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Conflicting Interpretations of Nietzsche's Will to Power

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CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF NIETZSCHE'S WILL TO POWER

BY

WESLEY HOFFMAN

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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ABSTRACT

In Conflicting Interpretations of Nietzsche's Will to Power the problem of discovering the nature of the will to power is investigated. Chapter one investigates the conflicting statements that Nietzsche makes about the will to power. Because there are so many contradictory statements interpretations of his writings become useful. The two interpretations that are considered in this paper are Walter Kaufmann's and Martin Heidegger's. Kaufmann's interpretation can be classified as scientific or psychological. Kaufmann believes that the will to power is useful only as a tool for explaining human behavior. He also believes that Nietzsche arrived at his conception of the will to power through empirical observation. Heidegger's interpretation can be classified as metaphysical. He views the will to power as the center of Nietzsche's entire philosophy. Heidegger believes that Nietzsche intended for the will to power to be an explanation of the physical world. In order to evaluate these conflicting interpretations there is a chapter in this paper which investigates Nietzsche's view of art. It is obvious that the will to power and art are closely related in Nietzsche's philosophy so any interpretation of the will to power should conform to his artistic views. Heidegger's view conforms better than Kaufmann's. This paper concludes that Kaufmann seems to understand the early Nietzsche while Heidegger grasps the later, metaphysical Nietzsche.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: WHY THERE IS A CONFLICT</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: KAUFMANN'S INTERPRETATION</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: HEIDEGGER'S INTERPRETATION</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: NIETZSCHE'S VIEW OF ARTISTIC CREATION</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: EVALUATION OF THE TWO INTERPRETATIONS</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**GUIDE TO ABREVIATIONS**

| Beyond Good and Evil                      | BGE |
| The Birth of Tragedy                     | BT  |
| Daybreak                                 | D   |
| The Gay Science                          | GS  |
| The Genealogy of Morals                  | GM  |
| Human All Too Human                      | HA  |
| Thus Spoke Zarathustra                   | Z   |
| Twilight of the Idols                    | TI  |
| The Will to Power                        | WP  |
INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of any serious discussion about Nietzsche a brief mention of his place in history is essential. Nietzsche himself considered the time in which he was writing an important one and he frankly admitted that it had considerable impact on the formulation of his ideas. He was born in 1844 and raised primarily by his mother and sister. At the age of twenty he studied philology and theology at the University of Bonn. After only a year he quit theology and began studies at Leipzig. At the young age of twenty-five he was given the chair of classical letters at the University of Basel, and his doctorate, without the customary examination. Three years later, in 1972, he published his first book entitled Birth of Tragedy (Solomon vii). In the following sixteen years Nietzsche would write close to fifteen books as well as innumerable notes and articles. The goal in this introductory paragraph is not to give a detailed biography of Nietzsche's life, the goal is to mention the time period in which Nietzsche was actively thinking and writing. He reacts against the metaphysics of such influential German thinkers as Kant(1724-1804), Hegel(1770-1831) and Schopenhauer(1788-1860) while providing inspiration for much of twentieth century Continental philosophy. His own writings attest to the rejection of his
German predecessors metaphysics while many interpreters have traced contemporary ideas back to Nietzsche's influence. Danto points out that there are striking resemblances between Nietzsche's view of truth and that of the early pragmatists. Also, there are resemblances to Wittgenstein, Quine, Sellers, Goodman, and Putnam. Furthermore, West believes that Nietzsche's ideas on epistemology and metaphysics have had such an enormous influence on the contemporary intellectual scene in both Europe and the United States that he calls him "the central figure of post modern thought in the west" (Clark 3). Even Freud, whose influence on twentieth century thought cannot be denied, said of Nietzsche "that he had a more penetrating knowledge of himself than any other man who ever lived or was ever likely to live" (qtd. in "Nietzsche", Encyclopedia of Philosophy 505). So, Nietzsche's philosophy involves reaction to early 19th century German philosophy (and a reaction to almost all philosophy since the ancient Greeks), and it has a definite influence reaching up to the present.

Now that it is clear where Nietzsche stands in the timeline of philosophy, a brief mention of his style of writing is appropriate. Nietzsche says, of his own style, that he is practicing 'psychological observation' and that he is contributing to the 'history' or the 'genealogy' of morals (Wilcox 2). These proclamations imply a certain objectivity that places Nietzsche in the role of an investigator. In much of his work he does in fact "Philosophize with a hammer"(TI
463), breaking down established ideas or "idols" in order to see what is left. But, this neutrality does not hold up in all of his writings, he also takes sides. Nietzsche does more than objectively evaluate particular ideas, he openly attacks the herd, slave morality, metaphysics, socialism and Christianity (to name only a few). He also builds up his own value systems such as the will to power. This dual aspect of Nietzsche's writings will become an important consideration of this paper. While criticizing metaphysical theory in one statement he will, in another statement, espouse his own ideas (will to power and eternal recurrence) which appear to be essentially metaphysical. Also, several of his assertions are ambiguous, the same sentence can be used to support both a pro-metaphysical and an anti-metaphysical interpretation. For this reason, the interpretations of Nietzsche's writings become almost as important as the writings themselves.

It is mentioned above that there is a certain ambiguity as to where Nietzsche stands on metaphysical thought. This uncertainty is magnified when the concept of the will to power is examined. The will to power can be viewed as a metaphysical theory. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines metaphysical thought as "a-priori speculation on questions that cannot be answered by scientific observation and experiment"("Metaphysics" 289). Heidegger defines the metaphysical as simply "a question of being". The metaphysical interpretation of the will to power can be
classified here as Heidegger's interpretation and it will be contrasted, in this paper, with Kaufmann's interpretation which can be called psychological or scientific. Kaufmann is openly hostile to Heidegger's interpretation, and in his article for the Encyclopedia of Philosophy he states that:

As a metaphysical theory about the universe or ultimate reality, the doctrine [will to power] need not be taken seriously....Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, which makes this metaphysic the center of his thought and significance, depends on a complete disregard for the context of the passages he sites and the Gestalt of Nietzsche's thought generally. He assigns to Nietzsche a totally uncongenial role in the history of western thought, [and] disregards the bulk of his writings..("Nietzsche" 510)

It is clear that these two interpreters of Nietzsche stand on opposite sides of the same fence.

The disagreement between Kaufmann and Heidegger about the status of the will to power is the major consideration of this paper. The best way to discuss this conflict is, first, to show as thoroughly as possible why there is a conflict. Chapter one of this paper will be devoted to looking at key selections from Nietzsche's texts and showing how they paint an ambiguous picture of the will to power. Chapters two and three will discuss Kaufmann and Heidegger's different interpretations of the will to power. Also, the passages that are used in chapter one will be examined from the viewpoint of each interpretation (other passages will be explored as well). Chapter four will go back to discussing Nietzsche directly. His theory dealing with art and the artist will be examined, and special attention will be given to the
unquestionable connection that art has to the will to power. In chapter five the controversy between Kaufmann and Heidegger will be resumed and the purpose of the paper will be fulfilled. Both interpretations will be evaluated according to their consistency with Nietzsche's texts. Of special interest is the consistency that each interpretation has with Nietzsche's ideas about art.
Heidegger's metaphysical conception of the will to power and Kaufmann's psychological conception are the only two interpretations under consideration in this paper. Before looking closely at these it is necessary to find out why there is the opportunity for different interpretations of this idea of the will to power.

There are several instances where it appears that Nietzsche is giving a direct account of the will to power as a metaphysical force, as something that is "the basic force of the entire universe" (Kaufmann 207). Many of these direct references occur in his later writings and appear as a collection of notes entitled The Will to Power (the notes in The Will to Power were not organized by Nietzsche himself). It is important to note that this chapter is meant to set up the conflict in Nietzsche's writings. Detailed analysis of the passages that are used will come later in the paper. True to the ambiguous nature of most of Nietzsche's work, many of the lines that are cited in order to support the metaphysical interpretation can be used to support a psychological one as well. Nevertheless, the passages that are cited in the first part of this chapter are striking in their blunt assertions.
that the will to power is metaphysical. For example:

My theory contends that all productive energy is will to power and that there is no physical, dynamic or psychological force beside it. (qtd. in Pfeffer 145)

Here, the mention of there being no other psychological or physical force seems to point directly to something that extends beyond human behavior. The above lines imply that this 'force' is something that underlies so-called physical reality as well. In another line this distinction is made more clearly. The line comes from note #1067 in The Will to Power.

Do you know what 'the world', is to me? .... This world is the will to power—and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power—and nothing besides. (WP 550)

Here 'the world' is said to be the will to power and human beings (whom he is apparently addressing) are also this will to power. This too appears to be telling the reader that the will to power is meant to explain more than just human behavior. It seems as if it also comprises the character of the external world, or of all 'being' (to put it in Heideggerian terms). If this was not Nietzsche's point it seems strange that he would distinguish between the will to power's relation to 'the world' and its relation to human beings. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche reacts to the physicists' belief in "nature's conformity to law". He talks about someone coming along who has a different way of interpretation, someone who knows how to read something different out of the same nature and the same phenomena.
An interpreter who could bring before your eyes the universality and unconditionality of all "will to power" in such a way that almost any word and even the word "tyranny" would finally seem unsuitable or as a weakening and moderating metaphor-as too human-- (BGE 30)

Once again there is the comparison between the will to power as it relates to the world, in this case nature, and the condition of human beings. This excerpt seems to tell us that we as human beings do not even have an accurate word for what this underlying force of the world is like. Since physics is the subject being discussed and the will to power is what an 'opposite' interpretation of nature discovers, it would be logical to assume that the will to power is something that refers to physical things as well as human traits.

Perhaps the most blatant assertion of a metaphysical will to power occurs in the next selection which is from Beyond Good and Evil. Maudemarie Clark refers to the entire passage (passage #36) as the only place in all of Nietzsche's published writings where a clear case is made for a metaphysical conception of the will to power (Clark 212). The last sentence of the passage stands out as the most compelling.

The world seen from within, the world described and defined according to its "intelligible character"- it would be "will to power" and nothing else.- (BGE 48)

Nietzsche mentions 'the world seen from within' which is very metaphysical language. It is reminiscent of Kant's thing-in-itself or of 'lifting the veil of maya', which Nietzsche discusses in Birth of Tragedy in order to describe the
The storm broke violently in gale and fury; I experienced an enormous feeling of stimulation.... How different the lightning, the storm and hail: free forces without morals. How glad, how strong they are; pure willing without the obscuring activity of the intellect. (qtd. in Pfeffer 203)

Not only is the storm directly associated with 'pure willing', but human features such as morals and the intellect are set apart from this 'willing'. This distinction between the will to power and humanness is one which occurs more than once in Nietzsche's writings (as is shown in this section) and it is a key element to the idea that the will to power is metaphysical. The above excerpt, as well as the others that have been used, go a long way toward persuading a 'casual reader' that Nietzsche intended the will to power to be metaphysical. But, what has not been discussed yet are Nietzsche's extremely anti-metaphysical views and the alternative interpretations to the passages cited so far.

Several of Nietzsche's texts suggest that he clearly rejects metaphysics. Sometimes this 'rejection' is so passionate that it might be better classified as an attack.
Since Kaufmann's interpretation is one which holds that the will to power is not metaphysical but simply a theory regarding human motivation these passages are of special interest to his point of view. In one of his earliest books, *Human all too Human*, Nietzsche does not waste any time before launching into a criticism of metaphysical knowledge. In the second paragraph he states that "there are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths" (HA 13). Further down he states that it is a mark of higher culture to value little unpretentious truths rather than the "errors handed down by metaphysical and artistic ages of men, which blind us and make us happy" (HA 13). In these brief excerpts Nietzsche's rejection of metaphysics can be seen in two ways. First, the rejection of 'absolute truth' and 'eternal facts' implies that the activity of formulating a metaphysical theory is a waste of time. Secondly, his preference for unpretentious truths seems to show that he resents the actual theories that have come out of metaphysics. He is reacting against both the practicing of metaphysics as well as established metaphysical theory.

Aside from criticizing metaphysics in general Nietzsche appears to have contempt for metaphysicians. In the passage "on self- overcoming" in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* he speaks about those who want to make all being thinkable (metaphysicians). He says that it is a well founded suspicion that being is already not thinkable. These metaphysicians
cause being to "become smooth and serve the spirit as its mirror and reflection" and are guilty of creating a world before which they can kneel (Z 225). What this is saying is that the metaphysician who seeks out being is in fact only creating a fiction that serves his/her own human spirit. This does not seem like the kind of behavior that Nietzsche would want to associate himself with, nor does it speak highly of his reverence for metaphysics. In another passage Nietzsche makes his contempt for those who practice metaphysics clear.

When we hear the hair-splitting metaphysicians and prophets of the after-world speak, we others feel indeed that we are the 'poor in spirit', but that ours is the heavenly kingdom of change, with spring and autumn, summer and winter, and theirs the after-world, with its grey, everlasting frosts and shadows. (qtd. in Wilcox 112)

Again, this sounds like a personal attack on those who practice metaphysics. Also present in this line is his denial of 'absolute truth' and 'eternal fact' which are both key elements in the presentation of any in metaphysical theory. The contrast between the change of this world and the static, barren quality of the 'after-world' attest to this denial.

It was mentioned earlier that in Human All Too Human Nietzsche launches several attacks on metaphysical theory and practice. Still early on in the text he rails against past metaphysical theory again.

..All that has hitherto made metaphysical assumptions valuable, terrible, delightful to [people], all that has begotten these assumptions, is passion, error and self-deception; the worst of all methods of acquiring knowledge, not the best of all, have taught belief in them. (HA 15)
Here it seems clear that Nietzsche has little respect for any established metaphysical idea. This criticism in and of itself does not necessarily prevent him from forming his own metaphysical theory though. Criticizing past metaphysical theories is not the same criticizing the possibility for metaphysical knowledge. What does make it difficult for Nietzsche to posit his own metaphysical theory is his rejection of 'absolute truth' and 'eternal fact'. Also, there are several places where he directly denies the possibility of having knowledge about a metaphysical world. Again, *Human All Too Human* provides evidence of this.

—For one could assert nothing at all of the metaphysical world except that it was a being-other, an inaccessible, incomprehensible being other; it would be a thing with negative qualities. —Even if the existence of such a world were never so well demonstrated, it is certain that knowledge of it would be the most useless of all knowledge: (HA 15-16)

With this quote in mind, it seems unlikely that Nietzsche would put forth his own theory of the will to power as being metaphysical. He openly states that even if there were an underlying metaphysical reality, knowledge about it would be useless. The amount of emphasis he places on the will to power seems to make it incompatible with a 'useless' metaphysical theory.

A possible defence for the metaphysical view, at this point, is to mention that these tirades against metaphysics occur in Nietzsche's earlier works. One could claim that Nietzsche simply reevaluated this position and constructed his
own metaphysical theory after all. Mention of the will to power as a metaphysical force occurs mostly in his later writings anyway. The problem with this defence is that a rejection of the metaphysical still exists in works written as late as 1888. In *Twilight of the Idols* Nietzsche speaks eagerly about the end of the idea of a "true" or metaphysical world.

The "true" world—an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating—an idea which has become useless and superfluous—consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it! (TI 485)

This eagerness to 'abolish' the "true" world seems to be equivalent to an eagerness to end metaphysical speculation and it would look very unusual standing next to a metaphysical conception of the will to power.

It has been established that Nietzsche expresses strong anti-metaphysical views in several of his texts. This appears to be damaging to a position that represents the will to power as metaphysical. After all, how could a thinker present a metaphysical doctrine while being so opposed to metaphysics? What is also damaging to the metaphysical view is the dual nature of many of the texts that can be used to support it. When Nietzsche states that "This world is the will to power and nothing besides!" (WP 550) the impact is somewhat lessened by the preceding line which states; "Do you know what 'the world' is to me?" (WP 550). The fact that 'the world' is in quotation marks makes the meaning of 'the world' ambiguous, also, Nietzsche seems to admit that this is only how the world
appears to him. The first passage that was taken from Beyond Good and Evil (passage # 22) runs across similar ambiguities. It is only stating that a clever interpreter could demonstrate the universality of all will to power. Nietzsche also seems to distance himself from the second passage that was used from Beyond Good and Evil (# 36). Throughout the passage he slips in and out of treating the whole argument as a hypothetical one, also, he only claims to define the world according to its 'intelligible character' and not how it really is.

It is clear that a metaphysical representation of the will to power has some problems to overcome. The view must be reconciled with a host of anti-metaphysical statements, and the ambiguities that exist in the places where Nietzsche does assert that the will to power is metaphysical must be sorted through. Heidegger's strategy for overcoming these problems is that he admits the contradiction between the anti-metaphysical statements and the metaphysical concept of the will to power. In fact he says that the rejection of metaphysics and 'absolute truth' is a necessary outcome of his metaphysical interpretation of Nietzsche. Also, there are still some passages which seem to make unequivocal claims about the will to power representing some kind of underlying metaphysical reality.

Kaufmann's interpretation also has some problems to deal with. The passages which occur in Nietzsche's later writings do imply a concept of the will to power that is more than
psychological. While Kaufmann can point to evidence of Nietzsche's denial of metaphysics in response to this, this strategy is a double edged sword. Along with the denial of metaphysics Nietzsche includes a denial of all truth. This threatens to prevent Nietzsche from asserting anything of value. While Heidegger views this denial of truth as the outcome of a metaphysical theory, Kaufmann denies that the denial of truth is really a denial of all truth. Kaufmann's position on this problem, as well as his overall interpretation of Nietzsche's will to power, will become more clear in the next chapter.
The best strategy for presenting Kaufmann's interpretation of Nietzsche's will to power is to show first how Kaufmann views the evolution of this concept. He points to one of the first places where the idea of power makes an appearance. In the notes for The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche speaks about power in a negative way, considering it to be equivalent to worldly power, social success, making friends, and influencing people. In these notes Nietzsche speaks about "Power which is always evil" (qtd. in Kaufmann 180) and in the meditation on Wagner (also an early writing) he asks: "Who of you will renounce power, knowing and experiencing that power is evil?" (qtd. in Kaufmann 180). He seems to have used Wagner as a case study for this negative aspect of power. Kaufmann points to the first time the phrase 'will to power' is explicitly used and mentions its relation to Wagner. The passage occurs in one of the notes of the late eighteen-seventies and states that "Fear and will to power explain our strong consideration for the opinions of men" (qtd. in Kaufmann 179). Kaufmann interprets this quote as reflecting Nietzsche's disappointment in how Wagner became corrupted by power. He apparently saw Wagner as making his peace with the
church and the state because of the desire to maintain and increase his 'power'. While the idea of power makes its first appearance as a negative force it is clear that Nietzsche saw more potential in it. Even though power is used to describe negative desires in the meditation on Wagner it also is shown to have the potential to be "entirely transformed into artistic creativity"(qtd. in Kaufmann 180).

It is appropriate to look at how the will to power develops into a larger theory. In Human All Too Human Nietzsche delves into psychological observation. It is clear that Kaufmann admires this phase in Nietzsche's writings:

The irrational springs of human behavior are uncovered expertly, and the self-styled vivisectionist cuts mercilessly through prejudices and conventions to lay bare the hidden motivations of our actions. (Kaufmann 183)

One example of how this work explains human behavior in the context of power is seen in the analysis of gratitude.

Without the satisfaction of gratitude, the powerful man would have shown himself powerless and would hence be considered so. (HA 36)

Kaufmann interprets this quote as saying that when someone helps me there is the implication that I am powerless, I am therefore degraded in the other person's eyes as well as my own. I then thank the person and reverse the implication, now he has done something for me as if he were my servant. Gratitude becomes a form of revenge here prompted by this idea of the will to power (Kaufmann 184). In this work Nietzsche also describes pity as a form of power. The neurotic's desire for pity is really a desire to hurt. This way he at least has
one power, the power to hurt others. In *Human All Too Human* Nietzsche goes on to explain our tendency to conform, Christian self abasement, and our desire for freedom as all being manifestations of this early form of the will to power. In a short aphorism from the same work he states, "He that humbleth himself wills to be exalted" (HA 48). Kaufmann points out that this statement shows that even an apparent negation of the will to power, caused by humbling one's self, can be explained in terms of desiring more power. Here the concept is indeed growing larger but Kaufmann tells us that it is not yet a psychological monism. He contends that first the will to power is shown as a craving for worldly success as in the case of Wagner, then it is used as a psychological hypothesis to explain various kinds of behavior. At this stage the concept is still a tool for discovering the motivation for certain actions, mainly actions that Nietzsche disapproves of (Kaufmann 185).

An exception to this view of power as being wholly negative is Nietzsche's mention of the will to power in relation to freedom. In a note from the same period as *Human All Too Human* he states:

> The pleasure of power is explained by the hundredfold experience of displeasure at dependence and impotence. If this experience is not there, then the pleasure is lacking, too. (qtd. in Kaufmann 186)

Kaufmann rightly points out two things in relation to this passage. First of all, and most importantly, Nietzsche is speaking about power in a positive sense. This is evident
because he puts it at odds with dependence and impotence, two things that he definitely disapproves of. Power is shown as something that overcomes these negative states and is therefore something positive. Secondly, power is not shown as something that can be enjoyed in and of itself. Power can be appreciated only as more power. Power is valuable only if it results in deliverance from things that restrict power (Kaufmann 186).

Kaufmann states that in Daybreak Nietzsche is coming close to declaring that the will to power is the sole motivation for human behavior. Even though he does not refer to the concept by name there are numerous instances where he reduces a wide variety of human phenomena to the idea of power. Kaufmann picks out some of these instances for us. The lust for money which gives rise to dishonesty in business, counterfeiting and stock market speculation (among other actions) is translated into a lust for power (D 204). The history of the Jews is attributed to their desire to achieve a feeling of power (D 215). Socialism and the limitations that it imposes on people are said to be tolerated because, "[the limitations] are self-imposed, and the feeling of....this power is so young and charming to them that they would suffer anything for its sake"(D 184). Napoleon and his actions are attributed to his desire to have the power to determine his own manner of speaking (D 245). Kindness too, is interpreted in terms of ones quest to retain or gain more
power (D 248). Eventually, Kaufmann shows that Nietzsche came to the realization that all of Greek culture was also motivated by the will to power (Kaufmann 191-2).

Kaufmann points out that towards the end of Daybreak Nietzsche states: "They [the Greeks] valued the feeling of power more highly then any kind of utility or good name" (Dawn 360). In other words, they preferred power over and above all else. Also, in one of the notes from this same time period Nietzsche states that 'the Greeks frankly admitted their will to power' (Kaufmann 192). Kaufmann states that:

This sudden association of the will to power with the Greeks was one of the most decisive steps in the development of this conception into an all-embracing monism. (Kaufmann 192)

Nietzsche already considered the contest to be the key to analyzing Greek culture. The rivalries that existed between the dramatists were thought to be a kind of contest. Also, the Olympic games and the greek gymnasium acted as forums for contests which played a central role in Greek culture. Furthermore, the speeches and dialogues of Plato were viewed as his effort to outdo the sophists and poets, while the Socratic dialectic was seen as a type of spiritual contest (Kaufmann 192). Kaufmann shows that the contest was previously thought to be at the root of Greek culture, and then he maintains that towards the end of Daybreak it is implied that the contest itself is a manifestation of the will to power. The will to power thus fills the role previously held by the contest and can be "..envisaged as the basis of
Greek culture, which Nietzsche then considered the acme of humanity" (Kaufmann 192). So, if the will to power is the basis of Greek culture, which Nietzsche considered to be supreme, it seems logical to assume that it is somehow the basis of all culture. In any case, it is evident that the will to power is no longer confined to the negative impulses of the neurotic or the greedy person. Nietzsche is close to viewing the will to power as 'an all-embracing monism' here but Kaufmann claims that this proclamation does not occur until Zarathustra.

Kaufmann shows that there are statements in the later pages of Daybreak that will not allow the will to power to exist as a monism. In "The Striving for Excellence."(D 113), which occurs fairly early on in the work, Nietzsche sets up 'a history of culture' that uses the idea of power as a value standard. The barbarian exists on the bottom of the scale because he wishes to hurt, he is depicted as having a low degree of the 'striving for excellence' or a low degree of power. Higher degrees of power involve wishing to elevate one's neighbor and to impress and delight him. Later on, Nietzsche expresses a negative view of the German Reich and its power in "The Demon of Power"(D 262). But, this view does not criticize the Reich because it expresses a low degree of power, like that of the barbarian; it criticizes the power itself as evil.

Not need, nor desire-no, the love of power is the demon of man.....One may take everything away from them and
satisfy this demon: then they are almost happy. (D 262)

This passage can be seen as indicating that Nietzsche is backsliding into a view of power that is not all encompassing. Kaufmann tells us that he is instead mixing the idea of power with reason. Power alone is not yet the universal measure of a nation's or person's worth but worth is measured by 'the degree of reason in strength' or power tempered with reason (Kaufmann 195-7). This stands in opposition to the monistic view of power that is discussed in relation to the Greek contest. Kaufmann believes that in Zarathustra Nietzsche finally disposes of his view of power mixed with reason and adopts the will to power as the basic force behind all human activity.

The passage from Zarathustra that Kaufmann believes is the most important with regard to the will to power is "On the Thousand and One Goals". This passage is essentially about different nations and their different moral codes, customs and goals. Here, Nietzsche is saying that even though there might be severe differences between nations on these matters, their different beliefs are all manifestations of the will to power. Furthermore, the standard used to evaluate these different nations is also the will to power. This seems to be clearly illustrated in the section of the passage which Kaufmann has chosen.

A table of virtues hangs over every people. Behold, it is the table of its overcoming; behold, it is the voice of its will to power. Praiseworthy is whatever seems difficult to a people; whatever seems indispensable and
difficult is called good; and... the rarest, the most difficult—that they call holy. (Z 170)

Here, Kaufmann sees the will to power as being placed in a position where it alone is the standard for evaluation. A nation's ability to overcome itself is a direct manifestation of its will to power. Also, Kaufmann sees the entire passage as stating that being able to overcome itself is what will determine that nation's ability to excel above other nations, in other words it will determine the value of that nation. This concept of self-overcoming (for Kaufmann) is meant to represent the situation where a society overcomes or transcends its own natural state. In overcoming itself a nation posits things like good and evil in order to control its natural tendencies towards violence and barbarism. This overcoming suppresses a state of anarchy and makes room for culture to develop. The passage makes it clear that this overcoming is also a difficult process. Kaufmann tells us that the comparison between nations that he sees illustrated in "On The Thousand And One Goals" is Nietzsche's vision of the globe as a 'Greek gymnasium' where nations compete with each other, trying to overcome themselves, and hence, each other as well (Kaufmann 201). No other force such as reason is necessary here; reason is incorporated into the will to power. Kaufmann believes this is where Nietzsche made a clear decision.

Instead of assuming two qualitatively different principles, such as strength and reason, he would reduce both to a single, more fundamental force: the will to
power. (Kaufmann 202)

This 'decision' is emphasized in another passage from Zarathustra, entitled "on self overcoming".

Only where there is life, there is also will: not will to life but ....will to power. (Z 227)

The fine points of this passage will be discussed later on. For now it is significant in showing Nietzsche's commitment to viewing the will to power as a single basic force. In Zarathustra Kaufmann believes that the will to power has clearly developed into a psychological monism. At this point he thinks it can be called the sole motivation for human action. He also thinks that this is as far as this concept can go.

Now that Kaufmann's ideas on the evolution of this concept have been presented it is appropriate to look at how he viewed Nietzsche's ideas on the metaphysical status of the will to power. It is important to trace thoroughly Kaufmann's portrayal of the evolution of the will to power because his ideas on how the concept developed are so closely connected to how he views the will to power's overall place in Nietzsche's philosophy. To summarize briefly, Kaufmann has shown how the will to power went from being an entirely negative principle associated with the kind of ambition seen in Wagner, to a tool for explaining various types of psychological phenomena in Human All Too Human. The idea then widened further in Daybreak where eventually the will to power was labeled as being the sole motivation for Greek Culture.
At this stage though, it seems as if Nietzsche could not decide whether the will to power could be labeled as a single motivating force (and a standard for evaluating for human action) or if reason was also needed to temper and control power. In *Zarathustra* he apparently makes the decision to employ the singular concept of will to power as a basic force that both motivates and evaluates human behavior.

This long development of the will to power fits Kaufmann's idea that the concept is an empirical one and that Nietzsche considered himself an experimenter and not a metaphysician. Kaufmann points to the passage in *Daybreak* where Nietzsche says that he plans on doing away with the metaphysician's habit of making grandiose, wide sweeping statements that 'unriddle the universe' or 'solve all with one word' and instead substitute "small single questions and experiments"(D 547) (Kaufmann 204). This image of Nietzsche conducting 'small experiments' is key to Kaufmann's conception of the will to power as an empirical theory arrived at through induction. He believes that Nietzsche pursued different investigations of human beings with no preconceived notions of what he would find. The whole idea of a proven, all-encompassing, monistic will to power (for Kaufmann) is not what prompted Nietzsche's 'experiments'. Rather, the will to power is what resulted from experimentation. Kaufmann describes how he views the formulation of the will to power.

Empirical studies, moreover, had led him to assume that all human behavior could be explained in terms of the
will to power. His own psychological observations, coupled with historical studies....and augmented, finally, by a sketchy knowledge of the natural sciences, had convinced Nietzsche that "the will to power is the most profound fact to which we penetrate"(Kaufmann 229)

Here Kaufmann's commitment to an empirical view of the will to power is clear. Placing this particular quote at the end of the passage shows that Kaufmann is trying to demonstrate that will to power is something that Nietzsche believes is discovered through human experience. In other words, if it is the deepest fact that we can have knowledge of, then it is through critical observation of life experience that we know it. For Kaufmann, the concept of will to power is not reached through reflection.

In other passages, Kaufmann directly states that the will to power is not a metaphysical theory but one that was reached through 'experimenting'.

[Nietzsche's] conception of the will to power is not metaphysical either in Heidegger's sense or in the positivists'; it is first and foremost the key concept of a psychological hypothesis.(Kaufmann 204)

The term 'psychological hypothesis' is meant to stress the empirical nature of the will to power. Again, Kaufmann can be seen as maintaining that the evolution of the will to power plays a role in the final conception of it. The 'stages' that the theory undergoes during its evolution are characteristic of the working out of a hypothesis.

Even statements that apparently support a metaphysical conception of the will to power are interpreted by Kaufmann to be empirical. When Nietzsche makes the bold assertions in
"On Self-Overcoming" that all living beings are driven by the will to power and "where there is life there is also will" (Z 227), Kaufmann instead focuses on one sentence towards the end of the passage. The sentence is "Thus Life Taught me"(Z 228) and Kaufmann believes that the sentence is there to indicate that the above insights are based on experience or, as Kaufmann states, are "offered in an empirical spirit"(Kaufmann 206). This reaction to the passage is further evidence of Kaufmann's commitment to the idea that the will to power is empirical. There are several statements about the will to power (some in chapter one) that on the surface look metaphysical but upon further examination (with Kaufmann's help) prove to be anti-metaphysical or supportive of an empirical view. These will be examined later. Specific attention will be given to passage number thirty-six in part two of Beyond Good and Evil, which many believe is the only published argument for a metaphysical view of the will to power. This passage can be seen as lending further support to Kaufmann's claim that the will to power is empirical. There are also several other points that can be examined in this rich passage.

Kaufmann cites this passage as being a sign that during the period in which Nietzsche wrote Beyond Good and Evil he was still committed to the idea of experimentation and basing ideas on empirical evidence (Kaufmann 217). It is helpful to look at some lines that are related to this point. Early on,
Nietzsche asks, "is it not permitted to make the experiment..." (BGE 47) and later he speaks about the "conscience of method" (BGE 48) demanding that 'the experiment' be permitted. This talk about 'method' and 'experimenting' are part of what leads several interpreters to reject the idea that the passage is supporting a metaphysical stance. The recurring use of these terms does in fact seem to support a more empirical outlook. Experimenting with a particular idea appears to be what Nietzsche has in mind throughout this passage. For example,

Not to assume several kinds of causality until the experiment of making do with a single one has been pushed to its utmost limit. (BGE 48)

This is probably one of the lines that Kaufmann had in mind when selecting the whole passage to support the idea that Nietzsche was still bound to empirical investigation and experimentation. Obviously, the single causality mentioned above is the will to power and it looks as if it is still being tested to see how much it really can explain rather than being put forth as a metaphysical doctrine.

Kaufmann believes that the will to power is an empirical theory arrived at through experimentation or asking 'small single questions' and that it is by no means a metaphysical theory. To support this anti-metaphysical view it is helpful to point to parts of Nietzsche's writings that discredit metaphysics (this was shown in chapter one). What becomes problematic here is that along with rejecting metaphysics
Nietzsche often rejects the possibility of all truth as well. In Human All Too Human, while undermining metaphysics, Nietzsche states that "there are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths" (HA 13). In The Gay Science he says that we do not have any organ for knowledge or 'truth' (GS 300). In later writings and unpublished notes he goes on to say such things as, "truths are illusions we have forgotten are illusions", that "truth is the kind of error without which a certain kind of being could not live" and he states that there are "no facts" but "only interpretations" (qtd. in Clark 2). Even Kaufmann points to where Nietzsche criticizes Hegel for 'Gothic Heaven storming' and for saying that "the universe has no strength to resist the courage of knowledge" (qtd. in Kaufmann 204). Kaufmann concedes that in these criticisms "Nietzsche insinuates that the world is not knowable" (Kaufmann 204). So, the question that is of concern now is: if 'the world is not knowable' and 'truths are illusions' then how can Nietzsche claim to make any assertions about the will to power?

All the above passages which deny the possibility of truth can be classified by Kaufmann as only denying a certain kind of truth. They only deny the possibility for truth about a platonic 'true world' or for truth that exists like the Kantian thing-in-itself (hidden from experience). In short, the denial of truth is only a denial of metaphysical truth. So, for Kaufmann, 'the world' that is not knowable is only the
metaphysical world. Wherever Nietzsche denies truth, he must be denying truth about another world that is not reachable through empirical investigation. This view holds that the empirical realm is the only place where Nietzsche believes that there is the possibility for knowledge. Furthermore, Nietzsche is shown as denying the entire distinction between this world and another world like Kant's Noumenal world or a Christian after-life. While speaking about the distinction between this world and another one, Kaufmann states that "Nietzsche, like Hegel, denied any such dualism" (Kaufmann 354).

The empirical interpretation of the will to power can now be seen as necessary in Kaufmann. There is no 'other world' or thing-in-itself, so, when Nietzsche says that "this world is the will to power and nothing besides" (WP 550) he must be interpreted as saying that "the constitution of the human mind might conceivably require it to interpret not only human behavior but the entire cosmos in terms of the will to power" (Kaufmann 207). This line from Kaufmann shows that his interpretation holds that statements about 'the world' must always be understood in terms of our way of experiencing the world. This would not lead to subjectivity because "the will to power is a universal feature of the human constitution" (Kaufmann 206). Considerable emphasis might be placed on the word 'This' in 'this world', stressing that the statement, 'This world is a will to power' is not about some
transcendent, metaphysical world (that world) but about the empirical world that is accessible to human experience. Kaufmann's interpretation has to portray Nietzsche as viewing the will to power as a strictly human explanation of the world because there is no possibility for true statements about a 'real world' that is not accessible to human experience. In Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy Clark verifies that Kaufmann interprets Nietzsche as rejecting metaphysical reality.

He [Kaufmann] attempts to explain away Nietzsche's apparent denial of truth as a denial of what Nietzsche called the "true world", the supersensuous and eternal world of the platonic forms or the Kantian thing-in-itself. (Clark 5)

Part of what Clark is telling us here is that Kaufmann's Nietzsche does not just discredit the idea of having knowledge about metaphysical reality, he denies the existence of metaphysical reality.

Now that more information has been given, it is interesting to take another look at passage number thirty six in part two of Beyond Good and Evil in light of Kaufmann's interpretation. Even though the passage is thought to be supportive of a metaphysical view there is much within it that coheres with what Kaufmann is saying. Three sections from this passage are particularly relevant to Kaufmann's interpretation. The first is from the top of the passage.

Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our world of desires and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other "reality" besides the reality of our drives....is it not permitted to make the experiment and to ask the question whether this "given" would not be sufficient for also understanding on the basis of this
This kind of thing the so-called mechanistic (or "material")
world? I mean, not as deception, as mere "appearance,"
an "idea"...but as holding the same rank of reality as
our effect- (BGE 47)

This section actually fits Kaufmann's interpretation
perfectly. His interpretation holds that the will to power
is understood, by Nietzsche, to be the basic drive of human
behavior. This gets extended, and the will to power is then
seen as the basic drive of the material world as well. This
is how Kaufmann explains the development of the will to power
from a psychological theory, to one that explains the outer
world. In this section there is the same thing going on when
the "given" reality of our drives is extended to the material
world. Another interesting point about this section is that
what is "given" is presumed to be all we can know, and after
it is applied to the material world, we are told that it is
not simply "appearance" or "idea". This can be seen as
supporting the part of Kaufmann's interpretation that says
that the empirical world is not merely a representation or
appearance of some deeper 'noumenal' world but that the
empirical world is an independent, self-sufficient reality.

The next section that is relevant to Kaufmann is where
Nietzsche associates himself with the psychological conception
of the will to power.

Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire
instinctive life as the development and ramification
of one basic form of will—namely, of the will to
power, as my proposition has it; (BGE 48)

It is important to point out that this is the only part of
the entire passage with which Nietzsche directly associates himself. The rest of the premises are put forward as hypothetical or as steps in an experiment. The fact that he only directly connects himself to this idea that the will to power explains our instinctual life, implies that this is the only part of the passage that he holds to be certain. This fits with Kaufmann's idea that Nietzsche meant the will to power to be essentially psychological (assuming that psychological and instinctual can mean roughly the same thing here).

Finally, the last line of the passage, which acts as the conclusion, can be seen in the context of Kaufmann's interpretation.

The world viewed from inside, the world defined and determined according to its "intelligible character"- it would be "will to power" and nothing else. (BGE 48)

The use of the term 'intelligible character' here can be seen as implying that the entire passage is about the empirical world that is open to human experience. There is no claim that the traditional idea of a metaphysical 'true world' is being defined. Only the intelligible character of the world is being dealt with. Viewing it through Kaufmann's explanation, this phrase takes away the preponderance of making a metaphysical assumption about the nature of the universe and limits the statement to dealing with what we can deduce from our experience and experimentation.

Now that Kaufmann's ideas about the nature of the will
to power have been examined, and his possible interpretation of certain passages has been given, it is appropriate to move on to Heidegger's interpretation. Both criticism and support for the position that Kaufmann outlines will be presented in chapter five.
Heidegger's approach to Nietzsche differs greatly from that of Kaufmann. While Kaufmann's interpretation can be classified as methodical, Heidegger's is more sweeping. In fact, there are times when calling it cryptic is an understatement. One gets a better sense of this after realizing that the style of Heidegger's presentation is very similar to Nietzsche's own writings. The similarity lies in the poetic nature of both philosophers' work, as well as in the sense of urgency that prevails throughout. Kaufmann's approach is much more structured and sedate than that of either Heidegger or Nietzsche. Another way that Heidegger is unlike Kaufmann is that Heidegger has a personal 'stake' in what Nietzsche is stating about the will to power. This 'stake' exists because Nietzsche plays a prominent role in Heidegger's own philosophical theory about the history of Being. Because of this connection Heidegger's interpretation must always be viewed with a certain amount of suspicion. The suspicion stems from the fact that he is not looking at Nietzsche with any amount of objectivity. As we shall see, this lack of objectivity in Heidegger's interpretation is something which Heidegger readily admits. Rather than
implying that his own interpretation is self-serving, though, Heidegger states that in order to represent a thinker's ideas accurately one must think from the same perspective as that thinker. For Heidegger, there is no virtue in an 'objective' interpretation of a philosopher.

Information on Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche will come primarily from the first two volumes of his four volume set entitled *Nietzsche*. The content of these volumes is basically a collection of his lectures and essays on the subject of Nietzsche. These writings and lectures were formulated over a period of time from 1936 to the early 1950's. Part two of volume 2 is a lecture entitled "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" and it has been reprinted in *The New Nietzsche*. The reprinted version will be the version used in this paper.

As stated, the only way that Heidegger believes an understanding of another thinker can be reached is through closely following that thinker's thought process. In Volume 1 of *Nietzsche* Heidegger explains his method of interpretation.

Confrontation is genuine criticism. It is the supreme way, the only way, to a true estimation of a thinker. In confrontation we undertake to follow his thinking and to trace it in its effective force, not in its weakness. To what purpose? In order that through the confrontation we ourselves may become free for the supreme exertion of thinking. (Heidegger, 1979, V.1, 4-5)

Here, it is evident that Heidegger believes that a very a personal relationship with a philosopher's ideas is needed
if one is to comprehend and evaluate them fully. Furthermore, the last line of the passage points to the other subjective aspect of Heidegger's interpretation. What is being interpreted must be thought out correctly because it is part of how 'we' must think presently. The point of reaching an understanding of a past thinker, for Heidegger, is to better develop a new position which is bound to the past theory. The new position must also move beyond the past theory. This connection between current thought and past ideas is an important one for Heidegger. In Volume 1 he speaks about the possibility of misunderstanding Nietzsche's doctrines of eternal recurrence and the will to power and the implications that this would have. Not only would we "comprehend nothing of the twentieth century and of the centuries to come" but we would also be unable to understand "our own metaphysical task" (Heidegger, 1979, V.1, 17). Heidegger, showing himself to be different from Kaufmann again, has a specific idea as to what our current 'metaphysical task' is. He sees his own attitude towards Being as the direction in which Nietzsche points us. Kaufmann, on the other hand, attempts to give his interpretation an objective or scientific tone.

Heidegger believes that Nietzsche is fulfilling a certain role in the history of western metaphysics. He sees Nietzsche's entire philosophy as an answer to "the ancient guiding question of philosophy, 'What is being?'" (Heidegger, 1979, V.1, 4). The question of 'being' is the major concern
of all philosophy for Heidegger and he is convinced that the significance of Nietzsche as a thinker lies in his ability to realize this guiding question of philosophy, and answer it with the concept of the "will to power". This is made evident right away in Heidegger's interpretation.

Nietzsche unfolds the guiding question of philosophy and responds to it (Heidegger, 1979, V.1, 4)

As the name for the basic character of all beings, the expression "will to power" provides an answer to the question "What is being?" (1979, V.1, 4)

The name "will to power" must therefore come to stand in the title of the chief philosophical work of a thinker who says that all being ultimately is will to power. (1979, V.1, 4)

This emphasis on being and the will to power is part of what makes Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche a metaphysical one. The will to power is, in Heidegger's theory, much more than an explanation of human behavior; it is "the fundamental characteristic of all beings, not only of man." (Heidegger, 1977, 65). This definition of the will to power situates Nietzsche within the history of metaphysics, for Heidegger, and forms the necessary background to Heidegger's own metaphysical theories. Heidegger's argument for this conception of the will to power will be outlined, but first another difference with Kaufmann has to be pointed out.

In Kaufmann's interpretation of Nietzsche, he makes it clear that the will to power is to be viewed as a concept that undergoes an evolution. The idea started off as a specific motivation for some of the negative behavioral traits of
Wagner and steadily evolved, through observation and experimentation, into an explanation for all human behavior. He sees this evolution as taking place in Nietzsche's published works and does not give a lot of clout to the collection of unpublished notes entitled *The Will to Power*. In fact he recommends that this work be completely dissociated from the published material.

Possibly still more fateful was his sister's decision to patch together some of the thousands of jottings, scribbles, and notes which Nietzsche had accumulated over a period of years...and to publish this *fabrication* as his system, under the title *The Will to Power*. (Kaufmann 6)

In a later passage, Kaufmann blatantly asserts his denial of the importance of *The Will to Power*.

Yet it is significant that *The Will to Power* was not, as is so often supposed, Nietzsche's last work; (Kaufmann 7)

Heidegger has a very different view of the will to power which directly affects his view of the work, *The Will to Power*. In Heidegger's interpretation the will to power is a concept that is arrived at through reflection and not experimentation. He expresses open contempt for the whole empirical process that Kaufmann interprets Nietzsche as embracing. In "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" Heidegger states his hostility towards empirical knowledge being associated with any interpretation of Nietzsche.

Because of the peculiar ascendancy of modern science, we modern men are ensnared in the singular error that holds that knowledge can be obtained from science......that which is unique in what a thinker is able to express can neither be demonstrated nor refuted logically or empirically. (Heidegger, 1977, 74)
The reflection that Heidegger sees Nietzsche engaging in instead of empirical experimentation is the 'question of being' mentioned earlier. This question of being is viewed as a constant concern of Nietzsche's that can be seen in all of his writings. So, when the concept of the will to power is incorporated into Nietzsche's thought as the 'character of all beings' it is not the result of an 'evolution' but the result of a constant asking of the same question. Heidegger states that the metaphysical concept of the will to power was a part of all of Nietzsche's writings which finally found expression in the project, *The Will to Power*.

the fundamental position on the basis of which he speaks in these and in all the writings he himself published, did not assume a final form and was not itself published in any book...What Nietzsche himself published was always a foreground. His philosophy proper was left behind as posthumous, unpublished work. (Heidegger, 1979, V.1, 9)

Not only does this quote show Heidegger's commitment to *The Will to Power* as a viable source of Nietzsche's thought, it also represents all of Nietzsche's published work as leading up to this final book. Everything that Nietzsche wrote is seen, not as a development, but as an attempt at an expression of one 'fundamental position'. This position is his attempt at an answer to the 'question of being'. So, Heidegger sees *The Will to Power* as the ultimate expression of Nietzsche's philosophy. All his previous works are considered valuable, but inadequate, expressions of this main point he wished to convey. On the other hand, Kaufmann sees *The Will to Power*
as a unnatural collection of notes with questionable relevance
to anything Nietzsche believed.

While Kaufmann sees Nietzsche as going through a
development in his published works, Heidegger sees Nietzsche
as being a part of the larger development of western
metaphysics. He makes the past influences on Nietzsche clear
and places a great deal of importance on his role in the
history of philosophy. The best way to describe this
historical importance is to look at how Heidegger describes
it in "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" from volume 2 of
Nietzsche. Heidegger describes Thus spoke Zarathustra as the
'vestibule' for The Will to Power, so, it is safe to say that
he views the former as the most important of the published
writings (Heidegger, 1979, V.1, 12). This lecture not only
lays out Heidegger's views on Nietzsche's historical
importance, it also gives insight into the will to power and
its relation to being.

Early on in the lecture, Heidegger picks out a line from
the section "On the Tarantulas" that he feels is highly
significant.

For that man be delivered from revenge, that is the
bridge to the highest hope for me, and a rainbow after
long storms.(Z 211)

Heidegger then goes on to examine closely this idea of revenge
expressed by Zarathustra. Another line is quoted in order to
get a better idea of what revenge connotes. This line comes
from "On Deliverance".

41
The spirit of revenge, my friends, has so far been the subject of man's best reflection;"(Z 252)

This line is interpreted as stating that revenge is the motivation for mankind's metaphysical thinking. Heidegger takes 'reflection' to mean more than just thinking here. He says that it is "that thinking in which man's relation to what is, to all beings, is grounded and attuned" (Heidegger, 1977, 70). He goes on to describe this 'reflection' as indicative of how man represents being. Heidegger states that this representation and relation to being depicts being with reference to its Being. This description of 'reflection' as a depiction of the 'Being of beings' is a description of what it means to think metaphysically, and the spirit of revenge is an integral part of it. Heidegger affirms this:

In understanding revenge as the spirit that attunes and determines man's relation to beings, Nietzsche conceives revenge metaphysically from the start. (Heidegger, 1977, 71)

Now that it is clear that revenge is deeply connected to past metaphysical thought, it is necessary to look further into its definition. Heidegger points to the literal meaning of the word which includes the activity of 'driving out' or 'banishing'. He goes on to give a more detailed definition which involves a description of 'avenging persecution'.

It opposes its object by degrading it so that, by contrasting the degraded object with its own superiority, it may restore its own validity... (Heidegger, 1977, 71)

Now, revenge can be defined as 'opposing degrading persecution'. In order to figure out how revenge fits within
the structure of metaphysics, Heidegger says that the 'essential character' in which the Being of beings appears within modern metaphysics must be observed. This makes sense since the spirit of revenge is apparently what sparks the pursuit of the Being of beings in the first place.

Heidegger cites a few lines by Schelling in order to describe how Being is depicted in all of modern metaphysics.

In the final and highest instance there is no being other than willing. Willing is primal being and to it [willing] alone belong all [primal being's] predicates: being unconditioned, eternity, independence of time, self-affirmation....(qtd. in Heidegger,1977, 71)

Heidegger states that this passage signifies 'willing' as the Being of beings. He believes that this concept of 'will' as Being prevails throughout modern thought. This can be described as a shift in thinking, where the modern period employed 'primacy of practice' over 'primacy of theory'. Another way to describe this shift is by stating that the modern period focussed on the question of how to live ones life while previously the focus of philosophy was on abstract reasoning. Modern metaphysics, which includes Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, etc., can be seen as being dominated by this idea of 'Primacy of practice' or 'will'. Heidegger states that Nietzsche is operating under this same historical notion of will when he recognizes the Being of beings as the will to power.

Now that it has been stated that the Being of beings in modern metaphysics has been depicted as 'will', Heidegger
turns his attention back to revenge. He quotes another line from "On Deliverance" which tells us more about the specific connection between revenge and metaphysics.

This ...is revenge itself: the will's aversion to time and its 'It was'. (Z 252)

Heidegger explains that the aversion to "time and its 'It was'" is in fact an aversion to the passing of time, or more specifically to transience in general. Now it becomes clear (when we remember the previous description of avenging) that the history of modern metaphysics involves the 'will' being put forth in order to 'degrade' transience, so that this eternal 'will' can restore its own validity. The whole concept of the 'will' as Being is prompted by revenge, and the will's desire to overcome transience is the form that this revenge takes. Heidegger equates transience with 'this world', the 'earthly' or the 'temporal', so what is being communicated here is somewhat familiar. Metaphysics is being represented as the positing of eternal ideas (the will) for the purpose of degrading 'this world' to the point of disappearance. Heidegger expresses this exact idea about half way through "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?".

For Nietzsche, the most profound revenge consists of that reflection [metaphysical thought] which posits eternal ideas [the will] as the absolute, compared with which the temporal [the earthly] must degrade itself to actual non-being. (Heidegger, 1977, 73)

The parenthetical inserts are put in to help better understand this result of Heidegger's thinking. Heidegger looks to the possibility of an alternative to the situation where the
'will' is exalted as the Being of beings, and 'this world' is devoid of all Being.

The first line from this discussion was Zarathustra expressing the hope that man be delivered from revenge. Heidegger points out that a deliverance from revenge would be a deliverance from the 'will' having the status of the Being of beings.

To the extent that the Being of beings is will in modern metaphysical theory, deliverance from the will would, simultaneously, be deliverance from Being, a fall into empty nothingness. (Heidegger, 1977, 73)

Here, Heidegger accurately describes the possibility of 'nihilism'. After exposing past metaphysics as a form of revenge, there is the danger of having nothing to base existence on, having no 'Being' left. However, Heidegger's interpretation holds that while deliverance from revenge is deliverance from what is 'repugnant' in the will, it is not an elimination of all willing (Heidegger, 1977, 73).

Deliverance liberates aversion from its no, and frees it for a yes. What does this yes affirm? Precisely what the aversion of the spirit of revenge negates: time, transience. (Heidegger, 1977, 74)

So, instead of degrading transience the 'will' affirms it and is thus delivered from the revenge of past metaphysics that posited the eternal in order to eliminate the temporal.

At this point in the interpretation, one may notice that this does not sound all that different from Kaufmann. The idea that we must reject the metaphysical 'true world' in favor of 'this world' is right in line with Kaufmann's
conception of the will to power as relating to the temporal. But, it will be shown that Heidegger's idea of Nietzsche's concept of 'will' is anything but temporal.

Instead of merely rejecting the metaphysical and having the 'will' affirm the temporal, Heidegger believes that Nietzsche raises the temporal to the status of the metaphysical. He sees this as being accomplished through the doctrine of 'eternal recurrence of the same'. In this theory, the characteristics of transience remain, (passing away, ceasing to be) but that which passes away is represented as returning again in the same form, or as Heidegger puts it "as self same in its coming" (Heidegger, 1977, 74). Furthermore, this returning is eternal. That which passes away returns again, only to pass away and return once again 'ad infinitum'. This eternal quality is what gives this explanation of time its metaphysical status. Heidegger reminds us that "the predicate 'eternal' belongs to the Being of beings" (Heidegger, 1977, 74). The Being of beings can now be represented as this doctrine of 'eternal recurrence of the same' which affirms the temporal. The 'will', by itself, is no longer the answer to "what is Being?"

The 'will' still plays a part in this new definition of Being, though. Heidegger demonstrates this by invoking a line of Nietzsche's which he believes, "gathers together the main point of his thinking" (Heidegger, 1977, 75).

To impress the character of Being upon becoming—that is the highest will to power. (WP 330)
Heidegger interprets this quote as stating;

The highest will to power—that is the life force in all life—is to represent transience as fixed becoming within the Eternal Recurrence of the same, and so to render it secure and stable. (Heidegger, 1977, 75)

In other words, the will to power is what is behind the theory of eternal recurrence. The will to power is the force that impresses the eternal quality of recurrence upon the temporal, thereby making it stable. 'Fixed Becoming' is to be understood as transience that is no longer transient because the will to power has posited eternal recurrence as the stabilizing factor in an otherwise chaotic world that is constantly slipping away. If eternal recurrence is the representation of the eternal Being of beings then the will to power is what prompts this representation. Clark states that in Heidegger's view the will to power is the essence of being and eternal recurrence is the mode of existence, and that together they answer the question of Being (Clark 9). Heidegger states:

Whoever neglects to think the thought of eternal recurrence together with will to power...cannot adequately grasp the metaphysical content of the doctrine of the will to power in its full scope. (Heidegger, 1979, V.1, 21)

In this passage it is evident that Heidegger believes these concepts to be interwoven with each other and that the will to power is metaphysical. In volume 2 of Nietzsche Heidegger blatantly asserts that eternal recurrence is a manifestation of the will to power.

It [Eternal Return] is true because it is just in that it brings the essence of the Will to Power to appearance in its highest figure. The Will to Power as the
fundamental character of being justifies the Eternal Return of the Same as the "appearance" in whose radiance the highest triumph of the Will to Power radiates (qtd. in Fynsk 83)

Now it is clear that the will to power is the essence of all being and that, according to Nietzsche's conception, it appears in its highest form as eternal recurrence which makes the transient eternal.

A brief explanation of the subjective character of the 'will' in Heidegger's interpretation is necessary here. While the will to power is represented as a metaphysical concept that has an impact reaching far beyond human motivation, it is nonetheless a subjective notion. Heidegger sees all metaphysical thought since Descartes as placing the subject in a position of dominance to everything that is, making all recent metaphysical thought subjective. Man is seen as the founding 'subject' for which everything else is 'object' (Fynsk 74). This, Heidegger believes, is a result of Descartes' 'First Meditation', which made the human being the ultimate source of deciding what is to count as being. Therefore, it is key to remember that the 'will', which has been represented as dominating modern metaphysical thought, is metaphysical, yet subjective. This 'Will' that Nietzsche posits in the will to power is also subjective, but the big difference is that it does not come from the 'conscious spirit' like the will of his predecessors (Schelling, Hegel etc.); it comes from the body and its corporating drives (Clark 10). The significance of this conception of the 'will'
as stemming from the body or the 'animalitus' will be examined Shortly. While this difference apparently puts Nietzsche at odds with modern thought, it remains to be shown how he is actually very much a part of modern metaphysics.

At this point, Heidegger notes that there is an obvious criticism to the line of thought that has been represented so far. The "deliverance" from the form of revenge which degraded the transient with eternal ideas seems still to be trapped in the same spirit of revenge. There is still a 'will' that has 'an aversion to time', it is just expressing itself as eternal recurrence here which lifts up the transient and not as an absolute which degrades the transient. Heidegger sees this problem with "deliverance" and states that Nietzsche is also aware of it. Rather than seeing Nietzsche's awareness of deliverance as a problem, Heidegger thinks that Nietzsche is merely acknowledging that he is moving within the "spirit of reflection-to-date" (Heidegger, 1977, 76). It is clear that 'Reflection-to-date' (or modern metaphysics) has been characterized as a form of revenge by Nietzsche. By developing this new theory of the will to power and eternal recurrence, Nietzsche appears to wish to break out of, or be delivered from, the revenge that has characterized past thought. Heidegger believes that Nietzsche has done more than achieve deliverance from revenge. Nietzsche is depicted as ending the entire chapter in philosophy that has been motivated by revenge. The following line from volume 1 of
Nietzsche substantiates this.

The age whose accomplishment unfolds in [Nietzsche's] thought, the modern period, is an end period. (qtd. in Fynsk 70)

Heidegger's realization that Nietzsche was not transcending modern metaphysics, but instead, bringing it to a close, rests on his interpreting the will to power and eternal recurrence in conjunction with the deliverance from revenge. The view that these concepts are not deliverance from revenge but, instead, a completion of the era that has been motivated by revenge, makes Nietzsche's understanding of the era in question significant. In Volume 1 of Nietzsche Heidegger states:

What alone must concern us is the trace that his path of thinking towards the will to power has drawn in the history of Being... (qtd. in Fynsk 70)

As was mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, Heidegger's main concern with Nietzsche lies in the role that he plays in the history of metaphysics. The 'trace in the history of Being' that is so important to Heidegger is the role that Nietzsche plays in bringing about the end of metaphysics. The lengthy discussion of revenge is used to show how Heidegger views Nietzsche's concepts of the will to power and eternal return as a reaction to past metaphysics. Again, we see this sentiment expressed in Volume 1.

The conception of the Being of all beings as will is very much in line with the best and greatest tradition of German philosophy (Heidegger, 1979, V.1, 34)

Heidegger believes that Nietzsche is important not only
because of his placement at the end of modern metaphysics, but because he sees brilliance in his ability to notice the patterns of thought that led up to his own role in history. While Nietzsche's notion of 'will' is consistent with that of his predecessors, in that it is apparently closely connected to the spirit of revenge, the differences between his theory and those of the past are what distinguish him in Heidegger's eyes. One must remember though, that it is because Nietzsche is trapped in the spirit of 'reflection-to-date' that his radical theories, which are so different from those of the past, serve to end 'reflection to date'. For Heidegger, Nietzsche must remain inside the tradition of metaphysics in order to bring it to a close. The characteristics of the will to power and eternal recurrence are viewed, by Heidegger, as an "exhaustion of the final possibilities of the metaphysical tradition and therefore an accomplishment of modern metaphysics." (Fynsk 75). At this point, the reason why these theories are so radical must be pointed out.

Heidegger believes that the doctrine of eternal return is referred to as Nietzsche's "most abysmal thought" (Heidegger, 1977, 78) because it is the last thought of metaphysics-to-date. The positing of the eternal onto the transient is, in essence, insisting that being both becomes and is. This response to the guiding question of philosophy "what is being?" harkens back to ancient metaphysics. It combines Heraclitean and Parmenidean responses in answering
the 'guiding question' and hence, Heidegger believes, closes the circle of metaphysics (Heidegger, 1979, V.2, 252). After this contradictory concept of being is put forth, Heidegger believes that there is nowhere left for metaphysical thought to go. The image of the eagle and the snake soaring through the air in wide circles at the end of "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" represents this closing of the circle of metaphysical thought (in Heidegger's view). By bringing metaphysics full circle Nietzsche apparently allows for no further advancement in the subject of metaphysics. Instead, he is seen as pointing the way towards a new way of thinking.

And when a way of thinking brings metaphysics to completion, it points in an exceptional sense toward something unthought, something clear and confused at the same time. (Heidegger, 1977, 77)

It was mentioned earlier that Heidegger sees his own philosophy as picking up at this point where Nietzsche has left off.

The will to power with its subjective nature is another contributing factor to Heidegger's view of Nietzsche as the one who brings metaphysics to its completion. The will to power, while subjective, is not subjective in the traditional sense. It (the will) is understood on the basis of the body and its corporating drives. This takes the traditional metaphysical view and inverts it. Instead of the 'rationalitas' (intellect) defining the essence of the 'animal rationale' (the human being) the 'animalitas' or bodily drives now become the dominant aspect of the definition of human
beings. The Bodily drives become dominant because they are seen as 'that which lies at the basis of' or the 'unconditioned subject' which is the will to power. Heidegger believes that this inversion of the ancient metaphysical idea of the make up of a human being is part Nietzsche's plan to take metaphysics to its limit, to think it through to its last possible thought, and therefore to complete it (Fynsk 75).

It is important to mention that this view of the will having an association with the body or the 'animalitus' did not originate with Nietzsche. Schopenhauer is known for having this same conviction. In order for Nietzsche to be the one who completes metaphysics his theory of the will must go farther than this (if not, then metaphysics ends with Schopenhauer). Fortunately for Heidegger, Nietzsche's theory does go farther. The concept of eternal recurrence and its contradictory conception of being is what takes Nietzsche beyond what Schopenhauer has done. Heidegger believes that Nietzsche's use of the will's connection to the body takes the subjectivity of modern metaphysics, that began with Descartes, to its limit by performing the inversion discussed above. This contributes to (but does not singlehandedly accomplish) the completion of metaphysics. Furthermore, it was shown that the will to power is given expression in the doctrine of eternal recurrence. So, the final blow to metaphysics that Heidegger believes is delivered with the concept of eternal return can ultimately be attributed to the will to power and
Now that Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's concepts of eternal recurrence and the will to power has been presented and the historical importance that Heidegger attributes to these ideas has been illustrated, it is appropriate to look at passage number thirty six from Beyond Good and Evil. Considering the amount of time that was devoted to Kaufmann's probable assessment of this passage it is seems necessary to view it through Heidegger's eyes as well. But before this is done, a brief look at Heidegger's view of Nietzsche's conception of truth is needed.

It was shown earlier that Kaufmann views the passages where Nietzsche denies the possibility of truth as merely a denial of metaphysical truth about a 'true world'. Heidegger, on the other hand, views Nietzsche's denial of truth as a denial of all truth. The concept of truth in this interpretation is very similar to the concept of eternal return that has been outlined. Like eternal return, truth is seen as a manifestation of the will to power. Both concepts 'fix' or give the quality of stability to the transient world. They both impress 'Being on becoming'. Nietzsche is seen as putting forth his idea of truth in this sense and then comparing it to the idea of truth as correspondence to reality. Fynsk describes Heidegger's position on Nietzsche accurately in Heidegger: Thought and Historicity.

...the truth, for Nietzsche, is not in accord with what is properly real. The truth is thus essentially in
error; it is an appearance, an illusion. (Fynsk 82)

Here we see that Heidegger interprets Nietzsche as viewing all truth as 'error' because it does not correspond to reality. In this interpretation, the truth, like eternal return, is an expression of the will to power. The will to power, for Heidegger, is related to bodily drives and is the essence of all being or 'what is properly real'; it is also chaotic and unstable. Chessick describes accurately this chaotic nature of the will to power in *A Brief Introduction to the Genius of Nietzsche*.

For Nietzsche, the nature of being is a continual clashing, a continual overcoming, a continual shaping and breaking, creating and destroying, in flux and change. (Chessick 65)

The will to power is chaotic reality that gives itself the 'appearance' of stability through concepts such as truth and eternal recurrence (Fynsk 82-4). The will to power, in this sense, has an aversion to its own transient nature and thus creates these 'stabilizing' concepts. The following line from *The Will to Power* represents this view of truth as an error or illusion.

*Truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live (WP 272).*

This line states that while truth posited by the will to power is necessary, it is not accurate in the sense of corresponding to reality. For Heidegger, reality is the will to power which is chaotic and truth is an expression of the will to power, but truth does not represent the will to power's chaotic
nature. Truth "makes all being thinkable" (Z 225) but this representation of being is not an accurate one. The question of how the will to power can be put forth as true (as reality or the essence of being) while Nietzsche denies all truth is not troubling to Heidegger because he believes that this contradiction is simply a call for a new conception of truth (Clark 7-9). Clark warns us that Heidegger has 'little incentive' to eliminate the apparent contradictions in Nietzsche.

[Heidegger's] use of Nietzsche's philosophy to support his own depends on interpreting it so that Nietzsche's claims about truth and metaphysics are inconsistent with his practice. (Clark 7)

The denial of all truth is like Nietzsche's denial of metaphysics. Heidegger sees him as attacking these concepts from within. Nietzsche is seen as rejecting all previous metaphysics only to bring the subject to a close with his own metaphysical theories of the will to power and eternal return which have elements of previous metaphysical thought. Similarly he attacks the notion of truth based on its lack of correspondence to his own conception of the true essence of reality (the 'chaotic' will to power). Again the apparent contradictions here do not trouble Heidegger since he sees Nietzsche's philosophy as signifying the end of traditional ideas about truth and metaphysics. In fact, it was demonstrated earlier how the contradictions actually strengthen Heidegger's position.

Now that Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's will
to power has been thoroughly examined, his probable reaction to passage number thirty six from *Beyond Good and Evil* can be illustrated. Clark refers to this passage as the only published argument for the metaphysical view of the will to power. She makes this assertion based on the fact that the *Will to Power* was never published, and in her opinion *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is too poetic and metaphorical to be taken seriously. It was mentioned earlier that Heidegger put great stock in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Why he considered it important and the conception of the will to power that he drew from that work have been presented. In *The Will to Power* one could find many passages defending a metaphysical view of the will to power. These passages are much less problematic than the one Clark cites in *Beyond Good and Evil*, but, since they can be dismissed by Kaufmann as irrelevant simply because of their origin, Heidegger's interpretation will be applied to passage number thirty six.

This passage from *Beyond Good and Evil* presents a challenge to those who wish to interpret the will to power as a metaphysical doctrine. As was shown in the chapter on Kaufmann, the passage is full of empirical language. For Heidegger's interpretation to fit with the text here, the focus must be shifted away from the many places where Nietzsche declares that he is performing an "experiment", dealing with that which is "given", or presenting a "hypothesis". For Heidegger, the contention that the will to
power is metaphysical (an answer to the question of being) must be a constant throughout Nietzsche's thought and not the result of empirical observation. Also, the theories that Nietzsche expresses in this passage must be the result of a priori reflection if Heidegger's interpretation is to apply. The three sections of this passage that were applied to Kaufmann's view will now be viewed through Heidegger's eyes.

The section that presents the view that the will to power is intimately connected to our "instinctual life" was seen as supporting Kaufmann's psychological view because it appears to be the only section that Nietzsche directly attributes to his own thinking. However, this association with "instinctual life" is not necessarily akin to stating that the will to power is about human psychological processes. Earlier on in the passage Nietzsche defines his use of 'instinctual life'.

...a kind of instinctual life in which all organic functions, together with self-regulation, assimilation, nourishment, excretion, metabolism, are still synthetically bound together—as an antecedent form of life (BGE 47)

This section of the passage clearly shows that 'instinctual' does not necessarily mean the same thing as psychological (as was assumed in chapter two). The 'instinctual life' does not refer to just human life, but to all life and its 'organic functions'. Furthermore, the statement that the instinctual life is an 'antecedent form of life' (all life) implies that it is a condition for life. Since Nietzsche is so confident that the will to power is closely connected to the
instinctual, it seems plausible that he is stating that the will to power is a condition for all life here. This is not to be confused with a Darwinian kind of evolutionary theory. The will to power may be the condition for all life, but it is still without direction or structure. This scenario fits closely with the Heideggerian idea that the will to power is the character of all beings, and more importantly, it takes away one of the empirical interpretations of this passage.

Kaufmann's interpretation was shown to be compatible with the first paragraph of the passage as well. This section depicts our own drives and passions as all we can know, and from this knowledge we can supposedly hypothesize about the external, material world. This fits with Kaufmann's theory that Nietzsche viewed the will to power as, first and foremost, a theory about human behavior. However, this same passage can be viewed as supporting a metaphysical stance. Clark points out that the picture that this passage paints is not one that could be formed from experience. It actually flies in the face of our experience to think that our own drives are all we can know. This position is one that could only be reached through a priori reflection (Clark 213). This type of reflection is indicative of metaphysical thinking and Heidegger's view of Nietzsche. While Heidegger would not want to focus on the division between an inner world and an external one here, he would be encouraged by the subjective viewpoint suggested. The view that our inner world is all
that is certain harkens back to Descartes' philosophy which initiated the modern period of subjectivity. Heidegger believes that Nietzsche brought this period to a close with the subjective notion of the will to power. The will to power is related to the body and its natural 'drives', so the section in question could be viewed from Heidegger's standpoint as, not making a leap from the inner world to the external one, but as positing the will to power as the essence of all being (the human being as well as external being).

Finally, Kaufmann's possible interpretation of the last sentence in the passage was looked at. This last sentence appears to be a blatant assertion of a metaphysical will to power.

The world viewed from inside, the world defined and determined according to its "intelligible character"- it would be "will to power" and nothing else. (BGE 48)

To fit this with Kaufmann, the term 'intelligible character' was focused on. This term implied that the statement was about the way we understand the world and not about the way the world really is. Heidegger's interpretation, on the other hand, would view this statement as solely metaphysical. It would focus on the 'the world' being viewed from 'inside' and take this to mean that Nietzsche is making an assertion about the external world. The world defined as the "will to power and nothing else" is one of the statements in Nietzsche's published writings that comes closest to directly asserting the Heideggarian idea that the will to power is the essence
of all being. This interpretation would deny that the term 'intelligible character' presents a problem. It would simply maintain that the way the world truly is, when viewed from inside, is in some sense intelligible as the will to power. This is different from the world merely appearing as the will to power.

In this chapter, Heidegger has been presented as taking a somewhat different approach than Kaufmann to the interpretation of Nietzsche's writings. Among the many differences that Heidegger has with Kaufmann is Heidegger's contention that Nietzsche's philosophy deals primarily with answering the metaphysical question "what is being?". Modern philosophy is depicted, by Heidegger, as answering this question with the concept of 'will'. Nietzsche too is pictured as employing the concept of 'will' in order to answer this 'grounding question of philosophy'. The will takes on the form of 'the will to power'. Heidegger sees this metaphysical interpretation of the will to power as being supported by the texts, Zarathustra and The Will to Power. He also sees 'the question of being' as the aim of all Nietzsche's thought. The radical characteristics of the concepts that Nietzsche employs in order to define being, in Heidegger's view, serve to end modern metaphysics and hence all previous metaphysics. In this interpretation, the will to power is seen as a subjective concept that is closely related to the body and its drives, thereby inverting the
traditional conception of the intellect's superiority to the body. It is also ultimately chaotic, but has the ability to give itself the appearance of stability through the concepts of eternal recurrence and truth. The will to power, in Heidegger's eyes, represents the end of modern thought (due to its radical nature), and it paves the way for a new way of thinking in which Heidegger sees himself as participating in.
One particular aspect of the will to power has been left out of the two interpretations that have been presented thus far. The will to power's relationship to art and the artist still needs to be discussed. Once the connection between the artist and the will to power is established, an examination of how the artist and art function should give some further insight into the nature of will to power.

Before the connection between the artist and the will to power is described, the development of Nietzsche's ideas on art must be illustrated. It is admitted by most interpreters that Nietzsche's conception of art underwent an evolution during his career. The Birth of Tragedy gives a detailed explanation of the early views that he had on the artistic process. In this early text, art is represented by two opposing forces, Apollo and Dionysus. The early conception of Dionysus is best described by Nietzsche himself.

Dionysiac stirrings arise either through the influence of those narcotic potions of which all primitive races speak in their hymns, or through the powerful approach of spring, which penetrates with joy the whole frame of nature. So stirred the individual forgets himself completely. (BT 22)

The above passage points out some important aspects about this early view of the Dionysian. This force in art has a very
close tie to nature. In the Dionysian rite, nature "rises again to celebrate her reconciliation with her prodigal son, man" (BT 23). One gains a connection to nature that has apparently been lost in "civilized" society. Not only is the connection between man and nature reinforced but a bond between persons is forged. Nietzsche tells us that "each individual becomes not only reconciled to his fellow but actually at one with him." (BT 23). This oneness is best expressed in the "revelling throng" which involves intoxication, song and dance, and always a crowd in which one can lose one's self and at the same time become part of a "higher community". Music also plays an important role in facilitating this loss of self. One's newly found connection to others and to nature is best expressed by dancing to, or better yet, creating music. Music is depicted as the best expression of this early view of Dionysian oneness. Another feature of the Dionysian is the connection that it has to a force that exists in the world.

The contrast between this truth of nature [Dionysian truth] and the pretentious lie of civilization is quite similar to that between the eternal core of things and the entire phenomenal world. (BT 53)

It is evident that in this early passage Nietzsche believes Dionysian art to have some sort of privileged view of the world as it really is. He says that Dionysian art lets us become "part of the life force with whose procreative lust we have become one" (BT 24). So, among other things this early view of the Dionysian involves an understanding of the
traditional idea of the 'true world'.

The Apollonian, in Nietzsche's early conception of art, can be seen as the opposite of the Dionysian. While Dionysus represents primal oneness and a privileged glimpse of reality, Apollo is "the marvelous divine image of the principium individuationis, whose looks and gestures radiate the full delight, wisdom, and beauty of 'illusion'" (BT 22). The Apollonian represents the individual and the power of the dream image. It is not concerned with reality but with deception. Lingis states in his article "The Will to Power" that the plastic arts, confined to the Apollonian realm, are appearances without anything appearing. There is no truth in the visions that the artist dreams, these visions are fixed in their own individuality and are basically hallucinatory. These Apollonian images do not reflect nature's "life force" but instead represent the individual's power to dream (Lingis 46).

The Birth of Tragedy depicts these two deities (described above) as representing the dual nature of art and artistic creation. They are presented as working both with and against each other. Eventually this text describes Greek tragedy as the synthesis of these two opposing forces. This theory has some features which Nietzsche later rejected. The description of these opposite forces coming together in order to form tragedy is dangerously close to a dialectical theory and Nietzsche consistently opposed dialectic systems in his later
writings. Also, the association of the 'true world' or 'eternal core of things' with the Dionysian is inconsistent with his later rejection of there being any such thing as a distinction between the phenomenal world and a 'true world'. These refuted ideas (among others in the text) lead Nietzsche to refute major portions of The Birth of Tragedy. In "A Critical Backward Glance" 1886, which is used as a preface for the book, he states that it contains "every conceivable fault of adolescence" (BT 5).

With time, Nietzsche put this dualistic conception of art behind him and brought the two opposed deities together under the single heading Dionysus. Rose Pfeffer describes the transition accurately in Nietzsche, Disciple of Dionysus.

...now Dionysus is no longer only the symbol of chaos and destruction; he is also the God of spring and production....He is in fact a synthesis of both chaos and form, of orgiastic impulses and visionary states (Pfeffer 216)

Nietzsche's mature position on the artistic process can be represented as solely Dionysian. In a line from Twilight of The Idols he speaks about the faith that "all is redeemed and affirmed in the whole" and he 'baptizes' this faith "with the name of Dionysus" (TI 554). Further evidence of this reconciliation between the opposite forces of art appears in a note from The Will to Power.

"Beauty" is for the artist something outside all orders of rank, because in beauty opposites are tamed (WP 422)
and stability, and truth and illusion. These are all represented by Dionysus alone.

Now that the development of Nietzsche's artistic theory has been described briefly, it is fitting to investigate the connection between artistic creation and the will to power. Even though Nietzsche warned his readers that the Birth of Tragedy contained errors, over-generalizations, and had a certain dialectical spirit that was 'too Hegalian', many of his ideas from this time period can be used in order to gain information about his final image of the artist. In a note from Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks he makes clear the connection between the activity of the artist and the nature of the will to power.

Heraclitus has no reason to prove...that this world is the best of all possible worlds; it suffices that it is the beautiful, innocent play of the Aeon...And just as the child and the artist play, plays the eternally active fire—it builds and destroys in innocence. (qtd. in Pfeffer 202)

In this passage Nietzsche points out the similarity between the 'eternally active fire' and the 'play' of the artist. Neither Kaufmann nor Heidegger's interpretation would deny that the reference to this 'fire' can be seen as a reference to the will to power. In Kaufmann's interpretation, 'this world' that the 'eternal fire' underlies would be seen as the world of the mind (with the emphasis on this), while Heidegger's interpretation would see 'this world' as representing all 'being' that has as its essence, the will to power. The most important aspect of this passage is that it
shows that the artist, whether the will to power is a psychological or a metaphysical concept, is exemplifying the will to power. The artist acts in the same way that the will to power acts. This is also demonstrated in a note from *The Will to Power*.

The phenomenon "artist" is still the most transparent: to see through it to the basic instincts of power, nature, etc.! (WP 419)

The artist is not necessarily showing the nature of the will to power in the art that he/she produces like "a kind of mouthpiece for the absolute" (GM 237). Rather, his or her actions, in creating the work of art, can be seen as exemplifying how the will to power operates. There is a subtle difference here: the artist is not a vehicle for the expression of the will to power, but, it is through learning how the artist behaves that one can see how the will to power behaves. This is because the two act in the same manner.

The true artist, for Nietzsche, is not concerned with expressing a type of 'early Dionysian' picture of the world. There is not a lifting of "the veil of Maya" (BT 22) in order to see the world the way it really is. Instead the artist is concerned with illusion and deception. In a note from *The Will to Power* Nietzsche states:

...truth does not count as the supreme value, even less as the supreme power. The will to appearance, to illusion, to deception, to becoming and change...here counts as more profound, primeval, "metaphysical" than the will to truth, to reality...(WP 453)

In a line following this passage Nietzsche calls art the true
"metaphysical activity" of life (WP 453), so it is safe to assume that the 'will to appearance' is put forth as relating to artistic activity. This passage is stating that artistic activity is concerned with 'illusion' and 'deception', and is more important than so-called reality or truth. Also, art is concerned with 'becoming' and 'change'; this is an important distinction that will be focused on shortly. Further evidence of Nietzsche's commitment to viewing art as deception can be found in the preface for The Birth of Tragedy (1886).

For both art and life depend wholly on the laws of optics, on perspective and illusion; both, to be blunt, depend on the necessity of error. (BT 10)

Here, the element of untruth in art is explicitly stated. Also stated here is the connection between art and life's need for illusion. This connection will be discussed next. What has already been established is that artistic creation behaves like the will to power, and it is essentially concerned with deception or appearance.

Not only artistic creation, but our existence itself, is concerned with deception. In The Will to Power Nietzsche states that "We have need of lies" and that "lies are necessary in order to live" (WP 451). He includes metaphysics, morality, religion, and science as various ways in which we lie to ourselves in order to "have faith in life" (WP 453). Here we see the need for deception in life. The true nature of life, for Nietzsche, is chaotic and unstable, so we invent concepts such as religion and science and we call them
'truths' in order to give stability and order to our lives. Nietzsche states this bluntly in another note from his later writings.

Truth is a kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live (WP 272)

The forming of stable institutions or 'truth' gives stability to the 'eternally active fire' that is the will to power. The idea that 'truth' is a fiction that human beings need in order to survive is right in line with Heidegger's interpretation. In the chapter on Heidegger it was demonstrated that Heidegger sees Nietzsche as viewing 'truth' as something which 'stabilizes' the chaotic nature of the will to power or 'impresses Being on becoming'. Kaufmann's interpretation, on the other hand, would have to deny that 'stable truth' is a necessary fiction. Kaufmann portrays Nietzsche as allowing for the existence of stable empirical truths.

It has been demonstrated that both artistic creation and our existence are concerned with lying or with deception, but there is an important difference between these two types of deception. This difference can be seen in the passage from The Will to Power where artistic activity is related to 'becoming' and 'change'. Rather than creating illusion for the purpose of stabilizing or falsifying the chaotic will to power, the artist creates illusion for the sake of illusion. The artist 'builds and destroys in innocence' just as the will to power does. While concepts like truth, religion, and
science are put forward by human beings in order to deceive themselves about the nature of the will to power, art is put forward as a deception for the sake of deception. The fact that art is only concerned with creation and not with establishing stability makes it similar to the will to power which also lacks stability or a specified goal. This is what makes art life affirming, it does not attempt to hide the chaotic essence of life which is the will to power. Nietzsche states that art is an "intoxication with life [and] a will to life" (WP 449). It does not matter whether the essence of life is taken to mean all life or just human life here, what is significant is that the artist reflects this essence which is essentially chaotic.

The difference between artistic illusion and the illusion of 'truth' (morality, science etc.) is made even more clear in another note from The Will to Power. The deception that is motivated by a desire for "rigidity, eternity, [and] being" is distinguished from deception that comes from "the desire for destruction, for change, for becoming" (WP 446). The latter is the desire for artistic creation and the former is the desire for concepts like absolute morality and logical systems. Here, Nietzsche makes it clear that the motivation for an artistic kind of deception is really what sets it apart from other forms of deception or lying. In The Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche verifies the importance of the artist's motivation.
In Art the lie becomes consecrated, the will to deception has good conscience at its back. (GM 290)

The 'good conscience' is the playful aspect of artistic creativity which lacks a designated direction or end.

Art is motivated by this desire for creation, similarly, the will to power is concerned with creation. Artistic activity is "worth more than truth" (WP 453) because it operates in the same way as the will to power, while 'truth' (stability) stands in opposition to the nature of the will to power. The inartistic is described by Nietzsche as unconducive to life or the will to power.

Inartistic states: among those who become impoverished, withdraw, grow pale, under whose eyes life suffers:-the Christian. (WP 430)

Here, anyone who embraces the stability of morality and religion, is seen as negating life and its creative essence. Art and the Artist, on the other hand, affirm life.

Art and nothing but art!...the great seduction to life, the great stimulant of life. (WP 452)

So, both art and stabilizing concepts such as 'truth' and morality are deceptions that are necessary for life. The illusion of morality, religion, etc. is antithetical to the essence of life while artistic illusion reflects life and its chaotic nature.

This description of the artistic process has been developed from an examination of Nietzsche's later writings, specifically The Will to Power and The Genealogy of Morals. The additional information that has been gained about the will
to power in this chapter will be applied to the previous interpretations, and, in the final chapter the most coherent picture of the will to power will be illustrated.
Before drawing any conclusions about the nature of the will to power it is useful, at this point, to review what has already been covered. In chapter one, the basic conflict that is related to the will to power was illustrated by showing the opposing statements that Nietzsche makes about the possibility of metaphysical theory. Statements that support a metaphysical interpretation of the will to power were contrasted with statements that attack all metaphysical thinking. It was shown how Kaufmann and Heidegger fall on different sides of this conflict. Also, the major questions that each interpretation has to deal with were outlined. It was shown how Kaufmann's 'psychological' explanation has to explain away the apparently pro-metaphysical descriptions of the will to power. Kaufmann's theory also has to demonstrate that Nietzsche's denial of truth is a denial of metaphysical truth only, leaving the possibility for empirical truth. Heidegger's interpretation was shown as having to explain how the anti-metaphysical statements and a denial of all truth could exist along side of a metaphysical interpretation of the will to power.

In chapters two and three, Kaufmann and Heidegger's
interpretations of the will to power were described in detail. Each dealt with explaining the resolutions to the problems posed in the first chapter. Each interpretation also touched upon the issues of: appropriate style of interpretation, whether or not Nietzsche's philosophy underwent an evolution, whether Nietzsche engaged in reflection or observation in formulating his theory 'the will to power', the validity of certain texts, and the proper reading of a passage from Beyond Good and Evil. A decision as to which interpretation presents the best explanation of each of these points will made in this chapter, but first, chapter four must be discussed.

Chapter four examined Nietzsche's views on art and artistic creation. The connection between the artist and the will to power was stressed. What was also emphasized was how both the artist and life are involved in deception. The artist was depicted as deceiving without purpose or for the sake of deception, while life was shown to deceive out of the desire (or need) for stability. The result of the artist's deception was shown to be art, while life's deception was depicted as resulting in dogmatic institutions like religion, morality and logic. This description of art was given in order to gain further perspective on which interpretation, Kaufmann or Heidegger's, comes closer to being a true representation of Nietzsche's philosophy. This chapter plays such an important role in making a decision about Nietzsche that a decision about the validity of The Will to Power must
be made. The Will to Power was used as a major source of information for chapter four.

This chapter (chapter 5), as well as the chapter on art, view The Will to Power as a viable source of Nietzsche's thought. This opposes Kaufmann, who views the text as unimportant because it was not organized by Nietzsche himself. Kaufmann sees the Will to Power as a collection of unrelated "Jottings and scribbles" that do not form a coherent system (Kaufmann 6). While it is true that Nietzsche did not organize the notes that are contained in the text, this does not mean that the ideas expressed in this work are to be ignored. Heidegger also believes in the importance of The Will to Power and he provides his readers with ample evidence that Nietzsche spent years planning this text in order to present his mature philosophy. This evidence comes from a series of letters that were written by Nietzsche between 1884 and 1887. On April 7, 1884, Nietzsche writes to his friend Overbeck:

...I am resolved to devote the next five years to the construction of my "philosophy", for which I have in my Zarathustra constructed a vestibule. (qtd. in Heidegger, 1979, V.1 12)

Here, Nietzsche is expressing his plans to 'construct' a major work which is to reflect his "philosophy". This does not appear to be the plan for some small experiment in thought considering that the lengthy Zarathustra is merely a 'vestibule'. Instead it seems that this planned work is intended to sum up a great many of Nietzsche's ideas.
Nietzsche affirms this in another letter from 1884. This one is to his sister.

...During the next few months I want to draw up the schema for my philosophy and my plan for the next six years. May my health hold out for this purpose! (qtd. in Heidegger, 1979, V.1 13)

Here again Nietzsche expresses his plans for a major work which apparently will take years to construct and will reflect the nature of his entire philosophy. In 1886, in a letter to his mother and sister, Nietzsche calls this planned major work by name.

For the next four years the creation of a four-volume magnum opus is proposed. The very title is fearsome: "The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values." (qtd. in Heidegger, 1979, V.1, 14)

It is clear that the letters from this time period provide evidence of Nietzsche's intention to make The Will to Power a summation of his philosophy. Also, these letters indicate that the proposed date of completion for this work was to be around the year 1890. Nietzsche was unable to write after 1888 so the work was never completed. There are however, several hundred notes left behind that Nietzsche had intended to use in The Will to Power. While there is speculation that Nietzsche's sister, who was a fanatical Nazi sympathizer, tampered with some of the notes contained in this text, there is no reason that all of these notes should be ignored. They are a valuable source (used along with the published material) for uncovering Nietzsche's mature philosophy, particularly, his views about the will to power and art. It is important
to note that no one should rely solely on this text for information about Nietzsche; his published works must also be used as support for the ideas found in *The Will to Power*.

Now that a final decision has been made about the validity of the *Will to Power*, it is appropriate to attend to some of the other discrepancies that exist between Kaufmann and Heidegger's interpretations.

Kaufmann viewed the will to power as a concept that underwent an evolution, while Heidegger saw it as a constant focus of Nietzsche's overall philosophy. Because he saw Nietzsche as a metaphysician, Heidegger could not allow for a view which depicted Nietzsche as a philosopher who 'experimented' with the concept of 'will' and the will to power. The ideas of 'will' and being, for Heidegger, had to be at the center of Nietzsche's reflection throughout his entire philosophy. However, a correct interpretation of Nietzsche bears out the fact that the will to power did undergo a kind of evolution. Kaufmann demonstrates this development of the concept. The texts which Kaufmann cites provide convincing evidence that the will to power started off as a psychological theory and grew from there. In the mid to late 1870's Nietzsche's writings show that it was originally associated with only a few negative human characteristics (Kaufmann 179). In *Human All too Human* and *Daybreak* the concept of the will to power does in fact snowball into a larger and more encompassing psychological theory. Finally,
in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* the concept expands even farther, becoming a psychological monism. This occurs in the chapter entitled "On the Thousand and One Goals". Kaufmann believes that this is as far as the concept can go. He denies that Nietzsche can ever consistently assert that the will to power explains anything more than human motivation. Appropriately, this is as far as Kaufmann's interpretation can go.

While it is true that the will to power developed as a psychological theory, it is also true that it developed into a metaphysical theory. The seriousness with which Nietzsche declares that "this world is the will to power" (WP 550) can not be ignored. Support for this metaphysical view will be given later, but what is important to recognize here is that the will to power did undergo the development that Kaufmann outlines. This evolution or development of ideas is admitted by Nietzsche himself when he writes his own preface for *The Birth of Tragedy*. In this preface he discounts a lot of what is contained in the text, stating that he has matured intellectually since that time. Even though this example of *The Birth of Tragedy* relates to Nietzsche's ideas about art, it shows that his ideas from the early stages of his writings are subject to change. The will to power is one of these ideas.

The view that Nietzsche's conception of the will to power undergoes an evolution effects another disputed matter. Kaufmann and Heidegger disagree as to whether the will to
power was reached as a result of reflection or as a result of observation and experimentation. It was previously decided that the will to power was originally conceived of as an explanation for certain types of behavior. This implies that Nietzsche observed various behaviors and then labeled them as resulting from the will to power. The concept was born out of these observations of human nature. So, if Kaufmann's interpretation is correct in asserting that the will to power evolved as a theory (which it is), then it follows that it was first formulated as a result of observation. Furthermore, the way that the theory developed was by Nietzsche experimenting with how far he could push this concept. The will to power expanded because of Nietzsche's investigations into how much it could explain. It was previously shown that Kaufmann's interpretation of the evolution of the will to power is correct up until his denial of the metaphysical status that it gains in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Similarly, the view that the character of the will to power is effected by observation is only correct up to a point. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Nietzsche ends the experimentation with the will to power and enters into reflection on how it relates to the world and the history of philosophy. This can be seen as a turning point in Nietzsche's philosophy where the scientist slips away and the metaphysician takes over. In his later writings the a priori assumptions that he makes become more frequent, not because of a loss of sanity, but because of his increasing
commitment to reflection and metaphysical thought.

A kind of happy compromise between Kaufmann and Heidegger's interpretations can be seen here. Kaufmann's interpretation of Nietzsche is correct up to the point where Nietzsche realizes that the will to power is more than an explanation for human motivation. This realization happens around the time of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. At this point Nietzsche is ready to view the will to power as the essence of all life, and all being as well. This is also the point where Kaufmann states that Nietzsche has completed all worthwhile insight into the concept of the will to power. (Kaufmann 207). He disregards much of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as being 'too poetic' to take seriously (Kaufmann 206). In his opinion the will to power is only viable as a psychological theory. Kaufmann's interpretation is mistaken about the completion of Nietzsche's valuable insight into the concept of the will to power onwards from this time period. He is also mistaken about the importance of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. He is, however, correct about the development of Nietzsche's thought up to this point. In contrast, Heidegger's interpretation of the will to power can be seen as being accurate from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* on. Heidegger states that the work is the most important of the published writings. In fact, he sees it as 'the vestibule' for what he considers the most important unpublished work, *The Will to Power*. This implies that Heidegger sees Nietzsche's most
worthwhile thought as beginning with Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche as a metaphysician engaging in reflection does, in fact, accurately describe the character of Nietzsche's later writings. So, Thus Spoke Zarathustra can be seen as a turning point for Nietzsche as well as the point where Kaufmann's interpretation becomes invalid with regard to viewing Nietzsche as an experimenter. Heidegger's view becomes relevant at this same point because it accurately describes the metaphysical character of Nietzsche's later thought.

Now it is appropriate to look at the conflicting interpretations of Passage #36 from Beyond Good and Evil. Since the work was written after Thus Spoke Zarathustra a metaphysical interpretation of the passage seems inevitable. Heidegger's interpretation does in fact fit this passage better than Kaufmann's. The section where the 'instinctual life' is depicted as being the ramification of the will to power does imply that all life, not just human life, is governed by the will to power. This was demonstrated in the Chapter on Heidegger (p.58). The first section of the passage, where Nietzsche assumes that our 'drives' are all we can know for certain, also supports a Heideggerian view. The most important thing about this section is that it is, as Clark points out, formulated from a priori assumptions. The a priori thought that characterizes most of Nietzsche's later writings can be clearly seen here. This a priori
interpretation of the first section supports Heidegger's view and is presented in the chapter on Heidegger (p.59). Finally the last sentence of the passage strongly asserts that the 'the world' can be defined as 'the will to power'. It is clear that 'the world', in this case, refers to more than just the world of the mind.

Along with supporting Heidegger's interpretation, passage #36 shows the transition between Nietzsche as experimenter and Nietzsche as metaphysician. This is the first work published after Thus Spoke Zarathustra and the switch in thinking is apparently still fresh in Nietzsche's mind. A major thrust of the passage is the description of taking what is known through observation, that which is 'given', and then reflecting on the nature of 'the world'. This can be seen as Nietzsche taking the psychological conception of the will to power (described by Kaufmann) and applying it to much more than human motivation. This psychological idea of the will to power is now expanded through reflection and not observation. Since it is established that this passage contains a new view of the will to power that is formed through a priori thinking, it is clear that it also indicates the switch from observation to reflection.

Continuing with this assessment of the disputed aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy, truth must be looked at. It was shown in the chapter on art that Heidegger's view of Nietzsche's theory of truth is the correct one. The chapter
followed a close read of The Will to Power (along with other texts) in order to determine that truth, like art, is essentially a deception. Life creates certain truths (religion, morality, logic, etc.) in order to create stability. This stability that is ‘truth’ is not, however, true. Nietzsche saw ‘truth’ as something that is created in order to survive. He also saw truth as a correspondence to what is properly real. The ‘truth’ that is put forth in order to create stability is not true, or is a deception, because it does not correspond to the chaotic nature of the world. Nietzsche believes that nothing can be true in this sense of corresponding to reality because reality is constantly in flux. The closest we come to understanding this reality is through artistic creation which acts in the same chaotic manner. It is appropriate to ask, at this point, how Nietzsche can say that he knows reality is in flux if there is no possibility for truth about reality? How can he posit the will to power as this reality if the will to power is essentially unknowable? How can the will to power answer all of the psychological and metaphysical questions that Nietzsche says it does if there is no possibility for any real knowledge and we have ‘no organ for truth’ (GS 300). Heidegger is right in interpreting Nietzsche as noticing these contradictions and letting them exist. Nietzsche admits his dual role as metaphysician and annihilator of metaphysics in the chapter "On Self Over-Coming" from Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
That I must be a struggle and a becoming and an end and an opposition to ends—alas, whoever guesses what is my will should also guess on what crooked paths it must proceed.

Whatever I create and however much I love it—soon I must oppose it and my love; (Z 227)

Here, Nietzsche admits that his denial of truth is inconsistent with the presentation of ideas that he believes to be true.

It has already been established that Heidegger's interpretation of the will to power is the one that is favored in this paper. While he seems to be incorrect in denying that the will to power undergoes an evolution, his interpretation of the will to power as the essence of all being fits the final understanding that Nietzsche has of the concept. The way that the will to power develops before Thus Spoke Zarathustra provides valuable psychological insight. But, it is the conception of the will to power as the essential character of all being which carries the most weight in determining Nietzsche's ultimate role in the history of philosophy. Nietzsche's role is as a metaphysician who sought to attack metaphysics from within. His metaphysical theories stand next to his resentment of metaphysics. Even his own metaphysical theories, Heidegger rightly points out, serve to undermine metaphysics due to their radical nature. Nietzsche was much like his own concept of the will to power in that he was perpetually at war with himself, creating metaphysical theory while at the same destroying metaphysics.

The metaphysical interpretation that Heidegger presents
is obtained from using The Will to Power as a valid source for discovering Nietzsche's ultimate philosophy. It was mentioned that this paper also views that text as useful. It is from an examination of The Will to Power, as well as some of the other later writings, that a conclusion about the validity of Heidegger's interpretation has been made. The will to power is clearly presented as a metaphysical idea in these texts.

The chapter on art also helped to bring about a conclusion that is sympathetic to Heidegger's interpretation. In this chapter it was established that Nietzsche views artistic creation as a reflection of the will to power. Artistic creation was depicted as an activity which involves 'creating in innocence'. The artistic process, for Nietzsche, is the creation of illusion for the sole purpose of illusion. There is no ulterior motive involved in true artistic creation. Similarly, there is no goal or designated end in the creative activity of the will to power. Chapter four depicted the will to power as the essence of life that is essentially in flux and chaotic. Chapter four also showed that the desire for illusion in the artistic process is unlike the desire for illusion that gives rise to 'truth'. In the case of 'truth' the deception or illusion that is sought is motivated by a desire for stability. Perhaps more importantly the desire for the illusion of stable 'truth' is motivated by an aversion to that which is not stable, namely, the will to power.
Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche recognizes that the will to power is chaotic and that it gives itself the appearance of stability in 'truths' like religion, science and morality. In the chapter on Heidegger's interpretation (chapter 3) it was explained that the reason the will to power gives itself the appearance of stability is that it has an 'aversion' to its own chaotic nature. Heidegger discusses this aversion to chaos or 'transience' in "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?". Heidegger correctly interprets Nietzsche's view of 'truth' as an attempt at stabilizing the transience of the will to power. Heidegger also is correct when he interprets Nietzsche as viewing artistic creation as the closest thing there is to 'real' truth (truth as correspondence to reality). Heidegger believes that Nietzsche saw artistic creation as exemplifying the chaotic nature of the will to power. Under Heidegger's view of Nietzsche, the artist has the greatest sensitivity to the will to power. If this is the case, then the artist also has the best perception of the essence of life because the will to power, under Heidegger's interpretation, represents the true essence of life. In other words, while 'truth' does not represent the chaotic nature of the essence of life, artistic creation does.

Heidegger's interpretation is right in line with the view of art that has been presented in chapter four. His interpretation of Nietzsche describes the will to power as the Being of beings and depicts the artist as the one who lets
Being (the will to power) be. Heidegger is correct to interpret Nietzsche as viewing the artist as the one who exemplifies the will to power because he lets transience and chaos reign. The artist does not impose stability, instead he acts without goals or ends, like the will to power does.

In comparison to Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche which has a metaphysical view of the artist, Kaufmann's interpretation pays little attention to the significance of artistic creation in Nietzsche's overall philosophy. Kaufmann focusses on the development of Nietzsche's theory of artistic creation and does not pursue the idea that the artist is the one who exemplifies the essence of the will to power. While Kaufmann's explanation of the development of Nietzsche's artistic theory is accurate and useful, the metaphysical implications of Nietzsche's ultimate view of the artist are neglected in his interpretation.

Finally, Heidegger's style of interpretation is far superior to Kaufmann's. It definitely would please Nietzsche if he knew that someone was interpreting his writings personally. Also, the passion that Heidegger's interpretation possesses is something that Nietzsche would approve of. Heidegger is right to see Nietzsche as demanding that those who read him become affected somehow. Nietzsche is calling for a new way of thinking and Heidegger apparently hears this call. The role that Nietzsche sees his reader playing is illustrated in the description of the child as the third...
metamorphoses in "On The Three Metamorphoses".

The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred "yes"....The spirit now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the world now conquers his own world. (Z 139)

This is what Nietzsche hopes his efforts can accomplish. It is as if he is saying "I have done the work of the first two metamorphoses. Now it is your turn". The first two metamorphoses represent the gathering together and destroying of all previous valuations (religion, metaphysics, etc.). Heidegger's interpretation would correctly include the will to power and its radical nature as part of the second metamorphoses (the will to power being part of the end of an era). Nietzsche represents the end of a period in history. The task for the reader is to realize this and to assist in the establishment of a new approach to philosophical thought.
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