J. L. AUSTIN
ON
STATEMENTS
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THESIS ABSTRACT

This thesis aims at setting forth how J.L. Austin understood the use of the term 'statement.' Austin put forth a doctrine analyzing the different aspects of an utterance. One of these aspects is the type of utterance it is, e.g., a statement rather than a command. Austin called this aspect the illocutionary force of an utterance. The illocutionary force of an utterance is distinct from the meaning of the words used in making the utterance. On Austin's own admission, he neglected any discussion of the illocutionary force, or what I will call the claim-making force of statements. It is for this reason that the use of the term 'statement' in his philosophy needs to be examined.

In Chapter One, I want to present Austin's development of the illocutionary force thesis in How to Do Things with Words. In the first part of his book, Austin made a sharp distinction between statements and other types of utterances he called performatives, e.g., warning, commanding, judging and promising. The distinction was based on the fact that performatives, unlike statements, were not the kind of things which can be true or false. Performatives do not describe anything. Instead, they are the performing of acts in themselves. I will discuss in this chapter how Austin came to reject this distinction in favor of a distinction between the illocutionary force of an utterance and the other aspects of the utterance, i.e., its locutionary and prelocutionary aspects.
Chapter two presents criticisms of the notion of the illocutionary force of an utterance. These criticisms argue that the illocutionary force of an utterance is not distinct from the meaning of the sentence used in making the utterance. They conclude that by unpacking and examining the meaning of the expressions used we will know what illocutionary act has been performed.

Chapter three is a rebuttal to the arguments against Austin's notion of illocutionary force that were presented in the previous chapter. By presenting various arguments and examples, I want to show that the criticisms in Chapter two are mistaken. The conclusion reached claims that the meaning of the expressions used in the utterance will not exhaust the utterance's force. We can know one independently of the other. The point of these two chapters is to offer a background for knowing and understanding the scope and importance of illocutionary force.

In chapter four, I begin to discuss the claim-making force of a statement. The chapter involves a discussion of the key terms involved in uttering something with a claim-making force. I also discuss facts and knowledge of the facts. This is to show what should be emphasized and what should not be emphasized in analyzing the claim-making force of a statement if problems are to be avoided. The discussion shows how our knowledge at the time of the utterance is important for knowing that an utterance has a claim-making force.
The last chapter begins by discussing some of the relevant elements that are needed in order for an utterance to have a claim-making force. I offer various examples as well, to aid in showing that things like the speaker's status, circumstances, knowledge, reasons and evidence play a role in determining whether an utterance has a claim-making force. To be stating, I must be making a claim about some actual or putative states of affairs based on information to which I have access. For the uttering of a sentence to be a happy act of stating, I must know certain things about certain states of affairs which I have been in a good position to know. This leads me and my audience to understand that my utterance is the making of a truth-claim.
INTRODUCTION

As a philosopher of language, Austin put forth a doctrine analyzing the different aspects of an utterance. One of these aspects deals with how the utterance is to be taken, e.g., as a statement as opposed to a command. Austin called this aspect the illocutionary force of an utterance. He is interested in what it is about an utterance that makes it a particular type of discourse, i.e., promising, commanding, stating, etc. My purpose is to discuss the illocutionary force, or what I choose to call claim-making force, of a statement. On his own admission, Austin neglected any discussion of the illocutionary force of statements. I shall explore how Austin would have explicated the illocutionary force of a statement if he had expanded his own discussion of this particular type of force. How is it that I may be said to be stating something? For one thing, I must be making a claim about some actual or putative state of affairs in the world based on my knowledge of the facts. Also, if I am to be taken as stating something, then my claim must be recognized as based on adequate information to which I have access. If this instance of stating something is to be, to use Austin's words, happy or appropriate, then everything must be in order for performing this particular act of stating, i.e., I must know certain things about certain states of affairs which I have been in a good position to ascertain. It is
these things that I want to bring out and discuss about a particular utterance so that I may determine whether it is the successful use of the utterance.

I will not be interested in defining or explaining exactly what a statement is. Instead, I will concern myself with those things that need to be appropriate in order for a person to infer that a certain utterance is being used with a claim-making force. Although much of Austin's *How to Do Things with Words* is devoted to elucidating what he called illocutionary force, he omitted any discussion of the force thesis in connection with statements. I shall be discussing how Austin would have construed the illocutionary force of a statement. In *How to Do Things with Words*, Austin showed how statements and other types of speech acts, i.e., warning or commanding have a lot in common. This common aspect between statements and self-motives has to do with the illocutionary elements of an utterance. Austin was interested in showing that certain things need to be in order for a warning or a statement to be considered the appropriate thing to have said. Austin believed that those reasons and evidence that make a warning the correct thing to issue (words are uttered; warnings are issued, or given) also make a statement the correct thing to say. In general, certain things need to be in order before I can succeed in making a statement or issuing a warning. It is the total speech situation that must be considered so that we may know what type of act is being performed. The speech situation will indicate whether an utterance is being used to issue, or give a warning or whether it
is being used to make a statement. What I want to do is deal specifically with those things in a situation from which we may infer that the utterance is being used with a claim-making force. If it can be correctly said to be an instance of stating, then we can go on to see whether the statement made corresponds to the facts truly or falsely. I am only interested in assessing a statement as to its force and not as to its truth or falsity.
Since I am going to examine what Austin understood the use of the word 'statement' to be and what that use entails, it will be important to include Austin's attempt to distinguish performative and constative utterances, the reasons for the failure of that attempt, and his introduction of a theory of speech acts to replace that distinction. This is necessary since the performative-constative distinction ultimately fails for Austin due to his further analysis of the use of 'statement'. This analysis leads him to the formulation of the illocutionary vs. locutionary speech-act theory. The inclusion of this topic will aid in gaining a clear notion of what Austin understood statements, or the use of the word 'statement' to be, especially with regard to the later theory.

Early in How to Do Things with Words, Austin introduces his theory of performative which he distinguishes from what he calls 'constatives'. Constatives are simply those types of utterances "whose main characteristic is that they are true or false descriptions or reports, etc." Constatives represent those utterances which are used to describe or report something which, accordingly, can be either true or false. Thus, for example, the truth or falsity of the constative utterance "It is raining outside now" depends on whether it is raining outside at the moment the

utterance is made.

A performative utterance represents something Austin wants to distinguish from constatives. He distinguishes this type of utterance from constatives in order to question "an age-old assumption in philosophy -- the assumption that to say something, at least in all cases worth considering, i.e. all cases considered, is always and simply to state something" which could either be true or false. He wants to discuss forms of words which are not used to make statements of fact. They characterize something totally different, even though in some cases they may be mistaken for constatives.

Austin calls this different type of utterance "a performative sentence or a performative utterance, or, for short, 'a performative' "which is "derived, of course, from 'perform', the usual verb with the noun 'action'". Its function "indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action" "or is the part of, the doing of an action". A performative utterance does not describe or report an action, rather it is the act or action itself. It is the performing of the action as contrasted with constatives which may report or describe an action. Because of this feature, it is not the kind of utterance which can be true or false as is the case with statements of fact, i.e., constatives.

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3 Ibid., p. 6.
4 Ibid., p. 6.
5 Ibid., p. 5.
There can be examples of saying something "worth consider-
ing"6 which are not simply instances of stating something. Utterances and sayings such as: 'I promise so-and-so', 'I bet so-and-so', 'I bequeath such-and-such', or 'I do' as uttered in a marriage ceremony are examples of performatives. In none of these utterances is the speaker describing something he has done. The speaker is in fact doing something in uttering these words; his utterances are not about those acts represented by the above examples; they are those acts. To say 'I promise' is not to report an instance of promising, 'I promise' is the act of promising: "The uttering of the word is, indeed, usually a, or even the, leading incident in the performance of the act."7 "I do" does not report an instance of marrying someone; it is an act performed in the course of marrying someone.

Performatives are neither true nor false, because they do not describe or report anything in the constative sense. Austin says "I assert this as obvious and do not argue it."8 We do not say of 'I promise so-and-so' that it was uttered truly or falsely. One who utters this simply obliges himself to fulfill certain intentions. If we accept someone as seriously making a promise, and that individual in turn does not fulfill those intentions to which he obliged himself, he still, nonetheless, made a promise.

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6 Ibid., p. 13.
7 Ibid., p. 8.
8 Ibid., p. 6.
The promise was just made in bad faith or not followed through, it is not false that he promised. A promise is not false because we can and often do hold someone accountable for a promise or bet that is unfilled. The veracity of someone making a statement no longer needs to be maintained or disputed, as when the statement has been shown to misrepresent what is actually the case.

This brings me to my next point about performatives: what is it that has to occur for a performative either to take place or for it to fall through, not to happen?

Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the words are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons, should also perform certain other actions, whether 'physical' or 'mental' actions or even acts of uttering further words. 9

To make a promise, I not only have to be serious, and be taken as serious, but I must also perform those actions which will serve to obligate myself. But promising is not a description of those actions, for even if they do not happen, I still promised, it was just given "in bad faith, or not implemented." 10 That is why, analogously, we can convict someone of bigamy; the circumstances for marrying someone were not appropriate, i.e., one of the participants was not single. The uttering of a performative is one of the necessary

9 Ibid., p. 8.
10 Ibid., p. 11.
circumstances for performing certain acts.

This brings us to the conditions under which Austin felt that a performative could be taken as being successful or going wrong. He characterizes this as the 'happy' or 'unhappy' functioning of the performative. The conditions for a 'happy' performative are as follows:

(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,

(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.

(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and completely

(B.2) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further,

(F.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.\[11\]

To violate any of these rules will make a performative utterance unhappy. These violations Austin terms "infelicities." These rules also show that the mere uttering of the performative is not sufficient for it to be happy. In considering relevant conditions, Austin wants to exclude from considerations those circumstances

that cause utterances to go wrong because they are "used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use," such as acting, poems, or jokes, instead of being "understood in ordinary circumstances."\textsuperscript{12}

The infelicities that Austin described represent violations of the above rules. Thus, "we shall call in general those infelicities \textsuperscript{A.1} - \textsuperscript{B.2} which are such that the act for the performing of which, and in performing of which, the verbal formula in question is designed, is not achieved, by the name MISFIRES: and on the other hand we may christen those infelicities (the \textsuperscript{r.1} and \textsuperscript{r.2} types) where the act is achieved ABUSES."\textsuperscript{13} Austin's two concepts of misfires and abuses can be used "to crack the crib of Reality, or as it may be, of Confusion" for to be "forearmed should be forewarned."\textsuperscript{14}

During his discussions of infelicities Austin distinguishes between explicit performatives and implicit performatives. Explicit performatives

(all) begin with or include some highly significant and unambiguous expression such as 'I bet,' 'I promise,' 'I bequeath' -- an expression very commonly used in naming the act which, in making such an utterance, I am performing -- for example betting, promising, bequeathing.\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 22.  
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 16.  
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 25.  
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 32.
\end{flushright}
performative may be uttered implicitly, i.e., "the utterance 'I order you to go'":16 "Austin employed this distinction solely to account for an expression's being a performative despite the fact that it does not satisfy the grammatical criterion for performatives."17 A performative does not have to look like one to be one.

Early in his discussion of infelicities, Austin briefly mentioned doubts he had about the performative-constative distinction, which he later expanded to show that the original distinction was not as clear as he originally thought. He began by asking "does the notion of infelicity apply to utterances which are statements?"18

Evidence that the original distinction begins to blur together for Austin can be seen when he claims that there is no reason to doubt that stating something is performing an act just as much as is giving an order or giving a warning; and we see, on the other hand, that, when we give an order or a warning or a piece of advice, there is a question about how this is related to fact which is not perhaps so very different from the kind of question that arises when we discuss how a statement is related to fact."19

Their specific domains of interest are found to be related. For this reasons, I will try to answer, first, what it is about performatives that makes them like statements, and second, what it

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16 Ibid., p. 3.
18 Ibid., p. 20.
is about statements that makes them like performatives. This should make it clear what it is about both types of utterances that cause the distinction to fail.

Austin held that there was one aspect of performatives which was similar to something found in statements. This was how performatives are "related in some way to fact."20 Performatives can be judged by considering how they agree or fit with the facts. These considerations seem to imply "that for a certain performative utterance to be happy, certain statements have to be true."21 This suggests that the performatives going right or wrong is as much involved with a correspondence to the facts as statements are in being true or false. Austin lists four conditions that need to be true for a performative to be happy:

(1) If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is happy, then the statement that I am apologizing is true.

(2) If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is to be happy, then the statement that certain conditions obtain -- those notably in Rules A.1 and A.2 -- must be true.

(3) If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is to be happy, then the statement that certain other conditions obtain -- those notably in our rule .1 must be true.

(4) If performative utterances of at least some kinds are happy, for example contractual ones, then statements of the form that I ought or ought not subsequently to do some particular thing are true.22

20 Ibid., p.251.
21 Austin, How to Do Things with Words. p. 45.
22 Ibid., p. 53.
Performatives imply certain things which can either be true or false, and this is a characteristic of statements. The implications of performatives are comparable to the implications of statements. The statement implications Austin was interested in were those of entailment, implication and presumption. I shall take each one of these separately and show its similarity with performative implications.

Entailment had to do with the idea, for example, that "'All men blush' entails 'some men blush'" and that we "cannot say 'All men blush but not any men blush'". Here the truth of a proposition entails the truth of a further proposition or the truth of one is inconsistent with the truth of another. To compare this with performatives Austin said:

'I promise' entails 'I ought', and that 'I promise but I ought not' is parallel to it is and it is not: to say 'I promise' but not to perform that act is parallel to saying both 'it is' and 'it is not'.

Just as the purpose of assertion is defeated by an internal contradiction..., the purpose of a contract is defeated if we say 'I promise and I ought not'. The comparison to be made here is between entailment, as an implication found in statement making, and the fourth type of condition for happy performatives described above.

\[\text{Ibid., p. 47.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., p. 49.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., p. 51.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., p. 51.}\]
Implication says, according to Austin, that "'the cat is on the mat' implies that I believe it is" and that we "cannot say 'the cat is on the mat but I do not believe it is.'" An assertion "implies a belief." If one makes an assertion stating or claiming something but holds that he does not believe it, then "Clearly it is a case of insincerity." Thus, "the unhappiness here is, though affecting a statement, exactly the same as the unhappiness infecting 'I promise'... when I do not intend, do not believe, & c. because to say 'I promise, without intending, is parallel to saying 'it is the case' without believing." This is similar to the third condition for happy performatives described above.

Finally, presupposition, with regard to statements would say something like "'All Jack's children' presupposes that Jack has some children and we "cannot say 'All Jack's children are bald but Jack has no children'". What can be said of a statement that is similar to the example quoted? "It is usual now to say that it is not false because it is devoid of reference: reference is necessary for either truth or falsehood." To Austin

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27 Ibid., p. 48.
28 Ibid., p. 49.
29 Ibid., p. 50.
30 Ibid., p. 50.
31 Ibid., p. 48.
32 Ibid., p. 50.
"the utterance is void." Comparing this with performatives we find something similar to the non-fulfillment conditions (A.1 and A.2). "Here we might have used the 'presuppose' formula: we might say that the formula 'I do' presupposes lots of things: if they are not satisfied the formula is unhappy, void: it does not succeed in being a contract when the reference fails... any more than the other succeeds in being a statement." This is all comparable or similar to the second condition for happy performatives described above.

So far, I have presented Austin's observation that performatives have a lot in common with statements. Now I want to expound his view that statements can be infected by infelicities, that were up to now only considered applicable to performatives. This has to do with showing "that considerations of the happiness and unhappiness type may infect statements." For if someone says 'It is raining outside but I don't believe it; then his act of stating is vitiated and his statement goes wrong just as the performative 'I promise I will go but I have no intention of being there' goes wrong, one is simply uttering a sentence that misfires. Also, knowingly making a statement about something which does not exist makes as much sense, and goes wrong in the same way, as contracting to sell something you do not own. Thus,

33 Ibid., p. 51.
34 Ibid., p. 51.
it would seem that we can use the same criteria to assess both
constatives and performatives, i.e., both in terms of a relation
to the facts and being happy or unhappy. Hence, we could say
something along the following lines:

To take statements first, connected with the utterance
(constative) 'John is running' is the statement 'I am
stating that John is running; and this may depend for
its truth on the happiness of 'John is running', just as
the truth of 'I am apologizing' depends on the happiness
of 'I apologize'.

Likewise, in a performative: "connected with the performative 'I
warn you that the bull is about to charge' is the fact, if it is
one, that the bull is about to charge." If it is not then the
warning "is open to criticism" not in the ways viewed as 'unhappi-
ness', but, as with a statement, "to say the warning was false," i.e., unrelated to fact.

The next point of comparison had to do with whether there
"is some grammatical criterion for distinguishing the performative
utterance" from the constative. The grammatical criterion that
Austin settles on is the first person singular present indicative
active. The first person singular present indicative active reveals
that the "'I' who is doing the action does thus come essentially
into the picture" and that the "implicit feature of the speech-
situation is made explicit." It also should be clear that all
performatives are not of this form, i.e., 'Go', 'Guilty!' etc.

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36 Ibid., p. 55.
37 Ibid., p. 55.
38 Ibid., p. 55.
39 Ibid., p. 61.
Performatives, therefore, "should be reducible, or expandable, or analysable into a form with a verb in the first person singular present indicative active."\textsuperscript{40} Thus 'Go' becomes 'I order you to go' and 'Guilty!' becomes 'I hereby find you guilty'. This will make "explicit both that the utterance is performative, and which act it is that is being performed."\textsuperscript{41}

But it is not always possible to reduce a performative to an explicit form. For this reason he introduces the notion of a 'primary utterance' which is opposed to an 'explicit performative'. An example of the former is "'I shall be there'" while for the latter it is "'I promise that I shall be there'".\textsuperscript{42} The point here is that the answer to the question 'Is that a promise?' may either be "'Yes, I promise it'" or "'No, but I do intend to be'".\textsuperscript{43} There seems, then, to be a certain ambiguity over how the primary performative can be taken while explicit formulas make it clear "the different forces that this utterance might have."\textsuperscript{44} Thus, there seems to be a type of utterance, 'I shall be there,' which is in between being reducible to a performative or being a description of something that is going to be done; i.e., it can be used both descriptively and performatively. But the 'primary utterance' could become an implicit performative, if, for some reason, the situation in which it is uttered reveals that 'I shall be there' was meant as a promise.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 62.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p. 62.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 69.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 69.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p. 73.
Austin also introduced what he called, expositive performatives, performatives which seemed to be descriptive, yet still performed an action. Some of his examples of these were, "I argue (or urge) that there is no backside to the moon." This seems to be both performative and descriptive.

Here the main body of the utterance has generally or often the straightforward form of a 'statement', but there is an explicit performative verb at its head which shows how the 'statement' is to be fitted into the context of conversation, interlocution, dialogue, or in general of exposition.

Here we have a combination of performative verbs and statements. Since a performative is the performance of an action by uttering something, it is obvious that we could not be performing an act of arguing without making some kind of statement.

From here one can move to performatives, such as, 'I approve', 'I apologize' and 'I criticize', 'I forecast', 'I endorse' and 'I question'. The point of these is that the "explicit performative verb itself operates, or operates sometimes or in part, as a description, true or false, of feelings, states of mind, etc.," which points to "the wider phenomenon...where the whole utterance seems essentially meant to be true or false despite its performative characteristics." They describe as well as perform an action.

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46 Ibid., p. 85.
47 Ibid., in passim pp. 79-98.
48 Ibid., p. 89.
It is only a short step now to showing the similarity between performatives and statements or constatives. Thus, "'I warn you that...' or 'I promise to...'' does not look so very different from 'I state that...'' and it "makes clear surely that the act we are performing is an act of stating, and so functions just like 'I warn' or 'I order.'\(^49\) When we come to instances of 'I state' or 'I maintain' then surely the whole thing is true or false even though the uttering of it is the performing of the action of stating or maintaining. So, under the grammatical criterion for distinguishing between performatives and statements it becomes possible to put stating into the explicit performative form which is also something true or false. Therefore, the distinction fails to distinguish between them, and in fact statements can satisfy the requirements of being performatives, yet which surely are the making of statements, ans surely are essentially true or false.\(^50\)

Statements, thus become a class of performatives, with the added feature of also being true or false.

The supposed distinction between performatives and constatives utterances has failed on three counts. First, it was found that considerations of the happiness or unhappiness of a performative also apply to constatives; second, considerations of a constative's truth or falsity also apply to performatives. Thirdly, the grammatical criterion of putting all performatives in their explicit form allows utterances beginning 'I state that...' which seem to satisfy the requirements of being performative, yet which

\(^49\) J.L. Austin, "Performative Utterances", p. 247.

\(^50\) J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 91.
are still statements.

What we need to do for the case of stating, and by the same token describing and reporting, is to take them a bit off their pedestal, to realize that they are speech-acts, no less than all these other speech-acts that we have been mentioning and talking about as performative. 51

"'True' and 'false' are just general labels for a whole dimension of different appraisals which have something or other to do with the relation between what we say and the facts. 52 All we have to do is "loosen up our ideas of truth and falsity and we shall see that statements...are not so different after all from pieces of advice, warnings, verdicts, and so on." 53 This entire discussion, up to this point, seems to indicate that what needs to be examined is "the total situation in which the utterance is issued -- the total speech-act -- if we are to see what is involved in making an utterance." 54

It would seem, then, that with the collapse of the performative-constative distinction, Austin needs to look elsewhere for a classificatory scheme of utterances. This is precisely what he does in the remainder of How to Do Things with Words. "We want to reconsider more generally the senses in which to say something may be to do something, or in saying something we do something (and

51 Austin, "Performative Utterances". p. 250.
52 Ibid., p. 251.
53 Ibid., p. 251.
54 Austin, How to Do Things with Words. p. 52.
also perhaps to consider the different case in which by saying something we do something."\(^{55}\)

Austin began this by providing a more lucid definition of a key concept. This has to do with the basic notion of making an utterance. He wanted to reveal exactly what is involved when we say anything "in the full sense of 'say'".\(^{56}\) Austin offered the following explanation that to say something is:

(A.a) always to perform the act of uttering certain noises (a phonetic act), and the utterance is a phone;
(A.b) always to perform the act of uttering certain vocables or words, i.e., noises of certain types belonging to and as belonging to certain vocabulary, in a certain construction, i.e., conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar, with a certain intonation, etc. This act we may call a 'phatic' act, and the utterance which is vocalized 'pheme' (as distinct from the pheme of linguistic theory); and
(A.c) generally to perform the act of using that pheme or its constituents with a certain more or less definite 'reference' (which together are equivalent to 'meaning'). This act we may call a 'rhetic' act, and the utterance which it is the act of uttering a 'rheme'.\(^{57}\)

This description represents what it is for someone to say something. Austin says that the "act of 'saying something' in this full normal sense I call, i.e., dub, the performance of a locutionary act, and the study of utterances thus far and in these respects the study of locutions, or of the full units of speech."\(^{58}\) Anytime that we say something, ordering someone, warning someone, etc., we are, in addition, performing a locutionary act. When we perform a phonetic act which is of a type that belongs to some vocabulary and some

\(^{55}\)Ibid., p. 91.
\(^{56}\)Ibid., p. 92.
\(^{57}\)Ibid., pp. 92-93.
\(^{58}\)Ibid., p. 94.
grammar which in turn is used more or less with some 'sense' and reference, then we are performing a locutionary act. In particular,

'Meaning' for Austin principally "attaches to" the rhetic act (or to the use of a pheme in a certain way), and so is meaning in a use; whereas, meaning in isolation would have to "attach to" the pheme (the pheme itself, not the phatic act and not to use of the pheme). 59

Also, to perform a rhetic act is to perform a phatic act and to perform a phatic act is to perform a phonetic act. But the converse does not hold. Parrots may mimic words phonetically but they are not performing a phatic act, and we may repeat sentences in a phatic act without comprehending its meaning so that we would not be performing any rhetic act. This shows what is involved and what has to be involved in performing a locutionary act.

From here Austin moved on to his next classification, in fact the one of most importance, both in his book and this thesis. After the locutionary act is performed, how then is it to be taken? How is it clear what we meant to do in issuing the utterance? Are we warning, ordering, or stating? "It may be perfectly clear what I mean by 'It is going to charge'..., but not clear whether it is meant as a statement or warning." 60 To answer these questions Austin introduced the notion of the 'illocutionary' act performed in making the locutionary act. To determine what illocutionary

60 Austin, How to Do Things with Words. p. 98.
act is performed we must determine in what way we are using the locution, i.e., whether we are stating, ordering, warning, begging, appointing, acquitting, promising, apologizing, or answering.

An illocutionary act has to do with how we want an utterance that we make to be taken. Does an utterance have the force of a warning or a statement? The performance of an act in this sense is the "performance of an act in saying something as opposed to performance of an act of saying something" and Austin will "refer to the doctrine of the different types of function of language here in question as the doctrine of 'illocutionary forces'."61 The force of an utterance is to be distinguished from its meaning which I will discuss further after I discuss the third kind of act that can be obtained from the making of an utterance.

The third type of act distinguished by Austin is the 'perlocutionary' act. A perlocutionary act is the production of "certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons... with the design, intention or purpose of producing them."62

Perlocutions have to do with the consequences of an utterance. In distinguishing the illocutionary from the perlocutionary "we must distinguish 'in saying it I was warning him' from 'by saying it I convinced him, or surprised him, or got him to stop'."63

What is important now is the illocutionary act and its relation to the other two acts. First of all, "to perform an

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61 Ibid., p. 99.
63 Ibid., p. 109.
An illocutionary act is necessarily to perform a locutionary act: that for example, to congratulate is necessarily, at least in part, to make certain more or less indescribable movements with the vocal organs. It is this relation that is important for our purposes, especially in view of the discussion of the criticisms to be leveled against Austin in the next chapter, so I will only briefly discuss perlocutions. An illocution would have the form "'In saying X I was doing Y' or 'I did Y'" while for a perlocution it would be "'By saying X I did Y' or "I was doing Y'". The illocutionary form can make explicit what is being done, for example "in saying A...I was warning." The "names of illocutionary acts seem to be pretty close to explicit performatives, for we can say 'I warn you that' and 'I order you to' as explicit performatives; but warning and ordering are illocutionary acts." To describe illocutions we "can use the performative 'I warn you that' but not 'I convince you that', and can use the performative 'I threaten you with' but not 'I intimidate you by'; convincing and intimidating are perlocutionary acts." What is important is how the verbs relate to the action. In an illocutionary act the verb constitutes the action, while in a perlocutionary act the verb suggests the outcome of an action, i.e., 'I was convinced' or 'I was intimidated'.

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64 Ibid., p. 113.
65 Ibid., p. 121.
66 Ibid., p. 139.
67 Ibid., p. 139.
Austin suggested that whenever I 'say' anything "I shall be performing both locutionary and illocutionary acts, these two kinds of acts seem to be the very things which we tried to use as a means of distinguishing, under the names of 'doing' and 'saying' performatives from constatives."68 Austin wanted to discuss this from the perspective of constatives, of which he considers "statements" as the typical or paradigm case.69 Considering all that has been said up to this point, then the making of a statement can be said to be both the 'doing' and the 'saying' of something: "Surely to state is every bit as much to perform an illocutionary act as, say, to warn or to pronounce," for example "I state that he did not do it is exactly on a level with I argue that he did not do it."70

We can distinguish the illocutionary force of a statement in exactly the same way we would a warning. When we do, it reveals how an utterance is to be taken, specifically as a statement rather than a warning. His conclusion here is that there is no conflict between "our issuing the utterance being the doing of something" and its "being true or false."71 We have already examined the ways in which a statement can be appraised in the same way that performatives can, as happy or unhappy, and subject to the same infelicities. This also suggests the ways in which stating can be

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68 Ibid., p. 132.
69 Ibid., p. 132.
70 Ibid., p. 133.
71 Ibid., p. 134.
like other illocutionary acts such as warning or ordering.

In view of all this, what then can be said about the performative-constative distinction with which we started? Austin said that what we have is this:

(a) With the constative utterance, we abstract from the illocutionary aspects of the speech act and we concentrate on the locutionary; moreover, we use an over-simplified notion of correspondence with the fact — over-simplified because essentially it brings in the illocutionary aspect.

(b) With the performative utterance, we attend as much possible to the illocutionary force of the utterance, and abstract from the dimension of correspondence with facts. 72

These important points reveal that in general the locutionary act as much as the illocutionary act is an abstraction only: every genuine speech act is both. 73 This emphasizes the need to be able to distinguish between illocutions and locutions, and it also emphasizes that in performing an illocutionary act we perform a locutionary acts which is to be taken in a certain way. For all utterances Austin has discovered the following:

(1) Happiness/unhappiness dimension
(2) An illocutionary force
(3) Truth/falsehood dimension
(4) A locutionary meaning (sense and reference) 74

All utterances conform to this, although they may attend to some aspects more than do others, for example, statements with (3) and (4).

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72 Ibid., pp. 144-145.
73 Ibid., p. 146.
74 Ibid., p. 147.
In the last lecture in How to Do Things with Words, Austin mentions several morals that he wants to suggest with respect to the discussion up to that point. These are:

(A) The total speech act in the total speech situation is the only phenomenon which...we are engaged in elucidating.

(B) Stating, describing, etc., are just two names among a very great many others for illocutionary acts; they have no unique position.

(C) In particular, they have no unique position over the matter of being related to facts in a unique way called being true or false, because truth and falsity are...not names for relations, qualities, or what not, but for a dimension of assessment...

(D) ...the familiar contrast of 'normative' or 'evaluative' as opposed to the factual is in need...of elimination.

(E) ...that the theory of 'meaning' equivalent to 'sense and reference' will require....reformulating in terms of the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts...75

Thus, Austin has subsumed the original distinction between constatives and performatives under the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts. This he did by showing their similarities and then how they represent abstractions of types of actions he had in mind when he developed his later notion of an illocutionary act.

The aim in the last two chapters will be to specifically consider the nature of statements, as the paradigm cases of constatives, with respect to their illocutionary force. This is, more or less, to fill in what Austin intentionally neglected, for he admits that "I have omitted any direct consideration of the illocutionary force of statements."76

75 Ibid., pp. 147-148.
76 Ibid., p. 148.
But before doing this I want to present and examine in the next two chapters various criticisms directed against Austin's notion of illocutionary force.
CHAPTER 2

In this chapter I will present three different philosopher's criticisms of the Austinian views expressed in the first chapter. These will be the criticisms of P.F. Strawson, John R. Searle and L. Jonathan Cohen. The Searle and Cohen criticisms are leveled specifically against the locutionary and illocutionary acts performed in an utterance, while the Strawson criticism will be drawn from another, but related, aspect of Austin's philosophy. This will be from the Austin-Strawson debate on truth and will be included for a number of reasons. These reasons are: (1) that it will help the reader understand what Austin took a statement to be, something he did not fully do in *How to Do Things with Words*, (2) that it will serve as an introduction and aid in discovering and understanding the concepts being disputed, especially with regard to the Searle and Cohen criticisms and (3) that it will reveal what Austin incorporated and changed about his notion of a statement and utterances as later seen in *How to Do Things with Words* as a result of Strawson's criticisms. Although the Austin-Strawson debate deals with how phrases such as 'It is true that --' and '--- is true' are used, I will deal specifically with that part of the debate concerned with statements.

Austin and Strawson held contrary opinions on how '--- is true' is used or functions when attached to a sentence. Austin believed that the addition of '--- is true' involves the making
of a statement about a statement. Austin's thesis was that a phrase like this is used to assert a conventional relationship between a statement made in performing an utterance and some non-linguistic situation in the world. To Austin, "the truth of statements remains still a matter, as it was with the most rudimentary languages, of the words being the ones conventionally appointed for situations of the type of which that referred belongs." ¹ The addition of 'is true' is just our way of asserting the relation between the words used in making a statement and the situation it is about. A phrase like 'is true' is to be taken as asserting something about the statement to which it is attached, i.e., that it correctly describes some non-linguistic state of affairs.

Strawson takes the opposite position in how 'is true' is used. To Strawson the addition of 'is true' is superfluous and redundant to the rest of the sentence to which it is attached. To say that 'It is true that it is raining outside' is to say no more than 'It is raining outside.' These two utterances make the same claim, that it is raining outside. This means the addition of the 'It is true that' does not add or assert anything more than was already there. He also maintains that 'true' has nothing to do with words and the world. All we are saying is that the statement was or could be stated. What needs to be answered

is both how he arrived at this conclusion and what it means for Austin's interpretation of statements.

On Strawson's interpretation, 'true' will still be about a statement, but it will have nothing to do with adding something about the correctness of the words used in the statement. 'That's true' and '--- is true' have a different function. To Strawson, 'is true' is predicated of the type of thing that can or will be uttered. It is about "a potential, if not an actual statement; a potential, if not an actual conjecture...."\(^2\)

'That's true' does not have to specify anything in particular about the utterance used in making the statement. The specific utterance is "not to be identified with a statement (= what is stated) which is the subject of predication of 'is true'...."\(^3\)

It is not to be identified with the words used in making the statements. There is no reason for an analysis of 'true' to specify anything about the content of the utterance. A statement is expressed by, but not identified with, a sentence. This demonstrates in what sense 'is true' can be about a statement without adding anything to the content and is elucidated by offering a 'Ramsey-like' analysis of sentences containing 'is true'. For example, "A's statement that X is eligible, is true" can be paraphrased "As A stated, X is eligible."\(^4\)

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\(^3\) Ibid., p. 75.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 78.
to a statement without anything being substantially added to it. It is just something that can or could be stated. Another example is, "A's statement (what A stated) is true." Here there is nothing known about the content of the made statement. We can obtain paraphrases such as 'It is as A says it is' or 'Things are as A states.' All they do is allude to the fact that something was stated while adding nothing to the content of the statement uttered.

Yet, although Strawson wants to separate a statement from the sentence uttered in making it, one still has to admit a dependence on words and sentences. To express a statement, one is necessarily committed to using words. How can one express a statement without doing so? One cannot. Although Strawson wants to exclude any mention of the words used in making a statement from any consideration of 'truth' it still has to be maintained that statements can only be made with words, i.e.,...words do have to be used. Strawson believes they just are not important to knowing truth. To say 'is true' for Strawson is to affirm the obtaining of some particular state of affairs which we already stated to obtain. This has nothing to do with the making of a statement, it is instead concerned only with the "fact, that matters are as stated." Thus, with regard to truth, the act of making a statement is quite distinct from the statement made, and truth applies to the latter but not the former.

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5 Ibid., p. 76.
6 Ibid., p. 83.
Even though Strawson's criticisms demonstrated that statements cannot be identified with the words used to make statements, the importance of words cannot be stressed enough. We use words to make statements; it is the only way we can know them. Yet, words are also used to make orders, laws, promises, opinions. But words used to do these things do not have the same import as words used to make statements; they are taken differently. Such things as commands are not taken as true or false. They do not make any claims about the world. We use words to perform different types of discourse and it is only as words are used that we can know a promise as one type and a statement as another type. To recognize a statement is to know that some claim is being made about some state of affairs. By contrast, when someone uses words to make a promise or issue a command, he is not making a claim about the world, and therefore, what he says is not capable of being true or false. It is because we can know when words are uttered that a certain type of discourse is the making of a statement that words should be emphasized in the explication of statements.

Strawson's claims about truth are not concerned with words as used. He feels that the "problem of Truth" is not the "problem of elucidating the fact-stating type of discourse."\textsuperscript{7} Strawson's problem is based on the notion that using "different

\textsuperscript{7}Ibid., p. 42.
sentences...sentences with different meanings, we all make the same statement."\textsuperscript{8} His example is that when "you say of Jones 'He is ill,' I say to Jones 'You are ill,' and Jones says 'I am ill.'\textsuperscript{9} We are using different sentences to make the same statement, namely that Jones is ill. But if statements were identified with the words used in making them, then we would have three different statements, which Strawson insists is not the case here. So, of what then are we predicating 'true' when we say '...is true'? Strawson identifies the common statement made in the three different examples as that of which 'true' is predicated by saying that "any significant predication of 'is true' is a predication of it of a statement (proposition)."\textsuperscript{10}

I now want to present Austin's position with regard to Strawson's discussion. It cannot be denied that Austin was concerned with statements and the words used in making them, but whether he identified them remains to be seen. Austin felt that any discussion of 'statement' must include a further discussion of sentences used to make them, something with which Strawson would disagree. The making of a statement involves the uttering of words. When we are talking about a statement that a person has made, we are referring to "the words or sentence as used by a certain person on a certain occasion."\textsuperscript{11} Yet, at the same time, "statements are made, words or

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., p. 34.  
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., p. 34.  
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 71.  
\textsuperscript{11} Austin, "Truth", Truth, p. 20.
sentences are used" and that further we "talk of my statement but of the English sentence."\textsuperscript{12} This implies that Austin did distinguish between a statement and a sentence. A statement is the result of uttering a sentence. Specifically, it becomes later for Austin the case of it being that "the statement itself is a 'logical construction' out of the makings of statements."\textsuperscript{13} A statement is the product of using certain words on a certain occasion of utterance.

As has been seen, Austin distinguished between a statement and a sentence, but they are still closely related. In fact, Austin had come to say that the same rhetic acts, using the same pheme with a certain sense and reference (as previously defined in Chapter One) would consist in "the same statement...using the same words."\textsuperscript{14} It must be remembered that a 'pheme' is a sentence and to use it with a certain sense and reference (meaning) is a rhetic act. The same pheme can be used "on different occasions of utterance with a different sense or reference, and so be a different rheme" just as we can use "different phemes...with the same sense and reference" and "speak of rhetically equivalent acts...but not of the same...rhetic acts."\textsuperscript{15} Going back to Strawson's example of Jones being ill, it is one thing for two people to say

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 20.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 97.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 97.
that 'Jones is ill, but something entirely different when someone says 'Jones is ill' and Jones says of himself that 'I am ill.' What is important is that the first two are the same rhetic act while the latter is equivalent but not the same because different words are used. These classifications are based on the phemes employed, or sentences as used. The two latter examples are, by definition, different rhemes since the words used are not the same. The whole situation is based on using words with a certain sense and reference, and to be truly the same rheme involves using the same words.

It seems that Austin had taken the lead from Strawson and likewise separated a statement from the sentence used in making it. Yet he still was concerned with the making of a statement, something Strawson would deny is important in studying truth. I think that this was in part due to a change of attitude by Austin during and after the debate with Strawson. He said, "the traditional 'statement' is an abstraction, an ideal, and so is its traditional truth or falsity." Austin was disagreeing with Strawson about whether or not 'elucidating types of discourse' is irrelevant to discussing truth or statements. It was important to Austin, as can be seen in How to Do Things with Words, yet it remains to be seen "whether Austin can have it both ways, i.e., that a 'statement' is a 'logical construction' and at the same time a 'linguistic product' of the makings of statements." Austin

\[\text{\footnotesize 16} \text{ Ibid., p. 147 (I owe much of this discussion to my conversations with my major professor, Edward H. Pauley).} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize 17} \text{ Edward H. Pauley, The Correspondence Theory of Truth in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy (Ph.D. Boston Univ., 1969) p. 238 fn.} \]
wanted to give a little to Strawson, but he also wanted what he
initially held. Strawson had been concerned with showing why a
statement should not be identified with a sentence. Austin seems
to accept this, yet he hangs on to the importance of words. Can
he do this? His debate with Strawson and his ensuing discussion
in How to Do Things with Words point the way to the further cri­
ticisms to be leveled against Austin. These will deal specifi­
cally with the latter work of Austin's as discussed in the first
chapter, i.e., does his doctrine of locutionary and illocutionary
acts, especially in connection with statements, settle the ques­
tion of whether he can have it both ways? Can he get away with
holding that statements are both logical constructs and linguistic
products?

I now want to consider L. Jonathan Cohen's criticism of locu­
tionary and illocutionary acts. This has to do with being able to
distinguish both a meaning and a force in an utterance. Cohen
contended that there are no such things as illocutionary acts.
What we attributed to the illocutionary force can, in fact, be
attributed to the meaning of the utterance.

He begins by discussing the performative prefix which makes
explicit the force of an utterance. By adding this prefix, 'I
warn you that' to the phrase 'The bull is about to charge' I
render it explicit that the phrase has the force of being a warning.
Whereas, if I added 'I state that' then the phrase is not a warning,
but intended as making some claim about the world; the bull is
about to charge. Cohen's claim is that the addition of the prefix
does not say as much about how the phrase is to be taken as it
does about the meaning as a whole. Since the performative prefix involves uttering certain sounds conforming to a specific vocabulary and grammar and having a reference and sense, i.e., the 'I', 'you', and 'warn', then it also must be a locutionary act. This implies that the utterance 'I warn you that the bull is about to charge' is different from 'The bull is about to charge' because they have different meanings; they are distinct locutionary acts. The prefix is a locutionary act in itself. With regard to our example "if the warning is part of the meaning of 'the explicit utterance', it is hardly unreasonable to suppose that the warning is also part of the 'other utterance's' meaning, though inexplicitly so."18 This means that what is being clarified or made explicit is the meaning of an utterance with regard to the circumstances it is uttered in and what it is intending to do, and not its illocutionary force. In making explicit the force of an utterance in Austin's fashion, we are, in fact, dealing with meaning. It is that what we rendered explicit. The prefix adds to the meaning because it has meaning.

"In short, what Austin calls the illocutionary force of an utterance is that aspect of its meaning which is either conveyed by its explicitly performative prefix, if it has one, or might have been so conveyed by the use of such an expression."19 The entire concept of the illocutionary force, for Cohen, collapsed into the meaning of an utterance. If I am in doubt about some

19 Ibid., p. 125.
utterance then, by Cohen's analysis, I should try to understand more about its meaning.

Cohen's rejection of Austin's doctrine of illocutionary force hinges on his interpretation of the word 'meaning.' Austin was interested in the 'meaning' and force of an utterance. Cohen maintains that the meaning of the expression used does give the force that the utterance as a whole possesses. Other aspects of the utterance contribute to its meaning. "The difference between a rising and a falling intonation has as much right to affect the classification of individual utterances into English sentences as has the difference of sound between 'raining' and 'hailing.'" 20 'It is raining' can be meant as a warning on the basis of the intonation with which it is uttered. Cohen is claiming that the difference in intonation effects an utterance just as much as uttering the word 'raining' instead of 'hailing.' To Cohen this has to do with the meaning of the sentence-type including more than just the meaning of the words used as part of the utterance of linguistic elements.

Meaning for Austin deals with both the sense and reference of an utterance. "But the reference of personal pronouns depends on their context of utterance." 21 To say 'He lost his case' has a different meaning when uttered in an airport than when it is uttered in a court room. For Cohen, this explains why the same

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20 Cohen, "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?" p. 125.
21 Ibid., p. 126.
sentence can have different meanings. All we have to do is consider the context within which the sentence was uttered to know its meaning. This means attending to the contextual considerations that the reference part of the rhetic act is dependent upon. Cohen is claiming that the circumstances are a necessary part of the 'meaning' of the utterance and not something distinct from 'meaning' called 'force.' They help determine the meaning of the utterance. The context of the utterance is needed in order to know the reference aspect of the meaning of the utterance. Meaning, therefore, for Cohen, is not just the meaning of the sentence uttered because it also involves all those contextual considerations which are, in fact, a necessary part of the meaning of the sentence. These considerations are a part of the meaning that the utterance has and not something distinct from meaning bearing another label called 'force': how an utterance is to be taken lies in its meaning.

Cohen's discussion makes the claim that any assessment of an utterance's meaning will have to involve more than merely looking at the words used. "To say that particular features of an utterance's meaning are specially related to particular parts of the utterance is quite compatible with supposing that some external information is also needed in order to determine the actual reference of the utterance."22 There is no reason why these contextual considerations should be distinct from meaning.

In criticizing Austin's concept of illocutionary force, Cohen has argued that it is void of any significance in explaining an utterance. All we need to do is elucidate the utterance's meaning if it is in some way ambiguous. Because meaning is an aspect of the locutionary act, i.e., the 'rhetic' act, then all we are left with is the locutionary act. We can know that some utterance is a statement by looking at its locutionary meaning. Once we know exactly the 'sense' and 'reference' behind the words or 'pheme' we used in making our utterance, then we can tell whether we are stating something or not. This implies that Austin cannot get away from Strawson's original claim that Austin's analysis of truth and statement will necessarily be concerned with words, sentences and their specific meaning as they are used in uttering a statement. It is all right there in the literal sentence meaning, which means using certain words in certain contexts and situations. After all, we can only know what dictionary meaning is being used, if it is in doubt, by looking at these non-linguistic things. Contexts and circumstances are a very important part of dictionary meanings.

I next want to consider Searle's objection to Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts. Searle does not accept Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts either. To this end, Searle says:

In the case of illocutionary acts we succeed in doing what we are trying to do by getting our audience to recognize what we are trying to do. But the 'effect' on the hearer is not a belief or response, it consists simply in the hearers' understanding the utterance of the speaker. It is this
effect that I have been calling the illocutionary effect.23

The effect that the speaker is trying to bring about is a function of the expressions used in an utterance on a given occasion. The effect can be recognized because it is the type of thing commonly recognized as being associated with the words used in expressing some utterance. We 'mean' what we 'say.' It is what we know about the meaning of words used in some utterance that enables us to grasp the illocutionary act that is being performed. An illocutionary act is understood by attending to the serious literal sentence meaning of the sentence used in making it. Searle, on the other hand, wants to "contrast 'serious' utterances with play-acting, teaching a language, reciting poems, practising pronunciation, etc., and.... contrast literal' with metaphorical, sarcastic, etc."24

With regard to statements Searle said "that there is a close connection between saying and the constative class of illocutionary acts."25 This was even held by Austin, who distinguished between constatives and performatives on the basis that the latter were not the saying of something, of which the former are instances, but the doing of something. The question that needs to be answer for Searle is 'How can the illocutionary act of stating be discerned by examining the meaning of the utterance used in putting forward this type of speech act?'

Searle's use of the term 'meaning' favors the assimilation of force into it. He wants "to make it clear that one's meaning

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25 Ibid., p. 68.
Searle's use of the term 'meaning' favors the assimilation of force into it. He wants "to make it clear that one's meaning something when one utters a sentence is more than just randomly related to what the sentence means in the language one is speaking."26 There are aspects of meaning which are not concerned with words and phrases. One just cannot simply refer and predicate. An illocutionary act succeeds for Searle when the hearer understands the utterance of the speaker. It is these other aspects of meaning which determine the 'force' of an utterance. To mean something by what we say is to perform an illocutionary act. Searle uses Austin's example of 'He said "Get out"', 'He told me to get out.' The former is an example of phatic act while the other is an expression of the rhetic act performed. The rhetic act characterizes the meaning of utterance. The problem is that "the verb phrases in the reports of rhetic acts invariably contain illocutionary verbs."27 'He told me' conveys force, although very generally, but it is still force. Illocutionary force is built into the meaning of the sentence uttered. It cannot be neutral as to its force. This is because it is "possible to utter a sentence the literal meaning of which is such as to determine that its serious literal utterance in an appropriate context will be a performance of that act."28 He is implying that meaning is more than just a matter of sentence meaning. He says that:

26 Searle, Speech Acts, p. 45.
28 Ibid., p. 153.
If one thinks of sentential meaning as a matter of sense and reference, tacitly takes sense and reference as properties of words and phrases, then one is likely to neglect those elements of meaning which are not matters of words and phrases, and it is often precisely those elements which in virtue of their meaning are such crucial determinants of meaning.  

Meaning for Searle includes those things that determine force. The force of an utterance can, therefore, be found in the meaning of the utterance because by definition it determines it. Meaning fastens on to more than words or phrases. Context is also essential for understanding the meaning of an utterance.

To mean something literally by saying something will in itself specify what illocutionary act is taking place. We know the illocutionary act being performed by virtue of the knowledge we have of the utterance's meaning, i.e., by attending to the context and situations which help indicate the appropriate meaning of the utterance. Once this is recognized we can tell what the speaker has intended to do in speaking. What the speaker has to do to perform the illocutionary act of stating is as follows:

1. S has evidence... for the truth of p. (proposition)
2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H knows... p.
4. Counts as an undertaking to the effect that p represents an actual state of affairs.  

To know that the above claim is being made in some utterance is to know the meaning of the expressions used. By being able to understand the literal meaning of an utterance used in making a claim about something, I will be able to see that the utterer has evidence

29 Ibid., p. 154.
30 Ibid., p. 66.
which he believes about some putative state of affairs which he thinks I need to be informed about. Once I recognize that the meaning of the utterance presupposes this, I can likewise recognize it as the illocutionary act of stating. That an utterer is making a statement becomes obvious to the audience because for them "to know the meaning of the descriptive expressions is to know under what objectively ascertainable conditions the statements which contain them are true or false." If someone rushes up to me and says "Your house is on fire," it is because I recognize the meaning of the expression employed that I know that he is stating something about some putative state of affairs about which he believes I should know.

The criticisms I have been discussing argue that illocutionary force is not different from meaning. That these criticisms pick up on this notion can be seen because Austin held that any performance of a locutionary act is to perform an illocutionary act at the same time. To know how the former is used is to know "what illocutionary act is so performed." Also, his earlier debate with Strawson brought out the fact that he held that elucidation of statements should involve a discussion of the words used in making them. But he still wanted to distinguish between sentences and statements. That he held this can be seen in earlier debates and in his later formulation of speech acts. What the views just discussed show is that his particular procedure for

31 Ibid., p. 183.
32 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 98.
showing the distinction does not work, and, in fact, can be shown to imply the opposite.

My aim is to show and examine the illocutionary force of statements, or what I dub its claim-making force. As previously quoted (fn 25), Searle claimed that acts of stating are readily identifiable with saying. I would like to end this chapter with a specific discussion of this claim. Can there be clear-cut cases where utterances are definitely taken as being only statements or necessarily having a claim-making force? The answer to this is given by Austin himself. Austin frequently used examples from the law to reveal some aspect of language with which he was concerned. I believe that it is here that we can find an almost classic example of what we have been discussing in this chapter.

In a court of law someone is being accused of something, such as murder or breach of contract. Whether it can be established that he is guilty or not guilty of what he is accused will depend on the introduction of evidence. One way that evidence is introduced is through the testimony of witnesses to the crime (witnesses do not have to be eye-witnesses, they can be character-witnesses), or psychological experts testifying about the defendant's mental ability, but they are still subject to the same conditions to be outlined for the eye-witnesses). What they will do is answer questions about what someone did or said. They will be describing something to the court. Everything they utter will have the force of a claim about what someone said or did. It is on the basis of the testimony that the defendant can be found guilty or innocent.
Everything they say in testifying is purported not only to be a statement, but a true statement. It has to be so to be admissible as evidence because opinions or hearsay would be thrown out of court. All admissible evidence insofar as it consists of statements is purported to consist of true statements; everything one testifies to will be considered as such. That it is so considered can be seen in the legal concept of perjury. This is in the violation of the oath by which we swear to tell nothing but the truth. It is in itself also a punishable crime. This should be enough to show that everything we testify to in a court of law automatically has the force of a statement.

What is testified to is always identified as having a claim-making force. The meaning of the expressions used in testifying in a courtroom situation are always, without qualification, taken as entailing the making of true statements. Thus, we have a situation where the meaning of what we say and the illocutionary act performed are one and the same. What we say is what is claimed to be true. We have here almost the perfect example of what Cohen and Searle have been discussing, that in the judicial situation, meaning and force are the same.

"It is possible to perform the act without invoking an explicit illocutionary force-indicating device where the context and the utterance make it clear that the essential condition is satisfied."33 The witness in the above example does not have to prefix everything

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he says with 'I state...' The particular situation and context in which he is making his utterance takes care of this function. We do not have to add anything to what is said to reveal or bring out how the utterance is to be taken. What the witness testifies to already counts as a statement; it always is taken as obviously a statement by itself. To say 'I state that I saw the defendant leave the scene of the murder' and 'I saw the defendant leave the scene of the murder' are to say the same thing in a courtroom situation. The context in which the latter utterance is made shows it is meant as a statement.

This example points in the direction that Cohen and Searle have been arguing. An individual does not have to go beyond the utterance's meaning as said in a particular situation to make explicit how an utterance is to be taken. The courtroom example implied this, it also implies that one can analyze and examine something like a statement by looking at the meaning of the words used in certain circumstances. Although not all situations are so obvious, Cohen and Seale claim any analysis of an illocutionary act will call for the unpacking of the utterance's meaning. Its force is simply there in its meaning.

We have been examining the notion of illocutionary force as being found in the meaning of what we say. The courtroom example of 'testimony' entailing 'statements' is almost an ideal example. Although Austin emphasizes studying words in examining statements, he still would not be amenable to reducing one to the other, as will be discussed later. What needs to be done next is to examine whether or not illocutionary acts can be analyzed in terms of 'what constitutes
undertaking a literal utterance in terms of (some of) the rules concerning the elements of the uttered sentence and in terms of the hearer's recognition of the sentence as subject to those rules. Austin as well as others believed that this is not the case. This will be discussed next with the aim of trying to show whether the arguments just discussed hold, all of which will assist in elucidating Austin's distinction between statements and their claim-making force, i.e., whether or not force can be found in the meaning of the expressions used.

34 Ibid., p. 48.
In the previous chapter, I presented some interpretations of illocutionary force that differ from Austin's explanation of it. These opposing views assert that the force of an utterance is exhausted by meaning, to to know the force of an utterance all we need to do is examine the meaning of the expressions used in making it. This implies that the claim-making force of a statement is disclosed by the meaning of the expressions employed in making the statement. What I will do is examine these interpretations to see whether they represent tenable explanations of the illocutionary force of statements. I will argue that they are not tenable because: (1) they would represent a mistaken view about the word 'statement'; and (2) their specific interpretations of Austin's views on illocutionary force do not hold. (1) I will discuss why the term 'statement' should not be conflated with terms like 'meaning' and 'sentence' or 'words' (2) deals with what I consider are the major faults in Cohen and Searle's notion of illocutionary force.

What is the relation between 'statement' and 'sentence'? Is talking about one talking about the other? After all, if there is one thing that Austin's discussions suggest, it is that to say something is to do something. Is 'statement' then to be identified with the words used to state it? I will try to show that what is asserted or claimed in the act of asserting
something, i.e., of stating something, should be distinguished from the words used in asserting it.

What are the reasons for distinguishing between the statement I make and the sentence or words I use to state it? The reasons become apparent when one realizes that no specific sentence is necessary to the making of a statement. Cartwright points

... to the familiar argument which proceeds from the fact that uttering the words A uttered is not a sufficient condition for asserting that . It is pointed out, quite correctly, that by uttering the words 'Botvinnik uses it' one may, even without indulging in aberrant usages, assert ever so many things other than what A asserted. From this it is concluded that the words themselves cannot be identified with any of the various statements made.

Two individuals speaking distinct languages may both assert that it is raining outside, yet it is obvious that what they utter will be quite different. Also, I may use the sentence 'Isn't it raining outside?' as a statement to make someone aware that it is raining outside, and for the purpose of getting them to wear a raincoat on leaving. The same sentence can also be uttered by me as a question put to someone who suggests we should go outside for a walk. All of this suggests that what is uttered is different from what is asserted. We can use the same sentence without asserting the same thing, or, indeed, without asserting anything at all. If this is the case, then it becomes absurd to hold that we assert what we utter.

Take the following example used by Cartwright: A utters the sentence (in English) 'Botvinnik uses it,' and a Russian utters a different sentence but asserts the same thing:

Consider A and the Russian. Whatever plausibility there is in saying that A asserted the words he uttered derives from the fact he did, after all, utter them. But even this plausibility, minimal as it is in any case, is missing when we consider the Russian; for, on the assumption that it is A who asserts what he utters, the Russian asserts A's words only if he asserts them without uttering them.²

We have an absurdity if we maintain in this instance that we assert what we utter. If we assert what we utter and I make the same assertion that A did using different words, then I am asserting certain words without saying them, which is absurd. One can conclude from this that a statement made by using a given utterance is not identifiable with the words used to make it. To make a statement one has to use words, but one should not be defined in terms of the other.

I now want to carry the present discussion to the relationship between what is asserted and the meaning of the words used in asserting it. This has to do with a statement being identified with the meaning of the words used. We know, for instance, the dictionary meanings of the various words used in the utterance 'It is raining'. But these same words can be used on one occasion to assert something different from what was asserted on another, or previous, occasion. 'It is raining' can be classroom

²Ibid., p. 91.
illustration showing correct grammar to an English class or a description of some actual state of affairs happening in the world. It can be used to do two distinct things even though the dictionary meanings of the words remain the same. What is important here is that an elucidation of the meanings of the words will not necessarily be sufficient for determining what was asserted. If it actually were sufficient, then the two utterances would automatically be used to assert the same thing: in the two above cases, for the dictionary meanings are the same. Yet, it is quite clear that they are being used differently, for one of them is used to describe correct grammar, while the other is being used to describe some event in the world that is presently occurring.

If one still wants to argue for an identity between meaning and what is asserted, then we can further argue against it through the following analysis. First, it is clearly possible for a statement to be asserted on one occasion using words with certain meanings and also to be asserted using different words with different meanings. Following the notion that what we assert is the meaning of the words used in the utterance, we can obtain the following consequence. If one asserts a statement which is tied to the meaning of the words which he used at that time:

Thus it might be suggested that any statement, asserted on one occasion by uttering words which there have a certain meaning, can, on another occasion, be asserted by uttering words which, on this second occasion, have a different meaning. Statements, it might be said, are
no more tied to the meaning of sentences than they are
to the sentences themselves. From this it would follow
that if what someone asserts, on some occasion, is the
meaning which the words he utters have on that occasion
of their utterance, then it is possible that he or some­
one else should, on another occasion, assert that meaning
by uttering words which on that occasion of their
utterance, don't have it.3

This absurd consequence would have to be admitted if one believes
that what we assert is identified with the meaning of the words used.

Someone who holds this view would also have to concede that
what we predicate about assertions must be predicable of the meanings
of the words that were used as well. If this is allowed, and I believe
it would have to be, then we again have absurd consequences. The
meanings of sentences cannot be "affirmed, denied, contradicted,
questioned,..." nor can they "be accurate, exaggerated, unfounded,
overdrawn, probable, improbable, plausible, true or false...."4
These are things we say of assertions and not meanings; it would be
nonsensical to affirm of meaning what is affirmed of assertions. To
determine something about a sentence or its meaning is not to deter­
mine anything about what is asserted, i.e., what statement or ques­
tion was asserted by the use of the utterance.

Strawson, similarly, pointed out some of the problems that can
arise from relating statements too closely to the words used in
making statements. This discussion is a result of his earlier debate
with Austin on the use of the word 'truth'. For Austin, any analysis
of the word 'statement' will involve an analysis of the words used

3Ibid., p. 97.
in making the statement. The only way a statement can be made and known is through the uttering of certain words. Strawson argues against the notion that particular speech episodes are the proper subject of any analysis of 'truth' or 'statement.' "The statement that p is not an event, though it had to be made for the first time and made within my knowledge if I am to talk of its truth or falsity." He says that a statement has to be made, but it still is not of the event of making the statement that we predicate 'true' or 'false'. 'True' is used to refer to the statement that is made in performing some speech-episode; it has nothing to do with the episode itself. The word 'statement' should also be separated from any consideration of speech-episodes or acts of statement-making.

Strawson's discussion reinforces what was previously examined in this chapter about 'statement', 'meaning' and 'word'. These discussions were directed against certain usages of the terms just mentioned. I have already stated that Austin did not claim what Strawson alleges he did. This is because Austin does not identify 'statement' with the making of a statement but with a made statement. This was clear by the time of How to Do Things with Words where he claimed, as previously quoted, that a sentence is "used in making a statement, and the statement itself is a 'logical construction' out of the makinons of statements." He is clearly distinguishing between 'statement' and speech-episodes. But this notion was suggested in his earlier debate with Strawson. That

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Austin did distinguish between them at that time can be seen when he says a "statement is made and its making is an historic event...."\(^6\) The statement made and the making of it are distinguished by Austin.

Before I get to my specific criticisms of the Cohen and Searle discussions, I would like to examine what has been said about 'statement' up to this point. It should be obvious that not a great deal has been added to what we know about 'statement' and how it should be used. In fact all that has been put forth about 'statement' is what we cannot say about it. The Cartwright article gave reasons for not identifying a statement with either 'word' or 'meaning' or 'speech-episode' so that statements will not be misidentified. He concluded his discussion with the remark that to "distinguish them from other things is not by itself to provide either means for their detection or rules for distinguishing one of them from another."\(^7\) Cartwright has not given any means for identifying statements but he has provided examples of things that should not be identified with statements.

Even Strawson has not gone any further in showing what 'statement' means. Based on the remarks he has already made, it seems that Strawson is drawing a distinction between statement objects and statement acts, and then telling us that although statement objects are the bearers of truth and falsity there are no such things as statement objects."\(^8\) Strawson has nothing to

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\(^7\)Cartwright, "Propositions", p. 103.

add to our knowledge of the word 'statement' other than how we should not use it. I will continue in this chapter to indicate the contexts in which 'statement' should not be used.

I would like to deal first with the explicitly performative prefixes that can be attached to an utterance. According to Austin, these prefixes are used to express the force of the phrase that follows it. Cohen objected to this notion by saying that for Austin the meaning of an utterance is confined to the expression that follows the prefix. This would give us a convenient method for distinguishing between force and meaning. But Cohen does not accept this notion. This is because the prefixes 'I state', 'I protest', 'I warn', or 'I promise', have meaning by themselves and do not lose their meaning when attached to another phrase. By adding a prefix we are adding another meaning to an utterance, and not simply making its force explicit. What was understood as the force of an utterance, as represented by the prefix, is just part of the meaning of the whole utterance, and is not something distinct from that meaning.

The problem with this criticism is that a prefix, such as 'I state' or 'I protest', is liable to the same difficulties over how it is to be taken. It is possible to know the meaning of a prefix like 'I protest', but still "wonder whether 'I protest...' is being said as a joke, as an insult, or as a protest."9 Is the meaning of the prefix so determinate that no questions and doubts

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as how it is to be taken will arise? Does 'I protest' have the same meaning as a prefix as it does when it stands alone? To say 'I protest' "shows but does not describe or state what my act is."\(^{10}\) But to say 'I protest that...' is to make a description or a statement as to what I am doing in my utterance. There is, therefore, a distinction between using 'I protest' alone and using it as a prefix to another phrase. 'I protest' does not always have the same connotation uttered alone as it does when uttered with another phrase. Cohen's argument has the cogency it does only if 'I protest' has the stability of the meaning he implies it has, but it clearly does not have this stability. If this is the case, there is no reason to think that all doubt will be removed about the meaning of an utterance by adding an explicit performative, such as, 'I protest.'

Cohen has also "failed to distinguish between those difficulties which have their locus in the sentence uttered and those which have their locus in the act of uttering the sentence."\(^{11}\) This is the difference between what was uttered and the act of uttering it. The former relates to 'meaning' while the latter relates to 'force'. What we fail to understand about an utterance, according to Cohen, is due to not grasping the full meaning of the sentence uttered. The act-object distinction, which corresponds to the force-meaning distinction, needs to be examined. If this distinction holds, then we have another reason for dismissing the above-mentioned view of Cohen.


Are there different things that an audience might understand or misunderstand when a speaker utters something? Is understanding an utterance just knowing the meaning of the words used in making the utterance? Specifically, does an audience understand the force of an utterance separately from its meaning?

I can say to a person on his way outside that 'It is raining outside' so that he will put on his raincoat before leaving. It is obvious that the hearer understood the meaning of the words uttered as well as knowing that it was meant to warn him about the weather. That same person can be sitting in an English class a day later just prior to dismissal and see the same words written on the blackboard and not know whether it is a description or a warning or an illustration of correct grammar. But he still knows the dictionary meaning of the words. After all, they were the same words he heard and responded to the day before. We certainly would not say that his ability to use language has suddenly diminished. In both cases the hearer and reader understood the dictionary meaning of the sentence used, but in the latter instance the reader did not know what act was being performed by the writer of the sentence.

Just as the type of act may not be known while the sentence's meaning is known, we may know the type of act performed without knowing the meaning of the sentence used. I can say to someone 'I order you to go to the bank'. This utterance makes it obviously clear what act is being performed, i.e., and order. Yet, the hearer may reply by saying 'Are you ordering me to go to the First
National Bank on the corner or are you ordering me to go to the river bank?" He is aware of the type of act being performed by the sentence, but he is in doubt as to the meaning of the sentence used. These examples imply that to fully understand an utterance, we must be able to know both what the sentence's meaning is and what type of act it is being used to perform. For someone like Austin, this 'uptake includes both grasping illocutionary force and knowing what the speaker said.'

Cohen's criticism has been directed at Austin's distinction between the force of an utterance and the meaning of an utterance. Another problem with Cohen's analysis can be found in the way 'meaning' can break down and the way that force may break down. This will involve a discussion of what Austin termed 'infelicities'.

Failure to perform what Austin called a rhetic act is due to the speaker failing to speak with a clear meaning. This is a result of using words without a clear 'reference' and/or a clear 'sense.' A failure to be clear over whether an utterance is a warning or a statement is also a breakdown. But one should not conclude that this is the only way that an illocutionary breakdown may occur. The way that these other breakdowns may occur is suggested when it is realized that such acts as commands, promises, statements or requests "are the same acts whether we call them performatives or illocutionary acts." The situations

that bring breakdowns in performatives and the situations that bring about breakdowns in illocutionary force are the same. Examples of these breakdowns are:

A man might say, "I warn you it's going to charge", when it is not going to charge. A speaker might say, "I apologize for arriving late", when he has not arrived late. A man might say, "I appoint you President of the Motor Company", when he has no authority to do so. 14

Despite the fact that each of these acts breaks down, it is clear that each utterance's 'meaning' and 'force' is apparent. There are no rhetic breakdowns and it is adequate to say the first utterance is a warning. We have, therefore, illocutionary breakdowns which are not due to a lack of clarity.

I have already discussed how being clear about the meaning of the words used in an utterance is different from being clear about the force of an utterance. Problems of clarity affect both, but clearing up one will not necessarily clear up the other. The problem of infelicities reveals that there is a whole range of questions about 'force' that have nothing to do with clarity of meaning. These breakdowns have nothing to do with meaning. One will have to look at other contexts and situations, in addition to those related to meaning, to consider all the problems and questions that are associated with the force of an utterance.

A further problem with Cohen's discussion is over the use of the terms 'mean' or 'meaning'. They can be very ambiguous

14 Ibid., p. 272.
in their usage. 'Meaning' can refer to the topic or subject of an utterance. But sometimes, "roughly, 'meaning' refers to the point of, or the intention behind, an utterance." 15 This latter use of 'meaning' refers to the point of an utterance. We can clear up this sense of 'meaning' which an utterance may have without clarifying anything about the other sense of 'meaning' that an utterance has. In saying "he lost his case" I meant, i.e., I intended to say by my utterance, that he lost his suitcase. Obviously 'meant' is being used here to clarify the intended meaning of the words used in the utterance, i.e., that he lost a suitcase and not a legal case. One can use 'meant' again to refer to the utterance, but do something quite different, viz., explain how it is to be taken, i.e., its intended force. In saying "He lost his case", I can mean to warn you not to do the same. It is not known whether we are referring to a suitcase or a legal case, but it is known that we are warning someone not to repeat the same mistake. Likewise, even if we knew what kind of case was being referred to, there could still be doubt as to whether it is a warning, description, or a criticism. Thus, to elucidate one's 'meaning', i.e., intention, in the one case is not automatically to do it in the other.

Austin himself admitted this other use of 'mean' when he said "we can use 'meaning' also with reference to illocutionary force -- 'He meant it as an order', & c." 16 Austin was aware

15 Cooper, "Meaning and Illocutions", p. 74.
16 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 100.
that 'meaning' could be used to show how an utterance is to be taken as well as being aware of its use which "is equivalent to sense and reference."17

The point here is that there is a certain ambiguity in the use of the word 'meaning' and Austin himself was aware of it. It has two uses in referring to an utterance: dictionary meaning and force. A clarification of one use does not mean that the other will similarly be clarified. Now it is:

surely wiser and less misleading to use 'meaning' in the narrower sense, and to employ other terms, say 'illocution' to refer to other aspects of utterances, even though in ordinary language people do use 'mean to cover a wider field.'18

This is precisely what Austin did, and any attempt to reduce it back to 'meaning' should include distinguishing it from its other sense. If 'illocutionary force' is the sense of 'meaning' that refers to how an utterance should be taken, then nothing is lost except a convenient way for distinguishing the two senses. But Cohen has confused one sense with the other when he states that the force of an utterance can be found in the meaning of the words used. I have argued that this is mistaken, that we can talk about what we mean by an utterance without clarifying anything about the meanings of words. We do employ a use of 'meaning' which is intended to explain the force an utterance has.

17 Ibid., p. 100.
18 Cooper, "Meaning and Illocutions", p. 74.
Cohen is only interested in the one sense of the word 'meaning', the dictionary sense, not taken in abstraction but in the context of utterance. A concern with just this aspect of 'meaning' will not help in discerning all of an utterance's characteristics, because its other aspects are quite distinct from this one. To talk of 'meaning' as if it had only one sense is misleading. Clearing up the meaning of words, even by drawing on the context of utterance, will not simultaneously reveal an utterance's focus. Cohen's notion of meaning is simply too unclear to accomplish this.

Keeping this discussion of 'meaning' in mind, I would like to turn to an examination of Searle's analysis of illocutionary force. Searle also incorporates illocutionary force into the meaning of an utterance. To sum it up, whenever somebody utters a sentence "and means something by it, he intends to perform some illocutionary act" and furthermore, "whenever someone utters a sentence with the intention of performing some illocutionary act, he means something..."\textsuperscript{19}

It is obvious by now that I do not think this is the case. We can be aware of what an utterance means without knowing how it was intended to be taken by an audience. Similarly, we may be clear about how an utterance is to be taken by an audience without knowing what it meant in the dictionary sense, i.e., without the context determining that sense. What we do to sharpen the dictionary meaning of an utterance will not necessarily sharpen

\textsuperscript{19} Frye, "Force and Meaning", p. 90.
our understanding of its force. This works the other way around also, because sharpening the force of an utterance will not necessarily clear up any ambiguities over its dictionary meaning. The example "The boy delivered the speech" can have difficulties over both its meaning and its force separately. Will answering questions over its 'meaning' answer questions over its 'force', and will answering questions over its 'force' answer questions over its 'meaning'? When we ask "What did he mean by 'The boy delivered the speech'?", we could obtain two different answers, both of which may have nothing to do with each other. We can say the following of an utterance:

That question demands answers like "He meant that the messenger brought the speech to the office." And on the other hand, this specification of what the speaker meant does not tell us whether the man was admitting something or claiming something...there is also available the "fuller" description: "He claimed that the boy delivered the speech." And this one leaves completely open the question of what he meant.20

Both answers describe something different about the utterance in question. There is no reason to believe either one is better for informing us about the 'meaning' of the utterance. Although either provides information about the utterance, it does not provide all the information that could be known. One answer can be better than the other depending on one's interests. The examples just used reveal how one sense of the meaning of an utterance can be

20 Ibid., p. 291.
known without knowing the other sense. This shows that Searle's interpretation of Austin's theory:

fails because of an equivocation on 'meaning' that we have already sorted out, namely, between 'meaning' signifying an intention of a speaker, using some meaningful utterance, to "mean" something ulterior, and signifying the sense of utterances that may or may not also be so used.21

Austin's distinction between the locutionary and illocutionary is an attempt to distinguish between an 'utterance' and the act performed in using it. I have been discussing how the different senses of 'meaning' are appropriate to the distinction between 'utterance' and 'act', and what you say of one can't be said of the other. Thus, we can say:

The sense of 'meaning' proper to speech acts is the sense in which "meaning" something is performing a distinctive act; and the sense of 'meaning' proper to that which may be used in given speech acts is the sense in which words, morphemes, and the like are meaningfully related to each other in the context of sentences normally used to perform speech acts.22

This is how the distinction between meaning and illocutionary acts as maintained by Austin, and rejected by Searle, can still be maintained. In fact, Searle's thesis which is "a study of the meanings of sentences is not in principle distinct from a study of speech acts"23 is mistaken. The sense of 'meaning' which is


22 Ibid., p. 689.

applicable to speech acts, and which Austin called illocutionary
force, is not the same as the sense of 'meaning' concerned with
the dictionary meanings of sentences. To say that a study of one
is a study of the other is mistaken. We can exhaust a sentence's
meaning by looking at the context of its utterance without
exhausting what 'force' it is meant to have (example, p. 75).

This discussion, up to this point, should be sufficient to
reject the criticisms of philosophers such as Cohen and Searle,
who would hold that the dictionary meaning of a sentence used in
an utterance can adequately explicate any questions that I may
have about the force of the utterance. They have neglected the
'act' aspect of an utterance. Austin abandoned the performative-
constative distinction (the former is the performing of an action,
the latter is the saying of something) in favor of the notion to
say something is always to perform some act. One of these acts
is called illocutionary acts and are distinct from locutionary
acts, the saying of something. This chapter has argued that this
distinction is able to endure attempts to assimilate one with the
other. Acts, such as betting, warning, stating and promising are
not discerned by examining the dictionary meaning of the sentence
used in what was said. The type of act performed does not depend
on the dictionary meaning of the utterance used. Early in How to
Do Things with Words, Austin held that constatives were the
saying of something and were not in themselves an act. But even
constatives became performative acts with both groups becoming
distinctions within the class of illocutionary acts. The particular
act performed determines the 'force' that an utterance will have. The utterance's dictionary meaning will not fix the force it will have. The remaining chapters will discuss the claim-making force that an utterance can have when the illocutionary act of stating is performed. The analysis to follow will present not only what claim-making force should be identified with, but also what it should not be identified with if confusions are not to arise.
CHAPTER 4

Underlying the last few chapters has been a discussion and examination of Austin's locutionary and illocutionary act distinction. I want now to focus on the notion of force as part of the total speech act independently of any concern about whether it is part of, or, as I believe, from, the dictionary meaning of the sentence uttered. Austin's critics have not eliminated the notion of force so much as they have subsumed it under another notion. They have simply increased the burden that the term 'meaning' must carry.

Before beginning an examination of the notion of the force of an utterance, I would like to do some stage setting. In the process, I hope to reveal the general scheme into which 'claim-making' fits.

How has the term 'force' been generally used? As previously seen, force has to do with how an utterance is to be taken. Is what was uttered a question, command; statement, etc.? This question is possible because one and the same sentence can be used to express a command at one moment and a statement at another. The sentence, i.e., the actual words, need not vary. The force of an utterance derives from what we do in the course of saying something, i.e., the speech act we perform. For Austin, this means "that the occasion of an utterance matters seriously, and that the words used are to some extent to be 'explained' by the 'context' in which they are designed to be or have actually been spoken in
a linguistic interchange."¹ The context, or situation, will help explain what illocutionary act was performed when the utterance was emitted. Thus, if the same sentence is being used on separate occasions to do different things, then the difference is attributable to something other than the sentence, viz., to the context. The context includes what else was said on that occasion, the speaker's status, and the other circumstances involved in uttering it.

How something that was said is meant to be taken can be understood by attending to the circumstances surrounding the occasion of its utterance. It is these things that change from one occasion of uttering a sentence to another occasion of uttering the same sentence and, explain why on one occasion it is meant as a question and, on another, as a statement. Force is, therefore, connected to the occasion and context of an utterance. Knowing the dictionary meaning of the words used does not explain whether the utterance is used to ask a question or make a statement.

The analysis of the illocutionary force of an utterance must go beyond the dictionary meaning of the words used because the characteristics of truth, falsity and infelicities may all belong to a given utterance. We must consider the total speech situation in determining how an utterance is to be taken:

That you did warn and had the right to warn, did state, or did advise, you were right to state or warn or advise, can arise—not in the sense of whether it was opportune or

¹ Austin, How to do Things with Words, p. 100.
expedient, but whether, on the facts and your
knowledge of the facts and purposes for which
you were speaking, and so on, this was the
proper thing to say.2

For this reason, Austin combined constatives and performatives to­
gether as illocutionary acts. The way performatives are assessed
and the way constatives are assessed are assimilated in assessing
the total speech act. About the constative-performative and the
locutionary-illocutionary distinctions we can say:

The thought of the purely constative, as that
which is just and simply true or false, is
really, he seems to suggest, the result of
concentrating on the locutionary aspect of
some speech acts, on their meaning (sense and
reference), to the neglect of their illocu­
tionary aspects; the thought of the purely
performative, as that which has nothing of
truth or falsity about it, is the result of
concentrating on the illocutionary aspect of
some speech acts neglecting the 'dimension
of correspondence with facts.3

This is how Austin arrived at his doctrine of performative and con­
stable utterances. This change paves the way for a discussion of
the illocutionary force of an utterance, including the force of a
statement. For the moment, I shall concentrate on the illocu­
tionary aspect of a statement and ignore the question of its
truth and falsity. This is what I intend, but one may wonder how
I can study the claim-making force of statements whose very nature
is to be true and false and at the same time ignore this crucial
aspect. Before going any further, I would like to discuss this point.

2 Ibid., p. 144.
3 P.F. Strawson, "Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning'", Essays on
J.L. Austin, ed. Berlin and others, p. 53.
My concern with claim-making force is not an interest in what statement is asserted in an utterance. Rather, I am interested in what it is about an utterance that makes it a statement, and gives it claim-making force. It is a matter of the difference between the act of stating something and the statement that is made. It is not the making of a statement which is true or false, but what is stated that is true or false. That an utterance has a claim-making force is due to certain intentions, contexts, situations, etc., as well as forms of words. Strawson's statement quoted in the previous paragraph implies that it is the locutionary aspect of the utterance that will inform us as to what is true or false, but it is the illocutionary aspect which tells us whether it is the kind of thing which can be true or false. It is this latter aspect that I want to explore. That something is true or false will depend on whether or not the statement made fits with, or corresponds to, the state of affairs which is claimed to be the case. If we are to say that it is the act of stating which is true or false, then we are left with the absurd consequences Strawson pointed out in his 1950 debate with Austin as mentioned in Chapter Two. But we have already pointed out in that chapter that Austin did distinguish between the statement made and the act of statement-making.

In examining the claim-making force of a statement, I want to deal with three examples of utterances used to make statements. The first example is where the statement is made explicit through a performatative device; the second is where the utterance lacks
this specific device but is still called a statement; and the third is the utterance which does not have the common characteristics usually associated with a form of words used to make a statement. Illustrations of these types of utterance just described would be: 'I state that it is raining,' 'It is raining' and 'Isn't it raining?' all of which could be said to express statements. Although I do not believe that the first and third illustrations are as common as the second, they are still possible, and their unusual character will aid in examining the notion of claim-making force. If they are possible, then it is their claim-making force which accounts for their all being considered statements.

What are the conditions that any speech act must fulfill for it to constitute a certain speech act? Speech acts imply certain things:

This is the use of 'imply' I shall be concerned with: the use in which the performance of a certain deed (including a speech act) gives the audience a right to infer something about the performer's beliefs. The right is given not by the speaker but by the action and its occurrence in a certain type of situation.

If this were not the case, we would cease to listen and respond to a speaker's utterance. These requirements are even necessary to insincere utterances such as lies, because if the audience did not believe that the liar had the beliefs and attitudes which the particular speech situation calls for, then his lie would not be

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Mats Furberg, Sayinq and Meaning, p. 95.
convincing. Every utterance a speaker emits must fulfill these conditions if it is to be taken seriously. In any serious utterance, there will be certain implications associated with that particular speech act. It is through these implications that we can determine whether the particular speech act performed is the appropriate one or not.

An examination of these implications is an examination of the illocutionary dimension of an utterance. This dimension, in the case of statement making, consists of uttering words in circumstances that satisfy the felicity-conditions of stating. What is it about an utterance that makes us take it as claiming something to be true or false when in other circumstances the same words could be used and not be taken as the making of a statement?

To take my first illustration, the 'I state that' which precedes 'it is raining' is prefixed to reveal how the speaker wants his utterance to be taken, in this case, as making a claim about the world: "'I state that' is often a signal that the speaker is firmly determined to defend a certain utterance, be it a constative, a value-judgement, or whatnot."5 This comment suggests that the phrase 'I state that' may be used to indicate something other than a claim about the world. But I am only interested in its use in making a claim. 'I state that it is raining' renders explicit how an audience should take my utterance. In this instance, I am telling you that my utterance is the type of thing which is true or false. It's the difference between making a claim and informing you that

5 Ibid., p. 228.
what I am doing is making a claim. Uttering 'I state that' is doing the latter.

Before we can assess something as true or false, we may sometimes have to indicate that it is the type of thing that can be true or false. To assess it as true or false, we see how it corresponds to some actual state of affairs. To assess it as a claim is to assess whether or not it is the appropriate thing to be saying on this occasion and under these circumstances: "The sense which does concern us is its illocutionary (or explicit performative) sense." It will be those things that are associated with performatives and their felicity conditions that will indicate whether or not what I am doing is the type of thing that should be taken as a statement.

When I say, 'I state that it is raining,' I assume responsibility for the fulfillment of certain conditions. For example, I must be in the position of possessing adequate information about the current weather situation. To be in this position, I must have just come in from outside, be looking out a window, or have been informed by someone who was just outside. If my audience cannot assume one of these conditions to be the case, then they will accuse me of simply hazarding a guess. These conditions must obtain for a claim-making utterance to be in order, just as an army officer must have the status of being in authority to give orders which others are expected to obey. A person has to be in the right position to

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make a statement. If he is not in the right position to make a statement there is no reason to think that what he utters is being used to make a statement. To know that an act of uttering something is making a claim will depend, in part, on whether it is justified by the utterers' position. If it is not so justified, the most one can say is that such an act is an attempt (albeit unsuccessful) to make a claim.

That an utterance should be taken as having a claim-making force, may depend on certain things being said or done by the speaker as well as by his audience. Austin says that "if I have stated something, then that commits me to other statements: other statements made by me will be in order or out of order." This not only refers to other statements that I make but to statements that other individuals make. If I make plans to go on a picnic immediately after stating that it is raining, then there is reason to believe that what I first said was not seriously intended as a statement of fact. I have by my actions seemingly contradicted myself. When we make a statement, we are implying that we believe that what is stated is actually the case. When I believe the statement that I make, then anything else said in connection with my statement must be in line with it. When an utterance is made, its claim-making force will be appropriate if certain other related things are true. Its force will be happy only if certain conditions obtain. If these other conditions, e.g., felicities F.1 and F.2 (as seen in Chapter One), do not obtain, then we may conclude that

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7 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 138.
the 'I state that...' was not the appropriate thing to say. The circumstances simply were not the ones that would justify the claim-making force made explicit in the utterance.

But why wouldn't we say that the utterance is false instead of inappropriate? This question represents the distinction between saying that the statement is true or false and that it is something which constitutes the making of a claim. In the latter "case of a putative statement presupposing...the existence of that which it refers; if no such thing exists, 'the statement' is not about anything"...."it is better to say that the putative statement is null and void...." The circumstances must allow for the utterance to have a claim-making force; if they do not, the utterance is not the appropriate one for the situation. The claim-making force is not found because the putative statement is unhappily made.

What about 'It is raining'? What gives this a claim-making force rather than the force of a warning? We could assess it the same way as the explicit version because "we may make explicit what we were doing" for example, "to say 'I state that he did not' is to make the very same statement as to say 'he did not.'" We simply look at those circumstances in which the utterance is made to see whether or not it can be said to have a claim-making force. That is, we look at the "ceremonial non-verbal procedures; the circumstances of the utterance and the speaker's status...." The audience

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8Ibid., p. 136.
9Ibid., p. 134.
10Furberg, Saying and Meaning, p. 211.
would have to infer from all these evidences that the utterance does or does not have the force of making a claim. In this instance, the speaker believes that certain circumstances are the case, for example, that the streets are wet, I take my umbrella, you take your umbrella, I have cancelled my outdoor activities, you have cancelled your outdoor activities, etc.

'It is raining' can also be a warning and made explicit by the addition of the prefix 'I warn.' But if this act is to be happy, then it must be true that it is raining. This means that the statement that it is raining must be true in order for the warning to be the correct thing to give under the circumstances. Also, if I utter 'It is raining' as a statement, it might serve to warn you even without my intending it to. Because I made the statement, you then had information, and were forewarned as to whether to take an umbrella or not. The point here is that an utterance may have the force both of being a warning and a claim. The situations and circumstances which need to obtain if the utterance can be said to have a claim-making force can be found in other types of utterances, just as other types of force can be implied when a statement is made.

It is for this reason that an utterance like 'Isn't it raining?' may well be a statement and can be taken to emphasize how hard it is raining and be equivalent to 'It is raining (hard), isn't it?' When I utter this to someone immediately after coming in from the outside and after cancelling my outdoor activities, the utterance might very well have the force of a statement although the words are uttered in the form of a question. If these things are the case, then the utterance may be appropriately said to have a claim-
making force. In fact, many types of discourse have the force they are said to have only because a true statement is implied. 'I warn you that the bull is about to charge' can fail as a warning unless the statement 'the bull is about to charge' is true. Since a statement is implied by these other types of acts, why couldn't the implied statement become the object of our interest? Despite the interrogative illocutionary force-indicating devices contained in "Isn't it raining?" the context in which it is uttered may suggest that a statement is actually being made. In this example, the context of the utterance is obviously very important for it to be taken as a statement. If various types of speech acts imply a statement or the truth of a statement, then why couldn't something that sounds like a question be taken as a statement, especially if the context in which it is uttered indicates some claim is being made? Why would someone ask this as a mere question if, for instance, he just came in 'from outside'? It seems more likely, under the circumstances, that he is making a statement.

This suggests that many types of discourse and not just statements, are dependent on a relationship with the facts. As previously quoted, in this chapter (footnote 2) Austin believed "the question of whether...you were right to state or warn or advise, can arise...on the facts and your knowledge of the facts." I think it is safe to agree with Strawson on the following:

The facts of the case may be such as to make a request a reasonable request, an order a sound or justifiable order, a piece of advice good advice; or they may be such that the request is unreasonable,
the order unsound, the advice bad.\textsuperscript{11}

A relationship with the facts is important not only for determining the truth or falsity of statements but also whether or not things like requests, commands, promises, warnings, statements, etc., are warranted or not. The facts make these illocutionary acts the appropriate acts to perform. It is because of this that things like commands and promises have a descriptive as well as performative aspect. Austin had come to believe that characteristics of constatives also apply to performatives and that characteristically performatives apply to constatives. A relationship to the facts, then represents one general dimension for assessing all types of discourse. How is it that the facts decide that a command or promise is appropriate? It is because the different types of discourse are warranted only if some statements are true. All types of discourse, commands, promises, statements, requests, etc., are appropriate only if the facts indicate that they were the appropriate things to say. Certain statements implied by these acts must be borne out of the facts, or, at the very least, must be believed to be so borne out.

Further Remarks

For an utterance to have or imply a claim-making force is to say that it was appropriate for the speaker to make some claim or imply a claim about the world, which may or may not fit the facts. The business of statements, for Austin, was to describe some actual state of affairs. But the making of a statement also implies a whole range of facts that need to obtain before we can call what we are uttering a statement, or an utterance can be correctly said to have a claim-making force.

I believe that if one is not clear about how Austin understood the word 'statement', then one could be left with a very confused and mistaken doctrine. I say this because it has been suggested that if we can determine that a statement was the appropriate utterance to make then we also know that it is a true statement. Establishing the claim-making force of an utterance presupposes, on this view, the truth of the statement that is made. It is no wonder that it was the appropriate utterance to make! Take, for example, the utterance "I warn you that the bull is about to charge."12 How do we know that this was the appropriate thing to utter? How can this be a happy act of warning? Austin said "that for a certain performative utterance to be happy, certain statements would have to be true."13 For a warning to be the appropriate act for the circumstances in which it is uttered, it will need to be happy and

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12 Austin, How to Do Things with Words. p. 55.
13 Ibid., p. 45.
to be happy or unhappy it must be "true or false that it is going
to charge; and that comes in in appraising the warning...."14 It
will be a happy act of warning if it is true that the bull is about
to charge and an unhappy act of warning if it is false that the
bull is about to charge.

Now consider the utterance 'I state that p'. According to
C. Olsen's interpretation of Austin we investigate "the happiness
(or unhappiness) of (this) locution, and its happiness will depend
to a great extent...on the truth of 'p.'"15 This means that any
happy occurrence of 'I state that p' "does not seem capable of being
ture or false in any significant sense, because the 'I state that'
guarantees the truth " of the entire utterance."16 'I state that p'
does not seem capable of lending itself to the truth/falsehood
dimension. As criticisms, Olsen's comments are important because
Austin believed that we investigate the truth of 'I state that p' in
the same manner that we would investigate the truth of the statement
'p'. Olsen said that for 'I state that p' we "investigate... the
happiness (or unhappiness) of the locution" while 'p' is"meant
first and foremost to be liable to assessment in what Austin (called)
the "truth/falsehood dimension." 17

In evaluating Olsen's comments, I can only conclude that he is
mistaken. At the time of How to Do Things with Words, truth and
falsity had become for Austin just one way in which "the words

14 Ibid., p. 135.
15 Olsen, "Austin Worries About 'I state that...'", p. 113.
16 Ibid., p. 112.
17 Ibid., p. 113.
stand in respect of satisfactoriness to the facts, events, situations, etc., to which they refer. An utterance can be related to the facts by more than the truth/falsehood dimension of assessment, statements included. Truth and falsity are only one dimension for assessing a particular utterance. Truth and falsity "have no unique position over the matter of being related to the facts in a unique way..." Austin wanted to go beyond assessing an utterance on the basis of only being true or false to the "general dimension of being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions."

Austin treated statements as he did other performatives; for an utterance to be a happy case of warning, it must be true that someone is in danger and that this is being successfully brought to his attention by words the potential victim will recognize. Similarly, for a statement to be happy, it will, among other things that must go right, have to fit the facts truly. This is because it is the right thing to utter with regard to the facts. If for some reason it is not and is therefore false, then according to the above quote it was the wrong or improper utterance to have made for the situation and circumstances, a determination that often cannot be made in advance but only after checking.

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18 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 148.
19 Ibid., p. 148.
20 Ibid., p. 144.
Statements, for Austin, were just one type of utterance, but he believed that they could be assessed in the same manner as other types of utterance. Austin asked, "Can we be sure that stating truly is a different class of assessment for arguing soundly, advising well, judging fairly, and blaming justifiably?" The evidence by which we judge the appropriateness of a statement is not very different from the evidence by which we judge the appropriateness of a warning or a piece of advice. The facts play the same role in assessing acts of stating as they do in assessing acts of warning. The same things determine if a statement and a warning were successful or unsuccessful. The success or failure of any illocutionary act is dependent on the same type of assessment.

The Olsen article uses an analysis where 'I state that p' is compared with 'I warn you that p'. For both utterances to be happy 'p' must be at least true. Olsen claims that if this is the case, then in all instances where it is proper to say 'I state that p' there can be no doubt as to the truth of the statement. The problem with this is that Olsen fails to carry his comparison far enough in attempting to drive a wedge between 'I state that p' and the statement 'p'. Remember, Austin believed that we should investigate the happiness of 'I state that p' in the same way as we would for 'p'. Olsen claims that the former implies the truth of 'p', and that the truth of 'p' is a condition for the happiness of 'I state that p'.

Olsen can be seen to miss the point if we look at what

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21 Ibid., p. 144.
Austin called a more general dimension of assessing utterances, i.e., when we judge whether something is the appropriate thing to say, and not just whether it is true or false. We should ask, is 'I state that p' appropriate for the same situation and circumstances that p is appropriate? For example, is 'I state that the bull is about to charge' as appropriate as 'The bull is about to charge'? What Olsen fails to realize is that the former merely presupposes the truth of '...the bull is about to charge' in the sense that if the whole utterance was the appropriate utterance to make, then it is presupposed that '...the bull is about to charge' must be true. Olsen's comparison does not go far enough because he does not treat 'The bull is about to charge' as an utterance which may or may not be happy for the circumstances in which it is uttered. If he had, he would have seen that the circumstances surrounding each should be investigated similarly in order to determine their appropriateness. Olsen applied the appropriateness assessment only to 'I state that p'. Since Austin meant this as a general dimension for all utterances, Olsen is mistaken.

If we can assess an utterance as being happy or the appropriate thing to have uttered, then, to use Olsen's words, "the utterance as a whole does not lend itself to true/false assessment." The reason that Olsen is mistaken is due to the fact that it is because we are able to assess a statement as either true or false that we can judge that it was happily or unhappily uttered. The truth/falsehood dimension is just one way that we can assess

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Olsen, "Austin Worries About 'I state that...'", p. 113.
the appropriateness of an utterance. To presuppose the truth of 'p' is not to determine that 'p' is true, but only to judge that 'p' is true.

One way that Austin's use of the term 'statement' could be said to prejudge the question of the truth of what is stated would be if those facts, situations and circumstances that make an utterance an instance of stating are confused with those facts, situations and circumstances that make it true. If this were the case, then Austin's notion of making a statement would entail an infallibility requirement. After all, Austin says "on the facts and your knowledge of the facts (that) this was the proper thing to say."23 Perhaps Austin may have suggested too close a relation to facts as a condition for knowing that a statement was the proper utterance to make, but I do not think this was his intention.

Take the status of the speaker and his relation to the facts. Austin said one's utterances can have the force of making a claim when the speaker is in a position to know the facts his statement is about. He said, "You cannot state how many people there are in the next room; if you say 'There are fifty people in the next room', I can only regard you as guessing..."24 This seems to mean that since I am not in the next room and cannot know that there are fifty people in it, I could not be making a statement, only a guess or conjecture.

23 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 144.
24 Ibid., p. 137.
But I could be taken as obviously making a statement if I were in the room. The situation would lend itself to making a statement appropriately, according to Austin, if I am in a position to know the facts that the utterance is about. He seems to be implying that statement making involves a very close acquaintance between the speaker and the facts that his statement are about, i.e., that the speaker's situation virtually insures that the statement is true.

Consider the insincerity forms of infelicity (.1 and .2). According to these, the statement 'It is raining' implies certain other statements, e.g., 'The streets are wet'. If the former statement is to be happy, then the latter statement must be in accord with it. The truth of the first statement implies the truth of the second statement. The second has to be true in order for the first utterance to have a claim-making force. But this begs the question since the truth of the first is the point at issue. If I settle the question of its truth in advance, then I am forced to admit, if someone takes me outside and shows me bone-dry streets, that I failed to make a statement.

It seems to me that what I should admit to instead is that I had made a false statement. Surely the latter makes more sense. It makes more sense because the facts prove the statement was false and not that the facts proved that the making of a statement was not the proper thing to have done. The statement that was uttered simply turned out to be false. We can come to know that a statement is true or false separately from knowing those facts.
that give the utterance a claim-making force. Thus, I may look out of a wet windowpane and not know that someone just hosed it down. 'It is raining' was apparently warranted, but I turned out to be wrong. If we are not careful about distinguishing between those facts and circumstances which make a statement a statement and those facts and circumstances which make it true or false then our interpretation of claim-making force would be full of difficulties. Austin obviously believed that the truth/falsehood dimension of assessment was applicable to statements. He believed that questions of truth and falsity depended on whether the statement "corresponds to the facts."25 I also implied that Austin seemingly required too close an acquaintance with the facts in order to make a statement. Although I do not think Austin is overly clear about this matter, my comments on this close acquaintance between the speaker and the facts are obviously an over-statement of the problem. At one point, Austin said that in making a statement "Facts come in as well as our knowledge or opinion about facts."26 This implies that what we believe or think as to what the facts are is important for deciding whether a statement was the proper thing to have said. Believing something is true will serve very well for making a statement, while the facts themselves will determine whether the statement made is true or false. A happy act of stating does not require an infallible knowledge of the facts. If we treat stating as dependent on what we believe to be true, then the usual sense of the term 'statement' is

25 Ibid., p. 139.
26 Ibid., p. 141.
is retained, i.e., a claim that is warranted by the circumstances.

What I have been attempting to do in the present discussion is show that if one is not clear over how Austin treated the word 'statement,' certain confusions can arise. I discussed how Austin went beyond the truth/falsehood dimension in giving a fuller assessment of an utterance. One must also be clear over the different ways that a statement may be related to the facts by distinguishing such things as those facts that make it true and those facts that give the utterance its claim-making force. If they are confused with one another, then confusions will arise. With these things in mind, I want to discuss, in the next chapter, exactly how Austin would have understood the claim-making force of an utterance.
Austin realized that being related to the facts is a complicated affair. The facts make whatever was uttered an appropriate thing to have said. Being true is only one way of determining that an utterance is the right or appropriate thing to say. Austin said that "we cannot quite make the simple statement that the truth of statements depends on facts as distinct from knowledge of facts."\(^1\) Our knowledge of the facts can change and may alter what we previously said was the case. Much of what we say "depends on knowledge at the time of utterance."\(^2\) This knowledge may very well be incomplete, obsolete, or misinterpreted so that any statement based on this knowledge may be proven false when put to the test. The facts and what we know of the facts are two different things.

Austin's emphasis on the importance of the speaker's knowledge of the facts in making truth claims leaves open the possibility of statements being false. The facts may seem to be such that the statement the speaker makes is believed to be true. But on closer examination it is seen to be false. Had he known more, the statement would not have been made. A false statement was not the appropriate thing to have said, although the speaker's knowledge at the time suggested it was the right thing to say. From this, it

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 143.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 143.
follows that he does not have to state the facts truly in order to
make a statement. Other things must also be in order for something
we say to be a statement. What a speaker knows about the facts
give him reasons for making a statement, while fitting the facts
makes it true. Together, they make the statement appropriate or
right under the circumstances. But only the speaker's knowledge is
relevant to the question of his utterance having claim-making force.

If a speaker's statement cannot be said to be either true or
false, it will be because the speaker's knowledge of the situation
and circumstances is not sufficient to decide one way or the other.
The speaker cannot claim: 'There is no life on Mars as we know it,'
because the circumstances are not sufficiently known to make such a
claim. We have never been there or been in any position to gather
any information about life on Mars, nor has the evidence gathered by
Mars probes been conclusive. Any utterance about life on Mars will
be more of a guess than a statement of fact. A speaker must have
enough knowledge of the facts which he believes his statement will
fit: "The truth or falsity of statements is affected by what they
leave out or put in and by their being misleading, and so on."³

When a speaker's utterances express a statement, it is false when it
inaccurately represents the facts and true if the statement repre-
sents them accurately. It is happy if it is the appropriate thing
to say under the circumstances.

As stated before, I am only interested in those utterances
which are seriously made. Lies, jokes, plays, metaphors, etc., do

³ Ibid., p. 145.
not count as serious statements of fact. They are important in the sense that, for example, a person uttering a lie is saying something that is parasitic on a serious linguistic exchange. If a liar could not get his audience to believe that what he has uttered is serious then his lie would not work on the audience. A lie can only be successful if the audience believes the liar sincerely means what he is saying. I am interested in those utterances where the speaker seriously believes that what he states is the case. In such instances, the speaker believes his advice is good, his promise will be kept, his statement is true, and his order is meant to be obeyed. His audience must believe that the speaker is sincere and intends these acts to be taken seriously. His advice may be bad or intended it to be bad, his promise not to be kept, his statement a lie, his order illegitimate; but the speaker must give his audience reason to believe that he can back them up. As attempts to deceive, lies must get the audience to believe everything is in order or the liar’s deception will fail: "A serious utterance does in our world entitle the audience to infer that the speaker thinks that he, when asked to, can back it up in a way appropriate to it." Our utterances have to be taken seriously or nobody would listen to us, as in the story of the little boy who cried "Wolf!" too many times. Because we take an utterance seriously, we infer that the speaker knows and believes certain facts: "A speaker who wants to affect us with what he says has therefore every reason to pose as having

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Furberg, *Saying and Meaning*, p. 91.
these beliefs.  

Just as a promise is still a promise when given in bad faith, a statement is still a statement even when it is false. In discussing claim-making force, the question that needs to be asked is: What is it that an utterance needs in order to have this claim-making force, even though the statement itself may be false? Further, what is it about saying 'It is raining outside' that makes it a statement as opposed to a guess or conjecture? Although a statement was not the appropriate thing to have said because it turned out to be false, it still may have the force of making a claim. It is the act of stating in which I am interested at the moment, i.e., the act of making a claim.

For an utterance to have claim-making force, the utterer must be making a truth-claim, i.e., he must be attempting to state a fact. The utterance must be asserting something about some actual or putative state of affairs. Although statements may falsely assert something about some actual state of affairs, the utterer must think his claim is true if his utterance is to have claim-making force. Although he may not possess the correct knowledge, he must believe that he does. It is on this basis that he is making a truth-claim. Statements, or truth-claims, are attempts to state facts. The utterer believes them to be true. If people regularly uttered statements that they thought were false, then they would violate the notion of serious linguistic exchanges. We would not be communicating

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5 Ibid., p. 95.
anything to each other, and this seems to violate the crucial task of language which is to communicate information. I think it is reasonable to conclude that when one utters a statement, he believes that it is true and that he believes that he has the knowledge and evidence to substantiate the claim he is making.

The possibility of a statement being false must always be left open. Nevertheless, the utterer must at least believe he has a credible knowledge foundation on which to base what he purports to be a truth-claim. If we require that a speaker must have first-hand, infallible evidence which indicates what claim he should make, then his statement will always be true a priori. The conditions for making a statement would then be such as to presuppose in advance the statement's truth. The utterer only needs to believe that he has the appropriate knowledge in order to make a truth-claim. This requires him to be prepared to back up his claim if challenged and to be prepared to withdraw his claim if it is shown to be false or inappropriate.

If one considers a scientist working in a space program, such a person must at least believe that the information obtained from the last satellite to Mars was credible enough to make the claim that 'There is no life on Mars.' If he believed the claim was true, then he would be prepared to show the evidence and information on which he based the claim. If he could not refer us to, or produce, this evidence, then we would have no reason for taking seriously what he says. We should or would not accept what anyone claims if we thought the person did not have good reasons for making his claim.

When an utterance has the force of a claim, the people
involved must have the appropriate intentions, attitudes and beliefs. One must be able to infer that the speaker believes his truth-claim on the basis of his knowledge at the time of his utterance. Not only must he believe that what he is claiming is true, based on his knowledge, but his audience must also believe that he has credible reasons for making the claim. Otherwise, the audience will have no reason to believe that his claim is a serious one. We prove that a claim is unhappy by showing the utterer that his putative knowledge, which served as the reason for his claim, was insufficient for making the statement. His information was inadequate although he thought it was accurate.

For the purpose of deciding whether an utterer has made a truth-claim, it is not necessary to decide in advance whether or not the utterance fits the facts. A non-serious statement does not qualify as a truth-claim. Since it does not make any claim about the facts, it is, therefore, not the kind of thing which may be true or false. It is not a statement at all because it is not making a serious claim about the world. A statement is the kind of thing which may be erroneous, the kind of thing which may or may not turn out to be the case after the act of truth-claiming is performed. We never say that lies, jokes, plays, metaphors, etc., are erroneous, this is reserved for things which are said to be the case but on further examination turn out not to be the case: "It should be noted that a mistake will not in general make an act void, though it may make it excusable." We can show that

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6 Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, p. 42.
an utterer's claim is false by showing that his knowledge was in some way in error without having to label him a liar.

The point of all this is that for someone to utter something with the force of making a claim we must be able to infer that he believes it and is entitled to believe it, on the basis of his knowledge at the time of his uttering it. A claim about some actual or putative state of affairs in the world is based on my knowledge of the facts. This claim must be recognized as based on adequate information to which the speaker has access. Everything must be in order for performing this particular act of stating, i.e., I must know certain things about certain states of affairs which I have been in a good position to ascertain. The circumstances, objects, individuals, etc., involved in my act of stating must be appropriate for making this particular statement. All of this is considered in judging whether a particular speech act has claim-making force. These things are still the basis of making such a judgement even if the utterance is proven false. Falsehood cannot rob a statement of its claim-making force, thereby voiding the act of stating.

The conditions for making a statement appropriately are that I believe that what I claim is so because my knowledge of the facts, circumstances, and my status justify its being made. Showing that it is not justified means that it is inappropriately made. Showing that it does not fit the facts the way I thought it did means it is false.

Take two individuals, one a world traveler who spends much
time flying from country to country and the other a hermit living on an island in the Atlantic Ocean who happens to be a descendent of a deserter from Christopher Columbus' fleet before it discovered the New World. The latter deserted because he believed it was true that the world is flat and that at any moment the fleet would sail over the edge of the world. So, he jumped ship before it took him over the edge. As there were only primitive natives on the island to which he swam, he was able to pass his belief, i.e., that the world is flat, as information without anyone proving it to be false. His descendent is finally found by civilization and it is discovered that the hermit believes the world is flat.

Both individuals are heard by an audience to say, 'The world is flat.' In the case of the world traveler, we can only assume he is making a joke or telling a story to an audience or children. We would not take him as making a truth-claim. We are aware that his knowledge of the facts would not justify his making this statement seriously. His status, knowledge, circumstances, etc., would not be appropriate for making this particular truth-claim, and if the audience is aware of this, they will infer that he is not making a truth-claim. A joke, yes - a statement, no. They are doubting he is making a truth-claim because the claim is false, but because his status, knowledge and other circumstances are inappropriate for him to make such a claim at all.

But the hermit who says the same sentence, i.e., 'The world is flat', represents a different case altogether. He really believes that he is making a truth-claim because his knowledge, circumstances,
status, et c., indicate that he really does believe it. His audience on hearing this would not say he is spouting nonsense or making a joke, but that he is making a statement. Everything about him, everything he knows at the time of his utterance is appropriate for his believing that 'The world is flat' is true. The circumstances do make this an appropriate thing for the speaker to say. The circumstances, knowledge, status of the speaker are also appropriate for his audience to infer that he is attempting to make a statement, although they know that his statement is false. The truth of his statement is not considered in judging that he was making a serious truth-claim. It will take more than falsity to make this the wrong thing for the hermit to have said under the circumstances. The appropriateness of an utterance may be criticized, whether the statement is true or false; "Thus, for example, descriptions, which are said to be true or false or, if you like, are 'statements,' are surely liable to these criticisms, since they are selective and uttered for a purpose." For a statement to be a right and proper thing to have said will depend on something more than whether it fits the facts truly or falsely.

Take another example. A parrot on one occasion, and I on another, both utter the sounds, 'It is raining outside.' I utter this sentence to give a piece of information to someone. I say it and my audience takes it as a statement because they decide that I believe it is true on the basis of the knowledge and evidence I

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 144.}\]
have. Let us say that my knowledge is based on the fact that when I came in from outdoors, it was raining and, further, that people around me said the same thing for the same reasons. But the person I talked to goes outside and then returns saying I and the others were wrong, that it is not raining outside, and that my statement is false. My knowledge of the facts at the time of my utterance justified the utterance. On the knowledge I had, it was justifiable for me to believe that I was making a truth-claim. Although it turned out later to be false, it still had the force of a statement at the time I uttered it. The circumstances, my status, facts, etc., were adequate enough for me to utter this sentence with a claim-making force and for my audience to infer that I had good reasons for saying what I did, even if I turned out later to be wrong.

Take the parrot who utters the same sounds, 'It is raining outside,' when it is, in fact, raining as the parrot utters the sounds. Are we to say that his utterance is the making of a truth-claim? No. He would not be "Saying" anything true because what he utters is not a sentence used in making a statement, and does not, therefore, have a claim-making force. The parrot does not possess knowledge of the facts and other evidences which he believes will justify his utterance as the making of a truth-claim. His audience will not infer he is doing this when he utters the sounds, so they will not consider him to be making a statement which happens to be true. It is not a statement because the circumstances, i.e., the parrot's status, how knowledge of the facts, etc., do not justify
judging the parrot's utterance to be the making of a statement. It is more than words being related to the world in a certain way that qualifies an utterance as an act of stating. There are other things necessary for the emitting of certain sounds to constitute the making of a claim, things which the parrot could never satisfy.

Going back to the second and third chapters for a moment, I would like to say that the claim-making force is not a matter of the locutionary side of the utterance. I think believing that the force of an utterance can be elucidated in terms of the dictionary meaning of the utterance is a mistaken notion and I have already argued against this doctrine. What I want to do now is bring it up again and see how my previous discussions bear on what I have been saying about the claim-making force of a statement.

If someone says 'John went to the bank,' I may be in doubt as to what this means. 'What kind of bank are you talking about?' I might ask the speaker. The speaker might then inform me that it is the river bank to which he is referring. He did not mean the First National Bank. By simply elucidating what the words used mean, with regard to the world, the speaker has been able to clear up the ambiguity of part of the sentence's meaning, i.e., whether John went to the river bank or to the First National Bank.

But suppose that I am a burglar and I want to break into John's house and rob him. I want to be positive that he is not at home so I can commit my crime. Even though the meaning of the words has been cleared up, could I not still wonder whether the speaker "meant it as a piece of information or as a guess..."?

8 Furberg, Saying and Meaning, p. 208.
It may very well be unclear as to whether or not the speaker really believes or would have any good reason to believe that John went to the river bank to fish. I could still be in doubt as to the utterance the speaker made. It was already determined by me that the speaker meant that John went to the river bank and not the First National Bank. What I have to determine now is whether the speaker believes he is making a truth-claim or merely guessing. If it is a guess, then I have no good reason to assume that it is a fact that John is down by the river bank; however if I thought the speaker was making a truth-claim, I would have a better reason to assume where John is. If I am to rob John, I must be assured that he is not home and will not be for a while.

So, in addition to clearing up the meaning of the speaker's utterance, I must now clear up its force. Is he making a truth-claim or a mere guess? I will have to examine the speaker's status, the circumstances of his utterance, his evidence or lack of evidence to see whether the reasons the speaker has for making the utterance would justify his making a truth-claim or a guess. Clearing up the meaning gave us no reason to believe one as opposed to another. By examining these things, I may find out that John actually told him where he was going and he even saw John take a fishing pole. I can then infer that the speaker was making a truth-claim. The speaker's status, situation, knowledge, and evidence is such that he has a credible reason for believing that he is making a truth-claim, i.e., that he is stating a fact. If he does not have good reasons for believing his claim is true, I can assume that he is
only guessing and that John might very well be at home.

Even if I can infer that he is making a truth-claim, John might still be at home. If John changed his mind about going fishing, his statement would be false. By establishing that he is making a truth-claim, I am assuming there is enough credible evidence for believing that it is a fact that John is at the river bank fishing. On this basis, I can assume that John is out, but, of course, I might be unpleasantly surprised to find him in.

This entire discussion is independent of knowing precisely what the words uttered mean. As a matter of fact, the speaker could make it clear that he is stating a fact without knowing which bank John went to. John may have said to the speaker, 'I am going to the bank,' so that when he says 'John went to the bank,' he has what he considered good evidence for believing that his utterance is a truth-claim. Yet, I may be in doubt as to which bank he went to. As a burglar who wants to rob him, I hope it is true that he went to the river bank and not true that he went to the First National Bank from which he may return shortly. We know a statement has been made, but I am in doubt as to part of its meaning. The meaning of the utterance left me in doubt as to what would make it true, despite the fact that the speaker's status, circumstances, etc., are seemingly appropriate for making a statement. John's going to either bank would make his statement true. Knowing that he did not go to either, he went to the bakery or the post office instead, would make it false.

I think by now it is clear what Austin would have said about the force of a statement, or what I have called a claim-making force,
had he done so. It is those things in a total speech situation that give us reasons for thinking that the utterance is an attempt to state a fact. These other elements have to warrant our assuming that the utterance is the making of a claim. This is why the utterance is assessed other than by its being true or false. Truth and falsity have no special place in assessing whether a statement is being made. Because of this Austin went past truth and falsity to a dimension of assessment concerned with whether what was said is the proper thing to have uttered.

In discussing claim-making force, I have been looking into those aspects of assessing a statement that are distinct from those which deal with truth and falsity. These have to do with the speaker's status, knowledge at the time of the utterance, circumstances, etc., by which we could infer that he would be making a truth-claim. If a statement is found to be false, then we have reason to believe this was the wrong thing to have said. But this is not the only way that we can show that an utterance was not the proper thing for a speaker to have said. The speaker's status, and his knowledge of the facts might also give us reason for inferring that the speaker is or is not justified in making a truth-claim. We may conclude that the speaker does not have adequate evidence for believing that 'p' is true so he could not justifiably have been making a truth-claim.
Concluding Remarks

Austin, in dealing with statements, has tried to elucidate the total speech act in the total speech-situation. In other contexts, the dominant theme with regard to statements has been to specify when they are true or what 'truth' is, as was done in the Austin-Strawson debate on truth. Some discussions have gone a little further, i.e., the Cartwright and Strawson articles mentioned earlier, and have sought to say what a statement is not. Austin's aim was to go beyond this and investigate those aspects of a speech act which make it the particular type of act that it is. What is it about an utterance which makes it a statement, warning, order, question, request, etc. What I have been attempting to do is make explicit what it is about an utterance that makes it the expression of a statement. Hopefully, what I have said would be similar to what Austin would have said about assessing the claim-making force of statements, had he done so.

I have already argued against thinking we can reveal what makes an utterance a particular type of discourse by investigating the utterance's meaning. Austin believed that what makes an utterance a particular type is how it is related to the world, i.e., the total speech situation, etc. This is precisely what he did in *How to Do Things with Words*, but he neglected to discuss what it is about a statement that makes it a statement. Facts, in one sense, make a statement true; facts, in another sense, make an utterance the
expression of a statement. We may appraise a statement not only on how it corresponds to the facts in the first sense, but also whether or not the facts in the second sense justify a statement as the appropriate thing to say in a given situation. Both forms of assessment represent a general dimension of appraising a statement. But these two types of appraisal should be distinguished. I have already examined what happens when we fail to do this in my critique of the Olsen article.

Appropriateness has to do with the making of a statement while both truth and appropriateness have to do with the statement made. The result is a broader view of the assessment of statements. We can say more about 'The cat is on the mat' than that it is being used to say something is true or false. We must also be able to determine that there are certain reasons, evidence, circumstances, etc., which obtain to justify the utterance as a truth-claim. If we cannot do this, then we have no reason to think that the speaker is justified in making a truth-claim. For instance, if I know that the speaker just came from outside, and that he owns a cat, then I have good reason to assume that he is making a truth-claim. Contrariwise, if I know that the speaker has been out all day, then I can assume he is speculating or guessing. In the latter case, he does not seem to be in a position where he could have sufficient credible evidence for believing that 'The cat is on the mat' is true.

In Austin's discussion of the illocutionary force of statements, he has presented more elements than we usually consider in assessing statements. Although it goes beyond the scope of this paper, and
despite the fact that I am somewhat inclined to discuss it, there are other things about statements that I find interesting in Austin's discussion. For instance, there is his point that the success of any illocutionary act, and not just statements, will involve the truth or falsity of some statement. This suggests that statements have a special place in performing various types of speech acts. Statements seem to represent a basic building block, or must be presupposed, in performing other types of speech acts. It seems to represent that aspect of an utterance that we want to be assumed, if not believed. In this case, it would be interesting to take this constative aspect of various illocutionary acts and examine it to see how claim-making is at least an implicit part of all speech acts. P.F. Strawson implies this when he says that in a performative "a proposition is expressed, though not 'constated' (issued as a constative)."9 I think the notion of a 'proposition' as an ideal entity would be unacceptable to Austin, but the quote nonetheless gets the point across that a claim can be expressed in an utterance which has a force other than that of claim-making. It would be interesting, then, to distinguish the different forces found in various utterances and see how they are related.

Another point of interest that I would like to discuss at length is also suggested by Austin. The point behind How to Do Things with Words was to show that to say something is also to do something. Austin showed that by saying something we could perform acts of

9 Strawson, Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning' p. 63.
warning, promising, stating, requesting, etc., but it is also interesting to note that by performing these acts we may perform other acts that could not be made explicit but which nonetheless are being performed. By performing an act of stating, warning, etc., I may also be insulting, sarcastic, rude, condescending, etc. We may also use these words to describe someone's utterance but we could not say 'I insult you,' or 'I condescend to you.' This would be nonsense. Yet, we still perform these perlocutionary acts, so it would seem they are dependent on these other acts. Those circumstances that make an utterance a certain type of act might also have a direct bearing on these other acts. When I say to a child, 'Be careful crossing the street' as a warning, this seems to be an appropriate thing to say. But if I say the same thing to a grown man, so as to be sarcastic or insulting, it almost seems that it is precisely because this act of warning was not the appropriate thing to say that it makes the insult successful. An intended failure of an illocutionary act might very well bring about the success of another type of speech act.

The importance of Austin's work is that it points out the complexity of ordinary language. One should not underestimate its richness, especially in making judgements about speech acts. If there is one thing Austin does, it is to reveal the many problems that arise if we underestimate language. Language and speech are complicated structures the study of which, if done with the care Austin exercises, can aid in the solving of problems and the avoiding of philosophical mistakes.
SOURCES

Books:


Articles:


