The Power of Narratives: A Cultural History of US Involvement in Axis-Occupied Yugoslavia

My thesis examines the ways in which narratives about Axis-occupied Yugoslavia developed within the United States over the course of World War II and identifies how these narratives influenced the development of American foreign policy. Methodologically, I utilize the literary theories of Northrop Frye and Hayden White as a means of narrative analysis. Frye categorizes narratives as romance, comedy, tragedy, or satire. Each of these modes of employment serves as a call to action or, in the case of satire, inaction. The initial narrative related to occupied Yugoslavia was romance, and it served as a call for the United States to aid the Četnik resistance. The romantic narrative of Četnik resistance was, in part, supplanted by the romance of the communist Partisans due to the ways in which Četnik ideology conflicted with American ideals and the US government’s comedic narrative of national and international unity. Many Americans became dissatisfied with US policy toward Yugoslavia and framed the cause of this dissatisfaction in terms of a moral failing, giving rise to the tragic narrative. This narrative called for the United States to return to its ideals and assume a more constructive role in Yugoslavia. However, the tragic narrative was ultimately undermined by the satirical narrative. The satirical view of Yugoslavia drew upon preconceived notions of a Balkan propensity for violence and disorder. It discouraged the US from becoming politically involved in Yugoslavia, and its emergence explains US foreign policy, or lack thereof, toward Yugoslavia at the end of World War II.


INTRODUCTION
On August 26, 1946, The New York Times printed the review of an "odd little book," George Orwell's Animal Farm. After walking its readers through Orwell's critique of totalitarianism, the book review concluded by noting that the book served as reminder of the "ancient cycle of revolution-first brotherhood, then organization, then tyranny." 1 Neither the New York Times reviewer nor the rest of Orwell's American audience was privy to the book's original preface, which was omitted from both the US and British versions. In it, Orwell castigated the complicity of "the English intelligentsia" in the uncritical propagation of Soviet propaganda. The most egregious instance of this behavior was to be found in the treatment of General Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović, the leader of the Četnik resistance to the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia during World War II. According to Orwell, the Russians, who had their own Yugoslav protege in Marshal Tito, accused [Mihailović] of collaboration with the Germans. This accusation was promptly taken up by the British press: [Mihailović's] supporters were given no chance of answering it and the facts contradicting it were simply kept out of print. In July of 1943 the Germans offered a reward of 100,000 gold crowns for the capture of Tito, and similar reward for the capture of [Mihailović]. The British press 'splashed' the reward for Tito, but only one paper mentioned (in small print) the reward for [Mihailović]: and the charges of collaborating with the Germans continued. 2 At the time that Animal Farm was published, Orwell's original preface would have undoubtedly found a receptive audience in the United States. The month prior to the release of Animal Farm in the US, Mihailović was executed in Yugoslavia after being found guilty of "treason against the people and the Fatherland" in the form of "political and military collaboration with the invader." 3 The government and private citizens of the United States attempted to intercede on Mihailović's behalf in 1946. In response to a radio announcement in Belgrade that Mihailović had been captured on March 13, the State Department sent a message to the Yugoslav Foreign Office. The note proclaimed that Mihailović "organized and led important resistance forces against the occupiers… [and] without adequate supplies and fighting under the greatest hardships contributed with his forces materially to the allied cause so heroically participated in by Yugoslavia." In closing, the message stated that the US government was "confident that in the interests of justice the Yugoslav Government" would avail itself of the evidence that was currently being compiled within the United States in defense of Mihailović. 4 The Yugoslav government was not receptive to this appeal and replied that "the crimes of the traitor Draza Mihailovich against the people of Yugoslavia are far too big and horrible that it could be or should be allowed to be discussed whether he is guilty or not ." 5 In light of the United States' encouragement of Yugoslav resistance to the Axis learn from Intelligence sources about Partisans, to show that there were Partisans as well as Chetniks. That took about three months -a fight with the Foreign Office and War Office, and GHQ Middle East.
The second step was to get permission to send certain agents not only to the Chetniks but to the Partisans… that was another three months, fighting, persuading, documents organizing, every type of work.
The next three months was to get permission to send arms to the people that were Partisans as well as arms to the Chetniks.
The next three months, four months about, was to get permission to send people to support the Partisans in Serbia, which was the area where Mihailovitch was strongest. Previously we'd only been allowed to send them to other areas.
The next stage-again for four or five months-was… skewing [and] building up reports we were getting from the Chetniks and… from the Partisans -[to show that there was] no activity against the enemy on the Chetnik side, [but] first-class activity on the Partisan side -[in order] to recall the missions from the Chetniks, and to give all support to the Partisans.
And the last stage… was to fight inside the organisation [for]… political recognition of the Partisans. 15 Although Klugmann gave himself and his machinations credit for the shift in British policy as it related to the Partisans, Bailey was skeptical of this assertion. According to Bailey, the "key decisions in favour of Tito were taken well above the heads of SOE" and were based upon "important intelligence to which the SOE staff officers had little or no access." 16 Bailey's dismissal of Klugmann's significance was reflective of the increasing credence given by historians to the claim that the ULTRA intercepts were far more influential in the formulation of British policy toward Yugoslavia than were any 15 Roderick Bailey, "Communist in SOE: Explaining James Klugmannn's Recruitment and Retention," in The Politics and Strategy of Clandestine War: Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946, ed. Neville Wylie (London: Routledge, 2012, 69-70. The "organisation" to which Klugmann referred was the SOE. 16 Ibid., 71. "ULTRA" was the name given to the Anglo-American decrypts of German, Italian, and Japanese communications. In May 1943, the British and Americans agreed to a "full exchange and distribution of Signals Intelligence. " Martin Gilbert, The Second World War: A Complete History, rev. ed. (New York, NY: Holt Paperbacks, 2004), 429. reports from the SOE. 17 Historian Heather Williams even suggested in Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans that Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, a member of British Parliament and also head of the SOE mission to Tito, possibly served as a cover to explain Churchill's decision to switch support to Partisans and mask Churchill's reliance upon ULTRA intercepts as the basis for the change in Yugoslav policy. 18 Kirk Ford, Jr. made clear in OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance that communist influence was not limited to the SOE. According to Ford, the OSS headquarters in Bari, Italy gained the epithet of the "Little Kremlin" due to the influence of Partisan sympathizers such as Major Francis Arnoldy, chief of the OSS Secret Intelligence (SI) Yugoslav section. 19 Robert Joyce, one of Arnoldy's predecessors as chief of the Yugoslav section, recounted in his unpublished memoir that he was informed prior to assuming his post in Cairo that several of his employees were "probable communists or at least fellow travelers." This was of concern, as SI "was supposed to report objectively military and especially political developments for American military and political policymakers." 20 Joyce had assumed overall head of SI in Bari and was thus Arnoldy's supervisor. He eventually had Arnoldy transferred for not following State Department policy and for his unabashedly "pro-Partisan" activity. 21 It thus seems that the US personnel were cognizant of communist infiltration within the OSS and increasingly wary of and proactive in neutralizing such influences in comparison to their SOE counterparts. The awareness of American personnel of communist 17 John Cripps, "Mihailović or Tito? How the Codebreakers Helped Churchill Choose," in Action this Day, eds. Ralph Erskine and Michael Smith (New York: Bantam Press, 2001), 262-3. 18 Heather Williams, Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans: The Special Operations Executive in Yugoslavia 1941(Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2003, 168. 19 Ford,OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance,82. 20 Robert Prather Joyce, "Chapter Twelve -Yugoslav Resistance 1941, " Robert P. Joyce Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, 3. 21 Ford,OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance,85. infiltration at the time, combined with the recent recognition of the importance of the ULTRA intercepts, has increasingly led scholars to dismiss the impact of communist influence on the trajectory of US and British policy toward Yugoslavia during World War II.
Rather than crediting communist conspiracy as the driver of US policy-making, many historians have instead emphasized the role played by military exigency. As Walter Roberts stated in Tito, Mihailović, andthe Allies, 1941-1945 Mihailović. However, Roberts stated that "the US government… dismissed all of these charges and continued to credit Mihailović with all resistance in Yugoslavia ." 24 Instead, Roberts emphasized the impact of a report by Major Linn Farish, an OSS liaison with Tito, that FDR received immediately prior to the Tehran Conference.
During this conference, the decision was ultimately made to switch full Allied support to Tito. Roberts claimed that the report "dramatically changed FDR's view of the 22 Roberts,Tito,Mihailović,and the Allies,184. 23 Ibid., 62. 24 Ibid., Yugoslav situation." In describing this impact, Roberts paid particular attention to the portions of the report that deemphasized the communist character of the Partisans while extolling their dedication to fighting the Axis. Roberts also quoted Farish's observations on the Četniks' consistent failure to attack the occupiers and their preoccupation with fighting the Partisans. 25 Ford, despite his previously mentioned description of communist infiltration of the OSS, also identified military concerns as the foundation of US decision-making on Yugoslavia and dismissed the notion that communists significantly influenced policy. 26 At the time of the Tehran Conference, "the current status of the war… dictated the necessity of according primacy to military over political matters" in the formulation of US policy. 27 Unlike Roberts, Ford dismissed even the impact of the Farish report and concluded that it "had little, or any, impact on the course of Allied policy." 28 Instead, this report merely served as confirmation of the wisdom of FDR's efforts to stay out of the Balkans and thus avoid becoming entangled with suspected British designs in the region with which the United States disagreed. 29 The trajectory of the historiography, as outlined above, demonstrates an increased focus upon geo-political and strategic concerns with a simultaneous deemphasis of the historical significance of narratives as they related to American involvement in Yugoslavia. Also, as indicated by Roberts' evaluation of the lack of impact that the US press had upon American policy, this historiographical trend belies the significance of the contemporary emotive valence of certain categorizations, such as 25 Ibid., 152. 26 Ford,OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance,183. 27 Ibid., 181. 28 Ibid.,35. 29 Ibid.,12. collaborator and resister or communist and reactionary. The largely discredited historiographical obsession with the influence of communist propaganda, whatever its faults, at least recognized the tendency of narratives to shape action. This recognition explains the preoccupation of those like Martin with the ways in which communist propaganda came to be repeated in the mainstream press and within governmental circles. This recognition also meant that those who fixated upon communist influence were often more attentive to the link between domestic discourse and international developments.
In the pages that follow, it is not my intention to resurrect the historiographical bogeyman of communist subversion, but rather to recenter the narrative as an historically significant factor in understanding US-Yugoslav relations during World War II. It is not my contention that these narratives served as the sole impetus for US policy. Instead, I argue that narratives represented a rhetorical and imaginative arena that served as the space in which policy regarding Yugoslavia was formed. The boundaries of this space were not fixed, and private citizens and governmental officials contended with one another in their attempts to circumscribe or expand them. This contest was informed by and appealed to the ideals, aspirations, preconceptions, and anxieties of its participants and audience.
According to historian Warren F. Kimball, World War II has increasingly been viewed "as little more than the origins of the Cold War," but this context can be overemphasized as it relates to foreign policy and public opinion during World War II. 30 Although George F. Kennan would not coin the term " containment" until 1947, curtailing Soviet expansion nonetheless weighed upon the mind of Roosevelt throughout World War II. 31 As I show in the chapters that follow, it also concerned members of the American press and the Yugoslav government-in-exile (YGE), as one area into which Soviet influence seemed to be encroaching was occupied Yugoslavia.
However, this concern led some to subsequently confuse hindsight with foresight in explaining US decision-making regarding Yugoslavia during the Second World War.
For example, diplomat Robert  Instead of narrowing the historical lens to focus upon US concerns about the spread of communism, expanding the scope of historical inquiry regarding US-Yugoslav relations during World War II has the potential to identify trends within US foreign policy that transcend the Cold War context. According to historians Michael Patrick Cullinane and David Ryan, US foreign policy has often been articulated by juxtaposing the image of the United States against "an 'other,'" that is "a simplified depiction" of the culture in question. Cullinane Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (New York: Pyramid, 1965), 249. 33 Milovan Djilas, Wartime (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1977), 348. "notion of superiority and inferiority running through such discourse." 34 Although the language used in this discourse has evolved from one "of racial hierarchies, civilization, and barbarism" to one of "development, modernity, and tradition… the hierarchy" has remained "the same." 35 Despite the fact that there is a "government monopoly" on the formulation and execution of US foreign policy, political scientist Charles O. Lerche, Jr. noted that US policy must nonetheless take into account "the demands of the democratic public." 36 In this way, defining "us" and the "other," and determining what constitutes the proper relationship between these two entities, can be seen as a process engaged in by both the American government and public. The development of narratives related to occupied Yugoslavia exemplifies this process.
Methodologically, I utilize the narrative theory of Hayden White and literary theory of Northrop Frye. 37 I categorize the evolution of wartime narratives about Yugoslavia using the "modes of emplotment" identified by Frye and used as means of historiographical criticism by Hayden White: romance,tragedy,comedy,and satire. 38 I describe the characteristics of these narratives in detail at the beginning of each of the following chapters.

13
The ways in which Americans spoke and wrote about occupied Yugoslavia, and thus contributed to the emergence and perpetuation of certain narratives, not only reflected their own evolving views and ideals, but also contributed to a wider discourse. The trajectory of this discourse, in turn, served as a call for a particular US policy of action or inaction in Yugoslavia. 39 Thus, an examination of these narratives has the potential to provide insight into not only the prevailing mentalité among different segments of US society that were concerned with the course of events in Yugoslavia, but also how these mentalités interacted with US foreign policy.
The sources that I use to identify the genesis and propagation of relevant narratives tend to be those generated by what historian Benjamin Alpers refers to as "cultural producers." According to Alpers, this "heterogenous set of cultural elites" was able to define American views through either "access to the mass media [or] of having expert status." 40 This included members of the mainstream and foreign language press, US and foreign government officials, and prominent citizens, such as Louis Adamic and Ruth Mitchell. As will be seen, communists played an outsized role as successful "cultural producers." However, rather than focusing upon this success as the result of some insidious conspiracy, I instead place it within the context of competing viewpoints. When analyzed from this perspective, the significance of communist rhetoric was not that it contributed to the installation of a communist regime in Yugoslavia, but rather that Americans were more receptive and sympathetic 39 Hunt describes the rhetoric of the French Revolution as not merely reflective of "changes and conflict, but rather was itself transformed into an instrument of political and social change. " Hunt,Politics,Culture,and Class in the French Revolution,24. Narratives can also be an impediment to change. As Krapfl notes, "in satirical emplotments, human agency is an illusion and political action is therefore pointless. " Krapfl,Revolution with a Human Face,22. Both of these observations are useful in examining the impact of narratives on the formulation of US policy toward Yugoslavia. 40 Benjamin Alpers, Dictators, Democracy, and American Public Culture: Envisioning the Totalitarian Enemy 1920's-1950s (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003 to the narratives they propagated in pursuit of these ends. In contrast, the narratives produced by Mihailović's supporters failed to either generate or maintain a similar degree of support because they did not resonate with either the American public or governmental officials to the same degree as those of their competitors.
In the first chapter of this thesis I examine the emergence of the romantic narrative that portrayed Mihailović as a paragon of European resistance to Nazi domination. I argue that the initial receptivity to this narrative was based upon established American notions about the fighting spirit of the heroic, but primitive, Serbians. I believe that this is a manifestation of what Maria Todorova termed "balkanism," which both served and then undermined the cause of Mihailović's American proponents. 41 I also provide an historical overview of US diplomatic and military involvement in Yugoslavia leading up to the emergence of organized resistance. This is important for establishing the wider context in which US narratives about Yugoslavia arose. In doing so, I attempt to ensure that in the process of emphasizing the significance of these narratives, I do not simultaneously decontextualize US foreign policy decisions from the very real strategic and geopolitical concerns with which American policymakers had to contend.
In chapter three, I examine the ways in which the heroic image of Mihailović was eroded through accusations that he was not only collaborating with the Axis, but that he was also a reactionary Serb chauvinist. As I show, these qualities increasingly came into conflict with the comedic narrative that was promoted by the US government to combat disunity within the domestic Yugoslav-American community, the YGE, and between Tito's and Mihailović's forces. I also examine how the competing romantic 41  narrator of historical events, the initial portrayal of Mihailović's resistance to Nazi occupation can best be described as romance. 43 According to Frye, the romantic narrative is based upon chivalric "knight-errantry." 44 Krapfl interprets romance as "a quest, a heroic struggle between good and evil." 45 In the romance, the heroic protagonist is capable of "marvelous" actions because the "the ordinary laws of nature are slightly suspended." 46 In this chapter, I first discuss preconceptions of the Balkans in general, and the Serbs in particular, as an explanation for the alacrity with which the US press adopted romance as the framework for its portrayal of Mihailović. I then provide an overview of American involvement in Yugoslavia leading up to the point of the Nazi invasion. After describing the impetus for the emergence of resistance in Yugoslavia, I look at the way in which Mihailović was initially presented to the American public. As will be seen, the romantic narrative and the specific components used in its construction were problematic as a framework for understanding, and establishing expectations of, the Četnik resistance.
According to Maria Todorava's concept of "balkanism," Western views of the Balkans were informed by and reflected in "a discourse of imputed ambiguity." 47 This 43 White, Metahistory, 7. 44 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays, 15th ed. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 34. 45 Krapfl, Revolution with a Human Face, 15. 46 Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, 33. 47 As opposed to Edward Said's concept of "orientalism, which is a discourse about an imputed opposition" between East and West. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, 17. One of the primary "channels and safeguards of balkanism as an ideal type" was the travelogue. Ibid., 19. The very term "Balkan" as a geographic identifier within the English language can be traced to one such travelogue written by a British traveler in the late eighteenth century. Ibid.,22. This genre continued to be an influential source of information on Yugoslavia through the outbreak of World War II. Perhaps the most significant of these works at the time of the war was Rebecca West's anti-German, pro-Serbian Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (1941), which met with significant critical acclaim within the United States. An example of the many positive reviews of West's book within the US press can be found in Katherine Woods, "Rebecca West's Brilliant Mosaic of Yugoslavian Travel," New York Times, October ambiguity stemmed from the Balkans state of liminality, or in-betweeness, in regard to its geography, culture, and racial makeup. 48 Sitting astride a civilizational crossroads, Yugoslavia was culturally and ethnically diverse. It included within its population predominantly Catholic Croats and Slovenes, Orthodox Serbs, and a substantial Muslim minority. 49 Developmentally, the Balkans had not achieved Western standards of modernity, but were instead in an "intermediary state somewhere between barbarity and civilization." 50 While the relegation of the Balkans to such a comparatively primitive state bore with it ostensibly negative connotations, particularly in regard to a presumed propensity for violence, there could be ambiguity here as well. According to Eugene Michail, "Western attitudes" toward Balkan violence "changed according to cross-national and ideological or national and strategic priorities, producing a variety of images that competed, co-existed and alternated between different sections of the Western public." 51 The most visible US attitude toward the potential for Balkan bellicosity at the time of the German invasion of Yugoslavia can best be described as a manifestation of  Tasovac, American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 1939(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999 Point XI of Wilson's Fourteen Points made explicit mention of Serbia and Montenegro, both of which were ultimately to form a part of Yugoslavia. This same point also called for the establishment of Balkan states "along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality" and that "international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into." Woodrow Wilson, "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points," The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy, accessed December 20, 2017, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp. Wilson's Fourteen Points were received with considerable enthusiasm by many South Slavs. This is indicated by the words of one Croatian writer who proclaimed that Wilson was "like Christ" in bringing "the good news first and foremost to the small and the weak." Josip Horvat, Politička povijest Hrvatske, vol. II, (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1991), 19, quoted in Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-2011(New York: Penguin Books, 2012, 364. On February 2, 1919, the United States was the first of the World War I powers to recognize what was then called the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, 53. In exchange for joining the Allies in World War I, Italy was promised territory along the eastern Adriatic in what would become Yugoslavia. Wilson vigorously protested this as a violation of the principles laid forth in his Fourteen Points. However, this bought Yugoslavia only temporary reprieve from Italy's territorial demands. In 1920, the Yugoslavs finally made significant territorial concessions to the Italians. Glenny, The Balkans, 369-377. Dissatisfaction over the denial of Italy's territorial ambitions along the eastern Adriatic following World War I, in which over 600,000 Italians were killed, contributed significantly to Mussolini's rise to power. MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 1939: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 33. periphery of US foreign policy concerns for most of this period. 54 US relations with Yugoslavia were also reflective of a more general trend within American diplomacy.

The Great Depression and disillusionment regarding US participation in First World
War had left Americans with little appetite for involvement in European affairs. If this was true for Western Europe, it was doubly so for the Balkans. As historian George C. Herring notes, the United States "scrupulously avoided the numerous, complex, and volatile issues that divided peoples and governments against each other." 55 This policy dovetailed nicely with the prevailing isolationist sentiments in America at the outset of World War II. 56 However, with the Nazi conquest of France and the Low Countries in 1940, a realization grew among Americans that their own security was at risk and that direct US involvement in the war was increasingly likely. 57  Depression and War, 1929(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, 390. 55 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relation since 1776(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, 462. For American diplomats in Yugoslavia, this meant that they were to act as "listening posts" while refraining from any interference in domestic issues. According to the biographer of the American minister in Belgrade, Arthur Bliss Lane, "years sometimes passed without a single [State] Department message to the legation." The use of Belgrade as a listening post is dubious, as nobody had the interest to read or the expertise to interpret the significance of most of the messages coming out of Yugoslavia. Petrov,A Study in Diplomacy,[103][104][105][106][107] Ivo Tasovac, American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 1939(College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1999 France fell to Germany in June 1940. That same month, opinion polls indicated that support for a peacetime draft had increased from 50 to 64 percent. Roosevelt then began supporting such a measure in public. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932(New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, 231-232. Also, in November, polls indicated that during Roosevelt's re-election for a third term as president, voters would have preferred his opponent by a margin of 5.5 percent if there had been no war. However, they preferred Roosevelt by 18 percent if the United States were to go to war. This indicates that his victory was, at least in part, based not upon his continued promise that the United States would not enter the war, but was instead a result of the American electorate's assumptions about the likelihood that the US would be drawn into the war regardless of the president's assurances to the contrary. Ibid.,[231][232] Mediterranean hegemony, Mussolini ordered the invasion of Greece on October 28, 1940. 58 While Hitler was not opposed to Italy's attack on Greece in principle, his approval for such an undertaking was predicated upon the assumption of its military success. 59 Instead, poor preparation, in which Mussolini's hubris undoubtedly played no small part, ensured that the invasion was a debacle. The Italian offensive almost immediately ground to a halt. Of even greater concern to Germany, the British, in keeping with their prior guarantee of Greek independence, responded to the invasion by providing military assistance to Greece. 60 The developing situation in Greece exposed Germany's southern flank and posed an unacceptable threat to the invasion of the Soviet Union that Hitler planned for the following year. 61 It thus became clear that Germany would have to intervene in Greece on Italy's behalf. Hitler informed the Italians that he would not be able to provide military relief until spring of 1941. In the interim, he embarked upon a campaign of diplomacy in the region in order to smooth the way for the swift deployment of German troops into Greece and minimize any impact this diversion might have on his plans regarding the Soviet Union. 62 58 The attack on Greece was launched from Albania. In pursuit of empire, Italy had already invaded Albania on April 7, 1939 and then vacillated in its view of either Yugoslavia or Greece as the next potential target of invasion within the Balkans. Martin L. Van Creveld, Hitler's Strategy 1940: The Balkan Clue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973 Hitler unintentionally contributed to the timing of the invasion of Greece by not consulting with Italy on his decision to grant the request of Romania's leader, Ion Antonescu, for German troops to be sent to Romania. This resulted in a loss of face for Mussolini and also raised Italian concerns about Germany's domination of the Balkans, a region that Italy considered to be within its sphere of interest. In response to this "fait accompli," Mussolini declared that Hitler "shall learn from the newspapers that I have occupied Greece. Thus equilibrium shall be restored." Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, and Detlef Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, vol. 3, The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, 408-409. Though Hitler discouraged Italian designs on Yugoslavia, Creveld argues that, in early October, Hitler essentially gave Mussolini the "green light" to invade Greece. According to Creveld, Hitler believed that Axis-occupied Greece would serve Germany's strategic interests as a "bastion" within the eastern Mediterranean. Creveld, Hitler's Strategy 1940. 60 Schreiber, et al., Germany andthe Second World War, 454. 61 Creveld, Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941, 181. 62 Schreiber,et al.,Germany and the Second World War,456. Hitler was increasingly concerned about Yugoslavia, which not only remained neutral and adamant in its refusal of the passage of German troops through Yugoslav territory, but was also being courted by the British and Americans. 63 While Hitler endeavored to create a crescent of Axis-allied states as a secure land route to Greece, the British worked to persuade Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria to join together in a united Balkan front in order to resist further German intrusion into the region. 64 However, Yugoslavia entered into a nonaggression pact with Germany in early December. At approximately this same time, Mussolini requested that Hitler pressure Yugoslavia to sign the Tripartite Pact in order to draw Greek troops to the Yugoslav border and away from the stalled Albanian front. In turn, Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop instructed the German representative in Belgrade to inform the Yugoslavian government that the nonaggression pact was insufficient as a basis for the relationship with Yugoslavia that the Germans "envisaged." 65 In order to aid the British in their effort to counter German overtures and stiffen the resolve of the Balkan states, the future head of the OSS, William Donovan, embarked upon a tour of the region in January 1941. 66 His visit with the Yugoslav regent, Prince Paul, on January 23, 1941 initially appeared to have succeeded in 63 Ibid., 459-461. 64 Ibid., 457; J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, vol. 2, September 1939-June 1941 Tasovac,American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia,80. Even though the United States remained ostensibly neutral, President Roosevelt took a number of incremental steps to aid the beleaguered British both diplomatically and materially. Donovan's tour can thus be seen as one way in which the president sought to assist the British via "methods short of war. " Kennedy,Freedom from Fear,420. encouraging the formation of a regional alliance. 67 " February 5, 1941, FRUS, 1941 Hull to Lane, January 19, 1941, FRUS, 1941 as Donovan and undersecretary of state Welles engaged in what were, according to diplomatic norms, more questionable activities. 72 In addition to his meetings with the Yugoslav prime minister, foreign minister, and regent, Donovan met with the former Yugoslav chief of staff, General Dušan Simović, who was "all out to fight the Germans" and impressed Donovan "very favourably" according to Donovan's British travel companion. 73 One way in which Simović may have impressed Donovan is suggested by Donovan's biographer, Richard Dunlop: Simović told Donovan that he believed concessions to Germany would be deadly and would destroy Yugoslavia's chance to resist invasion. Certainly the Yugoslavs, tough mountain people with a knowledge of every pass and crag, would be able to make their rugged terrain an ally. Donovan and Simović talked over Simović's plans for a coup d'état against the government of Prince Paul. The patriots would strike as soon as the government signed an agreement with the Axis and would place royal authority in the hands of 17-year-old King Peter, who agreed that Paul had outlived his usefulness. 74 Donovan met with other members of the Yugoslav military as well. He also made promises of American material aid to Yugoslavia in a meeting with Yugoslav intelligence officers and asked them to make a list of their requests, despite the fact that he knew such a request would go unfulfilled. 75 Any positive effect that Donovan had appeared to have on the Yugoslav government proved to be illusory. Hitler, concerned about reports of Yugoslav military mobilization, grew even less content with Yugoslavia's neutrality and 72 Tasovac, American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 57. According to Sherwood, "the State Department was compelled by twenty years of isolationism to operate on the principle that the Alpha and Omega of American foreign policy is to keep out of war [emphasis in original]." As such, its functions became "atrophied," and Roosevelt increasingly looked to either bypass Hull or look outside of the department altogether in order to "get things done" on the international level. Robert   This was particularly true of aluminum, of which Yugoslavia provided approximately one third of German demand, and tin, which was supplied in sufficient quantities to almost entirely meet German needs. Creveld, Hitler's Strategy 1940. 79 Lane to Hull, March 21, 1941, FRUS: 1941. 80 Pavlowitch,Hitler's New Disorder,[12][13] For a detailed account of the coup as it occurred, as well as the role that Simović played in leading it and forming the subsequent government, see Ristić, Yugoslavia's Revolution of 1941, 84-112. primary underlying causes. 82 Chief among these offending policies was the Sporazum, or agreement, reached between the government and Croatian political leaders in 1939. Since Yugoslavia's creation there had been significant tension between the Croats and Serbs regarding the way in which their respective nationalities and territories would be incorporated into and governed within the newly formed country. These tensions could erupt in violence, as they did when a Montenegrin member of the Serb Radical Party opened fire on and killed multiple Croat colleagues within the Yugoslav parliament in 1928. In response, King Alexander abolished the parliament and established a dictatorship. 83 He also reorganized Yugoslavia administratively and created provinces that "ignored… historical and ethnic" boundaries. 84 While Croats originally envisioned the establishment of an autonomous Croatian state within Yugoslavia, many Serbs believed that Croatia should simply be absorbed into the existing Serbian state and subordinated to its centralized rule. 85 Prince Paul acquiesced to Croatian demands and approved the Sporazum, which created the Banovina, or province, of Croatia and granted it a significant degree of autonomy and signaled the return to traditional, ethnically-based administrative borders. This agreement was met with resentment by many Serbs, who viewed it as a concession made at the expense of their deservedly dominant role within Yugoslavia and served to invigorate Serbian nationalism. 86 Besides serving as the galvanizing force behind the coup, this nationalism also 82 Pavlowitch, Hitler's New Disorder, 14. 83 Pavlowitch,Yugoslavia,[72][73][74] Dennison Rusinow, "The Yugoslav Peoples," in Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, ed. Peter F. Sugar (Washington, D.C.: The American University Press, 1995), 376. 85 Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, 57-8. 86 Pavlowitch,Hitler's New Disorder,[5][6][7][8] revitalized the idea of a Greater Serbia. According to this scheme, Yugoslavia would bring in those Serbs who currently resided outside of its borders and rid itself of minority populations via "population exchanges," thus allowing the Serbs to reassert their hegemonic position within the state. 87 This Pan-Serb ideology would come to have an understandably polarizing effect among Yugoslavia's constituent ethnic groups. It would also come to be associated with Mihailović and many of his most ardent supporters within the YGE and Serb-American community.
The accessibility of the heroic Serbian image, and the positive view of its violent potential, among American journalists is apparent within their reports of the March coup and expectations regarding the subsequent invasion. For instance, a New York Times' headline on April 6, 1941 proclaimed the "Balkans Aflame." There was no trepidation about this conflagration. Rather, it was hoped that it would ultimately consume the Nazi invaders. The article went on to note that the Serbs are a singing race. Many of their folksongs and war chants are centuries old. Last week Serbian voices raised in the streets of Belgrade and many of the singers were marching men…. Southward, in a mountain fastness, the Yugoslavs were expected to make their stand, and rely on their national tradition of guerrilla fighting. Such warfare, with its sudden forays on supply columns and on communications, might prove formidable, as in the World War, to the German military. 88 This belief in the Serbs' fighting spirit was soon put to the test, and the immediate results were not in keeping with the expectation of either the US government or press. Hitler, furious upon learning of the coup, ordered his military staff "to smash Yugoslavia militarily and as a state-form." 89 David Stafford, Britain andEuropean Resistance, 1940-1945: A Survey of the Special Operations Executive, with Documents (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 52. 100 Jørgen Haestrop, European Resistance Movements, 1939: A Complete History (Westport, CT: Meckler Publishing, 1981, 190. The British Special Operations Executive (SOE) was created in response to the likelihood of Germany's defeat of France. The British recognized in the spring of 1940 that a "special organization" would be needed to carry out the "major British strategic objective" of creating "widespread revolt in Germany's conquered territory." M.R.D. Foot, SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive, 1940-46, rev. ed. (USA: University Publications of America, Inc., 1986), 18. The SOE encouraged the coup, though Pavlowitch argues that, in doing so, they were "merely pushing an open door. " Pavlowitch,Hitler's New Disorder,14. 101 Jozo Tomasevich,War and Revolution in Yugoslavia,140. play the two primary resistance groups, the Četniks under Mihailović and the Partisans under Tito. Prior to the open revolt that the invasion of the Soviet Union ignited, both groups had avoided engaging either one another or the occupying forces. 102 Although both leaders participated in the rebellion, the defeat of the Germans soon became a secondary concern for both Mihailović and Tito. Both men quickly came to believe in the inevitability of Germany's defeat and expulsion from Yugoslavia. 103 This belief led them to instead focus on ensuring that their individual and mutually-exclusive visions of Yugoslavia would prevail in the war's aftermath. Tito, as the leader of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia, saw the conflict as an opportunity to achieve political revolution. He also increasingly came to see Mihailović as a reactionary impediment to this goal. 104 Mihailović, a colonel in the defeated Yugoslav army, refused to recognize capitulation and wanted to maintain "the persistence of the Yugoslav state." 105 At least some historians have concluded that his ultimate goal was "to create a greater Serbia" that was to be "based on traditionalist principles." 106 Regardless of whether or not he was an adherent of Pan-Serbism, Mihailović saw himself as a representative and defender of the traditional Yugoslavian order. He thus quickly recognized Tito as the greatest threat to his vision of Yugoslavia's postwar future. 107 102 Simon Trew, Britain, Mihailović, andthe Chetniks, 1941-42 (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1998), 9-10. 103 Pavlowitch,Hitler's New Disorder,[146][147] Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 154. 105 Ibid., 54. 106 Robert Gellately, Stalin's Curse: Battling for Communism in War and Cold War (New York: Vintage Books, 2013), 262. Pavlowitch asserts that it is not known what Mihailović thought of Pan-Serbism, but notes that "he was not politically minded, stuck to the Yugoslavia that he knew and served, and welcomed those non-Serbs that rallied to him. " Pavlowitch,Hitler's New Disorder,55. According to Aleksa Djilas, "Many [Serbs] did not consciously pursue hegemony but were simply unable to see Yugoslavia as anything but an extension of Serbia." Aleksa Djilas, The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991 Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 145.
Although Mihailović's Četniks initially joined the revolt in cooperation with Partisans, the "uncertain modus vivendi," by which the two groups agreed to fight the Axis occupiers rather than one another, quickly collapsed. 108 Mihailović felt pressured into action lest the uprising, and any territory liberated as a consequence of it, fall entirely under communist control. 109 Considering that this was his primary motivation for entering the fray, it is unsurprising that it was difficult to maintain peace between the two groups. Cooperation was also undermined by the Četniks' and Partisans' "differences in tactics and between the aims of their movements." 110 Tito was much more willing to engage the occupiers and accept any subsequent reprisals against the civilian populace than was Mihailović, who wanted to postpone decisive action until the arrival of the Allies. 111 From Tito's perspective, violence contributed to a breakdown of society that was conducive to revolution. 112 As a result of these irreconcilable differences, the resistance activities of the Partisans and Chetniks soon devolved into internecine strife.
As word of the uprising spread, the YGE, which had established itself in London after fleeing Yugoslavia, officially recognized Mihailović as the leader of the resistance forces and promoted him from colonel to general. 113 Nazism, 1940(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1977 originally attributed the uprising to the leadership of Mihailović, contributing to the rise of the romantic narrative in which he and his Četniks were hailed as the exemplars of anti-Axis resistance. 114 The US press quickly adopted this narrative as well.
The pervasive belief in the Serbs' fighting prowess was likely a contributing factor to the numerous reports of heroic feats that flourished following the recognition of Mihailović as the leader of the rebellion in Yugoslavia. For example, Life magazine assured its readers on November 24, 1941 that Mihailović's "army of Serb patriots today controls a quarter of Yugoslavia and most of the important railway lines." 115 Similarly, an article in the January 13, 1942, edition of the Chicago Daily Tribune announced that Mihailović, the "Serb 'Robin Hood,'" was in "absolute control of over 20,000 square miles" as a result of his "brilliant undercover campaign." 116 By August 12, 1942, Yank claimed that Četnik control had expanded to two-thirds of the country, marking the opening of "a second front ." 117 There were other reasons than just Serbophilia that contributed to the seeming credulity with which these fantastical tales about Mihailović's military successes were spread and consumed within the United States. This romantic narrative was at least in part a result of the lack of firsthand American reporting from the region that held true for not only the US government, but also for the US press. For example, Ray Brock of The New York Times, reported prolifically on Yugoslav affairs, but following the invasion he did so from Ankara. Therefore, he relied upon secondhand sources, such 114 David Stafford, Britain andEuropean Resistance, 1940-1945 The Četnik successes against the Wehrmacht, a seemingly unstoppable juggernaut that had conquered much of continental Europe with alarming speed and disconcerting ease, undoubtedly seemed incredible. According to Paul Fussell the "the Second World War was a notably secular affair," marked more by "skepticism" than superstition. 120 Though this would seem to preclude the preternatural heroism of the archetypal romance, it is hard to describe the above-mentioned exploits of Mihailović, 118  Notably, the victims of these and other atrocities were invariably identified as Serbian.
The US press joined in spreading news of the Axis brutality toward the Serbs. Proponents of Greater Serbia attempted to use these atrocities to further their agenda. That Yugoslavs in general, and Serbs in particularly, suffered horribly under occupation is beyond question. The war would leave 1.75 million Yugoslavs, or approximately 11 percent of the population, dead. 123 Serbs suffered particularly harsh treatment at the hands of the Ustaše within the NDH, where it is estimated that between 300,000 to over 400,000 Serbs were killed. 124 Rather than emphasizing the culpability of Pavelić and his followers for these atrocities, those seeking to reassert Serbian hegemony in postwar Yugoslavia instead blamed Croats as a whole. Within the United States, the primary voice of anti-Croatian propaganda, as well as one of Mihailović's most vociferous promoters, was Amerikanski Srbobran, the foreignlanguage paper produced by the Serbian National Federation (SNF). 125 Pan-Serbism had an auspicious beginning within the United States, particularly in regard to anti-Croat sentiment. Many members of the US press were ready to join the Pan-Serbs in painting the Croats as the traitors responsible for Yugoslavia's defeat.
There were "traitors under every rock" according to correspondent Cecil B. Brown's account of his experience in Yugoslavia during the time of the German invasion.
Besides having his vehicle stopped by a "Croat in Nazi uniform," he also observed "Croat fifth columnists" aiding in the identification of "suspiciously loyal Serbs and Bosnians," who were then "placed under guard." As Brown's interview of a Serb military commander in the field made clear, the Croats had betrayed Yugoslavia.
A tragic and majestic figure, General Nedelkovitch. Three days before, this rotund, heavy-faced, mild-mannered, fifty-nine-year-old general himself had been engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with the German invaders. Two of his four staff officers had been killed in bayonet battles with the Nazis. These men were Serbs, General Nedelkovitch had seen 40 per cent of his troops killed, and 50 per cent, all Croats, desert or refuse to answer the call to arms. 126 Even FDR seemed to be swept up in the Serbophile fervor. According to the Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States, Konstantin Fotić, on December 20, 1941, Roosevelt responded to a memorandum that detailed Croat atrocities by assuring Fotić that "the Serbs will rise again as a great people." The President then went on to question "how, after such horrible crimes, [the Serbs] could expect to live in the future in the same state with the Croats." 127 Those that desired to see the creation of a postwar Greater Serbia were undoubtedly encouraged that the US press and government seemed to have adopted a sympathetic outlook on Yugoslav affairs. show them their pleas have not fallen on deaf ears, we propose to send a bomber load of medical supplies…. 128 As evidenced by the above message, the romantic narrative of Četnik resistance resonated on an emotional level with at least some officials in the US government.

CONCLUSION
The romantic narrative initially garnered significant American sympathy for the Serbs suffering within Yugoslavia and support for the Četnik cause. However, this sympathy and support was based upon a superficial understanding of Yugoslavia.
Misinformation and preconceived notions about the Balkans and its inhabitants contributed to this understanding. This unsound foundation would not be able to bear the weight of the romantic narrative over time. The image of the Balkans was malleable, and as word of the conflict between the Četniks and the Partisans began to filter into the Western press, Americans would prove more than able and willing to abandon their positive view of Balkan volatility and violence. Also, the reach of Serbophilia within the United States had its limits, as would be discovered by the proponents of the Pan-Serb ideology.
Nonetheless, through 1941 and much of 1942, Mihailović was lauded as a hero by the American press and government officials. Unfortunately for him, US support was limited primarily to pledges of future aid. The near-term reason for this was a problem of logistics. This is indicated by a meeting that King  assured that aid for Mihailović "would be forthcoming as soon there were enough long-range bomber in the Middle East to permit it." 129 There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of this assurance, as the United States did increase its material support to Yugoslavia considerably in the coming years. However, by that time the romantic narrative had, for many Americans, run its course. 129  While the handbook acknowledged that Mihailović was able to achieve a degree of unity across ethnic boundaries by appealing to anti-communist sentiments among conservative Yugoslavs, it argued that Mihailović's efforts to overcome the alienation that resulted from the Četnik's association with Pan-Serbism proved to be too little, too late. 132 The military's findings on the Četnik resistance had parallels within the United States and were preceded by a discourse among American civilians and government officials about the nature of Mihailović's movement and what it meant for the future of Yugoslavia. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Krapfl described romance as "a quest, a heroic struggle between good and evil." 133 Mihailović enjoyed nearly universal support within the US when Americans understood the Četniks as being engaged in a generic struggle of good versus evil. In this chapter I discuss how many liberal cultural producers increasingly came to view the YGE and Mihailović as reactionary, dictatorial, and Pan-Serb. 134 None of these characteristics aligned with the liberal belief that the war was a "democratic revolution" based upon the principles 131 This "ample evidence" included reports from the initial SOE liaison to Mihailović, requests by Mihailović for the Allies to bomb the Croatian capital of Zagreb, "the official map circulated at [Mihailović's] HQ and showing [the] extent of Greater Serbia," and "a study of the early Četnik propaganda. " Ibid.,12. 132 Ibid., 13. 133 Krapfl, Revolution with a Human Face, 15. 134 As Tom W. Smith notes, liberalism is difficult to define and "becomes more entangling and shapeless as one struggles" to do so. Nonetheless, he identifies certain liberal attitudes or beliefs that clarify why liberals might be critical of the perceived politics and ideology of Mihailović and the YGE. These include a tendency to be "reformist, opting for change and rarely satisfied with the status quo… democratic, favoring a maximization of electoral rights… libertarian, supporting full extension of civil liberties such as free speech and the right to assemble… [and] humanitarian, establishing a social welfare system for the care and protection of society in general and the lower class in particular. The Free World… liberal ideology, liberal rhetoric, and liberal assumptions permeated discussion of war. "Democracy," "freedom," the "common man," the "people," and the "people's revolution" were the words and phrases which… did things in defining the meaning and purpose of World War II. 138 The divergence of the perceived aims of the Četnik movement from liberal ideals, combined with the accusation of collaboration, all served to erode the romantic narrative of Mihailović's resistance. Those that either contributed to or were persuaded by this reassessment of Mihailović's "quest," both in regard to its ends and means, called for the US to look elsewhere for a co-protagonist in its war against fascism.
In this chapter, I also describe the ways in which Pan-Serbism came into 135  conflict with the US government's attempts to promulgate a message of unity. This message was continually reiterated by both the government and press and fit the mold of what White termed the comedic narrative. According to him, the comedy results in a "reconciliation of men with men, of men with their world and society… [and] seemingly inalterably opposed elements… are revealed to be… harmonizable with one another, unified, at one with themselves and the others." 139 Mihailović, the YGE, and the Yugoslav-American community were components of a larger metanarrative of global unity. This narrative called upon Yugoslav-Americans to unite with one another and US society as a whole, for the resistance forces in Yugoslavia to fight together, and for the YGE to overcome its internal political differences. This metanarrative was given form in the United Nations, which would win the war and ensure peace, stability, and American security in its aftermath. 140 Tito, rather than Mihailović, came to be seen by many as the likelier candidate to ensure Yugoslavian unity and postwar peace.

THE PROBLEMS WITH PAN-SERBISM
Throughout the war, Pan-Serb proponents within the Serb-American community attacked the Croats as a whole and attempted to link Croat-Americans to fascism and Pavelić's regime, often while simultaneously advocating for US support of Mihailović. An example of this can be seen in a letter sent to the State Department by 139 White,Metahistory,9. 140 The United Nations was adopted as the name of the anti-Axis alliance on January 1, 1942. "Declaration by United Nations," in FRUS 1942: Volume I, General; the British Commonwealth; the Far East, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), 1, http://digital .library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1942v01. The declaration of this alliance, to which the YGE was a signatory, also professed a commitment to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Ibid., the leadership of a Serbian Eastern Orthodox parish in Steelton, Pennsylvania: We Americans of Serbian descent… direct this protest… against the so-called "Croatian Congress" which is to be held in Chicago, Illinois… BECAUSE it is a Congress called by those whose nearest kin have declared war against the United States… That it might be called 'Pavelich's' Congress can be seen by this, that [its] president… was [accused of being] a Pro-Nazi.
The letter proceeded to express gratitude for the "aid given to General Besides being encouraged by the pro-Serb sentiments expressed by members of the press and government, the Serb-Americans that made such accusations might have reasonably expected that domestic anxieties about disloyal citizens with foreign ties had produced an environment that was conducive to the propagation and acceptance of their message. In their eagerness to exploit America's wartime nativism, they apparently failed to appreciate that they wielded a double-edged sword.
Although the United States appeared to be working itself into a nativist lather over the threat posed by fifth columnists prior to its formal entrance into the war as a belligerent, these fears would largely be channeled toward combatting foreign influence and social discord. In 1940, the ubiquitous William Donovan co-authored a most of us will remember the unfortunate experience of World War I, when there was in many sections of the country an almost automatic tendency to classify as pro-German all who had German names or were of German descent. This bigoted assumption led to a kind of witchhunting which did serious damage to our national unity… Yet it is a matter of record that, with a very small number of exceptions, our German and other foreign-born citizens during the last war were as  between "1918 and 1939," the Yugoslav government had forced "the Croatians into submission by acts of brutality and savagery." Because of these injustices, Pavelić was to be considered no more of a "terrorist" than was "George Washington." While the defense of Pavelić was not a position that met with widespread American sympathy, the argument that traditional Yugoslav rule was unfair to non-Serbs and needed to be revised would be. The article claimed that Croats were subjected to "mass terror" by the Serbs and that "concentration camps" had been set up "throughout Croatia." However, this particular magazine likely had little to no influence upon the There was also a tendency among liberal cultural producers within the United States to link racism to Nazism. This can be seen in an article that appeared in the Autumn 1943 issue of Common Ground, which was co-authored by John Collier, the US Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and Saul Padover, Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior. The article explained that Hitler had started a global "race war" with the result that "everywhere race prejudice is endemic." The authors expressed their believe that "race and 'minority' questions" had the potential to "wreck our democracy" if left unresolved. The solution to this threat was overcoming race "prejudice" and "arrogance" and the "establishment of a genuine equality for all peoples… [without which] there [could] be no lasting peace in the world." The ideal course of action was to be modeled on the Soviet Union, which had "solved its racial and ethnic problems wisely-by preaching and practicing genuine equality of opportunity for all its citizens, regardless of their color or racial origin." 149 As will be seen, Pan-Serbism came to be compared to Nazi race "prejudice" and "arrogance." In contrast, the ethnic heterogeneity of the Partisan movement came to be portrayed in development of liberal and leftist criticism of Pan-Serbism. "Facts about Yugoslavia," Social Justice (April 21, 1941), 11, accessed January 3, 2018, http://www.unz.com/print/SocialJustice-1941apr21-00011/. The magazine's antisemitism is quite apparent in multiple articles within this same issue, including "Is Social Justice Anti-Semitic?" (yes) and "'Anti-Semite' on Town Hall Air." 149 John Collier and Saul K. Padover, "An Institute of Ethnic Democracy," Common Ground (Autumn 1943), 3, accessed December 23, 2017, http://www.unz.org/Pub/CommonGround-1943q3-00003?View=PDF&Text=%22Serbia%22+AND+%22race%22. Collier and Padover were undoubtedly enamored with the Soviet Union's solution in theory rather than in practice. In theory the Soviet Union was formed as a "voluntary association of peoples with equal rights," and "national identity was viewed as an atavistic holdover from the past." People within the Soviet Union could be arrested for "spreading ethnic hatred." However, this was often used as a means of repression in order to prevent secessionist talk or other forms of "nationalist deviationism." Stalin demonstrated his own form of ethnonational chauvinism with his declaration that Russians were "the first nation among equals." He also oversaw the mass deportation of a variety of ethnic groups from Eastern Europe "to remote areas of Siberia and Central Asia," with many people dying "en route or soon after their arrival." Edward W. the same way that Collier and Padover favorably described the Soviet solution to race problems.
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the State Department expressed concern about not just the foreign influence exerted by the enemies of the United States, but foreign influence in general. On December 10, 1941, within days of the government's designation of Japanese, Italian, and German citizens in the United States as enemy aliens, the State Department issued a policy statement regarding political activities of "free movements." 150 The State Department recognized that "the United States is composed of citizens from many national backgrounds" and allowed that they might have "a natural interest in their country of origin." Regardless of such inclinations, it declared that "United States citizens of whatever background owe, and have, an undivided allegiance to the United States." It then went on to state that "the first concern of the United States must always be the unity of the country," and that US government would look with disfavor on "any attempt to enlist the support of American citizens of like racial background on the theory that they are 'fellow nationals. '" 151 The threat that discord among Yugoslav-Americans posed to domestic unity was of serious concern to the US government, and the proponents of Greater Serbia were quickly identified as the ones who were primarily responsible for inflaming the [Pavelić]." The State Department surmised that the purpose of SNF's attack was to discredit "the idea of Yugoslavia itself, thus paving the way for a 'Greater Serbia. '" 154 The same report also concluded that some of the most egregious perpetuators of anti-Croat hostilities included two individuals linked to the YGE: Archbishop Dionisije 152 The level of concern is suggested by historian Lorraine M. Lees observation that, within the archival record, "the largest single group of FNB [Foreign Nationalities Branch] files is on the Yugoslav-American community. The files on Italians and Germans, with ties to countries with which the United States was at war, are second and third." Lorraine M. Lees, Yugoslav-Americans and National Security during World War II (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007), 9. The FNB was a branch of the OSS that was charged with providing "a systematic reading, from the diplomatic viewpoint, of the foreignlanguage press in the United States." It also maintained "contact with foreign nationality groups for whose use the foreign-language press is published," studied "agitations" among these groups "on foreign political issues," and made "contact with… foreign publicists and political leaders who [arrived in the US] as refugees [and] still hoped to promote their causes from American shores and to enlist… the sympathy of their American cousins and the support of American official influence." DeWitt C. Poole There were several other domestic factors that contributed to the government's particular concern over the ways in which Serb nationalism was being expressed within America and undermining the narrative of national unity. One of these was the large numbers of Yugoslav-Americans employed "in heavy industries in the East and Middle West," and thus the possibility that discord within this community might adversely affect war production. 156 Another factor was that Americans of Croat and Slovene descent significantly outnumbered the Serbs. According to a 1944 estimate, there were a total of one million first, second, and third generation Yugoslav-Americans. Of these, approximately 500,000 were Croats, 300,000 were Slovenes, and 200,000 were Serbs. 157 This meant that the majority of Yugoslav-Americans were understandably hostile to the idea of Greater Serbia and anti-Croat propaganda. This had potential implications for electoral politics if the majority of Yugoslav-Americans sensed that government policy favored the Serbs. 158 This was of particular concern in light of reports like the one sent by the COI to the State Department on May 27, 1942, that the apparent latitude granted to Fotić and Dionsije within the US had led many 155 Ibid.,161. 158 According to Lees, "in 1938, the Democratic National Committee established twenty-six 'nationality divisions' to secure the ethnic vote; the Yugoslavs were among those represented." Lees, Yugoslav-Americans and National Security during World War II, 30. Also, policymakers were concerned about the influence that the US position on Yugoslavia might have on the 1944 presidential election, but "these ethnic quarrels" ultimately "did not affect the outcome. " Ibid.,192. Serbs and Croats to assume "that the movement against a confederated Yugoslavia and for a Greater Serbia had at least the tacit approval of the United States Government." 159 The issue of demographics was brought up in a meeting between Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle and Fotić on June 12, 1942, during which Berle tried to bring Fotić to heel. According to Berle, he expressed to Fotić that the government was "disturbed by the recrudescence of the Great Serbian Movement in the United States." He pointed out to Fotić that the "majority of Yugoslav subjects in the United States… were not Serbs," but Croats, and that it was his "distinct impression" that "the great majority" of them did not support Pavelić. Berle also revealed that he was aware that Fotić had "interested himself" in the "Serb-Croat controversy" and expressed his hope that Fotić "would exert his influence" in "reducing" these tensions. 160 If he hoped that this meeting would either alter Fotić's behavior or quell the Croat-Serb dispute, Berle was to be sadly disappointed.
In September, 1942, Elmer Davis, the director of the Office of War Information (OWI), invited Berle to a meeting of the editors of the major Yugoslav foreign language papers in order to cajole them into assisting with the restoration of harmony in the Yugoslav-American community. According to Berle's account of the meeting, the Serbs were "still making trouble for the Croats-probably with some help from" If FDR had somehow remained unaware of the potential for public backlash in response to the perception of governmental endorsement of Pan-Serbism, this was remedied shortly after a speech he delivered on September 3, 1942. During this address, he made reference to the "fighting spirit" and "unconquerable peoples" of a number of occupied countries, to include "Serbia." 162 The New York Times reported on September 12, that the President had been told "some concern had arisen… that he no longer recognized Yugoslavia." The incident was explained away as "a slip… due that the President's saying "Serbia" disposes of Yugoslavia as a state, and that has caused an uproar among Yugoslavs and Yugoslav-Americans, whose number exceed 1,000,000, 90 per cent of whom are of Croatian and Slovenian origin. The matter involves the morale of hundreds of thousands of people (Croat-Americans) working in our war plants.
As evidence of the way in which Serb chauvinists might exploit the slip, the article recounted that, while speaking at a luncheon, Ruth Mitchell claimed "that the end of Yugoslavia has been conceded by the highest authorities." The article went on to explain the nature of the Pan-Serb ideology and the Croat-Serb dispute. It described the aim of "the Pan-Serb movement" as the creation of "post-war Serbian domination over the other nationality groups" in Yugoslavia. It also informed its readers that the State Department, OWI, and the OSS have all sought to discourage the men who are active in the attempt to arrange that Serbs shall be supreme in Yugoslavia over the Croats and Slovenes after Axis withdrawal. Officially, this is regarded as a denial of the thesis of the Atlantic Charter, which implies equality of nationality groups. 165 Despite official claims that the United States was uninterested in Mihailović's politics, the government kept informed about them throughout the war, and there was substantial reason to believe that the Četniks were a reactionary force that fought for the creation of a postwar Greater Serbia. In September, 1942, the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) provided the OSS with an assessment of the situation in Yugoslavia, to include the political character of Mihailović's resistance movement.
According to the report, Mihailović was "primarily concerned with Serbia and the Serbs." He also regarded the Partisans as "the most dangerous enemy of his ideal of 'Srpstvo,'" a term that, according to Adis Maksić, "roughly signifies a quality of being a Serb, and is often translated as 'Serbdom' or 'Serbianism. '" 166 SIS believed that Mihailović's overall policy was "to destroy these internal enemies and to build up an organization that will be in a position to establish an authoritarian Pan-Serb regime (under King Peter II)." 167 An OSS report from November 26, 1942, that was based upon information provided by "Russian sources" confirmed these findings, noting that while Mihailović was "non-political," he had "the reputation of a chauvinist with 'Great-Serb' ideals and a distrust, if not hatred, for the Croats." 168 Similar concerns were reported by Anthony Biddle, the US ambassador to the YGE. In a message to the Secretary of State in January, 1943, Biddle reported on the belief among the Croat, Slovene, and Serb-Democrat members of the YGE that Mihailović had been instructed "to pursue the Pan-Serb line of policy " within Yugoslavia. 169 Pan-Serbs were identified as chronic spoilers of unity within the YGE and were blamed for its failure to adopt of a "liberal forward-looking policy." Mihailović was seen as a party to this dispute due to his suspected adherence to Pan-Serbism and appointment as Minister of War. Biddle actively encouraged the YGE to declare "a post-war policy envisaging equal economic, social, and political opportunities for all." Although such a policy was supported by Serb Democrat, Croat, and Slovene 166 FNB, OSS, "The Position within Yugoslavia, " September 19, 1942, RG 226 entry 210, box 60. This description of the meaning of "srpstvo" can be found in Adis Maksić, "Priming the Nation for War: An Analysis of Organizational Origins and Discursive Machinations of the Serb Democratic Party in Pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-1992," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 35, no. 3 (September 2015: 342, accessed August 1, 2017, EBSCOhost. 167 FNB, OSS, "The Position within Yugoslavia, " September 19, 1942, RG 226 entry 210, box 60. 168 OSS, "Memorandum on Yugoslavia, " November 26, 1942, RG 226, entry 210, box 68. 169 Biddle to Hull, January 2, 1943, FRUS, 1943: Volume II, Europe, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1964 On December 20, 1942, Secretary of State Hull wrote to Biddle that he was to continue his "informal efforts" at "bringing about a better understanding" among the factions within the YGE. He also made the point that "aspects" of the "Yugoslav question" were of "direct concern to a considerable element of the American people" and that Serb-Croat dispute was having "a deplorable effect on" the United States' "national unity." Although he recognized that Fotić bore "a considerable degree of" responsibility for this discord "through his apparent support of the Pan-Serb element," he nevertheless thought that it was best that he remain as the YGE's representative within the United States. He expressed regret that the Mihailović-Partisan controversy had "gained some prominence in the American press," but insisted that the US government maintained "full confidence" in Mihailović, as "statements about to be 170 Biddle to Hull, October 19, 1942, FRUS, 1942 Biddle to Hull, December 5, 1942, DoS IAY, frames 38-40, reel 20. made" would make clear. In Hull's opinion, "the most effective" charge against Mihailović was that he had "lost respect for his own Government's belief in Yugoslav However, Time drew attention to the fact that the contents of the message were not released by Eisenhower's headquarters, but instead by the YGE. This was seen as a possible sign that the US government did not know "enough about the complexities" of the Yugoslav conflict "to justify a clean-cut commitment." 174 The YGE released the message to the press on January 11, 1943. According to The New York Times, "a spokesman said that the message was definite evidence that the United Nations were backing General [Mihailović] and threw down various recent attempts to discredit him and his efforts." 175 Central to these "attempts to discredit" Mihailović was the suggestion that one of the ways in which his "gallant" forces had been "resourceful" was by collaborating with the Axis occupiers.
The initial accusation of Mihailović's collaboration followed shortly after the Germans launched their summer offensive against the Red Army on June 28, 1942. 176 In anticipation of this offensive, the Soviet foreign minister traveled to London a few weeks prior in order to encourage the opening of a second front on continental Europe.
Churchill explained that, for the moment, this was impossible. 177 Michael Howard, Grand Strategy, vol. 4, August 1942-September 1943(London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1972 Churchill originally suggested that a second front might be opened by August or September at the earliest. However, on August 12, 1942, he traveled to the Soviet Union to deliver the news in person that there would be no second front until 1943. Williams,Parachutes,Patriots,and Partisans,[84][85] Sumner Welles, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles), " August 5, 1942, FRUS, 1942 Roberts,Tito,Mihailović,and the Allies,62. 180 Milorad M. Drachkovitch, "The Comintern and the Insurrectional Activity of the Community Party of Yugoslavia in 1941," in The Comintern: Historical Highlights, eds. Milorad M. Drachkovitch and Branko Lazitch (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966 Newspaper correspondents surmised as much at the time. According to New York Times reporter Harold Callender, it was "pointed out in diplomatic quarters that Russian support and propaganda for the Yugoslav partisans approximately coincided with Russian demands for a second front against In August 1942, Fotić presented Welles with a series of telegrams from Mihailović in which the general explained his actions in Yugoslavia. According to Mihailović's messages, he could not "give a serious blow" without adequate "arms and supplies." He also stated that he was instructed by the British to prevent "a Communist uprising for Soviet Russia," that "the Communists are hated by the people," and that "the people have been provoked by the incredible terror of the Communists who had killed thousands of Nationalists." 182 This was undoubtedly a move to counter the accusations in The Daily Worker, which Fotić also addressed. He complained that "this article had immediately been republished in the [communistinclined] portions of the Croatian press in the United States." 183 Considering the demonization that the Croats experienced following the invasion of Yugoslavia, it is not surprising that they seized upon the opportunity to slander the Pan-Serbs' hero.
While the mainstream press was not initially receptive to the communists' accusations, its defense of Mihailović grew muddled over a very short period of time.
Through October, 1942, The New York Times dutifully reported the YGE's "utmost confidence" in Mihailović and described the Partisans as a group of "criminals, renegades, bandits, and dissident Croats and Moslems." 184 By November 20, The New Germany to relieve pressure upon Russia… In the eyes of Moscow… [Mihailović] was moving too slowly." Harold Callender, "Yugoslavia's Rift is Laid to Russia," New York Times, December 22, 1942, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1942 Welles, "Memorandum of Conversation," 806-808. While it was true that the British did not wish to see a communist takeover of Yugoslavia, Mihailović's claims were misleading. The initial SOE liaison with Mihailović quickly recognized the counterproductive nature of the Četnik-Partisan dispute and suggested that supplies to Mihailović be halted until Mihailović ceased fighting the Partisans. Williams,Parachutes,Patriots,and Partisans,61. 183 Sumner Welles, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles), " August 5, 1942, FRUS, 1942. 184 "Yugoslavia's Regime Backs Mikhailovitch," New York Times, October 6, 1942, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1942/10/06/83889092 .html?pageNumber=3. "Mikhailovitch Story Denounced as False," New York Times, October 5, 1942 York Times conceded that although the accusation of "'traffic' with the enemy" had gained "some verisimilitude," Mihailović's "defenders" explained that contact with Italians and Nedić was necessary in order to obtain supplies. In addition, Nedić was "after all… a Serb and… no Quisling." 185 This was a distinction that few, if any, within the American government or press had made in the past or would make in the future. The Nation assured its readers on November 28, 1942, that  If war is a political, social, and psychological disaster, it is also a perceptual and rhetorical scandal from which total recovery is unlikely.
accessed January 10, 2018 https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1942/10/05/88504923.html?pageNumber=2. 185 Hanson W. Baldwin, "Within Yugoslavia-II, " New York Times, November 20, 1942, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1942 Ralph Bates, "Mihailovich andthe Partisans," The Nation 155, no. 22 (November 28, 1942), 577-578, accessed November 10, 2017, EBSCOhost. 187 The Yugoslav Embassy to the Department of State, December 16, 1942, FRUS, 1942 Looking out upon the wartime world, soldiers and civilians alike reduce it to a simplified sketch featuring a limited series of classifications into which people, in the process dehumanized and deprived of individuality or eccentricity, are fitted. 188 While the British were aware of Mihailović dealings with the Italians, and distinguished his behavior from "true" collaboration, the YGE was undoubtedly concerned that neither the American nor Yugoslav public would appreciate this distinction. 189 Moscow was also sensitive to the problem of categorization as it related to Tito's Partisans. In a series of messages in early 1942, the Comintern reprimanded Tito for allowing the Partisans to "acquire a Communist character" and instructed him not to "view the issues of [his] fight only from [his] own national standpoint, but also from the international standpoint of the American-British-Soviet coalition" and to demonstrate "political elasticity." 190 In November, 1942, the Comintern gave Tito permission to form "a national liberation committee of Yugoslavia… with an allnational Yugoslav and all-party antifascist character" with the caveats that Tito would refrain from putting "it in opposition to the" YGE or "raise the question" of abolishing the monarchy.  " in Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946: Subversion and Sabotage during World War II Series Two: SOE Operations in the Balkans (Marlborough, England: Adam Matthew Publications, 2007, frame 205, reel 19. In a message to London on April 16, 1943, Glenconner also addressed the view that collaboration between Mihailović and the Italians was seen in London "as an expediency that was not to [Britain's military] disadvantage." Glenconner to London, April 16, 1943, ibid., frame 192, reel 19. 190 Drachkovitch, "The Comintern and the Insurrectional Activity of the Community Party of Yugoslavia in 1941Yugoslavia in -1942 of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Bihać in November 1942. 191 This would subsequently be hailed by many as evidence of the Partisans' democratic character.
Possibly spurred to a higher standard of journalistic integrity by the British decision to begin mentioning the Partisans in its propaganda broadcasts, the December 14, 1942, issue of Time magazine declared that Mihailović had been "eclipsed" by the Partisans. 192 According to the article, Americans had been so "misled by previous reports" about Mihailović that "many a Time reader nominated [Mihailović] for Man of the Year." Time revealed that, in fact, the Četniks had been militarily inactive, and that those who wanted "to continue active resistance" had deserted to the Partisans.
The "impoverished peasants" of all nationalities within Yugoslavia showed "an increasing preference for the Partisans" over Mihailović, who fought "for a greater Serbia." In contrast to Mihailović, the Partisans had adopted "democratic methods almost unprecedented in the Balkans." Proof that the Partisans were neither "Communist" nor "bandit" could be seen in the political heterogeneity and respectability of the "National Constitutional Assembly" that had been formed in the Partisan "capital" of Bihać. 193 Within days of the Time's article, The Saturday Evening Post ran Adamic's "Mikhailovitch: Balkan Mystery Man," which was also critical of Mihailović and the Četniks. According to Adamic, Mihailović's "dilemma" was whether to choose to be 191 Ibid.,[209][210] By fall 1942, officials within the British government realized "that the Partisans' anti-Axis struggle could no longer be ignored, and that their activities… might henceforth be praised over the BBC." On October 18, 1942, the BBC actually preempted the official change in policy by making "flattering references to the Partisans" in their broadcasts to Yugoslavia. Trew, Britain, Mihailović, and the Chetniks, 165-166. 193 "Mihailovich Eclipsed," Foreign News, Time 40, no. 24 (December 14, 1942), 48-53, http://time.com/vault/issue/1942-12-14/page/48/. on the side of "democracy" and "revolutionary Communism" or on the side of "Fascism." Unfortunately, "orders from the" YGE led Mihailović "necessarily closer to the Quisling apparatus" than to the Partisans. While Adamic allowed that "some people" in Yugoslavia were "anti-Partisan," he claimed that the "majority" were not.
However, he did express some apprehension about the Partisan's revolutionary nature, reminding his readers of "the death of hundreds of thousands of people" as a result of Perhaps none of Mihailović's American supporters refused to go gentle into that good night more so than reporter Ruth Mitchell. Besides being the sister of General Billy Mitchell, she gained a measure of fame in her own right by joining the Četniks while on assignment in the Balkans. She then promptly fell into the hands of the Gestapo. After a year in prison, Mitchell was released by the Germans and returned to 194 The Chinese Nationalist Chiang Kai-shek seized power in 1928 with Soviet support and in alliance with the Chinese communists. However, Chiang Kai-shek turned on his allies, beginning with the slaughter of thousands of communists in Shanghai. Rana Mitter, Forgotten Ally: China's World War II, 1937(New York: Mariner Books, 2014, 44-50. Once established, his government then proceeded to engage in a number of human rights abuses, such as "assassinating political dissidents" and "extorting… farmers. " Ibid.,57. 195 Louis Adamic, "Mikhailovitch: Balkan Mystery Man," The Saturday Evening Post (December 19, 1942), 85-86, accessed October 30, 2017 the United States, where she advocated tirelessly on behalf of the Četniks. 196 Mitchell's refutation of the accusations against Mihailović served as a precursor to the early historiographical focus on communist conspiracy as discussed in the introduction. As Krapfl notes, "romance can attribute failure only to a diabolical antagonist. " 197  Masses, from where their "echoes" filtered into the mainstream press. Of the "communists and their collaborators" that were running "wild… in inflating the performance of the 'Partisans' and in smearing" Mihailović, Ruth singled out the influence of Louis Adamic as particularly pernicious. According to Mitchell, Adamic wielded undue influence upon the OWI, spread "communist propaganda," and was "widely regarded as a Serb hater. " 198 For his part, Adamic accused Mitchell of being on the payroll of the YGE. 199 Mitchell was right to be concerned that the "vilification" of Mihailović had led many "to doubt and to wonder," as one of those that had started to doubt was Ambassador Biddle. 200 Initially, Biddle appeared to give little attention to the accusations of collaboration. He instead focused on resolving the disputes within the YGE and the Yugoslav-American community and persuading the Yugoslav government to pressure Mihailović into brokering a truce with the Partisans. As he told the Yugoslav Prime Minister in January, "the most important point to stress," both for the YGE and its embassy in the US, "was the establishment of unity." This "unity amongst the Yugoslavs both at home and abroad" would also "overcome the opposition of the so-called Communist press." 201 However, in April, 1943, Biddle reported his assessment of Mihailović's denials of collaboration. He noted that Mihailović denied the "allegations in the first person," which Biddle suspected was done in the naive hope of sweeping "aside the question of cooperation by [Mihailović's] 'lieutenants. '" 202 A letter drafted by Elmer Davis in June 1943 to be sent to the president of the SNF indicated that his previous meeting with the foreign-language newspaper editors did not succeed in persuading Amerikanski Srbobran's to adopt a more harmonious tone. It also demonstrated that members of the State Department were not the only government officials who were frustrated by the ways in which Pan-Serb activism was undermining unity. Davis wrote, for some time, several branches of the United States Government , including the Office of War Information, the Department of Justice, and the Department of State, have watched with concern the policies of the "American Srbobran." Its violent attacks upon all peoples of Croatian extraction, its strong anti-Catholic articles, and its veiled efforts to defend the Quisling [Nedić] who supports the Nazi regime in Serbia often have the effect of aiding the Nazi campaign of intolerance and race hate… The United Nations are striving for the strongest possible unity of all those who are opposed to the Axis. In Yugoslavia, and in the United States, we seek to unite all people of Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian heritage who believe in freedom and democracy…. 203 Notably, Davis drew a link between the anti-Croat propaganda of the Pan-Serb movement and Nazi "race hate," an obsession that even drove the Srbobran to support a "Quisling." Elements of the mainstream press also took increasing notice, and expressed a dim view, of the Pan-Serb ideology and the émigré agitators that championed it. For example, in January 1943, an article in Harper's explained that upon the outbreak of the war… the [SNF] organized the Serbian National Defense Committee. Highly Serbian-nationalistic, the Committee now spreads across the United States an inflammatory propaganda not against the obvious enemies of Yugoslavia-the Germans and Italians-but against the Croatians, the Catholic partners of the Orthodox Serbs in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and against the Croat-Americans. The committeemen preach that Yugoslavia, established as a federation of three peoples, is dead, and that the Serbs are destined to become a Balkan [Herrenvolk], supreme and lordly over the Croats, who have 800,000 cousins in the United States, and the Slovenes, who have 250,000. 204 The description of the Serb nationalists' belief that they were "destined to become a Balkan [Herrenvolk]" blatantly compared the pursuit of Greater Serbia to Nazi race theory. The article blamed many of the same culprits for perpetuating the Serb-Croat dispute as had the State Department, including Amerikanski Srbobran and Ambassador Fotić. As a result of their agitations, "there raged a Balkan-minority war of words, emphasized furiously now and then by a monkey wrench flung at a Croat factory worker by a Serb on the same arsenal-of-democracy assembly line." 205 This suggested that the heroic image of the fighting Serb was under revision now that it was exhibiting itself on US soil. Although the article took pains to specifically 204 Blair Bolles, "The Stew in the Melting Pot: How a Few Exiles Stir It," Harper's Magazine , 183, accessed February 20, 2018, https://harpers-org.uri.idm.oclc.org/archive/1943/01/the-stewin-the-melting-pot/. 205 Ibid., disassociate Mihailović from Serb chauvinism, noting that "Croat guerrillas" fought under his command, the views it expressed did not bode well for his popularity should such a connection gain credence. 206 The article also expressed frustration over the "elements in the American government that encourage the most reactionary of the émigrés" despite the fact that the governments-in-exile knew "that changes [were] coming." 207 It did not comment on the fact that these same émigrés were also Mihailović's most vigorous defenders.
There was the potential for significant public backlash over the perception that the government was colluding with reactionary and collaborationist elements of Britain ." 208 An article in The New York Times indicated that the government was sensitive to the accusation that its policy was "based upon 'settled reactionary sentiments. '" In addition to the deal with Darlan, US support of Mihailović was cited as evidence for the existence of such sentiments. "Out of fear" that these accusations might "cause serious harm to united action both in this country and elsewhere," Under Secretary of State Welles responded to these charges by clarifying that although the "first" 206 Ibid., 183. 207 Ibid., John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947(New York: Columbia University Press, 1972 objective of the war was "absolute victory… secondly" the United States had to "work to establish a just and lasting peace." A critical component of this peace was for people to "choose freely the form of government they desire." In accordance with this aim, Welles insisted that while the US might support Mihailović, this was not a result of "favoritism." Rather, the US would "aid, to the full extents of [its] ability, any group which is fighting the common enemy. But that aid [would] not be in such form as to prejudice a people's basic right, stated in the Atlantic Charter, to choose its own form of government. admonished that "the Serb and Croat public" could "be excused for assuming that" the United and Britain tacitly approved of the YGE's "reactionary tendencies ." 211 In October 1943, shortly before the pivotal Tehran Conference where the decision would be made to switch full Allied support to Tito, Donovan provided FDR with a memorandum "on the Balkan situation" that, besides criticizing Mihailović's "relative lack of [military] activity," also stated that the Government-in-Exile anticipates that [Mihailović], with assistance from the Allies, will reestablish the monarchy with the present cabinet and with Pan-Serbian inclinations. This is stated in confidence by General [Petar Živković], Deputy of the King as Commander in Chief, and by Prime Minister [Božidar Purić]. The Government is not representative of the population, and causes controversy between factions which frequently terminate in grave clashes. The people are irritated that the United States and Britain protect the Government-in-Exile… these people are also firmly against General [Živković],who,under King Alexander,was Dictator. 212 As this memorandum suggests, Mihailović, the King, and the YGE were haunted by the specter of Yugoslavia's dictatorial past under the rule of King Peter's father, and the accusation of authoritarian ambitions was often leveled by the regime's detractors. An example of this can be seen in the November 1, 1943 issue of The New Republic, in which Heinz Eulau launched a blistering attack upon the YGE and Mihailović. According to Eulau, for "three years [the YGE's] clever publicity agents, with the aid of gullible English and American newspapermen, succeeded in attributing the exploits of" Tito to Mihailović. While it paid "lip-service to democratic ideals," the YGE actually continued to pursue "the reactionary, undemocratic, and Serbiannationalist program" directed by the same group that "dominated Yugoslav politics ever since King Alexander established a dictatorship." Mihailović refrained from fighting so that he might "preserve his forces" and make Yugoslavia "a safe place for the exiled ruling clique to return." 213  Amidst the concerns about Mihailović that were being raised within the press and among government officials, Roosevelt received a highly flattering report about the Partisans based upon the observations of OSS operative Major Linn Farish. Živković was appointed as Prime Minister of Yugoslavia after King Alexander abolished the parliament in 1929. Pavlowitch,Yugoslavia,77. 213 Heinz H. F. Eulau, "Europe's Exiled Governments," The New Republic 109, no. 18 (November 1, 1943), 614-617, accessed January 10, 2018, EBSCOhost. 214 Louis Adamic, "The New Yugoslav 'Government, '" The Bulletin 1, no. 1 (September 7, 1943), 6, in DoS IAY, reel 20, frames 574-580. According to this report, which Roosevelt subsequently shared with Stalin at the Tehran Conference, "the Partisan movement [was] of far greater military and political importance than [was] commonly realized." 215 The Partisans had "created… a free community" consisting of Muslims, "Christians, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Communist Party members," all of whom were allowed to practice "any religion or political belief" and freely "express" their opinions. 216 Mihailović and the other Četnik leaders, on the other hand, were "more concerned with their plans for themselves after the war… and thus commenced the bitter civil war which [had] become so savage" that Farish found it hard "to see how a reasonable understanding [could] be brought about." 217 While the British had once defended Allied support of Mihailović based upon the belief that his organization offered the "best prospect of preventing chaos after the war," Farish's report accused Mihailović of actually being the cause of this feared chaos. 218 FDR would not receive the report of Captain Walter Mansfield, a US Marine and OSS liaison with the Četniks, until April 7, 1944, but Farish's counterpart did not offer a ringing endorsement of the unifying potential of the Četnik movement. His report confirmed that, while some Četnik officers "believed there should be a federation of independent states… under King Peter," others wanted "a greater Serbia which will be the predominating influence in all" of Yugoslavia, and most favored at least an "independent Serbia." 219 Reporting in much of the American press mirrored Farish's positive assessment of the Partisans. According to an article in the Chicago Daily Tribune from October 26, 1943, while the Partisans claimed to represent all of the Yugoslav "national groups," the Četniks were "predominantly Serbian" and appeared "to be anti-Croat because of alleged Croatian treachery during" the Yugoslav-Axis conflict. 220 In December, 1943, Life informed its readers that the Partisans represented "a kind of New Deal for Yugoslavia." 221 And although a later article in Life allowed that Tito was a communist, it quoted the remarks of "a British observer" that Tito was "a most uncommunistic Communist." Examples of his "uncommunistic" behavior included the ways in which Tito protected "religion and private property." The article also emphasized the inclusivity of the Partisans, noting that there were "bearded Serbian priests" among their ranks, and that "a whole row of respectable conservatives" were to be found within AVNOJ. 222 An article titled "Balkan Time Bomb," in the January 22, 1944 Mihailović "splattered" his proclamations with "assertions of his loyalty to 'democracy,'" the article suggested that his "personal background" provided the "best clues" to his politics, and stated that first of all, he's a Serb, and the Serbs have always thought themselves the chosen people of the Balkans. They modestly admit that what Lord Gladstone once said of them is true. He described the Serbs as "a select, a noble and imperial race," and the story of Serbia is a story of a vital, bellicose minority which tried for decades to impose its will-and its king-on its neighbors.
Under the subheading of "Feudalism in our Times," the article described Yugoslavia's "peasant population" as so benighted and poverty-stricken that "when foreign relief agencies" provided them with "cocoa, they didn't know what it was" and used it to paint "their huts." It ended by warning that although Yugoslavia was "remote," if its problems remained unresolved, the reader "might just as well start getting ready for another war." 224 The article left little doubt as to the likelihood that Mihailović was the solution to Yugoslavia's problems.
After the withdrawal of the military mission to Mihailović, Roosevelt sent King Peter a message in May, 1944, in which he insisted that the "sentiments" of the United States had "not changed," and that it remained "pledged to the liberation of Yugoslavia and… [hoped] again to see the union of its national elements under common government, democratic in form and fact, as the purposes for which" World War II was "being fought" required. However, he noted that it is one of the misfortunes of the war that your country, battered and dismembered by the enemy, has suffered also from internal conflicts, which in turn have revived older antagonisms… You speak of the Government's popularity with the people at home. I wish I could say that our reports from within Yugoslavia confirm this. On the contrary, they indicate that the people in Yugoslavia have sought, and still are seeking, a leadership which would have vision for dealing with the new social forces at work in the world today…. Let us not forget that the [Mihailović] question has become more political than military.
FDR went on to suggest the Mihailović, although he was a "fine soldier," be relieved of his ministerial post. He also chided the King that "the Partisan movement is stronger, and has far greater popular support, and sympathy for it extends into larger areas, than your Government has been willing to acknowledge… Any fundamental approach to a solution of the unhappy civil strife in Yugoslavia must take this reality into account." 225 CONCLUSION While the romantic narrative of Mihailović never completely collapsed, it was sufficiently called into question to allow for the consideration of Tito as a viable alternative for US support. This rhetorical space, which allowed for the redirection of US policy, was in part created by casting doubt upon Mihailović's politics. The fact that government officials assiduously avoided aligning themselves politically with Mihailović demonstrates the degree of this doubt. Their avoidance was an ominous sign for the perpetuation of the romantic narrative, because it signaled that the United States and Mihailović were in pursuit of different postwar ends. The US government insisted that these ends had to be subordinated to the primary aim of defeating the Axis. However, in this regard too, the romantic narrative was undermined by 225 Roosevelt to King Peter II, May 17, 1944, FDR Library's Digital Collections, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President: Map Room Papers, 1941, box 164, Naval Aide's Files A-16 Balkan Countries, November 12, 1943-September 24, 1944 accusations that, as opposed to fighting the Axis, Mihailović had aligned himself with them in his fight against communism. Considering the parallels that some Americans drew between the Pan-Serb ideology and Nazism, these accusations likely seemed plausible to those that believed that this was an accurate comparison.
Although historian Susan Brewer argues that Americans fought World War II "for survival, not ideals," the concepts of security and ideals were not mutually exclusive as they related to American policy toward Yugoslavia. 226 American awareness of the civil war in Yugoslavia coincided with increasing contemplation of the postwar future. The liberal solution to the Yugoslav threat to postwar peace was a democratic Yugoslav government that was representative of its constituent nationalities. Tito's movement seemed to promise the realization of this desired end state. Also, the emerging romantic narrative of Tito did not conflict with the US narrative of unity to the same degree as did the narrative of Mihailović. Tito's movement appeared to have wide ethnic and ideological appeal, both within Yugoslavia and the United States. In contrast, the tenets of Pan-Serbism had alienated not only the majority of Yugoslav-Americans, but also liberals within the press and government. The romantic narrative of Tito complemented the US narrative of unity.
These narratives combined to create the space in which the reformulation of policy might be considered. While FDR never appeared to completely jettison his pro-Serb sympathies, the narrative shift constricted his options, as continued support of Mihailović would have been seen by many as a repudiation of American ideals.

THE SATIRICAL AND TRAGIC INTERPRETATIONS OF OCCUPIED
YUGOSLAVIA On July 8, 1944, William Donovan provided FDR with another report from OSS operative Linn Farish, the tone of which was markedly different than the one received by the President as he was en route to the Tehran Conference. Farish began his report by praising the OSS officers that had been assigned to both Tito and Mihailović, noting that they had all performed admirably within the "perplexing whirl of external and internal politics." Farish had come to see that the "deep rooted causes of the internecine strife" in Yugoslavia were a result of "racial, religious, and political" disputations of "such long standing that the people themselves [did] not understand them." Both the Partisans and the Četniks viewed the other as the other as their foremost enemy, and Farish believed that "both sides [were] speaking the truth" in that "they [were] their own worst enemies." However, the "vast majority" of Yugoslavs were "neither Right, Left, Communist, Reactionary," but instead were a "simple peasant type of people, strong willed, hot blooded, with tremendous powers of endurance and great personal courage," who loved "intrigue," and were "the most profound liars" that Farish had "ever met." Farish's report made it apparent that he believed that the US was, at least in part, responsible for the "terrible story of misguidance, of rape and death and destruction" in Yugoslavia, for there was only "one great power" that Farish felt "might have prevented… or stopped it," and this had "never been used." He explained that the United States of America is mentioned in the same breath with God in [Yugoslavia]. We were the one nation on earth to whom the people believed they could turn for unbiased, unpolitical aid and advice without having to pay something in return. I am speaking now of the common man, not Marshal Tito or General [Mihailović]…. It would be difficult to express the utter helplessness and frustration which we felt in the face of such complete faith in the ability of our country to right the wrongs which were so evident on all sides…. They saw in us… the representatives of a powerful democratic nation in which people of all racial extraction, religions, and political beliefs live side by side in harmony, free to speak openly…. In comparison to their own pitiful condition… it is not hard to realize why [the United States]… has taken on a more rosy hue than it perhaps deserves…. How long can a great nation continue not to pay attention to the obligations contained in such trust and respect? How long can a great nation continue in this manner and still remain great?
Whereas he had worried "at one time" that the United States was not receiving "proper recognition for her participation in supply operations," Farish now questioned the wisdom of wanting such recognition. This change in attitude was brought about by seeing "simple peasant boys" with "bullet holes in them… that resulted from  229 The romantic narrative of Yugoslav resistance was a call for the US to aid the Yugoslav resistance and thus become a co-protagonist in the Yugoslav quest for freedom from Axis occupation and the establishment of a just postwar order. The tragic interpretation of US involvement in Yugoslavia claimed that the US had failed to assume this role by betraying its ideals and commitments. The tragic narrative called for a return to American ideals and for the US to take an active and constructive role in Yugoslavia.
As I show in this chapter, the tragic narrative was ultimately unable to overcome the governmental inertia caused by the satirical interpretation of the Yugoslav conflict.
According to Krapfl, the satirical narrative, which is the "militant form of ironic employment" allows "virtually no freedom to the hero, and seeks explanations… only in social structures." 230 Rather than serving as a call to action, the satirical narrative portrays "human agency" as "an illusion," making "political action… pointless." 231 "The archetypal theme of irony and satire," Frye states, is "Sparagmos, or the sense that heroism and effective action are absent, disorganized, and foredoomed to defeat and that confusion and anarchy reign over the world." Notably, Frye defines "sparagmos" as "tearing to pieces." 232 Crucial to the rise of the satirical narrative was the reevaluation of the primitive, violent, and volatile nature of the Balkans. Rather than portraying these characteristics in a positive light, as was the case with the early 228 Krapfl, Revolution with a Human Face, 27. 229 Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, 210 230 Krapfl, Revolution with a Human Face, 31. 231 Ibid., 32. 232 Frye,Anatomy of Criticism,192. romantic narrative, the satirical narrative emphasized the view of the Balkans that gave rise to the term "balkanization." This should perhaps not be surprising considering the similarities between the concepts of balkanization and sparagmos.
The tragic interpretation of American involvement in Yugoslavia was introduced almost immediately after the German invasion. However, it failed to gain prominence within either the press or government circles. In May 1941, Bess Demaree wrote an article for the The Saturday Evening Post that was highly critical of US encouragement of the coup. As she put it, "the Americans" were "chiefly responsible for the setting off" of the "explosion which blew apart" Yugoslavia. In doing so, "the Americans… accomplished everything which they set out to do…. They persuaded the fiery Serbs to defy the Germans and thus invite martyrdom on their country." Even though the US knew "that thousands of [Yugoslavia's] people" would be "slaughtered," they put this "out of their minds" in pursuit of their "war politics ." 233 The United States took advantage of the "almost mystical faith" that Serbs "possessed" regarding the "the power and the benevolence of the American people," knowing full well that "thousands of sea miles separated [it] from the Balkans" and that the US had neither sufficient supplies nor ships to aid the Yugoslavs in the battle that was inevitably to come. 234 Demaree concluded that, even though the US had not yet entered the war as a belligerent, the only way to "rescue" Yugoslavia would be through the use of "American soldiers." 235 While this was certainly a call to action, it went unheeded. "American soldiers" would primarily be introduced into Yugoslavia 233 Bess Demaree, "Our Frontier on the Danube, " The Saturday Evening Post 213, no. 47 (May 24, 1941), 9, accessed December 1, 2017, EBSCOhost. 234 Ibid.,118. 235 Ibid.,120. in the form of downed airmen supplemented by a limited number of OSS operatives and other military personnel.
The YGE and Mihailović were willing to blame the interference of outside powers for Yugoslavia's troubles, but mostly kept their fingers pointed away from the That the British were not above reproach was made clear in a speech that Mihailović ill-advisedly made in front of the head SOE liaison with Četniks. In it, he accused the British of pursuing "their own strategic purposes" and of attempting to "purchase Serb blood at the cost of a trivial supply of munitions." He could now see "that the Serbs were… completely friendless" and that the aim of "the western democracies… was to win the war at the expense of others ." 237 The press also noted the problem of outside interference in Yugoslavia and called for the US to take a more constructive role in forming a Balkan policy with its Allies.
As The New Leader stated in an article titled "The Balkan Powder Keg," the US could "adopt the policy of an ostrich and pretend there was no difference between the Anglo-American bloc and the Soviet Union" and ignore the fact that Stalin had "long 236 Standley to Hull, October 1, 1942, FRUS, 1942 Biddle to Hull, March 30, 1943, FRUS, 1943 been making preparations for domination of Eastern Europe and the Balkans." The article predicted that "the Balkan tragedy [was] about to unfold itself in all its horror" in a battle between the West and the Soviet Union for "political domination." It warned that "only those who [foresaw] the future [were] destined to govern." 238 However, the United States had no desire to involve itself in such a contest.
The title of an article in The Progressive ominously asked "How Can We Avoid World War III?" and suggested that the spark for such a conflict was most likely to be found in Yugoslavia. According to the article, US was making "less and less visible effort to implement" the principles of "the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter." This was a result of the United States' focus upon "physical involvement in the war" without thinking "about the world after the war." This had led to a failure to reach "an understanding with the Soviet Union" about Yugoslavia. The cause of this cataclysm was to be the simultaneous invasion of the Balkans by all three of the Great Powers. 239 This joint invasion never materialized in large part because of the American reluctance to do so. FDR initially seemed amenable to an invasion of the Balkans. As late as the Tehran conference he suggested that an Anglo-American force might cross "the Adriatic, for a drive, aided by Tito's Partisans, northeastward into Rumania to effect a junction with the Red Army." 240  time" and asked him to "take this up with the War Department." 241 Historian Andrew Buchanan cites FDR's suggestion of a Balkan campaign in his argument that the US did not suffer from "Balkan-phobia." 242 In making such an argument, he set himself against historians such as Barbara Jelavich who argue that "the failure to formulate and carry through a clear and coherent policy in Eastern Europe… reflected the general lack of concern over the area among" Americans. 243 Both of these assessments are true. The United States did not originally suffer from "Balkanphobia." However, the image of the Balkans was subject to change, and government officials acquired this ailment over time. This in turn gave rise to the incoherency of US policy on the Balkans and the appearance that they did not care about the region.
This aversion to becoming entangled in the Balkans demonstrates the power of the satirical narrative.
Reporting within the American press increasingly portrayed Yugoslav internal turmoil as an interminable and inherent feature of the Balkans and contributed to the spread of the satirical narrative. The New York Times explained that "the growing strife" in Yugoslavia was "a new expression of an ancient conflict that has long torn the Balkan peoples; parts of Yugoslavia are looking… toward Rome and the West, part toward Byzantium and the East." While it acknowledged the certain individuals were guilty of fanning the flames of the conflict in their pursuit of postwar power, there nonetheless existed "great frictions" along "lines of natural cleavage" that were "racial, religious, and ideological." The article concluded that "more than any other country in Europe, Yugoslavia poses the terrible nature of the reconstruction problems that the world will face after the war." 244 Commonweal referred to "the anarchy that reigns in [Yugoslavia's] primitive mountain regions," and noted that even "in the face of an enemy as powerful and as hated as the" Nazis, the Partisans and Četniks nevertheless "engaged in bloody internecine strife." However, this was perhaps to be expected, considering that "even… between the two big wars there was intermittent fighting between fierce armed bands." The article suggested that although "the Big Powers have fished these troubled waters" in the past, there were now "more urgent problems for the peace than completely stamping out so chronic a flair for violence and disorder ." 245 One significant aspect of the satirical narrative was its portrayal of the Yugoslav conflict as an ancient religious dispute. For instance, a previously mentioned State Department report on disunity within the Yugoslav-American community identified the contributions made by the clergy of the Orthodox and Catholic Churches to the Serb-Croat dispute, which it described as the manifestation of a "thousand-year old animosity." 246  "racial, religious, and political" disputations of "such long standing that the people themselves [did] not understand them." 247 As historian Ivo Banac argues, "because South Slavic cultural diversity is really religiously based, there have been numerous attempts to link the country's divisions to religious intolerance." He points out that World War II was one such instance of this. Even though "some of the massacres" that were committed over the course of the war "became religiously based, [these] occurred in the context of occupation… not of a [religious] or even civil war," a term that Banac believes is "much misused." 248 While it is arguably reasonable, if not unavoidable, to portray the violent struggle between collaborators and resistance forces as a form of civil war, this verbiage redirects the focus upon such a conflict's causes.
Banac brings up a valid criticism of the use of the term "civil war," in that this term emphasized the Yugoslav contributions to conflict as opposed to the significant destabilizing effect of outside interference, to include the activities engaged in by the United States. As previously discussed, these activities included the initial encouragement of the coup, which ultimately led to the invasion and occupation of Yugoslavia and set the conditions for the violent internal political struggle that followed. The US further destabilized Yugoslavia by supplying both sides of the Partisan-Četnik conflict. Although the US eventually ceased aid to Mihailović, it continued to supply Tito indirectly. In a message to FDR in September 1944, 247 Farish, "Summary Report on Observations in Jugoslavia for the Period 19 Sept. 1943until 16 June 1944," June 28, 1944 Donovan reported that the US had "made clear" to Tito and Mihailović that it would "not support either side in internal political strife." However, he then reported that approximately "two thousand tons" of supplies, to include "military arms and equipment," were being delivered to the Partisans monthly. Although the British acted as an intermediary, many of the supplies were of American origin. In summary he assured the President that the OSS had been "punctilious in keeping out of any… political controversy" and avoided "any entanglement in rivalry between [Mihailović] and Tito." 249 This claim seems a bit farcical considering the use to which Tito was putting the equipment that he was receiving from the West.
The United States also contributed to the Yugoslav conflict by encouraging violent retribution for collaboration. For example, one American military liaison reported that he had succeeded in May 1944 in convincing a Partisan commander to agree "to issue an order stating that any peasant turning [US airmen] over to the Germans would be shot." 250  and Russian influence as baleful, the United States was more often imagined as being 254 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 711. 255 FDR to Churchill, May 18, 1944, FDR Library's Digital Collections, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President: Map Room Papers, 1941, Box 6, FDR to Churchill, April-May 1944 http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/mr/mr0035.pdf.

CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION
As this paper has shown, an examination of the narratives about Yugoslavia that were adopted over the course of World War II provides insight into the factors that influenced US policy decisions. Each policy decision was preceded by the rise of particular narrative that called for a particular type of governmental action or inaction.
The initial dominance of the romantic narrative called for support of Mihailović, which the US duly pledged. The attack upon this narrative, the rise of the romantic narrative about Tito, and the comedic narrative of unity, all encouraged a reexamination of the United States' pro-Mihailović policy. The tragic narrative demanded that the US be more proactive in resolving Yugoslavia's internal turmoil.
This was countered by the satirical narrative, which encouraged the US to remain politically uninvolved in the Yugoslav affairs. While the US governmental adamantly adhered to its insistence that its decisions were based upon military considerations, these narratives created the space that determined the scope and direction of those decisions. While I do not claim that narratives were the sole driver of US policy, it is apparent that once particular narratives gained dominance, they guided policy-making toward a particular course of action and deterred consideration of alternative policies.
This can be seen in the case of the comedic narrative, which emphasized Yugoslav unity and discouraged consideration of the postwar division of Yugoslavia.
It could be argued that particular narratives were merely adopted or instrumentalized in order to promote desired, predetermined policies. For instance, it is certainly the case that communists intentionally influenced the narratives about Mihailović and Tito in order to shift US policy and thus abet a communist revolution within Yugoslavia. However, narratives also served as a basis for why individuals perceived of a course of action or outcome as desirable. The initial romantic narrative about Mihailović's resistance served as an imperative for US support of the Četniks that went beyond the consideration of US interests. This can be seen in the emotional message sent by Roosevelt's son requesting aid to the Četniks. The dominance of the romantic narrative, with its emphasis upon the heroism and victimization of the Serbs, also explains why Roosevelt sympathized with the postwar aspirations of the Pan-Serbs. Linn Farish's later report, which epitomizes the tragic narrative, has no ostensible political objective. Rather, the tragedy of the Yugoslav conflict necessitated a change in US policy. An end to the tragedy, in and of itself, was Farish's desired outcome.
Each narrative presented a version of the "truth." Some narratives were truer than others in regard to historically verifiable facts. Mihailović's resistance, as far as can be determined, bore little resemblance to the way in which it was originally portrayed to American public. The Serbs were certainly heroic in resisting the Axis occupiers to the extent that they did. However, the romantic narrative of Četnik resistance could not withstand close scrutiny. This does not mean that narratives gained ascendency or declined simply due to the emergence of new information. Far more important was how that information was interpreted. In the case of the romantic narrative, there were numerous factors that contributed to this process of interpretation, all of which related to the way in which Americans viewed their own participation in the war and what they construed as the war's meaning. While the nature of Mihailović's political aims, or even if he had such aims, is disputed by historians, perhaps what is more relevant is that a significant number of America's liberal cultural producers came to see that the Pan-Serb ideology to which they believed Mihailović adhered was the antithesis of their own ideals. In this way, opposition to Mihailović and support for Tito tells us more about American society than it necessarily does about events within Yugoslavia.
The comedic narrative proffered by the US government is perhaps the most revealing in this regard. This might be viewed as the most artificial of all of the narratives in that it was more often used as an imperative for proper action than it was a description of reality. The preoccupation of many Americans with the Yugoslav threat to unity reflected their concerns about their own society, particularly as they related to the problem of race. While some acknowledged this American problem, others lashed out at Serb nationalists as if they were introducing a contagion amongst an otherwise healthy American public. The comedic narrative ultimately benefitted Tito as he seemed to offer the panacea to Yugoslav ethnic strife. And there seems to be "truth" to this interpretation as well, if only in hindsight, in that Tito did hold the country together throughout his life as the postwar leader of Yugoslavia.
The tragic narrative might be viewed as the least effective of the narratives as it did not seem to meaningfully impact government policy in the ways that those who adopted this narrative hoped. However, the tragedy of US involvement in Yugoslavia would have a prolific postwar life. The historiographical preoccupation with Communist influence can be viewed as a form of tragedy, wherein the United States betrayed its ideals and obligations to Mihailović and the YGE due to its naïveté about the nature of Tito's aspirations.
As an examination of the rhetoric of government officials makes clear, the satirical narrative both reflected and likely shaped US perceptions of Yugoslavia. This narrative emphasized another questionable "truth" informed by what can be seen as a manifestation of balkanism. There seemed to be facts upon which to base this narrative. The dispute within Yugoslav did have an ethnic and religious basis. It was also based upon historical grievances. However, in emphasizing these aspects of the conflict, this narrative simultaneously deemphasized the role that the US had played in creating and perpetuating Yugoslavia's internal conflict. This allowed for the US to eschew political involvement in Yugoslavia and wipe its hands of responsibility for a conflict that was ancient and intractable. This does not mean that the satirical narrative was opportunistically adopted in order to free the US from an obligation to intercede on behalf of the Yugoslav people. FDR had an apparent genuine interest in and sympathy for Yugoslavia. This interest diminished over time. The nature of the satirical narrative explains, at least in part, this decline and why FDR abandoned his stated consideration of a US military incursion into the Balkans. It also explains why his Serbophile sympathies were not translated into a coherent policy.
Unfortunately, the satirical narrative would again become ascendant within the United States as Yugoslavia descended into civil war in the 1990s, and once again it engendered American inaction. As former US ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power wrote in her study of American policy and genocide in Yugoslavia during the dissolution of the state in the 1990s, Hillary Clinton reportedly "gave her husband a copy of Robert Kaplan's Balkan Ghosts, a deftly written travel book that portrays people in the Balkans as if they were destined to hate and kill." It is suspected that, after reading this book, President Clinton came to see Yugoslavia as a potential "quagmire" and thus desired to avoid US involvement, such as military intercession on behalf of Muslim Bosnians who were being slaughtered by Serb

nationalists. 256
This thesis can be seen as a cautionary tale about the policy-making process related to US foreign intervention. US policy was informed by simplistic understandings of Yugoslavia. The dominance of the archetypal forms of the discussed narratives reflected these simplistic understandings. The adoption of certain narratives was undoubtedly facilitated by preconceived notions regarding the Balkans and its inhabitants. This is most apparent in the romantic narrative of Serb resistance and the satirical narrative of Yugoslavia's ancient ethnic and religious hatreds. While these narratives served as easily understandable conceptual frameworks, their lack of complexity undermined the development of an accurate or predictive analysis related to Yugoslavia. For instance, the romantic narrative served as a basis for US expectations of the Serbs' willingness and capability to fight the Axis. This faith proved to be misplaced in regard to the initial invasion and subsequent resistance. It also did not take into account the implications of the political aspirations of the Serb nationalists and the ways in which these aspirations might alienate members of both the Yugoslav and American public.
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis, the relationship between narratives and foreign policy has the potential to explain the trajectory of other instances of US foreign intervention. For example, the United States initially supported the anticommunist government of Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam. However, similar to Mihailović's suspected Pan-Serbism and the YGE's questionable commitment to democracy, Diem's repressive rule alienated much of the Vietnamese population and united communists and non-communists in resisting his rule. The US eventually saw the folly of its policy and "stood aside and gave its blessing to a military coup" that resulted in Diem's assassination. 257