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NATIONAL SOCIALISM: PURITAN OR ARYAN?
A REASSESSMENT OF THE NATURE OF
THE PHENOMENON OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM

BY

WILLIAM R. MATTESON

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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Abstract

This study involves, as our title states, a reassessment of the nature of the phenomenon of National Socialism. Following an extensive survey of the literature on the subject, we found two conclusions that predominated:

1. The conclusion that National Socialism was an aberration that did (and does) not fit within our western tradition.
2. The conclusion that National Socialism was the inevitable outcome solely of material factors associated with the development of a capitalistic society.

The central assumption of our argument was formulated to dispute these conclusions. That assumption is this: The phenomenon of National Socialism was an expression of both material and ideal traditions central to the development of modern western civilization. Specifically, we argue that it was an expression of a secularized version of the Puritan world-view.

Max Weber, in The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, and David Noble, in Historians Against History, have traced the profound impact that Puritanism has had on the development of the modern west. In examining the intellectual movements and cultural developments in Germany from the time of the Reformation up to the Post-World War I period, we have uncovered (and pieced together) the evidence

ANERKENNUNG

Zu Herren Travisano und Sennett,
für die Zeit zu helfen gehabt.
Verstehen sie mich? Vilen danke!
Und zu Herr Cohen für ein zufall
an die Bühne.

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Prologue

A distinction has often been drawn between the individualizing mode of historical thought and the generalizing mode of science,.. But even in historical thinking the particular fact is significant only by virtue of the relationship into which it enters,.. Its determination in time is the exact opposite of its temporal separateness; for historically it has meaning only if and as it refers back to a past and forward to a future.¹

The particular place that a social phenomenon occupies in history is determined, in good measure, by the treatment it receives in scholarly works attending it. Further, our understanding of that phenomenon depends in great measure on just how those works present it to us. Max Weber, in his investigation, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, analyzed the individual strands of thought that contributed to the development of "rational bourgeois capitalism". More recently, David W. Noble has traced the history of ideas associated with the world-view of the English Puritans (in Massachusetts) through a series of interpretations and reinterpretations by prominent American historians (Historians Against History, 1965). The impetus for our study follows from the works of these two scholars on the influence of Puritanism in the development of modern western civilization.

The specific phenomenon that this study will investigate is National Socialism. This subject has been the topic of

¹Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth (New York, 1946), p. 27.

a multitude of works by economists, historians, political scientists, psychologists, sociologists, theologians, and laymen as well.¹ In surveying a major portion of these studies (over two hundred and fifty books and articles on National Socialism) we have found that two conclusions predominate:

1. The conclusion that National Socialism was an aberration, an anomaly that did (and does) not fit within the traditions of the modern west;
2. The conclusion that National Socialism was the inevitable outcome of capitalist development in Germany society (the Marxist interpretation which explains the phenomenon solely in material terms).

The works that have portrayed National Socialism as an aberration fall into two basic categories:

- A. Aberration Theses, Type I: This category includes those works which by theoretical design (a) and/or historical focus (b) encapsulate the phenomenon of National Socialism within Germany from 1918 to 1945, and by so doing, treat it as an aberration unrelated to (or discontinuous with) the preceding social history of the modern west.

An example of type A (a) is Theodor Abel's The Nazi Movement, a comprehensive study of the growth of National Socialism from a social movement

¹The theoretical frameworks in which these analyses have been couched range from strict Marxist (conflict-coercion) interpretations to structural function (equilibrium-integration) ones.

perspective. It is an able study of the ideological and organizational aspects of National Socialism within the context of German society from 1918 to 1933, supported by a formidable array of personal interviews and election statistics. Within its interpretive framework it succeeds at what it sets out to do, namely to examine the elements of a successful social movement.¹ The social movement framework, nonetheless (ipso facto) casts National Socialism into a mold which portrays it as discontinuous with preceding social history (facilitating specificity, impeding generalizability).²

Examples of type A (b) include David Child's Germany Since 1918; John Conway's The Path to Dictatorship, 1918-1933; William Allen's The Nazi Seizure of Power; Stephen Roberts' The House That Hitler Built; and Dietrich Orlow's The History of the Nazi Party: 1919-1933, among a host of others.

¹Abel focuses on four general factors: 1) Prevalence of discontent with the existing social order; 2) The particular ideology and program for social transformation adopted by the Nazis; 3) Nazi organizational and promotional techniques; 4) Charismatic leadership. See page 166 of The Nazi Movement.

²See also Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements (New York, 1951); Neil Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior (New York, 1962); Crane Brinton's The Anatomy of Revolution (New York, 1952); and Anthony Oberschall's Social Conflicts and Social Movements (New Jersey, 1973).

These works, while offering much factual information relating to the phenomenon of National Socialism (propaganda techniques, party membership statistics, party programs, Weimar history, and so forth), segregate it as a distinctly twentieth century phenomenon and so fail to provide any developmental social history leading up to its emergence.¹

B. Aberration Theses, Type II: This category includes works which have attempted to explain the phenomenon of National Socialism along the lines of German particularism (the peculiarities of German history, the German people's penchant for militarism and idealism, German politics, German romanticism).² Here we find literary exorcisms

¹There are quite a large number of works limited to specific aspects of the phenomenon of National Socialism which, though oftentimes scrupulous in detail, nevertheless are severely limited in explanatory scope. For example: Hans Gerth's "The Nazi Party, Its Leadership and Composition" (AJS, Vol. 45, pp. 517-541); Charles Beard's "Education Under the Nazis" (Foreign Affairs, Vol. 14, pp. 437-452); Harold Gordon's Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch (Princeton, 1972); and Albert Speer's Inside the Third Reich (New York, 1970).

²Richard Grunberger's The Twelve Year Reich does the aberrant label justice with this description of the peculiarities of pre-Nazi Germany: "Though the coming of the Third Reich may have lacked the quality of inevitability sometimes attributed to it, it is difficult not to consider the Weimar Republic's fate as inescapable. The political immaturity of the German people, a deformed social system and a malfunctioning economy all interacted to bring about its collapse. But the particular form this collapse took was by no means predetermined. In Germany (where, incidentally, public executioners exercised their office in top-hat and frock-coat) the hangmen of democracy might as easily have

(Hans Kohn's The Mind of Germany; Z. Barbu's "The Uniqueness of the German Psyche"; J. J. Schokking's "Militarism in German Society") which, while frequently of a wider historical breadth than those works in category A, suffer from the "axe to grind" syndrome which makes them, for the most part, less enlightening than the previous category of studies. Kohn's The Mind of Germany grinds out the major argument of this category which is this: Due to the influence of the peculiarities embodied in the German romantic movement, Germany broke from the traditions of the modern west in the early decades of the nineteenth century. The subsequent arguments which stress particular aspects of German society as being aberrant are generally spinoffs of this assertion.

While the works in this category do draw a connection between romanticism and National Socialism, they fail to discern a connection between romanticism and the development of modern western civilization. In Historians Against History David Noble has proposed this connection, and in the development of our thesis we shall employ Noble's argument to:

worn gold braids as brown shirts, since the perverted minority Republican governments of 1932 faced the choice of either instituting a narrow, army-backed Presidential dictatorship or of surrendering to the broadly-based Nazi movement". (New York, 1971), p. 17. (Emphases mine)

1. Counter the assertions of the particularists that Germany broke from the traditions of the west at the beginning of the nineteenth century;
2. Untangle the tensions between romanticism, rationalism, and industrialism associated with Germany's transition from a primarily rural to an urban-industrialized nation;
3. Analyze the crisis that transition precipitated, and the role that romanticism played in its resolution (via the program of National Socialism).

C. The Marxist Theses (The Materialist Perspective): The Marxist interpretations of National Socialism have analyzed the phenomenon strictly in material terms. While they do not regard it as an aberration, but rather as an inevitable consequence in the development of a capitalist society, they fail to consider its ideal aspects.

Probably the most comprehensive study of National Socialism from the Marxist perspective is Franz Neumann's Behemoth (focusing on the Structure and Practice of National Socialism from 1933-1944).¹ Neumann's argument essentially is this: National Socialism, theory and practice, represented the outcome of the economic development

¹See Neumann's notes, pp. 477-518, for related works from the materialist perspective. Also Melchior Palyi's "Economic Foundations of the German Totalitarian State" (AJS, Vol. 46, pp. 469-486).

that preceded it. The mode of production--monopoly capitalism--was the primary determinant of the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of German society.¹ This provided the foundation upon which the legal and political superstructure of the modern total state arose in the form of the Third Reich.² While we shall not enter into an extended argument over the merits of the materialist perspective, neither shall we offer, heeding Weber's warning, a one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation as a substitute for a one-sided materialistic one. We shall argue, rather, that the phenomenon of National Socialism owed its due to a combination of "ideal"³ and "material" factors.⁴

¹The Marxist perspective, as a social theory, maintains that the social structure (of a particular society at a given point in time) is determined by the methods of production and distribution of wealth. The prevailing institutions and ideas are seen, in this theory, as those best adapted to maintain the interests of the class which dominates that social structure. Considered in a broader context as a philosophy of history, the Marxist philosophy contends that social change results not from a conflict of ideas but from a conflict of economic interests between the ruling (vested interests) and dispossessed classes.

²Furthermore, Neumann argues that Germany's imperialistic war was the outcome solely of the internal antagonisms of the German economy (see Behemoth, p. 202).

³Anthony Giddens, in his work entitled Four Myths in the History of Social Thought, has asked the question: Do the Marxian and Durkheimian models represent polar extremes in their conception of the Hobbesian question "How do men become tractable to social control"? Or rather, he suggests, do the integration and conflict approaches differ not so much in their theoretical structure as in their subject-matter orientation?

In the introduction that follows we will outline our argument; the interpretative framework in which we shall present it; and the evidence we have collected to support it.

4 (from p.)Marx's opposition to Hegelian idealism, particularly Hegel's view of the State as an absolute and his conception of nature as the mirroring of an abstract idea, stimulated him (Marx) to demonstrate the antagonisms between the abstract "State" and the "Real-Life" battleground of individuals, civil society. The real-ideal debate has taken on a variety of forms since then, as social scientists have delved into the nature of social action and subsequent forms of social organization.

Introduction

The growth, triumph, and transformation of the Puritan spirit was the most fundamental movement of the seventeenth century...Immense as its accomplishments were on the high stage of public affairs, its achievements in that inner world, of which politics are but the squalid scaffolding, were mightier still...For to the Puritan, a contemner of the vain shows of sacramentalism, mundane toil becomes itself a kind of sacrament. Like a man who strives by unresting activity to exorcise a haunting demon, the Puritan, in the effort to save his soul, sets in motion every force in heaven above or in the earth beneath. By the mere energy of his expanding spirit, he remakes not only his own character and habits and way of life, but family and church, industry and city, political institutions and social order.

For that awful journey (to the Celestial City), girt with precipices and beset with fiends, he sheds every encumbrance, and arms himself with every weapon. Amusements, books, even intercourse with friends must, if need be, be cast aside; for it is better to enter into eternal life halt and maimed, than having two eyes to be cast into eternal fire... If powers and principalities will hear and obey, well; if not, they must be ground into dust, that on their ruins the elect may build the Kingdom of Christ.¹

The central assumption of our argument is formulated to dispute the conclusions which were drawn by the two aforementioned categories of works:

1. The conclusion that National Socialism was an aberration, an anomaly that did (and does) not fit within the traditions of modern western civilization;
2. The conclusion that National Socialism was the inevitable outcome solely of material factors associated with the development of a capitalist society.

¹R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (Middlesex, 1922), pp. 198-201.

That assumption is this: The phenomenon of National Socialism was an expression of both material and ideal traditions central to the development of the west. Specifically, we contend that it was an expression of the German Protestant Weltanschauung, a secularized version of the Puritan worldview embodying the myth of the transcendence of time. We shall demonstrate that this Weltanschauung was an expression of traditions central to the development of western civilization, and consequently prove that National Socialism, as part and parcel of it, was as well. That is our thesis.

The perspective from which we shall consider National Socialism is that which Weber employed in examining the development of the "spirit of capitalism".¹ Otto Hintze² provides a clear, concise description of that perspective:

All human action arises from a common source, in political as well as in religious life. Everywhere the first impulse to social action is given as a rule by real interests (i.e. political and economic interests). But ideal interests lend wings to these real interests, give them a spiritual meaning, and serve to justify them. Man does not live by bread alone. He wants to have a good conscience as he pursues his life-interests. And in pursuing them he develops his capacities to the highest extent only if he believes that in so doing he serves a higher rather than a purely egoistic purpose. Interests without such 'spiritual wings' are lame; but on the other hand, ideas can win out in history only if and insofar as they are associated with real interests.²

¹Weber repeatedly asserted the importance of ideas and of the individual against the collectivism of the Marxists, but he also, like the Marxists, emphasized the social foundations of individual action.

²Otto Hintze, "Kalvinismus und Staatsrason in Brandenburg zu Beginn des 17ten Jahrhunderts", Historische Zeitschrift, 144, 1931, p. 23.

Working from that perspective on social action then, the general foci of this thesis are:

1. The influence of ideal and material factors in historical change;
2. The interplay of ideas and values on the one hand, and social, political, and economic forces on the other, as they contribute to the generation of social action and subsequent forms of social organization.

For both Weber and Noble, the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment stand as critical junctures in the development of modern western civilization. Accordingly, their works attempt to discern relationships between the traditions these movements spawned, and subsequent forms of social organization. One such form of social organization, we maintain, was National Socialism. In testing our basic assumption, we shall untangle Reformation and Enlightenment inspired traditions; their interplay with social, political, and economic forces; and their contribution, in toto, to a world-view of which National Socialism was an expression.

Needless to say, studies of the intellectual movements and cultural developments in Germany, let alone in the rest of Western Europe, between the Reformation and the rise of National Socialism, would fill the shelves of a village library. In covering so much ground we are forced to be selective, but we may still argue with some depth. The ideas surrounding the Reformation and the Enlightenment, ..

and the events they were associated with, will be documented and analyzed quite extensively. With these resources in hand, we may demonstrate that the enunciation and application of these ideas in the midst of ever changing external realities can indeed be tied to the rise of National Socialism. Our efforts are not aimed at fitting National Socialism into a preconceived pattern of events (or package of ideas) invariably associated with the development of the modern west. Neither are they aimed at establishing a common denominator scheme having panoplic explanatory primacy over all phenomena in our tradition. Rather, they are aimed at examining some principle socio-historical trends (as they unfold in Germany) which have been analyzed (in the works of Weber and Noble) as central in the development of the modern west. In this way we hope to demonstrate that National Socialism was a permutation of, and continuous with, our western tradition.

To explain National Socialism as an expression of a world-view embodying the myth of the transcendence of time, we must first explain the nature of this world-view, and then determine its existence and persistence in Germany. To the former task we turn now.

The Puritan World-View

In the latter half of the sixteenth century a diverse group of religious reformers in England began to concentrate their efforts on purifying a church (the Anglican Church) they saw as the retainer of accumulated corruptions and

abuses of the Roman Catholic Church.¹ Strongly influenced by Calvin's work on the Continent and following Luther's precedent setting protest against the Catholic Church in Germany,² these reformers demanded that all that was non-scriptural in polity, worship, and teaching should be stripped away with the Bible providing the primary direction for the conduct of an individual's daily life.³ As Noble relates: "The English Puritans were converts to the Calvinist

¹See John T. McNeill's Modern Christian Movements for a fairly comprehensive history of Puritanism and discussions of noteworthy Puritan leaders.

²Weber correctly draws a sharp distinction between Luther's conception of the calling and that of Calvin. Luther, nonetheless, while retaining much that was medieval in worship, condemned idolatry in bold terms in the fourth of his eight Wittenberg sermons: "Images ought to be abolished if they are going to be worshipped. I wish they were abolished everywhere because they are abused". John T. McNeill, Modern Christian Movements (Philadelphia, 1954), p. 25.

³While Luther condemned monastic asceticism as a renunciation of, and a selfish withdrawal from this-worldly duties, "quite devoid of value as a means of justification before God", his concept of the calling remained traditionalistic. His calling was something men had to accept as a divine ordinance. However, through their individual faith, men could achieve salvation. Calvin's reworking of the calling into a task set by God, with the doctrine of predestination pushing believers to strive ceaselessly for signs that they were among the elect, laid out an entirely different path for men, as Weber notes: "In what was for the man of the age of the Reformation the most important thing in life, his eternal salvation, he was forced to follow his path alone to meet a destiny which had been decreed for him from eternity...There was not only no magical means of attaining the grace of God for those to whom God had decided to deny it, but no means whatever". Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York, 1958), p. 105.

theology which rejected the authority of the central institution of medieval civilization, the Roman Catholic Church".¹ God's word, to the Puritans, was eternal and immutable. The Church, as an institution, was temporal. It symbolized, in its altars, surplices and crucifixes, the sinful superfluities in life and conduct that must be cast aside. The Puritan, in his calling, turned sharply away from these dregs of papistry:

The Puritans proposed a great simplification of worship and life. The brief span of our earthly years determines our eternal bliss or anguish. To loiter on our heavenly pilgrimage would be consummate folly. We husband our time, allowing no hour to slip by unprofitably. We use the things of this world only as aids toward the other. We eat and drink that we may be nourished for our rightful service. We engage in recreations only in so far as they contribute to our efficiency in God's work. Clothing is to be modest and free from showy and costly ornaments. The Puritan's life is a streamlined existence from which all superfluity is banished, and the frivolous and undisciplined activities of other men are excluded. He knows that at all times he has what Calvin called--negotium cum Deo--business with God. God, the giver of life and time, is to be obeyed and worshipped according to his word. The Puritan has no use for days of celebration other than Sunday,² which interrupt his proper work and service.³

¹David Noble, Historians Against History (Minneapolis, 1965), p. 5.

²Samuel Sewell, on April 1, 1719, had this to say on the subject: "I dehorted Sam Hirst, and Grindal Rawson, from playing Idle Tricks because 'twas first of April; they were the greatest fools that did so. N.E. men came hither to avoid anniversary days, the keeping of them such as the 25th of December. How displeasing it must be to God, the Giver of our Time, to keep anniversary days to play the fool". McNeill, p. 20.

³In comparing the Catholic route to salvation with that mapped out by Calvin and adopted by the Puritans, Weber notes

According to Puritan theology, God had made a covenant with Adam promising him a perfect life on earth if he remained true to God's law. Adam, however, had sinned, the covenant was broken, and for this sin all future mankind was to be punished. There was, nevertheless, a way out of eternal damnation for some chosen few. The Puritans believed Adam to have fallen because he had "lost his capacity to reason",¹ and thereafter mankind had gone astray under the misleading forces of passion, imagination, and will. History, accordingly, to the Puritans, was interpreted as the sinful record of the past where these forces held sway, "the sinful record of the institutional structure of the Roman Church and its traditions", as Noble puts it. Thus for the Puritan to achieve salvation and serve God in this world, he must renounce the authority of the Church, step out of history, and in so doing reject the authority of the past. The problem still remained of man getting back in God's good graces. That was resolved, as Noble points out, by the Puritan's assumption (through a new

3(from p. 6) that, whereas to the Catholic "the absolution of his Church was a compensation for his own imperfection", providing a place for the very "human cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, release, followed by renewed sin, with the priest holding the key to eternal life, "the God of Calvinism demanded of his believers...a life of good works combined into a unified system". "Since Calvin viewed all pure feelings and emotion with suspicion, faith had to be proved by its objective results in order to provide a firm foundation for the certitudo salutis...However useless good works might be as a means of attaining salvation..., they are indispensable as a sign of election...They are the technical means, not of purchasing salvation, but of getting rid of the fear of damnation". Weber, pp. 114-117.

¹Weber, in The Protestant Ethic, has asked the question: Whose intellectual child was the particular concrete form of rational thought from which the idea of a calling and the

revelation) that God, in his infinite mercy, "had decided to provide salvation to undeserving man if he would but have faith".¹

God...has given grace to a number of Englishmen who became Puritans as they learned of the necessity of abandoning medieval civilization and of beginning a new society based on God's truth as revealed to their clarified reason.² For the English Puritans the basic core of this new revelation was that God wanted man to live in a simple relationship with him.³

The possibility of this elect group of Englishmen creating a simple community of saints in early seventeenth century

1(from p. 7) devotion to labour in the calling has grown? This fundamental element of the Protestant Ethic which, according to Weber, contributed to the development of capitalism, he traces to the Puritans in particular, and the spirit of Christian asceticism in general.

¹Noble, Historians Against History, p. 5.

²Weber, as noted in the footnote on the previous page, examined (in The Protestant Ethic) one of the fundamental elements of the Protestant Ethic, the Puritan conception of rational labour in a calling. He traced, in his work, the influence of this element as a strong support for the spirit of capitalism. In arguing that National Socialism was an expression of a secularized version of the Puritan world-view, we shall demonstrate how this element, as it evolved in Germany: 1) contributed to the emergence of a complex social order; and 2) thus presented a severe challenge to the myth of the transcendence of time (with the appearance of that complex social order).

³Noble, p. 5. God's grace, the Puritan's covenant of grace, to Richard Greenham, a Cambridge Elizabethan Puritan, was formulated thus: "They that willingly hear and joyfully embrace the doctrine that we are by law condemned for sin, by the gospel saved through faith in Christ, and thenceforth endeavor to have this world crucified unto us, and us to be crucified unto the world, and to become new creatures, shall also be saved and find mercy and peace". See Marshall Mason Knappen, Two Elizabethan Puritan Diaries by Richard Rogers and Samuel Ward (Chicago, 1933).

England (where the King and the Anglican Church were allied against them) where the rhythms of historical complexity still held sway was next to nil. To create such a community, to establish a society based on God's laws, it would be necessary for the Puritans to step out of history and begin anew. The discovery of the New World provided a perfect setting for this new beginning, and an English philosopher provided a new political theory around which the populace of this historyless community to be could unite.

From this point David Noble, in Historians Against History, traces the Puritan world-view (and the myth of the transcendence of time) in the thinking of John Locke, the English philosopher, essayist, and Puritan sympathizer. Under the influence of the new natural science, Locke postulated the idea of nature as the basis of a political community. Nature, as he saw it, was a unified harmonious whole governed by uniform laws discoverable by reason (via Newton's scientific approach). If enlightened men chose to live by reason they could (he thought) avoid the irrational traditions and institutions of the past, step out of history, and live in timeless harmony with nature.¹ "Harmony for man, identical to nature's harmony, was possible if he lived by reason and not by his cultural inheritance of demonstrably false and irrational traditions preserved by equally irrational

¹Here the Puritan myth of the transcendence of time is translated into a secular form (Locke's political theory). We shall demonstrate, in the course of our argument, how the myth, and the world-view of which it was a part, were picked up on, and defended, by Germany's Enlightenment philosophers.

institutions. Harmony was possible for man if he stepped out of history to live by natural law."¹

Locke's thesis came to form, Noble writes, the "theoretical cornerstone" of Enlightenment thought. The philosophes, surrounded by "irrational" institutions, picked up on Locke and thought that a society could be constructed along the lines of natural law, and that men born into such a society would experience only good things. In their attempt to demythologize the world, in treating only what they regarded as rational as real (all else as false, artificial), they perpetuated the Puritan myth. For one among them, however, rationality was neither a large enough nor the proper shelter in which to enclose man.² For Rousseau, "man's natural goodness was to be found in his instincts... Civilization had corrupted the natural man, had led him away from the purity of nature, and had taught him the vices of historical society". The return to the primitive state of nature, the return to the "noble savage", required a "ruthless destruction of the ways of civilization, including the arts and sciences...and supremacy of the heart over the head".³

The majority of philosophes, nonetheless, continued to believe that a society could progress via rationality⁴ away

¹Noble, Historians Against History, p. 8.

²William Barrett, Irrational Man, Chapter Four: "Hebraism and Hellenism" (Garden City, 1958), pp. 69-91.

³Noble, Historians Against History, p. 11.

⁴See A. N. de Concorcet's The Progress of the Human Mind.

from the irrational past towards a natural state. Noble's thesis continues from this point to explain:

1. The philosophes' optimism that in America, such a political community as we have just discussed could embody both of these virtues, progress and primitivism.
2. American intellectuals' assumption of the philosophes' outlook.
3. The influence of the Puritan world-view in shaping the above, i.e. escaping Old England and founding a New England, a historyless state based on the rational principles of natural law.
4. The perpetuation of this world-view in succeeding generations of American historians.

Puritanism in Germany

Our concern in this thesis lies in demonstrating the existence and persistence of this Puritan world-view in Germany up to and including the era of National Socialism. The belief that the German people could and would transcend the "reality of complex society as the inevitable environment for imperfect man",¹ which National Socialism tapped in its rise to power, was an illusion bound up, as we shall see, with a world-view committed concurrently to the development of a progressive, rational civilization and a return to a primitive state of nature. These notions together constitute the German Protestant Weltanschauung, a secularized form of

¹Noble, The Eternal Adam and the New World Garden (New York, 1968), p. 74.

the Puritan world-view. This Weltanschauung has a built-in paradox, for it commits a nation to both progress and primitivism--to following Bacon's dictum that science be used to achieve control over man's environment (involving cultural creativity via technological development and economic progress)¹, while at the same time embracing Rousseau's prescription (ruthless destruction of the ways of civilization, including the arts and sciences) to return to a primitive state of nature. The phenomenon of National Socialism falls within the traditions of the modern west because it was an expression of this Weltanschauung. To state this, however, is not to demonstrate it. What follows is an outline of the evidence we will utilize to do just that. In support of our argument, we shall examine:

1. The beginnings of the Protestant Reformation in Germany and some of the critical ideas and values associated with Martin Luther's protest against the Catholic Church (i.e. Luther's conception of the calling and his notion of justification by faith).
2. The causal relationship of Luther's ideas to the shattering of the spiritual unity in the Germanic States in the tumultuous decades following his break

¹Henry Littlefield notes the influence of the Industrial Revolution on the course of scientific investigation: "The Industrial Revolution immensely stimulated scientific investigation. As manufacturing techniques became more complex, experts were required to manage and improve them. The profession of engineering became indispensable to the industrial civilization. Science began to be more and more pursued for its services to technology. In time, large scale industrial endowment became the accepted way of forwarding invention". History of Europe Since 1815 (New York, 1959), p. 12.

with the Church.

3. Germany's Enlightenment philosophers: their faith in reason; their rejection of the authority of the past (ipso facto their rejection of the authority of the central institution of the past, the Catholic Church); their advancement of the idea of nature (following Locke's footsteps) as the basis of a new unity for the German people; the reflection, in their writings, of a world-view embracing rationalism as the means to discover the natural laws on which this new unity was to be based; the perpetuation of this world-view in succeeding generations of German philosophers. "
4. The religious background to the emergence of this world-view in Germany.
 - a. Calvinism: the impact of Calvin's conception of the calling and the notion of predestination for the growth of Prussia (specifically the consequences of one of the fundamental elements of the Protestant Ethic, rational labour in a calling, for the development of the Prussian State).
 - b. Pietism: its affinity with Puritanism, and its contribution to the emergence of a progressive, rationally ordered Prussian State.
5. The romantic reaction, in Germany, to an increasingly rationally ordered society.
 - a. The impact of Rousseau's ideas on German Romanticism.

- b. The resolution of the tensions between romanticism and rationalism with the reaffirmation of faith in progress to sweep away complexity and deliver mankind into organic harmony with nature.
6. Prussia's contribution to Germany's transition from a primarily rural to an urban-industrialized nation.
7. Germany's national identity crisis: the challenge that transition posed, with the appearance of cultural complexity, to the myth of the transcendence of time (progress was not yielding primitivism); the resurgence of romanticism and the revolt against civilization; Oswald Spengler's prophecy, in light of the appearance of complexity, of the doom of western civilization.
8. The resolution of that crisis with National Socialism's program linking industrialism to progress, to a purge of complexity and to a restoration of natural simplicity.

Having laid out our argument, the interpretative framework in which we shall present it, and the evidence we will employ to substantiate it, we turn to the meat of the matter. Our first chapter begins with historical exposition, pinpointing major political and economic developments in Germany from mid- to late-nineteenth century. This period is critical for a number of reasons. Germany achieved national unification during this time, and the character of the nation changed dramatically from primarily rural to urban

industrial.¹ Historically it was in that period in Germany (as our arguments shall bear out) that the accrued developments of the Reformation and the Enlightenment congealed. While it might at first appear that we are putting the cart before the horse, the historical sketch offered will prove a useful backdrop for the analyses which follow it. These analyses shall probe the evidence we have uncovered which link National Socialism with our western tradition.

¹There are a number of detailed historical accounts of this period, including A History of Modern Germany by Hajo Holborn and The Social Foundations of German Unification by Theodore S. Hamerow.

CHAPTER I

THE BREAKTHROUGH OF INDUSTRIALISM--THE SPIRITUAL PRELUDE

A Dash of History: Urbanization and the Rise of Industrialism in Germany in the Latter Half of the Nineteenth Century

Our nation of forth million dreamers and idealists has learned a good deal in the hard school of reality, and it has also fortunately forgotten some things. Above all, it has become more practical. Romanticism and sentimentality, transcendental philosophy and supranaturalism have now withdrawn from the public life of our people into private life. For realism and steam, machines and industrial exhibitions, the natural sciences and practical interests now fill the great market place of life and work at the humming loom of our time.¹

The words of an anonymous Frankfurt publicist reflect upon the passing of German romanticism under the pressures of civil war, revolution, famine, and eventually--after a period of rapid industrial expansion--the depression of 1858. The industrial revolution (and the rise of capitalism) came much later to Germany than either neighboring France or Great Britain. Nevertheless, come it did, thrusting Germany into the incipient stages of what David Noble has described in the United States as the crisis of "rural stability versus industrial change." But romanticism was not dead in Germany, not by a long shot. Pushed to the side burner in mid-nineteenth century, its simmerings laced the literature and philosophy of the following decades. When political and economic developments finally brought that crisis to a head

¹Nach zehn Jahren, Auch eine Rundschau-Marz 1848-Marz 1858: Frankfurt am Main, 1858, p. 30.

in Post World War I Germany, a romantic revival provided the sanctifying principles for an attempt to transcend the hard realities of modern German society. For the time at issue here, however, realism and steam held sway.

The decade from 1849 to 1858, following the unsuccessful (from the liberal-democratic faction's standpoint) revolution of 1848, was a tumultuous one for Germany. In the political arena, it was an age of reaction in which the liberals were purged from government and the old aristocratic order was restored. Having failed to sustain and institutionalize a liberal political base, progressives sought inroads in the private sector. Despite restrictions on trade between the states (bear in mind Germany was not as yet a unified nation) and the widespread existence of usury laws prohibiting or sharply impeding the lending of capital necessary for industrial development,¹ the decade was one of spiraling industrial expansion. The construction of railroads laid the foundation for a modern transportation system, and was (as in the United States) a catalyst for the rapid growth of commercial ventures. "There gradually developed a spirit of enterprise more powerful than any experienced in Germany up to that time...Railroads, spinneries and rolling mills

¹Germany at the turn of the nineteenth century had only two-thirds the population of France, and 75% of her population lived in rural areas. In 1820, Germany was untouched by the industrial revolution, with no power-driven factories, enormous coalfields hardly scratched at, and an agricultural set-up backwards in comparison with the French or English. See John Midgley, Germany (Oxford, 1968), p. 6.

seemed to spring out of the ground...smokestacks sprouted from the earth like mushrooms."¹

But following the best of times came the worst of times: the depression of 1858. Karl Marx, banished to England for supporting the revolution a decade earlier, saw in the German economic reversals signs of the opening death knell for capitalism not only in Germany but throughout the west. Thus he set to writing Das Kapital, volume one of which was published in 1867. The proletarian revolution which Marx envisioned, however, did not materialize. The business boom of the 50's had whetted the appetites of Germany's industrial entrepreneurs. They now joined forces with progressive political factions and waged a decisive campaign for economic rationalization which enabled the factory system to triumph over anti-capitalistic forces in the crafts and agriculture. Countering Marx' assertion that the factory system was responsible for a host of social problems, Victor Bohmert, advocate of a laissez faire economic policy for all of Germany, stated: "Industrial freedom is the best and sole enduring means of putting an end to the proletariat. For only it guarantees to the poor man the freedom to earn or to work...at that which under the circumstances is most useful or most rewarding."² And if practical persuasion should prove less than convincing to the poor, Bohmert tried spiritual entreaties:

¹Max Wirth, Geschichte der Handelskrisen, (Frankfurt am Main, 1858), p. 348.

²From T. S. Hamerow, The Social Foundations of German Unification (New Jersey, 1972), p. 52.

Virtue and morality thrive...in the industrial sphere best where freedom rules. Work is already in and of itself an essential means for the advancement toward virtue. Everything which strengthens men in industriousness serves therefore also in a certain respect the higher purpose of virtue. But now there is nothing which spurs man on to activity more and which makes work more joyful than the certainty that with work he can be of some use to himself and to the world and can improve his lot. The commandment "Pray and work!" turns the human heart in one direction toward heaven and in the other toward earth.¹

And it worked. The Puritans had wanted to work in a calling. The Germans were forced to do so.

The depression of 1858 ended as quickly as it had come then, as Germany continued on the path of industrial development.² Still, the next decade, marred by three wars, saw both political and economic uncertainty. The German states, nonetheless, buoyed by the successful completion of these military undertakings, exuded a steamrolling nationalistic fervor. During this period Bismarck, as Frederick William IV's Prussian minister at Frankfurt, began working to unite those states into a nation.

The importance of unification for Germany should not be underestimated. Her internal divisions had severely delayed her political, social, and economic development (this is a point frequently overlooked by scholars bemoaning the absence of Enlightenment traditions in Germany, and one

¹From T. S. Hamerow, The Social Foundations of German Unification (New Jersey, 1972), pp. 52-53.

²The increasing penetration of the natural sciences into German academic institutions lent support to the technological developments supporting Germany's expanding economic development.

which we shall pursue in the latter half of this chapter). In 1789, at the time of the French Revolution, there were over three hundred separate German states. At the end of Napoleonic occupation (by the enlightened French) in 1815, that number stood at thirty eight.¹ Bismarck's efforts played a major role in ending that division:

The German Empire founded by Bismarck was a country of great strength and energy. There was rapid economic progress, especially in heavy industry, railway building and banking. The 1870's were a time of tremendous boom, interrupted by two short depressions caused by too rapid expansion. Between 1870 and 1900 many towns more than doubled their population; Berlin grew from a city of 775,000 to one of 1,888,000 inhabitants. While in 1870 only thirty-six percent of the Germans had lived in towns, by 1900 that percentage had increased to 54.5 percent, with a corresponding increase of the numbers employed in industry and trade.² Germany--with her great deposits of coal and metals in the Ruhr, the Saar, and Upper Silesia³--was becoming a country of factory chimneys, mines, and large urban conglomerations.⁴

Where before Germany's economy had faced a number of stumbling blocks to expansion, the legislation Bismarck introduced established industrial freedom and paved the way for free capitalistic growth in Germany. With the successful conclusion of the Franco-German War (1870-1871),

¹Henry Littlefield, History of Europe Since 1815 (New York, 1959), p. 46.

²The table on page 1 of the appendix charts population and density increases in Germany throughout the nineteenth century.

³The map on page 2 of the appendix gives the location of these resource areas.

⁴F. L. Carsten, The Rise of Fascism (Los Angeles, 1969), p. 22.

the possibility of a German nation became a reality. The war stirred nationalistic feelings to a fever pitch, caused princes of the German states to put aside their personal interests, brought the southern states to the side of Prussia, and in victory, brought consolidation. One by one, the states of Bavaria, Baden, Wurttemberg, and Hesse-Darmstadt joined the North German Confederation. Reforms that Bismarck had instituted in that Confederation were, upon unification (January 18, 1871) extended to the whole of the new German Empire. These measures included "freedom of movement for the people, freedom to found economic and commercial companies as well as coalitions of workers, a unified order of bills of exchange, a North German code of commercial law and the establishment of a court of appeal in commercial matters, and a unified patent and copyright law."¹ The business boom of the 50's provided a material base for the industrialization of Germany. The political integration which Bismarck engineered established a modern governmental and legal framework for its growth.

The rational systematization of the legal, political, and economic sectors of German society proceeded rapidly after unification. "The generation of German businessmen of the 1870's resembled...the British iron masters and pioneers in textile manufacturing at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries...German industry grew

¹Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany (New York, 1969), p. 201.

at a stormy tempo."¹ In the latter half of the nineteenth century, pastoral Germany disappeared amidst the progress of mechanization (see page 3 of the appendix for a chart of the rural-urban shift in Germany during this period). Germany in the early nineteenth century was a rustic place. Germany in the late nineteenth century was a bullish nation. By the turn of the twentieth century, the complexion of the Fatherland had been altered drastically. From a loose confederation of states she had been forged into a nation. From a land whose peoples' previous principal occupation had been agriculture, she had emerged as a major industrial power, with a landscape dominated by rapidly expanding urban centers (the table on page 4 of the appendix illustrates the increases in exports and imports; the chart on page 5 of the appendix demonstrates the great change in the German position in the total volume of world trade).²

The crisis which this rapid transition precipitated was no less severe, and perhaps was more severe than that which David Noble has described in late nineteenth century America.³ In Germany it pitted the forces of modernization and progress committed to construction of a rational-technological society, against those forces committed to

¹Friedlaender and Oser, Economic History of Modern Europe (New York, 1953), pp. 235-237.

²Friedlaender and Oser, p. 235. "The population of Dusseldorf increased from 26,000 in 1850 to 358,000 in 1910; Essen grew from 7,000 to 295,000; Chemnitz from 26,000 to 288,000.

³David Noble, The Progressive Mind, 1890-1917 (Chicago, 1970).

halting these trends and restoring the natural simplicity associated with Germany's agrarian heritage. The conflict that ensued, which amounted to a national identity crisis, continued unabated until a satisfactory resolution was presented in the form of the program of National Socialism. That resolution, our argument maintains, was not out of joint with the spiritual and material traditions of modern western civilization. Rather, National Socialism's program provided a redefinition of circumstances that had challenged the central myth of the tradition, the myth of the transcendence of time. Within the intellectual confines of that myth resides the major paradox of the Puritan world-view, and the source of the crisis we have mentioned.

In our introduction we provided a rudimentary sketch of the nature of Puritanism, the Puritan world-view, and the myth (contained in that world-view) of the transcendence of time. To better understand the nature of Germany's national identity crisis, and the consequent role that National Socialism played in its resolution (the crisis of rural stability versus industrial change highlighted, as we shall see, the paradox of the Puritan world-view), we will turn back, in the section that immediately follows, to Germany at the time of the Protestant Reformation. There, beginning with Martin Luther and his revolutionary protest against the Catholic Church, we shall initiate our analyses of the intellectual movements and cultural developments associated with the emergence of a secularized

version of the Puritan world-view in Germany (which we have labelled the German Protestant Weltanschauung); its contribution to Germany's emergence as a modern industrial nation (which we have briefly outlined); to the crisis that followed that rapid material development; and to the resolution of that crisis in the form of the program of National Socialism.

Reformation Germany:
Luther's Revolutionary Protest

So little do those who shoot the arrows
of the spirit know where they will light.¹

Whether or not the "orgy of materialism" that Weber foresaw has come to pass in the west is open to dispute. What is more clear is the emergence since the Protestant Reformation of forms of social organization quite different from those of the Middle Ages, and far removed from the medieval religious impulses which, however unwittingly, set them in motion. Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is perhaps the classic study of the fundamental religious, economic, and social interrelationships underpinning this new order from its incipient stages in worldly asceticism, through succeeding stages culminating in what he describes as pure utilitarianism (the state where the religious and ethical meanings originally attached to social action have been shed). As our analyses delve into the ideas and cultural developments which contributed to the creation of this new order in Germany, we shall see that:

1. The rapid breakthrough of industrialism which took place in Bismarck's Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century was to less a child of the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment than the industrial revolutions elsewhere in Western Europe, England, and America:

¹Tawney, p. 226.

2. The crisis which this wholesale transformation of German society instigated, and the resolution of it (in National Socialism) owe their due to these history-making epochs.

There are a host of explanations for why the Reformation begun in Germany in the sixteenth century succeeded where previous attempts throughout the Middle Ages had failed. The most visible ones involve politics and economics. As papal imperialism threaded its way throughout Europe, and the taxes and tributes which the European states were required to forward to Rome increased, the political and economic power of individual heads of state decreased. By the end of the fifteenth century, the gap between the professed aims of Christianity and the visible reality of the Catholic Church was perceptible to the least astute observer (i.e. the church's condemnation of usury on the one hand, and the buying and selling of indulgences on the other). The times were ripe for change. Into the abyss stepped a man concerned with reforming a church he believed was corrupt, and bent on saving men's souls.¹

The notion of worldly asceticism was first advanced in Germany by Luther. Its theological bases were laid in Luther's conception of the "calling", which Weber has referred to as the "central dogma of all Protestant denominations."²

¹See appendix, pages 6-11, for major religious and political developments in the German states and throughout Western Europe and England from Luther's birth in 1483 until 1558.

²Weber, p. 80.

Quite simply, Luther's calling demanded the fulfillment of the obligations one has imposed upon him by his position in the world. Besides establishing the idea of the primacy of all believers over any church organization and consequently fostering a religious individualism, the calling dramatically altered attitudes towards worldly activities. "The effect of the Reformation as such was only that, as compared with the Catholic attitude, the moral emphasis on and the religious sanction of, organized worldly labour in a calling was mightily increased."¹ Luther did not intend to father a revolution that was to undermine feudalism and lead, in the secularization of his beliefs and those of his Protestant successors, to an entirely new social order. In fact, "Luther accepted the social hierarchy (he believed that serfdom was the necessary foundation of society) with its principles of status and subordination, though he knocked away the ecclesiastical rungs in the ladder."² He, like the other great reformers who followed him, was more interested in the "long-range" goal of salvation than the "short-range" effects of improving life on earth. But given the widespread disenchantment with the policies of the Catholic Church in Europe at the time, and the nature of his message and its implications for society, his reformist preachings gained widespread acceptance. Lutheranism made

¹Weber, p. 83.

²Tawney, p. 102.

great inroads in Germany and Scandinavia as well. Not, however, without conflict. Germany in the next century was a half and the scene of continual religious struggles between Protestant and Catholic factions vying for power. Tawney provides an excellent description of the manner in which Luther's revolutionary theological conceptions (the calling, grace, and justification by faith) provided the ideational basis for these conflicts:

The difference between loving men as a result of first loving God, and learning to love God through a growing love for men may not, at first sight, appear profound. To Luther it seemed an abyss, and Luther was right. It was, in a sense nothing less than the Reformation itself. For carried, as it was not carried by Luther, to its logical result, the argument made not only good works, but sacraments and the Church itself unnecessary. Its effects on social theory were staggering. Since salvation is bestowed by the operation of grace in the heart, and by that alone, the whole fabric of organized religion, which had mediated between the individual soul and its Maker--divinely commissioned hierarchy, systematized activities, corporate institutions--drops away, as the blasphemous trivialities of a religion of works. The medieval conception of the social order, which had regarded it as a highly articulated organism of members contributing in their different degrees to a spiritual purpose, was shattered, and differences which had been distinctions within a larger unity were now set in irreconcilable antagonism to each other. Grace no longer completed nature: it was the antithesis to it. Man's actions as a member of society were no longer the extension of his life as a child of God: they were its negation. Secular interests ceased to possess, even remotely, a religious significance: they might compete with religion, but they could not enrich it.¹

Luther's "justification by faith" did call into question the legitimacy of the Catholic Church's control over the

¹Tawney, p. 102.

conduct of individuals,¹ the traditional definitions of reality which the church upheld, and the very institutional framework of the church itself. Tawney perhaps goes a bit far in claiming that "man's actions as a member of society were no longer the extension of his life as a child of God." A careful reading of Luther's own statements on secular activities reveals his uncertainty as to how these matters relate to the Kingdom of God. In a treatise entitled the "Freedom of a Christian" published in November of 1520 (a few months after the issuance of a papal bull threatening Luther with excommunication if he did not recant) Luther, drawing liberally from Romans 10:10, explains his position as follows:

For man believes with his heart and so is justified, and since faith alone justifies, it is clear that the inner man cannot be justified, freed, or saved by any outer work or action at all, and that these works, whatever their character, have nothing to do with the inner man. On the other hand, only ungodliness and unbelief of heart, and no outer work, make him guilty and a damnable servant of sin.²

But in a later discourse on "Stations and Vocations", he evinces a somewhat different attitude:

Our work in this vocation or station is our appropriate service to God. Since God has commanded this work, it certainly pleases him... Let each fulfill his duties in his vocation--then he will have enough and more than enough to do...

Since God has established and ordered our vocation, the works which we do in our vocation are, as we have heard, pleasing to him. However,...

¹Paul Althaus discusses the triumph of individual responsibility over social obligation in Chapter One of The Ethics of Martin Luther (Philadelphia, 1972), pp. 3-24.

²J. M. Porter (editor), Luther: Selected Political Writings (Philadelphia, 1974), p. 28.

we cannot fulfill any vocation without being involved in sin...Thus the work that we do in our vocation cannot be acceptable apart from the certainty that our sins are forgiven.¹

Despite Luther's firm conviction that the maintenance of a feudalistic form of social organization was necessary for the survival of German society, Lutheranism and the host of Protestant sects branching from it spelled its ultimate dissolution in Germany. The defender of the old order became, ironically, the primary inspirational source for its demise. But given the divided nature of Germany, the breakdown of feudalism proceeded more slowly there than elsewhere in Europe. Nevertheless, the Reformation did continue to exact profound changes on German society long after the flames of its religious fervor had subsided.

The most apparent consequence of the Protestant Reformation in Germany was the shattering of religious unity within the Germanic states (the the Holy Roman Empire as well) and the proliferation of a variety of religious modes. This is meant neither to deny the existence of divergent sects within the papal domain prior to the Reformation, nor to maintain that there was an all-embracing belief system operating within that domain, but rather to point towards a breaking up of the monopoly of ideal and material goods--or opportunities--which, prior to the Reformation, the Catholic Church and its advocates had had. The effects of this triumph of religious diversity over established orthodoxy

¹Althaus, pp. 39-41.

were far-reaching. Luther's conception of religion as a private, individual matter, as it gained popular acceptance in sections of Germany, gradually brought to an end the medieval faith in "religion supreme" over all the activities of an individual in society. The clergy, as a class, were downgraded, and large tracts of church property were confiscated. Meanwhile a portion of the peasantry became small landowners, a benefit reaped from their allegiance to local rulers' establishment of Lutheranism as their state's religion.¹ The states as well, due to the reduction of the influence of the Catholic Church, assumed more powerful roles in the direction of their internal affairs, taking responsibility for a greater portion of the economic interests and general welfare of their communities. Unlike Spain, Italy and France where Counter-Reformations curbed the Protestant influence for a time, Protestantism made steady inroads in Germany from the very beginning. Germany was, and has continued to this day to be, a nation split between Protestant and Catholic factions; but from Luther's time onward, the Protestant Weltanschauung was in ascendance, and came to be the dominant force in shaping Germany's future.

In 1555 when the Peace of Augsburg was negotiated, the territorial princes of Germany were granted the right to determine the religion of their subjects. Less than four decades after Luther had tacked his theses on Wittenberg's gates (in 1517) Protestantism was a legally recognized faith

¹See Joseph Lortz, The Reformation in Germany (London, 1968), Vol. I, pp. 381-385.

in Germany.¹ This "Peace" did not bring an end to religious strife in Germany, but it did allow individuals within the German states a choice of faiths. If the local ruler chose Catholicism as the faith of his particular principality, an individual was free to move to a territory where Protestantism held sway, and vice-versa. Luther, had he been alive, would have objected as strongly to investing princes with the power to determine the faith of their subjects as he did to that power wielded by the Catholic Church. In a treatise on temporal authority he stated:

How he believes or disbelieves is a matter for conscience of each individual, and since this takes nothing away from the temporal authority (except perhaps your head, as in the case of Mary Queen of Scots), the latter should be content to attend to its own affairs and let men believe this or that as they are able and willing...Indeed, it is a work of God in the spirit, not something which outward authority should compel or create.²

Though the edict of 1555 did not go as far as Luther would have desired, it did open the door for the establishment of Protestant territories in Germany, and a much greater degree of religious freedom therein. The principle of religious freedom was launched (long before Roger Williams found Providence in Providence).³

¹Lortz, Vol. II, p. 360.

²Porter, pp. 61-62.

³The edict, in effect, provided legal sanction to religious and political developments that had been taking place for two and one half decades. Following a series of attempts to abolish all church reforms (by Ferdinand of Austria and the Catholic party in Germany: the Diet at Speyer, reaffirming the Edict of Worms), princes and cities aligned

The religious boundaries that were established after the Peace of Augsburg divided Germany, roughly speaking, into a Protestant north and east, and a Catholic south and west. (With only minor exceptions these geographical demarcations remained until Germany was carved up after World War II.) Prussia's emergence as the "Protestant North German Great Power" in 1701 bore witness to the influence the Reformation (and consequential events) had had in these northern and eastern states. After the destruction and chaos of the Thirty Years War, from 1618-1648, "a new kind of German state grew up, frugal, austere, hard working, and meticulous, respecting its own laws, stern in what is asked of its subjects and honest in respecting their limited rights."¹ In the span of one hundred and fifty years, the first step had been taken in that "massive process of secularization, in the course of which utilitarian industriousness replaced the search for the Kingdom of God and created a specifically bourgeois economic ethos."² From this state came the impetus

³(from p. 32) with or sympathetic to Luther's cause had already transferred ecclesiastical power to secular authorities. By 1530, Protestantism was established "from Saxony and Hesse to Ansbach-Bayreuth, Braunschweig-Lüneberg (well known to all liverwurst lovers), Mecklenburg, Anahlt, Mansfeld, Eastern Frisia, Schleswig-Holstein (Heberle has documented the strength of the National Socialists in this farming area), Prussia, parts of Silesia, and in many cities, such as Magdeburg, Nurnberg, Ulm, Reutlingen, Constance, Strassburg, Hamburg, Lubeck, and Rostock." See Erich Kahler, The Germans (Princeton, 1974), pp. 190-191 and map on page 2 of the appendix.

¹Midgley, p. 46.

²Richard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (New York, 1960), p. 66.

for German unification, and the lion's share of Germany's scientific, intellectual, and technological achievements underlying her rapid economic development in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Neither Luther nor Calvin, of course, advocated the unrestrained pursuit of wealth. Calvin was, however, as Weber pointed out, less ambiguous as to the place of secular activities in the life of the reformed Christian. The full consequences of this-worldly asceticism (coupled with the notions of the doctrine of proof and predestination) for secular activities were not readily apparent in Germany until the appearance of Calvinism and the Pietist Movement. Before considering the relationship of those developments to Prussia's emergence as the "Protestant North German Great Power," and by way of introduction to those subjects, we will examine the world-view reflected in the writings of German philosophers in the Post-Reformation and Enlightenment periods.

Germany's philosophers played a crucial role, following the Protestant Reformation, in postulating the basis of a new unity for the Germanic peoples. They envisioned for those peoples a new society "based on God's truth as revealed to their clarified reason";¹ a society which rejected the authority and institutions of the past; a society which would evolve in Germany from the idea of nature as the basis

¹Noble, Historians Against History, p. 5.

of a political community. In the next section we shall discuss these philosophers and the world-view their writings reflected.

Die Wegweiser, Leibniz Kant
and Hegel: Rationalism and
the Unity of Nature Affirmed

Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night:
God said, Let Newton be! and all was light.¹

The shattering of religious unity in the wake of the Protestant Reformation lent stimulus to attempts aimed at establishing a new unity in the west. The discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the scientific inquiries of Renaissance men, and the upheavals of the Reformation all had contributed in part to a growing skepticism of traditional interpretations of reality. In England, John Locke--philosopher, essayist, and notable Puritan sympathizer--had set forth the parameters of a new unity. It was to be based on nature (God's creation), and the discovery of nature's laws (God's laws) was to be conducted through scientific inquiry. Germany's philosophers picked up on Locke's thesis, and postulated it as the foundation of a new unity for the German people.

The transition from worldly asceticism to utilitarian industriousness, from faith in God to faith in reason as a means of discovering God's natural laws, began in earnest in Germany following the close of the Thirty Years War. In the Enlightenment's attempt to bring an end to myth, superstition and belief (and the institutions these "irrational" conceptions supported and perpetuated) and

¹Alexander Pope's Epitaph for Newton.

secure rational control of the world, Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) led the way in Germany (appropriately enough, with a given name translating to God's peace).

Taking off from Descartes' mechanistic ideal (that all nature might be explained in terms of a universal scheme of mechanics) Leibniz, like his English contemporary Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727), attempted to construct a logical model of the universe which held the potential (he thought) to explain all manner of natural phenomena. While his contributions to the growth of science (and methods of scientific inquiry) were many,¹ his conception of nature as the embodiment of a "pre-established harmony" bears the greatest import for our study. In this conception Leibniz posited God as the logical organizer of the whole of nature (human nature as well), with the laws of logic, mathematics, and natural science derivable from God's intellect.² Nature, thereupon, could be explained entirely in rational terms. Where Cartesian dualism had separated the mind from physical nature, giving a "metaphysical sanction to the existing social

¹"He was the first philosopher to point out the essential difference between the laws of nature and laws of mathematics, thus going beyond Descartes and Spinoza and leading on to Hume." Claude Sutton, The German Tradition in Philosophy (London, 1974), p. 20. "Leibniz denied the absolute space and time demanded by Newtonian physics. Space and time must be conceived relationally, he argued...Philosophers and scientists of our own time...credit Leibniz with having worked out on a purely logical basis what was discovered by physics in the twentieth century." Marion Adams, The German Tradition (New York, 1971), p. 76.

²See Sutton, pp. 19-21, for a detailed account of this scheme.

barriers against the extension of free, scientific inquiry into religious, political, and moral domains",¹ Leibniz expanded the realm of philosophical inquiry to include these domains. Locke's notion of a political community based on natural laws; a harmonious community freed by virtue of the capacity to reason from the grip of historical complexity, the artificial accumulation of the Dark Ages, had found an adherent in Germany. This was not surprising considering the toll that the Thirty Years War had taken.²

Germany's move to escape from the instability of history to the stability of nature was fueled by Leibniz' successor as Germany's premier secular theologian. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) continued to advance the notion of a natural order as the basis of a political community. "Kant maintained that in learning about the world we are driven by three assumptions that we take for granted (the ideas of reason): that there is to be discovered a systematic unity of the human person, a systematic unity of physical nature, and a systematic unity of all the beings there are which later he termed 'God'".³ While contending that nature is fundamentally

¹Charles Frankel, The Faith of Reason (New York, 1948), p. 14.

²The population of the Germanic states (including Alsace but excluding the Netherlands and Bohemia, was reduced from approximately twenty-one million people to approximately thirteen million people. The devastation of homes, property, and livestock was catastrophic. The French general Mortaigne remarked: "I would not have believed a land could have been so despoiled had I not seen it with my own eyes." Kahler, p. 232.

³Sutton, p. 26.

one and rational (in keeping with Leibniz' thinking and Locke's political model), Kant's philosophy reflected the secularizing trend of Enlightenment thought. Of the existence of God he was not certain. But on the necessity of a God as a practical postulate, he evinces a thoroughly Protestant stance. Speaking of man's duty and freedom to "progress towards a good disposition," and to choose such goals that tend towards the establishment of an ethical community,¹ Kant states that man's final purpose in the world (establishment of that community) can be brought about by "rational beings in harmony with the pursuit of moral laws."² For both Leibniz and Kant, reason had to prevail over emotion in all social activities if a society was to progress. The Puritan world-view (reflected, as we will point out shortly in the development of the Prussian State) had established a firm beachhead in Germany. "The Puritan movement contained the seeds of rationalism which, after the passage of a few generations, burst forth everywhere. Puritanism was thus the prelude to the Age of Enlightenment. Locke in England, Voltaire in France, and Kant in Germany were the philosophic leaders of this development."³

¹Immanuel Kant, The Moral Law (New York, 1967), p. 94.

²Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (Manchester, 1953), p. 118.

³John F. Fennelly, Twilight of the Evening Lands (New York, 1972), p. 48.

The application of reason through science and technology to unlock the secrets of nature, at the same time, did pose a problem to Kant. He foresaw the conflict which would arise between the idea of nature as a mechanism and man as continuous with that idea. Being thoroughly acquainted with the scientific and philosophic undertakings of his time (he, as his predecessor Leibniz had done, corresponded frequently with other scholars on the Continent) Kant was greatly affected by the concept of the "individual will" which Rousseau had advanced in France.¹ In response to the political theory of the English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes,² Rousseau had constructed a model of a social and political order based on popular participation by all individuals.³ Direct popular sovereignty was possible, he believed, by the arising from diverse "individual wills," a "general will" (*volunte generale*), taking precedence over all factional interests.⁴ (The

¹A story frequently repeated by the citizens of Konigsberg tells how Kant became so engrossed reading Rousseau's Emile that he forgot to take his daily walk, by which the citizens of the town set their clocks.

²Hobbes' theory, in simplified form, stated that an absolute monarch was necessary to control the antagonisms created by individual interests in a society.

³Rousseau, unlike Hobbes, believed man to be basically good--having derived this belief from explorers' tales of "noble savages" uncorrupted by the fetters of civilization; living in a timeless harmony with nature.

⁴Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (London, 1895), translated by Henry J. Tozer.

practical consequences of his ideas, transferred from the level at which he had conceived them, the community, to nations, were profound.) Though by no means willing to place instinct and sentiment above reason as Rousseau had done, Kant did attempt, in his Critique of Judgment, to find a niche for them in his natural order dominated by rationality. Addressing the problem of reconciling "naturalness and urbanity," he suggested a "theory of reconciliation through aesthetic experience between human beings, who would otherwise be alienated from their environment both by morality itself, which requires them to overcome their natural impulses, and by the specialization of scientific understanding."¹

German Enlightenment thought culminated in the philosophy of Georg W. F. Hegel, who (in keeping with Leibniz' theory of a pre-established harmony and Kant's notion of a natural order) carried Locke's notion of a society constructed along the lines of natural law (and the commitment to rationalism as the means to discover those laws) to its penultimate expression in Germany.² Integrating the contemporary economic

¹Stuart Hampshire discusses Kant's theory in an article entitled "What is Modern in Eighteenth-Century Philosophy", from the Modernity of the Eighteenth Century, edited by Louis T. Milic (Ohio, 1971), Vol. I, p. 72. The problem Kant describes as that of "urbanity versus naturalness" was at the center of the romantic movement's reaction to rationalism in Germany and throughout the west in the opening decades of the nineteenth century.

²Hegelianism, the philosophy of the Absolute (Hegel lived from 1770-1831), was the leading system of metaphysics during the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Marx, as we mentioned in the Prologue, challenged Hegel's ideal of the State as the mirroring of nature, and stimulated the growth of a

theories popularized by Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham with the ideals of enlightened absolutism,¹ Hegel proposed a model for a modern German state which, "in its laws, its universal and rational arrangements," would become the "Divine Idea as it exists on Earth."² That model he described thus:

The essence of the modern state is that the universal be bound up with the complete freedom of its particular members and with private well-being, that thus the interests of family and civil society must concentrate themselves on the state, although the universal end cannot be advanced without the personal knowledge and will of its particular members, whose rights must be maintained. Thus the universal must be furthered but subjectivity on the other hand must attain its full and living development. It is only when these moments subsist in their strength that the state can be regarded as articulated and genuinely organized.³

Hegel's state came to reflect the enlightened rationalization of the Prussian State, the development of which we now turn to.

In the opening section of the following chapter, we shall discuss the religious developments in Prussia (after Luther and the Reformation) underlaying the world-view

2(from p. 41) Socialist movement in Germany which succeeded temporarily in assuming political power during the Weimar period. Ultimately, however, the "natural order" scheme proposed by the Nazi party attracted a sizeable enough proportion of German voters to depose the "Marxist Menace."

¹See Adam Smith's Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations and Jeremy Bentham's Defence of Usury.

²G. W. F. Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History (Hamburg, 1959), edited by J. Hoffmeister.

³G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (New Jersey, 1942), p. 280.

reflected (as we have just seen) in Germany's Enlightenment philosophers, as well as the consequences of those developments for Prussia's emergence as a modern, rationally-ordered State.

CHAPTER II

THE RISE OF PRUSSIA, CRADLE OF THE PURITAN WORLD-VIEW

Die Bahnbrecher: The Hohenzollerns

Prussia's geographical position, spreading right across northern Germany from the eastern to the western frontier, gave her a key place in the attempts to get around the commercial drawbacks of Germany's political fragmentation by forming customs unions. The new awareness of economics and economic policy had more to do with this, in the early stages, than any political purpose. After 1815, Prussia's population grew in numbers, as well as in wealth, as the result of an enlightened trade and education policy; a great program of inland waterway development; and road and railroad building. Trade expanded; capital was formed; towns started to grow; and steam-powered industry started to get a footing.

The Zollverein grew because Prussia, financially and commercially, had most to offer the smaller states. By fusing the trading systems of the majority of German states into something like an economic unit, it made it easier for them to stick together, and more natural for them to accept Prussian leadership when Bismarck decided to offer it.¹

The Puritan world-view, given secular expression in German philosophical thought, played a vital role in the development of the Prussian State. Underlying Prussia's emergence as the "Protestant North German Great Power" in 1701, the linking Leibniz' theory of natural law with Bismarck's utilitarianism, was one predominant theme: Rationalism and a desire to control nature by reason.²

¹Midgley, pp. 53-54.

²The rational ethics of ascetic Protestantism, reflected in the economic liberalism of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham (individual self-interest intelligently pursued is bound to contribute to the good of society as a whole) abound in

Prussia's rise to a dominant position among the German states, and her influence in the rational systematization of the political, economic, legal, and social sectors of German society, demonstrate her persistent adherence to that principle. Prussia led the way in Germany's flight from feudalism to the age of materialism. When that age of materialism dawned in late-nineteenth century Germany (with the breakthrough of industrialism) and the progress of rationalism threatened to sever the unity of man and nature that her philosophers had proclaimed, German romantic thought (a la Rousseau) regenerated the Fatherland's efforts to escape from the instability of history to the stability of nature. (In the phenomenon of National Socialism we shall see an attempt to realize a harmonious community peopled by perfect beings--the Master Race--who destroy the "corrupting influences" of civilization--international Jewry, modern art and literature--and as a result ensure the survival and prosperity of the nation through the regenerative forces of nature.)

The molding of a heterogeneous collection of territories into the Prussian State was, by and large, accomplished under four successive Hohenzollern rulers:

1. Frederick William, The Great Elector of Brandenburg (1640-1688).

2(from p. 44)utility theory. For example: "National progress is the sum of individual industry, energy, and uprightness, as national decay is of individual idleness, selfishness, and vice...Practical industry, wisely and vigorously pursued, never fails of success." Samuel Smiles, Self Help (London, 1958), Introduction.

2. Frederick III (1688-1713), crowned King Frederick I of Prussia in 1701. (King Frederick and his Queen, Charlotte, conversed regularly with Gottfried Leibniz, whose philosophical and religious ideas had great influence on them, and consequently on the development of the Prussian State. They appointed him the first president of the Society of Sciences.)
3. King Frederick William I (1713-1740).
4. King Frederick II the Great (1740-1786).¹

Through their "enlightened" leadership, the way was paved for the consolidation of the German Reich under Bismarck.

The adoption of the German Protestant Weltanschauung in the northern and eastern Germanic states after the Thirty Years War was facilitated by two important factors:

1. Lutheranism had, by the latter half of the seventeenth century, lost its spiritual freshness and become theologically dogmatic.²
2. The Hohenzollern rulers, beginning with the Great Elector, converted to the Reformed Church, Calvinism, paving the way for the Pietist Movement in the second half of the seventeenth century.

¹See Constantine Fitzgibbon's A Concise History of Germany (New York, 1973), Chapter 4.

²As McNeil notes: "The Pietist Movement took its rise shortly after the Thirty Years War, which spread physical devastation and human degradation through most of Germany. This disastrous conflict at the time (1618-1648) called forth little response from the churches that could suggest a favorable religious forecast. The invigorating conceptions of the Reformation had been systematized, and debilitated, in Lutheran Scholasticism." p. 50.

The Great Elector

"The Great Elector was remarkably undogmatic in his view of Christianity¹ and felt that the two main branches of Protestantism (Lutheranism and Calvinism) should be regarded as indistinguishable."² On the latter point, nevertheless, he was mistaken. For where Lutheranism bestowed God's grace by faith (with the calling a condition into which an individual was born) Calvinism, with its notion of predestination, placed the calling in a much different relationship to the individual. "To the Calvinist,...the calling is not a condition into which the individual is born, but a strenuous and exacting enterprise to be chosen by himself, and to be pursued with a sense of religious responsibility."³ Frederick William, the Great Elector, (how appropriate) baptized in the icy waters of Calvinist theology, set out to create a common spirit among very disparate territories. (The geography within these territories ranged from dense evergreen forests to vast plains so unfertile that the region was labelled over two centuries earlier "Des heiligen romischen Reiches Ersandbuchse," the Sandbar of the Holy Roman Empire.⁴ The climate there, however, "was neither too rigorous nor too

¹The Hohenzollerns had begun to take a live and let live attitude towards religion since the early decades of the sixteenth century.

²E. J. Feuchtwanger, Prussia: Myth and Reality (Chicago, 1970), p. 39.

³R. H. Tawney, Foreward to The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, p. 2.

⁴Constantin de Grunwald, Frederick II (Paris, 1966), p. 4.

enervating--well suited to the production of a strong race of men with rugged needs and severe work habits.")¹

Calvinism implanted in the Hohenzollerns a "strong belief that the rising fortunes of their house were the clearest token of divine grace. Only by the most devoted attention to the administration of their territories, careful financial husbandry, unceasing improvement of their armies, and intrepid maintenance of their European position could they assure themselves of remaining in a state of grace."² That faith, in turn, implanted in the peoples of these diverse territories those individual qualities associated with Calvinism's secular counterpart, capitalism, such as devotion to work, lack of ostentation, addiction to efficiency and sobriety, and reliance on impersonal probity.³ The Great Elector, not content with innovations in the fields of taxation and administration, strove for a higher degree of certainty that he and his peoples were among the elect. In the course of his reign, he devoted considerable time to

¹Grunwald, p. 5.

²Tawney's description of the Puritan's calling, an apt one for the Pietists of Prussia as well, is marvelous: "The Puritan flings himself into practical activities with the daemonic energy of one who, all doubts allayed, is conscious that he is a sealed and chosen vessel...Called by God to labour in his vineyard, he has within himself a principle at once of energy and of order, which makes him irresistible both in war and in the struggles of commerce...Tempered by self-examination, self-discipline, and self-control, he is the practical ascetic, whose victories are won not in the cloister, but on the battlefield, in the counting-house, and in the market." Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, pp. 229-231.

³Feuchtwanger, p. 21.

developing the economic life of his territories (he was well acquainted with the mercantilist theories of his age), as he realized increased revenues would not flow ipso facto from an improved taxation system. Concentrating on agriculture and industry (both relatively backward sectors before his time); he proceeded to:

1. Encourage Dutch settlers, skilled in building drainage systems, to immigrate to his territories.
2. Oversee the building of the Oder-Spree Canal (see map on p. 12 of the appendix).
3. Improve postal communications.
4. Begin naval and colonial enterprises.
5. Offer asylum to French Huguenots whose educators played an important role in the training of the Hohenzollern leaders.¹

On the "Sandbar of the Holy Roman Empire," one of the fundamental elements of the Protestant Ethic, "rational conduct on the basis of the ideal of the calling,"² had begun to impart to all economic activities an ethos of planning and self control. Later, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the appearance and growth of the Pietist Movement³.

¹Feuchtwanger, p. 30.

²Weber, p. 180.

³In comparing Puritanism with Pietism, John T. McNeill states that: "They were alike in their emphasis upon a disciplined life and demand for practical training for ministers. Like Puritanism, Pietism was 'intellectual' at least in the sense of possessing a concern for education and the training of the mind, and some Pietists were men of

in the Protestant territories of Germany,¹ "a reforming reaction to complacent Lutheranism," gave to German Protestantism "new devotional reality and social power"; and sent forth "its leaven into all the West and ultimately into all the world."²

Frederick III and Frederick William I

In the span of fifty years between the death of the Great Elector and the reign of Frederick the Great (beginning in 1740), the unification of the northern and eastern Protestant territories was completed. Four men in particular stand out for their influence in the secularization of the Prussian State during the tenure of Frederick III, who succeeded his father, the Great Elector. They were Eberhard Danckelmann, August Francke, Christian Thomasius, and Samuel Pufendorf.

First and foremost was Eberhard Danckelmann, Frederick's chief minister for the affairs of state. A stern Calvinist,

3(from p. 49)distinguished learning. The movement gave, indeed, an impulse to popular education in Germany comparable to that given by Puritanism and Nonconformity in England, and of greater relative importance. The Pietists first used the vernacular in university lectures, and they promoted the technical, vocational aspects of education in a most significant way." From Modern Christian Movements (Philadelphia, 1954); p. 72.

¹Pietism, like Puritanism, emphasized: 1. "The methodical development of one's own state of grace to a higher and higher degree of certainty and perfection;" 2. "The belief that God's Providence works through those in such a state of perfection" (i.e. If they wait patiently, he gives them His signs; his chosen ones are revealed through the success of their labours). See Weber, p. 133.

²McNeil, p. 10.

Danckelmann completed the centralization of financial affairs through the founding of the Geheime Hofkammer (literally translated as the central office of finance, its establishment was begun by Dodo von Knyphausen, a state official who had served under Frederick's father).¹ This was a major step towards the creation of a rationally systematized economic order in Prussia, and laid the groundwork for the establishment of the Zollverein (customs union), which Bismarck used to expedite unification between the North German Confederation and the other Germanic states.

The tradition of religious toleration which the Hohenzollerns had encouraged² created a very favorable climate for Enlightenment thought in the Protestant territories of Germany.³ With its emphasis on the value of education as a

¹Feuchtwanger, p. 33.

²The Hohenzollerns, by and large, observed those principles set down in the "Letters on Toleration" where Locke restricted and defined "the Jurisdiction of the Magistrate, excluding it from the regulation of public worship or the control of religious beliefs, except so far as such worship or beliefs may interfere with the ends of civil government." "The provinces of a Church and Commonwealth," he declared, "are distinct and separate and easily well defined. The bounds are absolute. As to speculative opinions, tenets and practices of any religious community, the civil magistrate has no right of restraint." See Chapter V, "Civil and Religious Liberty," in Volume I of the History of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (New York, 1920).

³Unlike England, where the Anglican Church held considerable influence in matters of state, and France, where the clout of the Roman Catholic Church was formidable up to the time of the Revolution, in Germany "the Lutheran and Calvinist Church authorities exercised a pressure which varied in the different states, and on the whole was not very severe. It did not prevent many philosophers from taking a positive attitude towards the church." Sutton, p. 44.

means for the individual to achieve a rational and happy life in this world, German Enlightenment thought (diffused in this period by Christian Wolff--1679-1754--the great popularizer and systematizer of Leibniz' philosophy) shared a common purpose with the Pietist movement. That purpose, to ensure human progress and the general welfare of the people, characterized the work of Professor August Francke, the major spokesman for Pietism at the University of Halle. With the Pietist movement in high gear during Frederick III's reign, Francke (with the encouragement and backing of his king) set out to reform German society. Believing that "by strict devotion to the basic and original Christian principles not only the individual but society as well could be reborn,"¹ Francke founded schools and orphanages throughout the territories to provide education to everyone, regardless of their social class.² Stern in his approach to learning, he did not favor children's play in any form, and preached against dancing, cardplaying, and theater as evils of social life which distracted men from their rightful and proper service to God. The above institutions were designed to provide a foundation for:

training up good workmen in all trades, good schoolmasters, good preachers and counselors, who of course hereafter will think themselves the more obliged to serve everyone because they

¹Feuchtwanger, p. 37.

²Francke's treatise on education entitled Short and Simple Instruction provides some insight into this most distinguished of Pietists' notion of what an education should consist of.

have both an experimental knowledge of God's providence from their youth up and the benefit of a sound and solid education...By such undertakings, therefore, the country will be cleared by degrees of stubborn beggars, thieves, murderers, highwaymen, footpads, and the whole pack of loose and debauched people.¹

His efforts produced a system of interrelated schools which came to be known as the Franckesche Stiftungen. This system included schools for poor, elementary schools, middle schools (called Burgerschule, these schools provided education to youths not intending to pursue further academic involvements), teacher training colleges (Seminarium Praeceptorum), and colleges for children of the upper classes (Padagogium).²

In the same spirit with which these developments in the economic and educational sectors of Prussian society were carried out, changes in the legal and political sectors were brought about by Francke's colleague at Halle, Christian Thomasius. Thomasius and his contemporary, Samuel Pufendorf, undertook the task of remodeling the Prussian State according to the prevailing theory of natural law. Together they:

1. Freed jurisprudence from medieval scholasticism religious dogma.
2. Attacked the use of Latin in higher education, and substituted German in their lectures.
3. Laid the groundwork for an enlightened absolute

¹August Hermann Francke, Pietas Hallensis: An Historical Narration (Edinburgh, 1727), p. 76. From McNeil, pp. 63-64.

²Adams, p. 116.

monarchy, freeing the ruler from the tenets of "divine right" and religious dogma.

In short, they translated Leibniz' theory into practice, secularizing conceptions of the law, the state, and morality to boot.¹ Prussia, with King Frederick at the helm, came to typify the "best of the west": enlightened leadership; religious toleration; public education; and progress towards a rationally organized state.

That progress continued under the watchful guidance of Prussia's second king, Frederick William I. Nicknamed the "Sergeant King", he has been referred to as a blend of Calvinist striving and Puritan parsimony and rectitude. And not unfairly so. In what appears to have been an attempt to "out-Franklin" Benjamin, whose homilies such as "Waste not, want not," "A penny saved is a penny earned," and "A stitch in time saves nine" eulogized the virtues of efficiency, frugality, and hardwork to generations of Americans, King Frederick William I issued an edict in 1723 which read as follows:

THE HUCKSTRESSES AND OTHER SALESWOMEN ON THE
STREETS AND IN THE MARKETS ARE NOT TO SIT WITH
OPEN MOUTHS BUT ARE TO SPIN WOOL AND FLAX,
KNIT, OR SEW--UNDER PUNISHMENT OF LOSING THEIR
CONCESSIONS.²

His admonition had, however, evidently long been taken to heart by the majority of the Prussian people. While

¹Kahler, p. 246.

²Ibid.

traveling through Prussia earlier in the eighteenth century, John Toland, the Irish deist and literary adventurer (who, born a Roman Catholic, converted to Protestantism in his youth, and being duly inspired by his new-found faith, wrote, among other publications Christianity not Mysterious--which closely resembled John Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity), commented that: "I may truly say that, without asking questions of anybody, a traveler may distinguish this country by most sensible effects, as soon as he enters it. The highways are here kept in better order than elsewhere, the Posts are more regular, popular carriages are more expeditious; and wherever the ways divide themselves, there are strong Pillars erected with as many pointing arms as there are roads, bearing, in letters cut or painted, the names of the next stage, and telling the number of miles to that place."¹

In continuing the efforts of his predecessors to stimulate the commerce and industry of Prussia, King Frederick William I centralized state authority under the General Finance Directory. This new body, into which the old Hofkammer was absorbed, provided orderly sub-divisions through which the King's policies could be rapidly put into effect in the territories.² Given such an efficient administrative system, the King was able to bolster Prussia's financial picture considerably and bring the commercial affairs of state under the umbrella of rational planning.

¹Kahler, p. 246.

²See Feuchtwanger, p. 42.

During his reign:

1. Middle class farmers and merchants were leased former Junker estates to expand agricultural production.
2. Excise taxes were levied on imported foodstuffs as a means of regulating trade, and taxes were imposed on the Junkers in an effort to provide a more even distribution of the tax burden.¹
3. The immigration of individuals whose skills were necessary to a developing economy was encouraged.
4. Specialists in agriculture and industry were provided transport to the territories to direct activities in those sectors.
5. Through the offices of the General Finance Directory, periodic reports were initiated to track the number of shops and farms in operation, the size of the work force, and the rates of consumption of all manner of goods.²

Prussia's financial affairs were moving steadily towards a state Weber has described as a system of economic activity where economic action assumes a "formally rational" nature (the extent of quantitative calculation or accounting which is technically possible and which is actually applied is

¹See Feuchtwanger, p. 42.

²See Kahler, section 30.

increasing).¹ To his son, Frederick the Great, the "Sergeant King" left a house in good order.

Frederick the Great

Undoubtably the most famous of the Hohenzollerns, Frederick the Great was described by Immanuel Kant thus:

The most independent mind in all Germany...When we are asked if we live in an enlightened age, one must answer: No, but in an age of light. The present still lacks that by which men would be able, as a whole, to make use of reason in religious matters without the guidance of others. But we have certain clear indications that henceforth the field is open for free action, and that obstacles are gradually disappearing, so that they may liberate themselves from a self-imposed tutelage. Thus we are living, more precisely in an age of Frederick... A prince who does not deem it unworthy to declare that his duty is to prescribe nothing for men in religious affairs but to grant them complete liberty...is an enlightened prince, meriting the praise of his grateful contemporaries and epigons for being the first one to free humanity from governmental tutelage and to let each one free to use reason in all matters of conscience.²

Prussia's commitment to progress (via rationality) away from the irrational past, encouraged by the three previous Hohenzollern rulers, intensified in 1740. The growth of rational asceticism, the mainstay of the German Protestant Weltanschauungen in the eighteenth century, reached new heights in Prussia during the reign of Europe's most "enlightened" sovereign. In a century in which the philosophes were preoccupied with order and the use of reason to discover and establish order in a chaotic world, he translated what they had conceived on an intellectual plane into decisive

¹Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York, 1947), Chapter II, Section 9, p. 184.

²Grunwald, p. 105 (our emphases).

political action. Reflecting the influence that Wolff and Voltaire (with whom he had a lifelong relationship) had had on him in regard to the place of reason in politics, he declared that: "A well conducted government must have an underlying concept so well integrated that it could be likened to a system of philosophy: all actions taken must be well reasoned."¹ Furthermore, he was in agreement with the entire program of the Enlightenment--a program of "secularism, humanity, cosmopolitanism, freedom from arbitrary power, freedom of speech, freedom of trade, freedom to realize one's talents, freedom of aesthetic response, freedom (in a word) of moral man to make his own way in the world."² He believed the responsibility of the leaders of states to bring happiness to their subjects required:

"The sovereign to be the first servant of the state. He is well paid in order that he may sustain the dignity of his office, but one demands that he work efficiently for the good of the state, and that he, at the very least, pay personal attention to the most important problems..."³ In most of the Kingdoms of Europe there are provinces in which the peasants are attached to the glebe, or are serfs to their lords. This, of all conditions, is the most unhappy, and that at which humanity revolts. No man certainly was born to be the slave of his equal."⁴

¹Frederick II, Die Politischen Testamente Friedrichs des Grossen (Berlin, 1920), translated by George L. Mosse in Europe in Review (New York, 1957), pp. 110-112 (our emphases).

²Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (New York, 1966), p. 3.

³Frederick II, pp. 110-112.

⁴Frederick II, The Posthumous Works of Frederick II, King of Prussia (London, 1789), p. 447. Translated by Thomas Holcroft (our emphases).

Steeped in the philosophy of the Enlightenment, Frederick the Great engineered Prussia's emergence as a major European power and coincidentally ended the Hapsburg domination in central Europe. Tempering the Puritanical zeal of his father with an "enlightened" rationalism, he enacted a series of humanitarian reforms designed for the good of his subjects and the state as well.¹ These included the abolition of torture and censure; the prohibition of maltreatment of recruits; and the curtailment of special privileges for the crown and the nobility. Continuing the Hohenzollern tradition of religious toleration, he proclaimed that "Everyone must attain salvation in his own way."² He did, nevertheless, have certain ideas as to how one might best go about attaining that salvation. As the leader of a land which had made a "state ethic" of hard work (and which, as a consequence, was reaping the benefits of the most efficient government in Europe), he understandably saw the virtue in it. Having inherited his father's efficacy with Franklinesque jargon,

¹In a statement anticipating the alliance between natural law theory and utility theory, Frederick stated: "Catholics, Lutherans, Reformed, Jews and other Christian sects live in this state, and live together in peace: if the sovereign, actuated by a mistaken zeal, declares himself for one religion or another, parties will spring up, heated disputes will ensue, little by little persecutions will commence, and, in the end, the religion persecuted will leave the fatherland and millions of subjects will enrich our neighbors by their skill and industry. It is of no concern in politics whether the ruler has a religion or whether he has none. All religions, if one examines them, are founded on superstitious systems, more or less absurd. It is impossible for a man of good sense, who dissects their contents, not to see their error; but these prejudices, these errors and mysteries were made for men, and one must know enough to respect the public and not to outrage its faith, whatever religion be involved." Frederick II, Die Politische Testamente, pp. 110-112.

he put it to good use, declaring:

We are in the world to work: that is so true that ninety eight of one hundred people work while the other two harp on their uselessness. If there are men who are mad enough to employ their vanity in keeping their arms crossed all day, there are also those who are much happier because they occupy themselves, and their spirit seeks that to which it is attached. Nothing resembles death so much as idleness. I believe that the condition of humanity requires that one be fortified against afflictions... The school of adversity renders one circumspect, discrete, and compassionate.¹

Political progress, to most of the Enlightenment philosophes (including Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel), took place from the top down, and centered on the organization of society in light of principles in the possession of a few enlightened men. These principles (evolving from the theory of natural law), indubitably fixed, were, they believed, universally applicable to any society. Under the guidance of these principles, societies would no longer drift aimlessly from error to error, but progress towards a harmonious unity (the Puritan world-view here given secular expression). If we assess the rise of Prussia from the time of the Great Elector up to and including the reign of Frederick the Great, we note (as we have maintained) her adherence to this political philosophy. The faith of Frederick the Great and the Prussian people, an unbridled faith in progress through reason to sweep away the "corruption" of the past ("History is the archives of man's wickedness...one must establish a

¹Aphorisms of Frederick the Great, from Constantin de Grunwald's Frederick II, pp. 101-102 (our emphases).

system and follow it step by step"),¹ coupled with the "vigor of Protestant individualism," led Prussia into an era of unparalleled progress.² For the next forty six years, Prussia's flight from feudalism to the sanctity of harmony of a rationally-ordered society continued its unrelenting march out of the annals of history.³ (David Noble, in Historians Against History, notes the belief of the American historian George Bancroft that by 1760--during Frederick the Great's reign, the forces of progress, symbolized by the Protestant monarchies of England and Prussia, had triumphed over the degenerate Catholic monarchies and planted the seeds of Protestant individualism in those Catholic nations.)

Prussia's reputation as an enlightened and progressive state was enhanced considerably during the reign of Frederick the Great. Though he is perhaps best known for his

¹Aphorisms of Frederick the Great, p. 102.

²See Noble, Historians Against History, Chapter Two: "George Bancroft: Nature and the Fulfillment of the Covenant," pp. 18-36.

³Despite the rose-colored prose of American history texts, enlightened absolutism was more in keeping with the thinking of the men who framed the American constitution than democracy. The delegates to the constitutional convention, including James Madison, thought democracy to be virtually synonymous with mob rule. To guard against the levelling tendencies of majorities, they adopted such checks and balances as the Electoral College, a powerful judiciary, and a selection process whereby senators were chosen by the state legislatures. The Federalists, representing the big landowners, the money power, and the conservatives, held power from 1789 to 1801. See Chapter 25 of Western Civilization by Edward McNall Burns.

military and diplomatic achievements, his contributions in the domestic affairs of Prussia were enormous. He strengthened Prussia's economy by:

1. The addition of valuable adjoining territories (see map on p. 13 of the appendix).
2. The setting of colonists (bringing farmers and skilled artisans to Prussia (see pp. 14-15 of appendix).
3. Raising agricultural standards.
4. Expanding existing industries and founding new ones.
5. Setting up the Royal Bank of Berlin and the maritime banking system, the Seehandlung.¹

Of major importance in promoting Prussia's economic expansion was a significant growth in her population, from 2,785,000 at the beginning of his reign to 5,629,000 at its end.²

A number of factors were responsible for this growth:

1. The birth rate was exceeding the death rate.
2. Thousands of immigrants settled in Prussia's territories.
3. New provinces were acquired.

The last two factors were particularly important. Most of the immigrants who came to Prussia did so at Frederick's invitation. The skills they brought with them (they included

¹See Studies in the Economic Policy of Frederick the Great by William O. Henderson (London, 1963).

²For statistics compiled by the General Directory, see Reinhold Koser, "Zur Bevölkerungsstatistik des preussischen Staates von 1756-1786," from the Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte, Vol. XVI (1903), pp. 583-589.

miners, linenweavers, silkworkers, and porcelain makers fleeing from political oppression and/or religious persecution) gave a shot in the arm to Prussia's fledgling industries.¹ And the acquisition of new provinces (Silesia in particular, which was structurally incorporated through a reorganization of her administrative and judicial systems) gave Prussia, with her central location on the Continent, nearly complete control over Germany's most important rivers and trade routes.

In the period between 1760 and 1784, over seventy new industrial operations were set up.² Frederick had taken over a State with an agriculturally-based economy. At that time (1740), timber and grain were her primary exports. "The manufacture of woollen cloth in the Mark Brandenburg and the production of metal goods in the County of Mark were virtually the only industrial activities of more than local importance." When he died, however, Prussia's position was markedly different, and the groundwork had been laid for Germany's industrial revolution which (due primarily to political divisions) came nearly a century later:

In Silesia he had gained one of the greatest centres of manufacturing east of the Elbe. In West Prussia he had secured a linke between East Prussia and the Mark Brandenburg. In Emden he had secured a window to the North Sea. He had seized a long stretch of the Baltic Coast and Prussia now controlled the important trade routes of the Oder and the Vistula. He had promoted the economic expansion of both the hereditary provinces and the recently acquired territories by setting up the Bank

¹Henderson, p. 127.

²Ibid., pp. 123-124.

of Berlin, the Overseas Trading Corporation, and several commercial companies. He had constructed a great public works; he had attracted thousands of farmers and artisans to his dominions; he had opened up new mines and had fostered the establishment of many industrial enterprises (see the maps and charts on pp. 16-19 of the appendix covering the industrial growth by region).¹

No less important to the future of Germany were the advances made in the educational and judicial systems. Following Kant's dictum that "man can become a true human being only through education" (formulated as an offshoot of the Enlightenment's belief in the perfectability of man through education, a Puritan-Pietist notion translated into secular jargon), Frederick charged Julius Hecker (a disciple of Francke's) with the task of reorganizing the Prussian educational system. Hecker, concerned that students be taught subjects useful to them after graduation, developed an approach to teaching which emphasized "not mere words" but "realities" explained to students through examples in nature, and from models and plans formulated by instructors. The school system he designed for this purpose was made up of three interrelated branches: the Deutsche Schule (an elementary branch); the Lateinschule (a secondary branch); and the Realschule (as opposed to the artificial ones).² Karl Baron von Zedlitz, his successor and Prussia's first Minister of Education, established a school board to oversee

¹Henderson, pp. 123-124.

²Hecker's book, the General School Regulations, established the first basic school law in Prussia, which aimed at promoting education to combat "harmful ignorance and train better and more skillful subjects."

the administration of all educational institutions in the State (der Oberschulkollegium). To promote the "pursuit of excellence," he introduced the Abitur, an examination required for entrance to a university. The net results of these progressive inroads in education were:

1. Greater unity and coordination within the educational sphere.
2. A diminution of the church's influence in education.
3. An increase in the influence of the state in educational affairs.
4. An increasing emphasis on the positivist and materialist philosophies that nurtured the growth of science and technology in nineteenth century Germany.

In the field of jurisprudence, a Silesian jurist, Suarez (a man of "enlightened humanitarian views"), produced a general code of Prussian law, intelligible to the layman and practical in its approach to the problems of society. The code stipulated a court system which was hierarchically organized (from lower to upper courts), and which required a complete revamping of personnel and procedures (shifting from ascribed to achieved the qualifications for judgeships, etc.).

Such reforms did not bring an end overnight to the privileged classes' influence in Prussian society. They did, however, lend potent support to the clout of a rising middle class whose search for the Kingdom of God had been supplanted

by a "specifically bourgeois economic ethos,"¹ and whose good conscience in monetary affairs contributed mightily to Germany's emergence as a modern industrial power.

That emergence, however, lay nearly a century away for Germany. The commitment to develop a rational, progressive social order, earnestly pursued by the Hohenzollerns from the time of the Great Elector, came increasingly under fire at the close of Frederick the Great's reign. And throughout the west in the closing decades of the eighteenth century, that commitment was bearing forth fruits that strained the belief that this rationally-ordered progress would yield a natural order. In Prussia, the material developments accompanying her explosive growth taxed that belief (the myth of the transcendence of time) severely. The Prussia of old, "a chaste uncomplicated land of rural virtue,"² was fast becoming history. The once unspoiled hills and dales were being dotted with factories and cities.³ The makings for a complex society loomed large on the horizon. The promise of the philosophes of the Enlightenment, a promise that a rational understanding of natural law would move a society from cultural complexity to natural simplicity, drew

¹See Weber, Protestant Ethic, p. 176.

²Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden (New York, 1964), p. 141.

³Prussia, though she had not entered fully into the mechanized march of the Industrial Revolution, was light-years ahead of the rest of Germany in laying the groundwork for that Revolution. Germany's rural-urban national identity crisis in the closing decades of the nineteenth century followed the Industrial Revolution which encompassed the entire nation.

more and more criticism towards the turn of the century. A reaction, in defence of the goal of natural simplicity, arose. It was fueled by the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Flickering tentatively at first, it soon burst into flames leaving a lasting mark on Germany and throughout modern western civilization.

The Prussian reform movement, after the death of Frederick the Great, continued to be characterized in part by ideas derived from the mainstream of Enlightenment thought: rational social arrangements; efficient government; and humanitarian considerations. Riding the tide of the French Revolution (liberty, equality, fraternity), at the same time, was a new movement which decried the limitations of rationalism and praised faith, sentiment, emotion, and nature. The movement was romanticism. Opposed to what it regarded as the product of the forces of rationalism, the Prussian Machine State; reacting against the straitness and formalism of the classical style which had predominated in the Age of Reason; it spurned order, reason, and impersonality in favor of fantasy, mystery, impulse, dreams, and originality. Its message: "Progress is the escape of men from the evil and complex cultures they have built to the simplicity and purity of God's law...Progress is the escape from the instability of history to the stability of nature."¹

¹See Noble on George Bancroft, Historians Against History, Chapter Two.

That message, and its consequences for the future of Germany, are the topics we will cover in the chapter that follows.

CHAPTER III

ROMANTICISM, RATIONALISM, AND INDUSTRIALISM

Untangling The Tensions Associated With Germany's Transition From A Primarily Rural To An Urban-Industrialized Nation

By 1800, the major intellectual tendencies of western civilizations were moving rapidly from the more sober expectations of the Enlightenment to the unbounded aspirations of romanticism. The European romantics had begun to dream of a hero who might transcend the restraints of society and the limitations of human nature to achieve total earthly fulfillment. This exceptional hero was to gain the strength for breaking his personal and social bonds by achieving organic union with nature; he would tap the vast power of the earth mother.¹

As the eighteenth gave way to the nineteenth century, opposition mounted throughout the west to a world growing ever more systematized and mechanistic. Supremacy of the "heart over the head", the battle cry of the romantic movement, was being proclaimed in Europe, Great Britain, and America. In England, William Wordsworth, echoing Rousseau's call for "destruction of the ways of civilization", including the arts and sciences, observed:

Sweet is the lore which Nature brings;
Our meddling intellect
Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things;
We murder to dissect.

¹David Noble, The Eternal Adam and the New World Garden (New York, 1968), p. 4.

Enough of Science and of Art
 Close up those barren leaves;
 Come forth and bring with you a heart
 That watches and receives.¹

And in France, Francois Rene de Chateaubriand, whose writings (Atala and Rene in particular) marked the beginnings of French romanticism, praised the unity of man, God, and nature:

The iceberg balances on the waves, its peaks shining, its hollows ordered with snow, the sea wolves give themselves to the passion of love in its valleys. The whales follow its footsteps over the ocean. The hardy savage, in the shelter of his floating iceberg presses to his heart the woman whom God has given him and with her finds undreamt joys in this mixture of danger and passion.²

In America, the romantic impulse found expression in Jacksonian democracy, where the yeoman farmer, an individual freed from the fetters of civilization, was to live in a timeless harmony with nature.³ The thrust of romantic thought in Germany, as in England, France, and the United States, centered on the nagging questions the Enlightenment philosophes had posed. Those questions, concerning man's place in the universe, his nature and potentialities, his social and political relations, evolved into arguments attempting to strike a balance between emotion and reason, genius and discipline, body and spirit, and nature and form.

¹William Wordsworth, "The Tables Turned", in Wordsworth's Poetical Works (New York, 1967).

²Francois Rene de Chateaubriand, Genius of Christianity (Paris, 1832).

³David Noble, in the Eternal Adam, traces the romantic tradition in American literature from 1800 onward, and the problems posed to American novelists by the "idea of nature".

Kohn's assertion (in The Mind of Germany, see Prologue) that German thought "rejected the premises of western thought" in the "typically German romantic counter revolution at the beginning of the nineteenth century"¹ loses whatever credibility it had when Rousseau's influence on German romantic thought is fully understood (David Noble, in Historians Against History, has traced the influence of "Rousseau's Noble Savage" thesis in America's self-definition as a nation from 1830 onward.) Rousseau's argument focused on the contradictions he saw between nature and civilization and between civilization and morality. Civilization, to him, stood in the way of the establishment of a moral community (as seventeenth century English society had stood in the way of the Puritans) where

¹ Kohn's treatise stresses the fundamental differences between German thought and Western thought, particularly the failure of Enlightenment traditions to sustain themselves in Germany. To substantiate his point, he turns to a lecture of the Protestant theologian, Ernst Troeltsch, on "The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity". Troeltsch's argument, Kohn insists, points to the "permanent problem of the contrast between German thought--in politics, history, and ethics--and that of Western Europe and America. Western thought was rooted in a long tradition from Stoicism and Christianity to the Enlightenment. German thought had fully shared in this development until the beginning of the nineteenth century when the 'typically German romantic counter revolution' rejected the premises of western thought. In this German thought, 'the State becomes the embodiment of a particular spiritual world...The result of this view is a total and fundamental dissolution of the idea of a universal Natural Law; and henceforth Natural Law disappeared almost completely in Germany" (p. 42). If Troeltsch had read Mein Kampf a year later, he would have seen the notion of Natural Law carried to its irrational extreme. He died before it was published.

Troeltsch's lecture, written in 1922 when the Weimar Republic was floundering and Germany was attempting to recoup from the losses of W.W. I, was a plea for Germany to adopt the Enlightenment's program; to establish a social order based on natural laws (Hitler gave him his wish). What Troeltsch and

man could live the life of the "Noble Savage", redeemed by nature. In America, the figure became that of the corn-fed, apple pie-eating yeoman farmer; in Germany the figure became the "peasant ideal". Believing European societies had been corrupted (as had the men in them) because they had moved too far from nature, he proposed a new set of emphases: instinct against reason; unspoilt virtue against corrupt society; inspiration against discipline; and nature against artifice.

German romantic thinkers, in agreement with the rationalists of the Enlightenment that the final goal of progress should be the establishment of a natural order, took inspiration from Rousseau in rejecting their (the philosophes') emphasis on rationality as the means to achieve that order. Where the German Protestant Weltanschauung, as elaborated by Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel, emphasized a correspondence between man and nature based on rationality (the application of reason

1 (from p. 71) Kohn overlooked was the role that Enlightenment traditions had played in leading Germany into the cultural crisis in which she then (post W.W. I) found herself. Kohn, while readily admitting that German's technological and economic development fit within historical trends of the modern west, maintains that her intellectual and cultural development did not, owing, as we have said, to the "peculiarities" of German romanticism. If however, German romanticism is considered not as a watertight compartment (unrelated, as Kohn suggests, to rationalism or industrialism), but rather as a consequence of the interplay of ideas and values, on the one hand, and social, political and economic forces on the other, its relationship to what came before and what came after can be understood in a way that incorporates it within the western tradition. Far from denying a relationship between German romantic thought and the phenomenon of National Socialism, we shall demonstrate, in the course of our argument, the formative influence it had in perpetuating a Weltanschauung National Socialism attempted to sustain.

to discover the laws of nature), the German romantics emphasized an inner, emotional correspondence between man and nature. Faith in reason, they felt, was threatening the unity between man and nature: nature was becoming the domain of scientific investigation, and science applied to technological development was supporting economic progress which posed a threat to the natural order. Reflecting on this dilemma, Wolfgang von Goethe was moved to say:

If we heard the encyclopedists mentioned, or opened a volume of their colossal work, we felt as if we were moving amidst the innumerable whirling spools and looms of a great factory, where, what with the mere creaking and rattling--what with all the mechanism, bewildering both to eyes and brain--what with the mere impossibility of understanding how the various parts fit in and work with one another--what with the contemplation of all that is necessary to prepare a single piece of cloth, we felt disgusted with the very coat we wore upon our backs.¹

Rousseau's scheme, new emphases and all, reflected a major flaw in Enlightenment thought in general (a Puritan holdover). The philosophes lacked an approach that was historical and practical at the same time. Rousseau's proposal for a new political community lays out that flaw in all its mythical majesty, as Noble's description of it clearly demonstrates:

For Rousseau, when men returned to their original and natural condition, there would exist a new political community of the 'people'. The 'people' would be free and equal individuals in a classless, institutionless, traditionless society, living in harmony

¹Wolfgang von Goethe, Poetry and Truth, translated by M. S. Smith (London, 1908), II, p. 35.

with nature. The 'people' would be sovereign, the source of all political authority, the source of all law. The 'people' would act together in spontaneous unanimity through the agency of the General Will,¹ the symbolic representation of the social unity formed by natural man's free act of association. No complexity, no corruption would be allowed to creep into the purified political life of the 'people'.²

In the early decades of the nineteenth century, including the period of French occupation (from 1806, when the Prussian armies were defeated in battles with the French at Jena and Auerstädt, till 1813 when the War of Liberation began), the German romantic movement flourished. Napoleon's occupation of the Germanic states enhanced the appeal of Rousseau's "idea of nature" as an escape route for a people(s) under foreign domination, exposed to the viscissitudes of history.³

¹Rousseau's major work, The Social Contract, is regarded by many scholars as a treatise which outlined the precepts for modern egalitarian democracy. It might be more accurate to describe it as an outline for the modern total state: i.e. "the general will is always right and always tends to the public advantage...Men always desire their own good, but do not always discern it".

²See David Noble, Historians Against History, p. 10. Hitler and the National Socialists reassert this commitment with disastrous consequences over a century and a half later.

³Sigmund Freud, in his General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, describes the nostalgic feeling we often attach to the unspoiled landscape as an example of our frequent yearning to achieve freedom from the grip of the external world: "The creation of the mental domain of phantasy has a complete counterpart in the establishment of 'reservations' and 'nature parks' in places where the inroads of agriculture, traffic, or industry threaten to change..the earth rapidly into something unrecognizable. The 'reservation' is to maintain the old condition of things which has been regretfully sacrificed to necessity everywhere else; there everything may grow and spread as it pleases, including what is useless and even what is harmful. The mental realm of phantasy is also such a reservation reclaimed from the encroaches of the reality-principle". Translated by Joan Riviere (New York, 1920), p. 325. (our emphases)

The "heart over the head" theme resounded in the verses of the Sturm and Drang poets, who rejected reason in favor of the glories of Geist; on the canvases of painters who sought inspiration from nature, and splashed wild landscapes on those canvases to symbolize emotional experiences; in Wagner's musical dramas that brought forests and fire to the stage; in Beethoven's opera *Fidelio* and his Ninth Symphony, stirring calls for freedom to oppressed humanity; in the writings of Herder and Lenz, and Goethe and Klinger, who asserted the rights of inner feelings over and above social conventions. This flood of creativity stressed an intense individualism, an impassioned rebelliousness, and personal freedom. Rousseau's ideas gave inspiration to this wholesale revolt against the conventions of the day. But "the poetry of life"¹ was more than a revolt against the status quo. The German romantic movement was marshalling the hopes of a people for their own nation; providing an apocalyptic vision of a purified millenium in the near future; and buttressing their faith in progress to spirit them into that paradise.

Germany's surge for national liberation rested on a merger of the romantic spirit with Prussia's military and industrial capabilities. This merger, combining Prussia's rational progressive orientation with Rousseau's primitivism (the idea of nature theme characterizing the Romantic movement), marked the beginnings of the German national consciousness.

¹A term coined by the German romantics to express the spirit of their movement.

Consumated in a common cause, the ousting of the French oppressors, this union of strange bedfellows transformed the German Protestant Weltanschauung into a world-view embracing both progress and primitivism. The reality of a German nation still lay over a half century hence. Nonetheless, the seeds of her self-definition as a nation were sown in this crucial period of her history. The paradoxical nature of that self-definition is made crystal clear in the following passage:

It should be borne in mind that the ideal of the natural man associated with rural life was not only a background for the romantic movement, but also went into making one of the most important preconceptions of the nineteenth century, indeed of modern times: namely, that the peasant represents the greatest virtues in a society growing ever more industrial and urban.¹

Now at this point in history England had already achieved the status of a modern, urban-industrial nation, due in large part to a higher degree of national unity and political stability than that being experienced by her counterparts on the continent. (The revolutions in England in the seventeenth century--breaking up the medieval guild system in industry and the feudal system of land tenure--had paved the way for her Industrial Revolution.) In fact, at the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, England was experiencing widespread depression and unemployment, and condemning to death unemployed workers who dared to wreck factory machines. France, after her Revolution and Napoleon's reign, began a rapid move

George L. Mosse, The Culture of Western Europe (Madison, 1961), pp. 14-15.

towards the Age of Industrialism. In Germany and America, however, industrial revolutions had not yet worked their wonders, and the faith in progress towards a state of nature remained secure.¹ In the next section we shall consider some aspects of that progress that were critical to Germany's development into a modern industrial nation.

¹Prussian progress, though geared up for industrialization, had not yet broken out into a full-scale power-driven onslaught. And Prussia, as we stated earlier, was far ahead of the rest of Germany in terms of proximity to the Age of Industrialism.

Progress and Primitivism:
The Romantic Spirit Given
Practical Application.

Prussian reformers, following the Puritan pattern initiated by the Great Elector (and running throughout Prussia's history from the close of the Thirty Years War onward), sought practical applications for the wealth of ideas arising from the romantic movement. Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, a Swiss-born disciple of Rousseau's, set to work translating Rousseau's theories into social action. Accepting his mentor's assumption that man was good by nature and had been corrupted by the evils of civilization, he believed that only a reform in education could improve the lot of men and the faulty institutions surrounding them. With that end in mind, he wrote Lienhard and Gertrud: A Book for the People, in which he outlined his "principles of the method of wise instruction for the people". It stipulated that:

1. Education must assist and not violate the course of natural development.
2. Harmonious development of every faculty (the body was never to be in advance of the mind; the mind was not to be developed to the neglect of the physical and emotional powers).
3. Education was not to aim at the individual alone but at his integration into society, with the form of that society determined by legislation enacted by the people.
4. A teacher's instruction should be made so attrac-

tive that the exhilarating feeling of progress would be the children's strongest inducement to industry and good moral conduct.

"Pestalozzism gripped Prussia in the period of reform and regeneration and provided its leaders with the mainspring for a national education."¹ One such leader was Wilhelm von Humbolt (the brother of Alexander, the naturalist who toured the backwaters of South America in search of data to confirm his theory of the Quintessential harmony of nature) who in 1809 became Head of the Public Education at the Ministry of the Interior. Humbolt dispatched his assistant, Süvern, to Pestalozzi's teacher training college in Yverdon. Upon his return, they laid out a plan for a universal system of education for all the Germanic states. The key to this system was the Gymnasium, which offered a ten year program of secondary education. It provided a highly disciplined, efficient general education for the German people. As a consequence of Humbolt's work, Prussia acquired a highly developed educational system ahead of other nations of the modern west, an essential for the growth of a strong class of businessmen and capitalists. It made possible the dissemination of scientific knowledge which had been steadily accumulating in the west over the previous two centuries, and the practical employment of that knowledge in the service of industrial technology.

¹Adams, p. 122.

Rousseau's influence was manifest in politics as well as education. Heinrich Stein, working as a minister in the Prussian civil service, centered his efforts on one idea. That idea was "to give the state greater organic life by securing the participation of the citizens at every level and by educating them to the tasks of self government and responsible citizenship."¹ With this objective in mind, he brought about reforms in taxation, administration, and civil service rules and regulations. Of primary importance among these was his program of municipal reform. Aimed at educating the middle class to self government and civic pride, his program provided for elected bodies in each city to oversee municipal affairs. While the monarchy (of King Frederick William III at the time) still retained a centralized control over the affairs of state, the Prussian cities gained a good measure of autonomy as a direct result of this reform measure. Stein's efforts to prepare the way for constitutional government encountered greater resistance however, and ultimately met with failure. Nevertheless the cities, freed to run their own affairs (after the defeat of Napoleon), began to bustle with commercial activities. Two Prussian administrators, Motz and Maasen, succeeded in removing the internal trade barriers remaining between the cities and eventually paved the way for the Zollverein, a customs union which by 1834 included a majority of the German

¹Feuchtwanger, p. 116.

states.¹ Their efforts, as Feuchtwanger notes, proved most helpful to the middle class business sector of German society;

The removal of internal trade barriers in Prussia together with the Zollverein gradually altered the social structure of the country (the Junkers privileged position, jarred bit by bit by reforms initiated during the eighteenth century, was severely undermined as free trade spread throughout the territories). Where the middle class had been weak previously, economic liberalism and the growth of capitalist enterprise strengthened the bourgeoisie and made it more self confident...The vast majority continued to earn its living from the land, but here too the changes of the reform era, coupled with the effects of a freer economy, were producing a great deal of movement.²

Although the German economy did not experience a considerable amount of expansion in the three odd decades following the defeat of Napoleon,³ Prussia's progress had provided the

¹The strongest advocate for a national economic policy in Germany was Friedrich List. A man of humanitarian and cosmopolitan ideals, List shared Adam Smith's hope that as economic forces evolved, they would lead to a harmonious world economy. After personally observing the rapid growth of the U. S. economy, where internal restrictions were absent, and where manufacturers were protected against foreign competition, he proposed a similar plan for Germany. His most comprehensive work, The National System of Political Economy, stressed the need to achieve balance between the agrarian, commercial, and industrial sectors to promote the healthy growth of a national economy, and the necessity of educating the people to stimulate economic development. His policies of economic liberalism were not wholeheartedly followed until Bismarck's time.

²Feuchtwanger, p. 145.

³Europe, after Napoleon's demise, entered an era of reaction which lasted until 1830. The dominant political figure in this era was Austria's Chancellor and Foreign Minister, Prince Clemens Metternich. Metternich's program (ideas supporting political absolutism, suppression of nationalistic ambitions, and preservation of the status quo in Europe) was accepted by Congress of Vienna, and owing to Austria's influence in southern Germanic states, impeded for a time Prussia's economic expansion.

bases for the development of modern capitalism. In agriculture, reforms at the turn of the century had abolished serfdom in most territories and individual peasant ownership of land predominated.¹ The way was thus paved for individualistic capitalistic enterprise in German agriculture. Agrarian reforms, on the other hand, left large numbers of peasants landless, and the movement of substantial numbers of peasants from the countryside to towns and cities began after 1815. "Whereas in 1815 four out of five Germans lived in rural communities, the ratio was close to two out of three in 1850."²

The establishment of a rational framework for a national economic policy hinged on two critical developments:

1. The creation of the Prussian Customs Union (the Zollverein).
2. The growth of the Railroad Industry, which remained, as in the United States, the leading sector of the German economy throughout most of the latter half of the nineteenth century.³

The building of railroads in the 1840's transformed the areas covered by the Zollverein into a common market. Besides providing employment for large numbers of people, the railroad industry, which required large amounts of capital for construction purposes, stimulated modernization of the banking

¹Lack of political unity delayed effectuating these reforms throughout the states, and while they were intended to improve the lot of the peasants, they often had the opposite effect.

²Holborn, p. 7.

³Hawthorne's "The Celestial Railroad" employs the metaphor

and finance business in Germany. With the creation of stock companies, the coal, iron, and machine industries were provided the capital necessary for development, while the railways served as the means for rapid transport of industrial goods. "In the nineteenth century, the Prussian State was quick to adopt large-scale capitalism and industrialization and soon became a leading power. Everything that Prussia had been from her earliest beginnings and everything she had absorbed in the course of her history came together in Bismarck's German Reich of 1871."¹

The fact that Prussia should weld the German states together into a nation came as no surprise to her historians. And they were in total agreement as to why that was to be the case. Sounding the prelude to the age of imperialism in the latter half of the nineteenth century in Germany, Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), the historiographer of Prussia, declared:

The Prussian spirit will be the basis for German unity...We shall organize companies of workmen who will be employed in public works, in the improvement of rivers, the cultivation of waste lands, and other works of this kind...Prussia has a mission to perform in Germany: she should not flinch from her task.²

3 (from p. 82) of the Iron Horse to satirize the popular faith in progress in the United States and Germany at the time, the race to salvation via machinery.

¹Kahler, p. 247.

²See von Ranke's Zur Geschichte Deutschlands, portions of which are translated in Modern Germany and her Historians by Antoine Guillard (London, 1915). Also von Ranke's fifty-four volume work, Sämmtliche Werke.

His historical treatises reaffirmed the romantic faith in progress to reform German society in its entirety (including the Catholic territories as well) and lead it into an era of unparalleled prosperity.

His successor as the historiographer of Prussia, Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896), an advocate of colonial expansion and German imperialism, laid out in bold type his explanation of the religious bases of the Prussian spirit: "The Kings of Prussia, in Treitschke's eyes, were models: a hard and resisting race, tempered by hard work on a poor soil and by the continual struggles they had to sustain themselves against their neighbors, they were prepared already for their great mission by these rare virtues. They became entirely so when they embraced Protestantism."¹ In attempting to demonstrate that Protestantism and Germanism were one and the same (comparable to the WASP ideal-type in the United States) and concurrently that Prussian history (as was the case with New England history) was the definitive history of Germany, Treitschke stated that:

The Jesuitical faith always remained foreign to the spirit of our people. The rich spiritual forces of the New Roman Church developed proudly in their Roman fatherlands: but on this hostile soil, among this people of inveterate heretics, they could never take root.

It was Prussia alone which made German unity, less by deliberate action of the Government than

¹From Modern Germany and her Historians by Guillard, section on Treitschke. See also Max Cornicelius's three volume work, Heinrich von Treitschkes Briefe. (our emphases)

by the inherent power of her institutions or what comes to the same, by the spirit (the Protestant Ethic) that directed her political evolution.¹

That Weltanschauung was shared by the Director of the Prussian government archives, Heinrich von Sybel (1817-1895), who expressed it even more forcefully. Claiming that in every modern State "the advances in civilization had for their basis the principle of independence in art and science," he felt that Prussia was a sterling example of the realization of those principles. Thus he declared that:

By embracing Protestantism, the Elector of Brandenburg (the Great Elector) became by that very fact the defender of independent Germany: Austria, on the other hand, by destroying the work of the Reformation in her territory, and by entrusting the education of her people to the Jesuits, definitely alienated herself from the true German spirit. The Jesuit's education, incomparable when directed to training all men for a specific purpose, begins precisely with the negation of all individuality and all free disposal of oneself. The most certain sign by which one could recognize Austrian nationality at that time was its failure to participate in the progress which was made in the rest of Germany.²

However, that progress, which to the Great Elector and his peoples served a critical religious function, providing a strong indication of their election to the Kingdom of Heaven; and which to Kant (for the individual) meant progress towards "a good disposition" and "self-improvement," and for the nation meant progress towards a state of nature, was becoming a horse of a different color as new scientific

¹ Ibid. (our emphases)

² From Guiland, Modern Germany, section on Sybel. See also Sybel's Die Begründung des Deutschen Reiches durch Wilhelm I. (our emphases)

revelations stimulated industrial-technological developments throughout the west. Eugen Weber put it thus:

The new scientific revelations persuaded a great many men that all the secrets of a mechanically determined world awaited eventual discovery by scientific processes which were ultimately infallible. They also persuaded many more skeptical thinkers that, until adduction of proof, doubt--even on religious questions--was at least as reasonable and worthy of respect as affirmation. Lastly, when vulgarized and misinterpreted, they seemed to endorse the current doctrines of free enterprise and the idea that survival and success went to the fittest in human society as, apparently, they did in nature.¹

The German historian Theodore Mommsen (1817-1903) expressed this popular late-nineteenth century notion of progress, and his estimation of the political climate in which it could flourish best, in the following manner:²

The least perfect political constitution, provided it allows a little play to the free decision of the majority, is better than the best absolutism. It is susceptible to progress and consequently lives. Absolutism is therefore a dead thing...

Civilization demands the suppression of races less capable of, or less advanced in culture by nations of a higher standing (Darwin on a social level). War therefore becomes the great machine which elaborates progress, and the prosperity of a country exacts that struggles should become wars and pillage conquest, in order that the political power of the State might begin to be organized.³

Their predictions that Prussia (and the Prussian ethos) would be the unifying force in Germany (predictions of Germany's most notable historians) proved correct. Everything

¹Eugen Weber, The Western Tradition (Boston, 1959), p. 630.

²Theodore Mommsen, bullish on the Fatherland in the manner of a Theodore Roosevelt, was a member of the German Progressive and later the National Liberal parties.

³See Guillard, Modern Germany, section on Mommsen. (our emphases)

that Prussia had been did come together in Bismarck's German Reich of 1871. The triumph of industrial capitalism coincided with Germany's achievement of national unification. The victory of this new order was a magnanimous victory for the middle class, as Hamerow relates:

Merchants and shippers profited from national unification as much as industrialists and bankers did...For them the victory of the new order meant above all the standardization and rationalization of the instruments of trade...By encouraging the rise of a capitalistic economy the new order was winning the sympathies of a wealthy and influential part of the nation. The forces of nationalism, liberalism, and industrialism rooted in the middle class formed a bulwark for the policies pursued by the government after 1866.¹

The German Protestant Weltanschauung, driving Prussia to secure rational mastery of her territories, had initiated Germany's transition to a new way of life. And there was a positive aspect to Germany's being a late comer to the age of industrialism. In the words of Thorsten Veblen:

The German captains of industry who came to take the discretionary management in the new era were fortunate enough not to have matriculated from the training school of a country town based on a retail business in speculative real estate and political jobbery... They came under the selective test for fitness in the aggressive conduct of industrial enterprise...The country being at the same time in the main...not committed to antiquated sites and routes for its industrial plants, the men who exercised discretion were free to choose with an eye single to the mechanized expediency of locations... Having no obsolescent equipment and no out of date trade connections to cloud the issue, they were also free to take over the processes at their best and highest efficiency.²

¹Hamerow, pp. 343-345. (our emphases)

²Thorsten Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (New York, 1939), p. 193.

Bismarck's Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century was far removed from the Germany of Luther's day, and the religious developments in Prussia following him, but nevertheless indebted to them:

For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order... Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world..., material goods have gained an increasing and finally inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period in history... Victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer. The rosy blush of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems also to be irretrievably fading and the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs.¹

Between 1871 and 1917, Germany's population increased at an explosive rate. There were only eight cities in Germany with a population over 1000,000 in 1870, whereas in 1900 there were forty-one, with eleven of those cities over 250,000 and five over half a million. In fact, the increase in Germany's urban population during this era equaled the Fatherland's entire population increase in the same period.² At the same time, Germany's industry and commerce experienced a phenomenal expansion. "Between 1890 and 1910, Germany's steel production increased seven times as fast as England's."³

¹Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic, pp. 181-182.

²Carlton J. H. Hayes, A Generation of Materialism: 1871-1900 (New York, 1941), p. 103.

With the increased production of goods, Germany sought a broader market base in which to peddle the fruits of her expanding economy. Thus, "under Kaiser Wilhelm II, the foreign policies of Germany became increasingly ambitious" (as they did in the United States under Roosevelt's stewardship).¹ The military establishment, under Bismarck, had kept pace with the rapid industrial expansion and at the end of his political career, Germany had emerged as the supreme military power on the Continent. While a sizeable portion of Germany's population supported the Kaiser's Weltpolitik (imperialism via military expansion), particularly the wealthy bourgeoisie and parties of the right, the Social Democratic party, founded in response to the problems accompanying Germany's industrialization, opposed the militarism and nationalism of modern industrial Germany. "They (the Social Democrats) opposed the German army because they considered it to be the aggressive instrument of German capitalism in Weltpolitik."² They opposed the German naval program and Germany's colonial policy for the same reason. As a result, the conservative and middle class interests considered the Social Democrats a threat to the established order. And they were. "From 1890 on, the Social Democrats polled a larger number of popular votes than any other party, and by 1912 they polled more than

¹Mellen, p. 603.

²George D. Crothers, The German Elections of 1907 (New York, 1941), pp. 56-57.

twice as many votes as the second largest party (see the voting chart on page 20 of the appendix)."¹ Despite their strength in the popular vote, their political influence was curbed by the fact that their support was concentrated in large industrial cities. Though Germany had experienced a rapid rural to urban shift in population from 1871 to 1914, these demographic changes had not been accompanied by a reorganization of representative districts. As a result the Social Democrats received far fewer seats in the Reichstag than their popular support mandated, and thus had their effective political power greatly blunted.

Germany's economic and military enterprises ultimately got their way, and in 1914 Germany went to war. By 1917 all of the power nations of the west were embroiled and Germany, a year later, was soundly defeated. What's more, the allies imposed political demands (establishment of a democracy, the Weimar Republic) and a heavy economic burden (see the terms of the Treaty of Versailles) on the defeated nation. Germany was certainly down, but, as it turned out, not out by any stretch of the imagination.

In the opening section of Chapter One we spoke of the rural-urban crisis precipitated in the closing decades of the nineteenth century by Germany's transition to a modern industrial nation. Before considering developments after Germany's defeat in World War I, and by way of introduction

¹Mellen, p. 609.

to our analysis of the theory and practice of National Socialism, let us consider the challenge this crisis posed to Germany's self-definition as a nation exempt from the vicissitudes of history.

The course of Germany's historical development from 1890-1917 offered much evidence that the Fatherland was straying from the path leading towards the final goal of progress. (That goal, shared by the rationalists of the Enlightenment as well as by Rousseau and the romantic prophets of progress, was the establishment of a natural order free of cultural complexity.) The evidence was not ignored. It fueled a wholesale revolt of Germany's youth against the "ways of civilization," and moved one particular German writer to prophecy The Decline of The West. The nature of that revolt, and its relationship to the German Protestant Weltanschauung, is considered in the next section, entitled "The Revolt Against Civilization."

The Revolt Against Civilization

It was the international middle class of Western Europe and the United States which was committed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to stepping out of time into space as spaciousness; out of community into autonomy for the individual. The closing down of space for European and American expansion at the end of the nineteenth century resulted in a common identity crisis in Europe and America...The United States and Germany were faced with growing internal complexity and without the promise of new internal frontiers that might provide mobility for the individual.¹

By the end of the nineteenth century the progress which the philosophes had defined as a purge of artificial complexity and a restoration of natural simplicity was rapidly coming to be seen as artificial and arbitrary itself. The existence of factories, sprawling cities, and large numbers of urban-unemployed posed a formidable problem to a nation with a long history rooted in the pre-industrial past. Economic, educational, legal, scientific, and technological innovations, which Prussia's progressives had advocated as a means to reform German society, had transformed Germany in a few short decades into a modern industrial nation. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (both Prussian born, Marx the son of a Jewish lawyer, Engels the son of a wealthy manufacturer) observed the consequences of the Industrial Revolution in England for the working class, and the picture they painted betokened neither a

¹David Noble, The Progressive Mind, 1890-1917 (Chicago, 1971); p. ix of the introduction.

"pre-established harmony" nor the "Divine Idea as it Exists on Earth":

Modern industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are organized like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants. Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the overlooker, and above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is.¹

Their message had a strong appeal to the working classes in Germany. Yet though the parties of labor gained many adherents and an abbreviated political influence in the wake of Germany's disastrous defeat in World War I, the ideology which rendered a seemingly incomprehensible social situation meaningful to the majority of Germans was bound up with a new wave of romanticism. The "idea of nature" as the basis of a political community ultimately proved more appealing than Marx' and Engel's Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

The "Revolt Against Civilization" in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany began as a youth movement with a distinctly Puritan character, similar in many respects to the "Flower Child" movement in the United States over a half-century later. The origin of the movement has been traced by historians to the Gymnasium, which offered, at the time, a

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London, 1888), preface.

humanistic-type education to German youths. What started as a practice allowing unsupervised excursions into the woods gradually evolved into a movement including tens of thousands of youths who rejected the materialism of their age. Opposed to drinking and smoking, opposed to the "artificiality" of cities and middle class mediocrity, these Wandervoegel (Roamers) set out to rediscover the German countryside. Determined to fashion their own lives, they sat around camp fires and sang folk songs proclaiming the beauty of nature and the virtues of Germany's primitive past. They decried the atomizing effects of modern German society and preached the necessity of returning to the genuineness of mother earth to cleanse their souls. While the German nation found itself mired in cultural complexity, its youth began to search for the path to simplicity. This insurgent rejection of the existing society and its institutions soon began to receive the support of many German patriotic organizations (facilitating the myth of the "Stab in the Back" which we shall come to) and by 1918 most political parties in Germany had their own youth movements. In the aftermath of World War I, they would take on very nationalistic and racist overtones.

The youth movement offered a romantic optimism that Germany might transcend the instabilities of history.¹ (Karl May's fictional character, "Old Shatterhand," had done just that as

¹Leo Marx characterizes the dominant motive behind this "state of mind" thus: "Evidently it is generated by an urge to withdraw from civilization's growing power and complexity. What is attractive in pastoralism (in keeping with our effort

the rugged individual surmounting all sorts of problems by sheer force of will to survive in perfect harmony with nature. May's paperbacks were immensely popular with the "have's" as well as the "have-nots" of Germany, and were the favorite reading of one Adolf Hitler.) But this optimism was crushed by Germany's defeat in World War I. Gone were their hopes for a new frontier; they believed their nation to be fraught with moral decay. In a society which had grown too complex to fathom, progress towards natural simplicity seemed doomed to failure. History was knocking at Germany's door, and a foreclosure on the myth seemed inevitable. The German people, nonetheless, took comfort in this nihilistic atmosphere from the assurances of their premier doomsday prophet that their fate would be shared by all the inhabitants of modern western civilization. In a searing indictment of Post-Reformation developments in the modern west, particularly the emergence of industrial-technological societies and the ethics of utility supporting this modern economic order, Oswald Spengler

1 (from p. 94) to demonstrate Rousseau's influence in Germany, we shall continue to employ the term primitivism with its associated connotations) is the felicity represented by an image of a natural landscape, a terrain either unspoiled or, if cultivated, rural. Movement toward such a symbolic landscape also may be understood as movement away from an "artificial" world, a world identified with "art," using this word in its broadest sense to mean the disciplined habits of mind or arts developed by organized communities." The impulse, in other words, stimulates a "symbolic motion" away from civilization towards nature, away from complexity towards simplicity, away from the city towards the country. Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden (New York, 1967), pp. 9-10.

(student of mathematics and the natural sciences, then schoolmaster turned philosopher), harking back to Rousseau,¹ outlined the tragic existence of modern men (especially the Mittelstand) devoid of a spiritual content:

Now, this utility was utility,² conducive to the "happiness of the greatest number",² and this happiness consisted in not-doing--for such, in the last analysis, is the doctrine of Bentham, Spencer, and Mill. The aim of mankind was held to consist in relieving the individual of as much of the work as possible and putting the burden on the machine. Freedom from the 'misery of wage-slavery', equality in amusements and comforts and 'enjoyment of art'--it is the panem et circenses of the giant city of the Late periods that is presenting itself. The progress-philistine waxed lyrical over every knob that set an apparatus in motion for the--supposed--sparing of human labour. In place of the honest religion of earlier times there was a shallow enthusiasm for the 'achievements of humanity',³ by which nothing more

¹Rousseau and Goethe, who gave inspiration to the earlier romantic movement in Germany, and whose influence reappears in the new wave of romanticism sweeping Germany in the opening decades of the twentieth century, stressed God and Nature as indissoluble components of their Weltanschauung; and the necessity of a spiritual component in man. "For both Goethe and Rousseau, reverence begins with the contemplation of nature. Since they believe that God is the Creator and animating Spirit of nature, they seek and find him there..." Rousseau thus sends Emile to the ideal setting for his upbringing, the countryside. "There amid natural surroundings and far away from the vices of the city, he is more thoroughly under the control of his tutor, who can direct his impulse for action into a practical channel, such as gardening. Goethe's Wahlverwandtschaften and Wilhelm Meister likewise emphasize the active life and praise the "noble art of agriculture." Carl Hammer, Goethe and Rousseau (Kentucky, 1973), pp. 128-129 and p. 158.

²The theme of Bentham's Defence of Usury. See also John Stuart Mill's Essay on Utilitarianism, where he attempts to reconcile the principle of individual self-regard with the greatest happiness thesis; and Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, where he advocates extreme individualism.

³On materialism shrouded by religion, Spengler states: "The real belief is always the belief in atoms and numbers,

was meant than progress in the technics of labour-saving and amusement-making. Of the soul, not one word.¹

And on the inevitable doom of modern western civilization, where men must face the drama of life without tradition or belief, Spengler writes:

Civilizations are the most artificial states of which a species of developed humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, the thing-become succeeding the thing-becoming, death following life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built, petrifying world-city following mother-earth and the spiritual childhood of Doric and Gothic.² They are an end, irrevocable... To the world-city belongs not a folk but a mass. Its uncomprehending hostility to all the traditions representative of the Culture (i.e. convention in art and limits of knowledge in science), the keen and cold intelligence that confounds the wisdom of the peasant, the new-fashioned naturalism that in relation to all matters of sex and society goes back beyond Rousseau and Socrates to quite primitive instincts and conditions... all these things betoken the definite closing down of the Culture and the opening of a quite new phase

3 (from p. 96) but it requires this highbrow hocus-pocus to make it bearable in the long run. Materialism is shallow and honest. Mock religion is shallow and dishonest." Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West (New York, 1926), II, p. 310.

¹Oswald Spengler, Man and Technics: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Life (New York, 1932), p. 6. This work is a compression of subjects dealt with in The Decline of the West. (our emphases)

²Nietzsche's influence on Spengler is obvious here. In the Birth of Tragedy, published in 1872, Nietzsche attacked the Socratic spirit which placed reason, "a dangerous, life-undermining force," above instinct. His anti-rationalism springs up again in Twilight of the Idols, published in 1879. The influence of Rousseau and the romantic movement in general, particularly Wagner's musical ideas, on Nietzsche is displayed in his interpretation of Greek tragedy as having been born from music and killed by rationalism (see The Birth of Tragedy).

of human existence--anti-provincial, late, future-less, but quite inevitable.¹

Impressionism has come down again to the crust of the earth. Its space is cognized, not experienced, seen, not contemplated; there is a tunedness in it, but not Destiny. It is the mechanical object of physics and not the felt world of the pastorate that Courbet and Manet give us in their landscapes... Rembrandt's mighty landscapes lie essentially in the Universe, Manet's near a railway station.²

Spengler's analogies are frequently indefensible and the conclusions he draws are often unsubstantiated (Van Gogh would have had his ear for his jab at the Impressionists). After all the criticisms have been levied and the dust settles, however, the most intriguing element in his attempt at a philosophy of history is a distinctly a-historical leitmotif. (Spengler, in his four part historical morphology--Pre-Culture, Culture, Civilization, and Decline--refers to the latter two epochs as "a-historical" periods.) His glorification of mother-earth, together with his decidedly anti-urban sentiments; his praise of the folk, together with his condemnation of the masses; his plaudits for the pristine

¹David Noble, discussing Mark Twain's dilemma, coming to grips with industrial capitalism and the threat it posed to the simplicity of the Jeffersonian republic, quotes Twain as follows: 'The eight years in America from 1860-1868 uprooted institutions..., changed the politics of a people, transformed the social life of half the country'. Noble goes on to say: "The authors (Twain and Charles Warner, *The Gilded Age*) were appalled by the rootlessness of the new generation. Against its lack of standards, its corroding materialism, its irresponsible selfishness, they contrasted the stability, the sobriety, the virtue of the Jeffersonian village world and the middle-class aristocracy of the Jeffersonian cities." Noble, The Eternal Adam, p. 53.

²Spengler, The Decline of the West, I, Introduction. (our emphases)

past,¹ together with his references to "Civilizations" as the most "artificial" states of which a developed species of humanity is capable all point towards his abiding faith in the myth of the transcendence of time.² That he bought the Puritan myth lock, stock, and barrel is evidenced by the following statement: "Americans did not migrate from Europe. Individual men migrated and they only became an American race in the true sense of the word as a result of the effect of the landscape upon their natures,³ and more importantly, as a result of the

¹The romantic influence in Spengler appears again and again. He praises the peasant life. In Emile, Rousseau refers to agriculture as the "first calling of man," the most honest, the most useful, and consequently the most noble." He attacks the mechanistic metaphor (he calls machines the "subtlest inventions against nature"). Likewise, while both Goethe and Rousseau bestowed their highest praise upon farming as an occupation, they distrusted "the effect of mechanical and scientific devices on the human mind." In Emile we find: "All the laws of statics and hydrostatics are discovered by experiments that are rough enough. I do not wish to go into a laboratory of experimental physics for any of that: all that display of instruments and machines is displeasing to me. A scientific air kills knowledge." Goethe, in the same vein, voices the following attitude through Wilhelm Meister, who has just gazed through a telescope: "We shall not ban these glasses from the world any more than any machinery, but it is important for the observer of morals to find out and to know whence many things about which people complain have crept into humanity." See Hammer, Goethe and Rousseau, Chapter VI.

²Published at the end of World War I, the thrust of The Decline of the West was popularly accepted by the general public in Germany.

³The unity of nature theme was of major interest to Spengler, and had a profound influence on his thinking. In his final year at the University of Halle (the Pietist fortress), he prepared a doctoral dissertation on Heraclitus, the "Dark Philosopher." Spengler investigated Heraclitus' system of metaphysics, which was based on a belief in the fundamental unity of all nature.

spiritual upheavals of the American Revolution in the eighteenth century and the great Civil War ninety years later"¹ (which destroyed, we are lead to believe, the remaining vestiges of European civilization in America).

Spengler's Decline of the West is on the one hand a call for the "ruthless destruction of the ways of Civilization" and a return to a primitive (pre-Culture) past, and on the other an attempt to come to grips with the "gremendous cosmos of the modern economic order."² Die Wegweiser und Bahnbrecher (the pathfinders and roadbreakers being Germany's philosophers and the Hohenzollern rulers, followed by the romantics) from the end of the Thirty Years War up to the end of the nineteenth century (when Germany's internal space was exhausted) had defined Germany (Prussia previously) as a nation (confederation of states) progressing towards a state of nature (history as movement from complexity to simplicity). The crisis which the transformation of Germany from a rural to an urban-industrial nation precipitated posed a formidable challenge

¹ Oswald Spengler, from Twilight of the Evening Lands (New York, 1972), p. 97.

²Spengler's "Noble Savage" thesis was a gem: "innumerable animal species have been extinguished, or nearly so, like the bison; whole races of humanity have been brought almost to vanishing-point, like the American Indian and the Australian... All things organic are dying in the grip of organization. An artificial world is permeating and poisoning the natural. The Civilization itself has become a machine that does, or tries to do, everything in mechanical fashion. We think only in horse-power now; we cannot look at a waterfall without mentally turning it into electric power;". Spengler, Man and Technics, p. 94. (our emphases)

to the myth, yea, to Germany's national self-definition. And Germany's agonizing defeat in World War I nearly sealed the lid shut on it. The National Socialist German Workers' Party, however, came to the rescue with a program linking industrialism to progress, to a purge of cultural complexity, and to a restoration of simplicity.¹

In Chapter Four our closing analyses shall focus on the theory and practice of National Socialism, paying particularly close attention to the Weltanschauung behind that program linking industrialism to progress, to a purge of cultural complexity, and to a restoration of natural simplicity. The opening section of the chapter, which follows, provides an overview of developments in Germany following World War I, and takes a hard look at the nature of the myth of the stab in the back. That myth, as we shall see, was but another expressive form of the myth of the transcendence of time, and a critical component in National Socialism's successful ascent to power.

¹Spengler, by placing the machine in opposition to the tranquility and order located in the landscape, made it a symbol of artificiality, a product of industrialism springing from the soulless utilitarian spirit. The National Socialist program, which initially took a similar tact, ultimately incorporated industrialism as a natural force which could ensure Germany's preservation in a state of nature.

CHAPTER IV

NATIONAL SOCIALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Die Dolchstosslegende

Bring in your banners, you brave soldiers! You were not defeated by the enemy, but by the crumbling home front.¹

The unhappy conclusion of the war, the spiritual, moral and physical collapse of the front, together with the bankruptcy of the German government, led us straight into the arms of the Marxists. Weary as we were, we resigned ourselves to their leadership and permitted them to seize the reins of government.

It seemed to me unbearable to think that there had been men who acquiesced in Germany's alleged responsibility for the war. Could a nation that had become great through decades of steady efforts for peace, suddenly precipitate such a conflagration?²

On November 9, 1918, the German public was informed that its military forces had been defeated. The German people were psychologically almost totally unprepared for defeat, as neither they nor the government had been adequately informed of the worsening military situation. For four years they had been led to believe that their armies were invincible, and fighting a just cause with success assured. Inglorious defeat foisted a severe trauma on the entire nation. Few could believe defeat had come about without some sort of foul play, and the search for a scapegoat began in earnest.

¹Die Deutsche Zeitung, October 13, 1918, front page.

²German soldier returning from the front. Theodore Abel, The Nazi Movement (New York, 1965), p. 33.

The ease with which the myth of the stab in the back was accepted by a large segment of the general public in Germany seems incomprehensible at first glance. But when the nature of the myth is examined, its expeditious acceptance assumes an almost a priori status. The myth involved:

1. A generally negative attitude towards, and disavowal of, the existence of cultural complexity.
2. A simplification process in which all of Germany's current miseries and discontent were funneled into one tight conceptual package.

In substituting a mythical reality for the empirically perceivable reality of Post World War I Germany, the myth of the stab in the back was but another expressive form of the myth that Puritanism had spawned--the myth of the transcendence of time.

Following the Kaiser's abdication in November of 1918 (preceded by a mutiny in the navy and massive demonstrations by workers and soldiers on leave), the Social Democrats, led by Chancellor Scheidemann, proclaimed the birth of the German Republic:

The monarchical system has collapsed. The greater part of the garrison has joined our ranks. The Hohenzollerns have abdicated. Long live the German Republic. Ebert is forming a new government in which all socialist groups have joined hands. Let nothing disturb the triumph we have achieved. Maintain peace, order, and security.¹

¹See Theodore Abel, The Nazi Movement, p. 19

The socialist founders of the Republic (labelled the "November criminals" by Hitler) and a parade of successors were, however, unable to maintain that peace, order and security. Why? For one thing, the socialists were fraught with factionalism. The Social Democrats attempted to steer a moderate course; the Spartakists demanded a "Dictatorship of the Proletariat"; and a host of minor socialist parties offered a variety of political programs (The German term *Kühlhande* was popularized in the Weimar period. It connoted political horse trading, and with the proliferation of political parties in the Republic, it became a necessity). To this division were added the twin screws of the Versailles Treaty and the Ruhr struggle. The terms of Versailles dictated the reparations Germany must make to the "wronged" parties, the allies. The Ruhr struggle involved an occupation of Germany's leading coal-mining and steel producing region by French and Belgian troops to insure that the reparations would be rapidly forthcoming. These provided a highly volatile fuel for the myth of the stab in the back. But over-riding the factionalism, Versailles, and the Ruhr struggle was the failure of the Social Democrats to come to grips with the processes of rationalization, concentration, and bureaucratization which Spengler had assailed and which were undergirding German imperialism. The Social Democrats failed to recognize "that the central problem was the imperialism of German monopoly capitalism, becoming ever more urgent with the continued growth of the process of monopolization. The more monopoly grew, the more incompatible it became with

the political democracy."¹

The blame for Germany's post-war spiraling inflation, which by the end of 1923 had fleeced the industrious German middle class of their hard-earned savings, was set squarely on the shoulders of the allies and of the "Jewish Bolshevik conspirators" who had signed the Versailles treaty (because, according to the myth, of the burden of Versailles' reparations, which incidentally the Germans had largely ignored from 1921-1923).² In fact, the inflation developed directly from the German government's economic policy during World War I. Having assumed military success to be assured, the government had financed the war not by taxation measures, but by printing paper bills at will (expecting the defeated enemies to pick up the tab after the war). Upon defeat, with the tables turned, the economic woes which beset Germany, the discontent of the "civilized" Germans with the "Civilization" they had created, were blamed on "corrupting alien influences."³

¹Neumann, p. 14.

²Many of the revolutionary leaders in Germany following the war were Jews. These included Rosa Luxemburg, Klara Zetkin (Liebknecht's wife), Edgar Jaffe, Gustav Landauer, Ernst Toller, Eduard Bernstein, Otto Landsberg, Ruth Fischer, Oscar Cohn, and Kurt Eisner (whose short-lived Soviet style leadership in Munich fueled anti-Semitism considerably there and throughout Germany). Still, non-Jewish Germans continued to hold the highest government posts and make major policy decisions throughout the history of the Weimar Republic, and it was they, and not the "Jewish Bolshevik conspirators" who had agreed to the terms of the treaty (and ipso facto Germany's guilt for precipitating the conflagration).

The inflation ultimately turned out to be a cloud with a silver lining, for all that, and by 1924 when it ended, the government was rid of all internal debts. "Germany (in 1924) was as free from debt as she had been in 1871 (after the war with France in which she had exacted huge reparations from the French), that is to say she was in as favourable a financial position at the end of a lost war as she had been at the end of a victorious one".¹ Financially back on its feet, the Weimar Republic teetered along through the Golden Twenties until 1929, when a worldwide depression rocked the Fatherland and stirred old sentiments to a feverish pitch. National Socialism had gotten its foot in the door in the chaotic period following Germany's defeat and that early success was to lay the groundwork for its legal assumption of power in 1933.²

3 (from p. 105) private property, was one of the biggest ramps in history. But the right-wing propagandists saw to it that it was blamed not on those who were responsible for it, but on the Allies, the system of democracy, and the Jews." Sefton Delmer, Weimar Germany: Democracy on Trial (London, 1972), p. 74.

¹A. J. P. Taylor, from Delmer, p. 74.

²The party membership had grown from 64 members in January of 1920 to 55,787 members in November of 1923. It was dissolved in 1924 but revived a year later. See Theodore Abel, The Nazi Movement, Appendix II. If there was a single most important factor in the initial growth of the Nazi party, it was its support of the myth of the stab in the back. Hitler, who had served in a Bavarian infantry regiment during World War I, was hospitalized for war wounds when a Soviet style regime assumed power in Munich. The regime was deposed shortly thereafter by regiments of the Free Corps, but the Bolshevik-Jewish "conspiracy" theory drew considerable support for the National Socialists. "The Munich Soviet Republic left deep wounds; it created a trauma. Clearly it had been the dark design not of true Bavarians, but of foreigners, especially the Jews, who had stabbed the victorious German army in the back, who must be eliminated from the body politic." F. L. Carsten, The Rise of Fascism (Berkeley, 1969), p. 92.

To integrate a fractionalized alienated people into something resembling a political whole; to restore a sense of community to a nation of individuals atomized by the effects of industrialization, National Socialism proposed the establishment in Germany of a Volksgemeinschaft: a national community modeled after the family. It was to be a community founded on natural laws, and to provide an answer to the dilemma of progress with a program:

1. Condemning cultural complexity and its "alien" carriers.

2. Calling for a revival of cultural primitivism.¹

Towards this end (giving the myth of the stab in the back full play from the time of its first mass meeting in the Hofbrauhaus), National Socialism posed the following antitheses:

1. The soul versus intellectualism.

2. The healthy German peasantry versus the diseased, alien urbanites.

3. Those rooted in the soil, in nature, versus those mired in the "Civilization" of the cities.

4. The decent, meaningful work of the individual versus the factory labor of the masses.²

¹See pages 21-23 of the appendix for the twenty five points of the original National Socialist program announced on February 25, 1920 in the Hofbrauhaus in Munich.

²These antitheses appear over and over again in National Socialist literature. Hitler stated them most explicitly in the section on the noble peasantry in Mein Kampf. See also pages 151, 255, 263-264, 642-643, and page 655 of Mein Kampf. They were integrated into the party program presented at the Hofbrauhaus. That program appears in the publication National Socialism by Raymond E. Murphy, published by the United States

The archetypal representative of the former characteristics was the German romantic hero who had transcended the instabilities of history and achieved a harmonious existence with nature, freed from the fetters of civilization (see George Grosz' pen and ink drawing of "Hitler, the Savior," portraying Hitler as the Noble Savage reincarnate, on page twenty four of the appendix). The archetypal representative of the latter characteristics was the Bolshevist-Jew, the embodiment of the modern city person¹ and international mass civilization: rootless and remote from the German soil.² (German romantic literature abounds with descriptions of ugly, money-clenching Jews foreclosing the farm mortgages of and uprooting pure Aryan-type heroes from their native environs.)

Munich, in 1920, was the ideal Geburtsort for the National

2 (from p. 107) Department of State in 1943. See also Ernst Rudolf Huber's Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich published in 1939, particularly the section on "The Party."

¹In 1933, the year Hitler came to power, 32% of the Jews in Germany lived in Berlin. The remainder lived in Frankfurt and other large German cities, so they were an easy target for anti-urban sentiments. See Adolf Leschnitzer, The Magic Background of Modern Anti-Semitism (New York, 1956), p. 18.

²The German-Jewish philosopher, Lessing, whom the Nazis murdered in 1933, described the thrust of anti-Semitism in this manner: "And so I believe that, if there ever was a sound instinct behind the persecution of the Jews, it was only this instinctive impulse of the blood against the city and its business deals...The Jew is the mind which has left nature... the German people perceive in the "Jew" the sinister genius of abstraction, estranged from nature, in whom the gay colors and pleasing forms expire, and the peoples' souls and landscapes die: the myths, images, native costumes, festivals, and old customs." Theodor Lessing, Deutschland und seine Juden (Prague, 1933), pp. 11-12. (our emphases)

Socialist program, as it had been the scene less than a year earlier of Eisner's attempt to establish a Soviet-type state. The Jews were a visible enemy here, and Hitler's references to Bolshevism as the "Jewish disease" (National Socialist propaganda, capitalizing on the fears of the moneyed classes concerning the Red menace, repeatedly pointed out the Jews involved in the Russian Revolution--Kamenev, Litvinov, Radek, Trotzky--though it avoided mention of such critical figures as Molotov, Lenin, and Stalin, who were not Jews. In December of 1920, when the National Socialists secured their own newspaper, the Volkische Beobachter, the attack on these diseased aliens began in earnest, and intensified in 1923 when Rosenberg took over as editor of the paper) gained widespread appeal as they capitalized on the internationalist nature of Bolshevism and the internationalist stereotype of the Jewish entrepreneur (the Jew as an urbanite, Bolshevism as an urban phenomenon associated with the masses). The irony in this association hardly deserves further explanation, for "to the true proletarian, the Jew was primarily the bourgeois, an agent of the economic sphere of the middleman..., the executor of capitalist tendencies who 'presents the bill!'"¹ Nevertheless, the image of the Jew as an international, a non-German alien, an urban dweller, coupled with Jewish forays into radical left-wing politics, provided a handy scapegoat formula for dealing with the alienation-run-rampant in modern German

¹Theodor Adorno, The Authoritarian Personality (New York, 1950), p. 638.

society.¹ The stabbers, according to National Socialist propaganda, the corruptors of the virtuous German heritage, those responsible for the social problems encountered in Germany's age of materialism, nay for the materialism itself, were not Germany's captains of industry who had worked hand in hand with the Kaiser's government to secure new markets for, and a monopolistic stranglehold on, a burgeoning capitalist economy, but were "Jews and their associates,...working tirelessly and participating in the extreme radical left to bring about the destruction and dissolution² of that to which us Germans has until now encompassed our humanity and our sacred things."³ National Socialism, while scapegoating the Jews for the crisis engineered by Germany's industrial revolution, revived the Puritan belief in a chosen few (the elect), with the myth of the Master Race, supermen who could and would transcend the most complex of historical situations and achieve organic

¹The Dolchstosslegende, the myth of the stab in the back, held that the Bolshevist-Jewish traitors had undercut Germany's powerful position in military and economic affairs among western nations. Thus the traitors were blamed on the one hand for Germany's loss of the world status (meaning military-industrial clout) and on the other hand for the materialistic civilization's appearance in the first place.

²The term Zersetzung, meaning decay or decomposition, became popular (Hitler employed it in Mein Kampf) as the conviction of the German people spread that they had been victimized by outside nations who were greedy and envious of Germany's expanding prosperity, and victimized internally by traitors. To these traitors, the Jews, was applied the term Zersetzung, implying that they were corrupt, decadent influences in German society.

³Cornelia Bernig, Vom "Abstammerungsnachivers" zum Zuchtwart" (Berlin, 1964), p. 213.

harmony with nature.¹ One vexing problem remained, nonetheless--there were no new frontiers where these supermen could flourish. It was a small problem for a man with grand designs. In the next section, we'll explore the National Socialist plan designed to enable the German people to transcend the reality of complex society as the inevitable environment for imperfect man, and thus escape, through the secular of new frontiers, the problems associated with the creation of a modern industrial society.

¹National Socialism has been referred to by a number of scholars as a revolt against the twentieth century; a revolt against modernity; an aberration arising from mystical elements in German romanticism coming to fruition after lurking beneath the surface of public affairs for over a century. In terms of its ideal aspects we have to agree with the first two observations, but the latter we take issue with. The success of National Socialism depended not on some magical mystery tour which it conjured for the German people, as Hitler himself made plain: "What ranks first in our program is not some mysterious sensing but a clear understanding...It would be a misfortune if, as a result of the creeping in of mystical elements, our Movement or the government were to give unclear orders. And it would be enough if the lack of clarity were in the wording. It can even be dangerous to give instructions for a so-called Kultstätte (cult sanctuary) because this will imply the necessity of later on inventing so-called ritual games and ritual acts. Our sole cult is devotion to that which is based on nature, and this implies that which is God's wish." (our emphases) See Max Domarus, Hitler's Reden und Proklamationen, 1932-1945 (Munich, 1965), p. 894.

Lebensraum: Von Den Bergen Zu Den Hügeln.¹

The threat that the appearance of such "artificial" forms of civilization as giant corporations, urban masses, and large-scale cities posed to Germany's romantic self-definition;² to her unity with nature, necessitated a purge of no small scale if the nation was to survive (in light of the myth of the transcendence of time). In the midst of a labyrinth of problems arising in conjunction with Germany's development into a modern industrial nation, National Socialism promised restoration of a past where natural laws reigned supreme. "Hitler found his main support among those who felt threatened...his first allies were the farmers, deeply in debt and terrified of the impact of the modern capitalist and commercial state..."³ Hitler's tactics and strategy to mobilize included opposition to industrialization and the advance of technology as well as anti-capitalism."⁴ In fact, National Socialism summoned the most highly sophisticated industrial technology yet to scour the earth. However, this industrial might was utilized in an

¹From the mountains to the prairies, this is a line from a song in Goethe's Wahlverwandtschaften, emphasizing the virtues of an active life in the countryside. National Socialism emphasized the necessity of Lebensraum, living space, to ensure the survival of Germans via nature's regenerative powers.

²"No complexity, no corruption, would be allowed to creep into the purified and simplified political life of the people" Noble on Rousseau's political theory, Historians, p. 10

³See Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements (New York, 1951), the section on his Schleswig-Holstein studies.

⁴Geoffrey Barraclough, "The Social Dimensions of Crisis," from Social Research (Summer, 1972), Vol. 39, No. 2, p. 346.

attempt through outward expansion to recreate a pristine past, a step deemed vital to the survival of the nation (recall Spengler's prophecy). Writing from the confines of Landsberg am Lech where he was imprisoned for his participation in the abortive putsch of November 1923, Hitler outlined his analysis of the circumstances leading up to Germany's current malaise:

In the nineteenth century our cities began more and more to lose the character of cultural sites and to descend to the level of mere human settlements. The small attachment of our present big-city proletariat for the town they live in is the consequence of the fact that it is only the individual's accidental local stopping place, and nothing more. This is partly connected with the frequent change of residence caused by social conditions, which do not give a man time to form a closer bond with the city, and another cause is to be found in the general cultural insignificance and poverty of our present-day cities per se.

At the time of the wars of liberation, the German cities were not only small in number, but also modest as to size...When Munich numbered sixty thousand souls, it was already on its way to becoming one of the first German art centers; today nearly every factory town has reached this number, if not many times surpassed it, yet some cannot lay claim to the slightest real values. Masses of apartments and tenements, and nothing more. How, in view of such emptiness, any special bond could be expected to arise with such a town must remain a mystery...even the really big cities...with the mounting increase in the population...seem more and more standardized and give entirely the same picture as the poor little factory towns.

And then, in the context of his digression on foreign policy, he outlined his plan for the resolution of that malaise:

The foreign policy of the volkish state must safeguard the existence on this planet of the race embodied in the state, by creating a healthy, viable natural relation between the nation's population and growth on the one hand and the quantity and quality of its soil on the other hand. Only an adequately large space on this earth assures a nation of freedom of existence..Our task, the mission of the National Socialist movement, is to bring our own people to such political insight that they will not see their goal for the future in the breath-taking sensation of a new

Alexander's conquest, but in the industrious work of the German plow, to which the sword need only give soil.¹

The belief that a people could step out of time into space as spaciousness, initiated by the Puritans and given renewed vigor by romanticism, reared its historyless head once again in the phenomenon of National Socialism.

The advocacy of Lebensraum (living space, embodying the illusion we mentioned earlier that the German people could and would transcend the reality of complex society as the inevitable environment for imperfect man) which developed (in terms of National Socialist theory) from Hitler's notion of an "adequately large space" into the primary goal of National Socialism, provides the key to recognizing National Socialism as an expression of the German Protestant Weltanschauung. It brought the champions of progress and the proponents of primitivism into the Nazi fold by incorporating romantic ideals with some very real interests.

National Socialism and Weber's Theory of Action

Now, Max Weber's general perspective on the nature of social action holds that, first, the impulse to social action is given by real interests (i.e. political and economic interests); and that, second, ideal interests lend wings to these real interests, give them a spiritual meaning, and serve to justify them. We shall use this perspective, in our final

¹Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston, 1971), pp. 263-264 and pp. 642-643, p. 655. (our emphases)

arguments, to analyze the program of National Socialism (in practice); the Weltanschauung of which it was an expression; and their convergence in the modern total state, the Third Reich.

Without discounting for a moment the importance of Hitler's charismatic leadership¹ and the superior organizational and propagandizing techniques of the National Socialists² (in relation to the leadership and conceptual machineries of the socialists, communists, and other groups attempting to thrust their interpretations of reality on the German people after World War I), the successful ascent of National Socialism to power in 1933 reflected in good measure the pervasive appeal of the German Protestant Weltanschauung, and its resolution, vis a vis the notion of Lebensraum, of the tensions between romanticism, rationalism, and industrialism.

In Chapter One we stated that romanticism provided the sanctifying principles (ideal interests) for Germany's attempt (via the phenomenon of National Socialism) to transcend the harsh realities of modern German society. The youth movement (Wandervogel), which began at the turn of the century as a romantic rebellion against industrialization, mechanization, urbanization, and the rigidity of rational thought, against

¹See Max Weber's remarks on the "Routinization of Charisma," pp. 363-386 of The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, for some keen insights on the importance and evolution of charismatic authority.

²Abel discusses the National Socialist's propaganda techniques on p. 61 of The Nazi Movement. Dietrich Orlow's The History of the Nazi Party covers Nazi propaganda comprehensively (Reichspropaganda Leitung) from 1919-1933.

modern mass civilization in toto,¹ found a cause célèbre in National Socialism. The anti-urban sentiments, and the idealized view of rural existence that Hitler proffered in his vision of the volkish state² held a strong appeal to youth who felt alienated from what they considered a "decadent civilization." The veneration of the peasantry in National Socialist ideology as the source of the German nation's renewal³ in tandem with a condemnation of giant corporations⁴ as evidence of a creeping cultural complexity, captured the fancy of a youth that had taken Spengler's dire forecast to heart.⁵ Echoing Spengler's call for a restoration of Geist,

¹Werner Sombart's Händler und Helden (Merchants and Heroes) reflects the revolt against the cosmos of the modern economic order and provides some interesting contrasts between the "romantic hero" and the "modern entrepreneur."

²The romantic aims of the early Wandervögel were not politically motivated, but rather emphasized a need to identify with the German folk and the landscape--Mein Kampf teems with references to the peasant as the representative or embodiment of the finest virtues of Germanness.

³National Socialist publications frequently referred to peasants as "trees of life."

⁴"A grave symptom of economic decay was the slow disappearance of individual ownership and the gradual transfer of the entire economy into the ownership of corporations." Mein Kampf, p. 256.

⁵For example,..."The maintenance of a healthy peasantry as a foundation of the entire nation can never be valued highly enough...Industry and commerce are to withdraw from their unhealthy leading position."...and

"The first result (of Germany's industrial revolution) of the gravest significance was...the weakening of the peasant class. To the same extent to which that class declined, the masses of the proletariat in the big cities steadily increased, until finally the equilibrium was lost entirely." See Mein Kampf, pp. 151 and 255. (our emphases)

and Neitzsche's anti-Socratic spirit, Reich youth leader Baldur von Schirach gave this inspirational speech to the German youth:

We interpret the National Socialist Revolution as the rising of German feelings against the arrogance of cold intellect. Its victory signifies the triumph of soul over everything that is only mechanic... Faith has overcome doubt. It rules the lesser forces that dared to deny it. The motto of our lives must be Adolf Hitler's most profound saying: 'Woe to the one who has no faith'.¹

The transformation of Germany's youth from an amalgam of alienated flower children into a cohesive, goal-oriented, pro-German, anti-Semitic political force under National Socialism was facilitated by the myth of the stab in the back, and reflected their faith that the National Socialist program was their dream come true.² Between the first and second world wars there were very few youths who supported the Weimar Republic, and most, in their search for a utopia which was part and parcel of the German Protestant Weltanschauung (recall Mosse's statement concerning the preconception of

¹Hermann Huss and Andreas Schröder, (eds.), Antisemitismus--Zur Pathologie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Frankfurt, 1965), p. 103. (our emphases)

²That the concept of the volkish state appealed to German youth imbued with the romantic spirit revealed itself in the increasing voter support which the National Socialists garnered from the ranks of the young, and the youthful composition of the party's rank and file and leadership. In 1933, the average age of Hitler's cabinet members was 40. The Reich youth leaders averaged 26 years of age. Thirty seven percent of the party members were under 30 years of age; sixty five percent were under forty years of age. Only fifteen percent were over 50 years old. See Karl Deitrich Bracher, Die deutsche Diktatur (New York, 1970), p. 299.

the peasant ideal and primitivism) were in open revolt against this alien political structure which had been foisted upon the German people. In National Socialism they found a program designed to purge the nation of alien influences and cultural complexity, and restore the natural simplicity which a large proportion of the youth and many of their elders yearned for (see page 25 of the appendix for a statistical compilation of Nazi voter support in rural areas). The fallacy that the German nation could exist outside of the rhythms of historical change held no mean influence in rural Protestant areas of Germany, as evidenced by Loomis and Beegle's study of Nazi voter support:

While the growth of the Nazi Party was checked in the cities by a firm block of Social Democratic and Communist labor votes, Nazism continued to grow in many rural Protestant communities until practically all eligible persons voted the Nazi ticket...In farmers' movements of both the United States and pre-Hitler Germany, the tiller of the soil was exalted as the foundation, "der erste Stand" or "back bone" of society...The small landowners hate and fear of communism, their prejudices against labor and business groups, and their desire for a place in the scheme of things was capitalized on by the Nazis,...who were in turn firmly supported by the Protestant, middle-class rural element.¹

The romantic ideals of the volkish state, which National Socialism posed against the narrow, pragmatic, materialistic, "utilitarian spirit" which had ushered Germany into the modern age (and which was labelled the Jewish, not the Prussian

¹Charles Loomis and J. Allan Beegle, "The Spread of German Nazism in Rural Areas," from the American Sociological Review, Vol. II: 1946, pp. 724-734. (our emphases)

ethos),¹ offered an escape for a beleaguered people into a supposedly less complex world where men would not have to face the myriad difficulties of modern technological society. To achieve this ideal state, National Socialism set four broad goals:

1. To create a single people.
2. To secure to this people through work its daily bread.
3. Within this people to raise a new and higher social community.
4. To protect this people and its work and to restore to it freedom, honor, and power.²

In proposing these goals, National Socialism sought to enlist the support of the German people to destroy the parasitical growth of historical complexity on the body politic,³ and

¹Opening the Party Congress at Nuremberg in September of 1938, Hitler set the party's task as follows: "Its task was to cleanse from that influence the life of the German people, our race and culture [the influence being the Jews] ...It had to purge Germany of all those parasites for whom the need of their Fatherland and people served as a source of personal enrichment. It had to recognize the eternal values of blood and soil, and to raise the respect paid to those values until they became the supreme laws of our life. It had to begin the struggle against the enemy who threatened to destroy our people--the international Jewish world-enemy"! From the Speeches of Adolf Hitler, by N. H. Baynes (New York, 1969), p. 121.

²Adolf Hitler, from Baynes, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, p. 120.

³Merton describes the painting of the villain as follows: "When the institutional system is regarded as the barrier to the satisfaction of legitimized goals [Weimar], the stage is set for rebellion...To pass into organized political action, allegiance must not only be withdrawn from the prevailing social structure but must be transferred to new groups possessed .

consequently reaffirm German history as progress from institutional and traditional complexity toward natural simplicity.¹ In "realizing" them, National Socialism scapegoated the Jewish-Bolshevist conspirators as the bearers of that complexity² (a chameleon-like attack on modernity) and forged a coalition of nationalistic groups to ensure the Fatherland's return to nature.

The manner in which National Socialism successfully defused

3 (from p. 119) of a new myth. The dual function of the myth is to locate the source of large-scale frustrations in the social structure and to portray an alternative structure which would not give rise to frustration of the deserving." Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York, 1968), p. 21.

¹Jefferson's vision for the United States was similar in many respects to that offered by National Socialism, though it was recorded over a century earlier. In it Jefferson castigates the corrupting influence of cities and extolls the virtues of those who labor in the earth as God's chosen people: "The mobs of great cities add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human body. It is the manners and spirit of a people which preserve a republic in vigour. A degeneracy in these is a canker which soon eats to the heart of its laws and constitution..."

Generally speaking, the proportion which the aggregate of the other classes of citizens bears in any state to that of its husbandmen is the proportion of its unsound to its healthy parts, and is a good-enough barometer whereby to measure its degree of corruption." The Adams-Jefferson Letters, edited by Lester Cappon (Chapel Hill, 1959), Vol. II, p. 335.

²"The modern theater, atonal music, expressionism in painting and literature, functional architecture, all these seemed to constitute a threat to the conservatives whose cultural outlook was basically rural, and who thus came to identify the city and its culture, its economy and its politics, with the Jew." Franz Neumann, Behemoth, p. 123.

the threat Socialism (labelled Bolshevism by the Nazis to shed maximum light on its "alien character") posed to monopoly capitalism and imperialist expansion (and in the process bested its strongest rival) involved, as we suggested earlier, identifying it with urban massified civilization. Previous efforts to undercut Socialism had failed:

For half a century or more, the history of modern Germany pivoted around one central issue: imperialist expansion through war.¹ With the appearance of socialism as an industrial and political movement threatening the established position of industrial, financial, and agricultural wealth, fear of this challenge to imperialism dominated the internal policy of the empire. Bismarck tried to annihilate the socialist movement, partly by enticement and even more by a series of enactments outlawing the Social Democratic party and trade unions (1878-1890). He failed. Social Democracy emerged from this struggle stronger than ever. Both Wilhelm I and Wilhelm II then sought to undermine the influence of the socialists among the German workers² by introducing various social reforms--and also failed.³

This tact proved successful. And as frosting on the cake, after grouping the Bolsheviks in the urban-decay category,⁴ National

¹As did the history of the U. S., Great Britain, and France following their industrial revolutions (i.e. the search for colonial frontiers where resources and markets for surpluses might be obtained).

²See the section on "The Social Democratic Party" and "Trade Unions" in Chapter Seven of Hajo Holborn's History of Modern Germany.

³Neumann, Behemoth, p. 3.

⁴In Chapter IV of Mein Kampf, "Personality and the Conception of the Folkish State," Hitler unseams Marxism from belly to jowls: "The folkish philosophy is basically distinguished from the Marxist philosophy by the fact that it not only recognizes the value of race, but with it the importance of personality... If the social program of the movement consisted only in pushing

Socialism proposed a political state which appealed not only to those whose isolation and alienation had been heightened by the transition to an industrial society,¹ but also to the advocates of industrialism as well. Here is where the notion of Lebensraum assumed critical importance. Having provided a spiritual dimension attractive to the proponents of primitivism, it suited, as it was incorporated into the political framework of the modern total state, the material interests of the military-industrial-bureaucratic machine (primarily parties of the right, including the Conservatives, National Liberals, and Anti-Semites, who represented the nobility and wealthy bourgeois industrialists as well as the Prussian civil service and the Protestant church, and in the pre-Weimar period, capitalism and the Kaiser's Weltpolitik).²

4 (from p. 121) aside the personality and replacing it by the masses, National Socialism would be corroded by the poison of Marxism, as is the case with our bourgeois parties. The folkish state must care for the welfare of its citizens by recognizing in all and everything the importance of the value of personality, thus in all fields preparing the way for that highest measure of productive performance which grants to the individual the highest measure of participation." pp. 448-449.

¹Joseph Gusfield's article, "Mass Society and Extremist Politics," *ASR*, Vol. 27: 1962, pp. 19-30, takes issue with the mass politics theorists (Mannheim, Arendt, Kornhauser, Nisbet, and Selznick) who contend that extremist movements are the consequence of weakening attachments to political institutions and persons resulting from the breakdown in the functioning of primary and secondary associations in mass societies. His observations on the "natural harmony of interests" are particularly insightful.

²This coalition, in Neumann's opinion (which we share), regarded the totalitarian doctrine of state as comparable to the monarchical system which existed prior to the founding of the Weimar Republic (and which supported imperialism and colonialism as corrolaries of Weltpolitik). Carl Schmitt (a prominent Nazi constitutional lawyer) made it (the modern total state) all the

Lebensraum, holding out the promise of mobility for the individual who was threatened by the appearance of internal complexity (neither a Hamburg nor a Frankfurt were conducive to the realization of the romantic dream to transcend the restraints of society and the limitations of human nature to achieve total earthly fulfillment) provided a spiritual shroud sanctioning the secular (conquest) of new frontiers. And henceforth, continued economic and technological development, via a wealth of new natural resources and expanded markets for the distribution of surplus goods, would be ensured. An Edenic garden for the supermen to flourish in; and unlimited commercial horizons for the industrial entrepreneurs, were the promised fruits.

The final barrier to National Socialism's assumption of power and the creation of the modern total state was the Weimar Republic itself. And that barrier, in the midst of a worldwide depression, came tumbling down. The following section covers the collapse of Weimar and National Socialism's ascent to power.

2 (from p. 122) more appealing with his policy which advocated the need for Germany to establish a powerful centralized state, while leaving economic activities unrestricted (similar to Pareto's espousal of political authoritarianism concurrently with economic liberalism). See "A Strong State and Sound Economics" in Der Begriff des Politischen, Munich, 1932.

The Collapse Of The Weimar Republic:
The Triumph Of National Socialism.

The reduction in popular discontent following the withdrawal of the French and Belgian troops from the Ruhr (the German government had provided large sums of money to support the Ruhr's six million inhabitants who struck their own industries in protest against the occupation) together with the financial relief forthcoming as a result of the Dawes Plan¹ brought a measure of political and economic stability to Germany from 1924-1928. German foreign relations, under Gustav Stresemann's skillful management, improved markedly.² Despite this semblance of order, however, neither the Social Democrats nor the Communists were able to capture a segment of the population that was becoming increasingly disenchanted and active in its opposition to the "alien" influences symbolized by the Weimar Republic.³ In May of 1928, nonetheless, the combined

¹For an explanation of the terms of this plan, see Chapter XI, "The False Recovery and the Era of Illusions," in René Albrecht-Carrie's A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna (New York, 1958), pp. 385-400.

²His postwar conciliatory policy included sponsorship of the Dawes Plan; the negotiation of a mutual security pact with France--Locarno--; adoption of the Young Plan; and Germany's admission to the League of Nations as a full-fledged member. See Carrie, pp. 417-447.

³David Bidney's article, "Myth Symbolism and Truth," provides an excellent description of the process whereby a myth serves to formalize emotions (in this case the myth of the stab in the back): "Mythical symbolism leads to an objectification of feelings; myth objectifies and organizes human hopes and fears and metamorphosizes them into persistent and durable works" (Voila, National Socialism as an expression of the myth of the transcendence of time). From Myth, A Symposium, Thomas A. Seboek (ed.) (London, 1958), p. 14.

votes of the labor parties reached 40.4% of the total votes cast.¹ It was, so to speak, the calm before the storm. By the end of 1928, with the rumblings of a worldwide economic depression being felt in the Fatherland, popular agitation stirred anew. The winter of 1928-1929 witnessed unemployment climb to 2.6 million, with many more only partially employed.² At the same time, the influx of American capital which had been propping up the German economy was completely curtailed. The Bruning government's attempts at deflationary measures thumped the middle class (whose savings had been wiped out in the post World War I inflationary period) severely. The National Socialists, who had lost over a million votes in the 1928 elections, made great gains in the September 1930 elections (an increase from 800,000 to 6,400,000 votes). By July of 1932, nearly six million Germans were unemployed:

The economic distress reached a point of extreme

¹See the index of voting statistics for that election on page 26 of the appendix.

²The increase in unemployment, with seasonal fluctuations, from .5 million in the summer of 1927 to 6 million in January of 1932, only exacerbated the wealth of negative feelings surrounding the Weimar Republic. As a result of the introduction of modern machines, the wage differences between skilled and unskilled workers declined in the 20's. "The real income of the individual even in the best years, 1928-29, remained 6% less than the prewar income; in 1931 almost 25%; and in 1932 almost 30%." Stock in the Dolchstosslegende, on the other hand, soured. Holborn, pp. 638-639.

severity...The psychological crisis was accentuated by the country's memory of defeat and by the record of failure and futility of the Weimar Republic. In the July-1932 election, there was a substantial increase in the number of votes cast, and the great majority of the young men voting for the first time cast their votes for the Nazis...Nearly all the voters who had previously deserted the old parties to join the dozens of small new ones now poured into the Nazi reservoir, both from the nationalistic right and from the republican middle.¹

The Nazis received nearly fourteen million votes, 37.3% of the total cast.²

The attractiveness of "soil and territory" as the avowed goal of Nazi foreign policy (Lebensraum),³ in contrast to the appeasement strategies of the Weimar governments, proved decisive in the elections the following year which gave the National Socialists 43.9% of the total vote and Hitler the chancellorship of Germany. First and foremost, Weimar was the stepchild of the victorious allies. Secondly, it had been supported throughout its brief tenure by parties tinged with "internationalist" traits. That the depression tolled the

¹Sydney L. W. Mellen, "The German People and the Postwar World," from The American Political Science Review (August, 1943), Vol. 37, No. 4, p. 620.

²See the index on page 27 of the appendix.

³The scheme (widely publicized) which Hitler at this time had a battery of theoreticians working on involved a plan to create a new European society via implementation of the policy of Lebensraum. This "National Socialist idea" presupposed a self-contained and inviolate "Europe for Europeans," and was analogous to the Monroe Doctrine of the Americas. It was to be based politically on German hegemony and economically on the quasi-colonial relationship of German industry and its satellites' agriculture and raw materials. See Lothar Gruchmann's Nationalsozialistische Grossraumordnung (Stuttgart, 1962) and Eric Voegelin's "Some Problems of German Hegemony," from the Journal of Politics (May, 1941), Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 154-155 and 162-165.

death knell of democracy in Germany is perhaps a misconception. A more accurate description, we suggest, is that the depression facilitated the triumph of German nationalism and the creation of the modern total state. As the economic, social, and moral hardships besetting Germany increased, the sentiments associated with the Dolchstosslegende intensified.¹ And the search for a leader and a program that could provide a better way of life for the German people found an attractive candidate in Hitler, and a soup to nuts program in National Socialism. Here was a man of the people who shared their pride and prejudices (and was a decorated war hero to boot); who supported a program built on the concept of the people (the Volk), out of which a spiritual and political unity, the modern total state, would arise. "The Führer-Reich of the German people was founded on the recognition that the true will of the people cannot be disclosed through parliamentary votes (particularly when there

¹As Abel's interviews attest. A petty tradesman states: "In 1926 I had to give up the shop, and see my stock and goods sold for a pittance, because of my creditors' Jewish partners... On the one hand the policies of the Red Government, particularly the inflation and the taxes, deprived me of all means of livelihood, while on the other hand, we were being ruled by a gang of exploiters ready to stoop to any means to seize the starvation wages of our suffering, duped comrades." A white collar worker notes: "People foreign to our land and race made up the government; the middle class was ruined through the scarcity of food and the depreciation of money; scoundrels and parasites cheated and robbed us and in an incredibly brief time ruined undertakings it had taken a whole people centuries to build." An elderly clerk stated: "Despite my lifelong conscientious service at the Reichsbank, I found myself, as a result of the famous order of retrenchment, out on the street. If I lacked confidence in the government before this, I now felt an honest hatred for the system." Abel, pp. 124-126. (emphases added)

were more parties than Hectate had pups) and plebiscites (a reasonably accurate evaluation of Germany's post World War I political experience), but that the will of the people in its pure and uncorrupted form can only be expressed through the Fuhrer, ...the bearer of the collective will of the people."¹ Certainly the national interests of the German people would be better served by such a state which promised to place community interests over and above private interests,² and which offered a solution (via Lebensraum) to the rural-urban crisis.

To the youth of Germany, the Mittelstand, and a host of nationalist and patriotic groups, the election of the National Socialists and Hitler's assumption of power symbolized the downfall of the forces responsible for the Fatherland's ignominious defeat in World War I, and a triumph of those forces dedicated to natural simplicity over those who had moved the nation into the tumultuous throes of cultural complexity.³ By scapegoating

¹Ernst Rudolf Huber, The Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich, a passage on the "Fuhrer principle," from the U. S. State Department Compilations on National Socialism, 1939.

²The resemblance of the Fuhrer principle to Rousseau's conception of the general will is worth noting. "It follows from what precedes that the general will is always right and always tends to the public advantage; but it does not follow that the resolutions of the people have always the same rectitude. Men always desire their own good, but do not always discern it; the people are never corrupted, though often deceived, and it is only then that they seem to will what is evil." Rousseau, The Social Contract, Introduction.

³Adding a shroud of credibility to the scapegoating of the Jews, in addition to their predominance in urban areas, was their presence in commercial affairs. Discrimination against the Jews in Germany (and throughout Europe) dated back to the Middle Ages, when they took the rap for a variety of occurrences ranging from natural disasters to the poisoning of wells. This discrimination had blocked their entrance into many occupations, but had left open to them commercial occupations, which the Catholic Church looked negatively upon.

the Jewish-Bolshevist conspirators as the conniving cultural creators of that complexity, true Germans were absolved of any burden of guilt for the military defeat, and concurrently any responsibility for the appearance of phenomena associated with Germany's transition from a primarily rural to an urban-industrial nation (sprawling urban centers; the urban masses; class inequities and antagonisms; the Red menace; inflation and the Depression; and sectional hostilities). To combat the corrupting influence of the Jews, who had led Germany from the primrose path, who were motivated by material greed and by a parasitical desire to pollute the pure blood of the noble Aryans and rape the German soil with their decadent urban Civilization, National Socialism promised (and delivered henceforth) a program of racial purification (extolling the myth of the Master Race)¹ and provided, via Lebensraum, a justification for imperialistic expansion (thus linking industrialism to progress; a purge of complexity, and a restoration of natural simplicity).²

The explanation of the phenomenon of National Socialism

¹"What then are the specifically Jewish aims? To spread their invisible State as a supreme tyranny over all other States in the whole world. The Jew is therefore a disintegrator of peoples...in economics he dominates peoples when he subjugates them politically and morally...In politics he propagates the doctrines of Marxism...Ethically the Jew destroys the peoples both in religion and in morals." Adolf Hitler, from Baynes, p. 59.

²Heinrich Himmler, whose romantic utterances had a particularly strong appeal to the alienated, angry young men of Weimar, assessed the success of his party and the appeal of its program as an expression of the conviction of the German people that the active German farmer was a superior individual and that the city and all it represented was a "moral swamp."

as a victory of capital over labor, with the Third Reich, the modern total state, symbolizing the inevitable consequences of capitalist development, ignores completely the spiritual dimension of that phenomenon. On the other hand, the explanation that National Socialism was a manifestation of the eccentricities of the German character and history that Hitler mystically capitalized upon ignores the material dimension of that phenomenon. The failure of the Marxist revolution in Germany, where the working classes were in 1914 and 1933 the best organized, the best educated, and the strongest in terms of political clout in comparison with those of other nations in the west, highlights the failure of the Marxists to take into account that spiritual dimension. The aberrationists, conversely, while discerning a relationship between romanticism and National Socialism, failed to pick up on the relationship between romanticism and the development of modern western civilization, and give short shrift to the material developments underlaying Germany's modern economic order. National Socialism suited the real and ideal interests of a larger segment of the German population precisely because it satisfied:

1. The proponents of primitivism, in keeping alive the feeling of being indeterminant and unconditioned.
2. The champions of progress for whom the modern total state provided an ideal environment for

monopoly capitalism.¹

Summarizing this and the previous section, we have outlined and discussed four key notions critical to recognizing National Socialism as an expression of the German Protestant Weltanschauung; a phenomenon consistent with our western tradition in its material and ideal aspects:

1. The myth of the stab in the back.
2. The myth of the Master Race.
3. The National Socialist program.
4. The notion of Lebensraum.

In the two sections that follow, we shall examine the application of these notions in the practice of National Socialism and in the reality of the modern total state.

¹That a modern total state was satisfactory to, and in harmony with, the political traditions of the west Neumann concedes: "The totalitarian doctrine of the state satisfied the various traditional partisans of German reaction: university professors, bureaucrats, army officers, and big industrialists. It was also acceptable to the western world in general. For, any political theory in which the state is central and dominant and entrusted with the guardianship of universal interests is in line with the tradition of western civilization, no matter how liberal that tradition may be. The western tradition does not regard the state as an oppressive machinery opposed to the rights of man, but as an entity watching over the interests of the whole and guarding those interests against infringement by particular groups." Neumann, Behemoth, p. 50. (emphases added)

Progress Reaffirmed

The whole effort of nature is to get rid of such (the unfit), to clear the world of them, and make room for better. Nature is as insistent upon fitness of mental character as she is upon physical character. He who loses his life because of his stupidity, vice, or idleness is in the same class as the victims of weak viscera or malformed limbs. If they are not sufficiently complete to live, they die, and it is best that they should die.¹...the law of self-preservation, as well as that of the survival of the fittest, is urging our people on in a path which is undoubtably a departure from the policy of the past, but which is inevitably marked out by the new conditions and requirements of the present.²

The ultimate development of the ideal man is logically certain--as certain as any conclusion in which we place the most implicit faith; for instance that all men will die...Progress, therefore, is not an accident, but a necessity. Instead of civilization being artificial, it is part of nature; all of a piece with the development of the embryo or the unfolding of a flower.³

I preach to you then, my countrymen, that our country calls not for the life of ease but for the life of strenuous endeavor. The twentieth century looms before us big with the fate of many nations. If we stand idly by, if we seek merely swollen slothful ease and ignoble peace, if we shrink from the hard contests where men must win at hazard of their lives and at the risk of all they hold dear, then the bolder and stronger peoples will pass us by, and will win for themselves the domination of the world.⁴

The relationship of man to nature (to the preservation of the race through hard work, a disciplined self-denial of leisure and wasted time, and a rooting out of the unfit, cor-

¹Herbert Spencer, Social Statics (New York, 1864), pp. 414-15. (emphases added)

²Charles A. Conant, "The Economic Basis of Imperialism," from the North American Review, Vol. CLXVII (1898), p. 326. (emphases added)

³Spencer, pp. 79-80. (emphases added)

⁴Theodore Roosevelt, The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, A. B. Hart (ed.), (New York, 1926), XII, p. 331. (emphases added)

rupting alien influences) was no less severe under National Socialism than had been man's relationship to God under the demands of Calvinism (refer back to the Hohenzollerns).¹ Inducements to men of superior character,² and punishment for the inferior was the rule of thumb employed by the National Socialist state to lift Germany out of the Jewish-designed "moral swamp" into which the back-stabbers had led it.³ Out the window went the belief in the principle of human equality, that device of "mass seduction" which the Jews had cunningly devised to subvert the pure Aryan soul, and rob the Germans of "their former consciousness of superiority,"⁴ as well as their opportunity to provide world leadership. The new Germany, the Third Reich, was dedicated not to those levelling principles of democracy and Marxism which had threatened the survival of the German people, but to the holiest of human rights: "There is only one holiest human right, and this right

¹The popularizing of the catchwords of Darwin, the "struggle for survival" and "survival of the fittest," was followed by an extrapolation of a biological theory to a social theory (society as an evolving organism--see Herbert Spencer's sociology) which fit nicely within the confines of the German Protestant Weltanschauung, provided a social justification for dismissing the hardships of the urban proles, and a scientific veneer for the extermination of the Jews.

²The SS, as an elite within an elite, the purest of the pure, were schooled in facilities set up in old castles amidst the German countryside.

³Lest we forget, the Puritans of Merry Old New England drew hard lines between good and evil, between the haves and the have-nots. Those who refused to follow their rigid standards of conduct were dealt with swiftly and harshly by the judicial system and their peers.

⁴Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. xix of the Introduction.

is at the same time the holiest obligation, to wit: to see to it that the blood is preserved pure and, by preserving the best humanity, to create the possibility of a nobler development of these beings."¹

The gospel of progress and primitivism, thus enobled by National Socialism, buttressed Germany's attempt to strip the Fatherland of the burden of history, and set the stage for her attempt to step into the unbounded space there for the taking.² The quandry into which industrialization had thrust Germany at the turn of the century (How do you ensure economic progress without destroying the natural order?) was resolved. With a Puritanical zeal, Hitler and the National Socialists set to work translating theory into practice.

¹Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 402.

²The willingness to assume the "might makes right" stance towards less powers, and to regard governments and constitutions as ephemeral issues secondary to national survival; growth and expansion through militarism of primary importance (to ensure the health of the national organism) was exemplified by General Homer Lea: "As physical vigor represents the strength of man in his struggle for existence, in the same sense military vigor constitutes the strength of nations; ideals, laws and constitutions are but temporary effulgences, and are existent only as long as this strength remains vital. As manhood marks the height of physical vigor among mankind, so the military successes of a nation mark the zenith of its physical greatness." Homer Lea, The Valor of Ignorance (New York, 1909), p. 8.

The Practice Of National Socialism

Things are in the saddle,
And ride mankind.

There are two laws discrete,
Not reconciled,--
Law for man, and law for thing
The last builds town and fleet,
But it runs wild,
And doth the man unking.¹

In Chapter One we pieced together some of the critical ideas and values associated with the development of the German Protestant Weltanschauung,² and established its affinity with the Puritan world-view (embodying the myth of the transcendence of time). In Chapter Two we discussed the creative contribution of that Weltanschauung to the subsequent rise of the Prussian State (with the commitment to rationalism and a desire to control nature typifying the Prussian ethos). Chapter Three explored the reaction to that commitment, the clash between rationalism and romanticism; their collective

¹Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Historic Notes of Life and Letters in New England," from Emerson's Works, X, pp. 310-311.

²Edward Dowden, the literary historian, in describing the progress of Bunyan's Pilgrim, epitomizes the Prussian spirit: "All that is best and most characteristic in Bunyan proceeds from that inward drama in which the actors were three--God, Satan, and the solitary human soul. If external influences from events or men affected his spirit, they came as nuncios or messengers from God or the Evil One. Institutions, rites, Churches, ordinances, ceremonies, could help him little or not at all. The journey from the City of Destruction to the Celestial City must be undertaken on a special summons by each man alone; if a companion join him on the way, it lightens the trials of the road; but, of the companions, each one is an individual pilgrim, who has started on a great personal adventure, and who, as he enters the dark river, must undergo his particular experiences of hope or fear." From Puritan and Anglican (London, 1901), p. 234.

importance (in shaping Germany's self-definition as a nation) for the unification of Germany under Bismarck; and the revolt against civilization (that civilization being, by an large, the fruits of Prussia's rational-progressive orientation). In Chapter Four we have examined the displacement of responsibility for creating that civilization (the Dolchstoßlengende); the myth of the Master Race; the notion of Lebensraum; and the creation of a program linking industrialism to progress (progress idealized as a law of nature), to a purge of complexity, and to a restoration of simplicity (and finally the acceptance of that program by a sufficiently large enough proportion of the German voters to carry the National Socialists into power in 1933, following the Great Depression).

The object of our inquiry throughout the preceding pages has been the phenomenon of the rise of National Socialism. In the pages to follow we will discuss some of the major aspects of the practice of National Socialism (the implementation of the three part program outlined above). For twelve-odd years, the hopes of the German people for a better way of life rested with Hitler and National Socialism. And throughout that period (until it became obvious to most of the German people that a military defeat was inevitable in the closing months of World War II) the Nazis were successful in keeping alive the illusion that the German people could and would escape the reality of complex society as the inevitable environment for

imperfect man,¹ "enabling the nation to continue defining its purpose as the pursuit of rural happiness while devoting itself to productivity, wealth, and power."²

We shall first consider the purge. The National Socialist purge of cultural complexity (actually only the crust of complexity) began with a wholesale condemnation of the symbols of Weimar³ (characterized by a venomous anti-intellectualism which focused on the degeneracy of modern art, architecture, and literature--a la Spengler, "the limits of knowledge in the arts and sciences--). This condemnation, which steamrolled into a "ruthless destruction of the most visible signs of the ways of civilization" (including mass book burnings; the pillaging and burning of the homes, businesses, and synagogues of Jews during the Crystal Night--November, 1938--; public displays of degenerate art followed by their destruction; the public displays of degenerate art followed by their destruction; the public discrediting of, forced exile of, and/or brutal murdering of intellectuals and politicians associated with the Weimar Republic or the Red Menace; and the enactment of the Nuremberg race laws which decreed protection of the German blood, deprived Jews of German citizenship, led to the wholesale roundup and incarceration of "aliens" in the "re-education" camps, and provided the legal basis for the mass

¹Concurrently keeping alive the myth of the perfectability of human beings (the Master Race).

²Leo Marx, The Machine in The Garden (New York, 1967), p. 226.

³See Ernst Cassirer, "The Place of Language and Myth in the Pattern of Human Culture," in Language and Myth, pp. 1-17.

extermination of the Jews),¹ came in direct response to Weimar's vitriolic message. That message, filtering through the spasms of political, social, and economic uncertainties unsettling the Republic, was this. The myth must be unmasked. The massive problems associated with Germany's transition to a modern industrial society cannot be wished away. "History is not progress from institutional and traditional complexity (as the philosophes would have had it) to natural simplicity. History is the record of man's moral responsibility to preserve civilization in its necessarily complex expression in constantly changing institutions and traditions."² That sacrilegious pronouncement had come bursting out of "Weimar Culture" in a variety of symbolic shapes and colors, and had struck Spenglerian terror in the souls of true German volk who were mesmerized by modernity and civilization. What sort of resolution did that appraisal of the state of things offer for the dissolution of community?³ How much comfort could it pro-

¹See pages 28-30 of the appendix for a chronological listing of Anti-Semitic events during the twelve year Reich.

²Carl Becker, from Noble, Historians, p. 156. (emphases added)

³The movement from community to individuality, to which the revolutionary thought of Luther and Calvin contributed in no mean measure, is the focus of Robert Nisbet's The Quest for Community. Speaking of the consequences of the primacy of individual faith for modern western civilization, Nisbet notes: "As Protestantism sought to reassimilate men in the invisible community of God, capitalism sought to reassimilate them in the impersonal and rational framework of the free market. As in Protestantism, the individual, rather than the group, becomes the central unit. But instead of pure faith, individual profit (in the process of secularization becomes the mainspring of activity...The individual finding himself unprotected, is compelled to rely on his own efforts and his own reason in the

vide to an alienated youth, a dispossessed Mittelstand, a vanquished army, and stifled industrialists? Not as much, so the story goes (and as the election results bore out), as the Dolchstosslegende, the myth of the Master Race, or Lebensraum. It was simply a case of intellectuals foisting responsibility for the creation of a complex culture on the German people; ivory tower intellectuals tasting, chewing, and digesting the "ways of civilization," laying them bare to the bone, unseaming them from the nave to the chops and dropping the innards, the burden of history, on the noble Fatherland. Where was the promise of natural simplicity amidst this heresy? Perhaps in a ballad about a dead body which is dug up and solemnly pronounced fit for military service because the Kaiser needed more cannon-fodder:

They poured some brandy down his throat
 The rotten corpse to rouse.
 Two hefty nurses grabbed his arms,
 And his half-naked spouse.

Because the rotten body stank,
 A parson limped ahead
 And over him his incense swung
 To cover the stench of the dead.

The band in the van with a rum-tum-tum
 Played him a rousing march.
 The soldier as he had been drilled
 Kicked his legs high from his arse.

3 (from p. 138) seething sea of competition." The supposition following from this (which had been hinted at by Luther and Calvin; translated into an economic theory by the Utilitarians; and glorified by the romantics of early nineteenth century Germany) is that society's well-being is best served by allowing the individual the largest possible area of moral and social autonomy (the step out of time into space, allowing mobility for the individual in the face of increasing internal complexity--i.e. Lebensraum--followed nicely from this supposition which Locke politicized from the Puritans). Robert Nisbet, The Quest for Community (New York, 1953), pp. 94-95. (emphases added)

You could not see him for the crowd
 Thronging round him with hurrahs!
 One might have seen him from on high;¹
 But nothing was there--but the stars.¹

That was highly unlikely. In the theatre of Georg Kaiser, Ernst Toller, Bertoldt Brecht,² or Karl Zuckmayer?³ No! Biting social realism would not do. From expressionism, which expropriated the will to abstraction and bypassed tradition (recall Spengler's condemnation of impressionism, which at the time he was writing had become a bourgeois mode) in favor of more "distorted" forms of art (Kirchner's city pictures and paintings of women in their boudoirs; Beckmann's self-portraits giving starkly raw, visual portrayals of the psychic anguish of modern man as well as his allegorical paintings of grief and fear and the horrors of war--i.e. The Night, based on the murder of Liebnecht and Luxemburg in 1919--; the grotesque displays of emotion, death, and impoverished spirits in the lithos and woodcuts of Ernst Nolde and Kathy Kollwitz;⁴ the play with lines and space in Klee's satires on

¹Bertoldt Brecht, The Legend of The Dead Soldier (Berlin, 1927), p. 127.

²Brecht's Mash-like experiences as a medical orderly (he was a conscientious objector) during W. W. I were vividly translated into his poetry and drama. The epic theatre, according to Brecht, demanded a detachment on the part of the audience, so that they could reflect in a truly critical way on the social and moral implications of the play. He brought a strict historical emphasis to his productions.

³Zuckmayer's "Kaptain of Kopenick" satirized the myth of the stab in the back, and a people's unquestioning respect for the military uniform.

⁴Rhode Island School of Design (Museum) has an excellent collection of their works and that of others of the period.

the foibles of mankind)? Certainly not! In the "outrages" of Dadaism performed for the lewd and licentious; in George Grosz' caricatures of "The Pillars of Society," "The Pimps of Death," and "The City"?¹ Again a resounding no! These demythologizers, these illusion breakers, these indulgers of the superfluties of civilization offered no plan of escape from the socially pervasive fear of moral decay.² In fact, according to the Dolchstosslegende, these Jew-tainted intellectuals were part of the problem themselves, attempting to make art an "international experience"; intimidating those who wished to champion the "normal sound intelligence and instinct of men."³ If they were not Jews by belief, they were

¹Hans Hess, in George Grosz (New York, 1974), has assembled most of Grosz' works and provides a lively commentary throughout on the life and times of Grosz, a child of Weimar. See also A Little Yes and a Big No, Grosz' own autobiography (New York, 1946).

²Headings such as "THUS DID SICK MINDS VIEW NATURE" and "GERMAN PEASANTS LOOKED AT IN THE YIDDISH MANNER" stood out at the Exhibition of Degenerate Art in Munich in 1937. Count Baudissin (who's contribution to the new aesthetic was "The most perfect shape, the sublimest image that has recently been created in Germany has not come out of any artist's studio, but is the steel helmet") and his colleagues, acting on instructions from the Fuhrer, confiscated nearly 16,000 paintings, drawings, etchings, and sculptures during 1936, of which nearly 4,000 were burned. They included 1,000 Nolde's, 600 Kirchner's, 500 Beckmann's, 300 Grosz', as well as Cezannes, Picassos, Matisses, Gaugins, Van Goghs', and Ernsts' among others. See Helmut L. Haupt's Art Under a Dictatorship (Oxford, 1954) and Chapter 28 of Richard Grunberger's The Twelve Year Reich. (emphases added)

³Baynes, pp. 584-592.

most decidedly Jewish in spirit. And what they had created was not unity, but chaos; not art, but pestilence.¹

The Jew has no art of his own. Bit by bit he has stolen it all from the other peoples or has watched them at work and then made his copy. He does not even know how merely to preserve the precious things which others have created: as he turns the treasures over in his hand they are transformed into dirt and dung. He knows that he cannot maintain any State for long [allusion to Weimar]. That is one of the differences between him and the Aryan. True, the Aryan also had dominated other peoples. But how? He entered on the land, he cleared the forest...and through him art and science were brought to flower..All that the Jew cannot do. And because he cannot do it, all his revolutions must be international. They must spread as a pestilence spreads.²

The artificial, soul-less achievements of an alien humanity; the futureless signs of the petrifying world-city;³

¹Speaking of the necessity of coordinating ideal and real interests to ensure the survival of both, Kintze states: "Wherever interests are vigorously pursued, an ideology tends to be developed also to give meaning, re-enforcement and justification to these interests. And this ideology is as "real" as the real interests themselves, for ideology is an indispensable part of the life-process which is expressed in action. And conversely: wherever ideas are to conquer the world, they require the leverage of real interests..." Otto Hintze, Kalvinismus, p. 232.

²Hitler, from Baynes, pp. 30-31. (emphases added)

³Alfred Rosenberg, a creator of insipid architectural designs in his own right, characterized Weimar-art thus: "The nineteenth century lacked a generally valid image of beauty [one, we might add, that did not unalterably align with the myth of the transcendence of time] and culminated in a state of Impressionist and Expressionist impotence. German post-war art is that of mestizos [people of mixed blood, another of the many references to purification made during the purge] laying claim to the license of depicting bastard excrescences, the products of syphilitic minds and painterly infantilism as expressions of the soul." From Grunberger, pp. 422-423. (emphases added)

the symbols of social dissolution, were summarily ground into dust by National Socialism's culture-cleansing campaign.¹ Weimar's foreboding message was muted; fears of inevitable doom were allayed.² National Socialism's program would ensure the survival of the German people. New blood would be transfused into the movement for a return to natural simplicity,³ which we turn to now.

Cleanly profiled Aryan heroic figures, idealized portraits of German youth, idyllic landscapes, and stern family portraits of rustic German life under the new order betokened the opening of a new phase in German history to which the sword need only give soil.⁴ Inaugurating the House of German Art in 1937 in Munich, Adolf Hitler proclaimed the victory of nature over artifice in his speech which forbade the use by any painter of colors other than those perceived by the normal

¹The reaction to Weimar's message, which challenged the transcendental illusion, appeared in one form in the creation of a purge tribunal which toured the galleries and museums of the Reich and ordered the removal of all degenerate art forms (those which did not fall within the aesthetic demarcations laid down in Hitler's canon). Rosenberg's Die Kunst im Dritten Reich and Wolf Willrich's Cleansing of the Art Temple spelled out the substance of the new form.

²Dietrich Eckart, a close friend of Hitler, had written a book at the end of W. W. I entitled Bolshevism from Moses to Lenin in which he had attempted to prove that Judaism was the great destructive force which had ruined Western Civilization.

³Konfliklosigkeit was popularized in Weimar drama as a stab at the stab in the back. It was a term describing the process of sweeping conflict-laden issues under the carpet.

⁴Wissel's "Farmer's Family of Kahlenberg" is a Puritan classic.

eye in nature. "The new art canon enjoined the banishment of all evocations of human anguish, distress, and pain--in other words all ugliness from the German people's consciousness."¹ The Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung described the works assembled for that inauguration:

Adolf Wissel's 'Peasant Group' told intimately of the secrets of the German countenance; Karl Leipold's 'Sailor' experienced the sea as creative world-fluidum; Adolf Ziegler's 'Terpsichore' combined a grasp of modern painting with the purity of classical antiquity in its conception of the human body; Elk-Eber's 'The Last Hand-Grenade' showed movingly how the artist had experienced the Great War and given sublime expression to this vision.²

What was happening? Precisely this. Evocations of the past had been assembled to establish continuity with that past and the present, and to point the way towards a better tomorrow.³ The outline of the new order, decorated with the trappings of Germany's pre-industrial past when faith in the unity of nature reigned supreme (before the incursion of the machine into Germany's pastoral garden), held out the promise "to engender

¹Grunberger, p. 423.

²Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung, February 27, 1937.

³Much hay has been made over the medieval symbols and "cult rituals" employed by National Socialist propagandists. And the Nazis did pull out signs and symbols from the past going all the way back to the tribes that settled in the Sandbar of the Holy Roman Empire. These collective symbols, however, served to reinforce the primitive illusion, the rural myth, or what Nisbet calls the pastoral ideal, providing continuity between the past and present for that illusion-myth-ideal. The aberrationists, in labelling these phenomena as mystical, find comforting documentation for their particularist theses. However, if they are considered not piecemeal but in their entirety, the whole kit and caboodle point towards Rousseau's primitivism, and a harmonious existence free from cultural complexity.

out of the social of disorganization the seeds of a new and successful form of social and moral security."¹ The symbols of Weimar had spelled disorganization, disintegration, decline, insecurity, breakdown, and instability: movement from simplicity to complexity. The symbols of the Third Reich displayed for the public in Munich in 1937 spelled organization, integration, security, stability, and progress:

Every single painting on display projected either soulful elevation or challenging heroism. Cast-iron dignity alternated with idyllic pastoralism. The many rustic family scenes invariably showed entire kinship groups, Spartan, hard, robust, barefoot and fecund. All the work exhibited transmitted the impression of an intact life from which the stresses and problems of modern existence were entirely absent--and there was one glaringly obvious omission: not a single canvas depicted urban and industrial life.²

Yet despite the tranquil illusion, the German Protestant Weltanschauung (expressed in the program of National Socialism) had set for Germany an impossible task: housing progress and primitivism under one national roof.

Progress towards a state of nature (the uncomplicated land of rural virtue) in a land whose internal frontiers had been exhausted necessitated the secular of new frontiers. In the six year period following the Nazi assumption of power, the National Socialists mobilized the military-industrial clout in a throw-out-all-the-stops effort to do just that. Mechanization, a petrifying death-force to Spengler, became the resuscitator which would breath new life into the flight

¹Nisbet, p. 7.

²Grunberger, p. 427. (emphases added)

from complexity to simplicity.

The first order of business for the Third Reich was economic recovery (with the memory of inflation and the Depression looming large for most of the German people), not an end in itself but a means to an end (the secular of Lebensraum where the Master Race might flourish). The glorification of work by Hitler and the National Socialists as a means to set the German people free from the burdens of history (Arbeit macht frei, the motto emblazoned on the walls of the lodgings of German workers and over the camp gates at Auschwitz as well) surpassed even that of Prussia under the Hohenzollerns. The message to the German people was this: Your desire for a better way of life, the translation of the National Socialist program into social reality, will come about only by hard work and an efficient economic program.¹ "Nothing great in life is created without the shock of pain; pain transforms and purifies man for his higher task."² It was no idle admonition. The population's leisure time was rapidly appropriated by the State.³

¹The new folk community, according to Hitler, would provide "an opportunity for every individual to develop his creative capacities. Our greatest pride in this Reich is that we have opened the way for every qualified individual--whatever his origins--to reach the top if he is qualified, industrious, and resolute." Max Domarus, Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, 1932-1938 (Wurzburg, 1962), pp. 206 and 702.

²Wallace R. Deuel, People Under Hitler (New York, 1942), p. 220.

³The custom of tea and dancing, as a representative form of cosmopolitan vagabondage, was condemned, as well as the superfluities of idle conversation. Modern dancing was regarded as harmful to the ideal of womanhood and declared to be an incitement to sexual promiscuity (typified by the "Negro" music, jazz).

Able young people were enlisted for compulsory duty in labor camps where the healthy outdoor work could distinguish them from the masses. A sizeable portion of the unemployed were conscripted for government projects (road, railroad, and bridge building as well as some coal mining and work in steel mills). In all of these undertakings, a high moral value was placed on the work by the Reich ideologists.

Despite some initial uncertainty on the part of the Reich as to how best to begin the economic recovery (i.e. plans to shorten hours and demechanize some phases of production to open up more jobs for workers versus tax reductions and deficit spending), the National Socialists affirmed support of the creative personality (i.e. the industrial entrepreneur) and rejected for the most part socialistic experiments in the private sector.¹ Though small business got a shot in the arm in 1933 and 1934 from the Reich, the policy of "the best help is always self help, achieved through greater efficiency"² benefitted the corporate giants and monopoly capitalism far more. By 1934, the combined public works and rearmament programs, together with a concerted attack on labor unions to prevent strikes, stabilize wages, and revive big business, contributed to cutting

¹An editorial in the Volkische Beobachter on April 4, 1933, explained the initial Nazi economic policy thus: "It rejects anarchic individualism but affirms the creative personality. It aspires to liberation of the power of the individual as well as protection both of the individual and the commonwealth from exploitation or incursions of excessive individualism."

²Ibid.

the 1932 unemployment level in half.¹ By 1939 the demand for labor exceeded the supply by nearly half a million workers, due in large part to the Labor Front's (the Reich's economic arm) wage freeze. The Mittelstand, which had thrown its voter support behind the National Socialists in 1933, gained most from this surge in economic activity. During the mid-thirties, the Nazi stimulus for increased rationalization and modernization of industry boosted the white-collar population both in absolute size and relative importance within industry as a whole. By 1938 the blue-collar work force had increased ten percent over 1929; the white-collar work force had increased twenty-five percent in the same period. The real disposable income of white-collar workers in 1939 had climbed to ten percent above its 1928 average, whereas blue-collar income had barely returned to its pre-Depression level. Despite booming industries, piecework and overtime incentives, the earnings of the two groups followed a divergent trend. Average blue-collar pay amounted to fifty-three percent of white-collar income in 1929, but only to fifty percent in 1936.²

By way of fringe compensation for this inequity, the Labor Front offered a variety of activities designed to organize leisure time towards self improvement (for the working class). These included evening education classes, sports programs pro-

¹The Labor Front physically moved through the SA to abolish trade unions, and was quite successful in doing so. Its influence with large industrialists (through plant leaders) was minimal, though smaller firms came increasingly under its influence.

²Hilde Oppenheimer-Blum, The Standard of Living of German Labor under Nazi Rule (New York, 1943), pp. 15-43.

viding recreation necessary to enhance physical efficiency, and mass theatre excursions (the Reich mobilized mass audiences of workers to attend theatre performances which the middle class traditionally went to for elevation and self improvement). "It was the avowed object of Nazi social engineering to inculcate the masses with this 'middle-class' ethos."¹

The pièce de resistance however, for the working man, was the creation of the Strength Through Joy program, which sent German workers on jaunts into the countryside and to other nations around the world to let them know they were the representatives of the new Germany. Actually the program was designed to give incentive to the workers, as Strength Through Joy ideologist Ingenieu Arnhold related: "Much of physical, mental and nervous activity such as music, sports celebration, housework, etc. is never paid for at all...The problem of modern human efficiency is to make this tremendous spiritual and emotional energy available for the production of goods."²

The various stick and carrot inducements of the Third Reich directed towards industrialists and workers did bring progress to Germany from 1933-1939 (and put more marks and pfennigs in the pockets of most Germans in comparison with their earnings in 1932). However, the resurgent economic progress, attended by the increased presence of factories, modern highways, and the growth of urban centers in both

¹Grunberger, p. 374. (emphases added)

²See Robert A. Brady, The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism (New York, 1937), p. 167. (emphases added)

physical size and population, taxed the credibility of the assertion that this progress was leading towards the establishment of a folk community. Nevertheless, the authors (Thomas Mann, Remarque, Leon Feuchtwanger, Vicki Baum, Heinrich Mann, Franz Werfel) and dramatists (Brecht, Toller, Kaiser, Zuckmayer) who could have pointed out the divergence between the promise and fulfillment of the National Socialist program were, after all, expatriates. To a people struggling to realize an impossible dream, their influence on public opinion, if they had not been driven into exile (given their affiliation with Weimar) would probably have been no greater than previously. Their message was not what most Germans wanted to hear. Hans Grimm's message was: "The cleanest, most decent, most honest, most efficient and most industrious white nation on earth lives within too narrow frontiers."¹ It fit nicely with the German Protestant Weltanschauung, and sold over half a million copies. So did Der Spiegel, a veritable Pilgrim's Progress, Emil Strauss's tale of the hero who ends his marriage because his wife has accepted an inheritance, which would deprive him of the character-building trudge through the school of hard knocks. Strauss preached the virtues of the hardy life in his tale, frequently contrasting rustic serenity with the isolation and asphalt of the big cities. The Nazis made propaganda hay with both. They were, after all, coordinating Germany's mission to create an Edenic Garden on earth:

The Holy German Empire is as infinite as the

¹Hans Grimm, People Without Space (Munich, 1926), p. 1,110. (emphases added)

world itself, established by God and conferred upon the Germans as the eternal task to create order and law in the visible world against the spirit of age and matter, of fear and intellect.¹

Toward that end the peasant plays (Heimatstück) celebrated the unity of Germans with nature, and a virtuous primitivism:

I am a man, you see, who is made of earth, out of a clod of earth, as the Scripture puts it. I can't make myself be anything else. If you were to push earth down my throat, I would chew it and find it tasted good.²

Yet, as the illusion of a progressive-primitive society became increasingly difficult to sustain, radio, cinema, theatre, and literature poured on the coals, buying time for the Reich to mobilize the military-industrial strength necessary to secure new frontiers. Meanwhile the Reich's scientific resources were focused on breeding the pure Aryan types necessary to populate these new frontiers.³ The working man, concurrently, the Nazi's strongest opponent during the Weimar period, was integrated quite effectively into the myth of the Master Race by a process of embourgeoisement, whereby the fruits of progress (radios, theatre tickets, volkswagons, and

¹Josef M. Wehner, "Vermachtnis von Langemarck," in Kurt Ziesel's Krieg und Dichtung (Leipzig, 1940), p. 339. (emphases added)

²Friedrich Griese, Mensch aus Erde gemacht, Theater-Verlag, Langen/Muller, 1933: p. 35.

³Himmler searched the hinterlands for Herrentypen to breed the Master Race. Darre and his subordinates spoke of biological predestination which would produce the Adelbauerntum (peasant nobility), Germany's 20th century Noble Savages. At the same time, a massive sterilization campaign was mounted against those who might produce diseased offspring and endanger plans to create the perfect people. By 1939 30,000 alcoholics, 73,000 schizophrenics, 200,000 feeble-minded, and 50,000 epileptics had been sterilized (most of them involuntarily). See Deuel, p. 220

the Strength Through Joy excursions) were made available to him. The fulfillment of even greater expectations seemed close at hand.

National Socialism did bring a greater degree of social cohesiveness, law and order, and industrial efficiency and productivity to Germany than it had had since the end of the nineteenth century.¹ To the many German people who were angry and frustrated during the Weimar period, National Socialism meant restitution of "the right to acquire property through honest work, whereas socialization meant collectivism, based on the materialistic view of nature."² And that view, according to the Dolchstosslegende, had spelled disaster for the Fatherland. In contrast, progress and prosperity appeared to be underway again under the stewardship of Hitler and the National Socialists. "By 1938 most people not only knew themselves to be far more affluent than in 1932, but also (turning Marx's celebrated dictum about Being--Sein--determining Consciousness--Bewusstsein--upside down) thought themselves better off than before the Depression."³

¹At which time the German biblical scholar Paul de Lagarde had issued a prophetic warning: "Germany must be full of German men and German ways, as full of itself as an egg; then it will have no room for Palestine." Jews who resist absorption into a "National German Christianity" should be expelled altogether from the country. Their "internationalism" and their "control of money and the press" will bring disaster to Germany. From Carlton J. H. Hayes, A Generation of Materialism (New York, 1941), pp. 261-262. See also Lagarde's Deutsche Schriften (Göttingen, 1894), and Juden und Indogermanen (1887).

²Der Angriff, October 14, 1937. (emphases added)

³Grunberger, p. 203.

The annexation of Austria, the Sudeten, and a chunk of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939 brought the German people to their feet. The stab in the back, it appeared, would be avenged; the Master Race would flourish, and Germany would be saved from the gaping jaws of cultural complexity. Industrialism as a frontier force was proving its worth. And while military success followed military success and new frontier followed new frontier, faith that industrial progress would toll the dawn of a new, less complicated, more harmonious era remained high. The contradictum ad absurdum, that rationalism and a desire to control nature (the modus operandi of National Socialism) could yield, through the labors of its rigorously ordered and highly synchronized society, a folk community,¹ was soon to become apparent.

Max Weber, though he died before National Socialism became a significant political force, had made some observations on the processes of rationalization and bureaucratization that provide a suitable description of its eventual impact on German society. The description is not that of an idyllic folk

¹In The Twelve Year Reich, Richard Grunberger stumbled over the material-ideal conflict arising from the German Protestant Weltanschauung without ever relating it to a world-view or the myth of the transcendence of time. His concern with pursuing the metaphor of the "Nazi embalming of German culture" obscured his vision of the forest through the trees. His statement that: "The Third Reich could be compared to a double-ended gun trained both on the twentieth century and the Treaty of Versailles, with nostalgia for a pre-industrial past speaking out of one barrel, and streamlined industrial preparation for war out of the other," brushed tangentially the progressive-primitive nature of the phenomenon, but he failed to relate it to a developmental social history.

community:

All advances of the Prussian administrative organization have been and will in the future be advances of the bureaucratic, and especially of the monocratic principle.

Today, it is primarily the capitalist market economy which demands that the official business of the administration be discharged precisely, unambiguously, continuously, and with as much speed as possible. Business management throughout rests on increasing precision, steadiness, and above all, the speed of operations.

Bureaucratization offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specializing administrative functions according to purely objective considerations...The 'objective' discharge of business primarily means a discharge of business according to calculable rules and 'without regard for persons',

...The more bureaucracy is 'dehumanized', the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation. That is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special virtue.¹

The National Socialists rationalized. The National Socialists bureaucratized. The National Socialists dehumanized. The discrepancy between the objective social reality and the Nazi promise of a Volksgemeinschaft, despite the early military successes, grew ever greater with each passing year. By 1940, Germany's cities had grown larger, not smaller; capital was concentrated moreso than prior to National Socialism's political debut; the rural population had been reduced, not increased, to supply factory labor; inequalities in income and property distribution had grown; industry's share of the gross national product was up and agriculture's share was down.²

¹Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, II: Kapitel Neun, p. 2.

²Neumann, Part Two, Section III.

The Nazi's new deal was wobbling on its two antithetical legs, progress and primitivism. By 1942 the ethos which had transformed Prussia into the most efficient State in Europe under a succession of Hohenzollern rulers had spirited Germany into the "cage of the future," "mechanized petrification."¹ The illusion of movement towards a Volksgemeinschaft was breaking down. Rational ordering was not begetting natural simplicity. The National Socialist program had not obliterated conflicts between producers and consumers; urban and rural areas; and employers and employees. On the contrary, the cost of the attempt to bring the Fatherland into harmony with nature was exacerbating the divisions that attempt had promised to mend.

In 1942, a national portrait of the Third Reich would not have yielded a canvas dominated by fair-skinned, Aryan peasants toiling peacefully in the fields. Three-fifths of Germany's wartime labor force (in 1942) were women and children.² Family life was eroding. Food for the home front and other everyday necessities of life were becoming scarce as the war drained the nations resources. The romantic vision of a national community where all of the fundamental problems of human existence would be resolved matched less and less with the German peoples' everyday experience as the promised Lebensraum was eaten up by the advancing allies. The so-called "progress" of National Socialism, the bureaucratization and rational

¹Weber, Prot. Ethic, p. 182.

²See Franz Ehrenwirt's Statisches Handbuch für Deutschland 1928-1944 (Munich, 1949), p. 31

ordering of nearly all phases of life, had wrought not a folkish community spirit but rather the complete depersonalization of human relations and a grossly atomized society as the war neared its end. In 1945, the Nazi ark engineered to whisk the Fatherland into the timeless waters of arcadian simplicity ran hard around on the perilous rocks of history.

Concluding Remarks

Unity has had, historically, a symbolic appeal greater than any possessed by the values of plurality and diversity. From the earliest Greek metaphysicians down to the present, the greatest single objective of philosophy has been that of converting plurality into unity, 'chaos' into intellectual order. The deep religious appeal of unity in experience, the craving of all human beings for an inner sense of order, and the age-old rationalist desire to transmute the flux and diversity of experience into symmetrical schemes of meaning have all, in one way or another, contributed to the modern veneration for unity and uniformity in society.¹

In 1953 George Lukacs arrived at the conclusion that the National Socialist Weltanschauung was nothing but a demagogic synthesis of the philosophy of German imperialism; the application of American advertising techniques to German politics and propaganda; an instrument of attack against "objective truth," devoid of content and open to any kind of manipulation.² We have, in the course of our arguments, sought to establish, contrary to Lukacs' assertion (and those of others outlined in our Prologue), that the Weltanschauung to which National Socialism gave expression (the German Protestant Weltanschauung) possessed a content directly tied to the material and ideal traditions of modern western civilization. Toward that end, utilizing Weber's groundbreaking study of The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, and Noble's related investigation of the Puritan world-view in America (Historians Against History), we have examined:

¹Nisbet, pp. 260-261.

²See George Lukacs, Die Zerstörung der Vernunft, p. 572.

1. Luther's revolutionary protest against the Catholic Church in Germany; the causal relationship of his ideas to the shattering of the spiritual unity in the Germanic States in the decades following his break with that Church.
2. The positing of a new basis for unity (nature) in the writings of Germany's Enlightenment philosophers; the reflection, in those writings, of a world-view embracing rationalism as the means to uncover the natural laws on which this new unity was to be based.
3. The religious background to the emergence of this world-view in Prussia (the nature and impact of Calvinism and Pietism).
4. The affinity of that world-view, which we have labelled the German Protestant Weltanschauung, with the Puritan world-view (two aspects in particular: 1. one of the fundamental elements of the Protestant Ethic, rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling--which Weber has linked to the "spirit of capitalism"; 2. the myth of the transcendence of time--which Noble has traced in the writings of American historians.
5. The contribution of the German Protestant Weltanschauung to Prussia's emergence as a progressive, rationally-ordered State.
6. The romantic reaction, in Germany, to an increasingly

rationally-ordered society (a la Rousseau).

7. The resolution of the tensions between romanticism and rationalism with the reaffirmation of faith in progress to sweep away cultural complexity and deliver the German people into organic harmony with nature.
8. Prussia's contribution to Germany's transition from a primarily rural to an urban-industrialized nation.
9. The challenge that transition posed, with the appearance of cultural complexity, to the myth of the transcendence of time; the romantic resurgence and the revolt against civilization.
10. The resolution of that crisis with National Socialism's program linking industrialism to progress, to a purge of complexity, and to a restoration of natural simplicity.
11. The implementation of that program in the practice of National Socialism.

In examining the practice of National Socialism, we have tried to demonstrate the consequences of the extension of the notion of rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling (its secular application) into nearly all phases of modern German culture during the Third Reich, and concurrently we have traced the futile quest for the natural simplicity (reflecting the myth of the transcendence of time) which such "progress" was supposed to yield. The following extract, from a treatise by Carl Becker entitled The Heavenly City of the

Eighteenth-Century, provides a philosophical overview of the intellectual movements and cultural developments which spirited Germany (and the rest of the west) from the Age of Reason into the modern industrial age:

When philosophy added a new word to her title (calling herself natural philosophy), no one noted that fact as ominous. Galileo and his successors were philosophers too, preeminently so, since their marvelous discoveries, based on observation and experiment, uncovered so many secret places in the world, and by promising to banish mystery from the universe seemed to leave it more obviously rational than they found it. The laws of nature and nature's God appeared henceforth to be one and the same thing, and since every part of God's handiwork could all in good time be reasonably demonstrated, the intelligent man could very well do with a minimum of faith--except, of course (the exception was tremendous but scarcely noticed at the time), faith in the uniform behavior of nature and in the capacity of reason to discover its modus operandi.

In the course of the nineteenth century this optimistic outlook became overcast. The marriage of fact and reason, of science and the universal laws of nature, proved to be somewhat irksome, and in the twentieth century it was, not without distress, altogether dissolved. Natural philosophy was transformed into natural science. Natural science became science, and scientists rejected, as a personal affront, the title of philosopher, which formerly they had been proud to bear. The vision of man and his world as a neat and efficient machine, designed by an intelligent Author of the Universe, gradually faded away. Professors of science ceased to speak with any assurance of the laws of nature, and were content to pursue, with unabated ardor, but without any teleological implications whatever, their proper business of observing and experimenting with the something which is the stuff of the universe, of measuring and mastering its stress and movement. "Science," said Lloyd Morgan, "deals exclusively with changes of configuration, and traces the accelerations which are observed to occur, leaving to metaphysics to deal with the underlying agency, if it exists."

It is well known that the result of pursuing this restricted aim (the scientific method reduced to its lowest terms) has been astounding. It is needless to say that we live in a machine age, that the art of inventing is the greatest of our inventions, or that within a brief space of fifty years the outward conditions of life have been transformed. It is less well under-

stood that this bewildering experience has given a new slant to our minds. Fresh discoveries and new inventions are no longer the result of fortunate accidents which we are expected to note with awe. They are all a part of the day's work, anticipated, deliberately intended, and brought to pass according to schedule.¹

The veneration of impersonal probity to uncover a unified natural order, from the time of Leibniz onward, coupled with the impulse to escape into nature's regenerative womb, which the German romantic movement rekindled; the progress of nearly three centuries away from the mysterious complexities of the Dark Ages, yielded up not a harmonious society in National Socialist Germany, but rather a stage of cultural development Weber had characterized thus:

Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved.²

¹Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven, 1932), pp. 1-28. (emphases added)

²Max Weber, Prot. Ethic, p. 182.

APPENDIX

TABLE I.
Area and Population
(population in millions of inhabitants)

	Area sq. m.						Average Density annual per increase sq. m. 1800-	
	1910 1	1800 2a	1850 2b	1870 2c	1900 2d	1914 2e	1910 3	1910 4
<i>Great Powers</i>								
1. Great Britain	88,729	9.2	18.0	22.8	32.5	37.0	12.3	618.0
Ireland		5.5	6.7	5.4	4.5	4.3	-2.0	134.7
2. France	212,731	26.9	34.9	36.8	39.0	39.8	3.4	189.3
3. Germany	208,825	24.5	35.4	40.8	56.4	67.8	8.9	310.8
4. Austria	115,832	13.3	18.1	20.6	26.1	29.3	7.0	246.6
Hungary	125,641	10.0	13.3	15.6	19.3	21.5	6.7	166.3
5. Italy	110,550	18.1	23.9	26.6	32.4	35.9	5.9	313.1
6. European Russia	1,887,028	38.0	61.0	75.2	103.3	124.2	11.3	680.4
<i>Middle-size Powers</i>								
1. Belgium	11,775	3.0	4.4	5.0	6.7	7.7	8.3	652.9
2. Holland	15,770	2.1	3.1	3.6	5.2	6.3	9.2	443.9
3. Sweden	173,206	2.3	3.5	4.2	5.1	5.7	7.8	31.9
4. Spain	194,783	11.5	14.5	16.3	18.6	20.4	5.0	102.3
5. Turkey and Bulgaria		7.3	8.5	8.8	9.9	11.0	3.3	102.0
<i>Small Powers</i>								
1. Switzerland	15,976	1.7	2.4	2.7	3.3	3.9	7.0	235.4
2. Norway	124,129	.9			2.2	2.5	9.1	
3. Denmark	15,582	1.0			2.5	3.0	9.8	
4. Portugal	34,254	3.1			5.4	6.1	5.9	
5. Rumania	53,689	2.6			6.0	7.4	9.3	
6. Serbia	15,241	.9			2.5	3.0	10.7	
7. Greece	41,933	1.0			2.5	2.7	8.9	

Sources: For Areas: *The New International Encyclopedia*, 2nd ed. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1935), under each individual country. For population: *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. XII, p. 244 and *Handwoerterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, 4th ed., Vol. II, pp. 688-689 (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1923-29).

TABLE 2.
Estimated Population of the World; Its Distribution by Continents
in Millions of Inhabitants

	1650	1750	1800	1850	1900	1930
Asia	250	406	522	671	859	992
Europe	100	140	187	266	401	505
Africa	100	100	100	100	141	142
North America	7	6	15	39	106	169
South America	6	6	9	20	38	83
Oceania	2	2	2	2	6	10
Totals	465	660	835	1,098	1,551	1,901

Source: *International Migrations. Vol. II Interpretations*, edited by Walter F. Willcox (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1931), p. 78. *Statistical Year-Book, 1931-32* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1932), pp. 18-23.

and establish the connection between the more remote past and the middle of the eighteenth century.

Table 2 shows the estimated population of the world between 1650 and 1930.

Friedlaender, Heinrich E. and Jacob Oser. *Economic History of Modern Europe*. New York: Prentice Hall, 1953, p. 21.




Adams, Marion. The German Tradition.
 New York: John Wiley
 and Sons, 1971, Cover.

ENGLAND AND WALES


FRANCE

GERMANY



From Ernest L. Bogart, *Economic History of Europe, 1760-1939* (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1942). pp. 463, 469, 475.

CHART 9. Percentage Distribution of Urban and Rural Population in England and Wales, France, and Germany, 1871 and 1911.



From Henri See, *Franzoesische Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1936), Vol. II, pp. 287-298.

CHART 10. Percentage Distribution of Urban and Rural Population in Six European Countries and in the United States in 1911.

Friedlaender and Oser, p. 187.


TABLE 13

Merchandise Exports and Imports of Germany
(in millions of marks)

Year	Foodstuffs	Raw Materials	Manufactured Articles	Total
Exports				
1872.....	504	787	1,027	2,318
1890.....	441	844	2,482	3,767
1910.....	761	1,918	4,796	7,475
1913.....	1,362	1,719	7,801	10,882
Imports				
1872.....	872	1,676	710	3,258
1890.....	1,168	2,950	1,196	5,214
1910.....	2,483	5,083	1,369	8,935
1913.....	3,063	5,264	3,039	11,366

Source: Statistische Jahrbuecher fuer das Deutsche Reich (1830-1914).

Friedlaender and Oser, p. 277



Source: United States Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1921* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 923; *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1928*, pp. 447, 450; *Statistique Générale, Annuaire statistique, 1924* (Paris: 1925), pp. 339-342.

CHART 7. *World Volume of International Trade and the Share of Principal Countries, 1840 and 1880.*

Chart 7 illustrates the great changes in the total volume of trade toward the end of this period and the spectacular rise in the German position.

Friedlaender and Oser, p. 105.

<i>Popes</i>	<i>Princes</i>	<i>Luther</i>	<i>Religion and Theology</i>	<i>World and Church Politics</i>	<i>Culture</i>
1471-1484 Sixtus IV			1475 Pilgrimage fever (Holy Blood of Wilsnack; Niklashausen; Children's Pilgrimage to Mont St Michel)	1452 The first <i>Gravamina</i> of the German Nation (anti-Roman) 1461-1483 Louis XI of France: France's policy of conquest begins	1470 The <i>Germania</i> of Tacitus printed
1484-1492 Innocent VIII	1486-1525 Elector Frederick of Saxony (the Wise)	1483 10 Nov, born	1476 Communistic, anticlerical preaching of repentance by Hans Böhm of Niklashausen. <i>Reformation</i> of Emperor Sigismund printed	1488 The Swabian League founded	
1492-1503 Alexander VI (Borgia)	1493-1519 Emperor Maximilian		1479-1552 Cochlaeus 1483-1542 Contarini 1486-1543 Dr John Eck	1494 Charles VIII of France marches on Italy to annex Naples 1495 <i>RT</i> at Worms: reform of empire, perpetual Land Peace, Imperial High Court	1494 Sebastian Brant's <i>Ship of Fools</i>

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	1499-1535 Elector Joachim I of Branden- burg		1497-1560 Melancthon (from 1518 at Wittenberg)		1498 Dürer's <i>Apocalypse</i> 1499 Marsiglio Ficino, founder of the Platonic Academy in Florence, and teacher of Leo X, dies
1503-1513 Julius II (Rovere)	1500-1539 Duke George of Saxony	1505 Enters monastery of Augustinian Eremites at Erfurt		1504 Naples falls to Spain (until 1713)	1502 University of Wittenberg founded
	1507-1548 Sigismund I of Poland	1507 Ordination and first mass at Erfurt	1507 Julius II issues the indulgence for reconstruction of St Peter's		1505 Erasmus publishes the <i>Adnotationes</i> of Laurentius Valla. James Wimpfel- ing's <i>Epilome</i> (first history of Germany)
1509-1567 Landgrave Philip of Hesse	1509-1547 Henry VIII of England	1507 Ordination and first mass at Erfurt			1506 University of Frankfurt/O founded
		1510-1511 Visits Rome	1511 Reuchlin controversy		1508 Celtis, the Archhumanist, dies
		1512 Doctorate in theology at Wittenberg	1512-1517 Lateran Council	1512 Holy League in Italy against the French	1509 Erasmus <i>In Praise of Folly</i>
					1511-1514 Reuch- lin controversy

Popes	Princes	Luther	Religion and Theology	World and Church Politics	Culture
<p>1513-1521 Leo X (Medici)</p>	<p>1514-1545 Albrecht of Brandenburg, arch- bishop and Elector of Mainz</p> <p>1515-1547 Francis I of France</p>	<p>1513-1516 First lectures (on Psalms and Romans); reads Tauler</p> <p>1517 31 Oct, Indulgence theses</p> <p>1518 June: In Rome the process against Luther introduced. Oct - Nov: Luther before Cajetan in Augsburg; Luther appeals to the pope, then to the council</p>		<p>1515 Milan falls to France</p> <p>1517 War of plunder by duke of Gueldres in Holland. Creation of many cardinals by Leo X</p> <p>1518 RT at Augsburg: help against Turks refused</p>	<p>1514 'Poor Conrad in Wittenberg' Dürer's <i>Melancholia</i></p> <p>1515-1517 <i>Letters of Obscure Men</i></p> <p>1516 Erasmus' Greek New Testament. More's <i>Utopia</i></p> <p>1517 Donation of Constantine con- tested by von Hutten. Erasmus announces to Leo X the dawn of the Golden age</p> <p>1517-1518 Veit Stoss, the Annun- ciation in St Laurence's, Nuremberg</p>

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<p>1519-1556 Emperor Charles V</p> <p>1520-1566 Suliman II, Sultan of Turkey</p> <p>1522-1523 Adrian VI</p>	<p>1519 July: Leipzig Disputation</p> <p>1520 June: bull threatening ex- communication, <i>Exsurge Domine</i> Aug - Oct: The great pamphlets. 10 Dec: L. burns the bull threatening ex- communication in Wittenberg</p> <p>1521 Bull of ex- communication. RT at Worms. L. at the Wartburg (until 1 March, 1522; Translation of the New Testament). Edict of Worms</p>	<p>1519 Leipzig Disputation</p> <p>1521 In Worms L. refuses to recant. Edict of Worms. The mass abolished in Wittenberg, Communion under both kinds officially dispensed (Karlstadt); the Zwickau prophets 1521-1597 Peter Canisius</p> <p>1522 The German Augustinian congregation abolished. L.'s New Testa- ment appears</p>	<p>1519 Electoral campaign of Charles I (V) against Francis I</p> <p>1521 RT at Worms: Imperial government. Supreme Court of Justice, Land Peace, <i>Gravamina</i>. Luther. Ferdinand receives Austrian Habsburg territories</p> <p>1521-1529 Charles V in Spain</p> <p>1521 Alliance between emperor and pope against France</p> <p>1521-1525 Charles V's first war with Francis I. Peace of Madrid 1526</p> <p>1522 New regulation of life in Wittenberg by 'the common man'. Fraternal union of the west German knights</p> <p>1522-1523 Sickingen's cam- paign against Trier. RT Nuremberg; the resolution</p>	<p>1519 Universities of Leipzig and Erfurt turn humanist</p> <p>1520 <i>The Book of the Shrine at Halle</i></p> <p>1521 Eberlin von Günzburg's reform pro- gramme: the Fifteen Con- federates</p> <p>1522 Michael Ostendorfer - woodcut of the pilgrimage to the beautiful Madonna. Murner on the great fool Luther</p>
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1522-1523
Adrian VI

Popes	Princes	Luther	Religion and Theology	World and Church Politics	Culture
<p>1523-1534 Clement VII (Medici)</p>	<p>1525-1532 Elector John of Saxony</p>	<p>1524 Resumes lectures in Wittenberg</p> <p>1525 Marries Catherine of Bora. <i>De seruo arbitrio</i> (against Erasmus)</p>	<p>1523 Confession of guilt at Nuremberg by Adrian VI. Landgrave Philip of Hesse joins the Reformation</p> <p>1524 Staupitz dies. Erasmus writes on free will</p>	<p>stresses the <i>Gravamina</i> and demands a council. Mandate of the imperial government: until a council - nothing but the true, pure, unadul- terated gospel</p> <p>1523 Alliance between Adrian VI and Charles V and Henry VIII and Ferdinand and Milan against France</p> <p>1524 RT Nuremberg: Demand for a German National Council (which Charles forbids). Regensburg con- ference (Ferdinand, dukes of Bavaria, south German bishops) to execute Edict of Worms. Thomas Müntzer writes against Luther</p> <p>1524-1525 Peasants' War</p> <p>1525 Anti-Catholic unrest in Basel and Frankfurt. Alliance between Clement VII and Francis I against the emperor. Prussian Monastic property becomes a secular duchy as Polish fief. The cathedral chapters of the twelve suffragan sees of Mainz advise against Lutheranism</p>	<p>1523 Hutten dies. Hans Sachs, <i>The Wittenberg Nightingale</i></p> <p>1524 Expectation of prophesied Flood. Erasmus, <i>De libero arbitrio</i></p>
		<p>1529 Larger and Shorter Catechisms</p> <p>1530 At the Coburg (RT at Augsburg)</p>	<p>1526 RT at Speyer. Hesse now Evangelical</p> <p>1527 Evangelical visitations begin in electoral Saxony</p> <p>1528 Bern Reformed. Out- break of iconoclasm in Basel. Berthold Pirstinger writes first dogmatic treatise of the time</p> <p>1529 Marburg conversations between Luther and Zwingli</p> <p>1530 RT Augsburg</p>	<p>1526 Evangelical League - Saxony, Hesse, Brunswick and others</p> <p>1526 Holy League of Cognac (France, the pope, Milan, Venice, Florence, England) against Charles V - RT at Speyer: each estate to live 'as it considers it must answer to God and his imperial majesty'. The Turks in Buda</p> <p>1527 The sack of Rome</p> <p>1527-1529 Second war between Charles V and Francis I</p> <p>1528 The Pack forgery leads to first intra-German religious war through Philip of Hesse</p> <p>1529 RT Speyer: the Evan- gelicals protest. Basel forbids Catholic public worship. Suliman besieges Vienna. Lutheran assembly at Schmalkalden</p> <p>1530 Pope crowns Charles V in Bologna. RT Augsburg: Evangelical confessional documents</p> <p>1531 Schmalkald League: Electoral Saxony, Hesse, Brunswick, Lüneberg, Brunswick-Grubenhagen, Lübeck, Magdeburg, etc.; Bavaria joins in. Church</p>	<p>1527 Machiavelli dies</p> <p>1528 Wimpfeling, Peter Vischer, Dürer die. University of Marburg founded</p> <p>1531 Tilman Riemenschneider dies</p>

Popes	Princes	Luther	Religion and Theology	World and Church Politics	Culture
<p>1534-1549 Paul III (Farnese)</p>	<p>1532-1547 (1554) Elector John Frederick of Saxony</p> <p>1535-1571 Elector Joachim II of Branden- burg</p>		<p>1532-1533 Negotiations about the council, between emperor and pope. The Schmalkald League, invited by the pope, demand a 'free' council in Germany. Erasmus writes on reunion</p> <p>1535 Vergerio, as papal ambassador, tries to get a council. Paul III calls reforming cardinals, and calls councils for 1537 in Mantua</p> <p>1536 Wittenberg Concordat</p>	<p>of England breaks with Rome. Catholic victory over Zürich at Kappel. Zwingli dies</p> <p>1532 RT Regensburg and religious Peace of Nuremberg. Turkish threat. Charles V grants religious toleration until the council. Imperial victory over Turks. Alliance between France, Bavaria, electoral Saxony and Hesse</p> <p>1532-1540 Emperor again away from Germany</p> <p>1532-1533 Pope and emperor negotiate in Bologna concerning the council</p> <p>1534 Württemberg falls again to Duke Ulrich, becomes Evangelical</p> <p>1534-1535 Anabaptists in Münster</p> <p>1535 Catholic Defence League: Charles V, Ferdinand, Bavaria, Palatinate-Neuburg, Brandenburg, etc. Francis I makes pact with Suliman</p> <p>1535-1541 Charles V's wars in North Africa</p> <p>1536 Denmark becomes Lutheran</p>	<p>1533 Vercelli Stoss dies</p> <p>1535 Moore, Fisher, Ulrich Zazius die</p> <p>1536 Erasmus dies</p>

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<p>1539-1541 Duke Henry of Saxony (the pious)</p> <p>1541-1553 Duke Maurice of Saxony - from 1548, Elector of Saxony</p>	<p>1541 <i>Wider Hans Worst</i> (Duke Henry of Brunswick)</p>	<p>1537 Schmalkald League reject council (Luther's Schmalkald Articles). Reform proposals by the cardinals</p> <p>1539 The council moved. Religious conversations attempted</p> <p>1540 Religious conversation: Hagenau Worms-Regensburg (1541). Jesuits' order ratified by Paul III. Peter Faber, first Jesuit in Germany</p> <p>1541 Karlstadt dies</p>	<p>1536-1538 Third war of Charles V with Francis I (ally of the Turks)</p> <p>1537 Assembly at Schmalkalden rejects the council (Luther's Schmalkald Articles)</p> <p>1537-1543 Charles V's war against William of Jülich-Cleves-Berg over Gueldres, which he annexes to Netherlands</p> <p>1538 Holy League of Catholic princes (Charles V, Ferdinand, Paul III, Venice) against Turks. Catholic League in Nuremberg</p> <p>1539 Duke George of Saxony dies. Saxony and electoral Brandenburg Evangelical. Frankfurt Truce between Charles and the Protestants</p> <p>1540 Bigamy of Philip of Hesse</p> <p>1541 RT Regensburg. Charles V extends the truce with the Protestants. Turks conquer Buda</p>	<p>1538 John Sturm founds the Protestant Gymnasium in Strasburg</p>
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Popes	Princes	Luther	Religion and Theology	World and Church Politics	Culture
			<p>1542 Paul III calls council in Trent in 1543. Hermann von Wied introduces the Reformation in Cologne</p> <p>1543 Eck dies. Canisius becomes a Jesuit</p> <p>1544 Paul III protests against the religious concessions at Speyer, calls council to meet in Trent in 1545</p> <p>1544-1545 The Protestants reject the papal council. Cardinal Albrecht of Brandenburg dies</p>	<p>1542 RT Speyer (aid against Turks). After expulsion of Duke Henry by the Schmalkald League, Brunswick becomes wholly Reformed. Palatinate-Neuburg and Regensburg Reformed. Hermann von Wied Reformer in Cologne</p> <p>1542-1544 Fourth war of Francis I (and Suliman II) against Charles V</p> <p>1543 RT Nuremberg (aid against Turks). Alliance between emperor and England</p> <p>1544 RT Speyer: Charles makes concession in religious matters and concerning secularisation to the Evangelicals who are prepared to join him against the Turks and against France, Peace of Crépy in Charles' favour (Francis renounces alliance with Protestants)</p> <p>1544-1545 RT Worms. Truce between emperor and Suliman for eighteen months</p>	<p>1543 Nicholas Copernicus dies</p> <p>1544 University of Königsberg founded</p> <p>1545 Collected edition of Luther's Latin works</p>

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		<p>works, with autobiographical reminiscence</p> <p>1546 Death</p>	<p>1545-1547 (1549) The Council of Trent. Continued 1551-1552; 1562-1563</p> <p>1546 Religious conversations Regensburg. Luther dies. Hermann von Wied deposed</p> <p>1547 Cologne again Catholic</p> <p>1548 Interim and Reformation formula of the emperor. First Latin edition of the <i>Exercises</i> of St Ignatius of Loyola. Oratory of St Philip Neri</p> <p>1549 Various provincial and diocesan synods. The Jesuits in Ingolstadt; Catholic university in Dillingen</p>	<p>1546 Palatine Electorate becomes Evangelical (the last secular elector). RT Regensburg: the Schmalkald League do not attend. Alliance between pope and emperor. Alliance between emperor, Ferdinand, Bavaria; emperor and Maurice of Saxony. John Frederick of Saxony and Philip of Hesse outlawed</p> <p>1546-1547 Schmalkald War. Emperor victorious. Emperor concludes truce with Turks for five years</p> <p>1547-1548 RT Augsburg: Imperial Interim (cup of the laity and marriage of clergy until the council)</p> <p>1548 Maurice of Saxony becomes an elector</p>	
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
1547-1553 Edward VI of England
 1547-1559 Henry II of France
 1548-1572 Sigismund II of Poland

Popes	Princes	Luther	Religion and Theology	World and Church Politics	Culture
<p>1550-1555 Julius III (Del Monte)</p> <p>1555 Marcellinus I (Cervini)</p> <p>1555-1559 Paul IV (Carafa)</p>	<p>1553-1558 Mary Tudor of England (Catholic monarch)</p>		<p>1552 Cochlaeus dies</p> <p>1555 Catechism of Canisius</p>	<p>1550 Duke William IV of Bavaria dies. His chancellor, Leonard Eck dies. Imperial RT Augsburg</p> <p>1551 Alliance between Henry II and German Protestants against the emperor at Lochau (1552 treaty of Chambord)</p> <p>1552 Maurice of Saxony abandons emperor. Henry II occupies Metz, Toul, Verdun. Revolt of princes against Charles V. Treaty of Passau: free ratification of religion until next RT</p> <p>1552-1555 Plundering wars of Margrave Albrecht Alcibiades. Elector Maurice falls in battle 1553</p> <p>1554 Emperor hands over German affairs to Ferdinand</p> <p>1555 RT Augsburg (without the pope): equal rights granted to followers of Augsburg Confession and to Catholics</p>	<p>1553 Luke Cranach dies</p> <p>1554 University of Dillingen founded</p> <p>1555 Sleidan, <i>De statu religionis</i>, the most important historical work of the times</p>
	<p>1556-1598 Philip II of Spain</p>		<p>1556 Ignatius of Loyola dies</p>	<p>1556 Abdication of Charles V</p> <p>1557 Religious conversations at Worms: the last attempt initiated by the empire to achieve religious and Church unity</p> <p>1558 Charles V dies. Ferdinand becomes Roman Emperor (no longer crowned by the pope)</p>	<p>1556 Flacius Illyricus, <i>Catalogus testium veritatis</i> (collection of all 'pre-Reformation' teachers)</p>




Germany during the early seventeenth century, showing borders of the Holy Roman Empire.

Fitzgibbon, Constantine. A Concise History of Germany. New York: The Viking Press, 1973. p. 50.




Henderson, William O. Studies in the Economic Policy of Frederick The Great. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1963, pp. 13-19 of Appendix.




Henderson, Appendix.


ODER, WARTHE & NETZE RECLAMATION SCHEMES IN THE REIGN OF FREDERICK THE GREAT.




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
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Henderson, Appendix.



Henderson, Appendix.



CENTRES OF THE METAL INDUSTRIES IN THE WESTERN ERZGEBIRGE
(ELECTORATE OF SAXONY) IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Henderson, Appendix.

TABLE I
REICHSTAG ELECTIONS, 1871-1912
Popular Votes, Stated in Thousands
(Rearrangement of Data from Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, 1921-22)

	1871	1874 ^a	1877	1878	1881	1884	1887	1890	1893	1898	1903	1907	1912
Total number entitled to vote	7,856	8,523	8,943	9,124	9,090	9,363	9,770	10,146	10,628	11,441	12,531	13,353	14,342
Total number of valid votes cast	3,858	5,190	5,401	5,761	5,098	5,663	7,541	7,229	7,674	7,753	9,498	11,263	12,208
% of total number entitled to vote	50.8	60.9	60.4	63.1	56.1	60.4	77.2	71.3	72.2	67.8	75.8	84.4	84.5
<i>Parties</i>													
1. Consistently nationalistic major parties:													
German Conservatives	549	360	526	749	831	861	1,147	895	1,038	859	949	1,060	1,126
German Empire party	346	376	427	785	379	388	736	482	439	344	333	472	367
National Liberals	1,171	1,542	1,469	1,331	747	997	1,678	1,178	997	972	1,317	1,631	1,663
Anti-Semites							12	48	264	284	245	248	52
Total	2,066	2,278	2,422	2,866	1,957	2,246	3,573	2,603	2,738	2,459	2,844	3,411	3,208
% of total number of valid votes cast	53.1	43.9	44.9	49.7	38.4	39.7	47.4	36.0	35.7	31.7	30.0	30.3	26.3
% of total number entitled to vote	27.0	26.7	27.1	31.4	21.5	23.9	36.6	25.7	25.8	21.5	22.7	25.6	22.2
2. Parties which were divided, neutral, or "unreliable" on national questions:													
Various radical parties (including South German People's party)	643	523	598	607	1,182	1,093	1,062	1,308	1,092 ^b	863 ^b	873 ^b	1,234 ^b	1,497 ^c
Center	724	1,446	1,341	1,328	1,183	1,282	1,516	1,342	1,468	1,455	1,875	2,180	1,997
Total	1,367	1,969	1,939	1,935	2,365	2,375	2,578	2,650	2,560 ^b	2,318 ^b	2,748 ^b	3,414 ^b	3,494
% of total number of valid votes cast	35.2	37.9	35.9	33.6	46.4	41.9	34.2	36.7	33.3 ^b	29.9 ^b	28.9 ^b	30.3 ^b	28.6
% of total number entitled to vote	17.9	23.1	21.7	21.2	26.0	25.3	26.4	26.1	24.1 ^b	20.3 ^b	21.9 ^b	25.6 ^b	24.3
3. Consistently anti-nationalistic party:													
Social Democrats	124	352	498	437	312	550	783	1,427	1,787	2,107	3,011	3,259	4,250
% of total number of valid votes cast	3.2	6.8	9.1	7.6	6.1	9.7	10.1	19.7	23.2	27.2	31.7	28.9	34.8
% of total number entitled to vote	1.6	4.1	5.5	4.8	3.5	5.9	7.8	14.1	16.8	18.4	24.0	24.4	29.4
4. Particularist parties (Poles, Alsations, Guelpha, Danes), minor parties (including Agrarian League and Economic Union), and all others, combined	331	591	547	523	464	492	627	549	589	869	393	1,179	1,256
% of total number of valid votes cast	8.5	11.4	10.1	9.1	9.1	8.7	8.3	7.5	7.7	11.2	9.4	10.5	10.3
% of total number entitled to vote	4.3	7.0	6.1	5.7	5.1	5.3	6.4	5.4	5.5	7.6	7.2	8.8	8.7

^a Including Alsace-Lorraine.

^b The figures shown for the Radical parties in the elections of 1893-1907 include the following votes (with percentages) polled by the Radical Alliance, a nationalistic group which from 1893 to 1910 sided fairly consistently with the Conservatives and National Liberals on national questions:

Votes (000)	1893	1898	1903	1907
% of total number of valid votes cast	259	196	243	359
% of total number entitled to vote	3.4	2.5	2.6	3.3
	2.4	1.7	1.9	2.7

^c All Radical parties united as the Progressive People's party.

Mellen, Sydney. "The German People and the Postwar World" in the American Political Science Review, XXXVII, No. 4 (August, 1943), p. 608.

THE PROGRAM OF THE PARTY OF HITLER

The Twenty-Five Points

The National Socialist German Workers' Party at a great mass meeting on February 25th, 1920, in the Hofbrauhaus-Festsaal in Munich announced their Programme to the world.

In section 2 of the Constitution of Our Party this Programme is declared to be inalterable.

The Programme of the German Workers' Party is limited as to period. The leaders have no intention, once the aims announced in it have been achieved, of setting up fresh ones, merely in order to increase the discontent of the masses artificially, and so ensure the continued existence of the Party.

1. We demand the union of Germans to form a Great Germany on the basis of the right of the self-determination enjoyed by nations.

2. We demand equality of rights for the German People in its dealings with other nations, and abolition of the Peace Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.

3. We demand land and territory (colonies) for the nourishment of our people and for settling our superfluous population.

4. None but members of the nation may be citizens of the State. None but those of German blood, whatever their creed, may be members of the nation. No Jew, therefore, may be a member of the nation.

5. Anyone who is not a citizen of the State may live in Germany only as a guest and must be regarded as being subject to foreign laws.

6. The right of voting on the State's government and legislation is to be enjoyed by the citizen of the State alone. We demand therefore that all official appointments, of whatever kind, whether in the Reich, in the country, or in the smaller localities, shall be granted to citizens of the State alone.

We oppose the corrupting custom of Parliament of filling posts merely with a view to party considerations, and without reference to character or capability.

7. We demand that the State shall make it its first duty to promote the industry and livelihood of citizens of the State. If it is not possible to nourish the entire population of the State, foreign nationals (non-citizens of the State) must be excluded from the Reich.

8. All non-German immigration must be prevented. We demand that all non-Germans, who entered Germany subsequent to August 2nd, 1914, shall be required forthwith to depart from the Reich.

9. All citizens of the State shall be equal as regards rights and duties.

10. It must be the first duty of each citizen of the State to work with his mind or with his body. The activities of the individual may not clash with the interests of the whole, but must proceed within the frame of the community and be for the general good.

We demand therefore:

11. Abolition of incomes unearned by work.

12. In view of the enormous sacrifice of life and property

demand of a nation by every war, personal enrichment due to a war must be regarded as a crime against the nation. We demand therefore ruthless confiscation of all war gains.

13. We demand nationalisation of all businesses which have been up to the present formed into companies (Trusts).

14. We demand that the profits from wholesale trade shall be shared out.

15. We demand extensive development of provision for old age.

16. We demand creation and maintenance of a healthy middle class, immediate communalisation of wholesale business premises, and their lease at a cheap rate to small traders, and that extreme consideration shall be shown to all small purveyors to the State, district authorities and smaller localities.

17. We demand land-reform suitable to our national requirements, passing of a law for confiscation without compensation of land for communal purposes; abolition of interest on land loans, and prevention of all speculation in land.

18. We demand ruthless prosecution of those whose activities are injurious to the common interest. Sordid criminals against the nation, usurers, profiteers, etc. must be punished with death, whatever their creed or race.

19. We demand that the Roman Law, which serves the materialistic world order, shall be replaced by a legal system for all Germany.

20. With the aim of opening to every capable and industrious German the possibility of higher education and of thus

obtaining advancement, the State must consider a thorough reconstruction of our national system of education. The curriculum of all educational establishments must be brought into line with the requirements of practical life. Comprehension of the State idea (State sociology) must be the school objective, beginning with the first dawn of intelligence in the pupil. We demand development of the gifted children of poor parents, whatever their class or occupation, at the expense of the State.

21. The State must see to raising the standard of health in the nation by protecting mothers and infants, prohibiting child labour, increasing bodily efficiency by obligatory gymnastics and sports laid down by law, and by extensive support of clubs engaged in the bodily development of the young.

22. We demand abolition of a paid army and formation of a national army.

23. We demand legal warfare against conscious political lying and its dissemination in the Press. In order to facilitate creation of a German national Press we demand:

a) that all editors of newspapers and their assistants, employing the German language, must be members of the nation;

b) that special permission from the State shall be necessary before non-German newspapers may appear. These are not necessarily printed in the German language;

c) that non-Germans shall be prohibited by law from participating financially in or influencing German newspapers, and that the penalty for contravention of the law shall be

suppression of any such newspaper, and immediate deportation of the non-German concerned in it.

It must be forbidden to publish papers which do not conduce to the national welfare. We demand legal prosecution of all tendencies in art and literature of a kind likely to disintegrate our life as a nation, and the suppression of institutions which militate against the requirements above-mentioned.

24. We demand liberty for all religious denominations in the State, so far as they are not a danger to it and do not militate against the moral feelings of the German race.

The party, as such, stands for positive Christianity, but does not bind itself in the matter of creed to any particular confession. It combats the Jewish-materialist spirit within us and without us, and is convinced that our nation can only achieve permanent health from within on the principle: **THE COMMON INTEREST BEFORE SELF.**

25. That all the foregoing may be realized we demand the creation of a strong central power of the State. Unquestioned authority of the politically centralised Parliament over the entire Reich and its organisations; and formation of Chambers for classes and occupations for the purpose of carrying out the general laws promulgated by the Reich in the various States of the confederation.

The leaders of the Party swear to go straight forward--if necessary to sacrifice their lives--in securing fulfilment of the foregoing Points.

Munich, February 24th, 1920.

Weber, Eugen. The Western Tradition. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1959, p. 742.



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Hitler, the saviour 1923
pen and ink drawing, signed
Die Pleite no. 8, November
1923
'Siegfried Hitler'

Hess, Hans. George Grosz. New York:
Macmillan Publishing Co.,
1974, p. 118

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AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

TABLE I. PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL VALID VOTES OBTAINED BY SPECIFIED PARTIES¹ IN SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN, HANNOVER,² BAVARIA,³ AND THE REICH IN 1920, 1924, 1928, 1930, 1932

Election Year and Area	Party									
	Nazis		Socialists		Conservatives	Liberals		Catholic Land-Parties	Other Parties	
	NSDAP	SPD	USPD	KPD	DNVP	DDP	DVP	Z & BVP	Volk*	
1920										
Reich		21.6	18.8	1.7	14.4	8.5	13.9	19.6		1.5
Schles.-Hol.		37.3	3.0	6.1	20.5	9.4	18.4	.8		4.5
Hannover		24.6	16.3	.9	6.9	7.7	19.4	24.0		.3
Bavaria		16.4	13.0	2.0	7.0	8.1	10.5	38.9		4.1
1924 (July)										
Reich	2.6	20.5	.8	12.6	19.5	5.7	9.2	16.6		12.5
Schles.-Hol.	7.2	24.9		10.2	31.0	8.1	12.1	1.0		5.3
Hannover	4.3	25.2	.6	8.0	15.3	5.5	12.3	8.3		20.5
Bavaria	6.4	17.7	.5	8.0	9.5	3.0	2.7	35.2		17.0
1924 (December)										
Reich	3.0	26.0	.3	9.0	20.5	6.3	10.1	16.1		8.7
Schles.-Hol.	2.7	30.3		6.7	33.0	8.7	14.6	1.1		2.9
Hannover	4.1	30.7	.2	4.6	17.9	6.3	14.8	9.0		12.4
Bavaria	5.1	21.1	.4	5.1	14.4	3.8	4.3	34.6		11.2
1928										
Reich	2.6	29.8		10.6	14.2	4.9	8.7	15.2	2.9	11.1
Schles.-Hol.	4.0	35.3		7.9	23.0	5.7	13.7	1.1	.3	9.0
Hannover	4.3	37.6		4.5	9.3	4.9	12.2	7.7	12.1	7.4
Bavaria	6.4	24.4		3.8	10.0	3.1	3.8	31.1	.1	17.4
1930										
Reich	18.3	24.5		13.1	7.0	3.8	4.5	15.7	3.2	9.9
Schles.-Hol.	21.0	29.8		10.6	6.1	4.7	7.3	1.0	3.8	9.7
Hannover	22.3	31.1		6.3	6.3	3.5	6.9	8.3	2.0	12.4
Bavaria	17.9	20.9		5.9	2.0	1.8	1.9	31.1	4.3	14.2
1932 (July)										
Reich	37.3	21.6		14.3	5.9	1.0	1.2	15.7	.3	2.7
Schles.-Hol.	51.0	26.3		10.7	6.5	1.4	1.4	1.2		1.6
Hannover	44.9	23.6		8.0	8.2	1.1	1.7	8.4	.2	3.9
Bavaria	32.9	17.1		8.3	3.1	.5	.9	32.3		4.9

* A small farmers' party with conservative leanings.

¹ Description of political parties is as follows: NSDAP: *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei* (National Socialist German Labor Party) or "Nazis." DNVP: *Deutschnationale Volkspartei* (German People's Party) or "Conservatives." DVP: *Deutsche Volkspartei* (German Peoples Party) or "Right Liberals." DDP: *Deutsche Demokratische Partei* (German Democratic Party) or "Democrats," this party later changed its name to Staatspartei. SPD: *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (Social Democratic Party of Germany) or "Social Democrats." USPD: *Unabhaengige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany). KPD: *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* (Communist Party of Germany) or "Communists." The last three parties are also referred to in the text as "Labor" or "Socialist" or "Marxist" parties. Heberle, *op. cit.*, Catholic Parties include Z: Zentrum (Center Party) and BVP: Bayerische Volks Partei (Bavarian Peoples' Party).

² Hannover taken to include Wahlkreis 16, 17, and 18 in 1920 (Weser-Ems, Osthannover, Südhannover-Braunschweig) and Wahlkreis 14, 15, and 16, in other years. Numbering systems vary for different years but the same areas are included for the different years.

Loomis, Charles and J. Allan Beegle. "The Spread of Nazism in Rural Areas" in the American Sociological Review, Vol. II (1946), p. 728.

TABLE I
 REICHSTAG ELECTIONS, 1871-1912
 Popular Votes, Stated in Thousands
 (Rearrangement of Data from Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, 1921-22)

	1871	1874 ^a	1877	1878	1881	1884	1887	1890	1893	1898	1903	1907	1918
Total number entitled to vote	7,658	8,523	8,943	9,124	9,090	9,383	9,770	10,146	10,028	11,441	12,631	13,353	14,442
Total number of valid votes cast	3,838	5,190	5,401	5,761	5,098	5,663	7,541	7,229	7,674	7,753	9,498	11,263	12,208
% of total number entitled to vote	50.8	60.9	60.4	63.1	56.1	60.4	77.2	71.3	72.2	67.8	75.8	84.4	84.5
<i>Parties</i>													
1. Consistently nationalistic major parties:													
German Conservatives	549	360	526	749	831	861	1,147	895	1,038	859	949	1,060	1,128
German Empire party	346	376	427	785	379	368	738	482	439	344	333	472	367
National Liberals	1,171	1,542	1,469	1,331	747	997	1,678	1,178	997	972	1,317	1,631	1,663
Anti-Semites	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	48	264	284	245	248	52
Total	2,066	2,278	2,422	2,866	1,957	2,246	3,573	2,603	2,738	2,459	2,844	3,411	3,208
% of total number of valid votes cast	53.1	43.9	44.9	49.7	38.4	39.7	47.4	36.0	35.7	31.7	30.0	30.3	26.3
% of total number entitled to vote	27.0	26.7	27.1	31.4	21.5	23.9	36.6	25.7	25.8	21.5	22.7	25.6	22.2
2. Parties which were divided, neutral, or "unre- lisable" on national questions:													
Various radical parties (including South German People's party)	643	523	598	607	1,182	1,093	1,062	1,308	1,092 ^b	803 ^b	873 ^b	1,234 ^b	1,467 ^a
Center	724	1,446	1,341	1,328	1,183	1,282	1,516	1,342	1,468	1,455	1,875	2,180	1,997
Total	1,367	1,969	1,939	1,935	2,365	2,375	2,578	2,650	2,560 ^b	2,318 ^b	2,748 ^b	3,414 ^b	3,494
% of total number of valid votes cast	35.2	37.9	35.9	33.6	46.4	41.9	34.2	36.7	33.3 ^b	29.9 ^b	28.9 ^b	30.3 ^b	28.6
% of total number entitled to vote	17.9	23.1	21.7	21.2	26.0	25.3	26.4	26.1	24.1 ^b	20.3 ^b	21.9 ^b	25.6 ^b	24.2
3. Consistently anti-nationalistic party: Social Democrats	124	352	493	437	312	550	763	1,427	1,787	2,107	3,011	3,259	4,250
% of total number of valid votes cast	3.2	6.8	9.1	7.6	6.1	9.7	10.1	19.7	23.3	27.2	31.7	28.9	34.8
% of total number entitled to vote	1.6	4.1	5.5	4.8	3.5	5.9	7.8	14.1	16.8	18.4	24.0	24.4	29.4
4. Particularist parties (Poles, Alsations, Guelphe, Danes), minor parties (including Agrarian League and Economic Union), and all others, combined	331	591	547	523	464	492	627	549	563	669	893	1,179	1,256
% of total number of valid votes cast	8.6	11.4	10.1	9.1	9.1	8.7	8.3	7.6	7.7	11.2	9.4	10.5	10.3
% of total number entitled to vote	4.3	7.0	6.1	5.7	5.1	5.3	6.4	5.4	5.5	7.6	7.2	8.8	8.7

Mellen, Sydney. "The German People and the Postwar World" in the American Political Science Review, XXXVII, No. 4 (August, 1943), p. 608.

	January, 1919 (Before Versailles and failures of Weimar Republic)	May, 1924 (After Versailles, Ruhr occupation, and inflation)		May, 1928 (After Dawes settlement, American loans, reconstruction, and moderate recovery)	
		Results	Change as compared with Jan., 1919	Results	Change as compared with May, 1924
Nationalistic parties:					
Combined votes	4,467,000	11,537,000	+7,070,000	9,242,000	-2,295,000
% of total	14.7%	39.4%		30.0%	
Hitler party votes included	—	1,918,000	+1,918,000	810,000	-1,108,000
Non-socialist republican parties:					
Combined votes	11,897,000	7,335,000	-4,562,000	8,636,000	+1,301,000
% of total	39.1%	25.1%		28.1%	
Labor parties:					
Combined votes	13,826,000	9,937,000	-3,889,000	12,418,000	+2,481,000
% of total	45.5%	33.9%		40.4%	

Mellen, Sydney. "The German People and the Postwar World" in the American Political Science Review, XXXVII, No. 4 (August, 1943), p. 619.

A comparison of the elections of May, 1928, and July, 1932, throws a little light on where most of the Nazi votes may have come from. The following table summarizes the net changes over this four-year period:

Parties or groups of parties showing net gains		New voters and parties or groups of parties showing net losses	
Net gains:		New voters	6,129,000
Nazis	12,936,000	Net losses:	
Catholic parties combined	1,124,000	Nationalists	2,204,000
Labor parties combined	825,000	People's party	2,244,000
Parties receiving under 100,000 votes each, combined	<u>21,000</u>	Small nationalistic parties combined	1,371,000
Total net change	14,900,000	Democratic party	1,134,000
		Small republican parties combined	<u>1,824,000</u>
		Total net change	14,900,000

Mellen, p. 621

THE JEWS

Chronology

- 1933
1 April First official boycott of Jewish shops, lawyers and doctors.
Demands for the removal of Jewish pupils and students from schools and universities.
- 1934
Aryan origin gradually becomes the prerequisite of professional life in many spheres; anti-Jewish propaganda and incitement increases.
- 1935
15 September Promulgation of the Nuremberg Laws for the protection of German blood and German honour.
14 November National Law of Citizenship. First decree of the National Law of Citizenship: definition of the term 'Jew' and of the Mischling (mixed-blood) status. The Aryan paragraph becomes a pre-condition of every official appointment. First decree of the law for the protection of German blood and honour. Marriages between Jews and second-generation Mischlinge prohibited.
- 1936
Summer A decline of the anti-Semitic campaign because the Olympic Games were taking place in Berlin.
- 1937
Spring Intensification of the Aryanization process, by which Jewish owners lose their businesses without any legal justification.
- 12 June Secret order from Heydrich concerning protective custody of 'sacral violators' (Rassenschänder) after they have served their prison sentence.
- 1938
13 March The Anschluss of Austria, where all anti-Jewish legislation in force in the Reich is applied immediately.
26 April Decree concerning the registration of all Jewish wealth exceeding 5,000 marks.
- 9 June Destruction of the Munich synagogue.
14 June Third decree of the Reich Citizenship Law: the registration and marking of all remaining Jewish enterprises
- 10 August Destruction of the Nuremberg synagogue.
17 August Second decree of the law concerning change of first names and surnames: the introduction of the compulsory prefixes Sarah and Israel, to come into force on 1 January 1939.
- 5 October Passports for Jews are only valid if they have the red letter J stamped in them.

- 28 October Expulsion of 17,000 former Polish Jews domiciled in Germany.
- 7 November Assassination of von Rath, chancellor of the embassy in Paris, by Herschel Grünspar.
- 9 and 10 November 'Crystal Night' pogrom takes place throughout Germany. Destruction of synagogues, shops and flats. More than 20,000 Jews imprisoned.
- 12 November Decrees concerning elimination of German Jews from the economy. Jews have to pay a collective fine of 1.25 thousand million marks and in addition pay for all destruction caused by the Nazis in the course of the pogrom.
- 15 November Expulsion of all Jewish pupils from schools.
- 3 December Decree concerning compulsory Aryanization of all Jewish enterprises and shops.
- 1939 Confiscation of all Jewish valuables.
- 30 April Law concerning Jewish tenancies. Legal preparation for the concentration of Jewish families in 'Jewish houses'.
- 1 September Jews forbidden to be out of doors after 8:00 p.m. in winter and 9:00 p.m. in summer.
- 23 September Confiscation of all wireless sets owned by Jews.
- 1940
- 12 and 13 February First deportations of Jews from Germany, mainly from the province of Pomerania.
- 22 October Deportation of Jews from Baden, the Saar and Alsace-Lorraine.
- 1941
- 7 March Employment of German Jews as compulsory labour.
- 31 July Heydrich charged by Goering with the evacuation of all European Jews in German-occupied territories.
- 1 September Decree compelling Jews to wear the yellow star from 19 September. Further limitation of Jewish freedom of movement.
- 17 and 18 September Beginning of the general deportation of German Jews.
- 1942
- 20 January The Wannsee conference, concerned with the 'final solution' of the Jewish question.
- 24 April Ban on Jews using public transport.
- June Beginning of mass-gassing at Auschwitz.
- 18 September Drastic reduction of food rations for Jews in the Reich.
- 30 September Hitler declares publicly that the Second World War will result in the destruction of European Jewry.
- 1943
- 27 February Start of deportation of Jews employed in the Berlin armaments industry.
- 1944 Start of the death-marches, but which the SS drives back inmates of concentration camps threatened by the advance of the Red Army into the interior of Germany.

End of
October Last gassings at Auschwitz.
27 November The Auschwitz crematoria are blown up.
1945
26 January Auschwitz liberated by Soviet troops.
15 April British troops liberate Bergen-Belsen.

Since 1945 time has slowly done its healing work--though not for the Jews of Europe. Even Russia, which suffered an estimated 20 million casualties at the hands of the Nazis, today has a larger population than prewar.

But world Jewry will never again number 18 million. Nor will synagogues ever rise again in the old Jewish heartland between the Baltic and Black Sea on soil fertilized with ashes. This will be Hitler's permanent memorial--and he would hardly have wished for another. History will record that just as hatred of the Jews was the kernel of Nazi theory so their murder was the culmination of Nazi practice

Grunberger, Richard. The Twelve-Year Reich. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, p. 467.

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