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SEATO's First Decade

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SEATO'S FIRST DECADE

BY

CHARLES DANIEL ARTHUR

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE

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ABSTRACT

The Manila Treaty of 1954 was a unique event in the history of Southeast Asia. It provided for the creation of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Organization, the first joint alliance between Western powers and the newly independent nations of this region. These nations were the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and France. The problem was first to determine the reasons for the creation of such an alliance. There had been no plans for collective action since the dissolution of the old imperial defense systems following World War II. With the removal of colonial administrations during the early postwar period, a "power vacuum" resulted which found millions of Asians in small, unstable states having little means of self defense and unprepared to act collectively against massive threats to their integrity. The rise of a militant Communist China in the north prompted active concern for the security of these small nations. The Western powers themselves were anxious to retain the old prewar Open Door doctrines in this area and took steps to join with the nations of Southeast Asia in this common interest. The defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu by the Communist Viet-minh created an atmosphere of urgency and resulted in immediate agreement for a mutual collective defense. The primary purpose of the resulting Manila

Treaty was to protect the nations of Southeast Asia against possible Communist aggression or subversion and to stabilize the areas facing a hostile Communist China, particularly in the Indo-China region. This feature of the Treaty was expected to provide the states of Indo-China an additional guarantee of security against violation of the Geneva Agreement if they requested such protection.

The next portion of the problem was to analyze the various positions taken against this means of collective security by the individual states which declined to join the compact. A review of the political and nationalist reactions of the neutral and Communist countries most closely concerned has helped to determine the source and nature of the widespread hostility to the Treaty. Next it was necessary to analyze the Treaty provisions and the organization, and then weigh SEATO's effectiveness against the series of political and military crises that have occurred in the Treaty area since 1954.

Location of the available materials used in this study constituted no problem, for most of the essential research had to be drawn from sources published by the governments involved. There has not been sufficient lapse of time for secret and private documents to have become available, so no final conclusions--no definitive history--can yet be written.

The decade since the creation of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Organization has witnessed some challenges to the peace and security of this Asian area, but none has been considered of sufficient magnitude to call for the concerted military reaction of the Treaty organization. Although the insurgency now taking place in South Vietnam might be interpreted to be a potential threat to the Treaty region, SEATO has carefully avoided precipitous action and entanglement in this problem because of the internal political implications of the uprising. The organization's military domination by the Western powers has had some alienating effect on many Asians still sensitive to possible revival of colonialism in any form. Therefore, a broader base of Asian support and participation, with a corresponding diminution of the Western role might strengthen the political effectiveness of the alliance. However, this study indicates that SEATO deserves credit for moderating, at least for a period, relations between rival states in the area, and continues to play an important role in the political stability of Southeast Asia.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
ABSTRACT	ii
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.	5
III. REACTIONS TO PROPOSALS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION	32
Nations Which Accepted Collective Defense.	33
Nations Which Rejected Collective Defense.	53
IV. THE OVERSEAS CHINESE AND SUBVERSION.	62
V. PRELUDE TO THE MANILA TREATY	79
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY AND SEATO	88
VII. CHALLENGES TO SEATO.	115
VIII. CONCLUSION	137
APPENDICES	153
BIBLIOGRAPHY	166

I

INTRODUCTION

Since the signing of the Manila Treaty in 1954 and the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization soon afterwards, sufficient time has passed to review with some confidence the events which led to the creation of this defense pact and its history. Not only could the passing of ten years test the durability of such a treaty, but it could measure, as well, its versatility in meeting the constantly changing political challenges of this evolving Asian area.

The primary purpose of the Manila Treaty was to strengthen the nations of Southeast Asia against possible aggression or internal subversion and to stabilize politically the areas facing a hostile Communist China, particularly in the Indo-China region. Aside from economic and political objectives, the main purpose of the Treaty was to provide collective military defense for the signatory powers and for certain designated states that might request military assistance in case of attack. This feature of the Treaty was to provide the free states of Indo-China, Laos, Cambodia, and divided Vietnam an additional guarantee against any violations of the Geneva accord. All the signatory powers were committed to defense plans which could involve each of them in

military action in event of "aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty area," or in the prevention of "subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability." Obviously then, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) is very much concerned with the continuing crises in South Vietnam and Laos, although neither situation has yet provoked the full concerted action of the Treaty powers.

The Manila Treaty was not well received by some nations. The hostility of the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union was expected, but the non-alignment and neutrality of some of the most vulnerable Southeast Asia states was a surprise and has not been easily understood. The Treaty marked the culmination of a long series of political and military events which prompted some of the new, independent nations of this area to seek security through a pattern of collective defense. There had been no similar defense systems established in the Treaty area since the dissolution of the old colonial systems of defense following World War II. The United States and other powers which had pre-war histories in these regions began talks during the Korean War which resulted in negotiation of the Manila Treaty in 1954. This joined Western and Eastern states in the mutual defense of an Asian region. It was recognized by all the parties to the pact that the defense

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) with headquarters at Bangkok, was created by the Treaty members to implement the provisions of the Manila Treaty--economic, cultural, political, and military. This organization has grown considerably since its inception in 1955 and continues to play an important role in the policies of the Treaty nations, and in the Southeast Asian area in general.

II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A very important political development of the late nineteenth century was the rapid domination and even the colonial partition of the Far East by European powers. The penetration of Southeast Asia began as early as the sixteenth century and took various forms, depending on the intent and objectives of the colonial powers. The early Portuguese and Spanish settlements in Malaya and the Philippines placed strong emphasis on Christian conversions. The Dutch settlements in the Malacca straits and the Moluccas were prompted by commercial interests, while British and French colonial development, in addition to this economic interest, attached great importance to political and strategic control of key areas as a source of power in an age of expanding national rivalries.

This scramble for colonies in Asia reflected Europe's smoldering international competition for markets and materials and extended the European balance of power doctrine to the Far East. The acquisition of the Philippines by the United States in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War added a new power element in the Pacific and at the same time enmeshed this country in the European scheme of power balance. Japan, however, was not immediately involved in this colonial pattern. But when

China challenged the independent status of Korea, the disastrous war with Japan which followed in 1894 gave Japanese ambitions in Manchuria and China an early foothold. European reaction to this development was swift and led to Russian seizure of Japanese-held Port Arthur and German occupation of Kiaochow. This colonial rivalry for the maritime provinces nearly reduced the defeated China to the role of a spectator. Even American involvement in Asia following the attachment of the Philippines was followed by a casual disregard for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. Alarmed at the tendency toward exclusive partition and control of the China coast by Russia, Germany, Great Britain, and Japan, with a resultant threat to American trade, President McKinley stated to Congress in 1898 that America could not remain indifferent to events in China which passed control of large areas of that country to various European powers. He warned that the vast commerce created by American business interests could not be prejudiced by an exclusive treatment by these colonial powers and this "obviated the need for our country to become an actor in the scene."¹

This early demand for an open door for all commercial interests in the area became the foundation of American

¹A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938), p. 58.

policy in China and led to deep American involvement in the intrigues and diplomatic maneuvers of the European powers in the Far East. The Open Door policy implied recognition of European spheres of influence in Asia either by lease agreement, treaty, or mere occupation. Outside of the Philippines, United States policy was directed at preventing preclusive trade policies in these special spheres of influence. Nationalist reactions in China and South Asia to these predatory moves by the West were quickly suppressed. In Southeast Asia the immediate objectives of resurgent nationalism were apolitical and were confined mainly to revitalizing all aspects of indigenous cultures.² But the Boxer uprising in China took a more militant form and received the support of the Imperial Government of China. During this rebellion, Secretary of State John Hay declared that the United States' policy was to seek safety and peace in China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative "entity" and yet protect all the rights guaranteed to the friendly powers by treaty and international law.³ How this "entity" could be maintained with these special territorial privileges created questions of honest motive. The defeat of the Boxers was followed by the foreign

²Richard Butwell, Southeast Asia Today and Tomorrow (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 16.

³Griswold, op. cit., p. 86.

occupation of Peking and Manchuria and the imposition of heavy indemnities on the Imperial government. However, the uprising did serve to notify the Western powers that Chinese and Asian nationalism could assert itself and was a strong force to be reckoned with against any further encroachment on its territories.

The advent of the Russo-Japanese War again returned Japanese rights in Manchuria to make her a leading colonial power on the Chinese mainland. Here again the concern of the United States for the preservation of the balance of power in Asia prompted President Theodore Roosevelt to intervene for a peace settlement favorable to the Japanese. The previous Treaty of Alliance between Japan and England in 1902 further countered France-Russian designs in the Far East. The Far Eastern policy of Roosevelt placed little emphasis on the commercial interests of the United States.⁴ The Treaty of Portsmouth offered no commercial advantages to the United States and confined American involvement to mere "good offices" in this dispute. In fact, the Roosevelt policy did not admit any great concern for the economic interests of the United States in the political stabilization of Manchuria and the assurance of a continued Open Door policy. But this was not so in the case of Japan in

⁴Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1959), p. 4.

Manchuria where commercial interests quietly followed behind the Japanese armies.⁵ With Japanese "manifest destiny" in Korea and Manchuria already assured, it was only a matter of time until Japanese hegemony over all of North China was to assert itself. The issue of the South Manchurian Railway was a serious impediment to the Open Door concept and the guarantee of full Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. The Taft administration attempted to curtail Japanese control of these vital commercial arteries by a policy of economic neutralization. With Japanese and Russian refusal to surrender their respective rights in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Open Door adherents met a serious reversal. The remaining European powers vied for closer political control in Peking through the use of government and private loans to the Chinese government. American participation in such financial "influence peddling" was quickly halted by the new Wilson administration with the President himself asserting that the conditions of such loans compromised the administrative independence of China.⁶

Throughout the period of 1898 to 1914, American policies, more than those of any of the other powers, attempted to maintain equal opportunities for trade and investment in that vast market. A balance of power status

⁵Ibid., p. 311.

⁶Ibid., p. 172.

was established through both economic and political instruments of diplomacy and while these did not fully protect the sovereignty of China, they did prevent the complete partition of China into closed spheres of influence. The United States was an inhibiting influence against uncontrolled expansion and hegemony by Japan, Great Britain, Russia, and Germany in Asia through the Open Door policy. However, it is significant that this resulted not from formal policies and treaties sanctioned by the Congress of the United States, but rather by mere executive acts and agreements.

The outbreak of World War I upset this balance of power in Asia. From then on, the so-called Open Door policy remained only a paper challenge to Japanese ambitions in China and the Far East in general. Immediate Japanese occupation of the former German leasehold territories and the German islands in the Pacific established for Japan, by right of conquest, a claim to legitimate presence in China and in the string of islands in the Pacific which cover the communication lanes between America and the Philippines. The imposition of the Twenty One Demands on the government of China clearly announced Japan's future expansionist intentions in Asia. An important development following the United States' entry into the War was Japan's effort to win confirmation of her new German conquests prior

to a peace settlement in Europe and in this some success was achieved. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917 oddly found the United States agreeing that "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries. . .," giving Japan special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.⁷

The postwar developments in the Far East soon made evident to the Western powers that concessions made to the Japanese during the war created a pattern for future Japanese expansion. The Japanese eagerness to deploy troops into Siberia following the Russian Revolution in 1918, coupled with Foreign Minister Ishii's insistence that Japan had special interests in Siberia, caused considerable concern in Washington regarding Japan's intentions and was a factor in the calling of the Washington Conference for the Nine Power Treaty in 1922. The naval and diplomatic rivalry between Japan and the United States was somewhat eased by the Washington Conference. Naval limitations were established, non-militarization of Pacific islands was agreed upon, removal of Japan from the Shantung Peninsula was assured, the Open Door policy in China was reaffirmed, and the territorial integrity of China guaranteed. A series of resolutions opened the way for tariff cutting, and the future abolition of extraterritoriality was discussed. A second

⁷Griswold, op. cit., p. 216.

naval limitation agreement at the London Naval Conference was concluded in 1930.⁸ The disarmament provisions of both these conferences weakened American strength in the Western Pacific.⁹ It was hoped that collective security in the form of the League of Nations would prevent any further encroachment on Chinese territory or other territorial violations in the Far East.

The Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931 was not met by any effective collective action either inside or outside the League of Nations. The return of Japan again to an outmoded form of imperial conquest was in part the result of external factors beyond her control.¹⁰ The conversion of Japan to an industrial nation created dependence on trade and access to raw materials. The depression of the early thirties brought about decisions to raise protective tariff policies throughout the world, causing Japan to face the specter of exclusion from the markets of the world.¹¹ Manchuria, where Japan had long extensive interests, became a logical outlet for expansion. The strategic weakness of the United States policy during the

⁸Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (New York: The Viking Press, 1957), p. 23.

⁹John King Fairbank, The United States and China (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), p. 9.

¹⁰Reischauer, op. cit., p. 23.

¹¹Ibid., p. 24.

decade which followed the Manchurian Incident invited further Japanese diplomatic and military ventures in Asia which eventually led to Japanese and American involvement in World War II. Japanese militarism and duplicity, plus American insistence that Japan conform to the Open Door policy in China and give up the path of empire in China, led to this collision.¹²

Although the war in the Pacific was essentially a Japanese-American war, the states of Southeast Asia were quickly engulfed in the opening phases. British, Canadian, and Dutch units were caught in the Japanese sweep through Southeast Asia and the islands to the south. Burmese, Indian, Malayan, and Chinese troops participated against the Japanese in these early stages, but were soon overwhelmed. American forces took the brunt of the military load in the Pacific and almost alone forced Japan and her new wartime empire to destruction and surrender.¹³ The states of Southeast Asia were largely spectators to this drama though their destinies and political institutions were to be greatly affected by the war's outcome.

Although the main Japanese effort was directed against the leading colonial powers in Asia--Great Britain,

¹²Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p. 135.

¹³Reischauer, op. cit., p. 29.

the Netherlands, and France--it remained for the United States to conclude the peace for an area in which she had no residual colonial or territorial interests since the independence of the Philippines had already been assured. Peace, then, presented new and myriad problems for the states of Southeast Asia.

There had been no greater influence on these states, so far as their attitude toward the West was concerned, than the long periods of colonial rule and development. Most of the imperial systems of economic organization, political structure, and philosophy of government were aimed at the perpetuation of colonial rule. Except in the British and American spheres, there was little thought given to education and training programs which might prepare the local populations for self rule. Native interest in participation in government was deliberately confined to the lowest civil service levels and scales of advancement were circumscribed to these levels. In the field of public education this lack of opportunity was even more true and it usually became necessary for the ambitious student to go abroad to complete university degrees or acquire technical education. Indonesia and Indochina were striking examples of this colonial failure to establish training in government administration.¹⁴

¹⁴John K. King, Southeast Asia in Perspective (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), p. 17.

Except for the United States and to a lesser extent Great Britain, none of the colonial powers promulgated plans with a view to future independence. Consequently, when independence finally came it did not take the form of an orderly transfer of power and authority, but stemmed mainly from the confusion following the Japanese defeat in the Pacific. Long before the war, strong nationalist ambitions came to the surface to emphasize the revulsion of the people against foreign rule and domination. But most of the states were very poorly equipped indeed to cope with this new status of independence and when it became a reality some important political and economic functions of government were neglected in order to cope with emergency challenges to law and order.¹⁵

The concept of the political party as an instrument of government was practically unknown and the sudden wide-spread proliferation of parties in these small countries led to chaotic situations. With no party discipline, followings were sometimes based largely on personal loyalties to friends rather than party doctrine, and quickly served selfish private ambitions which became a nuisance and hindrance to democratic procedures. The adjustment of border conflicts with neighbors consumed much of their international energies and little thought was given at this time to the

¹⁵Ibid., p. 18.

more complicated theories of regional alliances. Nor was serious thought given to the re-establishment of the shattered prewar patterns of balance of power in regional groupings since militant Chinese Communism has not yet become a reality or threat.¹⁶

During World War II the Japanese attempted to organize the conquered nations of Southeast Asia into a regional sphere of economic and political development called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.¹⁷ A specific design of Japanese policy in this area was to break down the old traditional economic patterns of the colonial powers and re-awaken the national interests of the people. At the same time they would set themselves up as the protectors of this new philosophy. The opposition to colonialism was a common cause among these states and this made Japanese overtures most inviting. In many instances the Japanese occupation was originally greeted as a liberation and the prelude to real independence as soon as the war was over. Strong pro-Japanese elements were placed in positions of leadership and the populace was made to regard the Japanese as the helpful "brother."¹⁸ The

¹⁶A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 5.

¹⁷Royal Institute of International Affairs, Collective Defence in South East Asia (London: The Chiswick Press, 1956), p. 29.

¹⁸King, op. cit., p. 40.

Japanese pressed the economies of the occupied areas to the fullest and this soon aroused reactions in the form of protest and demonstrations which were brutally suppressed. This quickly led to mass disenchantment throughout the occupied areas. But the philosophy of a Southeast Asia sphere of influence did much to nurture the growing nationalism of the area, and in this sense, the Japanese were quite successful. The plans drawn up by the Japanese Total War Research Institute for occupation policies, included the following directive:

The desires of the peoples of the Sphere for their independence shall be respected and endeavors shall be made for their fulfillment, but proper and suitable forms of government shall be decided for them in consideration of military and economic requirements and of the historical, political, and cultural elements particular to each area. It must also be noted that the independence of the various peoples of East Asia should be based on constructing East Asia as "independent countries existing within the New Order of East Asia" and that this conception differs from independence based on the idea of liberalism and national self determination.¹⁹

This philosophy of "controlled" independence was in sharp contrast with the earlier hopes of these peoples and quickly negated hope for full cooperation by the occupied states. Rather than gain support, the plan aroused rabid resistance and led to organized underground movements in support of the Allies. Thus the role of the Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere as a scheme for future development

¹⁹Ibid., p. 26.

did not get beyond the blue print stage.²⁰

The immediate postwar period in Southeast Asia witnessed considerable confusion and patterns of political organization varied from country to country. In many cases the vacuum left by the Japanese was filled by former colonial interests. Temporary "takeovers" of civil administration by local patriots were attempted in many instances, but seldom without inter-factional strife. And, in almost every case, except China, a reassertation of the former colonial power in the area was attempted and, in fact, succeeded for a limited period. The Dutch, after witnessing a short British military occupation, hastened to resecure their Netherlands East Indies. The French, after considerable political maneuver, were able to reestablish themselves in Indo-China. Likewise the British returned to Malaya and for a short period to Burma, which had already been promised self rule.

But these returns to the old prewar status quo did not reckon with the latent nationalism so recently fired by the Japanese. The movements for independence and self-government had indeed made strong headway during the war and it was not long before these became realities. Burma, the Netherlands East Indies, Indo-China, and the

²⁰Significantly, as late as 1950, the writer saw hanging in a Thai business office in Bangkok, a large Japanese wall map of the planned co-prosperity sphere, complete with legends of raw material sources, markets, etc.

Philippines, under various degrees of difficulty, soon divested themselves of colonial control and found themselves facing the hard, harsh realities of self-government. They were, in most cases, very poorly equipped for the task.²¹

Many of the problems immediately faced by these nations were the consequence of the long process of Westernization which of necessity they had to accept and which tended to compromise their oriental ways of living. Except for Thailand, (and to some extent the Philippines), the legacy left by foreign administration created an atmosphere of constant suspicion of Western conduct and policy. Over long periods this foreign domination tended to disrupt the old traditional social structures.²² Education, family relationships, law, property rights, police relationships, and military administration were all altered to fit the pattern of Western interests. There was a consequent weakening of the moral base upon which the local societies had been founded. J. S. Furnivall, in examining the effect of colonial rule in Southeast Asia, lists some of the failures of the system as reflected in the deterioration of societal forms: (1) failure of self-government

²¹King, op. cit., p. 27.

²²J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), p. 214.

institutions, (2) increase in crime and litigation, (3) rise in religious unrest, (4) increase in indebtedness and business failure, (5) tendency toward corruption in judicial and administrative branches of government.²³

Still fresh in the minds of most Southeast Asians was their long and bitter struggle against colonial rule, and as a residual effect, there still existed a marked sensitivity to foreign influence and a suspicion of any arrangements which implied active participation with stronger Western powers. Under these circumstances, any concepts of joint contribution to collective security and participation in economic alliances with Western nations, had usually been most suspect and very difficult to achieve.

Whereas the new Southeastern Asian states were weak powers and had little concern in foreign affairs, Western interests in the area were vital. This applied to economic as well as strategic interests. The tin, rubber, copra, and other raw materials found here had become a part of the West's economic life. The facilities for obtaining and protecting these essential raw materials were likewise a part of the West's economic life. The Southeast Asia landmass stretches like a barrier across the strategic sea and air routes of East-West passage. The significance of

²³Ibid., p. ix.

Southeast Asia during the Pacific War was witness to its importance, geographically and strategically. Historian Samuel Eliot Morison has stated,

The control of sea communications through the Pacific and Indian oceans by the United States Navy is a "must", . . . since the British have largely concentrated their now second-class Navy in home waters.²⁴

Should Southeast Asia fall into unfriendly hands which might deny western access to these essential basic materials, the economies of the Western world could be severely affected. Senator John Sparkman in a report to the Senate stated:

If these states were to succumb to Communist imperialism, not only would they find suppression of their own liberties, but the free states of the Western Hemisphere would find themselves cut off from vital raw materials and compelled to barter for their freedom . . . and the aggressiveness with which the Communist pursue their aims makes it clear that they recognize the vital strategic importance of this area.²⁵

The immediate security interest of Australia and New Zealand, neighboring as they do the long land masses of Southeast Asia, makes their voice in matters concerning this area an important one. Likewise, their immediate economic life is closely connected with the economic freedom and prosperity

²⁴Samuel Eliot Morison, "American Strategy in the Pacific Ocean," Oregon Historical Quarterly, Vol. LXII No. 1 (March 1961), 44.

²⁵Senator John Sparkman, "The Far East and Southeast Asia," Report for Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 1957 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 15.

of the area. Any moves inimical to this freedom would be of serious concern to Australasia.²⁶

The postwar attention to this region by both Chinese and Soviet Communist parties, aroused considerable uneasiness among some Southeast Asian and Western powers. But it had taken different forms. If one looks at the European pattern of security against possible Soviet aggression, he sees an integration of forces of the North Atlantic areas, along with a carefully planned economic integration in the form of the Common Market. In Asia, the pattern and tendency had been almost the opposite. The former empire protective alliances built on the concept of total imperial defense had been splintered and abandoned. This had isolated Australia and New Zealand to a very great degree. Here previous alliances lost their meaning as the British colonies found independence.²⁷

The newly independent nations of Southeast Asia became obsessed with their new status and nationhood and seemed to regard alliances of any type as a sign of weakness and an infringement of sovereignty. The flaunting of colors and national military forces seemed to become a necessary

²⁶Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper (eds.), Australia in World Affairs (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1963), p. 11.

²⁷Alvin Albinski, "Australia's Defense Enigma," Orbis--Foreign Policy Research Institute, IV No. 4 (1961), 38.

expression of this new sovereignty. The symbols of independence could not be compromised. Emancipation and nationalism were indivisible, and the nation-state, glorified in the literature of the West, would not play a secondary role in this era of independence.²⁸ Even though the organization and means for defense against massive attack were lacking, each new small nation attempted superficial postures of independent military strength.

Aside from the Japanese-imposed Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, there had been other suggestions for regional alliances among the Asian nations in the past but none had been of much significance so far as collective defense is concerned. As early as 1946 there were moves toward formal regional relationships based on trade and cultural affinities, which might later lend themselves to common defense. General Aung San of Burma spoke for a type of Asiatic commonwealth and a Southeast Asia economic union, but his efforts were cut short by his assassination soon afterwards and none of his hopes ever developed. The next major move in this direction was the Baguio Conference, convened in 1950 by the Philippine government. Quite by coincidence, the U. S. Congress had expressed support for the creation of a joint organization of the free countries of the Far East in the Mutual Defense Appropriation Act of

²⁸Richard Butwell, Southeast Asia Today and Tomorrow (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 172.

1950. Although no direct connection can be established between the two, it would appear that the initiative of the Philippine government had the active and continuing support of the United States. While not a success, the Baguio Conference has been called a modest first step in defense cooperation.²⁹

Prior to the Korean War the concern in Southeast Asia regarding Communist aspirations was not sufficient to arouse national leadership in the direction of collective security. Communist aims and maneuvers appeared to be non-military in nature and took the form of political pressures by minority groups in most instances, particularly the overseas alien Chinese in Southeast Asia. Although the Communist threat to Southeast Asia was a growing danger in American eyes, to the Asian leaders it was little more than a secondary concern in comparison with the more emotional issues of colonialism, nationalism, and neutrality. They believed that the proper reply to Communism was economic development, a rising standard of living, and government programs which would provide for social welfare.³⁰

²⁹Roger M. Smith, The Philippines and SEATO (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959), p. 3.

³⁰Philip W. Thayer (ed.), Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 2.

The outbreak of the Korean War quickly dispelled this complacency. Communism now took the form of an overt military threat to the security of Southeast Asia, and with the entry of the Chinese Communist "volunteers" in the war, the dangers of Chinese subversion and insurgency throughout Southeast Asia became very real indeed. After June 25, 1950 when a Soviet equipped and trained North Korean army began its assault against the Republic of Korea, a feverish series of diplomatic events took place. The immediate action by the United Nations Security Council quickly rallied the non-Communist nations against the attack and approved of the strong military stand taken earlier by the United States. The American forces were later buttressed by other member nations. Desire for closer military alignments among the nations of Southeast Asia led to the formation of the Melby Mission. It was sent by the United States to

determine the military build-up possible in each of the interested countries of Asia, to recommend priorities for arms shipments, and to discuss the composition of American military advisory groups which could be assigned to each country.³¹

Except for Indonesia and Burma, these missions were well received. Negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty were set in motion by the Dulles mission to Japan, and these culminated in a treaty of peace at San Francisco in 1951. Article 5 of the treaty recognized that "... Japan as a

³¹King, op. cit., p. 134.

sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective defense and may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements."³² This permitted an immediate bi-lateral mutual defense treaty between the United States and Japan. This was followed by a tripartite security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, the ANZUS Pact. A Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the United States preceded the ANZUS Pact by a few days, in August of 1951, and further tightened the collective security arrangements in Southeast Asia at this critical period.³³ To further strengthen its commitments among the Pacific states, the United States concluded a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea in 1953 and a similar one with the Republic of China on Formosa.

These bilateral pacts established for the United States a strong network of military agreements in the north and central Asian Pacific areas and secured, for military planning, a strategic chain of potential bases and resources which could be utilized and developed quickly to deter any further aggression. Another development of this period was the very strong warning issued by the United States of its new concept of "massive retaliation" in the event of recurrent Communist aggression in any part of the world. This threat

³²Ibid., p. 146.

³³The Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 18.

obviously recognized the possibility that Communist planning might easily include sporadic "brush fire" type of wars which could drain American resources and manpower relentlessly without, at the same time, exposing either Peking or Moscow to any retaliation. In defining the administration's strategy in further detail, Secretary of State Dulles signified the foreign policy implications of massive retaliation. He stated that local defenses would always be important, but there was no local defense which alone would contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Therefore, local defenses would have to be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. He declared further that when a potential aggressor is glutted with manpower, he might assume that resistance would be confined to manpower.

He might be tempted to attack in places where such superiority was decisive. The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.³⁴

There was immediate emphasis on mobility of forces, with troops held in a central reserve, ready to strike in any part of the world with highly mobile naval, air, and amphibious units. The use of nuclear weapons was implied in this newly defined massive retaliation concept.

³⁴Statement of John Foster Dulles, Department of State Press Release No. 139, March 16, 1954.

These new strategic doctrines were not accepted without debate. Within the administration itself, the Democratic opposition questioned the wisdom of committing one to full scale war when merely the suppression of "brush fire" type of provocations with limited arms would be equally effective.³⁵ Debates weighing the relative values of the foot soldier versus the megaton bomb were rampant in the press, both in the United States and abroad. European fears that carelessness or intemperate decisions of a few men might embroil the entire world in a nuclear catastrophe were not without some foundation. Vice President Nixon gave an explanation which did little to allay these fears. He stated:

Rather than let the Communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars, we would rely in the future primarily on our massive mobile retaliatory power which we could use in our discretion against the major source of aggression at the time and place that we choose. We adjusted our armed strength to meet the requirements of this new concept and, what was just as important, we let the world and the Communists know what we intended to do.³⁶

A great restraint was shown by the United States in seeking support for its policies. Dulles did not feel that the time was practicable to draw a line which would bring all the free peoples of the Pacific and East Asia

³⁵King, op. cit., p. 182.

³⁶New York Times, March 14, 1954.

into a formal mutual security area. He thought that nations such as Indonesia and Burma which had just won liberation from Japanese aggression and political freedom from Western colonialism would hesitate to assume security relationships either with Japan or with the Western powers, and as a practical matter,

. . . in Indo-China and Malaya, assistance must be given largely through France and the United Kingdom, a procedure which many in Asia find repellant, as promoting "colonial imperialism." Some countries are yet unable or unwilling to qualify for definite security arrangement under the Vandenberg formula of "continuous and effective self help and mutual aid." Lastly . . . the United States should not assume formal commitments which overstrain its present capabilities . . . treaties now made involve islands where security is strongly influenced by sea and air power . . .³⁷

Despite the bitter Korean experience and the Indo-China crisis, there remained a natural disinclination on the part of the United States to show any strong initiative in creating a collective security arrangement for all of Southeast Asia. This reticence and studied restraint was entirely within the bounds of good and patient diplomacy. An error in assumption or timing in such matters could have serious adverse propaganda value in the Communist press. Still working toward security the United States feared that the cessation of hostilities in Korea would lead to the diversion of additional Communist pressure to Indo-China.

³⁷ John Foster Dulles, "Security in the Pacific," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXX, No. 2 (January, 1952), 182.

Consequently there were strong arguments for a more active United States role in establishing a Far Eastern security pact.³⁸

There were calls for an American sponsored NATO type treaty for the Asian area and this bold idea had strong support in the Philippines and Thailand. But the official American attitude was much more restrained. The United States would give every support to a collective security arrangement in the Asian area, but it was largely up to the nations of Southeast Asia themselves to decide upon the scope and time for such an organization and for them to take the initiative in arriving at a meeting of minds on the subject. In October, 1953 the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter S. Robertson, had this to say on the matter:

Those both here and in the Far East who have recognized the desirability of a common defensive effort in the Asian Pacific area have looked to the United States government to exert its influence in favor of such a pact. We continue to believe, however, that any effective Asian Pacific organization must come about as a result of the Asian's own initiative; that it must wait upon a general appreciation among the Asians of the desirability of collective action in attacking their common problems. This is clearly not a field in which outsiders can usefully assert themselves. We do not wish to give the impression that we are trying to hustle or joggle our friends across the Pacific, because we are not. Any moves

³⁸King, op. cit., p. 148.

to be made in the direction of regional organization are clearly up to them.³⁹

Whether the small nations of Southeast Asia were yet ready to join in common interest and defense of their lands and liberties was not long in being determined, and the disaster to the French armies in Indo-China at the hands of the Vietminh Communist forces was to become the catalyst.

³⁹Department of State Press Release No. 549, 1953, quoted by King, op. cit., p. 149.

III

REACTIONS TO PROPOSALS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION

Events in Indo-China in 1953 and 1954 aroused grave concern among the nations of Southeast Asia and this concern sparked hectic political and diplomatic activity among them as they re-examined their security positions. Among the Asian nations, ethnic differences still played a large part in keeping them apart. Old enmities and suspicion of the neighboring country still persisted, resulting largely from long histories of border wars. Differences in languages, dialects, societal forms, and religion, further complicated efforts for political and economic cooperation and so long as inadequate and archaic educational systems prevailed, the majority of the people would continue to harbor these hatreds and suspicions. In addition, any pact with the Western World which might suggest a neo-colonial organization with non-Asian leadership, would certainly meet very strong opposition. The only immediate existing regional group in Southeast Asia were the Columbo Powers made up of India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia--so named from their meeting in April of 1954 at Columbo, where they attempted to form an economic bloc for mutual development, supported to some extent by the British Commonwealth nations. Defense or political alignment was not an organic part of the Columbo Plan.

The question of collective security for this area found each government concerned, including Australia and New Zealand, faced with very strong political considerations at home. The following study examines, in part, some of the problems faced by both those countries who became signatories to the Manila Treaty, and those who refused to participate in this regional alliance.

I. NATIONS WHICH ACCEPTED COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

In the case of Australia and New Zealand, there was close accord with the concern of the United States for Asian security. Very important to the decision later made by Australia and New Zealand, is an understanding of the ANZUS Pact as a precursor of the Manila alliance.¹ Signed at San Francisco on September 1, 1951, this security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States was, in fact, part of an inter-related system of defense arrangements which stemmed from the Japanese Peace Treaty. These included, among others, the treaty between the United States and the Philippines, and the treaty between Nationalist China and the United States.

Similar to the NATO agreement, the ANZUS Pact was designed to conform to the spirit and design of the United

¹See Appendix G, p. 162, for text of the ANZUS Treaty.

Nations Charter. But, unlike the NATO Pact, it did avoid the constitutional difficulties which might arise in the wording of the defense commitments and carefully left the sovereign power to declare war to the member states. Provision was made for the independent constitutional procedures within the ANZUS Pact (and all subsequent defense agreements involving the United States). In this instance, the defense provisions were made to read,

Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.²

Realistically, the Australians saw this treaty not as a formal NATO structure, with definite 'command' responsibilities, but rather as a re-expression of a "Monroe Doctrine" theory which bound the United States to the assistance of Australia and New Zealand in case of need. The Australian Minister of External Affairs had this to say about the alliance:

ANZUS provides the means whereby we can consult, government to government, with the strongest nation in the Pacific, the United States of America--not only the strongest nation but also our firm and declared ally. ANZUS gives Australia access to the thinking and planning of the American Administration at the highest political and military level . . . Finally, ANZUS ensures that our own interests, both political and military are kept before the United States--and this is of major importance when we

²Australia, Treaty Series, 1952 No. 2, cited by Royal Inst., op. cit., p. 175.

consider the complexity of the issues facing the United States and the many countries whose separate interests must be taken into account by the Americans in global planning and strategy.³

The Pact recognized the immediate concern of the signatories to the Communist threat and aligned Australia and New Zealand with the United States in an endeavor to strengthen the security of the countries of Southeast Asia. By the terms of the treaty, it gave Australia and New Zealand assurances of American military support and assistance in the event of an armed attack. It served as well to allay the fears of a segment of the Australian public of a resurgence of Japanese militarism following the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty.⁴

There is further intimation that ANZUS was a precursor to the Manila Treaty by noting the wording of the Preamble to the Treaty which states that it looks toward the development of a more "comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area." This phrase is again repeated in Article 8 as a justification for empowering the ANZUS Council,

to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

³R. G. Casey, Friends and Neighbors (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1955), pp. 53-54.

⁴Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper (eds.), Australia in World Affairs (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1963), p. 62.

It is interesting to observe that ANZUS Council activities have continued in this spirit up to the present time. A recent report of the SEATO Council at Bangkok declared:

United States officials expressed special appreciation for recent contributions to the war effort by their ANZUS partners. The Council noted with satisfaction that the members of ANZUS had increased their assistance to South Vietnam since the meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Council in April, 1964. The ANZUS ministers agreed that they should remain prepared, if necessary, to take further concrete steps within their respective capabilities to assure the defeat of this aggression.⁵

The exclusion of the United Kingdom from the ANZUS Pact was a sensitive issue in both Britain and Australia. British interest in the Pacific and her historic participation in the affairs of the area certainly could not be easily dismissed, nor could her strength there in the form of naval, land, and air forces in both Malaya and Hong Kong. Considerable bitterness and resentment was felt in Great Britain that so prominent a friend and long time United States ally should have not been invited to join in the agreement. At the time the Pact was signed, the British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, tried to minimize the significance of the United Kingdom's exclusion when he stated to the house of Commons that, it would not have been unwelcome to us if we had been included in the proposed pact . . . His

⁵"SEATO: 1954-1964 A Stabilizing Factor in Southeast Asia," Quoted in International Organization Vol. XVIII, No. 3, 657-659.

Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are, nevertheless, entirely satisfied that Australia and New Zealand should represent the interests of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth as a whole.⁶

A few months later, the new Conservative Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, did not conceal his feelings when he stated to the House of Commons that he had inherited the situation and regretted the manner in which the ANZUS Pact was arrived at without British participation.

However, there were strong and compelling reasons why the United States objected to the inclusion of Great Britain in the ANZUS Treaty. First, the United States was by no means sympathetic at that time to any arrangement which would have committed American obligations to the defense of colonial territories such as Malaya, Hong Kong, and British Borneo. And secondly, if Britain were included in the military provisions of the Pact because of her geographic and colonial interests in the area, so would it be necessary to invite the Netherlands and France as well. This was not the intent of the ANZUS Pact. The alliance was very limited in scope to the three English speaking Pacific powers and was, in fact, very restricted in its military authority and planning. This would consist of the ANZUS Council of Military Staff Members who were to meet occasionally at Pearl Harbor,

⁶George Modelski (ed.), SEATO: Six Studies (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire Ltd., 1962), p. 55.

Wellington, or Melbourne for military staff discussions. Thus, the military emphasis on the ANZUS Pact alone restricted its interest and scope in the Pacific. At the time the Treaty was signed, the representatives of the member nations emphasized that this was intended to be just the beginning of building up security arrangements in the Pacific.

The press tended to minimize the Treaty's importance and frequently made unfair comparisons between ANZUS and NATO. Such reactions gave early strong arguments for participation in the larger, more comprehensive, alliance which was yet to come. Australian hopes for a strong NATO-type agreement did not take into consideration the crucial difference between the North Atlantic nations and those of Southeast Asia. The same mature political conditions for such a NATO-type agreement simply did not exist.

R. G. Casey, in defending the Treaty said:

We still do not know how such a wider system of security will come into being. For the present, the essential political conditions for such a system do not appear to exist. I do not find that there is yet that community of interest and readiness to assume, in advance, far reaching and precise military obligations on which a treaty of alliance like NATO is based.⁷

However unreasonable the press and public opinion might have been regarding the significance of the ANZUS, the Pact has

⁷Current Notes, XXIV, November 1953, quoted in Modelski, op. cit., p. 57.

played an essential part in the Pacific defense structure. Although the SEATO organization has superseded to a large extent most of the functions of the ANZUS Treaty, it remains in effect and its councils continue to be held. The ANZUS Council held its thirteenth annual meeting in Washington on July 17-18, 1964, attended by the New Zealand Prime Minister Keith Holyoake, United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk, as well as the Secretary of External Affairs for Australia, P. Hasluck.⁸ The fact that the ANZUS Council of Ministers still meets regularly, as well as the Military Staff Council, would support the contention that this alliance has a character and function distinct from SEATO, and that function is playing an important part in South Vietnam today.

A Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the United States preceded the ANZUS Pact by a few days and further tightened the collective security arrangements in Southeast Asia at this critical period.⁹ President Truman stated on April 18, 1951,

The whole world knows that the United States recognizes that an armed attack on the Philippines would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and safety and that it would act accordingly.¹⁰

⁸Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 1310, (August 3, 1964), 146.

⁹See Appendix B, p. 159 for text of the United States-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty.

¹⁰New York Times, April 18, 1951.

Close association with the United States in defense matters was certainly not new to the Philippines. Of the many newly independent Southeast Asian states, she alone had served a long political and military apprenticeship with the United States. Unlike Thailand or Pakistan, the Philippines had a strong American orientation which logically resulted from her history as an American dependency until 1946. Aside from many common traditions and institutions, the close military association of the two countries during the war with the Japanese created close and binding friendships between many American political and military leaders. In addition, the immediate outpouring of American aid for indemnity and reconstruction following the Japanese surrender amounted to more than 1.5 billion dollars.¹¹ This made possible the early spectacular recovery of the Philippine economy. The manner of granting Philippine independence, as promised prior to the war, further created an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect. Despite this new independence, the Philippines relied upon the United States in matters of defense and agreed to the retention of American naval bases at Subic Bay and Sangley Point, as well as an air base at Clark Field for the U. S. Air Force. Whether these extraterritorial

¹¹King, op. cit., p. 33.

rights would continue palatable to the Philippine citizen and the opposition parties after full economic and political independence was achieved, had to be seriously weighed by both Philippine and American defense planners. As economic growth increased, so would economic dependency on the United States decrease and with it the day to day ties and contacts that would keep the two nations in close association.

As an insular republic of over 7,000 islands with a very heterogeneous tribal complex, the Philippines faced an immense task of internal domestic development which fully occupied the postwar government for many years. Stable government, land redistribution, reconstruction, unemployment, and Communist subversion, were among the many problems to be resolved. From the start, the Philippine leaders took a strong anti-Communist stand during the transition from colonialism to independence. Aside from the organized Hukbalahap rebellion during the early 1950s, there had been little evidence of militant communism, (although some of the areas coming more recently under the influence of Indonesian political pressure, especially in the Moslem islands, have witnessed some unrest). During the Korean War, the Philippine government became strongly aware of the potential danger of Communist subversion, and, still bitterly conscious of the Japanese occupation not many years before, this may have stirred interest in the need for

collective security. It was directed almost entirely toward the United States.

After a meeting in 1949 with Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek of the republic of China, President Elpidio Quirino launched a series of talks among Asian leaders on the subject of some form of Pacific pact which might offer a system of regional defense. In August of the same year, he expressed the same views before the United States Senate and received good support for his proposals. With Nationalist China and the Republic of Korea in favor, he called for a conference of Asian leaders for May 1950 to take place at Bagiuo, in the Philippines. This conference was attended by representatives of Australia, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. Few of the participants had authority to indulge in little more than exploratory talks on matters of collective security. Other aspects of mutual area interest were taken up, including trade and cultural exchanges, but few definitive recommendations were made.¹² The effort of Carlos P. Romulo at the United Nations during 1950 to "secure a closer union among the peoples of Southeast Asia, dedicated to the maintenance of peace and freedom in the region through appropriate methods of political, economic, and cultural

¹²Roger M. Smith, The Philippines and SEATO (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959), p. 3.

cooperation with one another" did not succeed as hoped. As president of the conference, Romulo was authorized in the final statement to communicate recommendations to the participating governments and make suggestions on the implementation of the few agreements arrived at. These related to cultural and social matters and had little political significance.

Although disappointing for the Philippine leaders, this conference did manage to bring together the significant leaders of Southeast Asia for talks on subjects of common concern. This was an accomplishment. The Indo-China crisis, which followed so soon after the Korean armistice, was an event that strongly influenced the Philippine decision to work in the direction of a security pact for the Pacific, similar to NATO. However, prior to this, Claro M. Recto, an opposition leader, had wielded wide influence in advocating a Philippine orientation toward Asian neighbors, based on national and racial grounds. With the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, they guided foreign policy with some success on the slogan of "Asia for the Asians."¹³ Aware of the mounting concern both by the conservatives in government and the military leaders over this extreme nationalist philosophy, President Ramon Magasaysay made a strong statement

¹³Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-1958 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 84.

on March 10, 1954 reversing this trend in Philippine-American and Philippine-Asian relations. With full approval of his congressional leaders he asserted:

There is no incompatibility between the political and economic ties and solidarity of aspirations in peace and in war, which have bound our two countries (the Philippines and the United States) for more than half a century, and our warm desire to become good neighbors in Asia in a united effort, imposed by geographical propinquity and racial affinities, to achieve the general prosperity of this region. Rather, these two complementary objectives should give us that balanced foreign policy which we have lacked in the past.¹⁴

But, unlike Thailand, her security needs were not so demanding. She was sheltered from the Communist China mainland by a friendly Formosa, the U. S. Seventh Fleet, and hundreds of miles of the China Sea. This geographical security became a source of Philippine reluctance to enter into any formal declarations or warnings against further aggression by the Viet-Minh and Chinese in Indo-China. When Secretary of State Dulles approached the countries of Southeast Asia for such a joint warning, President Magsaysay was wary and did not wish to lend support to any measure which would antagonize fellow Asians and possibly continue the French colonial presence in Indo-China. But in April 1954, Magsaysay gave support to any moves that would establish a NATO type alliance in the Pacific area, provided that the following conditions were met:

¹⁴Ibid., p. 86.

First, that the right of Asian peoples to self-determination is respected; and second, that the Philippines be given a plain and unequivocal guarantee of United States help in case of attack under our Mutual Defense Pact.¹⁵

These preconditions guaranteeing self-determination were later to be attached to the Manila Treaty in the form of the Pacific Charter, inspired and sponsored by Ramon Magsaysay.

In the case of Pakistan, the history of its associations with the United States in any alliance was very recent and limited indeed. Quite dramatically, the date of the SEATO agreement marked a further deterioration of relations between Pakistan and India and the United States and India, with a corresponding improvement in India's relations with Communist China. The initial links with Karachi started during the government of Mohammed Ali following his visit to Washington at the invitation of President Eisenhower. As the former Pakistan Ambassador in Washington, his personal contacts and influence among Americans was considerable. Immediately after his elevation to the office of Prime Minister in 1953, his initial request for emergency food aid was soon forthcoming. The United States quickly granted a million tons of wheat. Concurrently, talks were begun toward a mutual military assistance agreement to strengthen Pakistan's

¹⁵Republic of the Philippines, Official Gazette, Vol. 50 (April 1954), quoted in Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, p. 102.

role in the general defense of the Middle East. With Pakistan divided geographically, bordering both on Southeast Asia and the Middle East, her pivotal position in the geographic and political divisions of these areas was quickly recognized. The nation's capitol, Karachi, is situated in West Pakistan and its natural political affiliations tend to follow Moslem patterns.¹⁶ As a member of the Columbo Plan, she was the only member of that group to ultimately become a signatory to the Manila pact. Both Dulles and Vice President Nixon made visits to Pakistan in the same year. These visits were returned by the then Pakistan Commander-in-Chief, Ayub Khan, and during his stay in Washington, a Mutual Security Assistance agreement was signed May 19, 1954, followed by an agreement for friendly cooperation with Turkey in the west.¹⁷ With these essential associations binding her closely to the non-communist, non-neutral blocs, there was little hesitation on the part of the United States and others to invite Pakistan to participate in talks regarding a collective defense agreement in Southeast Asia.

The motives which prompted Pakistan's leaders to enter into both the Mutual Assistance pact with the United

¹⁶The Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 28.

¹⁷Modelski, op. cit., p. 131.

States and later the Manila Treaty are somewhat obscure. Events leading up to these associations offer some interesting conjectures. It is interesting to note that Pakistan was not among the Southeast Asian nations that Dulles had originally approached for a joint warning to Communist China, although he did contact Pakistan and Ceylon a few days later for consultations on "general matters" relating to Southeast Asia.¹⁸ The New York Times reported in May that Pakistan was bent upon bringing all the members of the Colombo Powers except India into the alliance, thus isolating India politically and militarily and rendering Pakistan leadership in Southeast Asia paramount.¹⁹

During a visit of the Pakistan Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan to Washington, he placed great emphasis on the Communist threat to East Pakistan, and the necessity for his government to keep troops alerted in that area. His visit was the last step in paving the way for Pakistan's presence at the Manila conference. While little has since been heard from Pakistan about the Communist threat to East Pakistan in particular, these early alarms gave weight to its agreements for full association in SEATO. It would appear that despite the morbid fears of aggression against this eastern border, one of the real intentions in the

¹⁸Ibid., p. 132.

¹⁹New York Times, May 28, 1954.

alignment with the Manila Pact powers was to create a defense potential against possible Indian military adventures resulting from the Kashmir issue, and to give it a strong hand as well in this territorial dispute. Considering the reluctance of the other Columbo Powers to join in the Manila Treaty, Pakistan's acceptance did help in contributing to the "Asian content" of the membership.

The issues which faced Thailand during this period were much different from those of Pakistan or the Philippines. There could be no question that her geographical position on the mainland of Asia put her in a most vulnerable spot regarding military and subversive encroachment from Communist China. A small but stable state, Thailand has had a reputation for adroit political maneuver which managed to keep her independent for centuries, despite colonial dominations surrounding her. By carefully playing the ambitions of the French in Indo-China against those of the British in Burma and Malaya, a remarkable history of uninterrupted independence was maintained, much to the envy of all Asia (the Japanese occupation during World War II notwithstanding). Many critics think Thailand's readiness to compromise principles in pursuit of this independence might not make her a staunch partner in any alliance. Whether this is still true is difficult to say, but it is interesting to note that the same political leaders who had led Thailand

into an accommodation with the Japanese in 1941, without even token resistance to the invasion, were the same political clique which led Thailand to join the Manila Pact of 1954.

A look back to the Thai position in 1941 is important. It is known that historically, Thai thinking, both political and economic, came under strong British influence. Even today the leading export houses for tin, timber, rubber, and copra are essentially British. Such names as Anglo-Thai Corp. Ltd., Bombay-Burmah Ltd., The Chartered Bank of India, the Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., go back to the days of Britain's Empire and were, indeed, appendages of that same system. The historic British concern for Thailand was its own interests in Malaya and Burma, and, naturally, Great Britain feared the presence of any unfriendly government in Thailand. Nevertheless, this British orientation was of little value in 1941 when Thai Premier Phibun Songram bowed to the threat of invasion and joined in full partnership with the Japanese military occupation.²⁰ While British forces were pinned down in the fruitless defense of Malaya, they were unable to rally sufficient defense for themselves and could give no thought to assisting Thailand. The failure of any Thai resistance left Britain's northern defenses open

²⁰ John F. Cady, "The Historical Background of United States Policy in Southeast Asia," quoted in Henderson, Problems of United States Policy, p. 7.

and contributed very much to the British capitulation at Singapore. Thai apologists point to the 1941 debacle as a lesson in failure to implement treaties of friendship with solid guarantees of military assistance.

In 1954 Thailand's defense problems involved two main categories, external aggression and subversion. While not bordering directly on Communist China, her northern neighbor, Laos, is a friendly but small and weak buffer. To the east lies Cambodia and Vietnam, while to the west is found Burma, with Malaya to the south. Her shores on the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean create a considerable coastal defense problem. The national and political splintering created by various ethnic groups found along Thailand's borders has always made her an easy target for treachery and subversion during any overt military action. During the 1950's Malaya was heavily involved with the "emergency," battling a serious threat of admitted Communist insurgents; Burma, too, was faced with similar insurgency from the Karens and a Communist rebellion, while in Indo-China, a bitter struggle ensued between the French and the Communist Viet-Minh. Consequently there were very strong reasons for Thailand's concern for her own security. Above all, there had persisted for centuries the problem of the thousands of alien Chinese, whose loyalties to their adopted fatherland had always been suspect. This potential threat of subversion has been a most important consideration for all the mainland

countries of Southeast Asia, and will be examined in greater length in a following section of this study.

Thus Thailand, of all the nations of Southeast Asia, has been the most directly concerned geographically in its security and defense problems. The Thai signature to the Manila Treaty was not her first step in mutual cooperation. As early as the late 1940's, successive Thai governments have turned to the United States for assistance in internal development. Foreign aid and Point Four projects have proliferated throughout the provinces of Thailand. Road systems, hydro, and irrigation schemes, were developed with American help. Cultural and social ties with the United States were strengthened with exchange programs, Fulbright grants, training programs in mechanical fields, and medical aid programs. A considerable amount of interest in internal security and stability directed American efforts to a broad police training program, long before any thought was given to military aid. This early apprenticeship with Washington was further expanded at the outbreak of the Korean War, when Thailand contributed a contingent to the United Nations forces. These forces were trained and equipped almost entirely through the U. S. Military Advisory programs.²¹

²¹On 24 November Pravda announced that the United States was transforming Thailand into a military base for American aggression. It maintained that the technical and military agreements, concluded between Thailand and the

At the time of the Dien Bien Phu crisis, Thailand indicated a readiness to play a part with the United States, had the Geneva Conference not arrived at a satisfactory cease-fire. With this recent background of close military and political association with the West, it is not surprising that Thailand found herself a keystone in the Manila alliance with her capitol, Bangkok, eventually to become the head of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

In addition to these nations that accepted invitations to join in the Manila conference, there must be considered, as well, the arguments of those states which, though invited, refused to participate after careful and long debate, in most instances. Some, of course, like the free states of Indo-China were disqualified by the parties to the Geneva Agreement. It is not surprising that Communist China and the Soviet Union rose with alarm at the spectre of a military alliance openly dedicated to the containment of Communism within its present borders in Southeast Asia. And it is not surprising that they would bring strong pressures and propaganda forces to bear on the nations of Asia in an attempt to limit the effectiveness of such an alliance.

United States had established complete American military control. M. Beloff, Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 240.

II. NATIONS WHICH REJECTED COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

Of the so-called Columbo Powers invited to the Manila Conference, India was without doubt the most important. By territory, population, and resources, she was certainly the most influential as a counter-balance to Chinese Communist expansion and the new Chinese political orientation of the border countries.²² And India's influence and cultural affiliations with Southeast Asia were centuries old. For these reasons alone, she would have been a giant among the Asian participants. But the official attitude of the Indian government from the start was one of hostility. Even during the preliminary hearings on the Manila invitation, India took a strong position against any Asian participation and did much to dissuade the other Columbo Powers who had interest in such an alliance. Her strong pressure on Burma and Ceylon will be discussed below. One cause of the Indian Government's opposition to the Manila Treaty was the prevailing mistrust of most Indians for British and American motives. Her long period of imperial domination had not been forgotten in six short years. And her fear of Pakistan's new strength, which was growing with American assistance, further hardened her attitude against the alliance. With her buffer to the north, Tibet, already absorbed by China, Indian sensitivity

²²Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 93.

to Chinese displeasure was very acute indeed. The border disputes along the McMahon line were a constant political irritant between China and India. And this new political alignment appeared to worry Prime Minister Nehru even more. When he received the joint London-Washington inquiry asking for views on the projected conference, he advised the Indian Parliament that the government did not intend to depart from its avowed policy of neutrality, and intended to promote peace and resolve conflicts by peaceful negotiation, rather than by accentuation and threats or display of force. His opposition became even more adamant as the Manila conference drew to a close. He had this to say:

Our Hon. members may remember to old days--they appear to be old days he said . . . when Great Powers had spheres of influence in Asia and elsewhere--of course the countries of Asia were too weak to do anything. The quarrel was between the big powers, and they, therefore, sometimes came to an agreement about dividing the countries into spheres of influence. It seems to me this particular Manila Treaty is looking dangerously in this direction of spheres of influence to be exercised by powerful countries, because ultimately it is the big and powerful countries that will decide and not the two or three weak and small Asian countries that may be allied to them.²³

Nehru's conviction that any collective security pact which included former colonial powers represented a reactionary colonial threat to the area, that it would be an obstacle

²³Rosemary Brissenden, "India's Opposition to SEATO," The Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. vi, No. 2 (November 1960), 205.

to peace in the area and that Asian nations adhering to it were acting contrary to the best interests of the Asian peoples, was reiterated time and again in his dealings with the other members of the Columbo Powers.

The Indian government expressed its official views on the subject subsequent to the treaty, in early January 1955 at Madras during a meeting of the Indian Congress Party. It said that,

the establishment of a South East Asian Defence Organization by some Great Powers of the West and some States in South East Asia, is regrettable and has added to the insecurity of that region and extended the area of cold war.²⁴

The resolution further stated that peace could only be maintained by the five principles of co-existence and it welcomed the proposal for a meeting of all the independent Asian and African states, a proposal which led to the Bandung Conference of April 1955.

Of the invited Columbo Powers, Ceylon, like Pakistan, was inclined to accept the proposals. Her relations with India, though close, had long been strained by the problem of large migratory invasions of South India Tamils, mostly vagrant unemployed laborers in search of food and work. India did little to control the emigration and Ceylonese officials likewise had difficulty in coping with the situation.

²⁴Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 94.

With similar heritages of British imperialism, they held similar suspicions of Western ways. But the Ceylonese Prime Minister, Sir John Kotalawalla, regarded any move that might strengthen Ceylon's prestige in the Commonwealth and world as a national advantage and did not like to subordinate his country's ambitions to those of India. This had been the case during the Empire.

India's attitude appeared to stiffen when Pakistan and Ceylon began to show a readiness to participate in the Manila conference. Although of a regional nature, the long dispute between Pakistan and India over the Kashmir problem had been a bitter major foreign policy issue that had even reached the portals of the United Nations. In fact, at this period, each considered the other a threat more awesome than Chinese expansion to the south.²⁵ With India and Indonesia leading the core of opposition among the Columbo Powers, it was left to Sir John Kotalawalla and U Nu of Burma to challenge this leadership and promote a more spirited attitude towards the problems of Southeast Asian defense. It was his intention to encourage more open discussion of the issue. With this in mind, Kotalawalla proposed that a meeting be held in Rangoon to reconsider earlier policy statements regarding the Manila plan during a meeting

²⁵King, op. cit., p. 67.

of Colombo ministers in Ceylon. Both Burma and Pakistan were anxious to participate in such a meeting but Nehru stated that he was too busy to leave.²⁶ When Kotalawalla then suggested a meeting in New Delhi for the convenience of the Indian leader, Nehru admitted that he thought the Colombo decisions were already made and open conversations would have a divisive effect on the solidarity of the Colombo Powers. Indian diplomacy at this juncture appeared to have three major goals: (1) to secure unanimous Colombo Power rejection of the Manila invitation, (2) to accommodate and support Communist China's position during the Geneva Conference, (3) to encourage Communist China's guarantees of peaceful intentions through the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (Panche Sila).²⁷ These principles proclaimed: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) non-aggression, (3) non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, (5) peaceful co-existence.

The Prime Minister of Ceylon had to keep in mind the strong influence the large Tamil and Indian segments of his population had on his government, and it would appear that he had difficulties within his cabinet on this issue.

Immediately following Nehru's decision, the Ceylon government

²⁶Brissenden, op. cit., p. 221.

²⁷Ibid., p. 228.

issued a communique stating that,

Ceylon would not be able to participate in the conference which had been proposed to be held regarding SEATO, and the authorities concerned have been informed accordingly. Ceylon, however, is prepared to maintain an open mind on the subject.²⁸

With a common border, Burma was one of the most exposed of China's neighbors and there were compelling reasons for this small state to be much concerned with her relations with China. Like Thailand, she too had a serious internal problem with alien Chinese and dissident tribal border groups. Soon after independence in 1948, she was faced with the Karen uprising, followed a short time later by an open Communist rebellion, with extensive breakdowns of law and order in large areas of the country.

Like Ceylon, a similar conflict of opinion seemed to exist between Burma's U Nu and Nehru. While there had been a history of conflicts on many issues between the Columbo Powers, U Nu was usually found on the side of India. However, at the Columbo meeting U Nu revealed himself as an independent and did not agree with the expressed Indian view that most fears of Communist encroachment were greatly exaggerated. He reminded Nehru that Burma lived too close to Communist China to regard underestimating the Communist threat as harmless.²⁹ That the Burmese too

²⁸Brissenden, op. cit., p. 223.

²⁹Ceylon Daily News, Columbo, 8 May 1954, quoted by Brissenden, op. cit., p. 222.

were disappointed in the failure of the Rangoon meeting to take place, there could be no doubt. Although there were frequent official denials that Burma was willing to join SEATO, privately,

many high Burmese officials expressed their belief that SEATO was a good thing and might serve as a protector of Burma's independence, even though the Burmese government could not join it for fear of antagonizing Communist China.³⁰

Burma has never shown any hostility toward SEATO. While she could not join for political considerations, she has, in fact, derived some comfort from Thailand's strong membership in the organization and welcomed Thai assurances that SEATO would aid Burma against China if called upon.³¹

Indonesia, like India, was openly antagonistic towards such an alliance and, like India, refused to consider open debate on the subject. At the time the invitation to the conference was received, the then Prime Minister, Dr. Sastroamidjojo, enjoyed the support of the Indonesian Communist Party in Parliament, so his opposition to the Treaty was not surprising. During a visit to India after the Manila conference, he declared before the Indian Parliament that the "peace in our part of the world cannot be assured by military pacts such as the recently concluded

³⁰William C. Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 101.

³¹Ibid., p. 101.

Manila pact."³² President Sukarno, a strong proponent of the Columbo principle, felt very adamant that the Columbo Powers should stay unified in purpose. He said that "the yardstick is whether any action of ours in the field of foreign affairs can be reconciled with out national interests and with the spirit of Panche Sila."³³

Here again, the presence of a large Chinese minority created some influence in the Indonesian Parliament. It was only after the signing of the Treaty on Citizenship with Chou En Lai, the Chinese Foreign Minister at Bandung, that their thorny Chinese problem was settled. This did much to strengthen Indonesia's ties with Communist China. At the earlier Bagiuo Conference, Indonesia had made some strong statements against joining any blocs for external security. The chief Indonesian delegate stated,

It is to our interest and that of our neighbors that we refuse to take sides with this or that nation or group of nations, that we keep open the political, economic, and cultural traffic lanes of the Indian and Pacific Oceans that cut across Indonesia.³⁴

Soon after the signing of the Manila Treaty, Secretary of State Dulles remarked during a visit to Indonesia that he appreciated that Indonesia did not believe it needed the

³²Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 99.

³³Fifield, op. cit., p. 160.

³⁴Ibid., p. 166.

protection of SEATO and stressed that the organization was only for those who felt the need of it. Nor did he place any relationship between the granting of foreign aid with one's membership in any mutual security pact with the United States.³⁵ Judging from recent events in Malaysia, with Sukarno's determined policy of "confrontation," Indonesia's presence in SEATO might have been a dangerous liability.

³⁵Ibid., p. 161.

IV

THE OVERSEAS CHINESE AND SUBVERSION

The problem of political subversion of governments, with or without violence, has been a very important defense consideration during the past twenty years. In Southeast Asia in general and more especially Thailand, Burma, and the Malay archipelago, this has become particularly acute by the presence of a large unassimilated mass of the Overseas Chinese, alien to the areas in which they reside, and loyal in most cases to the Chinese homeland, regardless of the political regime in power in China at the time. This has been a centuries old problem in Southeast Asia and has always caused serious concern on the part of the local governments.

Whether this concern merits the label of "the Chinese Problem" has been subject to debate for many years. Prior to the Communist victory in China in 1949, there had been little evidence of Chinese ambition to create a political dominance in Southeast Asia, or even to unify Chinese minorities into a Chinese political party. To the contrary, over the years in which the national government was weak they had maintained an attitude of aloofness and indifference to political involvement. That this attitude persisted for such a long period, implied a deliberate Chinese withdrawal

from the national political life within the states of Southeast Asia. Exclusiveness and political isolation did contain some danger, and programs in education and legislation to help assimilate these Chinese were undertaken by most governments. British Imperial policy, however, was content, in many cases, to let these ethnic groupings remain as a check and counterbalance to the indigenous political parties. But, it would be very much in error to suggest that the Chinese had completely isolated themselves from the political fabric of the country. Those who thought that their exemplary political propriety would continue were soon disillusioned soon after the triumph of the Communist Revolution in China. As early as 1949 the Chinese Communist regime began making strong political overtures to these Overseas Chinese and in January of 1950, the Ta Kung Pao, a Shanghai newspaper, had this warning to make regarding the brethren in Southeast Asia:

Now that the People's Republic of China has been established and diplomatic relations have been opened between the Central People's Government and a number of other countries, the more than 10,000,000 Overseas Chinese shall and must not be subjected to further abuse.

The article went on to say that in accordance with Article 58 of the Common Programme of the Central People's Government, every effort would be made to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad. These warnings from Peking began to take on a more threatening

tone as the new Communist regime became more and more firmly entrenched.¹ Few people have underestimated the effect of the Overseas Chinese in this part of the world, since they have been a strategic, economically powerful minority whose importance has been even more enhanced by the kith and kin ties with the Communist homeland and the Chinese propensity for family loyalty.² The non-assimilation of minorities within a country does not in itself constitute a threat to security, but the concentration of economic power and political influence within a minority can be a real threat. During residence in Thailand, the writer quickly learned that most Thais maintained a dual attitude toward their Chinese neighbors. They were happy to maintain and foster the cultural exclusiveness of the Chinese but deplored this same exclusiveness in the economic and political sphere. The same attitude has been reflected in government policy.

With the disappearance of Western colonial rule in Southeast Asia following World War II, the growing importance of the Chinese in replacing the European in the economies of the new states has had wide repercussions. The Chinese migrations to Southeast Asia over the centuries have been for

¹Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 693.

²G. William Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand: an Analytical History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. v.

an economic objective. It is only within the last century, following the expansion of Western colonial influence, that the volume of Overseas immigrants reached large and alarming proportions.³ As early as the seventeenth century, European documents have mentioned the presence of several thousands of Chinese in the old Siamese capital of Ayuthia. During the period of the Tribute missions to China under the Ming Dynasty, mention is made of the return of Chinese pottery makers to Siam at the request of King Ramkamhaeng of Sukhothai in 1300. Even before this, there is evidence in the ruins of the old Khmer civilization at Angkor Wat that Chinese fishermen and merchants occupied large stretches of the Gulf of Siam. Most of the migrations to Southeast Asia have originated from the southern Chinese coastal cities in Fukien, Kwangtung, and Hainan Island. Population pressures, rather than Chinese policy, prompted these emigrations to the more abundant lands to the south. Before the nineteenth century, such movements were officially illegal and prohibited by the Imperial Government of China, but with control almost non-existent and easily manipulated through corruption, the traffic flowed unimpeded into Southeast Asia. Total Chinese population figures vary, but most authorities

³Richard J. Coughlin, Double Identity, the Chinese in Modern Thailand (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), p. vii.

agree on approximately 15 per cent to 20 per cent in the border countries of Burma, Thailand, and Indo-China.⁴

The control maintained on the economic city life by the Chinese in these regions has frequently been demonstrated. As early as 1910, Chinese strikes and riots in the city of Bangkok, in protest against a general head tax, completely stopped all trade and essential markets for many days. The Thais realized for the first time the strength of the Chinese economic grip on the country and the ability of this minority to paralyze the life of the Kingdom. Thus the dislike and fear earlier felt by the government now found support in popular sentiment.⁵

Another irritant and concern of the governments of Southeast Asia was the proliferation of Chinese secret societies. While such organizations as the Triad and Yee Hong societies operated many beneficial programs which covered such diverse interests as language schools, immigration aid committees, burial assistance, etc., their activities frequently assumed political significance and lent clandestine support to indigenous political groups within the country. But their inter-society rivalry sometimes led to serious outbreaks of street fighting and lawlessness.

⁴L. Dudley Stamp, Asia: A Regional and Economic Geography (London: Methuen and Company, 1962), p. 512.

⁵Skinner, op. cit., p. 160.

The strongest pattern of Chinese influence in the life of these countries has been their control over nearly all aspects of economic activity. This phenomena of Chinese business energy and acumen is prevalent throughout this entire region, and is very obvious in such cities as Bangkok, Singapore, Saigon, and Djakarta. This economic problem is the most outstanding to the new nations of Southeast Asia. Efforts to curb Chinese control have led to strong immigration laws and occupational restrictions.⁶ Exclusive Chinese work stoppages and strikes have had crippling effects in Malaya, Thailand, and Vietnam where Chinese labor organizations have been strong.⁷

Throughout their history, the people of China have, perhaps to a unique degree, felt themselves culturally superior to these southern races and their view of the native populations of Southeast Asia has been, for the most part, disdainful. This contempt has naturally bred bitter reaction among the local native citizens.⁸ The Chinese have also organized strict family and dialect associations, and

⁶Kenneth P. Landon, The Chinese in Thailand (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 205.

⁷Robert S. Elegant, The Dragon Seed. Peking and the Overseas Chinese (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959), p. 9.

⁸Lea E. Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), p. 15.

business societies, but because of their minority status, these have confined political expression to their organization officials. These heads have been recognized by the national governments as quasi-official spokesmen for the Chinese elements in the area and are treated by them with considerable protocol. And these contacts can likewise act as channels between the local government and Peking.

Traditionally, all Chinese governments have adhered to the concept of dual citizenship for their nationals overseas. This, in effect, has induced the Chinese to maintain their loyalty to China.⁹ Their importance in Chinese nationalist movements is of ever increasing interest, particularly while the Chinese overseas increase in substance and affluence. Since the turn of the century, they have had a strong hand in most revolutionary movements in China, and in the case of Dr. Sun Yatsen, prepared both the organization of revolution and provided the financial support almost entirely. The question of dual nationality became an important issue during the Bandung Conference in 1955, and on this occasion Premier Chou En-lai agreed to Indonesian demands that this dual privilege be eliminated. Thereafter, every Chinese in Indonesia had to make a declaration of nationality. There was hidden in this offer to the other countries present that proper recognition of the People's

⁹ King, op. cit., p. 71.

Government of China was a prerequisite to the solution of this nationality problem.¹⁰

The continuous struggle which has been going on since 1949 between the Peking and Taiwan governments for support of the Overseas Chinese, represents an extension of the long Chinese civil war, concluded on the mainland, but continuing in the Straits of Formosa, and has taken the form of a propaganda war. Both these governments have implored their nationals to be "good citizens" of the countries in which they dwell, yet neither has ever fully accepted complete severance of ties with the homeland. Not to be outdone by the Nationalists, the Chinese People's Republic has launched an ambitious Overseas Chinese program, incorporated in the Constitution. Article 98 states: "The Peoples Republic of China shall protect the acquired rights and interests of the Overseas Chinese."¹¹ Within the Communists Party's Central Committee, three organizations from the central government take responsibility for these interests. The first is the Commission for Overseas Work, the function of which is to plan and direct propaganda among the Overseas Chinese; the second is the Third Office of the Bureau of United Front Work which has the responsibility for organizing Oversease Chinese participation in the "democratic movement";

¹⁰ Philip W. Thayer (ed.), Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 147.

¹¹ A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 182.

the third is the Social Department of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, which has a general intelligence gathering mission. In addition to these, a commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs has been established in Peking under the Government Administration Council with the same rank as a ministry. This organization was set up to organize returnees for study and indoctrination in Communist China, as well as to foster the purchase of government bonds by the Overseas Chinese as a means of increasing remittances. Wealthy Chinese overseas have been wooed and flattered into support of the Communist regime, often making red carpet visits to the mainland as state guests of the government. These overseas organizations have been taking an increasingly active interest in the Chinese affairs of Southeast Asia. The propaganda programs are extensive. Despite appeals to the Overseas Chinese for loyalty to the countries in which they reside, Ho Hsiang-ming, Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission in Peking, has urged them to develop closer ties with the homeland and stated that "nobody can sever the bond which ties the Chinese residents abroad to the fatherland. Mainland China is the homeland of all Chinese."¹²

In developing these closer ties, the Chinese Communists have undertaken a wide dissemination of popular

¹²Barnett, op. cit., p. 189.

literature and dialect broadcasts, and have made attempts to slant teaching in the Overseas Chinese schools. They have established large scholarship programs for study in China and finance students liberally for this. This type of political and ideological sponsorship has increased rapidly during the past eight years, and in turn has increased the concern of the governments involved in these overtures. That the People's Republic of China has seen fit to utilize these Overseas Chinese for their own subversive political ends, has become a serious problem and a menace to the integrity of these small nations. In order to remove the irritating effects of Chinese dual nationality, the Chinese Communists have taken steps to meet the individual government's suggestions. During a visit of Chou En-lai to India in 1954, Prime Minister Nehru reminded Chou of the apprehension caused by the presence of a large Chinese population with dual nationality. In his speech to the National People's Congress on September 23, 1954, he referred to this subject:

For our part, we are willing to urge the overseas Chinese to respect the law of the government and the social customs of all the countries in which they live. It is worth pointing out that the question of nationality of the Overseas Chinese is one which the reactionary governments of China in the past never tried to solve. This placed the overseas Chinese in a difficult situation and often led to discord between China and the countries concerned. To improve this situation we are prepared

to settle this question and are ready to settle it first with the Southeast Asian countries which have established diplomatic relations with us.¹³

The policy of the People's Republic of China toward her neighboring Asian states, has derived strong influence from previous Chinese hegemony in the area. The Chinese Communist regime stands in direct succession to an old Imperial Chinese tradition which consistently held that China, by virtue of its superior civilization, was entitled to take a preeminent position among her neighbors.¹⁴ This policy was interrupted for the long period between 1840 and 1919 by the rise of European colonial influence. Mao Tse-tung spoke in 1936 of his vision "to lead the Chinese revolution to its completion and also exert far-reaching influence on the revolution in the East as well as in the whole world."¹⁵

The essence of this old Imperial system prior to 1840 was the existence of a satellite belt, whereby China was surrounded by subservient "client" states--Korea, Indo-China, Siam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Tibet, Nepal, Malaya, and even parts of Indonesia. China's actual relationship with these "tribute" states varied from place to place, but always took the form of a formal tax obligation

¹³Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 88.

¹⁴David P. Mozingo, "China's Relations with her Asian Neighbors," Current History (September, 1964), 156.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 157.

to China, usually in the form of elaborate gifts. These token contributions were meant to emphasize China's preeminence and power over her neighbors. Today, her interest in these states as buffers to what she considers predatory colonial systems, is a paramount consideration of her foreign policy. While China has not made excessive overtures for friendly relations with the non-Communist states of Southeast Asia, she has made no attempt to conceal her strong interest in ultimately realizing their revolutionary conversion to the Communist ideology, and has actively encouraged Asian Communist parties to follow "the path of the Chinese peoples" in seizing power.¹⁶

Aside from political interest in the areas, there has been the more important economic considerations as well. As the People's Republic of China transforms gradually from an agrarian to an industrial economy, so will her demand and need for these vast raw material supplies become more acute. The population explosion in present day China has been a serious concern to her leaders and the world in general. The rich resources of Southeast Asia offer abundant supplies of food, industrial raw materials, and fuel. These would appear to be the logical answer to China's problem. Burma and Thailand rate as the leading producers and

¹⁶Liu Shao-Chi, "Inaugural Address to the Asian-Australian Trade Union Conference," November 23, 1949, quoted in Current History, September 1964.

exporters of rice in the world. Southeast Asia accounts for almost 90 per cent of the world's supply of natural rubber. Indonesia, Malayasia, and Thailand together contribute to world trade about 60 per cent of its tin. Other primary products in less commanding positions, such as petroleum, tea, copra, palm oil, hemp and hardwoods are very plentiful. Likewise the strategic location of Southeast Asia, with its good inland waterways, and excellent harbors, have made it a target of both Chinese and Japanese over the years. China's control of the East-West sea lanes here could deprive both India and Japan of important economic and strategic interests in Southeast Asia. It could also endanger Oceania and the still free countries on the western rim of the Indian Ocean. They could interrupt traffic from the Persian and Aden Gulfs, as well as the Ports of East Africa.¹⁷ While the United States has been represented as the sole deterrent to Chinese ambitions in this direction, there is no doubt that India's similar interest in this region has already created a heated rivalry with China, both ideological and commercial.

The use of subversive techniques in attaining internal political control of countries since World War II has been attempted frequently by the Communist leadership, both

¹⁷William Henderson (ed.), "The Communist Challenge to Southeast Asia," Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1963), p. 134.

Soviet and Chinese. This danger to Southeast Asia was, indeed, very real and became an issue of prime consideration among the proponents of the Manila Treaty. Subversion was somewhat like the illusive ghost and made the problem of counteracting it very complex and difficult. Its forms have been hard to identify and isolate since subversive activities often border on the legal procedures of normal government process, but the aims are directed to the overthrow of the established political order, often in the name of freedom or liberty. The usual forms of attempted subversion are the armed insurrections witnessed in the Philippines, Malaya, and South Vietnam, or the more restrained combinations of general strikes and riots as in Singapore and prewar Shanghai. The methods the Communists have employed in the direction of subversion have varied from country to country, depending a great deal upon the political maturity of the people. Known methods have been to exploit small internal dissensions, arouse racial minorities when they exist to revolt against "suppression" and to foment civil strife with the use of indigenous Communist party members or anyone dissatisfied with the status quo. There are many who believe that it is almost impossible to cope with this menace.¹⁸ In stating the case

¹⁸SEATO REPORT, "The Second Year," Bangkok, 1957.

before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Dulles had this to say in 1954:

To go on now to the question of subversion, as I pointed out, we deal with that in this treaty more specifically than we have with any other treaty. We recognize the danger more clearly. I must admit that the mere fact of recognizing the danger does not mean that we automatically have found a way to meet the danger. Subversion in that area is a very difficult thing to control. It is virulent, it is well organized, it is efficiently prosecuted by trained persons, and the task of meeting that threat will tax our resources and ingenuity to the utmost . . . This threat is most acute at the moment in Vietnam, but I understand there are threats of the same character to Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaya, and Borneo and Indonesia are not free from the danger.¹⁹

Singapore serves as a good case study in subversive tactics. This former Crown Colony, the activities of which are almost entirely commercial, is a city of extremes in wealth and poverty. Despite it being a Malayan city geographically, the population is more than 80 per cent Chinese, one-half of whom are under twenty-one years of age. This mass of youth has been fired by the great success of the Chinese revolution. Many programs of travel and student exchange have taken place between Singapore and the People's Republic of China, at which time the Chinese Communists have been active in organizing party cadres, labor union cells, and Chinese school indoctrination. Their tools have been the usual methods of terror, threats, bribery,

¹⁹ John Foster Dulles, Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, November 11, 1954 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 14.

civil disobedience, and effective manipulation of the Chinese population against civil authority. Police reaction to Communist tactics in many cases appeared to feed the fires. In referring to the Malayan government's effort to combat rebellion, Victor Purcell states,

The great danger for the Government was that it might allow itself to be led into repressive action against sections of the population which, willingly or unwillingly, were assisting the Communists, and this would arouse enmity against itself.²⁰

Thailand too has faced a formidable menace of infiltration. Announcement of the formation of a "Thai Autonomous Peoples Government" in south Yunnan Province was made by the Peking Government in January, 1953. It stated that this was a Chinese administrative arrangement to give cultural autonomy to the ethnic Thais of southern China. However, it soon became evident that this plan was being used in the north for the purpose of indoctrinating Thai youths in Yunnan for the organization of Communist cells in northern Thailand. Quick action and exposure of these activities by the Thai Government at Bangkok did much to minimize the effectiveness of the program.²¹

The task of countering subversion is, by its nature, the responsibility of the respective governments, but certain

²⁰Purcell, op. cit., p. 293.

²¹King, op. cit., p. 192.

powers decided that there was real need for coordination of counter-subversive activities in the various countries of this region. This cooperation could provide a clearing house for intelligence reports and set up programs in developing counter-subversion techniques. This was an aim of the Manila Treaty powers.

PRELUDE TO THE MANILA TREATY

The rapidly deteriorating position of the French forces in Indo-China created an atmosphere of grave concern for the security of the states contiguous to this area. Despite disclaimers to the contrary, the events in the late months of 1953 and early 1954 led to a gradual change of the official United States position on the matter. The Viet Minh forces in Indo-China, with increased aid from the Chinese Communists, were very methodically disrupting French plans for ultimate victory and resistance was steadily crumbling. Under the circumstances, the United States took the initiative in sounding out its Western allies and the interested nations of Asia on the advisability of a collective defense treaty. During the sanguinary progress at Dien Bien Phu, the United States announced that the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political systems of China or Russia, by whatever means, would constitute a grave threat and would not be passively accepted. Since talks with her allies had already been in progress when these views were expressed, it is obvious that a tacit understanding had already been reached with the Western partners and the preliminaries for full scale talks with the Asian members were already underway. A flurry of diplomatic activity at this time, which included visits to the United States by

Sir Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden, as well as talks in London and Paris by Secretary Dulles, indicated that substantive decisions were being made regarding this threat to the Far East. In April, 1954 the British and United States governments issued a joint communique which said in part that the events in Indo-China,

. . . not only threatened those now directly involved, but also endanger the peace and security of the entire area of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, where our two nations, and other friendly and allied nations have vital interests. Accordingly, we are ready to take part, with the other countries principally concerned, in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defense, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, to assure the peace, security, and¹ freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific.

There is no question but that the Indo-China crisis in 1954 served as a springboard for the Manila Treaty, and the joint communique quoted above was an immediate prelude to such a treaty conference.² Coming at the time of the scheduled Geneva conference, the British Government was anxious that no action should be taken which might prejudice the negotiations taking place there on the Indo-China question. Since Britain had long recognized the People's Republic of China, she found herself in an awkward position regarding her posture at the Geneva conference, as well as

¹Joint Communique, CMD.9282, ibid., p. 2.

²Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 3.

in her negotiations with her Western allies covering a security pact in Asia aimed against Chinese threat of aggression. Her unenviable position was strongly supported by the French who, facing a debacle at Dien Bien Phu, were hard pressed by the French electorate to conclude some arrangement ending the Indo-China war. The long drain on her manpower and treasure had reached the breaking point, and the French Premier, Pierre Mendès-France pledged his political life, and the life of his government on a scheduled conclusion of a treaty to end the French participation in this war. At this point, the United States could get no more than a declaration from the French that they would be willing to examine the possibility of establishing a defense pact. Actually, Secretary of State Dulles strongly believed and pressed his conviction that entering immediately into some kind of formal arrangement with the Asian nations and the Western allies would immensely strengthen the French hand at the Geneva round table. The fall of Dien Bien Phu and the hopelessness of the French position quickly persuaded the British and French to associate themselves with a formal declaration of intent to participate in a conference to conclude a collective defense pact for Southeast Asia. With no guarantees seriously binding the parties to a Geneva agreement, such a pact now was considered to be a necessity to deter the victorious Viet-Minh and Chinese Communists

from breach of faith in the Geneva talks regardless of the outcome of the conference.

It had been Britain's intention to withhold any action until obtaining the full support of the Columbo Powers--India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia. Foreign Minister Eden, continuing his constant contact with the Asian members of the Commonwealth during the conference, gave his opinion that there would never be any real security in Southeast Asia without the good will of the free Asian countries.³ Nor did he think any organization could be effective without the understanding and support of the Columbo Powers. In this regard and at Eden's insistence, the British arranged a meeting of the Columbo Powers for the purpose of hearing their views in regard to such a treaty. There was such strenuous resistance on the part of India and Indonesia, that the meeting actually never took place.⁴

Australia and New Zealand, on the other hand, found themselves in close accord with the concern of the United States regarding Southeast Asian security. But, in patient regard for the awkward position of the British, the Australians did not openly criticize British caution. However, Australian leaders did remember the earlier

³Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 5.

⁴Brissenden, op. cit., p. 221.

contentions of H. V. Evatt in 1947 when, as Minister of External Affairs, he gave a detailed postwar policy statement regarding Southeast Asia. He said Australian policy should include the "development of a system of regional security in cooperation with the United States and other nations."⁵ He predicted that as the people of Southeast Asia acquired independence and ceased to be dependent upon the decisions of European governments, then would Australia's interests in the councils of Asia increase proportionately. During this period of hectic events leading up to the Manila Treaty, Australia's Casey used his substantial influence among the Asian members of the Columbo group to moderate their views, but to no purpose. In the interim, Australian public opinion became fearful of the Indo-China collapse and pressed for some security arrangement. The Sydney Morning Herald had this to say:

For America and Britain, the defense of Southeast Asia may be seen as strategically desirable; for France it is a matter of national prestige; but for Australia it is life and death. If the cork is forced out of the bottle, in Mr. Eisenhower's graphic phrase, and aggressive communism floods over the peninsula into Indo-China, Australia will be placed in immediate and deadly peril. The security of Southeast Asia is Australia's security.⁶

⁵Leicester Webb, "Australia and SEATO," SEATO Six Studies, George Modelski (ed.) (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1962), p. 51.

⁶Ibid., p. 61.

It was now just a matter of time and the fall of Dien Bien Phu until active arrangements were made for a discussion of a treaty. During a speech in the House of Commons in July, Sir Winston Churchill explained that it was the hope of the British government that if an acceptable settlement of the war in Indo-China were to be negotiated at Geneva, means might be found for getting countries which participated in the negotiations to underwrite the settlement. He hoped that other countries with interest in the area might subscribe to such a guarantee. It was this view that he and Foreign Secretary Eden advanced to the American government and the proposal was one of several being examined by a joint Anglo-American committee. This group was also studying the question of Southeast Asia defense, for, as the Prime Minister stated, it was necessary to plan "not only for the contingency of a negotiated settlement, but for other eventualities less agreeable."⁷ He went on to say that arrangements for collective defense in Asia would proceed whether or not any agreement was reached at Geneva though their nature would depend on the results of the conference.

Armistice agreements which ended the Indo-China hostilities were signed on July 20, 1954 at the Geneva

⁷Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 4.

Conference. Finding themselves differing with the Communist powers over the terms of a reciprocal guarantee of this settlement, the United States and British governments decided to underwrite and guarantee the terms of the Geneva settlement by a defense treaty. While the Columbo Powers did not take any part in the Geneva meeting, they did express their satisfaction with the results of the Geneva Conference and gave strong support to the agreements.

With events moving swiftly, the United States, after consultation with the other interested powers, arranged for a conference to take place at Manila, which was to convene on September 6, 1954. Thus, it remained for the first effective regional organization in Southeast Asia to come about as the result of Western, rather than Eastern initiative. The eight nations which participated in the conference were Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, France, Great Britain, the Philippines, and the United States. In his opening address, Dulles declared that the United States felt "a sense of common destiny" with all the countries of the area and all were united by a common danger arising from "international communism and its insatiable ambition."⁸ He further hoped that the embodiments and

⁸New York Times, September 6, 1954.

structure of such a pact would leave the way open for the other nations of Southeast Asia to eventually participate. Just prior to the opening of this conference, Vice President Carlos Garcia of the Philippines and Secretary of State Dulles took part in a meeting of the Philippine-United States Council set up under the United States-Philippine treaty of 1951. At this meeting Dulles stated "in the most emphatic terms, that in the event of any attack on the Philippines the United States would honor fully its commitments under that treaty and would act immediately."⁹ Similar sentiments were expressed by the other national leaders during the opening statements, but Pakistan emphasized her concern for aggression from any source, besides that of Communism, and hoped that the resulting pact would cope with such threats. After these opening statements were made, the conference went into closed session until the treaty was written. While the United States viewed the pact only as a bulwark against Communism, it agreed to omit the term "communist" threat in the text of the treaty but reserved the right to further define the specific United States view on this subject as a separate "understanding of the United States."¹⁰

⁹New York Herald Tribune, September 5, 1954.

¹⁰Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 8.

The work of the treaty conference took only two days, discounting the previous consultations in Washington, Manila, and other capitols of the interested powers, and the Manila Treaty was signed on September 8, 1954. At the conclusion of the Manila Conference, President Magsaysay of the Philippines stated:

Through the Manila Pact and the Pacific Charter, we give assurance to our sister nations in Southeast Asia that we do not seek to defend colonialism in Asia but rather to liquidate it as speedily as possible by methods or free consent.

Given these two assurances, the other free states of Asia can find nothing objectionable to the Manila Treaty and the Pacific Charter.¹¹

This treaty, as a long-range defense structure, supported and welded by mutual economic and political understandings, was indeed an exceptional accomplishment when one considers the diverse backgrounds and interests of the parties to the agreement.

¹¹SEATO: 1954-1964, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Bangkok, February 1965, p. 8.

VI

ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY AND SEATO

The signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty--generally known as the Manila Treaty--marked the beginning of an intimate association of Eastern and Western powers concerned in the common defense of a vast Asian and Pacific region. In addition to the Treaty proper, the work of the conference resulted in the signing of three secondary documents, related to but not essential to the purpose of the Treaty. They were entitled the "Understanding of the United States," the "Protocol," and the "Pacific Charter."¹ These will be discussed briefly before an analysis of the Treaty is undertaken.

The special "Understanding of the United States" was insisted upon by Secretary of State Dulles and it merely defined the special interest of the United States in Communist aggression. But in the event of other aggression or armed attack, it was prepared to consult under the provisions of the Treaty. This definition was made to placate many Congressmen who feared that American military power might become involved in local political or quasi-colonial disputes.

¹See Appendix C for text of the Manila Treaty.

The "Protocol" to the Treaty designated the states of Cambodia, Laos, and the free territory of Vietnam as eligible for benefits under Article III and IV of the Treaty. These states were unable to participate as full members as a result of the Geneva Agreement.

The "Pacific Charter" was included at the suggestion of President Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippines in order to make clear to the signatories that right of self determination of peoples would be guarded and "colonialism" in any form would not be promoted.

The Treaty itself suggests a "Monroe Doctrine" concept of protection but implies much less of a commitment than that declared in the North Atlantic Treaty where "an attack on one equals an attack on all." Dulles is reported to have deliberately planned this to avoid issues of constitutional law when the treaty came up for ratification in the Senate.² But President Eisenhower's official comments on the signing of the Treaty were not nearly so specific in defining "aggression." He stated, "The Treaty is designed to promote security and peace in Southeast Asia and the Southwestern Pacific by deterring Communist and other aggression in that area. . . ."³ The Treaty provided in part

²Ralph Briabanti, International Implications of the Manila Pact (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957), p. 18.

³United States Congress, Senate, Message of the President, The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and

for a duplication of some commitments which had been assumed by the United States and the Philippines under their Treaty of 1951, and also, the obligations assumed by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States under the ANZUS Treaty. While the main theme of the Treaty related to military collective defense, there was also incorporated in the pact some provisions for trade, economic assistance, and cultural exchange programs.

Looked at from a broad perspective, the Manila Treaty embodied two essential military and political features which should be emphasized before a more thorough study and examination of the provisions of the Treaty are made. First, the agreements were a means of putting on a permanent basis the staff consultations that had been held between some members as a result of bilateral defense arrangements. The Treaty served as a permanent framework for the continuation of these military contacts on a regular basis and defined which threats to mutual security would arouse organized military response by the signatory powers. The military provisions offered protection to the small non-signatory countries in the area which might request such aid, and might otherwise be defenseless against threat of aggression. The second broad feature of the Treaty was the

the Protocol Thereto, Executive K, The White House, November 10, 1954 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 2.

political arrangement for aligning the nations of Southeast Asia formally on the side of the United States on matters of common interest in the area.

In his message, President Eisenhower also emphasized that the "Treaty calls for economic cooperation to enable the free countries of this area to gain strength and vigor not only militarily, but also socially and economically." The main body of the Treaty, however, relates to the military security aspects of the Treaty area and these are very clearly defined.

The Preamble of the Treaty set forth the spirit and purpose of the Treaty. It recognized the sovereign equality of all the parties and reiterated their faith in the Charter of the United Nations and defined the legality of this Treaty under Article 51 of that charter which permits individual and collective defense. This Treaty, it stated, was directed against no government, no nations and against no peoples.

Article I reiterated the resolve of all the parties to reaffirm their solemn obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to settle by peaceful means any international disputes in which they may be involved, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II contained the principle of the earlier Vandenberg resolution, which required that collective security pacts entered into by the United States must be based on continuous self-help and mutual aid. The parties pledged themselves by such means not only to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack but also to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without. The Treaty thus emphasized the danger of subversion and indirect aggression.⁴

Article III declared that sound economies and free institutions were essential in maintaining internal peace and security. It recognized that Communism breeds on poverty, and that nations might be able to develop their internal stability through economic cooperation. Secretary Dulles pointed out that this article created no economic walls against nations in the region which did not participate in the Treaty but did offer a special relationship to the member states. Nor did Article III preclude United States' aid to non-member nations when their economic strength and stability contributed to the stability of the area.⁵

⁴Ibid., p. 3.

⁵United States Senate, The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, p. 4.

The collective security objectives of the Treaty were two-fold. One is implied in the Protocol to the Treaty. This made it possible for the designated Protocol states to appeal for assistance in case of violation of the Geneva Agreement and would thus help to stabilize the area as a whole. Another is found in Article IV which was designed to avert acts of aggression or subversion. This article, described by Dulles as the most important of the Treaty, contained three sections.⁶ Section I defined measures to be taken against overt aggression and provided for certain non-signatory states to be included in the protection of the Treaty, under specific conditions. Section II described the obligations of member states pursuant to the measures to be taken against subversion, while Section III described the duties of member states in assisting the designated states in case of aggression.

The non-signatory states referred to in Section I were Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Associate membership was broached for these "Protocol" states by the members, particularly the United States, which regarded the cease fire in Indo-China as a major Communist achievement and recognition of certain Communist control in Southeast

⁶Ibid.

Asia.⁷ The neutralization of Laos and Cambodia had been part of the Geneva Agreement. Many Americans feared that this might embolden those who hoped to bring these states under future Communist influence and control and thus constitute a threat to the Treaty area. Since the Manila Treaty resulted mainly from the crisis in Indo-China, the security of these states was of great importance to Southeast Asia.

To facilitate implementation of the Treaty, Article V provided for a Council of the member nations. This Council would provide for consultation regarding military and other planning as the situation in the area might require. It was this article that gave authority for the permanent Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

Article VI reminded the parties of their obligations to the United Nations Charter. Each member declared that it was party to no international arrangements in conflict with the United Nations and that it would not in the future undertake such arrangements.

Article VII made it clear that not all nations which were interested in the Treaty or might benefit from it were able to become members, and this provision would make it possible for them to accede to membership at some future

⁷J. H. Brimmell, Communism in South East Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 284.

date. This would require, however, the unanimous consent of the members.

Article VIII described the "Treaty area" as the general area of Southeast Asia, including the entire territories of the Asian parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of twenty-one degrees thirty minutes north latitude.

Article IX merely assigned the Republic of the Philippines as the official depositary of the Treaty while Article X and XI covered technical aspects of the duration of the Treaty, procedures for withdrawal of membership, and agreement on the language of the Treaty texts. The Treaty was to continue indefinitely.

It is significant that the Treaty commitments of the United States included defense of part of the mainland of Southeast Asia, since the United States has been traditionally shy of military involvement in this area. It was also the first time that Australia and New Zealand had participated in treaty arrangements in Southeast Asia, outside of previous empire commitments. New Guinea, Timor, Indonesia, and Burma belonged to the Treaty area. Though not being members, their governments might nevertheless request protection which would be accorded if the signatory members agreed. The Treaty could be applied in the case of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos only "at the invitation

or with the consent of the government concerned."⁸

The wording of the commitments against external attack in Article IV differed from that of the North Atlantic Treaty both in purpose and spirit. Rather than the "attack on one is an attack on all" concept, this Article stated more moderately that "aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty area against any of the parties . . . endangers its own peace and safety," and each government would "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."⁹ Article IV likewise stated that the parties to the Treaty must consult together to devise methods against subversion, while consultation prior to action against external attack was not required although coordinated efforts were implied. Interpretation of this Article IV led to long debate during the Congressional hearings on ratification of the Treaty. Hamilton Fish, as president of the American Political Action Committee, pleaded that the real danger of this provision was that the United States government could now make war without a declaration of war, and might feel duty bound to react in a military way to any Chinese or other Communist provocation. He did not feel that Article IV, as presented, could definitely avoid dual

⁸Department of State, Bulletin, "The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty," Vol. XXI, No. 795, 20 (September 1954), Art. IV, Sect. 3.

⁹Ibid., Art. IV, Sect. 1.

interpretation.¹⁰ The rather loose interpretation that could be given to this section of the Treaty was made evident in 1962 during the crisis in Laos. Eager to reassure its ally, the United States declared that any action in meeting an armed attack by Communist forces did "not depend upon prior agreement of all parties to the Treaty, since this treaty obligation is individual as well as collective."¹¹

And again in Dulles' report to the Senate, mentioned above, he stated that no material changes in military planning were required since we were "maintaining at all times powerful naval and air forces in the Western Pacific capable of striking at any aggressor by means and at places of our choosing."¹² This too could suggest independent interpretations of action in non-member states rather than consultations and collective determinations as required by the Treaty. Action against subversion and overt military attack, when carried out simultaneously, could render Article IV's provisions against subversion somewhat ambiguous.

¹⁰United States Congress, Senate, Hearing Before Committee on Foreign Relations, The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, January 19, 1955 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 43.

¹¹Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 46, "Statement by Dean Rusk and Thanat Khoman," HO 11671 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 498.

¹²United States Congress, Senate, Hearing Before Committee on Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 6.

Since no action should be taken against attack or subversion on a non-member state except at the invitation of that state, the Treaty powers might face a difficult problem. As a result of a successful coup d'etat, the legally constituted state would no longer exist and no invitation for intervention could legally evolve. This could be a real dilemma under the Treaty and would have to be anticipated in an area where the coup d'etat is not infrequently employed. These risks of possible misinterpretation did exist but it was decided that the danger of this could hardly be worse than inaction. Dulles had declared earlier that collective action might have risks, "but these risks are far less than would face us in a few years from now if we dare not be resolute today."¹³

The Council, established under provision of Article V of the Treaty, was granted only broad general outlines of authority. In fact, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) itself became an organization as a result of Council action and was not inherently provided for in the Treaty. The Bangkok Conference, held in the Thai capital February 23-25, 1955, involved an epochal development in American foreign policy with respect to Southeast Asia. It not only marked the first meeting of the Council created by the

¹³Norman A. Graebner, An Uncertain Tradition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), p. 295.

Treaty, but also founded the structure for SEATO which was to implement the spirit and provisions of the Manila Treaty.¹⁴

The SEATO Council which consists of the Foreign Ministers of the eight member countries and meets annually, sets the broad, common policies required for the fulfillment of the objectives of the Treaty. Each Foreign Minister represents his country and each has an equal voice in the proceedings. All decisions are unanimous.¹⁵ The Bangkok Conference first set up a Permanent Council of Representatives which was to meet at SEATO Headquarters, at least once a month. The selection of Bangkok as the permanent headquarters of SEATO was a very logical choice. Although both Singapore and Manila put up strong arguments in favor of these two sites, emphasizing the excellent technical facilities and communications systems already available, both were rejected for sensitive political reasons. Singapore, being a Crown Colony, and representing a system repugnant to most of the newly independent states of Asia, could not be seriously considered. Likewise, Manila was

¹⁴Department of State, The Bangkok Conference of the Manila Powers, Publication 5909, Ser. II, Far Eastern 5 (Washington: Government Printing Office, August 1955), p. 1.

¹⁵Office of Public Information, SEATO REPORT, 1954-1959 (Bangkok: Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Headquarters, 1959), p. 14.

regarded as too much on the periphery of the area and possibly too closely oriented with the United States to offer a good neutral background for the participating powers. Thailand, however, was part of the Asian land mass, and headquarters in Bangkok would reflect the faith of its planners in the permanence of the area. With the SEATO Military Headquarters in close proximity to the areas of possible Communist aggression, such presence might act as a deterrent to any rash action on the part of Communist China, and would serve as a political stabilizing influence within Thailand as well.¹⁶

In addition to this Permanent Council, a Military Advisory Group was formed, composed of a military member each from the signatory states, for the purpose of making recommendations on military matters to the Council and to pursue the implementation of recommendations approved by the Permanent Council. This group established a planning office in Bangkok for training facilities in Thailand and throughout the Treaty area. A Secretariat-General was established to support and coordinate the non-military work of the organization. Its head, the Secretary-General, was to be the chief permanent official of SEATO and the spokesman for the organization. Other committees and

¹⁶Modelski, op. cit., p. 107.

sections were created to carry out the special purposes of the Manila Treaty. The Central Service Office was to deal with administrative and financial matters pertaining to the organization. The Cultural Relations Office was expected to encourage the strengthening of the members' cultural heritage through use of grants, exchange scholarships, and traveling lectureships. The Economic Services Office was given the broad function of collecting information on current economic development and problems, and economic activities of the Communist bloc, especially in the Treaty area.¹⁷ On the basis of the information gathered by the Office's own research and other sources, studies were to be prepared on the specific economic questions for the consideration of a Committee of Economic Experts and the Council representatives. Another function was to make periodic reports on actions in the economic field taken by the member governments to carry out recommendations of the SEATO Council.

The program for economic cooperation and the improvement of social conditions was provided for in Article III of the Treaty. Here, technical assistance was specifically mentioned in promoting economic progress which would contribute to internal and collective efforts of governments.

¹⁷SEATO REPORT, 1954-1959, op. cit., p. 19.

The Pacific Charter also affirmed the intention of the signatories to "continue to cooperate in the economic, social and cultural field in order to promote higher living standards, economic progress and social well being in the region." Although it was not clear at the time the Treaty and Charter were signed whether it was intended to implement these proposals through an organization created specifically for this purpose under the Treaty, or whether agencies already existing in the area would be used, this question was explored at the Bangkok Conference and resolved accordingly. Rather than set up administration of foreign aid which might duplicate efforts and programs already underway, it was decided that existing arrangements for aid should continue and that additional aid under the Manila Treaty should be confined to compensation for military aid and other expenditures incurred in connection with the Treaty itself. Programs already in existence referred to the vast bilateral aid programs supported by the United States, the Colombo Plan, United Nations agencies such as ECAFE, and the World Bank.

The foreign aid planning of the United States had kept in mind the danger of economic under-development and the accompanying stress which might invite Communist schemes for reform. There was no certainty that a country would not turn to Communism even though, possibly with Western

help, it was making good progress in raising living standards. But there was a real danger that a country which found itself frustrated in its social and economic aims would turn to Communism in despair. The chances that a country would be encouraged to preserve a system of social and political freedom were certainly much better if it were improving and raising the standard of living of its citizens. Where living standards were not raised, unrest and agitation could quickly invite change. The measure of economic improvement was entirely relative. In Southeast Asia, where economies were based largely on agriculture, the scope and cost of a program to render improvement was much less than that for a country of similar size in Europe which had advanced to a greater degree of industrialization. The encouragement of land reform schemes, improved methods of cultivation, increased access to markets through better transportation systems, irrigation projects, canals, road building, and electrification of rural areas, would greatly increase living standards. The American foreign aid programs began as early as 1942 in the Latin American countries, but the first ambitious effort followed President Truman's Inaugural appeal to make the benefits of scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of under-developed areas. From a modest beginning of 35 million dollars in 1950, the American foreign aid

programs to Southeast Asia exceeded 8 billion dollars by 1958. Under pressure of the Korean and Indo-China wars, the essentially economic objectives of foreign aid gave way to assistance related more closely to political and military requirements.¹⁸ The stated purpose of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 was to

. . . maintain the security and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries and to strengthen the national security and individual and collective defense of the free world.¹⁹

The original good intentions of purely economic assistance was perforce altered to meet the military threats during this period. By January of 1954, Secretary of State Dulles had to admit that foreign aid was being limited to situations where it clearly contributed to military strength, especially in Vietnam. There was some early hesitation on the part of the United Kingdom to accept this diversion to military aid since British emphasis at the first Bangkok Conference was on the economic rather than military objectives of the Treaty. British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden hoped it would ". . . promote economic well-being and

¹⁸Amos A. Jordan, "U. S. Foreign Assistance in Southeast Asia," in William Henderson (ed.), Problems of U. S. Policy (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), p. 213.

¹⁹King, op. cit., p. 156.

development . . . We should all know by now that a free and prosperous people is Communism's most formidable foe."²⁰ In answer to the question on the purpose of aid to Southeast Asia, the Clay Committee replied that if this assistance strengthened the will and capacity of a country to remain independent and helped it move toward political and economic stability, our money would have been wisely spent.²¹ The United States' bilateral assistance under the Manila Treaty was undertaken with this purpose in mind in most instances. By doing so, it helped these regions achieve an improvement in both economic and political posture.

Other aspects of foreign aid took more specific forms. The securing of bases for military purposes of SEATO defense required large capital outlays which were beneficial to the countries involved. In some cases, offers of aid were extended to preclude offers of aid from Communist sources. The Russian and Chinese Communist governments have always been disturbed by this successful venture into development of the nations of Southeast Asia, and they have sought to picture ulterior motives behind Western moves. They usually described such foreign aid as a scheme to

²⁰Department of State, The Bangkok Conference, op. cit., p. 25.

²¹Jordan, op. cit., p. 214.

resume the old colonial positions in Southeast Asia. A typical charge was that:

American businessmen and politicians, placing little reliance on doctrines and theories, preferred to conduct their shady business with the countries in the name of their allies and under the auspices of international organization. This happened in South Vietnam when the U.S.A. 'imperceptibly' supplanted France.²²

Expenditures in good will, communications, medicine, education, and cultural exchanges, likewise required heavy capital outlays. The use of funds in preclusive purchasing to deny strategic materials to the Communist bloc entailed large hidden expenditures. These were all economic measures pertinent to American implementation of Article III of the Treaty. But they were small measures in comparison to the overall military assistance given in support of indigenous armed forces. In evaluating the potential economic benefit of some of these so-called military expenditures, it can be seen that many projects had dual value. The same roads constructed for the military in the north of Thailand could also be used for hauling teak or wolfram to the port of Bangkok for export. The new vast telecommunication systems served both the military and civilian needs, even though the cost was charged as a military expense. Too, the establishment of military air bases throughout the Treaty area has created a fine network

²²Y. Konovalov, "The Tentacles of Bases Strategy," International Affairs, Vol. 7 (Moscow: July 1963), p. 56.

of commercial air-strips which can be used concurrently. New military power stations have a capacity and permanency to meet civil requirements of large areas for years to come.²³

Implementation of the economic provisions of the Treaty were an important task of the first meeting of the Council at Bangkok, but the creation of the military organ to maintain the collective defense of the Treaty area was a much more complicated undertaking. The military commitments of the Treaty were carefully spelled out. It was fully agreed, for example, that in the event of an attempted Communist conquest of Thailand, the members would be committed to fight and must be willing and able to fight. The method of meeting such an attempted conquest would depend on its nature, the area of attack, and the type of terrain involved in the immediate theater of the attack. Consequently, the type of threats possible in the Treaty area should be examined before analyzing the military provisions of the Treaty.

By its geographical nature and configuration, the area did not lend itself to the deployment of mass armies.²⁴

²³"Partners in Progress," SEATO REPORT (Bangkok: SEATO Headquarters, 1962), p. 7.

²⁴Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 158.

Poor roads, heavy jungle, monsoon weather cycles, and an almost purely agrarian economic base for supply, contributed little to the support of modern land forces. The logistic requirements per man in the modern Western army was many times that of the Communist Asian counterpart, as was revealed in World War II and the Korean War. From a political point of view, the traditional dislike of foreign garrisons in Asian countrysides, the inevitable incidents between military and local citizens, the differences in the political and social philosophies of the member nations, all made the question of permanent foreign garrisons impractical.

Because of the long distances involved from the Asian mainland to the Philippines or Australia and the vast amount of material necessary, it could be assumed that an overt attack would not take the form of an amphibious operation, although submarine and mine warfare was a limited possibility. Chances of air attacks were more to be reckoned with, but these would hardly assume dangerous proportions unless they came as a prelude to invasion. The remaining type of attack would take the form of either a mass land invasion or concerted guerilla operations. Among member nations, only Pakistan had a common border with China and this was 200 miles of mountain barrier. An attack against Thailand or East Pakistan would perforce violate the

neutrality of Burma and India, and any other theater of aggression would have to be directed against Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. The decision not to maintain large permanent garrisons in static posture in the treaty area was first set forth by Secretary Dulles at the Bangkok Council meeting in 1955.²⁵ Instead, the main strength would rest with mobile strategic forces of great sea and air power which could strike swiftly wherever the need arose. This massive retaliation force would be able to utilize most of the United States strategic bases from the Aleutians to the Philippines. In addition to this heavy mobile force, each partner would be expected to supply ground forces, and the United Kingdom and the United States would make the major naval contributions. Among Western forces would be the nearly 45,000 Americans based at Okinawa, and the 28th Commonwealth Brigade plus the supporting air units available in Malaya.²⁶ Air power would contain groups from the Asian members as well. Mobility and massive striking power was to be the basis for all defense doctrine. Arthur H. Dean, the former special Ambassador to Korea, in 1953-1954, declared,

²⁵The Bangkok Conference, op. cit., p. 5.

²⁶The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances (London, 1963), p. 22.

We ought not to scatter our power into show pieces of ineffective size by establishing substantial stationary United States forces in forward areas, since our military establishment is relatively small compared with the extent of the territory to be protected.²⁷

Specific commitments to the SEATO military establishment by the member states was to be determined by the nature of their forces, and their geographical proximity to threatened areas. This applied as well to air and naval forces permanently assigned to SEATO function. These SEATO obligations became a great part of the U. S. Seventh Fleet's training and service activities. Great Britain was maintaining a substantial Asiatic force, spread from her strategic commitments in the Middle East to Hong Kong. Australian air and sea participation was also substantial. The SEATO garrison in Thailand was to be manned by local troops. The bulk of the massive retaliation striking force rested with the United States. There were also Military Assistance Advisory Groups and supporting troops stationed throughout the Treaty area, but the main American combat units remained in the Korean, Hawaiian, and Okinawan areas, outside of those employed in South Vietnam. The 13th Air Force, stationed in the Philippines at Clark Field had full sweep of Southeast Asia and was within easy striking

²⁷ Arthur H. Dean, "Collective Defense in Southeast Asia," Current History, Vol. 31, No. 179, July 1956, p. 8.

distance.²⁸ Under the Security Section of SEATO, a training program to combat subversion was set up, using military and constabulary forces of the member nations.

SEATO joint planning and training programs, both military and civil, were an active and essential part of the organization from the start. Member nations, especially Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand all experienced a shortage of skilled workers in the industries and shops that were to support the organization. The outcome was the SEATO Skilled Labour Project which supplemented the efforts of the governments of these countries to increase their supply of trained manpower. Besides various technical schools established in the Treaty areas, a SEATO Graduate School of Engineering at Bangkok provided a two-year course of advanced instruction leading to a master's degree in structural, hydraulic, transportation or public health engineering.²⁹ A SEATO Military Technical Training School in Bangkok provided a three-year training course for the future technical supervisors, foremen, skilled workmen and instructors of the Royal Thai Army, Navy, and Air Forces. Meteorological telecommunications projects were also set up

²⁸James E. King, "Collective Defense: The Military Commitment," in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 129.

²⁹SEATO: 1954-1964, op. cit., p. 9.

in Thailand and the Philippines, as well as medical research laboratories.

The military training programs began soon after the founding of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. As early as 1956, SEATO undertook its first joint military maneuver named "Operation Firm Link" in which all members participated in a mock airborne operation against a simulated attack in northern Thailand.³⁰ The operation employed use of amphibious, paratroop, air, naval, and ground forces. This exercise was the first of a long series of joint problems of this type to be conducted regularly throughout the Treaty region since its inception. The first maneuver was far from a real success, but it did serve to emphasize the weaknesses inherent in any operation of this type, employing multi-lingual elements with diverse training backgrounds. Standardization of procedures would be very necessary.³¹ The areas used for these exercises changed regularly to better acquaint the SEATO members with their various theaters of operation. Operation "Saddle Up" invaded North Borneo and this was followed by exercise "Tulungan" carried out by amphibious forces against a

³⁰SEATO Record, Vol. 1 (Bangkok: SEATO Headquarters, 1956), p. 8.

³¹"Seato," Deadline Data on World Affairs, August-March 1962, p. 3.

Philippine shore. Of these many practice maneuvers carried out each year, a specific type of military operation was attempted, to acquaint these forces with operations they might encounter in case of a military aggression in the Treaty area. Operation "Tulungan," held in 1962, employed 400 aircraft, 78 naval ships, and 37,000 men. The planning and study involved in such operations required close team work and coordination and this was made possible through the Military Planning Office of the Organization. In a recent report on SEATO, the Secretary-General, Pote Sarasin, drew attention to the military exercises held during the past years which he said,

developed from relatively simple demonstrations of coordinated movement, into highly complicated maneuvers which tax and develop skill of the members' armed forces in combined action.³²

The political and military problems faced by these member nations were shared to some extent by non-member states as well and SEATO's success has evinced considerable interest throughout Asia. In 1959, for example, both Burma and Indonesia dispatched observers to the SEATO military exercises in Thailand. Besides military preparedness, their interest was focused, as well, on the economic and technical developments of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

³²Pote Sarasin, Secretary-General, Report on Seato, 1962-1963 (Bangkok: SEATO Headquarters), p. 12.

Such a complex, coordinated military structure had not been maintained over this vast area since World War II. The successful growth of the organization from the early hopes of the first Council meeting at Bangkok to the present reflected the concern that the member powers held regarding possible Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.³³

³³Modelski, op. cit., p. 8.

VII

CHALLENGES TO SEATO

Before any evaluation of SEATO's usefulness can be attempted, there must be a review of the political and military crises that have developed in the Treaty area since 1954 and the challenges that these events have posed to the Manila Treaty powers. As anticipated by Secretary of State Dulles, the most serious breaches of peace have occurred in the "Protocol" states of Laos and South Vietnam which were not eligible for full membership in the Treaty due to the Geneva Agreement, but which Dulles hoped might be given some "mantle of protection."¹ In the case of Laos, the Communist Pathet Lao have attempted a series of insurgencies aimed at the overthrow of the Royal Government. A similar rebellion in South Vietnam, led by the Communist Vietcong, an integral part of North Vietnam's Lao Dong Party has resulted in very heavy military operations which could engulf the Treaty powers in a major war. Communist Chinese and Soviet support of this rebellion has been quite open, as will be seen, but the Manila Treaty powers have had to exercise great restraint in their reactions to avoid charges of "reckless interference" in the internal affairs of these states, despite requests from the states

¹U. S. Daily Wireless Bulletin, September 7, 1954.

themselves.

When SEATO was created, China had already become formally allied with the Soviet Union in a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance dated February 1950. This Treaty joined these Communist powers against a resurgence of Japanese militarism and for the purpose of furthering their mutual interests in the economic well-being and peace of Asia.² The Chinese Communist Party made early efforts to assert its ideological independence from the Soviet Union and this was soon made evident by China's participation with Communist leadership in Southeast Asia and its support of other Asian Communist movements. Not wishing to become subservient to the Soviet Union, and finding themselves frequently at odds with Soviet policy on such matters as Hungary and Albania, the Chinese have taken a more active independent part in the Communist movement in Asia. Following the Chinese disengagement in Korea, heavy logistic commitments went to the extension of military support to the Vietminh in Indo-China which ultimately led to the political settlement of the Indo-China war at Geneva in 1954.³ The spread of Communism into northern Vietnam

²Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 261.

³J. H. Brimmell, Communism in Southeast Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 259.

gave the Peoples Republic of China the opportunity to extend its influence through the support of expanded Vietminh activities in southern Vietnam and the strengthening of the Pathet Lao dissident forces in northern Laos.

The political turmoil that has existed in Laos since World War II resulted mainly from the struggle for power between a few elite political factions, two of which were led by rival half-brothers, Prince Souphanouvong and Prince Souvanna Phouma. These groups had their origin in the strong anti-colonial movements which prevailed prior to World War II and they were strengthened by a period of semi-political autonomy during the Japanese occupation. The Pathet Lao, under the leadership of Prince Souphanouvong, strongly opposed the re-establishment of French presence in Laos after Japan's defeat and turned to the Vietminh for support, both political and military.⁴ Using Thailand as a base (and not without sympathetic Thai support), Souphanouvong organized his "Resistance Government" and by 1952 succeeded in securing political control over two of the remote northeastern provinces of Laos bordering Tongking in North Vietnam. At about this time his activities in Thailand were curtailed by the Thai government after evidence was uncovered that this same group had tried to incite

⁴Butwell, op. cit., p. 131.

Laotians in Thailand to agitate for an autonomous Lao province in northeast Thailand.⁵ During July of 1955, fighting erupted between the Communist oriented Pathet Lao forces and the Royal government troops in northern Laos despite the Geneva accord, and the presence of the International Control Commission. At this time an attempt was made by Thailand to have the Manila Treaty powers formally declare their concern over this matter, indicating both SEATO jurisdiction and SEATO unity. But, for the first time, Britain and France vetoed the resolution and suggested that the International Control Commission merely be notified that the situation was reviewed. The Soviet press made a propaganda issue of SEATO disagreements and spoke of the

deepening crisis which has beset the principal aggressive grouping in Southeast Asia, the United States' sponsored SEATO bloc. Britain and particularly France have not expressed any desire to participate in SEATO "join" actions.

In 1957 the Royal Laotian government arrived at a settlement with the Pathet Lao. The two northeast provinces were

⁵During a talk with Prince Souphanouvong at Bangkok in 1951, he complained to the writer that Laotian refugees in the Udon district of northeast Thailand were being harshly treated by the Thai police and many of these Laotians were anxious to return to north Laos if the Royal government of Laos would give them safe conduct.

⁶"Washington's Asian Impasse," International Affairs, VIII (Moscow, 1962), 34.

re-incorporated into the Laotian state, the armed forces of Prince Souphanouvong were assimilated into the regular Laotian army except for his own elite political guards. While SEATO played no direct role in the settlement, it did maintain contact with the Royal Laotian government. During the negotiations the United States, Britain, and France issued a tripartite note affirming their interest in the independence and unity of Laos. This gave the Laotian government the public support of the three major Western powers in SEATO but did not commit the organization to any other course.

Efforts of the International Control Commission to investigate and expose violations of the Geneva Agreement were continuously hampered by the veto power of the Polish commissioner against the Indian and Canadian members. Laos again became the focus of world attention in 1959 when another flare-up took place between re-grouped Pathet Lao and government forces. The Secretary-General of SEATO immediately declared the matter entirely a Laotian internal affair and that SEATO would remain outside this conflict. The United Nations Security Council expressed concern over the Laotian situation as early as 1959. At that time, Thailand notified the Council of border violations in her northeast provinces when fighting had erupted in that area facing Laos. Although Russia protested the implication that

the Pathet Lao were supported by forces of North Vietnam, the United Nations agreed to investigate the matter.⁷ Speaking of this Laotian incident before the Supreme Soviet in October 1959, Chairman Nikita Khrushchev stated,

Given a reasonable approach and adherence to international agreements, the skirmishes which are taking place there can be ended and the situation normalized. The important thing is that the Great Powers should not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries or else there may be undesirable consequences.⁸

In late 1959 and early 1960, the Pathet Lao, supported by a Soviet airlift of military supplies, regained control of much of northern Laos as well as areas in the south bordering on South Vietnam. The effect of this Soviet aid which was sent from North Vietnam was to put the Pathet Lao in a position of unprecedented strength.⁹ The Laotian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the same time announced that his government was considering an appeal to SEATO under Article IV of the Manila Treaty. The SEATO Council responded by announcing its "grave concern" over the continued offensive of the Pathet Lao rebels. The Council

⁷"Request of Thailand for Assistance Under the Peace Observation Commission," Yearbook of the United Nations, 1959, p. 60.

⁸K. U. Chernenko (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy, Basic Acts and Documents of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1956-1962 (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1962), p. 90.

⁹Modelski, op. cit., p. 13.

further declared that if active military attempts to obtain control of Laos continued, members of SEATO were prepared ". . . within the terms of the Treaty, to take whatever action may be appropriate in the circumstances."¹⁰ As the Laos situation assumed major crisis proportions, moves for a cease-fire were offered to the Pathet Lao, and when they refused, the Royal government appealed to SEATO members to bring pressure to bear, the United States threatened unilateral action to preserve the integrity of Laos. President Kennedy appealed to the American people, moved new forces to the Pacific and marine helicopter crews into the north-east provinces of Thailand. With this adamant show of intention, the Pathet Lao called for a cease-fire in May. SEATO had to decide whether to intervene in this internal war, and it concluded reluctantly that it had to face such a possibility. It declared its readiness to do so in guaranteeing the cease-fire in Laos. The Geneva settlement of the Laotian question in 1962 guaranteed peace and neutrality for Laos, but the Pathet Lao, supported by Vietminh, acquired still more territory during 1962-1963 and have largely invalidated the position of Souvanna Phouma.

¹⁰William Henderson (ed.), Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), p. 150.

as the neutralist leader of the Geneva-sponsored coalition government.¹¹

A second and more serious challenge to peace and stability in the Treaty area which constitutes a challenge to SEATO as well, has been the Communist Viet-Cong threat to South Vietnam. Of the many countries of Asia, Vietnam is one of the few that can be considered basically a Sinic culture, and has in fact been incorporated in China proper during many periods of its long history. Like the Thais, the first Vietnamese migrated southward from China centuries ago. During this period the Chinese had sought to extend their control and influence over these migrated brethren, but usually met resistance.¹² From the first Chinese conquest until the French in turn gained control in the nineteenth century, Vietnam's political relationship to China had been one of a cautious and anxious neighbor. Before the French era, this studied caution was determined largely by the strength of the Chinese government in power at the time. Even the late Manchu dynasty in the seventeenth century imposed a tribute relationship on Indo-China and as late as 1885 Vietnam rulers received investiture from Peking.

¹¹Ibid., p. 150.

¹²Harold C. Hinton, China's Relations with Burma and Vietnam (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations), p. 56.

Although this direct subservience was ended with the French occupation, the national and political development of these people was strongly affected by Chinese influence. Vietnam's thousand year vassalage to China contributed several historical traditions.

Despite the ethnic similarities, the Tongkingese in the northern part of Vietnam have been extremely distrustful of the Chinese. This has resulted in awkward relations between the Communist parties of the two countries. The cultural sophistication and unusual discipline of the northern Vietnamese gave them a superior attitude in their dealings with the Chinese. The memory of the early Mongol invasions of the Thirteenth Century, followed later by the Ming and Manchu forces, did not make the Nationalist Chinese occupation of Tongking very pleasant after the surrender of the Japanese in 1945.

Nguyen Ai Quoc, who took the name of Ho Chi Minh, was released from a jail in South China in 1944 at the urging of U. S. military authorities. They hoped that this known Communist leader would be able to form a core of resistance to the Japanese in Tongking and could serve the OSS as well in developing contacts in Japanese held territories. In addition he was to form an indigenous liberation movement, similar to the Free Thai movement led by former Thai Premier Pridi Panamyong. That he succeeded much beyond American expectations is very evident today.

There is an interesting parallel to this phenomenon in Thailand, Malaya, and the Philippines where the so-called "anti-fascist" forces of liberation during World War II became the nuclei of Communist movements in these countries following the Japanese surrender. By August of 1945 Ho Chi Minh's influence extended across most of the northern districts of Tongking and down to the delta provinces of South Vietnam. The OSS was delighted with his success and he was in very high favor with the first American contingents in Hanoi in 1945.¹³

Contrary to American wishes, the French managed to reestablish effective military and political control over the southern half of Vietnam with the assistance of a British occupation force under General D. A. Gracey. The north was relieved of the Chinese Nationalist occupation in late 1946 and Vietnam was unified with a promise of independence within the French Union under Emperor Bao Dai. But failure of the French to carry out this promise set off bitter reactions throughout the country and a guerilla warfare broke out in early 1947 which was to continue through to the present day.

Prior to World War II, the old Indo-China Communist Party was an offshoot of the French Communist Party and

¹³Ibid., p. 17.

maintained a close association with the Soviet Communist Party as well. But under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh after the Japanese War, this party became more closely associated, geographically and ideologically, with the Chinese Communist Party. Problems peculiar to Asia and the close similarity of the agricultural and industrial development of the two states made this orientation rather logical. In 1951 the Indo-China Communist Party was transformed and took the title of the Vietnamese Workers Party or Lao Dong. In addition to Marx and Lenin, the teachings and theories of Mao Tse-tung were adapted for party direction.¹⁴ This new party aimed for international solidarity with the people of Cambodia, Laos, the Soviet Union, China, and all Peoples democracies. Ho Chi Minh became President and Vo Nguyen Giap its military commander. In structure the party took the Chinese rather than Soviet form and this reorganization formally broke French Communist Party control.¹⁵ Like the Chinese Party, the Lao Dong provided for a broad base of support through various front organizations.

Following the French defeat and the Geneva Agreement in 1954, Chinese influence and activity in the Lao Dong was

¹⁴Bernard B. Fall, The Viet Minh Regime (New York: The Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956), p. 36.

¹⁵Brimmell, op. cit., p. 296.

greatly stepped up as well as Chinese participation in the economic strengthening of the new Peoples Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The leading role played by Communist China during the Geneva Conference paved the way for greater Chinese influence in North Vietnam. In 1955 the Vietminh made further changes in the party structure in order to create a greater appeal to nationalist opinion in South Vietnam and to enhance the Party's respectability in Asian eyes. This resulted in separating the functions of the Party chief, Ho Chi Minh, and the political leadership, Premier Pham Van Dong. In September 1955, the third congress of the Lien Viet Fatherland Front declared that North Vietnamese regarded the division of Vietnam as merely a temporary measure until sufficient time and indoctrination prepared the south for acceptance of Communist leadership in a unified Vietnam. This was to be accomplished by "free" elections.¹⁶ In the summer of 1955 Ho Chi Minh made an official visit to Peking and on July 7 signed a Sino-Vietnamese communique with Chou En-lai in which they warned the United States and the other Treaty powers against implementing the "designated" states portions of the Manila Pact. The same communique announced that China would grant North Vietnam 800 million Chinese Yuan for rehabilitation

¹⁶BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, Vol. V, No. 494 (1955), 34.

and would greatly expand the technical cooperation between the two nations. In addition, the North Vietnamese would send cadres to China for training and the Chinese would send technical and military advisory missions to North Vietnam.¹⁷

After the appearance of a new political strong-man in South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, the Lao Dong's ambition to win over early support of nationalist sentiments in South Vietnam came to an end. With American support, Diem quickly aroused a strong political following in the south. This American support took the form of heavy outlays in foreign aid, both military and economic. He declared that the free elections throughout Vietnam would not take place since South Vietnam was not a party to the Geneva Conference. Such elections could not be considered free unless all Communist cadres were withdrawn from the north and impartial United Nations' observers were on hand to supervise the elections. These conditions were not acceptable to North Vietnam. Diem's effective pacification of dissident elements in South Vietnam, including the religious Cao Dai sect and the French supported Binh Xuyen party, established him in a strong position to counter North Vietnam influence. Facing this new power, Ho Chi Minh was forced to discontinue

¹⁷Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs (London: The Chiswick Press, 1955), p. 475.

his appeals for unity under the Communist leadership and instead established an underground apparatus called the Vietnam Labour Youth League, a division of the Lao Dong Communist Party.¹⁸ The United States' aid program in South Vietnam was undertaken outside of its SEATO obligations, but not in conflict with them. Other SEATO powers made independent contributions as well, especially Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. The massive United States aid program was seen not only as an effort to save Vietnam alone, but "to deny to the Communists the strategically and economically important area of Southeast Asia."¹⁹

Internally, the Communist organization in all Vietnam was seriously shaken by the Sino-Soviet ideological split following the Hungarian uprising and the de-Stalinization program undertaken by Khrushchev. The uncertain situation in the USSR and throughout the Communist movement after 1956 gave the Chinese an opportunity to exploit their strength and prestige in Asia.²⁰ Chinese interest in the North

¹⁸Brimmell, op. cit., p. 300.

¹⁹United States Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of the Special Study Mission to Southeast Asia, 88th Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 12.

²⁰P. G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 29.

Vietnamese became more active in late 1958. Speaking before the Fifth Session of the Peoples Congress in February 1958, Chou En-lai stated,

As one of the parties to the Geneva Agreement and a close neighbor of the Indo-Chinese countries, China is at all times concerned with the consolidation of peace in Indo-China . . .²¹

More evidence of this competition for Party support by both the Soviets and Chinese was the stepped-up Soviet participation in Laotian affairs in late 1959. This was followed by substantial increases in aid to North Vietnam at the same time.²²

It has been seen that no direct intervention by SEATO in this region was formally invited or undertaken, but individual nations within SEATO did offer assistance in the form of economic aid, medical programs, military advisory schemes, and training programs. Since 1961 means have been devised for associating South Vietnam in an observer status with meetings of the SEATO Council and other SEATO bodies. Vietnamese officers have observed most of the SEATO military exercises. While falling short of full participation, these new arrangements have made it possible for the

²¹Center for International Affairs, Communist China 1955-1959 Policy Documents (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 408.

²²Boyd, op. cit., p. 54.

Vietnamese army staff to make contacts with the Military Planning Office of SEATO at Bangkok. This has permitted at least some coordination of the individual foreign aid projects without committing SEATO collectively in the Vietnam war. Without full participation, the North Vietnamese feel confident that ultimate victory will be theirs. Following an interview with Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi during July 1962, Barnard Fall stated:

The feeling of the Hanoi leadership seems to be that a protracted revolutionary struggle in South Vietnam would fully discredit the south by the size of the U. S. commitment needed to keep it in power and would permit, in their words, "... the marshalling of world public opinion against American Imperialism."²³

During the long years of fighting in South Vietnam,. massive evidence and intelligence has been collected on the origins, support, strategy, and ultimate goals of the Viet Cong insurrection. Much of this material collected by the Security Branch of SEATO and the International Control Commission indicates that the Communist regime in North Vietnam, supplied by the Communist bloc throughout the world, has assisted in the organization and direction of the insurrection in South Vietnam. Statements of North Vietnam's leaders, captured documents and supplies, confessions of

²³Bernard B. Fall, "The Road to Socialism in North Vietnam," in Doak Barnett (ed.), Communist Strategy in Asia (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1963), p. 213.

captured agents, and other information secured through SEATO and South Vietnamese intelligence channels, would strengthen this charge. The Communist leadership does not deny this support and frequently exhorts the Party publicly to stronger action and greater discipline. For example, Le Duan, a member of the Politburo and First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party, said at the Party Congress held in Hanoi in September 1960,

Parallel to the building and consolidation of North Vietnam, bringing it to Socialism, our people should endeavor to maintain and develop the revolutionary forces in South Vietnam . . .²⁴

Numerous speeches and statements of the North Vietnam government leaders could be cited to show the nature of their activities in South Vietnam. A few of these are cited to substantiate their open avowels to subversion. Writing in the party organ Hoc Tap in April 1961, Truong Chinh, one of the principal leaders of the party in North Vietnam, referred to Hanoi as the "revolutionary base common to the entire country" and expressed confidence in the ability to remove the present government of South Vietnam. He added, "North Vietnam is serving as a strong base for the struggle for re-unification."²⁵ North Vietnam's Defense Minister,

²⁴SEATO Special Report, The Communist Plan to Conquer South Vietnam (Bangkok: The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 1962), pp. 3-4.

²⁵Ibid., p. 4.

General Vo Nguyen Giap, explicitly pointed out in Hoc Tap in January 1960 that "the North has become a large rear echelon of our army . . . The North is the revolutionary base for the whole country."²⁶ Even earlier in 1959 the Party Congress in Hanoi reaffirmed that:

The common task of the Vietnamese revolution is to . . . accelerate the socialist revolution in North Vietnam while at the same time stepping up the democratic revolution in South Vietnam . . . to maintain and develop these forces in the South and create a favourable condition for national re-unification.²⁷

A very significant document on this subject is the report of the International Control Commission, signed by India and Canada (not by Poland) and released by the British government on June 25, 1962. It stated that:

In specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the North (Vietnam) to the zone in the South with the object of supplying, organizing, and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks directed against the armed forces and administration of the zone in the South. These activities are in violation of Articles 10, 19, and 27 on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam²⁸

The use of sections of Laos as a base and infiltration route for the Viet Cong has been an important factor in the movement of men and supplies from North to South Vietnam. SEATO Security organs have been aware of this

²⁶Ibid., p. 5.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid., p. 17.

system for several years. In September 1961 there were several major engagements involving North Vietnamese Viet Cong forces of 500 to 1000 men, in Kontum Province and near Ban Me Thuot in the central highlands facing Laos, as well as in Phuoc Thanh and Kien Phong along the Laos border further to the south. In this connection, Tchepone, the town in eastern Laos to which Soviet transport planes had been airlifting supplies in 1961, is only twenty miles from the Vietnamese border. The airbase there has recently been expanded and Tchepone is now believed to be a major base of operations both for the Pathet Lao and the Viet Cong.²⁹

In 1961 the Department of State issued a special report entitled A Threat to the Peace. It described North Vietnam's program to seize South Vietnam. The evidence was collected by the Republic of South Vietnam and presented to the International Control Commission. A majority of the Commission agreed that there was sufficient evidence to show beyond a reasonable doubt that North Vietnam was guilty of organizing and supporting the insurrection in South Vietnam in specific violations of four provisions of the Geneva Agreement of 1954.³⁰

²⁹Ibid., p. 6.

³⁰Department of State, Aggression From the North, the Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam,

Very recently the Department of State issued a White Paper on the subject of Vietnam entitled Aggression From the North, the Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam. Released in late February 1965, it was timed to coincide with the United States' increased military involvement in Vietnam, particularly the airstrikes against North Vietnam supply and staging centers used by the Viet Cong. The report is a summary of the massive evidence of North Vietnamese aggression. The evidence has been jointly analyzed by South Vietnamese and American experts. It showed that the key leadership of the Viet Cong, the officers and much of the cadre, many of the technicians, the political organizers, and propagandists had come from the North and operated under Hanoi's direction. The training of essential military personnel and their infiltration into the South was directed by the Military High Command in Hanoi.³¹

The second section of this report gave evidence that the weapons and munitions used by the Viet Cong came from North Vietnam. In recent months new types of weapons have been introduced for which the ammunition had to come from outside sources, namely Communist China and Eastern European Communist bloc countries.³²

No. 7839 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 2.

³¹Ibid., p. 3.

³²Ibid., p. 15.

Section III of this report described the political apparatus used through the Lao Dong to control and direct operations against South Vietnam. The Fourth section explained the military-political structures used by Hanoi to further the Viet Cong war. Each of these sections of the report presented a mass of documentary evidence, many including photographs, and the findings of the International Control Commission are likewise produced as evidence. Under the heading of military infiltration, the report cites the following example. Special training camps are operated in Xuan Mai and Thanh Hoa in North Vietnam. Trained personnel are then infiltrated to the South by the 70th Transport Group which uses trails via Laos as well as the maritime route along the coast. A typical case was Major Tran Quoc Dan, formerly with the Vietminh Army against the French, who, after the Geneva Agreement was sent to Hanoi to join the new Peoples Army. In March of 1962 he received orders to move to South Vietnam. With six hundred men he traveled through the Laos corridor and joined the First Viet Cong Regiment in South Vietnam. He subsequently took part in forty-five actions against the South Vietnam army before defecting.³³

Covering the logistic field, the report cites many cases of Czechoslovak and East German arms being captured.

³³Ibid., p. 21.

On February 16, 1965 an American helicopter pilot sighted a suspicious vessel offshore of Phu Yen Province. A Vietnamese airforce strike against the vessel sank it and a short time later the cargo was retrieved. It contained one hundred tons of assorted weapons and ammunition, including two thousand Mauser rifles, light machine guns, anti-tank 75 mm recoilless weapons of Chinese manufacture, one million rounds of small arms ammunition, medical supplies, and other field equipment. A member of the International Control Commission and members of the free press were present to examine the cargo and ship which had sailed out of Haiphong just a few days before.³⁴

This Department of State document along with the reports of the International Control Commission give conclusive proof that North Vietnam is guilty of aggressive actions against the government of South Vietnam and consequently endanger the peace of the Manila Treaty area. SEATO intelligence reports based on the findings of the Organization's Security Branch confirm the reports submitted by the government of South Vietnam and a majority of the International Control Commission. On the basis of these diversified reports, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization is faced with a real and present challenge to its purpose and authority in the Treaty area.

³⁴Ibid., p. 15.

CONCLUSION

Since the United States had no South Asian colonial territories under administrative control after the independence of the Philippines, her interest and participation in the Manila Conference was made less suspect than that of Britain or France. The latter nations at the time continued as colonial powers. An essential element of American prewar policy was the Open Door in Asia, and this policy appears to have been important in prompting the United States to support the creation of SEATO. While this no longer took the form of special privileges or extraterritorial rights, American policy sought to continue free access to the vital raw materials of this region and unfettered trade through the friendly cooperation of the governments of Asia. American policy was prompted as well by the desire to contain Communism within its immediate bounds. The United States expressed concern in early 1946 that the Soviet Union's implementation of the Yalta Agreement in the Manchurian ports of Dairen and Port Arthur had denied free and open access of these ports to other powers and improperly removed Chinese political authority over these cities. In December 1946, the writer accompanied a United States naval vessel to the port of Dairen which challenged the Soviet position and this resulted in the

so-called "Dairen Incident" of 1946.¹ While the United States government responded to a Russian ultimatum to leave the harbor within twenty-four hours or bear full responsibility for the safety of the vessel, the incident did serve to focus attention on Russian violations of the Yalta Agreement and the Open Door doctrine.

When the formation of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Pact was announced, the Communist and neutralist denunciation which followed took very similar form. The Warsaw Pact powers considered the presence of a military defense bloc in the East a threat to the balance of power, but their hostility did not approach that of the Chinese. They looked upon SEATO as a subterfuge to undermine the Communist achievements at the Geneva Conference table. These powers complained that the alliance was intended to be a cover for the return of Western imperialism to carry out further exploitation of the people of Asia and to "grab up the natural riches of these countries."²

The Russians were quick to point out that Asian participation in the Treaty represented a small minority and consequently it could not be regarded as a Southeast Asian

¹New York Times, December 24, 1946.

²"Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty States," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, (July, 1958), X:20.

fact. The next step, according to the Soviet Union, would be an effort by these same Western powers to conclude an aggressive alliance with South Korea, Taiwan, and a re-militarized Japan which could eventually be merged with SEATO.³ This would not only make the Western position more palatable to the Asian members but would provide a cheap source of manpower as well. Khrushchev in early 1958 protested against all these military blocs as a cause of war rather than a means of defense, and reminded the world that the Socialist camp would be willing to dismantle its alliances if the West would do likewise.⁴ A recent article in Pravda criticized American retaliation against North Vietnam in the following terms:

In an attempt to create at least a semblance of a pretext for these new acts of armed aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, U. S. officials could refer to the fact that in the course of their liberation struggle, the South Vietnamese patriots are dealing blows at military installations on the territory of the U. S. occupied South Vietnam. But who gave the United States the right to retaliate against the actions of guerillas in South Vietnam . . . thereby helping a puppet government in South Vietnam.⁵

³M. Markov, "SEATO's Future and the NEATO Project," International Affairs (Moscow: June, 1962), 6:61.

⁴Mikhail Kremenyev, "The Non-aligned Countries and World Politics," World Marxist Review, Vol. VI (April, 1963), 28.

⁵Pravda Editorial, Soviet Documents, Vol. III, No. 9 (March, 1965), 7.

The reaction of India and Indonesia was similar to that of the Soviet Union. The substance of their complaint was that SEATO itself was an instrument of potential aggression dominated by the Western powers and was actually Western colonialism in a new form.⁶ Nehru objected that SEATO gave the West a hand in Asian affairs and was not only directed against Communism, but against all non-member nations as well.⁷

In studying Indonesian resistance to the SEATO alliance, two very important political factors must be considered. First, the political fabric and philosophy of the present day Indonesian government has been closely sympathetic with the Communist bloc and the largest supporting element of the Sukarno leadership has been the Indonesian Communist Party. Second, if Indonesia had become one of the Treaty's signatory powers, it is unlikely that her own expansive geographical ambitions could have been attempted or realized. Sukarno had this to say as early as 1945:

I have on one occasion in my life dreamt of a Pan-Indonesia, which will include not only Malaya and Papua (New Guinea) but all the Philippines. . . .

⁶Ralph Briabanti, International Implications of the Manila Pact (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957), p. 37.

⁷Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Thoughts Along the China Border," Foreign Affairs (January, 1960), 265.

I myself am convinced that the people of Malaya feel themselves as Indonesians, belonging to Indonesia and as one of us . . . I still say . . . that Indonesia will not become strong and secure unless the whole Straits of Malacca is in our hands.⁸

Sukarno was not inhibited in his militant approach to the West Irian problem nor in his recent threats to destroy Malaysia. His encouragement to subversive elements and his organized guerilla attacks against this neighbor in recent months are common knowledge.

The Peoples Republic of China not only took a strong position against the Manila Treaty but also brought considerable pressure to bear against the small states of Southeast Asia to avoid their alignment with the Manila Treaty powers. Chou En-lai, the Foreign Minister, declared to the Peoples Congress in September 1954 that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was set up to undermine the 1954 Geneva Agreement and to give the United States an opportunity to suppress national movements in the area. It further permitted the United States, under the guise of foreign aid to "strip these countries of their raw materials and enslave the peoples with a return to colonial rule."⁹ Chou also warned that through the use of the

⁸"The Territory of the Indonesian State," Background to Indonesia's Policy Towards Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Government, 1964), p. 20.

⁹Brimmell, op. cit., p. 288.

"designated" states, United States imperialism would be able to extend its armed intervention and oppression to other parts of Asia. A returned Thai visitor to Peking in 1957 reported after his interview with Mao Tse-tung, that China considered the SEATO structure a false wall made with faulty bricks, and like the Baghdad Pact, could not hold up.¹⁰

The states which came under the protection of the Treaty by designation took different views. Both Cambodia and Laos during the late 1950s welcomed the political stability that SEATO encouraged, especially in regard to the peaceful handling of long smoldering border disputes. But late in 1962, after the Geneva settlement on Laos, both nations asked to be released from the "designated" category in order to remain entirely neutral and non-aligned so far as relations with Communist China were concerned. However, soon after the cease fire in Laos in 1962 the agreement had been repeatedly broken by the Communist Pathet Lao, and the International Control Commission stated that it had been impeded in carrying out its function by the opposition of the Communists. Consequently, there has been little

¹⁰David Wilson, "China, Thailand, and the Spirit of Bandung," The Rand Corporation (July, 1962), 28.

progress towards national reunification.¹¹

The insurgency against the government of South Vietnam reflects a very complicated situation containing strong political factors as well as military. The postwar policy to contain Communism had its origins in Europe. Here nations faced the military threat of the Red Army marching against the West. A line was drawn, beyond which Soviet power could not prevail without battle. But in the Far East, and especially Vietnam, the nature of the threat is not primarily military but political.¹² Weak and corrupt government in South Vietnam has been an easy target for Communist reaction and subversion. Despite all the features the world dislikes about Communism, it has adroitly recognized and exploited historical forces working in its favor, while the attractions of Western political democracy have not aroused any mass acceptance.¹³ South Vietnam has continued under SEATO protection as a designated power and this question was the subject of heated debate during the recent meeting of the members at Manila in April 1964. The

¹¹United States Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of the Special Study Mission to Southeast Asia October 1963, 88th Congress Report #893 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 15.

¹²Hans J. Morgenthau, "We are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam," New York Times Magazine, April 18, 1965, p. 25.

¹³Sidney Lens, The Futile Crusade (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), p. 40.

Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman sounded out the signatory powers on the possibility of direct SEATO assistance in the long struggle against the Viet-Cong, should South Vietnam make such a request. While only France vetoed discussion of the proposal, and this was not unexpected in view of the diminished French interest in the area, some of the other Treaty nations have been reluctant to enter this situation without a clearer demonstration of political stability in the south.

A proper evaluation of SEATO's role in Southeast Asia must take into account two important and continuing factors. The first is the militant and expansive nature of international Communism with its professed doctrine to eradicate, ultimately, all forms of non-socialist political economies throughout the world. The second is the historical pattern of Chinese pressure for hegemony over Southeast Asia based on Chinese security considerations and the material requirements to support China's exploding population. These patterns have not changed. To say that China has always been well placed to overrun her neighbors, but has not been inclined to do so, fails to admit the long periods of Chinese suzerainty over the "tribute" states. Furthermore, the advent of European colonialism in this area with its techniques of modern warfare and the competitive demands of Imperial Japanese policy temporarily inhibited Chinese

ambitions in Southeast Asia.

With the removal of both Japanese and European colonial status in most parts of Southeast Asia following World War II, the focus of Chinese interest on the area resumed new vigor and purpose, especially after the victory of the Chinese Communist revolution in 1949. While the more obvious component of this interest has been Chinese economic penetration, a greater concern to the people of Asia has been China's aid to Communist insurgent organizations. The Overseas Chinese problem has been a serious one to these small countries and became more so when Communist China decided in 1953 to provide places for thirty representatives of the Overseas Chinese in the National Peoples Congress in Peking.¹⁴ This representation emphasized the effort at central control maintained by the Peoples Government of China over its brethren in Southeast Asia. These countries have also been alarmed by Communist China's continued adherence to the traditional jus sanguinis doctrine which, in contrast to the more generally accepted jus soli, regards ancestry and not birthplace as the criteria of nationality and furthermore permits no renunciation of the former. The Secretary-General of SEATO stated that where the Communist party is legally forbidden, it has been able to function

¹⁴Barnett, op. cit., p. 190.

through various Chinese front organizations, secret societies, and even Chambers of Commerce.¹⁵ The governments of Southeast Asia openly challenged this dual policy during the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states in 1955, and while the Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai expressed willingness to compromise this issue with Indonesia at that time, no comparable arrangement has been made with any of the other Southeast Asian states. In fact, even in Indonesia the Chinese have been very reluctant to accept the change, and as a double insurance have elected to have one member of a family assume Indonesian citizenship while another would maintain his Chinese nationality.¹⁶ Many regarded this as an implied possibility among the overseas Chinese of some form of future take-over by the Communists. To most of these Chinese blood has always proved thicker than economics, geography, or ideology. The writer was constantly reminded of this fact during his residence in Thailand, and especially after the Communist victory in China in 1949.

Here, then, exists a situation similar to that found in prewar Europe where German communities outside the Reich

¹⁵Department of State, Bulletin, "Report on SEATO," Vol. XL, No. 1035 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, April, 1959), p. 607.

¹⁶Barnett, op. cit., p. 325.

(as in Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland) were clearly organized and manipulated to the Nazi's advantage in undermining the integrity of these smaller border states.¹⁷ But where Germany had to face the sturdy nationalism of the non-German elements in these countries, China can depend on the support of most of the non-Chinese who have espoused the international concept of world Communism and whose loyalties are doctrinal rather than national. Here China would appear to control two "fifth" columns, one ethnic and the other ideological. In the countries of Southeast Asia, these elements could be employed in varying degrees, depending upon the overseas Chinese content of the area. In Malaya, for example, with a large Chinese minority but small Communist element, the ethnic control would be emphasized, while in Indonesia with a relatively small Chinese community, ideological ties would predominate.

China has used these minorities within the Treaty area and has supported or participated with these Communist groups effectively in a long series of uprisings and insurgencies since the end of World War II. A list of these would include the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, the Malaya Insurgency, the Communist uprisings in Burma among the Karen and Kachin tribes, the coup d'etat attempted by

¹⁷Charles A. Fisher, "The Chinese Threat to Southeast Asia," Royal Central Asian Journal, LI, 3 & 4, London (July, 1964), 262.

Pridi Panamyong in Thailand, the military conquest of Tibet, the Kerala autonomous movement in India, the Korean War, the Viet-cong insurgency in South Vietnam, and the invasion of India in 1962.

The overt Chinese aggression against a neighbor as in Tibet in 1951 could be likened to Germany's annexation of territories on her borders in the 1930's which resulted in an intimidation and sense of defeatism among the small states following these adventures. Likewise the military ineffectiveness of India against open Chinese attack and invasion in 1962 has tended to produce similar reactions in Southeast Asia, with significant shifts in policy within Cambodia and Burma and the accelerated crumbling of resistance in Laos and South Vietnam. Aside from the latent and implied deterrent effect of American nuclear capacity, no effective check on Chinese Communist expansion, other than world opinion, existed until the organization of the Manila Treaty powers.¹⁸

The reason for fearing Chinese interest in this area is that Southeast Asia is one of the richest of all the world's tropical regions and as such has attracted invaders, both military and economic, continuously during the last 1000 years. The lure of this tropical abundance set off the whole

¹⁸Ibid., p. 260.

process of worldwide colonialism in this area. Although the earliest activities were confined merely to gaining control over these resources, more advanced forms of colonialism required guarantees of political stability and security to protect investments. The departure of European control and the totalitarian organization of the Japanese occupation at the end of World War II left not only a power vacuum but an administrative one as well. This was reflected in the long postwar disorganization of the economies of the small states of Asia. During the war India saw itself as a potential substitute for both Japanese and European influence in this area. Thus writing in 1943, K. M. Panikkar stated that in most respects,

the economy of India and Southeast Asia can be considered as being complementary. Therefore, if a satisfactory economy is to develop in this area after the war, it can only be if India and Southeast Asia work out a 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' based on their inter-dependence.¹⁹

With Japan, India then was the third great over-populated state to eye the abundance of Southeast Asia as a solution to its food and raw material problems. India aimed at a good neighbor policy toward Asia, based on mutual trust, self help, and the other tenets of Panche Sila, and for a period it appeared that this relationship was indeed beginning to grow. The Columbo Plan itself

¹⁹Fisher, op. cit., p. 262.

embodied these hopes and it is very likely for this reason that India took a strong position against Columbo Plan participation in SEATO, regarding it as a splintering influence of her own prestige in the region. But India's failure to complete her own ambitious plans for industrialization and her inability to meet Japanese competition in the area by 1960, reduced her claim as a serious leader in the economic organization of Asia.

The pressing need for food and raw materials has been a strong incentive for China to organize its own co-prosperity sphere.²⁰ Geographical factors seriously restrict her ability to increase the necessary agricultural production for minimal needs, but this nation does not lack the manpower to obtain these needs by force if necessary. Thus, the ambitions of Communist China in Southeast Asia can be easily understood, and likewise the fears of the people in this region for such ambitions.

The value of SEATO is best measured by its implied function as a psychological deterrent to massive attack and Communist subversion. However, the military and technical capabilities of the Treaty powers, organized and directed by SEATO, ultimately determine the effectiveness of this deterrent. Admittedly, it is difficult to assess the full

²⁰ Ibid.

value of this defense organization and its presence in Southeast Asia. It is also impossible to state that SEATO has prevented a more aggressive Communist policy in Asia in the last decade. But, since the Manila Treaty came into effect in 1954, there has been no major assault or open attack against any of the Treaty powers similar to that witnessed in India in 1962. SEATO may well have been a deterrent. The settlement of the Laotian problem has not called for formal intervention of SEATO. Nor has there been a formal declaration by South Vietnam to seek Treaty protection as a designated state during the present Vietcong insurgency. But, individual members of the organization have not been prevented from taking independent action in support of the South Vietnam government. SEATO withstood much maligning because of its inaction during the Laotian crises. The lack of unanimity and cohesion on the political level during this crisis in 1961 and 1962, led many to believe that the alliance had lost its meaning. Even today SEATO's caution in the South Vietnam crisis has aroused criticism and even some joshing on the part of the Communist leadership. But by refusing to act precipitately, it may have avoided springing a Communist trap. By keeping the military strength of the alliance in the background during the crucial political developments in Laos, the Treaty powers were able to gain time to bolster the faltering Laotian

government by political means. In many Asian eyes, this raised the stature of the organization, especially among those who feared that hasty and precipitous military judgement might prevail and plunge all Asia in war.²¹

Mao-Tse-tung has compared SEATO to a faulty wall which will crumble under its own weight. Even so, Secretary of State Dean Rusk has pointed out that frequent Chinese propaganda attacks and demonstrations against the organization would suggest a high regard and concern for this so-called "paper tiger."²² Former Ambassador to South Vietnam, Frederick Reinhardt believes that such hostility to the Treaty implies that SEATO's presence has interrupted Communist designs on this region.²³ Consequently, until the fear of Communist aggression is removed, these Treaty nations of Southeast Asia seem inclined to support Western participation in their collective defense and regard the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization as the better alternative to a possible forced accommodation with Peking.

²¹Norman J. Padelford, "SEATO and Peace in Southeast Asia," Current History (February, 1960), 38:95.

²²Dean Rusk, "Seventh Anniversary of SEATO," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLV, No. 1161, p. 528.

²³G. Frederick Reinhardt, "What SEATO Means to the United States," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XL, No. 1030, p. 397.

APPENDIX A

THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY

The Parties to this Treaty,

Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the

Parties,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the sovereignty of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and believing that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-peace and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and **APPENDIX** of all peoples in the Treaty area,

Intending to declare publicly and solemnly their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

APPENDIX A

THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY*

The Parties to this Treaty,

Recognising the sovereign equality of all the

Parties,

Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the Treaty area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to co-ordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:-

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

*Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXI, No. 795, September 20, 1954.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to co-operate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of Governments toward these ends.

ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party recognises that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any state or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the Government concerned.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the Government concerned.

ARTICLE V

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet at any time.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE VIII

As used in this Treaty, the 'treaty area' is the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the South-West Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the treaty area.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by the Government to the other signatories.

2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.

3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE XI

The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.

UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to Communist aggression, but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

(Signatures)

PROTOCOL

DESIGNATION OF THE STATES AND TERRITORY AS TO
WHICH PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IV AND
ARTICLE III ARE TO BE APPLICABLE

The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty unanimously designate for the purpose of Article IV of the Treaty and the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

The Parties further agree that the above mentioned states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures contemplated by Article III.

This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

PACIFIC CHARTER

The Delegates of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,

Desiring to establish a firm basis for common action to maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific,

Convinced that common action to this end, in order to be worthy and effective, must be inspired by the highest principles of justice and liberty,

Do Hereby Proclaim:

First, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities;

Second, they are each prepared to continue taking effective practical measures to ensure conditions favorable to the orderly achievement of the foregoing purposes in accordance with their constitutional processes;

Third, they will continue to cooperate in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote higher living standards, economic progress and social well-being in this region;

Fourth, as declared in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, they are determined to prevent or counter by appropriate means any attempt in the treaty area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity.

Proclaimed at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

APPENDIX B

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES*

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side-by-side against imperialist aggression during the last war,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific Area,

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted as in any way or sense altering or diminishing any existing agreements or understandings between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines,

Have agreed as follows:-

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

*U. S. Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty Provisions Relating to Use of U. S. Forces for Mutual Defense, October 27, 1956, p. 22.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE III

The Parties through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty and whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific.

ARTICLE IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Manila.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August 1951.

(Here follow the signatures)

APPENDIX C

SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ('ANZUS' TREATY)*

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area,

Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Therefore declare and agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

*U. S. Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty Provisions Relating to Use of U. S. Forces for Mutual Defense, October 27, 1956, p. 153.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

ARTICLE IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VII

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

ARTICLE VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the Area.

ARTICLE IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia.

Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done at the City of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951.

(Signatures)

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