The Paid Vote: America's Neutrality During the Greek War for Independence

This thesis will center upon the level of involvement Americans had in the Greek War of Independence from 1821-1829 despite remaining neutral during the conflict. Primarily focusing on the contributions of individuals and organizations, the thesis will discuss the political actions that occurred to support the Greeks, and how different American citizens contributed to the conflict. In addition, the text will explore why the United States did not formally give support to the war despite the philhellenism of prominent political figures, such as Thomas Jefferson and Daniel Webster. Groups and individuals in the Boston area had competing interests that both helped and hindered aid to the Greek cause. Trade interests with China and Turkey motivated Bostonian elites to press Congress to stay out of the conflict. These same forces, however, along with political likening to the cause, fueled individual efforts that provided private American aid to the Greek Independence Movement.


Introduction and Historiography:
The Early American Republic faced several challenges as its government attempted to uphold revolutionary and republican values while navigating diplomacy with former allies and enemies. Tested by the War of 1812, the economic panics of 1807 and 1817, and upholding Washington's recommendation for neutrality, the young Republic discovered that foreign affairs challenged the very foundation of America's identity. Since the country's early economy was strained, its leaders felt pressure to compromise Revolutionary values for financial prosperity. The Greek War for Independence proved to be one of these great obstacles, and required leaders, as well as businessmen, to choose between a cause they believed in and economic prosperity.
Popular support for joining the international community to defend the Greek people spoke to the nation's ideologies of Classical Liberalism, Classical Republicanism, and Christian Brotherhood yet the government of the United States ultimately refrained from joining the conflict. This restraint might be explained by the spreading notion that the nation's economic stability might become uncertain if the young nation became involved with the Greek conflict. Individuals, as well as communities, felt increasingly vulnerable to possible commercial ambiguity. Thus, in the early days of the American Republic, it was only logical for the United States government to secure its economic bearings before engaging into serious military and diplomatic upheavals.
Despite the clear economic concerns, the more popular explanations for why the United States stayed out of the conflict have centered upon diplomatic and political considerations. One of the most prevalent arguments is that John Quincy Adams did not want to be allied with the British immediately after the War of 1812, and United States did not want the powers of Europe interfering in Latin American and United States affairs. While these explanations are true and were the official policies of the United States government at the time, it seems more likely that economic factors heavily influenced the ultimate decision to not intervene. The young Republic was recovering from war and much of its economy depended upon trade. At this time, Colonel Thomas H. Perkins, a wealthy Boston merchant involved in the Canton trade and opium market, and other prominent figures involved in commerce were attempting to expand their wealth and wanted a stable economy to do so. The political maneuverings of Col. Thomas H. Perkins and his economic influence on the Boston community suggest that the real reason for United States' neutrality was not diplomatic concerns, but rather economic interests and backroom deals. By examining letters, public papers, and speeches from the time, it is evident that American neutrality during the Greek War for Independence was brought on by individual interests, political connections, and concern over the country's maritime economy.
The sources and scholars that have dealt with this topic have explored several different aspects of why America remained neutral from the conflict. While much of the work has focused primarily upon diplomatic and political reasoning for neutrality, the most significant and recent revelation in scholarship on the subject has looked to economic factors as the main cause of the neutrality. Therefore, the extent of private involvement and influence in the government's decision to not join the Greek War for Independence can be illuminated by secondary sources. More specifically, it is through an examination of scholarly work that deals directly with this subject, the historical literature that focuses upon the philosophical thinking of Ante Bellum America, and the lives of prominent figures of this time that this influence can be understood.
Studies of American involvement in the Greek War for Independence can be divided into three or four different schools of thought. One perspective focuses on a political and diplomatic reasoning for American neutrality, and tends to focus on President John Quincy Adams' own political philosophy for the refrainment. 1 Another posits that Adams reacted to this situation not just out of his own political and diplomatic philosophy, but also because he wanted to distance himself from the controversial Federalist Party. 2 A third perspective insists that economics and commerce were the primary motivation for non-involvement. The economic reasoning did not necessarily focus on the general welfare of the country, but rather upon certain individuals that held substantial financial investment in both the United States and Turkey. 3 The last school of thought takes on a more post-modern approach that centers upon the ways individual Americans were involved in the conflict. This view does not directly address the discussion of economics versus politics, but rather focuses on how Americans contributed to the conflict. The reasons why the government did not formally get involved are ignored. If authors that subscribe to this perspective do take a side, they generally indicate that the Monroe Doctrine and politics prevented the government from being formally involved. 4 What is most interesting about the different perspectives on this topic is the universal agreement on a handful of different ideas and concepts. First, all authors seem to agree that there was massive popular support for the Greek Revolution and that Americans held certain assumptions about the innocence of the Greek people. Second, all historians agree that the justification and interest for support of the Greek War for Independence came from America's admiration of the "Ancient Past," a common Christian heritage with the Greeks, and America's view that the Greeks were also fighting for the same revolutionary tenants as the Americans had. In addition, Americans saw this as an important opportunity to be the model Republic in the world. If Americans supported the Greek cause, then the nation would be passing on the revolutionary spirit and acting as a leader for other emerging republics. Finally, all sources agree that John Quincy Adams did not want to get directly involved in Greece, irrespective of whether there were good diplomatic and/or economic reasons. The points that Adams used in his defense of non-involvement were a continuation of Washington's appeal for isolationism and James Monroe's diplomatic precedence with the Monroe Doctrine.
The school of thought that focuses the most on these common themes is the postmodernist group that explores American interest in the conflict, and the contributions of individuals. One author from this school is Edward M. Earle; his work, which dates back to 1927, is one of the earliest academic accounts on this topic. Earle argues that support of the Greek War for Independence was very popular with the American people; Greek Committees organizing resources for the war popped up all around the country in cities, such as Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. 5 The author points to the different individual contributions that helped support the cause. Such contributions included donations, fundraising events, and the donation of space on ships to the Greek Committees for sending supplies to the Greeks. 6 Aside from the material contributions of individuals, Earle also discusses the personal involvement of individuals in the conflict and demonstrates how important this conflict was in the minds of many Americans. 7 Earle also discusses in detail the reasons people favored the Greeks and wanted to help them so desperately. Using the Bostonians Edward Everett, the leader of the Greek Committee of Boston and also a United States congressman at the time, and Daniel Webster, a prominent United States senator that was known for his strong support for the Greek cause, as examples Earle explains that Americans supported the war because people admired the Ancient Greeks. Furthermore, he discusses how the Greek Revolution had adopted the revolutionary ideas of America, and how the Greeks were fellow Christians being oppressed by Muslims. This gave Americans a sense of brotherhood with the Greek people. 8 Earle discusses the Monroe Doctrine, but only mentions the foreign policy to justify United States neutrality during the conflict. 9 The focus of his paper was the support from individual Americans, not the reasons why America decided to remain neutral.

Andrew Horton's text on Jefferson and Korais further examines the reason why
Americans were interested in the conflict but also how the influence of these two men effected public perception of the war. Horton argues that the long-term relationship between Thomas Jefferson and Adamantios Korais, exemplified by extensive correspondence between the two men, helped plant the seed of liberty and revolution in each other's country. Through the comparison and exchange of ideas between the American culture and Greek history, each civilization mutually supported and inspired the other. Specifically, Korais was inspired by the American struggle and liberalism while Jefferson and his peers were influenced by the Classics. The discussion of Ancient History and the views of early-modern political philosophers, such as Rousseau and Locke, brought these prominent figures together intellectually and each inspired the other's cause. 10 Horton's text, while brief in its discussion, demonstrates the philosophical and cultural commonalities between Greece and America. It identifies the reasons for America's popular support of the conflict and serves as an important academic source that many scholars of this field draw upon.
Earl and Horton serve as the basic foundation of the subject; their articles are the first to identify the historical sources and explain why Americans were interested in the Greek War for Independence. In addition, both serve as the launching point for the economic and political perspectives of this field that one sees in academia today.
The first perspective that emerged after these foundational studies of the subject centered upon the political and diplomatic reasons as to why America did not formally become involved in Greek Independence. For a lack of better terms, these historians can 10 Andrew S. Horton, "Jefferson and Korais: The American Revolution and the Greek Constitution," Comparative Literature Studies 13, no. 4 (December 1976): 323-324. be viewed as the Monrovian 11 and Anti-Federalist schools of thought. Lawrence Kaplan best represents the political argument (Anti-Federalist view) for why America decided to not become involved. Pointing to John Quincy Adams, Kaplan explains that becoming involved in the conflict would have been a bad move for America and Adams politically.
If the British were to become involved in Greece, and Americans were fighting right along side them, it would imply that Adams was a Federalist and that Adams was willing to forget the War of 1812. If Adams was to involve the United States on the side of the British, then it would be seen as an act of treason because the Federalists wished to secede from the United States during the War of 1812 and give aid to the British. 12 Kaplan also explains that Adams thought it was America's duty to remain independent from European conflicts even if an event seemed to echo the American Revolution. To reinforce this point, Kaplan points to the Monroe Doctrine as Adams' reasoning for staying out of the conflict entirely. Adams did not want to risk being entangled in European conflicts and he wanted to keep Europe out of Latin America. Going to war in Greece would give European powers license to interfere in the Americas. While Kaplan helps exemplify the tenants of this perspective, he draws much of his arguments from Ernest May, and the focus of Kaplan's article is a comparative analysis of U.S. relations with Greece between the 1820s and 1947.
Angelo Repousis builds off of Kaplan's work by re-evaluating the reasons why America did not get involved in the Greek War for Independence. Repousis echoes the 11 Monrovian is the historical perspective that reasons the United States stayed out of the Greek War for Independence because of the Monroe Doctrine's commitment to staying out of European affairs. This view draws upon diplomatic commitments and political ties for its justification.
12 Lawrence S. Kaplan, "The Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine: The Case of Greece," Journal of the Early Republic 13, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 2-3. same understanding of the Monroe Doctrine as Kaplan but also demonstrates that despite the reluctance to commit the United States to a European conflict there was a real urge to be involved in some way. In fact, James Monroe approached Congress, and the public at large, pleading for non-intervention with the military but also encouraging relief efforts to be made and supplies to be sent to the Greeks. 13 Furthermore, Repousis argues that Adams feared getting involved in a foreign conflict unrelated to Europe, specifically one that involved Egypt and other African states. 14 While Repousis certainly takes the diplomatic and political perspective on American neutrality, he does touch upon an important point in regard to trade. While he does not use economics as a main argument, he does open up the door to another reason why America did not get involved.
Specifically, some businessmen, particularly Boston merchants, were nervous about the repercussions of a war with Turkey on their companies; they were even nervous about non-combative assistance to the Greeks. 15 The risk of upsetting the Ottoman Empire raised the concern that trade in the Mediterranean Sea could be diminished, and Muslim pirates and the Barbary States would become emboldened and be far more active in attacking American vessels since they were allied with the Ottoman Empire. Adding this to the diplomatic reasons, Repousis takes a position that rests upon mostly political reasoning and a certain degree of economic protection.
From this argument, one can see the foundation of an economic perspective in this area of study. The first to take a mostly economic perspective is Michael Chapman.
Chapman proposes that merchants were nervous about the economic repercussions of the 13 Angelo Repousis, "'The Cause of the Greeks:' Philadelphia and the Greek War for Independence, 1821-1828," The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 123, no. 4 (October 1999): 338-339. 14  spoke on the nation's behalf in determining American foreign policy for the rest of the 19th century. Shining a light upon the business practices and dealings of the prominent merchants Thomas H. Perkins and Israel Thorndike, one can see just how influential and invested these men were in American politics. These individuals built political networks, controlled the financial and political fates of entire states, and expanded their business empires to halfway across the world. Through money and political puppet mastery, the Boston mercantile elites tamed several national figures and utilized the positions of these politicians to protect their own investments. Thus, it was not truly in the interest of the nation that the American government stayed away from Greece and declared a foreign policy of neutrality through the Monroe Doctrine for the rest of the 19 th century. These actions, rather, benefitted the financial elites that dominated New English shipping economy as well as those Americans involved in the Chinese Opium Trade.

Part I: The Philosophical Foundations
In many cases, historical actors have some sort of motive and cultural perception of the world that inspires their actions. While economic motives have been a powerful force, it is far more common to see cultural values and beliefs generally drive human action and policy. It is for this reason that America's treatment of the Greek War for Independence was so controversial. Not only was it a matter of favoring one revolution over another, but also it was a philosophical crisis rooted in the very founding ideals of that nation. The foreign policy of the United States contradicted both the identity of the nation and the will of the American people because the American people identified with the Greeks and the Greek War for Independence reflected many of the same values Americans fought for in the American Revolution. In a way, turning away from the Greek cause was the same as rejecting the United States Constitution and the ideals expressed during the American Revolution.
During the Early American Republic, the influence and spirit of the American Revolution was still very much alive and Americans identified themselves with Classicism,Classical Liberalism,and Christianity. 19 The Founding Fathers had constructed the U.S. Constitution with an eye towards Classical Liberalism and ancient political theory, and political discourse relied upon references to Classical ideas.
American farmers (especially those in the American South) emulated the Classics through ideas of Roman Pastoralism, and large sections of the American population, although not highly educated, were familiar with Classical references because it was a part of daily culture. Therefore, the fact that the American government refused to formally enter the Greek War for Independence, either as a belligerent nation or as a formal economic and diplomatic sponsor, was counter to both the will and identity of the American people.
To understand how fundamental Classical ideas were to the country and the population, one must look to both American education and the foundations of the American government itself. According to Carl J. Richard, the Founding Fathers, and most well-to-do people in the late 18 th to early 19 th centuries, were brought up with a "Classical Education." From the age of eight through college, all educated students were trained in Greek and Latin, and these students not only read the histories of Livy, Plutarch, Xenophon, Virgil, Cicero, and other ancient authors, but also read these works in their original language. 20 Dedicating several hours a day to translation of Latin and Greek, the educated became highly skilled in classical languages. It was even a part of the curriculum to translate long sections of the New Testament from Koine Greek into Latin and/or English. 21 The Classics, therefore, took on a special meaning to the Founders and other educated Americans. Not only was it the foundation of their education in law, grammar, philosophy, history, and ethics, but also it was intimately tied to Christianity in the classroom.
Knowledge of Classical languages and history was viewed as a necessity for entering the middle class and professional occupations. Reverend James Maury, Thomas Jefferson's teacher, wrote "an Acquaintance with the Languages antiently spoken in Greece and Italy, is necessary, absolutely necessary, for those who wish to make any 20 Carl J. Richard, The Founders and the Classics: Greece, Rome, and the American Enlightenment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 12-14. 21 Ibid., 13.  States, and the United States views the Greek people as the descendants of these ancient people and that the United States should pay homage to them. In addition, there seemed 32 Ibid., 323. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., 324. 35 Ibid., 325. 36 Ibid.,326. 37 Ibid.,327. to be this feeling of needing to provide philosophical guidance in classical liberalism by speaking extensively on political theory and prescribing a democratic form of government best suited for the people of Greece.
This sort of philosophical guidance was apparently accepted by the Greeks (at least in the case of Korais). In fact, Korias expressed great gratitude for Jefferson's advice and event sent the former president a copy of Plutarch. These words were not empty in meaning. Korais helped design the Greek Constitution, and he even urged his peers to study Thomas Jefferson and the various political works (including the Constitution and Bill of Rights) produced during the American Revolution. 38 Horton's analysis of this exchange understates just how intellectually intimate the interchange of ideas were between Korais and Jefferson. At the beginning of one letter, Jefferson not only references the copy of Plutarch he had received from Korais, but also refers to reading Korais' translation of Aristotle's Ethics and how Jefferson utilized a modern Greek dictionary to read Korais' "patriotic" speech to his countrymen. 39 This sort of academic attention suggests both a real interest on Jefferson's part and a sort of intellectual kinship through both the Classics and Liberalism. Jefferson not only responds to this Greek statesman, whom he has never met, but also becomes familiar with his work. The ancient world becomes a common intellectual playground in which both men share books and history. Jefferson, having advised Korais on government, even suggested the implementation of a classical education system for the Greek Republic. The American leader mentioned this education system in the context of describing the individual state governments of the United States where public education was made 38 Ibid.,327. 39 Thomas Jefferson to Adamantios Coray, 31 October 1823, in America in Greece: A traditional Policy, ed. David M. Robinson (New York, NY: Anatolia Press, 1948), 41. available and each student learns history, Latin, and Greek. 40 Such an association suggests that Jefferson viewed the Classics, not only as a foundational element in education, but also as the foundational element in a Republican society. Jefferson prescribes the Classics and Liberalism to Greece not just for the sake of revolution, but for the goal of creating a self-determined society that has a republic as its form of government. This interest in the conflict from one of America's founders demonstrates an intention to promote the spirit of revolution in another country. Furthermore, Jefferson's attentiveness to explaining classical thought and liberal philosophy suggested an exchange of ideas that, in the American leader's view, aimed to support and encourage a people that the United States itself took inspiration from for its own revolution.
Obviously, Jefferson's letters and Webster's speeches, demonstrate that the ancient classics were a strong influence upon the middle and upper classes of American society. Prominent leaders, elites, and politicians knew their Cicero, Livy, and Herodotus as well as their ancient Greek and Latin. Classics were not only a sign of a modern education, but knowledge of the Classics served as an essential skill for professionals and allowed for socio-economic advancement. It served as an important tool for political discourse and it facilitated conversation for both social and intellectual activities. While it is easy to assume that the Greek and Roman Classics were limited to only the well-to-do, there is strong evidence to suggest that the common man not only understood Classical references and ideas, but the Classics were a part of the everyday experience. Dwight's reference so telling, is not the fact he was using this specific reference, but that this speech was being delivered to a crowd of everyday Bostonians in two churches on two different occasions. This suggests that the people of Boston were familiar with ancient history and ancient authors, and that there was even a somewhat intellectual understanding of literature and ancient cultural concepts. This sort of casual reference in a church speech points to an American culture that had been influence by ancient works in all areas of society. This single passage was not an anomaly; Dwight spoke several times about the Ancient World and further demonstrates the expectation that the audience had some familiarity with the Ancient World. In one particular passage, Dwight elaborated on how the Greek countryside was "Classic ground," and how it was the birthplace of freedom. 43 By referring to Greek art, philosophy, and plays, Dwight attempted to illustrate how Greece was the cradle of Western culture and that it should be protected. Drawing upon the history of countryside and depicting the art of Phidias and Praxiteles, he argued that it took Western civilization 2000 years to reclaim such artistic perfection, and that if Greece could achieve freedom, then artistic expression could once again flourish. 44 These illusions not only suggest a working knowledge of Greek history, but also speak to a comprehension of Classical art and the various artists throughout the Ancient World. The true extent of Classical knowledge that the average Boston layman had is up for debate, but what is absolutely certain, as demonstrated by Dwight's speech, is that there was at least a common culture formed around the Classics in America and even the poorest citizens had some knowledge of the Ancient World. Furthermore, Dwight's close association of antiquity with freedom and liberty demonstrates that the average citizen must have viewed American values and classical liberalism as being related to classical republicanism and the values of Ancient Greece and Rome.
It seems clear that Classical knowledge was not only a means of economic advancement for the common person, but also it was the cultural norm that had manifested itself during the American Revolution. 45 One way we can see the common man utilizing ancient references and labels into their everyday life was through the lenses of slavery. In the 18 th century, middle-class and poor slave owners frequently named their slaves after historical figures from Greece and Rome. Run-a-way slave advertisements provide a glimpse into this era and demonstrate that the connection to Classical culture continued up until the close of the 18 th century. In one case, a run-away slave in 1782 was named Caesar. 46 In 1799, another run-away slave went by the same name. 47 When slavery was abolished in the North by 1800, run-away slave articles ended in northern publications. While the inhuman practice was finally abolished in the North, it 44  According to Peter Kolchin, Classical names were common during the late 18 th century and early 19 th century, composing of 21% of the population in the Carolinas in 1750, and 14% of the population in the same states in 1809. 51 While the use of Classical names decreased over time, it still remained prevalent during America's age of Neo-Classicism and seemed to only decrease as the traditional education in the Classics slowly became less prevalent by the mid-19 th century. The South continued slavery until the end of the Civil War and also proved to be one of the most Classically oriented populations in the United States as southerners used the ancient texts to justify slavery as well as adopt the ideas of Classical Pastoralism.
Southerners specifically relied upon Aristotle to justify their view and argued that the Aristotelian belief of "some were born to follow, while others were naturally meant to lead" supported the institution of slavery. 52 Classical Pastoralism also pushed forth the idea of an agrarian nation and Southern plantation owners jumped upon this concept for defining themselves and justifying their occupation. Northerners, however, were not unaffected by the ideas of Classical Pastoralism; they too were heavily dependent on agriculture during the early years of the Republic and latched onto the same ideas, but not to the same degree as their Southern counterparts. Classical Pastoralism, as expressed by Virgil, emulated the idea that virtue and republican values came from one's mastery over one's farm and that the backbone of a society came from its farms. 53 Americans adopted the same mentality and added late 18 th century economic theory and political ideology. founded not only the American Revolution, but also the growing Greek Revolution. The appeal did not fall upon deaf ears. Not only did it reach the masses, but also it made its way to Edward Everett and John Quincy Adams. 57 The public response burst from the heart of the American Revolution, the people were flattered and excited at how the Greeks turned to the United States as a model of "civil and religious liberty." Everett viewed the Greeks as fellow "patriots," and President Monroe encouraged the country in its quest for liberty and independence. 58 Thus, the Greek cause proved to be the catalyst of the American spirit, people echoed the philosophy of the American Revolution, lauded the virtues of democracy, and the love of liberty was all but dominant on the streets of the country. While the Classics appealed to the mind, culture, and heritage of the United States, it was Classical Liberalism that pulled at the heart and passion of the young nation.
Dwight, in his 1824 address, spoke to the common people of Boston and argued that the Greek people were expert capitalists and, despite the violation of their unalienable rights, they were still able to overcome the Turkish mercantile oppression and fight for their liberty: In Greece, it [Greek economic liberty] has flourished in spite of opposition and rapacity. Those who engage in it are pillaged by the Turkish governors, are defrauded with impunity by the Turkish Merchants, and exposed by their very success to the loss of liberty, property and life. Yet thus pillaged, thus defrauded, they have extended it, with unbending resolution and increasing activity, until it covers all the shores and harbours… while their seamen are celebrated throughout the Mediterranean for the dexterity with which they manage their ships. It is owing to these causes, that… they have been the common carriers of the surrounding world, and have engrossed in their own hands almost all its local commerce." 59 Harkening to foundational ideas of the Social Contract and Unalienable Rights, as formulated by Rousseau, Locke, and Hobbes, which were important in the American Revolution, Dwight maintained that the Greek people's rights were being violated and they were yearning to rewrite the Social Contract. Furthermore, he pointed to economic oppression and likened the Turkish oppression to the mercantile system America freed itself from, and, like the late Colonial economy, credited the Greek people with a natural 58 Ibid.,46. skill and desire for a Free Market economy. To Dwight and the people of Boston, the people of Greece faced the same exact challenge and were almost "indistinguishable" from those Revolutionary Bostonians.
To further this parallel, Dwight stated that the people of Greece have long yearned for liberty and, for centuries, have been oppressed by the Turks. Despite this desire, the Greeks faced an oppressor that was not 3000 miles away, like the British, but rather one that is right next-door. This direct subjugation, as a result, had always swiftly prevented any Greek rebellion from escalating to revolution. It was because of this that the Greek quest for liberty was so dire and it had almost been physically impossible to shake off the Turkish yoke of tyranny. 60 Thus, Dwight argued that the Greeks cannot achieve their independence on their own and that help from their ideological brethren was key. Dwight even went as far to plant slogans into his speech that echoed the battle cries of the Revolution, in this case "We will be free; or we will perish," instead of "give me liberty or give me death." 61 As previously discussed, Jefferson also viewed the Greek struggle in both the light of Classics and as a revolution similar to the American cause. In Jefferson's 1823 letter, not only did Jefferson prescribe the need for a liberal Greek constitution based upon one of the United States' states, but also recommended that the Greeks uphold the Social Contract and ensure that the freedoms of speech, assembly, the press, religion, and a trial by jury be protected. 62 Therefore, not only was this patriotism felt by the common man, but also even the Founding Fathers felt a philosophical kinship with the Greek people. 60 Ibid., 14-15. 61  This shared patriotism was even echoed in the rotunda of the Capital Building when Daniel Webster argued that America has played a part in the revolutions in Europe and that now the Greek people are clamoring for liberty. Furthermore, Webster said that America should not only encourage such movements but also "go to prostate the liberties of the entire civilized world, whether existing under an absolute, a monarchal, or a republican form of government. They are doctrines which have been conceived with sagacity, they are pursued with unbroken perseverance, and they bring to support, a million and a half of bayonets." 63 Thus, Webster argued that it was almost a civilized duty on the part of the United States to spread liberty through encouraging and participating in revolutionary movements in other nations, in this case Greece.
Endless examples of state resolutions, local speeches, and organizations dedicated to supporting the Greeks all professed support for the liberty of other nations. These organized proclamations throughout the country not only justified their support through the ideals of the American Revolution, but also viewed the Greeks as fellow patriots fighting the same fight America did several years ago. What is certain is that every political organization, prominent individual, and (to an extent) every citizen found cause through their similarities with the Greeks in Classical influence and ideals of the Revolution. Alongside the rhetoric of Revolution and the Classical world, many of the accounts also distinguish the cause as a Christian duty. Specifically, they viewed the need to support the Greeks as both a religious obligation and as an act of charity because of the common belief in a similar religion. Again, all levels of society seemed to share this view and, in some cases, seemed entirely interwoven with Revolutionary ideas and/or Classical thought. Repousis argues that several Americans viewed the conflict as both a humanitarian cause and as a holy war because the Greeks were fellow Christians. 64 Earle further postulates that the war was viewed as a fight against the spread of Islam, as well as a struggle for religious liberty for fellow Christians. 65 This sort of religious and Christian liberation is downplayed by both Repousis and Earle. In fact, the feelings of religious brotherhood and crusading were almost fanatical and imperialistic in nature. Americans did not just view aiding this cause as a duty, but rather viewed it as a holy obligation. Jonathan P. Miller, a military volunteer from the United States that fought alongside the Greeks, wrote, "If there was ever a country, that called for the charities of the Christian world, that country is Greece." 66 In this respect, Miller saw the Greek War for Independence as a type of Christian charity; it was a sacred "good deed" to help another Christian nation. Furthermore, this passage implies that Christian nations should feel morally obligated to help the Greeks out of both charity and common Christianity. George Jarvis, another volunteer on the Greek front, also viewed the Greeks as Christian brothers and saw the cause as a noble one. What is most interesting about Jarvis' view, in contrast with Miller, is the lumping of liberty, Classicism, and Christianity all together when explaining the nobility in fighting for the Greek cause. 67 Jarvis described his Greek brothers-in-arms as "patriotic and brave" and described their efforts in the war as "principled achievements." In this context, Jarvis was describing their revolutionary spirit and noticed the makings of liberty in the Greek people. Directly after this statement, Jarvis also described his efforts in the war and specifically cited helping fellow "Christian fugitives" captured by the Turks. Most interestingly, Jarvis mentions how the Greeks reminded him of their forefathers, in this context we can only assume that Jarvis was referring to Ancient Greece. 68 This referencing to the Classics, Christianity, and the American Revolution reveals some important clues to how many Americans viewed the world and the Greek cause.
First, the Americans engaged in the issue of Greek Independence had an expectation or picture of what the Greek people were and often attributed the actions of the Greeks to this idealized image that was formulated in the American imagination. Second, not only did Americans view the Greeks through the lenses of Christianity, Classicism, and Liberalism, but also these interpretations seemed to be one in the same and entirely interdependent.
To understand how intimately each one of these perspectives depended on each other, one must understand how the ideology Orientalized the Greeks when faced with something the Greeks did or believed that was in utter contrast to the American perception of them. For instance, Col. Jarvis discussed the strange religious practices of the Greeks and found their veneration of saints to be both foolish and "erroneous" in the practice of worshiping God. 69 Ironically, Jarvis retracted the statement and argued that liberty and science were opening up their minds. Therefore, Jarvis makes the assertion that the virtues of the Enlightenment and Liberalism will "civilize them" and correct them in their religious practices. In context, the United States at this time was largely 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid.,18. Protestant and tended to assume Christians should conform to a certain set of beliefs. The Greeks, who practice Orthodox Christianity, have a completely different set of practices that most Americans were not familiar with. As is consistent with Edward Said's theory on Orientalism, Americans used their historical knowledge of Ancient Greece, their experience in forming a government based on Liberalism, and their own view of what qualifies as "proper Christianity" to impose certain assumptions about the people of Greece. 70 Essentially, this assumed authority placed itself as the standard of "civilization" and characterized other cultures based upon how similar or different they were from the imposing culture. In the case of Americans interpreting modern day Greeks, they saw "potential for civilization" and therefore identified with the Greeks while aiming to "correct" certain characteristics of their culture. Jarvis, Miller, and, most especially, Dwight all impose their own views on the Greeks and the potential of a successful independence movement.
Jarvis was convinced that the American system was the correct and "civilized" way of life, he explained that there was much potential in the people of Greece and they could soon join the civilized nations of the world. Jarvis argued that, through the

Part II: Sacrifices for the Cause and the Issue with the Monroe Doctrine
American interest in the Greek War for Independence went beyond a simple political infatuation. American sympathy was so strong that, even when formal diplomatic action failed at the federal level, individuals and organizations invested themselves into the Greek cause. Veterans and active soldiers volunteered to fight alongside their Greek brethren, and influential public figures and intellectuals founded and led organizations that brought aid to Greece. Those that lacked the financial, political, or personal capacity to volunteer contributed what they could from their own funds and resources to aid in the cause. Local and state governments made impassioned resolutions that urged Congress to get involved. These municipalities even passed bills to send local and state funds to assist in the Greek cause. On the federal level, the topic was hotly contested, and prominent politicians, specifically Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, made some of the most eloquent speeches and arguments that ever echoed in the Capital Rotunda.
Despite the strong advocacy of individuals, organizations, and state governments, the formal resolution to support the war died on the House floor. On the surface, diplomatic obligations and the Monroe Doctrine were blamed for the death of the bill, but, upon closer examination, it becomes evident that behind the scenes it was a different story. Webster, a staunch advocate for the conflict, suddenly backed down and allowed the resolution to fizzle. President Monroe was conflicted on the Greek War for Independence and held off on showing full support or neutrality for a long period of time.
When the decision was make, conveniently, John Quincy Adams (an open opponent to the conflict) proved to be the one that finally convinced the President to forgo the conflict. Through the examination of the financial and personal relations of the politicians involved in making the final decision, it becomes evident that personal agendas, rather than the best interest of the nation or the Greeks, directed American foreign policy.
While the fate of a nation was decided in the backrooms of the legislature, everyday American men and women willingly sacrificed their time and money for the Greek cause. For instance, Dr. Samuel G. Howe, a prominent Boston physician, volunteered to serve in the Greek army and helped care for the wounded on the battlefield. His assistance proved to be a crucial factor in maintaining the Greek cause, as he served as both a medic and as an officer. Eventually, he became the surgeon general for the Greek Navy, and became an active supporter of the Greeks after returning to Boston. There, he both raised money and directed resources for the Greek relief effort. 79 Howe was not the only American to serve alongside the Greeks-George Wilson of Providence, Rhode Island and James Williams of Baltimore, Maryland served with honor in the Greek navy. Wilson was noted as a sharp gunner, and Williams served with a "calm and heroic spirit," despite suffering broken limbs in combat. 80 American volunteers not only supplied extra manpower and medical assistance, but they also served as battle-hardened commanders. In particular, Jonathan Miller, a veteran of the War of 1812, provided both leadership and experience on the frontlines. 81  Greek Revolution understood as a political cause, but also it was accepted as a moral obligation that appealed to all members of American society. This letter proves that not only did this committee and several others, including New York and Philadelphia, raise the funds to fight the conflict as though they were at war, but they also attempted to facilitate the transportation and safe passage of goods to their "soldiers" in Greece. 85    The Greek cause inspired political and social organization, for individuals were acting both separately and cooperatively to achieve goals. Whether by urging the government to take action or acting independently to cause this change, average citizens decided to become involved. Churches across the country were taking up collection for the Greek cause and dedicating crosses to the people in Greece. College students at Yale, Columbia, Brown, and several other major institutions ran fundraisers for the Greek people. 97 The numerous Greek Committees across the country, which were started or inspired by Everett, Webster, and others, distributed pamphlets, threw countless balls and fundraising parties, and hosted auctions for the cause. 98 Private individuals also sent aid through the Greek Committees; among them were students that donated their money, workers that reserved part of their paychecks for the Greeks, merchants that committed a percentage of their profits to Greece, and ship owners that designated cargo space on their vessels for resources that were to be sent to Greece. 99 Nearly every segment of American society donated to the cause, and political debates and discussions on the issue were commonplace. There was not a major city in America that did not have some sort of Greek committee and program (whether it was event or donation system) committing resources to the Greek War for Independence. 100 Thus, it is irrefutable that the American people from all segments of society were not only philosophically supportive of the Greek cause, but also financially committed to supporting the Greek people. The will of the people was clear-Greece was an ally, and the United States citizenry was willing to put their lives on the line for her people. In light 97 Edward Meade Earle, "American Interest in the Greek Cause, 1821-1827," The American Historical Review 33, no. 1 (1927): 49-51. 98 Ibid., 51-52. 99 Ibid., 51. 100 Ibid.,[51][52][53][54] of this, it is a paradox that the United States kept out of this conflict and did not even Hemisphere. 104 When one considers how Monroe expected to treat European affairs, the President said: Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. 105 Essentially, Monroe declared Europe as forever "off limits" and that the only concern of the United States should be the Western Hemisphere. Historians, especially  Greek War for Independence, the British were assisting the Greeks. In the eyes of Adams and many Americans, jumping into a foreign conflict on the side of an enemy you just finished a war with was, in Adams' view, political suicide and had a bitter taste of treason. 108 Using his influence on Monroe and his position in the government, Adams steered the country away from the conflict and ensured his viability in the next election.
Historians have also argued that both economic and diplomatic concerns pushed the young nation to avoid the conflict. Since, John Quincy Adams (maybe out of his own political needs) discouraged any action, as he feared it would lead to a war with not only Turkey, but also the Barbary States. Facing a war with these two states would have brought economic hardship and would have prevented the United States from having any access to Mediterranean trade. 109 This, of all these different interpretations of the reasoning for staying out of the conflict, provides the only definitive recorded evidence of John Quincy Adams expressing an actual reason for staying out of the conflict. Adams' reason, beyond any speculation, points to a direct economic concern that was both true and potentially damaging. This, however, brings into question a rather telling concern about Adams; truly the United States economy would have been cut off from the Mediterranean, but was it really such a Monroe's dismissal of the bill also raises some questions, on one hand the President supported the Greek cause out of the interest of liberalism and thought it would not be a major issue if a commissioner was appointed. On the other hand, however, he more strongly discouraged the action because the Turks had "forever lost dominion" over the region and that there was already enough international support to ensure that the Greeks achieved independence, in his mind, it was not worth breaking American neutrality. 113 Monroe believed that discussion of the issue was "important" and that it was symbolic to have a debate in Congress concerning the issue. 114 This odd explanation does not seem to achieve any clear political objective other than raising awareness about the issue. But, if one is intending to only have a "discussion," then why provide the opportunity for it to possibly pass? According to Repousis, Monroe was very divided on the issue of supporting Greece and even considered outright recognizing Greek Independence. Adams 112 Ibid., 451-452. 113   Col. Thomas Perkins' business was initially a joint venture between himself and his older brother, James Perkins. Their major joint venture was participation in the Canton Trade, using investments from Ephraim Bumstead and several others, the brothers were able to send a ship in 1803 to Canton and begin trading with the Chinese people. 127 In order to begin a successful trading relationship with Canton, Perkins and his investors purchased furs from the American Northwest and additionally used specie (gold and silver coinage) to make up any monetary shortcomings. They then shipped the furs and specie to Canton to either purchase spices and tea, or sell the furs at a marked up price. 128 This initial investment let the Perkins brothers enter the market and allowed for them to accumulate wealth pretty rapidly. In addition, Perkins also worked out of multiple ports, not only was he based in Boston with multiple investors within the community, but also he commissioned the ship the Patterson with four other investors out of Providence harbor. 129 Using his nephew (also adopted son), John Cushing, as the representative "supercargo" agent in Canton, Col. Thomas Perkins purchased three "factories" in Canton to have both a base of operations and a place to store and prepare products. 130 Thus, the entire wealth and operation of Perkins' company depended upon foreign investments and his ability to access them. If Perkins was to lose contact with these factories, then he could suffer a possible financial loss.

Part III: Perkins and the Boston Oligarchy
Early in Perkins' mercantile career, he had a diversified trading system between all regions of the world. Despite briefly practicing the slave trade in the late 1790s, Perkins mainly traded furs, lumber, flour, fish, horses, and other miscellaneous products for various clients. 131 Essentially, his shipping industry was in the business of moving all things around the globe. 132 Once he had accumulated enough wealth, he and his brother decided to focus on a main "staple" and enter the Canton trade with fur. He was only further encouraged to do this as trade in the West Indies began to falter and the potential return of investment (over a $300,000 investment at the time) in Canton became more and more promising. 133 Thus, at this point in Perkins' career (1803Perkins' career ( -1807 his investments were diverse and he could rely upon one business venture if the other came up short. Perkins developed three main categories of trade: short-term speculation (focusing on West Indian trade), medium-term speculation (focusing on Europe and delivering raw or finished products), and long-term trade (the China trade, creating a long distance base with long journeys between New England, the Northwest fur trade, and Canton). 134 It was this long-term investment that brought in most of Perkins' later wealth and would push his business to focus primarily on Canton.
Perkins' business in Canton began to change shortly after the War of 1812.
Noticing a diminishing demand for furs and specie, and a rapid rise in value for opium and quicksilver (mercury), Thomas began to follow the market. He selected Turkish opium because India had been monopolized by the British and there was a high demand for that type of opium in Northern China. 135 Using the advice of John Perkins Cushing, monitoring the situation in Canton, Perkins heavily invested in opium and noticed a significant increase in return. This sort of rapid change in trading interests demonstrates two important features about Col. Thomas Perkins as a businessman and about his business. First, he paid extremely close attention to the market and wanted a completely safe return on investment. Opium was a "safe" investment because it was a high demand product and other commodities were losing profitability, he wanted to minimize risk.
Second, Perkins' further investment into the opium trade and dependence on higher and higher profit margins would make it exceedingly difficult for him to withdraw from the market if something happened.
Another unique consideration of Perkins' business model is his investment in the iron mining industry during the War of 1812. Due to the essential shut down of trade because of the British blockade, Perkins was unable to further his business dealings in Canton or anywhere else outside of the country. As a result, Perkins was forced into "laying by," essentially resorting to not-so-profitable business ventures within the United 134 Ibid.,[145][146] Ibid.,[265][266] States to continue his income. 136 In Perkins' case, he decided to invest in the iron mining industry in the state of Vermont. It was a grueling task and Perkins was able to yield some income, especially from the United States government as the iron he mined was used to create cannonballs for the war. 137 This falling back on crude but ultimately "safe" measure for continuing business demonstrates both a weakness in Perkins' business and a personal characteristic of Perkins. First, Perkins' business was based overseas and he depended upon the freedom of sea travel to ensure a profits; any war or trade embargo could easily threaten that prosperity. Second, Perkins, like any good businessman, did not like uncertainty, and always wanted to be making money, even if it was a small profit.
His investment in the iron industry was a desperate safety measure that kept him "afloat," and gave him some sort of economic certainty that he could depend upon.
This sort of cautionary investing and constant need for certainty can even be viewed in his business affiliations and social position in Boston. For instance, the Perkins family tended to keep the business a "family business" by either hiring children and other relatives or marrying their children into families they regularly did business with. Col.
Thomas Perkins even made sure that his close family friends and business associates all lived in the same neighborhoods in Boston; this familial "grouping" lasted about two generations. 138 Perkins and his associates also built a network of familial relations both in business and in politics, not only did it ensure trustworthy partners but also it gave Perkins the ability to influence Boston society and politics. For instance, Perkins formed several partnerships with the Higgins family, another merchant family in Boston, because Thomas' brother had married into that family. 139 Col. Thomas Perkins also secured his overseas assets with family members, in Canton John Perkins Cushing served as Perkins' on-the-ground representative that oversaw all transaction. Also, Cushing was Thomas' nephew and Thomas also raised Cushing as an adopted son of sorts. 140  Thorndike family also became close associates not just through their dealings, but also through tight bonds of friendship. Specifically, Thorndike's son was married to Otis' daughter and therefore made him as equally influential as Perkins when it came to national and local politics. 145 139 Ibid.,146. 140 Ibid.,163 and 138. 141 Ibid., Ibid.,245 and 340. 143 Ibid.,[235][236] Ibid., 300 and 311-313. 145 J.D. Forbes, Israel Thorndike, Federalist Financier (New York, NY: Exposition Press, 1953), 71.

Perkins had countless connections across Boston both in politics and in business,
whether it was through mutual friends or direct family ties, Perkins built an "empire" through family blood and money. He staffed his business with the only people he could trust, his family, and kept his personal ties both happy and close. In fact, Perkins Perkins, 1764-1854(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971, 149-150. 147 Ibid., 180-181. 148 Ibid.
another state and gave him more economic influence in the region of New England as a whole.
Perkins also often kept in contact with his competitors. Boston's political structure in the Early Republic was less of a democracy and more of an elitist oligarchy where the economically well-to-do and old familial political dynasties sat on top. This system thus enabled Perkins to utilize his connections to secure his own interests. He also knew how to play the game in Boston politics and even set the "rules" that turned Boston into a Federalist stronghold well into the Ante Bellum Period.
Perkins' influence was so pervasive that he was able to capture the ear of national politicians and bend them to his will.
Before discussing the intricacies of Perkins' political network, it is important to note his source of popularity in Boston and how he maintained an "uncontroversial" status in the eyes of common Bostonians. Specifically, Col. Thomas Perkins and his brother James were generous philanthropists and received much praise from the general public of Boston. James and Col. Thomas Perkins were longtime members of the Boston Athenaeum and usually helped sponsor various libraries throughout Boston. Upon James' death in 1822, the brothers donated funds to the Boston Athenaeum and even handed over James' old estate to the library so as to better facilitate the growing collection. 152 Due to Perkins' contributions, the Boston Athenaeum was able to expand, leading to the eventual establishment of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts decades later. 152 Ibid., 301-302.
In 1825, Perkins decided to help organize and fund the building of the Bunker Hill Monument, lending his expertise in finance, Perkins helped plan out the logistics for the project. He helped supply the money and got the society to acquire a granite mine to fund the project; curiously, he also purchased the mine and built the rail to it. 153 Perkins also assisted the planning of many parades, and even helped host President John Adams in 1798 and President James Monroe in 1817. 154 Philanthropic gestures like these kept Perkins uncontroversial and viewed as a good influence on the city of Boston. Not only did this benefit Perkins in the public eye, but they also advanced him personally, as he gained some profit from the Bunker Hill project and was able to gain access to two sitting presidents.
Col. Thomas Perkins also served as a public servant; in 1797 he was elected as a "fireward" in Boston. 155 He served as a "vote distributor" and handed out ballots to voters during election time. 156 This position was a form of open ballot voting, which put voters in a situation where their employers could see how they voted. As a result of this lack of anonymity, voters were silently coerced into voting against their own interests. Thus was Perkins openly participating in an election system that controlled the way people voted.
Furthermore, Perkins helped organize and lead a committee that would select candidates that would be elected to Boston's city government. Intriguingly, all of the candidates that were selected were Federalists and Perkins was one of these candidates. 157 This sort of unusual unanimity for a particular party and the holding of surreptitious committees indicate some sort of foul play in the democratic process, and an attempt to 153 Ibid., 329-332. 154 Ibid., 273-277. 155 Ibid., 121-122. 156 Ibid., 123. 157 Theodore Lyman, "Statement of Facts," Columbian Centinel, May 14, 1796.
dominate the government of Boston, if not Massachusetts. By all accounts, Perkins was deeply involved with this committee and the Federalist Party, the faction that seemed to be pushing for this dominance. Such a rigging of the democratic process indicates that Perkins was primarily interested in protecting his own assets, and was willing to manipulate the local government to get his way. This realization makes it only clearer that Perkins and his close associates, specifically H.G. Otis, were political bosses and, through the "Central Committee" system, they had engineered the appearance of democracy, but really implemented a Federalist Party web of favors. 163 Otis, in a letter to Woodbury Storer, indicates that they had successfully systemized the Federalist Party into the electoral process and that he viewed democracy as something "wild" that had "cursed the country." 164 Thus, to Perkins and Otis, democracy was something to be feared because of its uncertainty and, if one had the chance, one should seek to manipulate it and permit select individuals to run the government. What is more telling about Perkins is his placement in this Central Committee system. Since Perkins, Otis, and other Federalists organized this system, they actively made sure the Federalists in each county of Massachusetts were both represented and had the necessary support. 165 In effect, this active control and support of the Federalist political system in Massachusetts made Perkins exceedingly influential. Candidates were approved by him, each Federalist politician owed their status to him, and Perkins knew every  Perkins, 1764-1854(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971 169 Ibid.,[191][192] Christopher Gore to Rufus King, 16 June 1808, letter box 12, folder 2, Rufus King Papers, New York Historical Society, New York. and telling of Perkins power in Massachusetts alone. Perkins had enough influence to punish and reward his political peers on a whim, and worked to control key politicians so as to protect his business.
The Adams family is the best example of this "stick and carrot" relationship, and how Perkins kept key figures dependent and grateful for his rewards while cautious and heeding of his punishments. In 1827, Adams, Everett, and Webster turned to Perkins for political support during the run up to the 1828 election. Instead of being tried for murder, Perkins, in his testimony, argued that it might qualify as manslaughter and should be considered a case of self-defense. 182 The final verdict, after fifteen minutes of deliberation, was "not guilty." How fortunate it was for Selfridge that the entire jury seemed to be composed of political allies. 183 Perhaps it is coincidence that the jury just ended up being composed of fellow Federalist and Perkins just so happened to have served on this jury. The events surrounding the case, however, seem to suggest that there was something intentional going on. When the prosecution placed three people on the stand it 179 Ibid.,[172][173][174][175] Thomas Lloyd, George Caines, andThe Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, The Trial of Thomas O. Selfridge, attorney at law, before the Honorable Isaac Parker, Esquire. For Killing Charles Austin, On the Public Exchange, in Boston, August 4, 1806 (Boston MA: Russell andCutler, 1807), 7-8. 181 Ibid. 182 Ibid. seemed almost certain that Selfridge would be convicted. When the defense had its turn, they produced twice as many witnesses (all of whom were Federalists) that provided testimonies that were completely opposite the prosecution and seemed to push toward the notion of "self-defense" on Selfridge's part. 184  Perkins would not only become one of the key organizers of the project, but also he would serve as the main supplier of stone to the monument, thus Perkins was given the chance to profit off a philanthropic project. 184 Ibid., 174-175. 185 Ibid., 318.
Specifically, Perkins was able to construct the Granite Railway between the quarry and the building site. It was the first railroad in America and a large chunk of the funding for this came from the Massachusetts Commonwealth legislature (which Perkins was a member of at the time). 186 He owned the majority of the shares in the railway and eventually expanded parts of the rail system. By no means was this railway a great moneymaker for Perkins, but it did bring in a respectable profit for the old merchant. 187 It seems that whenever Perkins used his resources to help other individuals, it was either out of party loyalty and/or the expectation of receiving some sort of return favor. Thus, it is not inaccurate to describe Perkins as a power broker and financial boss of the entire Boston area, he never did anything for free and many of the major projects in the city had to go through him.  Perkins' behalf. 198 Initially, Perkins' business in Canton relied upon the sale of furs, specie, and typical European commodities (flour, paper, etc.), but by the mid- 196 Ibid.,[168][169][170][171]253,301,302,[313][314]318. 197 Ibid.,234. 198 Ibid.,[165][166] 1810s these products had lost value. Opium and quicksilver thus became the most attractive alternatives, for they could double Perkins' profits in the region. Perkins, a man always cautious of his investments, jumped at the chance to switch to opium. 199 If the United States were to go to war or face some sort of embargo, then Perkins would face a sharp drop in profit and an overall economic slump. It only makes sense that Perkins would want to limit these disruptions by having loyal surrogates at the national level.
It must also be noted that Perkins and his associates were by no means pacifists and at times even welcomed conflict in other countries. During the Napoleonic Wars,  Ibid.,[284][285] fought against the increase in tariffs, informed Perkins that the tariffs would hurt any merchants that built their fortune on foreign trade. 217 While Boston was secure and it would not increase its own tariffs, New York City had approved the increase and, as the leading commercial center of the country, many of the other American ports would reflect this policy therefore making it difficult overall for those involved in commerce. 218 Thus, the cotton market was becoming problematic for Perkins and might have encouraged the merchant to participate less in that particular trade and instead focus his efforts in Canton.
In 1820 an 1821, Perkins only became more eager to invest in the opium trade as he and Cushing realized that they had cornered a section of the market. The Chinese in the Northern Provinces preferred exclusively Turkish opium, the British and other European traders were selling Bengalese and Indian opium, and these types did not appeal to that part of the market. Fortunately for Perkins, he was only one of a handful of merchants that had access to the Turkish strain of opium. Perkins and Cushing had enough of the opium warehoused that they could control the market and sell the product strategically at the highest price. 219 This part of the market was so profitable and safe for Perkins that he was able to purchase opium from Turkey at $2.50 a pound and sell it for more than 3 to 4 times as much ($7 to $10 a pound). 220 Thus it was only to Perkins' advantage to keep himself in the Turkish opium sector of the market because he had very little competition, he could make an astronomical profit, and he could control the market.
If he were to try and enter the Bengal or Indian opium market, he would have to deal with the British, who could raise their prices at any time, and the South Asian type of opium was so common that Perkins would constantly be faced with competition and there would be only a small margin of profit. Adams first entered this relationship of reward and punishment through the "election" process, he owed Perkins for his position in some way and would "fall in line" when he was asked. Whether or not such a system was formally in place, one can only speculate.
Though, it is curious that Adams' political and social ostracism as well as prevention from taking public office in 1808 was directly attributed to his half-approval of the 1807 threatened his business and, coincidently, John Quincy Adams proved to be one of the strongest opponents to the war, both as the United States Secretary of State and as the President of the United States. 236 Adams, oddly enough, also advocated for a "Most Favored Nation" status with the Ottoman Empire, this agreement essentially secured Perkins' assets indefinitely and made sure the Opium Trade could continue. 237 Adams, as it turned out, was financially tied to Perkins and his associates during the Greek War for Independence. In a letter from 1827, Adams thanked Perkins for his business advice and getting him stocks in a factory with Israel Thorndike. 238 Furthermore, Perkins was initially an ardent support of John Quincy Adams for his 1828 bid for the presidency. Using his political connections, funds, and the network he had in Massachusetts, Perkins was able to give Adams a running start. 239 Politics, as it would be, stirred up scandal for Adams as his connections to Perkins and the Federalist Party ended up landing the President into some hot water.
Stemming from a letter written by Thomas Jefferson, the issue of the Hartford Convention and the New England Secession movement called into question Adams' loyalties and connections to the Federalist Party. Adams foolishly tried to explain away the events and, essentially, accused the Federalist of being traitors that were in league with the British. 240 Perkins, to say the least, did not approve of this and he, as well as other politicians such as Otis, stepped forward questioning Adams' comments. This lead to a publication war in the newspaper between Adams and Perkins' alias, A Merchant, while it rustled feathers and put Adams into a rather awkward situation, the incident did not help Adams in the election at all. 241 Perkins withdrew his support and Jackson made fast work of Adams' faux pas in the newspaper. Needless to say, Adams was not reelected. 242 Whether or not Perkins and Adams were friendly, it is almost certain that the two knew each other for most their political careers. Perkins seemed to have some sort of influence over Adams whenever he was in office and there was some sort of reward and punishment between the two men. Perkins pulled Adams into his influence both politically and financially. With Adams under his influence, Perkins was able to use Adams' position in the federal government to protect his own interests.
The other unfortunate figure that fell under Perkins' influence was Edward Everett, a passionate supporter of the Greek War for Independence, was also caught up in a similar reward and punishment situation. As previously mentioned, Perkins and Everett were both members of the Boston Greek Committee and Everett, after being elected to the United States House of Representatives, was in dire financial straights and asked Perkins for his financial support in the conflict. 243 Perkins also used his influence to deter Everett at the beginning of the conflict by writing anonymous letters to the local newspaper counterpointing the articles published by Everett and the committee. 244 Despite this odd relationship of both opposing and somewhat supporting each other, Everett and Perkins also shared a financial and professional relationship with several 241 Ibid., 352-355. 242  Association and worked closely together. 245 Everett was also connected financially to Perkins through his brother Alexander Everett. Alexander, also a friend and business associate of John Quincy Adams, had conducted some business with Perkins and he was also a friend through Perkins' daughter Eliza. 246 Perkins also dealt with Edward Everett directly in politics. When Perkins began to organize the re-election campaign for John Quincy Adams, Perkins called upon Everett and Daniel Webster to help draw up the plans. 247 Thus, Everett was within Perkins' sphere of influence and, at the very least, Everett was obligated to Perkins because of his political prominence in the state, as well as the mixed financial support Everett needed and Perkins could provide for the Greek War of Independence. Thus, despite the support Everett had for the Greeks, Perkins more than likely "changed his mind" on this issue by using his political and financial influence. Simultaneously, Perkins might have also used his influence with the wealthy Boston merchant community to prevent donations from reaching the Greek Committee of Boston. Much like the affair with Gilbert Stuart, Perkins more than likely convinced his wealthy peers to withhold their donations to the Greek Committee of Boston, or at least threatened Everett that he might do so. Thus, this put Everett in a position where he had to water-down his rhetoric on the cause so as to gather and send any funds to Greece. Daniel Webster also fell well within this sphere of influence due to his friendship with not only Perkins, but also with several of Perkins' business associates. Israel  Perkins, 1764-1854(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 222-223. 247 Ibid.,[350][351][352] Thorndike, one of the wealthiest people in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts at the time, had conducted business several times with Perkins both in Canton and on local prospects. Thorndike was also one of Perkins' oldest friends and had often invested in projects together for mutual benefit, some of the most noteworthy investments they shared in were the (now) McLean Hospital, the Massachusetts Cape Cod Grand Canal, Nahant Hotel, and the Bunker Hill Monument. 248 Interestingly, Webster was also a participant in the Bunker Hill Monument project and was a very friendly neighbor of Israel Thorndike. 249 So close were these two individuals that, in fact, they had a door cut between their houses so they could both host larger parties together and socialize together more often. 250  formal interest in the Greek War for Independence. Therefore, the government turned against both the will of the American people and the principles of Liberalism, Republicanism, and Classicism in which the nation was founded upon. Thus, the United States government not only chose a stance of neutrality that only a select group of people benefitted from, but also set the precedence for American foreign policy for the rest of the 19 th Century.