.⁴

In considering measures which might be taken in Korea, the administration had to keep in mind the relative strength of the United States and of Russia. Here again there was disagreement with MacArthur. The general firmly believed that the Soviet government had not stockpiled sufficient material in Siberia to maintain a major aggressive campaign in Asia for any length of time.⁵ General Sherman showed himself to be in sympathy with this view of Russian strength when he stated that the real deterrent to Russian aggression was the fear of being soundly beaten.⁶ In refuting this estimate of Russian strength, Marshall assumed a Russian possession of the A-bomb, an increasing relative military power, and a growing efficiency of weapons.⁷

¹Ibid., pp. 144 and 1001.

²Ibid., p. 659. Acheson also expressed a belief in a closer connection between Communist China and the Kremlin than MacArthur saw (ibid., p. 1923).

³Ibid., p. 1776. ⁴Ibid., p. 1001. ⁵Ibid., p. 130.

⁶Ibid., p. 1568. ⁷Ibid., pp. 375-76.

The United Nations in Korea

In deciding what measures could be taken in Korea, the United Nations technically had the major role. In reality, the United States had the real power of decision, tempered by its desire to keep the support of its allies. Since there was no Military Staff Committee in the United Nations, President Truman became the agent for all the countries.¹ Although the United States was to carry out United Nations resolutions on Korea, it did not always act in pursuance of a UN resolution. On several occasions, e.g. on July 7 and October 7, the American government acted previous to or at the same time it was seeking approval for an action.²

General Marshall explained the official line of command for orders going to Korea. From general United Nations resolutions the JCS prepared a "precise directive," taking into consideration all the military involvements and implications. Directives were forwarded to the Secretary of Defense and the President, and if very important, to the National Security Council. Any political questions involved were discussed with members of the State Department.

MacArthur's reports originally went through the JCS on their way to the United Nations. Later, when reporting exclusively on military operations, the United Nations Supreme Commander reported directly to the international

¹Ibid., pp. 1938-39. ²Ibid., pp. 326-27.

body.¹ Generally this worked well. Nevertheless, according to Acheson, General MacArthur overstepped his authority in his twelfth report to the United Nations by stating his own views in what was supposed to be a "factual recitation of military events." When MacArthur denied the validity of State Department objections, the report was forwarded to the United Nations.²

Dean Acheson believed strongly in the necessity of maintaining international support for actions in Korea, since they were being taken in the name of the United Nations.³ Because the main resolutions of the world body were in support of a vigorous war against aggression in Korea, they were little discussed in the hearings. However, several Senators did attack an Indian resolution of January 11, 1951, calling for a five-member group to consider cease-fire proposals and an armistice. The Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, Communist China, and one other country were to be on the committee. The Senators claimed that the proposal made the concessions of discussing Formosa and of recognizing Red China by including her on the committee. Senator Knowland referred to an article in the New York Times in which it was stated that Ambassador Austin had voted for the resolution in expectation of a Chinese Communist refusal to see the committee. According to Knowland, this had been a dangerous wager because of the

¹Ibid., p. 989. ²Ibid., p. 1981.

³Ibid., pp. 1940-41.

possibility of an acceptance.¹ In Acheson's opinion the cease-fire proposal did not promise Formosa and China to the Communists. It was meant to say merely "if you people stop your defiance of the United Nations, then you will have the chance to discuss, as you had a chance before this defiance, these questions in which you are interested." He further averred that although we did not consider these questions part of the Korean situation, we could not prevent other people discussing them.² Acheson could find nothing in the proposal which indicated how many nations would confer on the cease-fire, and we should have insisted on the inclusion of Nationalist China in any discussion group.³

Another subject involving the United Nations was the seating of Red China in the United Nations. Part of the discussion centered on whether Communist China's entrance was a procedural question not subject to the veto. Acheson spoke of our hope of keeping the Red regime out of the United Nations by a majority vote. If evidence showed that a minority supported our position, we would request an

¹Ibid., p. 523.

²Ibid., p. 1784. According to Marshall, the JCS had recommended the omission of these questions from the cease-fire discussions. However, they made no recommendation as to a discussion of these questions in a final settlement, a suggestion made in the fifth principal of the Indian resolution.

³Ibid., p. 1969. The proposals are outlined on page 1967 of the hearings.

opinion of the World Court on the Charter provision that the Republic of China should be the permanent member of the Security Council.¹ If a veto of the admission was being considered, an opinion of the World Court on record that the entrance of Italy was a vetoable question could be taken into consideration.²

The Allies

Not all member nations of the United Nations fought in Korea. Of course, Russia and her satellites opposed all United Nations actions to deal with the aggressor. Others made no contribution of manpower or material. But there were sixteen countries which sent units to fight with American and Korean troops. During the hearings Senators repeatedly questioned the contributions of these countries. Were they contributing their share of men and material? Were they too anxious to compromise with the aggressor and with Russia? Had the allies put pressure on the administration to remove MacArthur? Was the administration favoring Europe at the expense of Asia?

Many Senators pictured the allies as not doing as much as they could to support the Korean War. Although military officials appearing before the committees generally agreed with this judgment, the Secretaries of State and Defense pointed to some of the reasons for this. Acheson

¹Ibid., p. 2023. Senator Smith opposed Communist China's entrance into the UN because Russia was in control there and this meant a conquest by an external power.

²Ibid., p. 2024.

spoke of the allies as "painfully aware" of the inability to do all they would like to do. For some time the British had been carrying on guerilla warfare in Malaya, while France had been struggling to maintain her position in Indo-China.¹ Marshall mentioned the inability of some countries to do more because of internal political issues.²

In October 1950 the United States might even have discouraged other nations from sending troops, since we considered the war near an end. Then too, we had turned down some offers of less than a thousand troops, for MacArthur had requested that all units accepted have at least this many men. Furthermore, when the United States would have had to furnish all equipment, training, transportation, and logistical support for the troops offered, they were not accepted.³

Secretary of State Acheson did not think the allies were too anxious to compromise. The foreign ministers of the United States, France, and Great Britain had discussed the importance of limiting the war and were in full accord on major measures in Korea.⁴ On the other hand, when Collins was asked whether the allies were giving us full support through approval of our actions, his answer was that he did not think they were supporting us to the extent they should.⁵

¹Ibid., p. 1772. ²Ibid., p. 607.

³Ibid., pp. 950 and 980-81. ⁴Ibid., p. 1880.

⁵Ibid., p. 1225.

MacArthur held that, if necessary, the United States should go it alone in Korea; he believed, however, that his plans for victory would be supported by a majority of the United Nations.¹ If to help an ally were in the American interest, the country should do so; if to help an ally ran contrary to American interest, the country should not do so.² This point of view did not accord with Bradley's idea that propaganda, not military might, would help the United States to win the war. To win in this field the American government would have to cooperate with other nations having the same ideals and objectives.³

As for alleged pressure from other countries to remove MacArthur, Acheson asserted that they had opposed the Supreme Commander's policies several times and were worried about some of his statements.⁴ There had, however, been no pressure brought on the administration to replace the general as leader of the United Nations troops.⁵ After his removal, the New York Times reported a general approval of Truman's action by the allies, with a consensus that it should have taken place earlier.⁶

Europe versus Asia

During World War II General MacArthur often complained of the administration's policy of trying to bring

¹Ibid., pp. 168 and 296. ²Ibid., p. 108.

³Ibid., p. 730. ⁴Ibid., p. 1733. ⁵Ibid., p. 1879.

⁶New York Times, April 12, 1951.

the war in Europe to a finish before giving all-out support to his forces in the Pacific.¹ During the Korean War he voiced the same complaint. He disagreed with the policy of holding a large number of troops in Europe under the supposition that Russia's real aim was to conquer these industrial countries. With this in mind he had written to Congressman Martin this comment:

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquests, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom.²

Generals Marshall and Bradley held that Russia's main goal was to achieve domination over Europe and that the United States must ensure the freedom of that vital area. Europe's manpower of three hundred million and her great industrial capacity made her the bulwark against communism.³ Air bases on the continent were essential for maintaining a striking power which could reach industrial cities of the Soviet Union. Moreover, if the United States lost Europe, it would lose Middle East oil, bases, and strategic materials.⁴ Added to the communist bloc, these resources would greatly increase Russia's strength as an opponent.⁵

¹Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Co., 1956), pp. 36-37.

²Military Situation in the Far East, p. 3544.

³Ibid., p. 731. ⁴Ibid., p. 883. ⁵Ibid., p. 742.

General MacArthur admitted during the hearings that perhaps he did not know all the factors which led the administration to place such a stress on Europe. When Senator McMahon expressed a desire to know how MacArthur would defend the American nation, MacArthur replied, "That doesn't happen to be my responsibility, Senator. My responsibilities were in the Pacific, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the various agencies of the government are working day and night for an over-all solution to the global problem."¹

¹Ibid., p. 76.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The committee hearings ended on June 27, 1951, almost two months and over two million words after their beginning. On August 17 the two committees convened once more and adopted a resolution to transmit the hearings, records, and appendices to the Senate without filing a report or reaching any conclusions. Nevertheless, members could submit their private views to the chairman. Subsequently, a group of Republicans filed a long and virulent report.¹ In a summary of witnesses' testimony, these Republicans pointed to the testimony of Vice Admiral Badger as conclusive evidence that a United States failure to provide arms caused the downfall of the Republic of China, although admitting that General Barr contradicted this view. General Hurley's testimony supported the thesis that Yalta was one of the greatest tragedies in our history, while General O'Donnell estimated the Air Force of being capable of carrying out MacArthur's suggestion of

¹Republicans signing the report were Style Bridges, Alexander Wiley, H. Alexander Smith, Bourke B. Hickenlooper, William F. Knowland, Harry P. Cain, Owen Brewster, and Ralph Flanders.

bombing Manchuria. They thus claimed vindication of their point of view. In their opinion, little could be learned from the testimony of General Bradley or the Joint Chiefs, since it would have been embarrassing for them to contradict the Secretary of Defense or to oppose administration policy.

These Republicans outlined thirty areas of "agreement" representing "common-sense conclusions which anyone regardless of political party would draw after the facts had been set forth." The preface to these items read, "The conviction that the administration's Far East policy was one of appeasement toward communism was proven to be fact as a result of the investigation." This statement is indicative of the tone of the rest of the report. The administration might well have agreed with the judgment of the Senators in a few of the areas, e.g., that the President had the right to remove General MacArthur, that MacArthur never violated military directives, that the recommendations offered by the general were based on his desire to bring about a victory. Other of the "agreements" were slanted in such a way that they conveyed a criticism of the administration's policy, e.g., that the military potential of the United States after World War II was not maintained at a level commensurate with our political commitments or financial expenditures and that limited war is impossible to define.¹

¹Ibid., pp. 3567-88.

After condemning the administration in its post-war Far East policy and accusing the State Department of harboring Communists, the Senators supported a greater use of the air and naval forces by following MacArthur's recommendations. They contended that this would ensure the victory which the "immoral policy of killing more Chinese Communists" was not likely to produce.¹

In their conclusion, the Republican Senators expressed the belief that a peace based on the division of Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel would be a victory for aggression.² In a separate statement Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. agreed with the committee report on most questions, but placed more emphasis on the Korean War.³ In a much more reasonable report Senator Saltonstall agreed with most of the conclusions of the other Republican Senators, but not with the bases on which they had been predicated. He also emphasized a point completely ignored by his colleagues--that General MacArthur's statements caused considerable doubt in the world as to his support of the United Nations' policies. He correctly judged the importance of the hearings in influencing the administration on the importance of (1) keeping Formosa out of Communist hands, (2) keeping Red China out of the United Nations, and (3) indefinitely delaying American recognition of Communist China.⁴

¹Ibid., p. 3590. ²Ibid., pp. 3600-05.

³Ibid., p. 3659. ⁴Ibid., pp. 3659-60.

Wayne Morse, still a Republican at this time, showed his independence by criticizing the Republican report as "very highly partisan and biased," especially in avoiding a discussion of whether MacArthur's conduct justified his removal. In Morse's opinion, it did, especially because of MacArthur's ultimatum to the Chinese leaders to meet with him to negotiate a peace. Although deploring the emphasis Republicans put on the ousting of the Nationalists from China proper, he thought the Democrats should have insisted on greater control of the aid they gave to the Nationalists.¹

Democrats had no general report on the hearings. They were content to let the hearings themselves rest as evidence of Truman's justification in recalling MacArthur. There was general praise of the way in which Senator Russell had conducted the hearings.

Results of the hearings were both good and bad for the country. Arthur Krock pointed out some of these results in an article written shortly before the end of the sessions. MacArthur's testimony led to protests against the shipment of strategic materials to Communist China and an embargo on these goods imposed by the United Nations. The reasons for which the administration had dismissed MacArthur were clearer, although it was evident that the abrupt manner in which he was dismissed was ill-advised.²

¹Ibid., p. 3662.

²New York Times, June 1, 1951.

The hearings also necessitated a review of Korean War strategy. They resulted in positive statements by the United States that we would oppose Chinese Communist admission to the United Nations. Truman's determination to contain the war was clearer and this forcefulness removed an excuse for the allies not to contribute more to Korea on the pretext of disapproving of General MacArthur's tactics and disbelief in the President's ability to control him.¹ That the nation wanted peace and desired above all to avoid a third world war was demonstrated time and time again. As for the conservative Republican views on Korea, the transcripts revealed how illogical was the position of favoring MacArthur's proposals and at the same time advocating reductions in the number of troops and the amount of money being spent to carry on the war.

The hearings were harmful in several respects. Bradley had testified during the hearings that the prolonged probe of the military situation was endangering the United States and that the military disclosures might incite an attack by the Russians in other spots of the world.² It was undoubtedly true that the Russians could glean much information from the published reports. Several articles in the New York Times pointed out what these areas were. The full picture of the division of opinion over Korea between the United States and its allies, as well as between

¹Ibid., April 26, 1951.

²Military Situation in the Far East, p. 953.

MacArthur and the administration, was shown. The vagueness of future policy, as charged by the Republicans, was revealed, along with the fact that we did not consider ourselves strong enough to wage a successful war on a larger scale.¹ This vagueness as to future action stemmed partially from our lack of concrete knowledge of actual conditions behind the Iron Curtain. Our admission that we were attempting to kill as many Chinese as possible and that we had many casualties gave impetus to the Russian propaganda machine.²

On the other hand, several predicted results of the dismissal did not occur. Forecasts of a harmful effect on the Japanese peace treaty negotiations resulting from the removal did not materialize. Immediately after MacArthur's departure from Japan, John Foster Dulles informed the Japanese government that our policy had not changed. There were, subsequently, no great obstacles in coming to an agreement on what the treaty should contain.³ General Ridgway took command of the Far East theater and carried out his mission effectively.

Thus the administration's decision to remove MacArthur had passed before the "high court of public opinion," as the general himself said it would have to.⁴ In spite

¹New York Times, May 27, 1951.

²Ibid., May 13, 1951.

³Military Situation in the Far East, p. 752.

⁴Ibid., p. 102.

of the initial uproar over the way the dismissal notice had been given and the tumultuous reception given MacArthur on his return to the United States, Truman's views on limiting the war were justified and were followed by the succeeding Republican administration.

APPENDIX

Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General
MacArthur on December 6, 1950

6 Dec., '50

From Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Far East,
Tokyo, Japan (and other commanders):

1. The President, as of 5 Dec., forwarded a memo to all Cabinet members and to the chairman N.S.R.B., administrator E.C.A., director C.I.A., administrator E.S.A. and director Selective Service, which reads as follows:

"In the light of the present critical international situation, and until further written notice from me, I wish that each one of you would take immediate steps to reduce the number of public speeches pertaining to foreign or military policy made by officials of the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch. This applies to officials in the field as well as those in Washington.

"No speech, press release, or other public statement concerning foreign policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of State.

"No speech, press release, or other statement concerning military policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of Defense.

"In addition to the copies submitted to the Departments of State and Defense for clearance, advance copies of speeches and press releases concerning foreign policy or military policy should be submitted to the White House for information.

"The purpose of this memorandum is not to curtail the flow of information to the American people, but rather to insure that the information made public is accurate and fully in accord with the policies of the United States Government.

2. He also forwarded the following to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense:

.....
"Officials overseas, including military commanders and diplomatic representatives, should be ordered to exercise extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media in the United States.

3. The above is transmitted to you for guidance and appropriate action.

Excerpts from President Truman's April
11 Address to the Nation

The whole Communist imperialism is back of the attack on peace in the Far East. It was the Soviet Union that trained and equipped the North Koreans for aggression. The Chinese Communists massed forty-four well-trained and well-equipped divisions on the Korean frontier. These were the troops they threw into battle when the North Korean Communists were beaten.

The question we have had to face is whether the Communist plan of conquest can be stopped without general war. Our Government and other countries associated with us in the United Nations believe that the best chance of stopping it without general war is to meet the attack in Korea and defeat it there.

.....
We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended. We are trying to prevent a world war--not to start one. The best way to do that is to make it plain that we and the other free countries will continue to resist the attack.

But you may ask: Why can't we take other steps to punish the aggressor? Why don't we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why don't we assist Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland of China?

If we were to do these things we would be running a very grave risk of starting a general war. If that were to happen, we would have brought about the exact situation we are trying to prevent.

If we were to do these things, we would become entangled in a vast conflict on the continent of Asia and our task would become immeasurably more difficult all over the world.

.....
First of all, it is clear that our efforts in Korea can blunt the will of the Chinese Communists to continue the struggle. The United Nations forces have put up a tremendous fight in Korea and have inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy. Our forces are stronger now than they have been before. These are plain facts which may discourage the Chinese Communists from continuing their attack.

Second, the free world as a whole is growing in military strength every day. In the United States, in Western Europe, and throughout the world, free men are alert to the Soviet threat and are building their defenses. This may discourage the Communist rulers from continuing the war in Korea--and from undertaking new acts of aggression elsewhere.

.....
I believe that we must try to limit the war in Korea for these vital reasons: to make sure that the precious lives of our fighting men are not wasted; to see that the security of our country and the free world is not needlessly

jeopardized; and to prevent a third world war.

A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy. I have therefore considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy.

It was with the deepest personal regret that I found myself compelled to take this action. General MacArthur is one of our greatest military commanders. But the cause of world peace is more important than any individual.

Excerpts from Address of General MacArthur to
Joint Meeting of Congress on April 19

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, distinguished Members of the Congress, I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride; humility in the wake of those great American architects of our history who have stood here before me; pride in the reflection that this forum of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised. [Applause]

Here are centered the hopes, and aspirations, and faith of the entire human race.

I do not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected. I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American. I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life with but one purpose in mind, to serve my country. [Applause]

The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector oblivious to those of another is but to court disaster for the whole.

While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other.

There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism. [Applause] If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort.

Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean which became a vast moat to protect us as long as we held it. Indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Marianas held by us and our free allies.

The holding of this littoral defense line in the western Pacific is entirely dependent upon holding all segments thereof, for any major breach of that line by an unfriendly power would render vulnerable to determined attack every other segment.

This is a military estimate as to which I have yet to find a military leader who will take exception. [Applause.]

For that reason I have strongly recommended in the past as a matter of military urgency that under no circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control. [Applause.]

While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision, from a military standpoint, proved a sound one. As I say, it proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete and our objectives within reach when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.

This created a new war and an entirely new situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders, a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy.

Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.

Apart from the military need, as I saw it, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary, first, the intensification of our economic blockade against China; second, the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast; third, removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria; fourth, removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the Chinese mainland. [Applause.]

In war there is no substitute for victory. There are some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches, with unmistakable emphasis, that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative. Why, my soldiers asked of me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer. [Applause.]

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