An Analysis of Two Types of Commitment That Bring an Objective Bond Into Existence

The problem is to elucidate the nature of two types of commitments that involve an objective bond, the promise and the vow. The basis for the discussion is an article by Adolf Reinach, "The Apriori Foundations of Civil Law''. Promising and the promise are compared and contrasted with vowing and the .vow. The method used is an attitude of openness to the data which present themselves. The essential chararcteristics of these entities are examined.

This, together with the sense in which a bond that would be objective in one sense can also be called "subjective" in another sense. will be discussed below.
A commitment that does not involve an objective bond could be. for example. a commitment to an ideal or to a way of life. Here it could be that a person merely makes an internal resolution to be committed. If the commitment is taken seriously. he will make the ideal a priority in all the relevant decisions that he makes . As will be seen. a purely internal resolution is not a type of act that can bring an objective claim and obligation into existence. A social act is one which is not only directed to another person, but which is addressed to another per scn , and so needs to be announced. 2 Promising is such an act; thus a t ype of commitment that does involve an objective bond is the promise.
The present discussion will be limited to the type of commitments which do involve an objective bond. Specificall y , the promise and the vow will be chosen for discussion.
It is important to recognize that there is a distinction between the act of promising and the promise itself, 3 and similarly a distinction between the making of a vow and the vow itself.
Clearly. promising, which can also be expressed as making a promise, brings the promise itself into existence. Similarly, vowing, or the making of a vow, brings a vow into existence. Care will be taken to never confuse the verb with the noun, so to speak. 4 It will be assumed throughout this paper that the promise and the vow are each identical to the obligatory relationship, or bond, that is brought into existence by promising or vowing.
The nature of the act of promising and the promise itself will first be analyzed from Adolf Reinach's point of view which he explains in his article: "The Apriori Foundations of Civil Law". An exposition and further clarification will be made, and some related questions not discussed by Reinach will be addressed. On the basis of the above analysis, the making of a vow and the vow itself will next be analyzed. The analysis will be limited to one particular type of vow, the marriage vow. Thus a comparison and contrast between promising and the making of a marriage vow on the one hand, and between the promise and the marriage vow on the other, . will be accomplished. I will buy you that model airplane". then it seems that the promise would dissolve. Thus it appears that another way for a promise to meet an end is for the promise to become unusually difficult, or a hardship. to fulfill. at some time after the promise has been made.
In this case it seems that the obligation is dissolved and thus the promise ceases to exist. If it will be a hardship to perform an action even before the promise is made and neither party realize it.
then it seems that the obligation does not come into existence from the beginning.
It was mentioned above that there were two exceptions to the promise ceasing to exist at the death of the promisee or promiser. Taking the more complicated case of the promisee himself making a promise to accept the promise made to him. the analysis again depends on whether the content is morally wrong or not. If the content is morally wrong. then the situation would be analyzed as explained earlier.
If the content is not morally wrong but simply not to the advantage of the original promisee. then it might seem that the original promisee has waived his right to waive his claim by promising not to waive it. Reinach. however. holds that even if one has promised to accept a service.
It is false to say that the claim cannot then be waived. for the ability to waive is grounded immutably in the essence of a claim. But even if the claim is waived there still very much remains. on the basis of the second promise. an obligation in the holder of the original c laim/O So it seems that one can never promise not to waive a claim.
but only promise to accept the conte . nt of a promise. If one waives the claim. then the original promisor no longer has an obligation. Mendus. which will be referred to below.) In fact in the taking of marriage vows. each person is normally asked whether they promise to "love honor and obey''. and the vow has been defined as a "solemn promise ••• an act by which one consecrates or devotes himself to The vow, which is the product, so to speak, of the vowing, or making of the vow, seems to be nothing more than the bond which the act of vowing brings into existence. Because of this, the vow will at times be referred to simply as 'the bond', and of course it should be understood that if the term vow is used, it refers to the bond.
Since the act of vowing brings claim and obligation into existence, and as mentioned above the existence of the claim and obligation is an objective one, the act of vowing must be more than simply an expression of intention • . This follows for the same reasons that the act of promising must be more thah simply an expression of intention to account for the existence of an objectively existing claim and obligation; namely, that an expression of intention does not bring an objective bond into existence.