2003

Self-Concept, Self-Monitoring and the Relationship of Human Social Interaction

Crystal Rose Fonseca
University of Rhode Island

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses>

Recommended Citation

Fonseca, Crystal Rose, "Self-Concept, Self-Monitoring and the Relationship of Human Social Interaction" (2003). *Open Access Master's Theses*. Paper 808.
<https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses/808>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact digitalcommons-group@uri.edu.

SELF-CONCEPT, SELF-MONITORING AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF
HUMAN SOCIAL INTERACTION

BY

CRYSTAL ROSE FONSECA

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
IN
COMMUNICATION STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND

2003

MASTER OF COMMUNICATION STUDIES THESIS
OF
CRYSTAL ROSE FONSECA

APPROVED:

Thesis Committee:

Major Professor

DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND
2003

Abstract

Self-monitoring research has developed into a significant literature that spans across disciplines. However, little research has examined the influence of self-monitoring on the development of the self-concept, which sets the stage for the current research endeavor. In the first study, it was hypothesized that directional questions “Are you extraverted?” would influence the self-concept of self-monitors to a greater extent, as they would be more likely to generate supporting thoughts which would mediate this effect. Findings generally supported the end effect of the hypothesis, but not the mediating process with high self-monitors reported a greater change in self-ratings after receiving a directional question. While low self-monitors were influenced more by thoughts that they retrieved in response to directional questions.

The second study tested the assumptions of a proposed model of self-concept development that implicated self-monitoring as playing a central role. Self-monitoring correlated significantly and positively with similar magnitude with both communication and psychological measures. These results point to self-monitoring being both a communication and psychology measure. Participants’ self-ratings changed on most domains of the Big Five traits from time 1 to time 2 indicating that appraisal of both communication acts and psychological traits influenced their self-concept as the findings of these two studies support

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my fiancé, Michael DeRosa, for all of his support, generosity, and unwavering patience for the duration of my higher education career. He is the only one that I know that truly understands the pressures, responsibilities, and dedication that it takes to successfully complete a masters program. I can't wait to start enjoying life as a "non student" with you!

To my parents for fostering in me the drive to be a perfectionist, and instilling the importance of education. During the past couple of years we have suffered great losses, Grandpa, Auntie Jenny, Bob, Grandma Gallo, and Mrs. Brennan. You and Joe gave me the strength and support to persevere during the ongoing healing process.

Geoff, Dr. Leatham, you're the reason why I continued to stay at URI. You are an extraordinary scholar, one of the funniest people that I know, and my mentor. Through your support and confidence in the quality of my work you have coached me from my undergraduate days of being shy, introverted, and unsure of myself, and have helped to create a self assured, gregarious, serious student. Not only have I learned a great deal from you, but I also transmit your style and hope to aspire to be the same source of encouragement for both my present and future students.

Without the help of Dr. Ketrow, I would have given up on writing a thesis well into the first semester. You inspire and motivate me to excel. You are one of the few Professors that I know that can actually balance their profession, social life, and actually maintain a sense of self. I hope to aspire to be the same.

Sherri you're the BEST!

Preface

The focus of this research project was to examine how individuals construct their self-concept through interaction style, and how their pre-existing interaction style affects how people integrate social cues, and encode and decode messages. Currently no research exists regarding the role or relationship of ongoing interaction to the dynamic nature of social cognition, especially how communication and one's self monitoring function. It was hypothesized that high self-monitors will be more likely to exhibit a change in self-concept between the first and second session on their self-rated trait that was assessed with the directional question; and that high self-monitors will be more likely to exhibit a change in self-concept based on the quantity of thoughts generated.

There is a great justification for and significance of the problem being addressed. Communication research has recently started to integrate concepts of cognition as explanations of communication behavior. This includes emphasis on structures, input and the process of the creation of communication. These are important aspects of social cognition, yet lack the "social" facet aspect of social cognition. The aspect of individuals' motivation and goals are neglected and focus is placed on the generic mapping of the cognitive mechanisms that affect communication. Self-monitoring is an important construct in both disciplines as it serves as a theoretical link between psychology and communication in regards to both interaction style and self-concept and may help bridge the disciplines together.

Self-monitoring is a construct that has been implicated as an important moderator in classical areas of psychology such as attitude/behavior congruence,

differential bases of attraction and friendship selection and cross-situational consistency. It has also become an important construct in the field of communication studies. As both disciplines converge to the similar theoretical basis of social cognition, both fields would benefit from research that is interdisciplinary in nature and uses constructs that are germane to both perspectives, such as self-monitoring. However, very little research in either discipline has examined the impact of self-monitoring on the malleability of self-concept using a social cognitive methodology.

A series of studies were conducted to further stimulate interdisciplinary research in these two fields. Study 1 examined the influence of directional questions on self-concept and the influence of self-monitoring. Study 2 tentatively tested a proposed model of the development of self-concept and its subsequent assumptions in which self-monitoring plays a central role in integrating both communication and psychological perspectives. The two studies support the model.

Table of Contents

Abstract.	ii
Acknowledgements.	iii
Preface.	iv
Table of Contents.	vi
List of Tables.	126
List of Figures.	137
<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
1. Introduction.	1
2. Background Research.	2
Overview.	2
Stability of Self Concept	6
Self-Verification.	7
Self Concept as Malleable.	8
Motivational Biases.	9
Direction of Self-Concept Change.	12
Can Self-Concept Change Without a Motivational Bias.	15
Self-Monitoring as a Construct.	16
Self-Monitoring Scale.	17
Self-Monitoring Scale Assessment.	20
Cross Situational Variability.	23
Attitude/Behavioral Congruence.	25
Attention to Differing Sources of Social Information.	27

Review of the Theoretical Integration of Self Concept

and Self Monitoring.	34
---------------------------	----

3. STUDY 1

Overview of Study 1.	35
Hypothesis.	35
Method.	36
Participants.	36
Materials.	37
Procedure.	39
Overview.	39
First Session.	39
Procedure – Second Session.	40
Results.	41
Descriptive Statistics.	41
Self-Monitoring.	41
Diagnosis Manipulation Checks.	42
Change in Self Ratings.	43
Listed Thoughts.	45
Mediation.	48
Discussion.	50
Malleability of Self-Concept.	51
Influences on Extraversion Change.	54
Limitations.	55

Implications for Future Research.	56
 4. STUDY 2	
Overview of Study 2.	57
Hypothesis.	58
Method.	61
Participants.	61
Procedures and Material.	62
Analysis.	65
Results.	67
Descriptive Statistics.	67
First Analysis: Psychological and Communication Measure Similarity and the Role of Self-Monitoring.	68
Second Analysis: Change in Self Concept.	71
Discussion.	76
 5. APPENDIX	
1. Study 1.	82
Informed Consent Forms.	82
2. Study 1 Questionnaire Material.	84
S.M. Scale.	86
Self Rating.	89
Open Ended Introversion Question.	91
Open Ended Extraversion Question.	92

Variability Extraversion Question.	93
Variability Introversion Question.	94
Participant Demographic Information.	95
3. Study 2.	96
Informed Consent Forms.	96
4. Study 2 Questionnaire Material.	101
Communication Scales.	101
A.S. Instrument.	101
C.A. Scale.	103
C.S. Scale.	106
I.I. Scale.	111
S.D. Scale.	114
Psychology Scales.	115
S.M. Scale.	115
Self Rating.	118
Open Ended Introversion Question.	120
Open Ended Extraversion Question.	121
Variability Extraversion Question.	122
Variability Introversion Question.	123
Participant Demographic Information.	124
S.D. Form.	125

6. LIST OF TABLES

Table

Study 1 Tables

1. 2x2x2x2 ANOVA Change in Extraversion. 126

2. 2x2x2 ANOVA Listed Thoughts.127

3. Mediational Analysis.128

Study 2 Tables

4. Means and Standard Deviations of Communication and
Psychology Measures (n=224).129

5. Correlations of Psychology measures with Psychology
Measures and Communication Measures (n=224).131

6. Correlations of Self-Monitoring with Communication Measures.133

7. Within Group Comparisons by Condition. 134

8. Between Group Cross Comparisons of Com-First (n=148) and
Psych-First (n=131) Groups/Self Ratings.135

9. Within Group Comparisons by Level of Self-Monitoring. 136

6. LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

1. The Interdisciplinary Problem. 137

2. The Role of Self-Monitoring. 138

Bibliography. 139

Introduction

Scholars and pedagogues have attended to social cognition, or how one perceives the self, as central or integral to explaining and understanding human interaction. Sociologists Mead (1934) and Cooley (1902) developed symbolic interactionism and its associated processes of co construction of juxtaposed social reality, meanings, and the self. A body of research exists (Cappella, 1981) that firmly establishes the influence of input on social cognition from significant others and social comparison. However, currently no research exists regarding the role or relationship of ongoing interaction to the dynamic nature of social cognition, especially how communication and one's self monitoring function. The focus of this research project is to examine how individuals construct their self-concept through interaction style, and how their pre-existing interaction style affects how people integrate social cues, and encode and decode messages.

Concomitant to the joint construction of selves through interaction with others is the social cognition process of creating, noticing, verifying, and recreating one's self-concept. Affirmation or disconfirmation of one's self concept by another is also coupled with the simultaneous reciprocity of acceptance or rejection of the other's self concept as interaction proceeds. Negotiating the self-concept with another requires an individual to engage at some level in what Snyder (1974) identified as self-monitoring. Self-monitoring has been defined as the amount of expressive control than an individual has across various situations (Snyder, 1974). To further explicate the relational importance of self-monitoring and communication, it can be assumed that self-monitoring, a fundamental interaction style (i.e. one is either low or

high) is fostered through both intrapersonal and interpersonal communication. High self-monitors are more socially skilled than low self-monitors (Ickes & Barnes, 1977), and as a result appear friendlier (Lippa, 1976). They can communicate more emotional states, are more likely to initiate conversations, have good self-control, and are better at discerning the meaning of nonverbal communication than low self-monitor. (Snyder, 1979). Hence, self-monitoring is created and sustained through the communication process, while in turn affecting that process as postulated in this paper.

Background Research

Overview

Communication research has recently started to integrate concepts of cognition as explanations of communication behavior. Terms such as script, schema, prototype, motivation and goals are typically used in communication research. For example, Schank (1982a) proposes a dynamic memory theory in which communication memory is constantly changing in response to experiences, memory is dynamic rather than static. Changes occur by creating, altering, and updating scenes, the building blocks of memory. This theory is similar to the psychological theory of self-schema/working self-concept (Markus, 1977; Markus & Kunda, 1986), in which individuals have a dynamic self-concept that changes with goals, motivation and any event that makes parts of the self-concept more accessible. These two theories provide similar accounts of the same phenomenon. In essence, they differ on the content of input, such that dynamic memory theory is focused on scenes, while self-schema is focused on any event or motivation that makes aspects of self-concept

more accessible. The process of integration is the same in both theories. They both have a structure that an individual changes based on interaction, while self-schema or the working self-concept is more encompassing in that other factors influence change.

Since social cognition is a relatively new approach in communication research, the cognitive communication foundation is still being established. Communication researchers typically focus on the interpretative and choice-making powers while explaining interaction and explain their processes in a cognitively grounded manner (McPhee, 1995). This includes emphasis on structures, input, and the process of the creation of communication. These are important aspects of social cognition, yet lack the “social” aspect of social cognition. People are not solely information-processing computers. This is an issue that psychology addressed as social cognition research grew. The aspect of individuals’ motivation and goals are neglected and focus is placed on the generic mapping of the cognitive mechanisms that affect communication.

Since research on the cognitive aspects of communication is still developing, interdisciplinary collaboration may contribute information that will provide a more complete picture of the cognitive aspects of communication. Motivation and goals are issues that McPhee (1995) has discussed as being less emphasized in social cognitive communication research; they can be introduced by studying self-monitoring, a psychological construct that focuses on an individual’s motivation and goals with respect to her or his interaction with the other. High self-monitors are motivated to be socially appropriate; thus they communicate with others in this

manner. This desire and how successfully appropriate they are in communicating then in turn will influence their self-concept.

Self-monitoring also ties in the reciprocal influence of self-concept and communication. Goss (1989) stresses since “we build our self-concepts with interactions with others, self-monitoring influences our self-concept, as self-monitors examine their self-concept ‘in action’”(p. 88). Therefore, self-monitoring is an important construct in both disciplines as it serves as a theoretical link between psychology and communication in regards to both interaction style and self-concept.

Self-Concept

The self-concept, or how the individual sees the self, has been an area of research interest for quite some time. Certain perspectives have found that the self-concept is stable; individuals actively try to reinforce their established self-concept, while other perspectives have found that the self-concept is malleable. A more contemporary perspective is that the self-concept is both malleable and stable, depending upon what structure of the self-concept is being discussed or theorized. This thesis discusses both sides of the argument surrounding the nature of self-concept. Following the discussion of the various perspectives and their corresponding research, is a more in-depth focus on the malleable (impressionable, and changeable) nature of the self-concept. This thesis also addresses the processes that have been theorized as responsible for the change in self-concept. This section will conclude with research that frames the current empirical question that will be posed. One thrust derived from this literature review is an assessment of the role that

directional questions, and consequent retrieved memories associated with them, play in changing one's working self-concept.

The second section examines the construct of self-monitoring; a construct that may provide qualifications of when directional questions elicit biased memory searches with the resulting change in self-concept. Scant research has examined the self-concept of low and high self-monitors. A cogent approach to examining the self-monitoring literature would be to review the literature that is the most significant to the current research question. The researcher claims that the variability of a high self-monitor's self-concept is more loosely defined than a low self-monitor's self-concept, which will then result in a high self-monitor's self-concept being more amenable to change when presented with a directional question. Thus various relevant areas of research were unpacked and are presented: stability of the self-concept; malleability of the self-concept; motivational bases of the self-concept etc..

The first area that will be discussed involves differences in cross-situational variability of the low and high self-monitor. The author assumes that a more situationally variable person, such as a high self-monitor, will have a less consistent self-concept than a low self-monitor. The second area of inquiry involves research on differences between the attitude/behavior relationship of the low and high self-monitor. This research provides insight into the dynamic self-concept of the high self-monitor. The final area of research reviewed discusses the different types of social information to which a low self-monitor attends compared to a high self-monitor. Since high self-monitors look to the situation for behavioral guidance, they

should have a self-concept that is more inconsistent, as they have information about how to act in various situations, yet have no consistent self-guide.

Stability of Self-Concept

The previously discussed notion of the self-concept can be defined as the constellation of categories that an individual uses to describe self. These categories span many levels of detail. These categories include country of origin, the region of the United States where an individual resides, level of self-monitoring, down to the traits that an individual uses to describe their personality, among others. These categories also consist of the types of roles that an individual uses when in the presence of others, how an individual interacts with others, and how typically other people have treated them in the past. Self-concept also has an evaluative component in that it is the repository of what type of regard an individual has for one's self. The self-concept is molded through social comparisons with other people and allows us to evaluate our standing among others on any issue that we choose to acknowledge.

Now that self-concept has been conceptualized, one of the fundamental questions addressed in self-concept research is: Will I be tomorrow who I am today and who I was yesterday? Some researchers on self-concept claim that an individual's self-concept is relatively stable across the whole lifespan, or for a majority of the life span. For example, Mortimer and Lorence (1981) found that five dimensions of self-concept "including well being, self-doubts, sociability, competence, and unconventionality" were stable from late adolescence to early adulthood. These results are significant, in that stability of the self-concept is held during a life period usually marked by instability and change.

Certain inherent characteristics of individuals affect their self-concepts. An individual may be white, female, with an average IQ. Self-perception of these qualities comprise the basis of the individual's self-concept. Individuals enact these qualities in differing degrees throughout their social interactions with others. Besides stable demographic features, individuals may have certain personality characteristics that are a predominant part of their self-concept. They may be extraverted or introverted, and this, in turn, affects their behaviors and attitudes toward others. These individuals may place themselves in certain situations that are characteristic of the self-concept. For example, Snyder and Gangestad (1982) reported that low self-monitors, who have a self-concept that is internally constructed from their moods and beliefs, were more willing to enter situations that reflected their personal dispositions. High self-monitors, with a more situationally-based self-concept that is more situationally-based, were most willing to enter situations in which extraverted roles were clearly defined, such as being a meeting facilitator.

Self-verification. Some researchers state that individuals actually engage in self-verification; that is, they actively try to reinforce their established self-concept. In interaction with others, individuals who want to verify their self-concept may try to draw the attention of others to certain traits or attitudes that they possess. Swann and Read (1980) discuss a variety of these self-verification techniques that individuals use, which include social, behavioral and cognitive means.

One technique used for self-verification is to seek out social feedback that readily confirms an individual's self-concept. Swann and Read (1980) found that individuals who perceived themselves as being "unlikable" would spend more time

reading negative statements that their partner produced about them, while “likable” individuals would spend more time reading positive statements that their partners produced.

Individuals also engage in self-verification by behaviorally eliciting responses that confirm their self-concept. Swann and Read (1980) found that individuals that perceived themselves as being likable elicited more favorable reactions from partners. The amount of liking was statistically mediated by individuals’ increased praises to their partner, and this effect was stronger when they believed that the partner had a negative impression of them.

Individuals also confirm their self-concept through their cognitive processes. Swann and Read (1980) found that individuals that perceived themselves as being likable recalled more positive than negative evaluative statements that their partner made about them. Similarly, Markus (1977) found that schematic individuals (or individuals that have a self schema that is strongly characterized by a particular trait) would be less willing to accept information that was incongruent with their schema. Thus, on the basis of the research reviewed to this point, it appears that the self does seem to remain stable, and that individuals actively try to maintain this conception of self through self-verification.

The Self-Concept as Malleable

Markus and Kunda (1986), and numerous other psychology researchers, propose that the self-concept may be both stable and malleable. Inside the more stable, general self-concept, Markus and Kunda (1986) believe that there is a working self-concept, or a malleable self-concept that individuals have for the current moment

in time. Markus and Kunda (1986), drawing from Bem's (1972) self-perception theory, posit that the working self-concept is affected by our current motivations and goals and the norms of social situations. These working self-concepts guide behavior in how individuals should act in the current situation. Once individuals leave a social situation, they may employ a different working self-concept, although in contrast, they still maintain a stable, general self-concept that was intact across these social situations. They should still recognize the self as a member of their respective gender category, yet their perception of their level of a more abstract concept, such as a personality trait, may be higher or lower.

Self-concept can be less rigid than previously thought, based on the context or the phenomenological experience associated with social stimuli (Markus, 1977). Aschematic individuals (or individuals who did not attribute a trait in question as being characteristic of their self-concept) were more inconsistent in their responses when asked to indicate whether the trait was indicative of self or not. This result is significant on numerous fronts. First, it supports the idea that the self is not solely stable, underscoring the capacity of the self-concept to be both stable and malleable. Another important consideration from Markus's (1977) study provides guidance to what aspects of the self-concept are malleable and which processes germane to this plasticity. Perhaps individuals have a self-concept that is rigidly stable on some characteristics of their personality, while other aspects are less rigid, and may possibly change with situations or goals.

Motivational Bases. Much of the literature on the malleability of self-concept emphasizes the self-esteem needs of individuals. When an individual feels too unique

or similar to everyone else, they may be motivated to change their self-concept to establish a social comparative equilibrium. Markus and Kunda (1986) capitalized on this prospect, and investigated the malleability of self-concept through use of a traditional research paradigm in which individuals experienced one of these two socially undesirable outcomes.

Markus and Kunda (1986) posited that these differing states are aversive states to the self-concept, and will have a significant impact on the working self-concept. To reduce threat to the working self-concept, the researchers theorized that individuals would attempt to conscript memories that stress the opposite state. In other words, if people are made to feel overly different from others, they will retrieve memories or behaviors that implicate their similarity with others. If people feel overly similar with others, they retrieve memories in which their behaviors were different from other individuals. The cognitive act of retrieving either type of memory has processing implications, which reduces response latencies when deciding whether a word (reflective of the retrieved memory) is self-descriptive or not.

Markus and Kunda (1986) found that participants who were told that they were overly unique or similar from others did not differ on their choices of either unique or similar items when describing themselves, providing evidence that the general self-concept is stable. However, participants made to feel unique had shorter response latency times when deciding if conforming words were descriptive of them, indicating that their working self-concept may have activated memories or concepts in which the participant was similar to others. This pattern extended to participants who were made to feel similar to others. In a word association task, participants

made to feel unique later associated uniqueness with negative terms, and similarity with positive terms. Thus, a valence is attached to certain memories or structures associated with one's self-concept. Markus and Kunda (1986) indicate that the individual's working self-concept is malleable, and can change if there is a motivational basis behind the change. Individuals theoretically conduct a memory search through their past experiences, trying to find those particular events that fulfill the current need. The individual may define their current self-concept based on their most recent communication style or active memory structure. This theory captures the malleability and fleeting characteristics that represent the self-concept, as evidenced by Markus (1977) and Markus and Kunda (1986).

Kunda and Sanitioso (1988) believed that individuals recruit one-sided memories to support the hypothesis or theory and they neglect to look for memories that do not support the initial hypothesis. The researchers set up a paradigm in which they told students that a certain personality characteristic (either introversion or extraversion) was related to being successful in graduate school, something that is extremely desirable and self-esteem enhancing for most students. Kunda and Sanitioso (1988) then had students theorize why either introversion or extraversion would have a significant relationship with academic success. Kunda and Sanitioso (1988) found that students who developed theories of why one trait was important in being successful in graduate school, perceived themselves as having the trait to a greater extent.

Sanitioso, Kunda, and Fong (1990) examined the process that Kunda and Sanitioso (1988) had proposed, and found evidence that supported their proposal of a

biased memory search when participants answered questions that assessed an individual's self-concept. Congruent self-concept memories that supported a supposedly desirable trait were more accessible to individuals. That is, when participants were told that a certain trait was more desirable, the participants conducted a biased memory search. This biased memory search activates these characteristics and they became more accessible than incongruent memories in the working self-concept. This was reflected through shorter response periods and one-sided answers on memory-listing tasks reflecting the desirable trait.

Self-esteem, or how positive or negatively one evaluates self, which is also an evaluative component of self-concept, is also amenable to change when there is a motivational basis. Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, and Skelton (1981) examined the effects of strategic self-enhancement and self-deprecation on self-esteem. In this study, participants were involved in a mock interview where they had previously observed a confederate and were provided with incentives to use either a self-deprecating or self-enhancing strategy. The strategy that they had used had a corresponding effect on their self-esteem. Participants had a higher self-esteem when they engaged in a self-enhancing strategy and a low self-esteem when they engaged in a self-deprecating strategy. This effect was replicated even when participants were explicitly told by the experimenters to act a certain way. This study shows that communication behaviors that are motivationally based can change self-esteem. Also, the process of pretending to act a certain way can affect self-esteem.

Direction of Self-Concept Change. When individuals are presented with different social stimuli, either self- or other-initiated, individuals either accept or

reject integrating the information into their self-concept. When they do accept the information, it can either increase or decrease their perceived level of a trait in their self-concept. Rhodewalt and Aguttdottir (1986) discuss this concept when they describe the phenomenal self, a concept similar to Markus's and Kunda's (1986) working self-concept. Phenomenal self is a subset or collection of self-relevant information that is currently activated. Rhodewalt and Aguttdottir (1986) believe that individuals have certain latitudes of rejection or acceptance. That is, if a person engages in certain behaviors, acceptable to the self, the behavior falls within the latitude of acceptance. If a person engages in behaviors that fall outside the range of acceptable behaviors to the self, the behavior is in the latitude of rejection.

If a behavior falls in the latitude of acceptance, individuals will engage in self-perception processes whereby their self-concept will change, reflecting their attention to their current behavior. If the behavior falls in the latitude of rejection, the behavior will elicit cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is an aroused state in which the individual's behaviors do not match their attitudes, and they try to rectify this discrepancy through various processes.

For example, Rhodewalt and Aguttdottir (1986) believed that participants would reduce cognitive dissonance by reporting that they were less like the self-discrepant behavior elicited. The process of using either self-perception processes or experiencing cognitive dissonance is mediated by the individuals' self-knowledge of their behaviors. If someone has a developed self-knowledge structure and they engage in a self-discrepant behavior, he or she will experience cognitive dissonance, while a less developed structure will result in self-perception processes.

Rhodewalt and Aguttsdottir (1986) found that depressives (depressed people) who had to act in a self-enhancing manner, and nondepressives (people who are not depressed) who had to act in a self-deprecating manner, felt cognitive dissonance, which had an opposing effect on their self-esteem. Depressives who acted in a self-deprecating manner and nondepressives, acting in a self-enhancing manner, emphasized a change in self-esteem that reflected their behavior. These areas of research point to the role of motivational bases in changing self-esteem. Several studies assessed what effect, if any, certain types of questions would have.

Can Self-Concept Change Without a Motivational Basis?

One issue raised by the preceding is whether self-concept can change. Fazio, Effrein, and Falender (1981) examined the effect that certain types of questions would have on an individual's self-concept. Fazio et al. (1981) proposed that asking certain types of self-directed questions without a motivational basis may prime or activate a different self-concept. In the study, individuals silently read questions to themselves and then answered them. The questions were either indicative of introversion or extraversion. Based on the type of questions asked, individuals actually answered in a manner similar to the type of questions. Individuals who asked themselves introverted questions responded in a less extraverted manner than individuals who asked themselves more extraverted questions.

These questions influence participants' behavior Fazio et al. (1981) . Individuals acted in either a more introverted or extraverted manner towards a confederate. These self-directed questions also affected the participant's self-perception of their own introversion or extraversion. Participants who asked

themselves introverted questions thought that they were more introverted than participants who asked themselves extraverted questions. Sherman, Skov, Hervitz, and Stock (1981) reported that participants who were asked to explain either failure or success on an upcoming anagram task resulted in the participants having either higher or lower expectations of behavior, which then translated into actual performance.

As previously discussed, the rationale for a third study was that a directional question would provoke individuals to think of memories that were one-sided in favor of the question. Kunda, Fong, Sanitioso, and Reber (1993) conducted a study assessing whether asking an individual a directional question about one's introversion or extraversion influences their self-concept. Individuals will engage in a "positive-test strategy" (Klayman & Ha, 1987), in which information will be found (in the form of memories) which supports the question and there will be a general lack of memories retrieved that do not support the question being asked. Kunda et al. (1993) constructed a research study in which participants answered a question about themselves, such as "Are you happy/unhappy with your social life?" Participants then listed any thoughts that answered the question. After listing their thoughts, participants then completed a self-rating scale that asked them to rate themselves on how happy or unhappy they were with their social life. Kunda et al. (1993) found that the directional question facilitated the retrieval of memories that answered the question in a one-sided manner, providing support for a biased memory search. Participants also rated themselves as being happy or unhappy with their social life (above or below neutral) based on this memory search.

In subsequent studies, Kunda et al. (1993) explored some of the parameters or the boundary conditions in which a change in self-concept was less likely to occur. Kunda et al. (1993) found that a directional question no longer had an effect on self-concept if participants' perceived themselves as being more variable on the particular trait. Kunda et al. (1993) also found that participants' listed more two-sided thoughts when they described themselves as being more variable on the trait in question.

Regarding Kunda et al.'s (1993) findings that an individuals' perceived variability on a trait has a significant relationship on two-sided thoughts listed and also subsequent self-ratings; and arose the usage of a personal characteristic to account for these differences. The personal characteristic that can most likely account for these differences is an individual's differences in self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974). According to Snyder (1974), self-monitoring can be described as the degree to which an individual can "monitor their self-presentation or communication style, expressive behavior, and verbal affective display" (p. 527). In other words, high self-monitors are able to put on the right "social mask" when it is called upon, while low self-monitors tend to follow their internal dispositions and present themselves in a way that is a reflective of how they feel or think during a given moment rather than what is perceived to be "socially correct" or "expected" in that situation. The Kunda et. al (1993) work allows the bridge between self-concept and self-monitoring.

Self-Monitoring as a Construct

Self-monitoring has been defined as the amount of expressive control than an individual has across various situations (Snyder, 1974). Low self-monitors are

typically thought of as individuals who let their moods or general dispositions on various issues guide their behaviors or outward expressions when they are interacting with those around them. If a low self-monitor is interacting within a group, they typically reveal their true self through what they say, or how they behave with outward expressions of emotion. The low self-monitors' behavior is consistent across situations. High self-monitors are typically thought of as individuals who have no consistent base of behaviors, as they are typically change their own behaviors to fit the social situation. They mask or hide their "true self" constantly changing their expressions based upon the external, or rather the social stimuli of which they find themselves a part. The high self-monitors' behavior is inconsistent across situations, because it adapts to changing situations.

Self-Monitoring Scale

One way to better discern who a self-monitor is involves examining the factors that compose the original Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974). Snyder (1974) stated that self-monitoring consists of five aspects: (a) concern with being socially appropriate in one's presentation; (b) attention to social comparison information as cues to appropriate expression; (c) the ability to control and modify one's self-presentation; (d) being able to use this ability in particular situations; and (e) the consistency of behavior across situations (Snyder, 1974).

The Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974) was validated through various procedures and appears to be both a psychologically meaningful and unified construct. However, other researchers have argued that Snyder's (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale consists of more than one latent variable. Briggs, Cheek, and Buss

(1980) found that the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974) consisted of three distinct factors: acting, extraversion, and other-directedness, which all lacked significant intercorrelations with regards to the independent factors. Various other factor-analytic studies support the claim that the Self-Monitoring Scale consists of multiple independent factors (Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980; Lennox & Wolfe, 1984; Nowack & Kammer, 1987; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). Some studies have found as many as four factors (Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980) while others have found two general factors (Briggs & Cheek, 1988; John, Cheek, & Klohnen, 1996) in the Self-Monitoring Scale.

Based on their data, Briggs et al. (1980) warrant caution in conceptualizing self-monitoring as a unitary construct. Briggs et al. (1980) found that other-directedness, the willingness to change one's behavior to suit others, was positively correlated with neuroticism and shyness, and negatively correlated with self-esteem. While extraversion, was negatively correlated with neuroticism and shyness, and positively correlated with a different measure of extraversion.

Another concern is the construct of self-monitoring is not truly operationalized in the Self-Monitoring Scale. Snyder and Gangstad (2000) state that the self-monitoring scale is a valid measure of self-monitoring because of its intrinsic validity. Hence, hundreds of studies have shown a significant difference when people were assessed on their self-monitoring.

Miell and Le Voi (1985) found that using the three subscales of the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974), (derived from Briggs et al., 1980) in analysis were more useful predictors than employing the scale as a whole. Miell and Le Voi (1985)

replicated the same type of patterns as Briggs et al. (1980). Some subscales of the Self-Monitoring Scale went in the opposite direction of the other subscales when they were used in analysis. Therefore, the predictive utility of the scale was lowered when subscales that are moving in opposite directions were combined. Dividing self-monitoring into three constructs when conducting analyses has also been utilized in other studies (Carver, 1989; Hull, Lehn, & Tedlie, 1991; Richmond, Craig, & Ruzicka, 1991; Snyder and Gangestad, 1986; Sullivan & Harnish, 1990).

Results like Miell and Le Voi's (1985), and Briggs et al.'s (1980) classic factor analytic study started to create doubt among researchers about the meaning of self-monitoring as developed by Snyder (1974) and measured by the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974). Not taking these criticisms lightly, Snyder and Gangestad (1986) wrote a rebuttal directly to Briggs et al. (1980) and Miell and Le Voi (1985) in which they claim that self-monitoring is a psychologically meaningful construct and does measure one main underlying factor.

Snyder and Gangestad (1986) provide support for self-monitoring from various sources. One critical source of support is strong empirical findings when self-monitoring has been used as a way to differentiate individuals. This point serves as an indirect statement of the reliability of a construct. According to Snyder and Gangestad (1986), simply relying on factor analysis to determine a scale's internal structure may ignore a more complex phenomenon, which has been found to be significant in numerous studies.

Gangestad and Snyder (1985) also cite direct support for the construct by reanalyzing studies of self-monitoring and conducting analyses of the internal

structure of the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974). Through the use of a taxometric analysis, Gangestad and Snyder (1985) found that their measure of self-monitoring does tap an underlying causal variable.

Self-Monitoring Scale Assessment

In a later analysis, Briggs and Cheek (1988) found that there were two factors that composed the Self-Monitoring Scale, not one, and that the first factor correlated with extraversion, exhibitionism, and social potency. Briggs and Cheek (1988) also discuss some of the problems with the general theoretical approach taken in the development of the self-monitoring concept from inception to the current time (e.g. Gangestad & Snyder, 1985; Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 1988). One problem that Briggs and Cheek (1988) identified that it is assumed that a person is either a high or low self-monitor, instead of being placed on a continuum of self-monitoring. Miller and Thayer (1989) also support the claim that self-monitoring may not be a discrete class variable. Miller and Thayer (1989) conducted analyses with both discrete and continuous measurements of the Self-Monitoring Scale and found better empirical evidence in treating self-monitoring as a continuous variable, evidenced through higher factor loadings.

However, Gangestad and Snyder (1991) believed that Miller and Thayer's (1989) analysis consisted of false psychometric premises and a general misunderstanding of Gangestad and Snyder's (1985) claims. According to Gangestad and Snyder (1991), Miller and Thayer (1989) implicitly proposed that if a continuously measured scale correlates with a dichotomous variable, then a dichotomized version of the measure would measure the variables better. Hence,

when Miller and Thayer (1989) found that the continuous scaled measures better fit the variable, they believed that self-monitoring was a continuous variable. Gangestad and Snyder (1989) stated that a continuously scored indicator would actually correlate higher with a dichotomous variable, than with a dichotomized version of the variable.

The second concern that Briggs and Cheek (1988) presents is similar to past arguments about the specious nature of the self-monitoring construct. Basically, one factor of the scale, termed other-directedness (Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980; Miell & Le Voi 1985) is indicative of a person who “may have a neurotic maladjustment” (p. 674). A final concern of Briggs and Cheek (1988) lay with the general use of the term self-presentation, which is found within the self-monitoring individual. Briggs and Cheek (1988) argue that high self-monitors engage in self-presentation, while low self-monitors never engage in self-presentation. This contradicts Snyder’s (1974) conception of the self-monitor in which low self-monitors do engage in self-presentation. That is, a low self-monitor’s style of self-presentation is consistent across situations, and is indicative of their internal states. However, Briggs and Cheek (1988) believe that self-presentation means something different. Self-presentation is conceptualized as the individual communicating in ways that reflect themselves to others in a positive light, no matter in which situation they find themselves. Briggs and Cheek (1988) believe that this is something that is not characteristic of a low self-monitor. Thus, Erving Goffman (1959) states that we are actors following scripts which are determined by the situation. Extending this to the current research paper, it is believed that high self-monitors are better adept at understanding and following the prescribed scripts.

Several parallel theoretical lines appear to lay similar support for the communicator reaction to the environment stimulus. First, social psychologist Kurt Lewin (1936) devised the formula $B=f(P,E)$ to represent the notion that behavior is a function of the person and the environment, interactionists have been interested in the relationship between personality characteristics and the situation as well as the resulting behaviors. Second, Erving Goffman (1967), a symbolic interactionist, developed a dramaturgical approach, building upon G.H. Mead's work. This theory explained communication behavior on the basis of a particular situation or "frame" thereby giving situation the defining influence in all interaction. Using Goffman's explanation: "the emphasis is placed upon how selves and identities emerge out of situational constraints that shape the 'performance' of the role players" (Layder, 1981). Goffman believes that our interaction is guided by following particular rules, "scripts" of a situation.

People act particular ways in different situations because they are following the rules and expectations of their interpretation and perception of the situation. An individual may perceive a situation to have certain rules because a situation resembles another, the rules of which they are familiar (Lord, 1982). Lord (1982) states, "the notion that behavior is a function of the situation as perceived or interpreted by the individual ... has been a basic premise of social psychology" (p. 1084). He, like Cody and McLaughlin (1985) developed a method of classifying situations based on knowledge and perceptions. This paper will not fully delve into individuals' perceptions, because although that is an important area of study.

Cross-Situational Variability

Similarly, psychologist's theoretical concepts give validity to the focus of interaction responses shaping self-monitoring that has seldom been discussed by either critics (Briggs and Cheek, 1988; Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980) or by supporters (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985; Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 1988) is the issue of context effects. Nesler, Tedeschi and Storr (1995) describe context effects as a phenomenon in which responses to one personality inventory influences responses to other scales or behaviors measured within the same testing session. Not surprisingly, Nesler et al. (1995) found that when participants read instructions that indicated that the Self-Monitoring Scale measured one's ability to act, with females' scores on the scale being higher while males' scores on the scale were lower than the standard testing condition. In a second experiment, Nesler et al. (1995) had participants respond to the Self-Monitoring Scale after responding to questions about sexual deception. Nesler et al. (1988) found that in this case, scores on the Self-Monitoring Scale were lower than the standard testing condition.

Lippa (1976) found that when participants were asked to role-play either introverted or extraverted teachers over subsequent trials, high self-monitors were better able to act out the various performances better than low self-monitors, based on naïve judge's ratings. High self-monitors' expressive behaviors changed more across trials to fit the requirements of the situation compared to low self-monitors (Lippa, 1976). However, there was one facet of personality that high self-monitors had trouble changing across trials. Lippa (1976) found that high self-monitors were consistently rated by judges as being more extraverted across situations; their

extraversion “leaked out” even when they were required to role play an anxious teacher.

Snyder and Monson (1975) examined the differences that self-monitoring has on an individual’s sensitivity to situational cues to act in a socially appropriate manner, and the behavioral consistency of self-monitors. Snyder and Monson (1975) found that high self-monitors would reliably conform to group discussions that differed over time. In a second study, Snyder and Monson (1975) found that high self-monitors reported more situational variability than low self-monitors on the traits of generosity, honesty, and hostility.

Lippa and Donaldson (1990) conducted a study assessing the cross-situational consistency of self-monitors’ behaviors across interpersonal relationships. In this study, participants filled out diaries in which they indicated who they were interacting with, their current inhabited setting, and the behaviors that they engaged in. Participants filled out a computer assessment indicating people that they interacted with, the role or relationship with that person, behaviors that are typically engaged in, in these situations, and the settings typically inhabited with these people. Lippa and Donaldson (1990) found that the various measures were highly intercorrelated, and that consistency measures were negatively correlated with self-monitoring. That is, high self-monitors show less cross-situational consistency in relationships

High self-monitors’ tendency to be more cross-situationally variable in expressive behavior implies that these individuals that are more adaptable to differing situations. Caldwell and O’Reilly (1982) examined the role of self-monitoring and performance in boundary spanning jobs. Boundary spanning jobs are characterized as

sending and receiving information both inside and outside the organization's boundaries. Individuals who have boundary spanning jobs must present organizational information to other constituencies, outside of their organization, and thus, create variable situation and interaction demands. This type of job brings an individual into contact with many different types of people and social settings, as varied organizations conduct business with his/her home organization. A boundary-spanning job would probably be best performed by high self-monitors, according to Caldwell and O'Reilly (1982), as they can alter their self-presentations in the various situations that they find themselves in. Caldwell and O'Reilly (1982) found that high self-monitors outperformed low self-monitors in boundary spanning jobs.

Attitude/Behavior Congruence

In an early study of attitude and subsequent behaviors of self-monitors, Snyder and Tanke (1975) found that low self-monitors have a higher correspondence between behaviors and attitudes than high self-monitors. Zanna, Olson, and Fazio (1980) extended the research on the attitude behavior relationship among self-monitors and found that only low self-monitors who held previously unchanging views about a topic held consistent behaviors and attitudes. Further evidence by Paulhus (1982) showed that low self-monitors' are more apt to experience cognitive dissonance (a type of cognitive conflict) when they are asked to engage in behaviors that are against their attitudes, or that they would view with a negative valence. To rationalize this attitude behavior discrepancy, low self-monitors change their attitudes to reflect the recent behavior, and actually perceived the behavior to be more enjoyable. However, since high self-monitors have lower attitude/behavior

congruence, they did not experience cognitive dissonance, or all of its subsequent effects.

Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) examined determinants of the correspondence between attitudes and behavior concerning affirmative action. Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) initially found that correspondence between attitudes and behavior was low for both low and high self-monitors. However, when increasing the availability of attitudes, by allowing individuals to think about their attitudes, created a high attitude/behavior correspondence for low self-monitors, but not for high self-monitors. In another condition of the study, Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) found that increasing relevance, or the importance of attitudes, created an attitude/behavior correspondence between low and high self-monitors. The similarity of responses between low and high self-monitors can probably be justified by interpreting their actions through different motivational biases. Relevance, or importance of decision possibly affected low self-monitors on an internal level. Low self-monitors may have taken personal responsibility for the outcome of their decision. High self-monitors may have interpreted the relevance information on a self-presentation level, and felt compelled to be socially desirable.

Mellema and Bassili (1995) examined the relationship between values and attitudes and the possible moderating role of self-monitoring. Mellema and Bassili (1995) predicted that there would be a stronger relationship between the values and attitudes of low self-monitors compared to high self-monitors. Mellema and Bassili (1995) drew these predictions from the past research findings of Snyder and DeBono (1987), who found that attitudes for the low self-monitor were more indicative of

their actual values, while a high self-monitor's outward displays of attitudes were more based on socially appropriateness or what attitude best fits the "attitude of the social situation." The "attitude of the social situation" is manifested through a groups' decision, or through a description in a vignette. Mellema and Basilli (1995) found that values for low self-monitors were more predictive of attitudes towards issues.

Attention To Differing Sources of Social Information

Besides "attitudes", another dimension of the situation is how the communicator perceives her/his partner, especially with respect to social knowledge about her/him. Elliot (1979) examined how differing levels of self-monitoring affect individuals' preparation for a future interaction, and the impact that presenting an accurate or fabricated impression has on this preparation. Elliot (1979) predicted that since high self-monitors are eager to acquire information about a target, they will spend more of their time trying to learn information about the target, while a low self-monitor will let his or her internal states guide the future interaction. Elliot (1979) found that when high self-monitors planned a fabricated interaction, they "bought" more information about the partner, while low self-monitors relied more on internal information in both types of interactions.

When we typically choose our partners for social activities, we may choose them based on usually one of two sets of considerations (Snyder et al., 1983). Snyder, Gangestad, and Simpson (1983) conducted a study examining the different considerations that high and low self-monitors take into account when they are choosing with whom they want to interact. Snyder et al. (1983) were mainly

concerned with the systematic differences in the nature of friends who comprise the social networks of low and high self-monitors.

One set of considerations involves choosing friends that are experts, or are knowledgeable about a task. These types of friends are typically chosen for a particular task or activity. Snyder et al. (1983) believe that high self-monitors choose activity partners that are specialists, making it easier for them to display their competence in various domains. As a result of "expert picking," high self-monitors should tend to have a social world, where they pick different friends for different situations. Conversely, low self-monitors choose activity partners that they like, or share similar views with, resulting in low self-monitors having a consistent set of friends that they interact with in various situations. Snyder et al. (1983) found that their predictions were true. High self-monitors preferred partitioned social worlds in which they used specialists for activities and low self-monitors chose friends that were similar to them and did all activities with them. These results show that high self-monitors prefer multiple friends for varying situations, while low self-monitors prefer friends who are similar to them and with whom they interact across various situations.

Does this type of result also apply to dating relationships? These types of patterns also prevail in romantic relationships of low and high self-monitors (Snyder & Simpson, 1984). Snyder and Simpson (1984) reported high self-monitors were more willing to change intimate partners for alternative partners, but low self-monitors were unwilling. Furthermore, high self-monitors reported dating a greater number of partners and dating partners over a shorter period of time. There was less

of a link between length of relationship and level of intimacy as opposed to low self-monitors.

Again, Snyder, Berscheid, and Glick (1985) dichotomize as Snyder, Gangestad, and Simpson (1983) had done with the two sets of considerations that are taken into account when choosing an activity partner. However, Snyder et al. (1985) dichotomized the sets of consideration that individuals take when initiating dating relationships and serving as factors related to attraction. Snyder et al. (1985) propose that high self-monitors want attractive partners as it serves as a boost to their public appearance, while low self-monitors are more invested in internal attributes of the other person. Individuals either attend to physical appearance or to personality attributes when making relationship choices.

These patterns of attraction, physical appearance or personality, which also served as indicators of initiation of relationships among low and high self-monitors (Snyder et al., 1985). High self-monitors held physical appearance as the most relevant determiner of and most relevant on whether they would chose someone for a date. Low self-monitors chose personality characteristics as their main determiner when choosing a date. Supporting Snyder et al. (1983), Jamieson, Lydon, and Zanna (1987) reported similar results. Initial attraction towards an individual was based on attitude similarity for low self-monitors, and activity preference similarity had a stronger influence on high self-monitors' attraction.

Besides attending to either physical or internal characteristics of potential dating partners, self-monitoring also serves as a moderator for the self-attribution of emotions. Graziano and Bryant (1998) demonstrated that low self-monitors used the

self as a guide to evaluate and regulate emotions, although high self-monitors would look to situational cues to understand their emotions. High self-monitors believed that certain stimulus objects were more attractive when they heard a measure of their heartbeat increase, when in actuality the supposed measure of their heartbeat was manipulated by the experimenters. This effect did not replicate among low self-monitors. When they heard a fake measure of their heartbeat increase when viewing certain objects, there was no difference in perceived attraction. Graziano and Bryant (1998) also found that high self-monitors found comedy skits to be funnier when a laugh track was included, while low self-monitors did not report a difference in perceived jocularity of the comedy skits that included a laugh track.

Other research examined the role that self-monitoring plays in individuals' usage of consensus information to predict future behavior in a new situation (Krosnick & Sedikides, 1990). Consensus information is "data regarding how most people would act in the situation" (p. 718). Their predictions were based on earlier findings by Kulik and Taylor (1981) who found that high self-monitors used consensus information more than low self-monitors.

This previous research on consensus information typically yielded two findings: 1) People either use the consensus information (or the base rate information of how most people would act); or, 2) they may use their past behaviors in similar situations to predict how they would act in the new situation. Krosnick and Sedikides (1990) predicted that certain personality characteristics, such as self-monitoring, potentially would moderate individuals use of consensus information, or information that is more idiosyncratic in nature. Krosnick and Sedikides (1990) predicted that

high self-monitors, being overly concerned with projecting a socially positive image, would use consensus information that is related to engaging in good deeds and avoiding socially undesirable actions, compared to low self-monitors. However, Krosnick and Sedikides (1990) were also examining the types of consensus information as previously indicated. Through a series of studies, Krosnick and Sedikides (1990) found that high self-monitors were more responsive to complimentary or socially desirable consensus information than low self-monitors; while low self-monitors were more responsive to threatening consensus information. In other words, high self-monitors were more likely to engage in socially desirable behaviors when others engaged in the socially desirable behavior; while low self-monitors would help engage in socially desirable behavior when no one else would. Thus, self-monitoring is used for predicting future actions based on differing types of consensus information.

Self-monitoring has been used to further understand the different social information processing goals of low and high self-monitors. Chen, Shechter and Chaiken (1996) discussed two different types of processing goals. One type of motivation in processing information is to attain accuracy, or to “be right.” The second goal in processing is to “be friendly” or to put across a friendly, socially desirable image to others. Chen et al. (1996) also discuss these goals and their implications on the depth of processing. They state that accuracy-motivated goals are “indicative of both heuristic and systematic processing in which the individual processes information in a relatively impartial, open-minded manner” (p.263) The researchers mention that impression-motivated goals are indicative of the “selective

use of heuristic processing, set at achieving the immediate social goal at hand” (p.263). Chen et al. (1996) predicted that high self-monitors were more likely to use impression-motivated processing, and low self-monitors would use more accuracy-based processing. In their first study, Chen et al. (1996) discovered that high self-monitors were more impression motivated, and tended to reflect attitudes of the same valence as their partner, when compared to low self-monitors. In their second study, Chen et al. (1996) found that accuracy-motivated individuals (low self-monitors) displayed their accuracy “bias” in both initial attitudes, reflecting heuristic processing and then this bias continued with later attitudes in which low self-monitors engaged in more systematic processing.

Snyder and Cantor (1980) also examined different types of social knowledge that low and high self-monitors attend to in their social interactions. Based on the self-monitoring typology, low self-monitors tended to reflect their internal dispositions when interacting with others; while high self-monitors behaviors tended to fit in with the current social interaction. Since both have divergent styles of interaction, and sources of social knowledge in how to interact, it should also relate to their self-knowledge. Their self-knowledge reflects their social knowledge or behaviors and their social behaviors are indirect ways of measuring their self-knowledge. Taking this into consideration, Snyder and Cantor (1980) predicted that low self-monitors would have a better internally based, cognitive representation of their characteristic selves compared to high self-monitors. On the other hand, high self-monitors would have more knowledge or a “richer” knowledge base of externally based cognitive representations of prototypes, or the typical, ideal way of acting

across situations. These predictions were supported when Snyder and Cantor (1980) found that low self-monitors provided more informative descriptions of their own characteristic selves. High self-monitors were better able to provide “richer” descriptions of prototypes or of individuals that had different traits.

Low and high self-monitors show an increased attention to sources of information that were converse to each other. As a result, the feedback from these sources of information can have differing effects on low and high self-monitors’ self-esteem after self-presentation. An interesting study by Jones, Brenner, and Knight (1990) found that when low self-monitors were asked to play self-serving, unethical roles that are typically unrepresentative of self, they had an increase in self-esteem when audience feedback indicated that they failed to act in a convincing manner. Jones, Brenner, and Knight (1990) also found that high self-monitors reported a higher self-esteem if they received audience feedback indicating that they were successful in playing the same role.

Earlier research by Ickes, Layden, and Barnes, (1978) examined the greater emphasis low self-monitors’ place on self as the informational base for their self-concept. Ickes et al. (1978) created an experimental scenario in which objective self-awareness was either present or not present for low and high self-monitors and found that low self-monitors were affected more than high self-monitors in the objective self-awareness condition. Low self-monitors’ responses shifted in the objective self-awareness condition in that they described their self-concept as being more unique. However, high self-monitors showed no change across conditions. In general then,

results show the greater emphasis low self-monitors place on stable self as the key to understanding how they see themselves.

These results indicate that it was reaffirming and self-esteem enhancing for low self-monitors to have difficulty acting like someone else and convincing an audience. High self-monitors' self-esteem was increased when they were able to convince a crowd of being someone different. This places the emphasis of self as being the main source of self-esteem for the low self-monitor, while success at "playing the role" was more important to the high self-monitor's self-esteem. An interesting modification of the self-monitoring literature was that playing the role of someone socially undesirable did not reduce the effect of self-esteem enhancement in the high self-monitor, rather successful acting for an audience was more self-esteem enhancing.

High self-monitors, who develop a variable self-concept through various social situations, most likely did not change their description of their self-concept as the experimental situation did not "necessitate" a change in their socially constructed self-concept. However, high self-monitors do not look to the self to assess their self-concept. The self-awareness condition creates an emphasis on the self, however high self-monitors do not use self for describing self-concept.

Review of the Theoretical Integration of Self-Concept and Self-Monitoring

This review of the self-monitoring literature brings up significant points that bridge self-monitoring as a possible moderator of the relationship between directional questions and self-concept. Referring back to Kunda et al. (1993) the investigators assessed how individuals perceive their variability on either extraversion or

introversion across situations. They determined that the perceived variability consequent to cueing was related to whether retrieval of thoughts in response to a directional question had effected a subsequent self-rating on that trait. This indicator seems rather similar to the aspect of variability as evidenced by the research on cross-situational consistency, attitude/behaviors and attention to different sources of information in the self-monitoring literature. To establish self-monitoring as bridging construct before communication and perspectives, the researcher designed and executed two studies.

Therefore:

H₁: It is hypothesized that high self-monitors will be more likely to exhibit a change in self-concept between the first and second session on their self rated trait that was assessed with the directional question.

H₂: High self-monitors will be more likely to exhibit a change in self-concept based on the quantity of thoughts generated.

Overview of Study One

The first study was designed to test to see the reaction of one's self-concept after the presence of a strong directional question. The second study was designed to test how significantly related/ similar certain measurements between the disciplines of psychology and communication studies are with regards to the areas of self-monitoring and self-concept. Therefore, in the first study, the researcher adapted Kunda et al.'s (1993) methodology. Similar results were expected, i.e. high self-monitors, or individuals who have a variable self-concept including either

extraversion or introversion, will perceive themselves as possessing differing levels of that trait after recalling thoughts that support a directional question (“are you introverted?”, “are you extraverted?”).

The hypothesis for Study One may be explained by two differing accounts. First, high self-monitors are more situationally responsive and they will perceive themselves differently based on the thoughts that they recalled. In this case, the thought process and the research paradigm (presentation of a directional question) itself will serve as the situation. Second, since low self-monitors perceive themselves as being consistent and behaving on internal dispositions, they will disregard the thought process as solely being a situation that has no true bearing on how they perceive themselves. Furthermore, thought process (recalling and writing down thoughts to the proposed directional question) and the research paradigm will have no effect on self-concept, as evidenced through self-ratings.

Method

Participants

Participants consisted of 53 (21 males and 32 females) undergraduate students from University of Rhode Island enrolled and listed on an instructor’s roster from either a COM 101 (Public speaking) or COM 206 (Research methods) introductory communication studies course. Of the 53 participants, 52 indicated their race/ethnicity, with 45 (86.5%) being European-American, 2 (3.8%) being Asian-Americans, 2 (3.8%) being Hispanic-Americans, and 3 (5.8%) indicated “other” as

their ethnicity. The age range of the participants was rather homogenous (18 to 25) with a mean of 19.7, and a standard deviation of 1.55.

Materials

Participants completed two counterbalanced forms during the first session of the experiment and four forms in random order (with certain constraints) during the second session. The first session took approximately fifteen minutes. Participants were given a packet consisting of a title page, a personality scale and a self-rating form. The revised Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) consists of 18 items that will be changed from a True-False format to a likert-type scale with a 1 to 5 response format, with 1 indicating “strongly disagree”, to 5 indicating “strongly agree”. A higher score on the scale indicated having a higher degree of self-monitoring. The revised Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) was used as it has been reported to have a α of $+0.70$, which is higher than the internal consistency of the original Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974). The revised scale was also used as it has been reported to be a more distilled measure of self-monitoring (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986).

Another form that participants filled out was a self-rating form based on the Big Five construct of personality. The Big Five construct was used, as it has become a prominent personality structure in both personality and social psychological research. The Big Five include extraversion, conscientiousness, emotional stability, culture, and agreeableness. The self-rating form consisted of 25 items (five indicators for each construct of the Big Five) on a 10-point scale with a negative trait anchored at the left and a positive trait anchored on the right. Accordingly, higher scores

indicate more positive judgments of self. Some indicators were randomly reversed to prevent response set in participants.

The second session of the experiment also took about fifteen minutes. Materials and procedures were modified from Kunda et al. (1993), in which participants were given packets containing various forms in a random order under certain constraints. One form that participants completed was a form with the instructions "Please list below some examples of your past behaviors, thoughts, or feelings that come to your mind as you try to answer this question" (p.67). Half of the participants were either presented with one of two questions, "Are you introverted?" or "Are you extraverted?". These two trait items will be used as they were previously replicated in Kunda et al's work (1993). In addition, past research on the impact of extraversion on communication has been very strong. One result has been that extroverts talk more than introverts (Goss, 1989). To apply this, we assume that there will be a subsequent effect in the quantity of words used in descriptions to answer the two proposed questions. On another form they completed a self-rating form consisting of the Big Five, the same as the self-rating form in the first session. The third form that participants filled out was assessing how variable they see themselves on the particular trait on a scale from 1 to 10. On the fourth form, demographic information was measured by asking open-ended questions assessing gender, age, and race/ethnicity.

These four forms were placed in random order with one constraint. The stimulus form (ie "Are you introverted/extraverted?") always came before the self-rating form. This constraint on random order was impinged for two reasons. First,

the causal variable always preceded the dependent variable, allowing the researchers to make a stronger claim for causation. Second, because instructors and professors were unwilling (after initial assent) to allow data collection, the researcher did not have enough participants to allocate for another independent variable assessing changes in self-rating in the second session before receiving the directional question and after receiving the question. The self-rating form and the Revised Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder and Gangestad, 1986) were counterbalanced to prevent presentation effects.

Procedure

Overview. The experiment was conducted in two sessions, each session taking approximately fifteen minutes. In the first session, the experimenters indicated the purpose of the experiment, the requirements of the study, and that participants will complete the informed consent document, a self-monitoring scale and a self-rating. Experimenters told the participants that the second session would consist of answering questions and then completing a self-rating, a measure of variability and demographic information. There was at least a one-week lag time between sessions so that participants were less likely to remember their self-ratings in the first session.

First Session. In the first session, an experimenter came to the class, introduced herself and told participants that they are conducting an experiment that will be assessing the interaction of personality and situational factors regarding interpersonal interactions. The experimenters indicated that the study would be conducted over two sessions. The experimenters mentioned that for the first session of the study, participants would fill out various scales. For the second session of the

experiment, the experimenters indicated to the participants that they will be asked a few questions and then they will fill out various forms. Possible participants were notified that they can withdraw at any time and will not be penalized for sole completion of the first stage. The class was told that anyone who does not want to participate can leave with their professor and he/she will have an alternative exercise provided for them. Both failure to participate (or participation) did not affect the student's grade in any way.

After covering the guidelines of the study, the researchers then indicated that anyone who would like to participate in the study should raise her/his hand, and an informed consent document was distributed to those individuals. Those participants willing to be a part of the study were handed a packet to complete. The packet consisted of a title page, the Revised Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder and Gangestad, 1986), and a self-rating form. Participants were then instructed to proceed through the packet until they were finished.

After the participants have completed the packet, the participants submitted their forms to the experimenter. The participants were then instructed to write a word and one number that they could easily recall as a password for both the first and second sessions on their data packets. This word and number were used as a means to track and match participants across sessions, and to keep them anonymous; not for any other means. This step was taken to insure both anonymity and confidentiality for the participants.

Second Session. Experimenters returned to the class after one week, or after 19 days had expired. Upon entrance, the experimenters reminded the participants that

they were here to proceed with the second session of the experiment. The researchers then reiterated that the participants who previously agreed to participate in the second session should raise their hands and the experimenter gave them the packet.

The packet that participants filled out consisted of five pages. The packet consisted of a title page, a page with a question asking participants to indicate the thoughts or feelings that they think of when answering whether they are (a) introverted or (b) extraverted. The next page of the packet consisted of a 25-item self-rating scale followed by a page assessing the participant's perceived variability on the indicated trait. A fifth page assessed demographic information.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Self-monitoring.

Self-monitoring was relatively equal across gender and ethnicity. An independent-samples t-test revealed that there was no significant gender difference in relation to self-monitoring $t_{50} = .503, p = .617$; with means and SDs of 55.81 and 7.51 for males, and 54.71 and 7.88 for females. A one-way ANOVA revealed a lack of a significant ethnicity effect for self-monitoring $F_{3, 47} = .169, p = .917$. The means and SDs for ethnic groups were 55.09 and 8.15 for European-Americans, 55.5 and 3.54 for Asians-Americans, and 53.00 and 4.24 for Hispanics. However, these results should be viewed as tentative since the sample was 86.5 percent European-American.

Extraversion.

Extraversion had the same pattern of results as self-monitoring regarding gender and ethnicity. Self-rated extraversion was relatively similar for males and females, $t(49) = -.731$, $p = .468$, two-tailed. Means and SDs were 5.5 and 1.73 for males and 5.97 and 2.50 for females. Across ethnicity, a one-way ANOVA revealed no significant effects, $F_{(3,46)} = .755$, $p = .525$. The means and SDs based on ethnic groups were 5.93 and 2.27 for European-Americans, 3.50 and .71 for Asians-Americans, and 6.00 and 1.41 for Hispanics. Highly unequal Ns for ethnic groups was also a concern regarding this analysis.

Diagnostics/Manipulation Checks

Kunda et al's (1993) measure of variability was correlated with self-monitoring, to assess whether this initial predictor and self-monitoring tap the same construct. There was no significant relationship between self-monitoring and self-reported variability of introversion/extraversion, $r = -.068$, $n = 45$, $p = .659$.

Since the forms were counterbalanced in the first session, an independent samples t-test was conducted to determine whether there was an order effect on responses to forms. Ratings of extraversion and self-monitoring scores were analyzed for differences depending on the order of presentation. Presenting the self-monitoring scale and then the self-rating scale resulted in means and SDs of 5.68 and 2.56 for self-rated extraversion ($n = 25$); 54.00 and 8.22 for self-monitoring ($n = 24$) vs. presenting the self-rating form and then the self-monitoring scale with means and sd's of 5.89 and 1.88 for extraversion ($n = 26$), and 56.15 and 7.18 for self-monitoring ($n = 28$). There was no significant difference between extraversion and self-monitoring

based on order of presentation, $t(49) = -.326$, $p = .746$, and $t(50) = -1.003$, $p = .321$ both two-tailed, respectively.

Change in Self Ratings

A 2x2x2x2 mixed-model ANOVA (Study 1, Table 1), consisting of one within-subjects variable and three between-subjects variables, was used to analyze under what conditions; personal characteristics, contextual conditions, and the interaction of personal characteristics with contextual conditions affect change in self-concept. The within-subjects variable, change in extraversion, consisted of two levels; pre and post directional question rating of extraversion. One between-subjects variable was level of self-monitoring, as either low or high based on scores on the self-monitoring scale. Participants who scored less than or equal to the theoretical median of 54 were coded as low self-monitors, while those who scored 55 and above were coded as high self-monitors.

Another independent variable was the type of question (either introverted/extraverted) that participants were asked. A third between-subjects variable was congruence/incongruence of question with self-rated extraversion. A discussion of coding for the third between-subjects variable is in order. First, the participants were coded as either introverted or extraverted based on self-ratings in the first session. A rating of 1 through 5 indicated self-rated introversion and 6 through 10 indicated self-rated extraversion. This information was then compared to the type of question that they were asked. Congruency of question occurred when participants' self-rating matched the type of question that they were asked.

There was no significant change in extraversion, $F(1,42) = 1.468$, $p = .232$, from time 1 to time 2. Type of question did not have a significant main effect on change in extraversion, $F(1,42) = .050$, $p = .825$. Congruency of directional question with an individual's self-rating did not have a significant main effect on change in extraversion, $F(1,42) = 1.028$, $p = .317$. However, there was a significant main effect for self-monitoring on change in extraversion, $F(1,42) = 5.992$, $p = .019$. Means for extraversion for low self-monitors decreased from session 1 to session 2, from 5.367 and 4.133; and means increased for high self-monitors from 5.619 to 6.036. There was also a two-way interaction between type of question and congruence on change in extraversion, $F(1,42) = 12.154$, $p = .001$. Participants given a congruent extraverted question exhibited a decrease in extraversion, from 7.50 to 6.33; participants given an incongruent extraverted question exhibited an increase in extraversion from 4.167 to 4.667. Participants that were given a congruent introverted question, rated themselves higher on extraversion, from 3.567 to 4.6; while participants who were given an introverted question that was not congruent, rated themselves more introverted, from 6.738 to 4.738.

There were no significant two-way interactions between type of question and self-monitoring or congruence of question and self-monitoring, $F(1,42) = .001$, $p = .98$, and $F(1,42) = .050$, $p = .825$. There was no significant three way interaction between type of question, congruence of question, and self-monitoring on change in extraversion, $F(1,42) = .587$, $p = .448$.

Listed Thoughts

Two raters coded thoughts in response to the directional question asked during the second session. The raters were two undergraduate students, who were trained by the researcher to code the listed thoughts into various fixed categories. Thoughts were either coded as supporting the question, refuting the question, irrelevant to the question, and total thoughts overall. Inter-rater reliability was sufficiently high, Cronbach's α 's of .93, .97, .89, and .95 for agreeing, disagreeing, irrelevant, and total thoughts, respectively. The results confirmed that the raters were judging coded responses reliably with each other.

There were no significant gender differences on any of the types of thoughts listed; $t_{(51)} = .223$, $p = .824$; $t_{(51)} = .901$, $p = .372$; $t_{(51)} = .741$, $p = .462$; and $t_{(51)} = 1.09$, $p = .281$ (all two-tailed) for agreeing, disagreeing, irrelevant and total thoughts between males and females. Means and sd's for males' reported thoughts were 1.47 and 1.57, .86 and 1.35, .333 and 1.11 and 2.67 and 2.01 on agreeing, disagreeing, irrelevant and total thoughts in response to a directional question.. Females thoughts were means and SDs of 1.38 and 1.64, .53 and 1.24, .15 and .63, and 2.06 and 1.95. Also, a t-test revealed no significant difference between high and low self-monitors on types of thoughts, $t_{(50)} = -1.224$, $p = .227$; $t_{(50)} = .77$, $p = .441$; $t_{(50)} = 1.132$, $p = .263$; $t_{(50)} = .011$, $p = .991$ for agreeing, disagreeing, other, and total thoughts. However, correlations showed some significant relationships between self-monitoring and types of thoughts listed. There was a significant relationship between self-monitoring and agreeing thoughts, $r = .251$, $n = 50$, $p = .040$; and total thoughts, $r = .251$, $n = 50$, $p = .039$, both one-tailed, when self-monitoring was not median split into two groups, which is necessary for a t-test.

Means and SDs for agreeing thoughts across racial groups were 1.42 and 1.53 for European-Americans, 0 and 0 for Asian-Americans, 2.83 and 2.00 for Hispanics. Means and sd's for disagreeing thoughts were .67 and 1.35 for European-Americans, 1 and 1.41 for Asian-Americans, 0 and 0 for Hispanics. Means and SDs for other or irrelevant thoughts were .09 and .35 for European-Americans, 2.5 and 3.54 for Asian-Americans, 1.5 and 2.12 for Hispanics. Means for sd's for total thoughts were 2.18 and 1.87 for European-Americans, 3.5 and 2.12 for Asian-Americans, 3.5 and 4.95 for Hispanics.

A 2x2x2 ANOVA (Study 2, Table 2), (type of question, self-monitoring, and congruence) similar to the previous ANOVA, was created to examine the differences in cognitive processes (i.e. listed thoughts) of participants when responding to directional questions under certain conditions. Type of question did not have a significant main effect on any of the four types of thoughts; F 's (1,42) of 1.618, .005, .241, and .771, p 's > .05. As previously stated, a t -test revealed no significant difference between any of the four thoughts in regards to self-monitoring alone. Therefore, there was no difference in the ANOVA procedure, which makes reporting the analysis redundant. Congruence of question elicited no main effects on any of the four types of thoughts, F 's (1,42) of 1.053, .470, .061, and .270, p 's > .05.

There was a marginally significant interaction between type of question and self-monitoring on disagreeing thoughts, $F(1,42) = 3.283$, $p = .07$. Low self-monitors generated an average of 1.33 disagreeing thoughts compared to high self-monitors who generated .411 disagreeing thoughts when asked an extraverted question. Low self-monitors generated an average of .567 disagreeing thoughts when asked the

introverted question, compared to high self-monitors who generated an average of 1.119 disagreeing thoughts. For the other types of thoughts, there was no interaction between type of question and self-monitoring, F 's (1,42) of .002, .365, 2.393, p 's > .05. There was a significant interaction between type of question and congruence, $F(1,42) = 6.783$, $p = .013$, for disagreeing thoughts, and for total thoughts, $F(1,42) = 6.790$, $p = .013$.

Extraverted individuals generated an average of .202 disagreeing thoughts when they were presented with an extraverted question. Introverted individuals generated an average of 1.542 disagreeing thoughts when they were asked if they were extraverted. Introverted individuals asked if they were introverted generated an average of 1.233 disagreeing thoughts, while extraverted individuals generated an average of .452 disagreeing statements when presented with an introverted question. Regarding total thoughts, extraverted individuals given an extraverted question generated an average of 1.988 total thoughts, while introverted individuals given an extraverted question generated an average of 3.250 total thoughts. Introverted individuals given an introverted question generated an average of 3.033 total thoughts while extraverted individuals given an introverted question generated an average of 1.143 total thoughts. There was no interaction between type of question and congruence for agreeing thoughts and other thoughts, $F(1,42) = .047$, $p = .829$; $F(1,42) = 1.914$, $p = .174$, respectively.

There was a significant interaction between self-monitoring and congruence on total thoughts listed, $F(1,42) = 5.728$, $p = .021$. Low self-monitors generated an average of 1.867 total thoughts when presented with a question that matched their

self-concept, while high self-monitors generated an average of 3.155 total thoughts when asked a question that matched their self-concept. Low self-monitors asked a question that did not match their initial self concept generated an average of 3.00 total thoughts, while high self-monitors who were asked a question that did not match their initial self-concept generated an average of 1.393 total thoughts. No significant two-way interaction between self-monitoring and congruence on agreeing thoughts, $F(1,42) = 2.831, p = .10$. Low self-monitors that were presented with a question that matched their self-concept generated an average of 1.00 agreeing thoughts, while high self-monitors presented with a question that matched their self-concept generated an average of 2.036 agreeing thoughts. Low self-monitors presented with a question that did not match their self-concept generated an average of 1.33 agreeing thoughts, while high self-monitors presented with a question that did not match their self-concept generated an average of .661 agreeing thoughts. There was no significant interaction between self-monitoring and congruence on disagreeing or other thoughts, $F(1,42) = 1.434, p = .238$; $F(1,42) = .130, p = .720$. There was no three-way interaction between type of question, self-monitoring, and congruence on any of the four types of thoughts. F 's $(1,42) = 1.20, .181, .601, 2.504, p$'s $> .05$.

Mediation. (Table 3) A difference variable was computed which measured the change in extraversion in session one and in session two. These analyses provided insight into what specifically is related to change in extraversion. First, self-monitoring, congruence and type of question presented were loaded as predictor variables with extraversion change as the criterion variable in a forced entry multiple regression. B. weights were produced were .265, -.195, and -.086 for self-monitoring,

congruence, and type of question respectively. Self-monitoring had a marginally significant effect on change $t(49) = 1.855, p = .070$. Congruence was not an adequate predictor of change, $t(49) = -1.394, p = .170$. Type of question was also not an adequate predictor of change, $t(49) = -.603, p = .550$.

However, correlation showed that there was a significant relationship between self-monitoring and change in extraversion, (Study 1, Table 3): $r = .252, n = 50, p = .038$, one-tailed. This datum indicate that the degree of self-monitoring is related to the type of change in extraversion ratings in the second session. Regarding types of thoughts, the number of disagreeing thoughts and total thoughts were related to change in extraversion: $r = .30, n = 50, p = .017$; $r = .369, n = 50, p = .004$, respectively both one-tailed. There was no significant relationship between the number of agreeing thoughts and change in extraversion, and other thoughts and change in extraversion, $r = .174, n = 50, p = .114$; $r = .065, n = 50, p = .328$, respectively both one-tailed.

There was a significant relationship between the number of disagreeing thoughts, total thoughts and change in extraversion: $r = .519, n = 27, p = .003$; $r = .358, n = 27, p = .034$ when the participants were presented with the introverted question. When participants were presented with the extraverted question, there was a significant relationship between the number of agreeing thoughts, total thoughts and change in extraversion, $r = .484, n = 24, p = .009$; $r = .414, n = 24, p = .022$.

Regarding self-monitoring, there was a marginally significant relationship of $r = .378, n = 19, p = .055$ between the number of other thoughts and change in extraversion for low self-monitors when presented with either type of question.

There was a significant relationship between number of disagreeing thoughts and change in extraversion, $r = .522$, $n = 31$, $p = .002$, when high self-monitors were presented with either type of question. There was also a significant relationship among high self-monitors between the number of total thoughts and change in extraversion, $r = .417$, $n = 31$, $p = .009$.

Regarding congruence of question with initial self-concept change in extraversion and the number of disagreeing thoughts, which correlated significantly at $r = .376$, $n = 33$, $p = .015$, (one-tailed) when participants were presented with congruent questions. When presented with congruent questions, there was also a significant correlation between change in extraversion and number of total thoughts, $r = .427$, $n = 33$, $p = .007$, (one-tailed). There was no significant relationship between change in extraversion and the number of any type of thoughts when the question was incongruent with initial self-concept.

DISCUSSION

The present findings suggest that changes in extraversion occur only under certain conditions and when certain personality characteristics are present. Kunda et al's (1993) mediating variables (thoughts) are only used (explicitly through writing) in certain conditions or combinations of conditions. Sometimes these thoughts influence change in self-concept, and then sometimes it is only certain types of thoughts that have an influence on change in the self-concept.

Overall, there was no significant change in extraversion from session 1 to session 2 (5.78 to 5.68). However, this does not take into account the various moderators that may have increased or decreased extraversion, resulting in scores

“washing out” variables that may influence extraversion by decreasing it and other variables acting to increase it, would negate each other out when this data is aggregated.

Malleability of Self Concept

Of the three main variables used, self-monitoring was the only construct that had a significant main effect on change in extraversion, with low self-monitors rating themselves more introverted, and high self-monitors rating themselves more extraverted in the second session. A tentative interpretation of this result is that indeed each group’s (low and high self-monitors’) self-concept are malleable, but the change that occurs is self-verifying. Low self-monitors had a lower mean self-rating of extraversion (5.36), displayed a lower extraversion rating (4.13); high self-monitors had a higher mean self-rating of extraversion (5.619), which increased during the second session to 6.036.

Malleability of self-concept does occur in both groups, but it occurs in a direction that reinforces who they already are. This advocates that “change” is actually fortifying the group’s initial self-concept, similar to the argument that Swann and Read (1980) advocate. This was a surprising result as it was intuitively believed that low self-monitors would be less likely to change their self-concept at all based on situational constraints, while high self-monitors would have more self-concept change potential, either increasing or decreasing their self-rated level of extraversion based on the situation at hand, as high self-monitors’ self-concept is based on prototypical situations, rather than stable attributes that low self-monitors use to describe their characteristic self (Snyder & Cantor, 1980).

When a participant was asked a directional question congruent or incongruent with her/his initial self-concept, there was an interaction. However, interaction occurred in an unexpected way. When an extraverted person was asked if they were extraverted, they rated themselves more introverted, and an introverted person rated self more extraverted. Introverted individuals asked if they were introverted rated themselves more extraverted. Extraverted people asked if they were introverted rated themselves more introverted. These results are unexpected.

The types of thoughts that were produced in this two-way interaction may provide some insight into these unusual results. Extraverted individuals used less disagreeing thoughts (mean of .202) with a congruent question, introverted individuals used more disagreeing thoughts (mean of 1.542) with an incongruent question. Introverted individuals used more disagreeing thoughts to a congruent question (mean of 1.233), while extraverted individuals generated less (average of .452) disagreeing statements when presented with an incongruent question.

Taking these results as a whole it seems that social desirability may play a part in explaining these findings. When introverted individuals are asked if they are introverted or extraverted, they used disagreeing thoughts to guide their judgment. Since introversion is not as socially desirable as extraversion, introverts when asked if they are introverted might say something like "I am ..., but I do like to do this....", using a more defensive style when answering the congruent question. Therefore, they retrieve thoughts that support the question because they are able to accept who they are and retrieve thoughts that do not support the question as they are trying to maintain that they are not total introverted "geeks" and promote their self-esteem

though listing socially desirable behaviors or traits. This is further supported by the amount of total thoughts (3.25 for incongruent question, 3.033 for congruent question) introverted individuals used compared to extraverted individuals (1.988 congruent, 1.143 incongruent). In either case, they rate self as higher on extraversion, as dissonance may have been created in which their introversion was made salient through either the question presented or the thoughts that they retrieved, resulting in them rating themselves higher on extraversion.

Extraverts used a less active approach towards congruent and incongruent questions. When asked if they were introverted, many extraverted participants simply wrote “no” and did not bother to think about any possibilities when answering the question. They seemed to be less actively processing the information. Further evidence to support this is that they rated themselves as more introverted, perhaps being biased by the presented question, and less by cognitive processes. However, extraverted participants presented with a congruent question may have exhibited a decrease in extraversion due to chance, as they displayed very little disagreeing thoughts.

Regarding thoughts listed, there was a two-way interaction between self-monitoring and congruence of question. High self-monitors generated more total thoughts when they were presented with a congruent question compared to low self-monitors. Low self-monitors generated more total thoughts than high self-monitors when presented with an incongruent question. This could mean that the type of situations in which low and high self-monitors find themselves elicit different cognitive strategies. Low self-monitors engage in more processing when they are in a

situation that disputes their self-concept, while high self-monitors engage in more processing or active thinking when they are in situations that support their self-concept. This makes sense, because when the low self-monitor is in a situation that is supportive of self there is no need to monitor the attributes of the self. Conversely, in disparate situations they need to maintain a sense of who they are. High self-monitors withdraw from situations incongruent with their self-concept, and become more cognitively active when they are in situations that support their self-concept.

Influences on Extraversion Change

Several predictors and mediators are related to change in extraversion. Overall, self-monitoring was the only marginally significant predictor ($p = .07$) of change in extraversion, but congruence and type of question were not significant. According to Kunda et al (1993), retrieval of thoughts in support of the question are mediators that influence ratings of self-concept. However, it seems that the number of disagreeing thoughts and total thoughts were related to a change in extraversion. When participants were presented with the introverted question, there was a significant positive relationship between disagreeing thoughts, total thoughts and change in extraversion. This study supports Kunda et al. (1993). When participants were presented with the extraverted question, there was a positive relationship between agreeing thoughts and change in extraversion.

Regarding self-monitoring and congruence, there was a significant positive correlation between other thoughts listed and change in extraversion for low self-monitors. It was interesting that low self-monitors' change in extraversion was not significantly related to agreeing or disagreeing thoughts, perhaps providing support

that low self-monitors are less malleable in self-concept than high self-monitors when retrieving agreeing and disagreeing thoughts to a directional question. For high self-monitors, there was a positive relationship between disagreeing thoughts listed, total thoughts and change in extraversion. This relationship implicates that the process of disagreeing for high self-monitors has more influence on change in extraversion.

Interestingly, there was a significant positive correlation between change in extraversion and number of disagreeing thoughts and total thoughts in response to a congruent question, and there was no relationship between types of thoughts retrieved and change in extraversion when being presented with an incongruent question.

Limitations

Even though these are interesting results, we need to view this empirical inquiry as tentative in nature. One limitation of this study was choosing introversion and extraversion as the directional questions. Introversion tends to be viewed as socially undesirable compared to extraversion. This social desirability was implicated as why introverted individuals rated themselves higher on extraversion in the second session, and could also explain extraverted individuals' withdrawal response to incongruent questions. Another issue with the use of introversion and extraversion is that they are similarly related to low and high self-monitors. There may be a possible confound between extraversion and high self-monitors that needs to be addressed statistically. However, it was decided that introversion and extraversion should be used, since they were used in Kunda et al's (1993) study and introversion/extraversion are probably the most salient way to categorize people. But this salience also carries with it controversy.

Another limitation, purely statistical, is that the sample size was not large enough to compute a 2x2x2x2 (with one within-subjects variable) ANOVA without producing some biased results. It would have been optimal to have at least 80 participants to complete the analyses. This problem will be fixed in the future, by including more participants.

Implications for Future Research

Some areas that could be addressed in the future are whether these effects replicate when the traits are switched from introversion/extraversion to something less controversial. Perhaps hardworking or something related to conscientiousness could be used. However, different traits may not evoke any type of thinking of whether it pertains to the individual, as it may be innocuous and not pique the attention of the participants.

Another area that could be examined is whether directional questions and retrieved thoughts translate into actual behavior in a group setting or in a dyad. If participants are asked if they are extraverted, do they act more extraverted when they are conversing with others in a group? Also, the different social cognitive mechanisms of low and high self-monitors need to be examined, as there seems to be a general lack of research on how each group attends differently to information and makes decisions.

Overview of Study 2

The initial analysis in Study 1 piqued the development of a model of self-concept that seeks to align two diverging perspectives of self-concept development (see Figure 1). In communication research, the self-concept is theorized to develop

through communication acts while in psychology, self-concept is believed to be derived from appraisal of behaviors or perceived personality traits. Therefore, each discipline has a different focus of what “material” accounts for the development of the self-concept.

To solve this interdisciplinary schism, and to try to initiate an interdisciplinary approach to understanding self-concept, this researcher proposes that self-monitoring influences both the development of personality traits and communication acts (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). In turn, these personality traits and communication acts directly and indirectly influence each other, which help shape the self-concept. Among various communication and psychology constructs, the author believes that self-monitoring is the most amenable to mediating the influence of both communication and psychological aspects of the developing self-concept. This is because self-monitoring is a construct that is based on both psychological and communication aspects of interacting with others. With this in mind, two analyses were conducted to try to test the assumption of this model regarding self-concept, psychological communication perspectives of self-concept development and the role of self-monitoring.

Therefore, it is hypothesized that communication and psychological measures of similar constructs (such as semantic differential extroversion and Big Five extraversion) will be highly correlated. Results supporting this hypothesis would indicate that the self-concept is comprised of direct appraisals of internal dispositions, or personality traits.

H₁: The psychology construct of self-monitoring will be directly related to the

psychological construct of the Big Five Measure of Personality.

H_{1A}: Self-monitoring will correlate positively with Big Five measures of

Personality:

H_{1Ai}: Extraversion

H_{1Aii}: Agreeableness

H_{1Aiii}: Conscientiousness

H_{1Aiv}: Emotional Stability

H_{1Av}: Culture/Intelligence

Results supporting Hypothesis Two - Six would also indicate that the self-concept is comprised also of direct appraisals of communication acts.

H₂: The psychology measure of the Big Five factor of extroversion and communication measures will be directly related.

H_{2A}: Communicator Style subscales of Dramatic, Dominant, and Animated will correlate positively with Extraversion.

H_{2B}: Affinity Seeking subscale of Strategic Performance will correlate positively with Extroversion.

H_{2C}: Communication Adaptability subscale of Social Confirmation and Social Experience will correlate positively with Extraversion.

H_{2D}: Semantic Differential subscale of Sociability and Extroversion will correlate positively with Extroversion.

H_{2E}: Interaction Involvement subscale of Responsiveness will correlate positively with Extroversion.

H₃: The psychology measure of the Big Five factor of agreeableness and

communication measures will be directly related.

H_{3A}: Communicator Style subscales of Friendly and Contentious will correlate positively with Agreeableness.

H_{3B}: Affinity Seeking subscale of Affinity Seeking Competence will correlate positively with Agreeableness.

H₄: The psychology measure of the Big Five factor of Conscientiousness and communication measures will be directly related.

H_{4A}: Communicator Adaptability subscale of Articulation will correlate positively with Conscientiousness.

H_{4B}: Communicator Style subscale of Precise will correlate positively with Conscientiousness.

H₅: The psychology measure of the Big Five factor of Emotional Stability and communication measures will be directly related.

H_{5A}: Communicator Style subscale of Relaxed will correlate positively with Emotional Stability.

H_{5B}: Semantic Differential subscale of Composure will correlate positively with Emotional Stability.

H_{5C}: Communicator Adaptability subscale of Social Composure will correlate positively with Emotional Stability.

H₆: The psychology measure of the Big Five factor of Culture and communication measures will be directly related.

H_{6A}: Communicator Style subscale of Open will correlate positively with Culture.

H_{6B}: Semantic Differential subscales of Character and Competence will correlate positively with Culture.

H_{6C}: Interaction Involvement subscale of Perceptiveness will correlate positively with Culture.

As shown in preceding discussion, limited evidence indicates that self-monitoring appears to be comprised of both communication and psychology aspects. However, extant literature connects self-monitoring and psychology, or self-monitoring and communication, but is relatively unsuccessful in linking these two aspects. If this true, then both types of processes influence the self-concept, indicating that both perspectives of the development of the self-concept are theoretically valid. It is also hypothesized that self-monitoring is both a psychological measure and communication measure of self-concept and comprised of both communication and psychological aspects.

H₇: Self-monitoring will have a correlation of equal magnitude with both the Big Five measure of personality and all of the subscales comprising the following communication measures: Affinity Seeking, Communication Adaptability, Communicator Style, Interaction Involvement, and Semantic Differential.

Self-monitoring will be directly related with communication measures, and the Big Five is more than adequate of a measure of self-concept because of the high interdependence of psychology and communication measures. As a result of the success of the Big Five, it will be used as the representative indicator for

operationalization of the self-concept. While effects will occur when self-monitoring is examined by both psychology and communication measures, there will be a stronger effect when measures are employed from both disciplines.

H₈: Psychology and communication measures combined will explain greater variance of self-monitoring than will psychology or communication measures administered independent of each other.

This hypothesis will be supported if there are significant correlations of similar magnitude with both psychological and communication measures of self-concept. Finally, self-concept, as measured by the Big Five, will change based on direct appraisals of both psychological aspects and communication acts.

STUDY 2

METHOD

Participants

Participants from the initial sample consisted of 280 University of Rhode Island undergraduate students from a variety of undergraduate Communication Studies courses recruited during the Spring 2003 semester. Of the participants who provided ethnicity information, 92 percent were Caucasian, 2.5 percent Asian, 2.1 percent African-American, 3.4 percent other. Ages of the participants ranged from 18-37 years with a mean age of 19.95 and a standard deviation of 1.83. Participation was entirely voluntary and students did not receive any type of incentive for completion of the study.

Procedures and Material

operationalization of the self-concept. While effects will occur when self-monitoring is examined by both psychology and communication measures, there will be a stronger effect when measures are employed from both disciplines.

H₈: Psychology and communication measures combined will explain greater variance of self-monitoring than will psychology or communication measures administered independent of each other.

This hypothesis will be supported if there are significant correlations of similar magnitude with both psychological and communication measures of self-concept. Finally, self-concept, as measured by the Big Five, will change based on direct appraisals of both psychological aspects and communication acts.

STUDY 2

METHOD

Participants

Participants from the initial sample consisted of 280 University of Rhode Island undergraduate students from a variety of undergraduate Communication Studies courses recruited during the Spring 2003 semester. Of the participants who provided ethnicity information, 92 percent were Caucasian, 2.5 percent Asian, 2.1 percent African-American, 3.4 percent other. Ages of the participants ranged from 18-37 years with a mean age of 19.95 and a standard deviation of 1.83. Participation was entirely voluntary and students did not receive any type of incentive for completion of the study.

Procedures and Material

Participants primarily filled out various psychological surveys and communication-based surveys. Psychological forms consisted of the Revised Self-Monitoring scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) measures that were similar to the first study which assessed whether the participant perceived him or herself as introverted or extraverted, their thoughts that supported or refuted this question, how variable they were on the personality trait in question, and a self-rating that measured the Big Five. The self-monitoring scale and the Big Five self-rating were the only psychological measures that will be examined in these studies, and the other measures will be used in future studies. Consequentially, the self-rating form was assessed over 2 time periods.

Participants also filled out communication forms that consisted of a measure of Affinity-Seeking Instrument (Bell, Tremblay, Buerkel-Rothfuss, 1987); Communication Adaptability (Duran, 1983); Communication Style (Norton, 1983); Interaction Involvement (Cegala, 1981); and a 15-item Semantic Differential Scale (McCroskey, Hamilton, Weiner, 1974). The Affinity-Seeking Instrument, ASI, (Bell et al., 1987) measures to what extent an individual is able to get others to like him or her. It consists of 13 items scored on a seven point Likert-type scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The ASI consist of two factors: 1) Affinity Seeking Competence, which measures the ability to say what is necessary to be seen as interpersonally attractive; and 2) Strategic Performance, which measures the ability to play roles in order to be liked. The ASI has both acceptable reliability (ASC alpha of .80 to .87 and SP alpha of .83) and validity (Bell et al., 1987).

Communication Adaptability (Duran, 1983) consists of the ability to adapt one's interaction goals and behaviors to match what is expected in an interaction. It consists of 30 5-point Likert scale items, with responses that range from "always true of me" to "never true of me". The scale consists of six subscales: 1) social composure, or feeling relaxed in social situations; 2) social experience, or enjoying and participating socially; 3) social confirmation, or maintaining the other's social image; 4) appropriate disclosure, which is adapting one's disclosures to another's intimacy level; 5) articulation, the use of appropriate syntax and grammar, and wit, using humor to diffuse social tension. Reliability of the subscales is in the .70s and .80s (Duran, 1992) and concurrent validity is strong (Duran, 1983).

The Communicator Style Measure (Norton, 1978) examines communicator style, or the way that one interacts to signal how literal meaning should be taken. The measure consists of 51 items on a five point Likert scale that ranges from "NO!" to "YES!". It consists of 11 different types of communicator style, including friendly, impression leaving, relaxed, contentious, attentive, precise, animated, precise, animated, dramatic, open, dominant, and communicator image. Reliability ranges from .37 for friendly to .82 for dominant (Norton, 1978). The CSM has shown both content validity and criterion-validity (Norton, 1983).

The Interaction Involvement Scale (Cegala, 1981) measures the degree to which people are engaged in their conversations with others. The measure consists of 18 items scored on a 7-point Likert-type scale with responses ranging from "not at all like me" to "very much like me". The measure consists of three subscales, including perceptiveness, attentiveness, and responsiveness. Perceptiveness measures being

aware of message meanings, attentiveness means hearing and observing, and responsiveness relates to a person's certainty about how to respond to others during a conversation. Reliability ranges from .86 for responsiveness to .90 for the overall scale. Concurrent validity for the measure is rather strong (Cegala, 1981).

The 15-Item Semantic Differential (McCroskey, Hamilton, Weiner, 1974) consists of 15 items that measure five dimensions of perceived speaker credibility. These dimensions include sociability, extroversion, competence, composure, and character. McCroskey et al. (1974) report that the scales have adequate reliability and validity. Participants in the current study answered these questions in self-report format, describing how they perceive themselves on these traits.

Demographics and general characteristics of the participants were assessed, including such things as gender, ethnicity, and age. The procedure was relatively straight forward, there were two sets of forms, either psychological or communication-based, that were presented in a counterbalanced order so that participants received one set (psychology or communication-based forms) in the first session and the second set (psychology or communication-based forms) in the second session. This procedure created two groups, one group that received communication measures in the first session and then psychological measures in the second session, and another group that received psychological measures in the first session and then communication-based measures in the second session.

Analyses

Overall, there were seven different measures of psychological and communication self-concept were assessed in the study. One measure, the psychological self-rating of the Big Five was distributed twice, raising the total to 8 different measures. Within these measures, there were a variety of subscales that were used for analysis. One exception was the Revised Self-Monitoring Scale, in which it has been argued that the scale should not be divided into the subscales that other researchers have developed through factor-analytic methods. The challenge is raised because as this has not been the original conception of the construct, and the scale as a whole has produced significant intrinsic validity (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). Accounting for all measures and subscales, 38 different subscales were available for analyses.

The 27 communication scales and subscales (Affinity Seeking has 2 subscales, Communication Adaptability has 6 subscales, Communicator Style had 11 subscales, Interaction Involvement had 3 subscales, and Source Credibility 15-item Semantic Differential had 5 subscales) were examined for content emphasis and then categorized into one of the Big Five domains when applicable. One subscale of Communication Style, communicator image, was dropped from the first analysis as it is theorized to be used as a dependent variable (Norton, 1978), and this author did not think that it would be useful for this analysis. These communication subscales were then correlated with their measure of the Big Five and the other communication measures within each category to examine the magnitude of the relationships between communication measures and psychological measures of similar constructs. For example, Big Five extraversion was correlated with communication dimensions of

extraversion including dramatic and dominant Communication Style and then these subscales of Communication Style were correlated with each other to examine differences in the magnitude of the relationships.

For Big Five factor 1, the psychological measures of extraversion, 9 of the possible 27 subscales were theorized to be similar based on content. This included the Strategic Performance subscale of the Affinity Seeking measure and also the Communication Styles of dramatic, dominant, and animated. Communication Adaptability subscales that were included under factor 1 consisted of social confirmation, social experience, also the Interaction Involvement subscale of responsiveness was included. Two subscales of the 15-item Semantic Differential including measures of sociability and extroversion were categorized under Big Five extraversion.

For the Big Five factor 2, the psychological measure of agreeableness, three communication subscales were theorized to be measuring the same construct. These included the Communication Style of friendly, contentiousness (negative relationship), and the Affinity Seeking Competence subscale of Affinity Seeking. Conscientiousness, Big Five factor 3, had 2 communication measures that were theorized to be related to it. These included the articulation subscale of Communication Adaptability and the precise subscale of Communication Style. Factor 4, emotional stability, was represented by three communication measures. These included the Communication Style subscale of relaxed, the Semantic Differential subscale of composure and the Communication subscale of social composure. Factor 5, culture/intelligence, was theorized to be represented by

Communication subscale of open, Semantic Differential subscale of character and competence, and the Interaction Involvement subscale of perceptiveness.

For the second analysis, Self-Monitoring was correlated with the other measures of psychological and communication measures, to establish that it is a construct that is both psychologically and communication-based. For the final analysis, participants self-ratings on the Big Five will be examined across sessions and cross comparisons will be conducted to determine whether psychological measures or communication measures had an influence on a change in self-concept.

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

The Affinity Seeking instrument (Table 4) consists of two subscales, affinity seeking competence, and strategic performance, which had means of 40.89 and 21.63 and standard deviations of 6.85 and 5.61, respectively across the 224 participants that were used for the analysis. The six scales of the Communicative Adaptability included social composure, with a mean of 12.65 and standard deviation of 4.27, social confirmation with a mean of 12.33 and a standard deviation of 4.67, articulation with a mean of 12.61 and a standard deviation of 4.24. Social experience had a mean of 12.62 and a standard deviation of 4.72, appropriate disclosure had a mean of 13.24 and a standard deviation of 3.52, and wit with a mean of 14.66 and a standard deviation of 3.53.

Communicator Style (Table 4) consisted of 11 subscales. These included friendly, with a mean of 14.97 and a standard deviation of 3.54, impression leaving, with a mean of 14.16 and a standard deviation of 3.54, relaxed, with a mean of 12.77

and a standard deviation of 2.56, open, with a mean of 11.76 and a standard deviation of 3.37. Contentious, with a mean of 12.84 and a standard deviation of 3.34, attentive, with a mean of 13.95 and a standard deviation of 2.42, precise with a mean of 13.18 and a standard deviation of 2.46, dramatic, with a mean of 12.96 and a standard deviation of 2.93. Dominant, with a mean of 11.66 and a standard deviation of 3.09, communicator image, with a mean of 17.14 and a mean of 2.90 and animated, with a mean of 13.92 and a standard deviation 2.51.

Interaction involvement's (Table 4) three subscales include perceptiveness, attentiveness and responsive. Perceptiveness had a mean of 20.12 and a standard deviation of 3.49, attentiveness had a mean of 29.52 and a standard deviation of 5.09, and responsiveness with a mean of 39.44 with a standard deviation of 8.32.

Semantic differential (Table 4) consisted of five domains, including sociability, extroversion, competence, composure, character. Sociability had a mean of 17.59 and a standard deviation of 2.60, extroversion had a mean of 14.57 and a standard deviation of 3.79, competence with a mean of 16.29 with a standard deviation of 2.32, composure with a mean of 14.84 with a standard deviation of 3.44, and character with a mean of 17.99 and a standard deviation of 2.65.

Participants' average self-monitoring score (Table 4) was 56.33 with a standard deviation of 7.64. Factor 1, extraversion, had an average of 36.10 and a standard deviation of 7.77 at time 1 and a mean 36.61 and a standard deviation of 7.26 at time 2. Factor 2, agreeableness, had an average of 38.54 and a standard deviation of 5.78 at time 1 and 39.03 and a standard deviation of 6.14 at time 2. Factor 3, conscientiousness, had a mean of 34.54 and a standard deviation of 6.45 at

time 1 and a mean of 37.89 and a standard deviation of 7.21 at time 2. Factor 4, emotional stability, had a mean of 34.46 and standard deviation of 7.51 at time 1 and a mean of 35.68 and a standard deviation of 7.76 at time 2. Factor 5, culture/intelligence had a mean of 36.55 with a standard deviation of 6.32 at time 1 and a mean of 38.81 and a standard deviation of 5.51 at time 2.

First Analysis: Psychological and Communication Measure Similarity and the Role of Self-Monitoring

Factor 1 of the Big Five, extraversion at time 1, was correlated with another psychological measure, self-monitoring, yielding a significant correlation (Table 5), $r = .48$ $n = 224$ $p = .000$. Extraversion was then correlated with a variety of communication measures that measure extraversion (content-wise). All subsequent correlations reported involved $n = 224$ and significant tests reported were one-tailed. These included Communicator Style subscales of dramatic, $r = .319$ $p = .000$, dominant, $r = .45$ $p = .000$, animated, $r = .33$ $p = .000$, Affinity Seeking's subscale of strategic performance $r = .23$ $p = .000$, Communicative Adaptability's subscales of social confirmation $r = -.07$ $p = .158$, social experience $r = -.31$ $p = .000$, Semantic Differential's subscales of sociability, $r = .30$ $p = .000$ and extroversion $r = .72$ $p = .000$ and Interaction Involvement's subscale of responsiveness, $r = .384$ $p = .000$.

Factor 2 of the Big Five, agreeableness was correlated with another psychological measure, self-monitoring, (Table 5) $r = -.07$ $p = .14$. Agreeableness was correlated with communication measures that were theorized to be related to agreeableness, they included Communicator Style subscale of friendly, $r = .28$ $p =$

.000, contentious, $r = -.30$ $p = .000$ and the Affinity Seeking subscale of affinity seeking competence, $r = .19$ $p = .000$.

Factor 3 of the Big Five, conscientiousness was correlated with another psychological measure, self-monitoring, (Table 5) $r = -.06$ $p = .20$. Conscientiousness was correlated with Communication Adaptability's subscale of articulation, $r = -.20$ $p = .000$ and Communicator Style subscale of precise, $r = .13$ $p = .030$.

Factor 4 of the Big Five, emotional stability, was correlated with self-monitoring, (Table 5) $r = .25$ $p = .000$. Emotional stability was correlated with Communicator Style subscale of relaxed, $r = .41$ $p = .000$, Semantic Differential of composure $r = .63$ $p = .000$, and Communicator Adaptability subscale of social composure $r = -.19$ $p = .000$.

Factor 5 of the Big Five, culture/intelligence, was correlated with self-monitoring, (Table 5) $r = .29$ $p = .000$. Culture was correlated with the Communicator Style subscale of open $r = .23$ $p = .000$, Semantic Differential subscale of character $r = .39$ $p = .000$ and competence $r = .52$ $p = .000$ and Interaction Involvement subscale of perceptiveness $r = .26$ $p = .000$.

To examine whether self-monitoring is conceptually a psychological measure or a communication measure, self-monitoring was correlated with various psychological measures and communication measures. As previously stated, self-monitoring was significantly correlated with extraversion, emotional stability and culture/intelligence, factors 1, 4, and 5 of the Big Five. Across the communication measures, self-monitoring was correlated with the two subscales of the Affinity Seeking instrument, (Table 6) affinity seeking competence $r = .30$ $p = .000$, and

strategic performance $r = .40$ $p = .000$. The six scales of the Communicative Adaptability were correlated with self-monitoring and these included social composure, (Table 5) $r = -.24$ $p = .000$, social confirmation, $r = -.01$ $p = .418$, articulation, $r = -.12$ $p = .037$, social experience, $r = -.26$ $p = .000$, appropriate disclosure, $r = -.01$ $p = .451$, and wit, $r = -.25$ $p = .000$.

Self-monitoring was correlated with the 11 subscales of Communicator Style 11, (Table 6) these include friendly, $r = .15$ $p = .012$, impression leaving, $r = .29$ $p = .000$, relaxed, $r = .20$ $p = .001$, open, $r = .34$ $p = .000$. Contentious, $r = .17$ $p = .005$, attentive, $r = .04$ $p = .282$, precise, $r = .14$ $p = .017$, dramatic, $r = .48$ $p = .000$. Dominant, $r = .50$ $p = .000$ and animated, $r = .29$ $p = .000$.

Self-monitoring was correlated with Interaction involvement's three subscales including perceptiveness, attentiveness and responsive (Table 6). Perceptiveness, $r = .17$ $p = .005$, attentiveness, $r = .01$, $p = .462$, and responsiveness, $r = .29$ $p = .000$.

Self-monitoring was correlated with Semantic differential consisted of five domains, including sociability, extroversion, competence, composure, character. Sociability, $r = .18$ $p = .004$, extroversion, $r = .55$ $p = .000$, competence, $r = .19$ $p = .002$, composure, $r = .21$ $p = .001$ and character $r = -.01$ $p = .424$.

Second Analysis: Change in Self-Concept

Change in self-rating or self-concept was analyzed in three ways. In the first approach, there was a comparison of self-ratings within groups across the two testing conditions. In the second approach, there was a "cross-comparison" made comparing the 1st session of one group versus the 2nd session of other group, this analysis would provide insight into whether assessing information about the self in either a

psychological or communication-based manner would influence self-rating. In the final analysis, there was a comparison of time 1 and time 2 self-ratings within group based on level of self-monitoring to determine whether high self-monitors showed a greater change in self-rating after completing various psychological or communication measures.

Multiple paired-samples one-tailed t-tests were conducted comparing self-ratings across sessions for the group of participants that received communication measures in the first session and psychology measures in the second session (“communication-first”) and the group that received psychology measures in the first session and communication measures in the second session (“psych-first”) (Table 7). “Com-first” participants’ self-ratings on the Big Five (Table 7) consisted of means of 35.28 and 36.29 and standard deviations of 7.36 and 7.25 for ratings of extraversion on session 1 and session 2, yielding $t(123) = 2.418$ $p = .017$, indicating a significant increase in self-rated extraversion from session 1 to session 2. Ratings on agreeableness significantly increased from session 1 to session 2 from 38.09 to 38.90 with standard deviations of 6.25 and 6.08, $t(123) = 1.687$ $p = .047$. Ratings on conscientiousness significantly increased from session 1 to session 2, means of 34.00 to 38.03 with standard deviations of 6.03 and 7.27, $t(123) = 8.03$ $p = .000$. Ratings on emotional stability significantly increased from session 1 to session 2, means of 34.14 to 35.21 with standard deviations of 7.61 and 7.93, $t(123) = 2.48$ $p = .007$. Ratings on culture significantly increased from session 1 to session 2, means of 35.06 to 38.34 with standard deviations of 5.73 and 5.59, $t(123) = 7.82$ $p = .000$.

Mean “Psychology-first” participants’ self-ratings on extraversion (Table 7) decreased from 37.25 to 37.11 with standard deviations of 8.10 and 7.32, $t(105) = -.23$ $p = .415$. Mean ratings on agreeableness increased from session 1 to session 2 from 39.12 to 39.23, and standard deviations of 5.17 and 6.21, $t(105) = .29$ $p = .385$. Ratings on conscientiousness significantly increased from session 1 to session 2, means of were 35.08 to 37.88 with standard deviations of 6.91 and 7.27, $t(105) = 5.46$ $p = .000$. Ratings on emotional stability significantly increased from session 1 to session 2, means of 34.88 to 36.23 with standard deviations of 7.32 and 7.44, $t(105) = 2.04$ $p = .022$. Ratings on culture significantly increased from session 1 to session 2, means of 38.18 to 39.26 with standard deviations of 6.50 and 5.45, $t(105) = 1.85$ $p = .034$.

Cross comparisons were conducted, comparing session 1 self-ratings of the com-first group and session 2 self-ratings of the psych-first group using independent-samples t-tests (Table 8). There was a marginal difference between self-ratings of extraversion for these groups, means of 35.61 and 37.11, standard deviations of 7.50 and 7.32, $t(252) = -1.59$ $p = .057$, thus self-ratings were higher in the second session of the psych-first group. There was a marginal difference between self-ratings of agreeableness for these groups, with means of 38.16 and 39.28, and standard deviations of 5.92 and 6.21, $t(251) = -1.45$ $p = .074$. There was a significant difference between mean self-ratings of conscientiousness for these groups, means of 34.09 and 37.88, and standard deviations of 5.93 and 7.27, $t(196.93) = -4.41$ $p = .000$. There was a marginal difference between self-ratings of emotional stability for these groups, means of 34.72 and 36.23, standard deviations of 7.42 and 7.44, $t(252) = -$

1.59 $p = .057$. There was significant difference between self-ratings of culture for these groups, means were 35.33 and 39.26, with standard deviations of 5.67 and 5.45, $t(252) = -5.54$ $p = .000$.

Further cross comparisons were conducted, comparing session 1 self-ratings of the psych-first group and session 2 self-ratings of the com-first group employing the same statistical procedures (Table 8). There was not a significant difference between self-ratings of extraversion for these groups, means of 36.31 and 37.53 and standard deviations of 7.23 and 7.86, $t(254) = -1.29$ $p = .094$. There was not a significant difference between self-ratings of agreeableness for these groups, means of 38.88 and 38.92 and standard deviations of 6.06 and 5.33, $t(254) = -.06$ $p = .951$. There was a significant difference between self-ratings of conscientiousness for these groups, means of 38.10 and 35.15 and standard deviations of 7.28 and 6.85, $t(254) = 3.34$ $p = .001$, indicating that com-first session 2 self-ratings were higher than psych-first session 1 self-ratings. There was not a significant difference between self-ratings of emotional stability for these groups, means of 35.25 and 35.01 and standard deviations of 7.91 and 6.93, $t(254) = .26$ $p = .40$. There was not a significant difference between self-ratings of culture for these groups, means of 38.34 and 38.22 and standard deviations of 5.57 and 6.26, $t(254) = .16$ $p = .44$.

For the third analysis, participants were divided into groups based on their self-monitoring scores (Table 9). Participants who scored 54 and above were assigned to a group as high self-monitors and groups that scored below 54 were assigned to a group as low self-monitors. These groups were then compared with paired-samples tests to determine whether low or high self-monitors rated themselves

differently across sessions. Low self-monitors reported no significant difference between ratings of extraversion in session 1 to session 2 (Table 9) with means of 32.54 and 33.02 and standard deviations of 7.02 and 6.80, $t(82) = .88$ $p = .19$. Low self-monitors reported no significant difference between ratings of agreeableness in session 1 to session 2 with means of 39.61 and 39.88 and standard deviations of 6.29 and 5.81, $t(81) = .42$ $p = .34$. Low self-monitors reported a significant increase in ratings of conscientiousness in session 1 to session 2 with means of 35.01 and 38.55 and standard deviations of 6.92 and 7.06, $t(82) = 6.73$ $p = .000$. Low self-monitors reported a significant increase in ratings of emotional stability in session 1 to session 2 with means of 32.58 and 33.87 and standard deviations of 7.65 and 8.01, $t(82) = 2.19$ $p = .02$. Low self-monitors reported a significant increase in ratings of culture in session 1 to session 2 with means of 34.54 and 37.30 and standard deviations of 5.89 and 5.70, $t(82) = 4.97$ $p = .00$.

High self-monitors reported no significant difference between ratings of extraversion in session 1 to session 2 (Table 9) with means of 38.23 and 38.74 and standard deviations of 7.44 and 6.71, $t(144) = 1.12$ $p = .13$. High self-monitors reported a marginal increase in ratings of agreeableness in session 1 to session 2 with means of 37.97 and 38.64 and standard deviations of 5.38 and 6.30, $t(144) = 1.59$ $p = .06$. High self-monitors reported a significant increase in ratings of conscientiousness in session 1 to session 2 with means of 34.37 and 37.68 and standard deviations of 6.15 and 7.35, $t(144) = 6.92$ $p = .00$. High self-monitors reported a significant increase in ratings of emotional stability in session 1 to session 2 with means of 35.56 and 36.67 and standard deviations of 7.23 and 7.43, $t(144) = 2.20$ $p = .02$. High self-

monitors reported a significant increase in ratings of culture in session 1 to session 2 with means of 37.64 and 39.67 and standard deviations of 6.28 and 5.25, $t(144) = 4.27$ $p = .00$.

DISCUSSION

The first analysis examined the relationship between psychological and communication measures of self-concept. Many communication measures that the author believed were related to the psychological measures of a similar construct, showed a significant positive correlation in most cases, or a negative correlation of significant magnitude. In some situations, communication measures of a similar construct had significant correlations of greater magnitude than the correlations between psychological measures. For example, the correlation between semantic differential extroversion and Big Five extraversion (.72) was dramatically higher than the correlation between self-monitoring and Big Five extraversion (.48). This finding has many important implications. These results indicate that measures used in psychology and communication are assessing the same underlying construct, even though the measure's content may focus on communication style instead of personality traits and vice versa. This has far reaching implications as it establishes the interdisciplinary nature of both disciplines, in that both disciplines measure areas of interest that are assessed by the other (Figure 1).

It is important to mention that these findings are not simply confined to extraversion. Similar results occurred for factors 4 and 5 of the Big Five, emotional stability and culture. Emotional stability and culture showed significant correlations with self-monitoring, but there were correlations of greater magnitude found when

comparing communication measures with these factors. Emotional stability had relationships of greater magnitude with the Communicator Style subscale relaxed and the Semantic Differential subscale of composure. The magnitude of the semantic differential composure relationship with emotional stability was about 2.5 times as large as emotional stability's relationship with self-monitoring. Also, it is important to point out that a measure besides the Semantic Differential score was highly correlated with a Big Five factor, indicating that the magnitude of the relationship is not constrained to a particular communication measure. Culture demonstrated stronger relationships with the Semantic Differential subscales character and competence than with self-monitoring, further supporting previous points.

Self-monitoring should be conceptualized as both a communication measure and psychological measure as it significantly correlated with 3 of the 5 Big Five factors and numerous communication subscales. Significant correlations of large magnitude occurred across different scales, and on scales with different conceptual foundations. For example, self-monitoring was highly correlated with the Affinity Seeking subscales of affinity seeking competence and strategic performance, and also with the Communicator Style subscales of dramatic, dominant, open, and animated.

For the second set of analyses, there was mixed support for the hypotheses. Participants who received communication measures before the second self-rating reported significant increases in their self-ratings in all factors of the Big Five. Participants who received psychological measures before their second self-rating reported significant increases on factors 3 through 5 of the Big Five. However, the crossed comparisons that were conducted provide greater insight into these findings.

Crossed comparisons indicate that participants who received psychological measures in the first session had marginally higher self-ratings of extraversion at session 2 than participants in the first session before receiving any communication measures. Similar results were found when participants had marginally or significantly higher self-ratings on the other factors of the Big Five compared to participants who had not yet received any measures. Regarding the other crossed comparison, participants that received communication measures had similar self-ratings at time 2, compared to session 1 self-ratings of participants who had not received psychological measures. The exception was for conscientiousness, which participants reported a higher level at time 2.

Finally, low and high self-monitors reported being similarly influenced by the psychological and communication measures. Both groups reported significant increases in Big Five factors 3 through 5. Thus, there was little support that change in self-rating would be moderated by self-monitoring.

Although these results are interesting and tentatively assess the assumptions of the proposed model, there are some drawbacks that need to be discussed. Like all correlational research, it is nearly impossible to assess the influence that various factors have on other factors. Relational data provide information on the common variance that each shares, but this common variance may be influenced by a third factor (or more) that is not directly observable. Another drawback of this research is the manner in which forms were presented to participants. Participants received each set of forms in a particular order. Theoretically, forms that came later in the set were influenced by the responses on the earlier forms. Forms that came later are also more

likely to be filled out differently due to response burden, or participant fatigue. The former issue is typically solved with placing forms in random order, but the number of forms that were used and the design of the study made it logistically impossible to order the forms randomly.

As Study 2 evidences, self-monitoring can be conceptualized as both a communication and a psychological construct, as it significantly correlated with measures that were both psychological and communication-based. Also importantly, self-ratings change after appraising both communication acts and psychological traits. These changes mark as self-concept is influenced and subsequently adjusted by these two types of appraisals. This indicates that both the psychological perspective of the development of the self-concept and communication perspective are both “right”. A construct that is germane to both perspectives such as self-monitoring can be used to integrate the two perspectives into one coherent model.

Results from Study 1 remind us that self-monitors are influenced differently by social information. High self-monitors seem to engage in more heuristic processing as evidenced by their lack of disagreeing thoughts, and low self-monitors systematically process information about self and make a decision regarding self (or self adjustment) as evidenced by their disagreeing thoughts. High self-monitors may not negotiate their self-concept in the traditional sense of self-reflected appraisal, but rely more on interactions with others in their social settings. In effect, they develop their self-concept through others. Then, this raises the issue of whether they have a self-concept or a meaningful conceptualization of who they are.

It is crucial to remember that the results implicating self-monitoring as both a communication and a psychological construct are both correlational and tentative in nature and require further analysis, such as structural equation modeling, to determine if both of these variables load on a latent factor of self-concept. Again, with correlational research, it is impossible to assume causality, which is implicated in the proposed model. The current analysis did not determine directionality of causes, but it did provide support for some underlying assumptions regarding the model. This is an important first step towards advocating and outlining a path for further empirical investigation.

Future studies that could be conducted would use actual communication acts to further examine the influence that communication has on the self-concept. It was not feasible, economically or time-wise (as Professors would not allow more than fifteen minutes per session), to conduct a laboratory experiment that would allow the author to examine this influence. Therefore, results from the two experiments were extrapolated from a rather artificial environment through artificial means. On the other hand, the surprising patterns and significant results strengthen the posited interdisciplinary joining. This limitation reduces the generalizability of the current results as it is now fundamentally cogent to consider the self-concept as malleable and fluid in nature. These artificial limitations reduce the rich amount of social information that occurs when dyads or groups interact with each other. This is a significant problem that has held back the potential prominence of the social cognitive perspective in general and has been extensively discussed in both the disciplines of psychology and communication. This investigation is a major step in

the multiple and previously independent perspectives of the communication and psychology fields to yield a stronger explanatory model for self-monitoring.

APPENDICES

1. STUDY 1 FORMSInformed Consent Document

The University of Rhode Island
Department of Communication Studies
308A Independence Hall
Kingston, Rhode Island 02881-0811

CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH

You have been asked to take part in a research project described below. The researcher will explain the project to you in detail. You should feel free to ask questions. If you have more questions later, call Dr. Geoff Leatham, the person mainly responsible for this study, at (401) 874-4735, and he will discuss them with you. You must be at least 18 years old to be in this research project.

Description of the project:

You have been asked to take part in a study that is concerned with the interaction of personality and situational factors regarding interpersonal interaction for the purpose of furthering information regarding self-concept and self-monitoring.

What will be done:

If you decide to take part in this study here is what will happen: You are asked to participate in two sessions. In the first session you will complete two scales. After finishing the first session, you will then have a one-week absence and you will meet with the researchers again to complete the second session in which you will complete four separate forms. The first form will be a general question, followed by three separate forms. Both sessions will take approximately fifteen minutes each, for a total participation time of approximately thirty minutes. The research data will be kept for at least three years following the completion of the study.

Risks or discomfort:

You will not experience any risks of discomfort as a result of your participation in this study. Anyone that does not want to participate in the two sessions of the study can leave with their professor and he/she will have an alternative exercise provided for you. Both failure to participate (or participation) will not affect the student's grade in any way.

Benefits of this study:

Although there will be no direct benefit to you for taking part in this study, the researcher may learn more about the variables under consideration. You will have the experience of being a participant in a research study.

Confidentiality:

Your part in this study is confidential. None of the information will identify you by name. All records will ensure participant's confidentiality, while also ensuring that the participant's responses can be linked from session 1 and session 2. The participant will write a word and one number that they will easily be able to recall as a password for both the first and the second sessions on their data packets, again ensuring that the participant's name is held confidential.

In case there is any injury to the subject:

If this study causes you any injury, you should write or call the office of the Vice Provost for Graduate Studies, Research and Outreach, 70 Lower College Road, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, telephone: (401) 874-4328.

Decision to quit at any time:

The decision to take part in this study is up to you. You do not have to participate. If you decide to take part in the study, you may quit at any time. Whatever you decide will in no way penalize you, affect your grade, or status as a student. If you wish to quit, you simply inform Dr. Geoff Leatham at (401) 874-4735 of your decision.

Rights and Complaints:

If you are not satisfied with the way this study is performed, you may discuss your complaints with Geoff Leatham or with Crystal Fonseca at (401) 874-7486 or crystalrosef@yahoo.com anonymously, if you choose. In addition, you may contact the office of the Vice Provost for Graduate Studies, Research and Outreach, 70 Lower College Road, Suite 2, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, telephone: (401) 874-4328.

You have read the Consent Form. Your questions have been answered. Your signature on this form means that you understand the information and you agree to participate in this study.

 Signature of Participant

 Signature of Researcher

 Typed/printed name

 Typed/printed Name

 Date

 Date

The University of Rhode Island
Department of Communication Studies
308A Independence Hall
Kingston, Rhode Island 02881-0811

TEAR OFF AND KEEP THIS FORM FOR YOURSELF

Dear Participant:

You have been asked to take part in the research project described below. If you have any questions, please feel free to call *Crystal Fonseca* at (401) 874-7486 or *Dr. Geoff Leatham* at (401) 874-4735 the people mainly responsible for this study.

The purpose of this study is to furthering information regarding self-concept and self-monitoring. Responses to these items will consist of circling numbers of the various forms that are distributed to you. Confidentiality will be maintained as none of the information will identify you by name. Your password that you create will ensure participant's confidentiality, while also ensuring that the participant's responses can be linked from session 1 and session 2. The participant will write a word and one number that they will easily be able to recall as a password for both the first and the second sessions on their data packets, again ensuring that the participants name is held confidential.

YOU MUST BE AT LEAST 18 YEARS OLD to be in this research project.

If you decide to take part in this study, your participation will involve filling out a total of six questionnaires pertaining to self-monitoring and self-rating.

The possible risks or discomforts of the study are minimal, although some of you may feel some embarrassment answering questions about private matters, but remember that you can refuse to answer any question.

Although there are no direct benefits of the study, your answers will help increase the knowledge regarding the variables of interest (self-monitoring and self-ratings).

Your part in this study is anonymous. That means that your answers to all questions are private. No one else can know if you participated in this study and no one else can find out what your answers were. Scientific reports will be based on group data and will not identify you or any individual as being in this project. The research data will be kept for at least three years following the completion of the study.

The decision to participate in this research project is up to you. You do not have to participate and you can refuse to answer any question. Whatever you decide will in no way penalize you, affect your grade, or status as a student.

Participation in this study is not expected to be harmful or injurious to you. However, if this study causes you any injury, you should write or call Crystal Fonseca at (401) 874-7486 or Geoff Leatham at (401) 874-4735 both are located at the University of Rhode Island.

If you have any more questions or concerns about this study, you may contact University of Rhode Island's Vice Provost for Graduate Studies, Research and Outreach, 70 Lower College Road, Suite 2, URI, Kingston, RI, (401) 874-4328.

You are at least 18 years old. You have read the consent form and your questions have been answered to your satisfaction. Your filling out the survey implies your consent to participate in this study.

Thank you,
Dr. Geoff Leatham

2. Study 1 Questionnaire Materials

SM Scale

Instructions: Please read each statement below and then circle a number that best describes how much you agree with each statement in regards to how you see yourself, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”.

1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
 Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
 Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

3. I can only argue for ideas that I already believe.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
 Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
 Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
 Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

6. I would probably make a good actor.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
 Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

7. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
----------------------	----------------------	---------	-------------------	-------------------

8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
----------------------	----------------------	---------	-------------------	-------------------

9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
----------------------	----------------------	---------	-------------------	-------------------

10. I'm not always the person that I appear to be.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
----------------------	----------------------	---------	-------------------	-------------------

11. I would not change my opinions (or the way that I do things) in order to please someone or win their favor.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
----------------------	----------------------	---------	-------------------	-------------------

12. I have considered being an entertainer.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
----------------------	----------------------	---------	-------------------	-------------------

13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
----------------------	----------------------	---------	-------------------	-------------------

14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

15. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

16. I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end)

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

Self Rating

Instructions: Please rate yourself on these 25 traits by circling one number between each pair of adjectives that best reflects how you see yourself.

Argumentative 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Good Natured*

Discourteous 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Courteous*

Creative 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Ordinary*

Insecure 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Secure*

Unambitious 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Ambitious*

Quiet 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Talkative*

Un-cooperative 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Cooperative*

Emotionally Unstable 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Emotionally Stable*

Extraverted 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Introverted*

Agreeable 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Disagreeable*

Lazy 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Hardworking*

Academically Responsible 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Academically Irresponsible*

Not Studious 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Studious*

Unmotivated 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Motivated*

No Sense of Humor 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Sense of Humor*

Sociable 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Unsociable*

Imaginative 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Unimaginative*

Narrow Interests 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Broad Interests*

Timid 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Outspoken*

Nervous 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *At Ease*

Calm 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Anxious*
Inflexible 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Flexible*
Unintelligent 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Intelligent*
Uncultured 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Cultured*
Unconfident 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Confident*

Instructions:**Please answer both questions**

1. Are you introverted?

☐☐☐☐

Yes

No

Sometimes

It depends

2. In the space provided below, list some examples of your:

❖ past behaviors,

❖ thoughts,

❖ feelings

that came to mind as you considered question #1.

Instructions:
Please answer both questions

1. Are you extraverted?

☐☐☐☐

Yes

No

Sometimes

It Depends

2. In the space provided below, list some examples of your:

❖ past behaviors,

❖ thoughts,

❖ feelings

that came to mind as you considered question #1.

How variable is your extraversion from one situation to another?

Low variability 1---2---3---4---5---6---7---8---9---10 *High Variability*

How variable is your introversion from one situation to another?

Low variability 1---2---3---4---5---6---7---8---9---10 High Variability

Participant Demographic Information

Instructions: Please read the questions below and then fill in the answer in the blank.

1. What is your age? _____
2. What is your gender? _____
3. What is your race/ethnicity? _____

3. STUDY 2 FORMS

Informed Consent Documents

Informed Consent Document

This study is concerned with the interaction of personality and situational factors regarding interpersonal interaction. You are asked to participate in two sessions. In the first session you will complete two scales. After finishing the first session, you will then have a two-week absence and you will meet with the researchers again to complete the second session in which you will complete four separate forms. The first form will be a general question, followed by three separate forms. Both sessions will take approximately ten to fifteen minutes each.

Should you wish to discuss any aspect of this study please feel free to contact Dr. Sandra Ketrow in the Communications Studies Department at the University of Rhode Island (401- 874- 4733). We have no reason to believe that you will experience any discomfort as a result of participation in this experiment. If you do experience any discomfort, please contact Dr. Ketrow.

Your responses will be anonymous so please do not write your name on any of the data collection forms. However, in order to establish what forms participants filled out across the two sessions, you are requested to legibly print your name on a separate sheet.

Instructors of the class will not see the sheet of those who have participated in the study. A research assistant, independent of the class and the instructor, will be the only individual that sees the forms and has access to these forms. After the study is completed, all forms that have been signed will be destroyed. You may withdraw from this study at any time, during or between sessions, with no negative consequences. Simply inform the experimenters that you wish to end participation.

After you have signed the consent form, it will be placed in a file with the other consent forms in no particular order, separate from your data packets. This is done to ultimately protect your anonymity. Your informed consent to participate in this study will end on May 18, 2003.

I agree to participate in this study _____
Signature

I do not agree to participate in this study _____
Signature

The University of Rhode Island

Department of Communication Studies
308A Independence Hall
Kingston, Rhode Island 02881-0811

CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH

You have been asked to take part in a research project entitled "The Malleability of Self-Concept and the Moderating Role of Self-Monitoring" described below. The researcher will explain the project to you in detail. You should feel free to ask questions. If you have more questions later, call Dr. Sandra Ketrow, the person mainly responsible for this study, at (401) 874-4733, and he will discuss them with you. You must be at least 18 years old to be in this research project.

Description of the project:

You have been asked to take part in a study that is concerned with the interaction of personality and situational factors regarding interpersonal interaction for the purpose of furthering information regarding self-concept and self-monitoring.

What will be done:

If you decide to take part in this study here is what will happen: You are asked to participate in two sessions. In the first session you will complete five scales. After finishing the first session, you will then have a one-week respite and you will meet with the researcher again to complete the second session in which you will complete seven separate forms. The first form will be a general question, followed by seven separate forms. Both sessions will take approximately fifteen minutes each, for a total participation time of approximately thirty minutes. The research data will be kept for at least three years following the completion of the study.

Risks or discomfort:

You will not experience any risks of discomfort as a result of your participation in this study. If you do not want to participate in the two sessions of the study, you can leave with your professor and an alternative exercise will be provided. Neither your failure to participate nor participation will affect the student's grade in any way.

Benefits of this study:

Although there will be no direct benefit to you for taking part in this study, the researcher may learn more about the variables under consideration. You will have the experience of being a participant in a research study.

Confidentiality:

Your part in this study is confidential. None of the information will identify you by name. All records will ensure your confidentiality, while also ensuring that your responses can be linked from session 1 and session 2. You will write a word and one number that you can easily recall as a password for both the first and the second

sessions on your data packets, again ensuring that your name is held confidential. The researcher will collect all consent forms without perusing any of them. All forms will be stored in the faculty supervisor's filing cabinet.

In case there is any injury to the subject:

If this study causes you any injury, you should write or call the office of the Vice Provost for Graduate Studies, Research and Outreach, 70 Lower College Road, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, telephone: (401) 874-4328.

Decision to quit at any time:

The decision to take part in this study is up to you. You do not have to participate. If you decide to take part in the study, you may quit at any time. Whatever you decide will in no way penalize you, affect your grade, or status as a student. If you wish to quit, you simply inform Dr. Sandra Ketrow at (401) 874-4733 of your decision.

Rights and Complaints:

If you are not satisfied with the way this study is performed, you may discuss your complaints with Dr. Sandra Ketrow or with Crystal Fonseca at (401) 874-7486 or cfon0630@postoffice.uri.edu anonymously, if you choose. In addition, you may contact the office of the Vice Provost for Graduate Studies, Research and Outreach, 70 Lower College Road, Suite 2, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, telephone: (401) 874-4328.

You have read the Consent Form. Your questions have been answered. Your signature on this form means that you understand the information and you agree to participate in this study.

Signature of Participant

Signature of Researcher

Typed/printed name

Typed/printed Name

Date

Date

The University of Rhode Island
Department of Communication Studies
308A Independence Hall
Kingston, Rhode Island 02881-0811

TEAR OFF AND KEEP THIS FORM FOR YOURSELF

Dear Participant:

You have been asked to take part in the research project described below. If you have any questions, please feel free to call *Crystal Fonseca* at (401) 874-7486 or *Dr. Sandra Ketrow* at (401) 874-4733 (the researchers mainly responsible for this study).

The purpose of this study is to further knowledge about self-concept and self-monitoring. Your responses to these items will consist of circling numbers on the various forms that are distributed. Confidentiality will be maintained as none of the information will identify you by name. Your password that you create will ensure your confidentiality, while also ensuring that your responses can be linked from session 1 and session 2. You will write a word and one number that they will easily be able to recall as a password for both the first and the second sessions on your data packet, again ensuring that your name is held confidential.

YOU MUST BE AT LEAST 18 YEARS OLD to be in this research project.

If you decide to take part in this study, your participation will involve filling out a total of six questionnaires pertaining to self-monitoring and self-rating.

The possible risks or discomforts of the study are minimal, although some of you may feel some embarrassment answering questions about private matters, but remember that you can refuse to answer any question.

Although there are no direct benefits of the study, your answers will help increase the knowledge regarding the variables of interest (self-monitoring and self-ratings).

Your part in this study is anonymous. That means that your answers to all questions are private. No one else can know if you participated in this study and no one else can find out what your answers were. Scientific reports will be based on group data and will not identify you or any individual as being in this project. The research data will be kept for at least three years following the completion of the study.

The decision to participate in this research project is up to you. You do not have to participate and you can refuse to answer any question. Whatever you decide will in no way penalize you, affect your grade, or status as a student.

Participation in this study is not expected to be harmful or injurious to you. However, if this study causes you any injury, you should write or call Crystal Fonseca at (401) 874-7486 or Dr. Sandra Ketrow at (401) 874-4733 both are located at the University of Rhode Island.

If you have any more questions or concerns about this study, you may contact University of Rhode Island's Vice Provost for Graduate Studies, Research and Outreach, 70 Lower College Road, Suite 2, URI, Kingston, RI, (401) 874-4328.

You are at least 18 years old. You have read the consent form and your questions have been answered to your satisfaction. Your filling out the survey implies your consent to participate in this study.

Thank you,
Dr. Sandra Ketrow

4. Study 2 Questionnaire Materials

Communication Scales

A. S. Instrument

Instructions: For each of the following statements, please indicate your perceptions of your general abilities. That is, consider how you generally behave, rather than any specific conversation or event. Please use the below scale to respond to the following 13 questions. Circle one answer per question that BEST represents the following categories to you:

Very strongly agree	Strongly agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Very strongly disagree
VSA	SA	A	U	D	SD	VSD
1. I seldom know what to say or do to get others to like me.						
VSA	SA	A	U	D	SD	VSD
2. If I put my mind to it, I could get anyone to like me.						
VSA	SA	A	U	D	SD	VSD
3. I have trouble building rapport with others.						
VSA	SA	A	U	D	SD	VSD
4. I have difficulty getting others to want to spend time with me.						
VSA	SA	A	U	D	SD	VSD
5. If I want someone to like me, I can usually create positive feelings between us.						
VSA	SA	A	U	D	SD	VSD
6. I just can't seem to get others to like and appreciate me.						
VSA	SA	A	U	D	SD	VSD
7. I am good at getting others to want to hang around with me.						
VSA	SA	A	U	D	SD	VSD
8. I do not seem to know what to say and do to make myself popular with others.						
VSA	SA	A	U	D	SD	VSD
9. When necessary, I can put on an act to get important people to approve of me.						
VSA	SA	A	U	D	SD	VSD

10. I am not very good at putting on a show to impress others.

VSA SA A U D SD VSD

11. I am very good at playing roles to draw people to me.

VSA SA A U D SD VSD

12. I can present myself as more likeable than I really am.

VSA SA A U D SD VSD

13. I can put on excellent social performances to get others to approve of me.

VSA SA A U D SD VSD

C. A. Scale

Instructions: The following are statements about communication behaviors. Answer each item as it relates to your general style of communication (the type of communicator you are most often) in social situations.

Please indicate the degree to which each statement applies to you by circling the appropriate statement at the end of each sentence.

1. **I feel nervous in social situations.**

Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me

2. **In most social situations I feel tense and constrained.**

Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me

3. **When talking, my posture seems awkward and tense.**

Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me

4. **My voice sounds nervous when I talk with others.**

Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me

5. **I am relaxed when talking with others.**

Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me

6. **I try to make the other person feel good.**

Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me

7. **I try to make the other person feel important.**

Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me

8. **I try to be warm when communicating with another.**

Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me

9. **When I'm talking I think about how the other person feels.**

Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me	true of me

10. I am verbally and nonverbally supportive of other people.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

11. I like to be active in different social groups.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

12. I enjoy socializing with various groups of people.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

13. I enjoy meeting new people.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

14. I find it easy to get along with new people.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

15. I do not "mix" well at social functions.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

16. I am aware of how intimate my disclosures are.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

17. I am aware of how intimate the disclosures of others are.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

18. I disclose at the same level that others disclose to me.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

19. I know how appropriate my self-disclosures are.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

20. When I self-disclose I know what I am revealing.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

21. When speaking I have problems with grammar.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

22. At times I don't use appropriate verb tense.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

23. I sometimes use one word when I mean to use another.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

24. I sometimes use words incorrectly.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

25. I have difficulty pronouncing some words.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

26. When I am anxious, I often make jokes.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

27. I often make jokes when in tense situations.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

28. When I embarrass myself, I often make a joke about it.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

29. When someone makes a negative comment about me, I respond with a witty comeback.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

30. People think I am witty.

Always true of me	Often true of me	Sometimes true of me	Rarely true of me	Never true of me
----------------------	---------------------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------

C. S. Measure

Instructions: You have impressions of yourself as a communicator. The impressions include your sense of the way you communicate. This measure focuses upon your sensitivity to the way you communicate, or what is called your communicator style. The questions are not designed to look at *what* is communicated; rather, they explore the way you communicate.

Because there is no such thing as a “correct” style of communication, none of the following items has a right or wrong answer. Please do not spend too much time on the items. Let your first inclination be your guide. Try to answer as honestly as possible. All responses will be strictly confidential.

Some questions will be difficult to answer because you honestly do not know. For these questions, however, please try to determine *which way you are leaning* and answer in the appropriate direction.

The following scale is used for each item:

Feeling		Definition of feeling
NO!	=	strong disagreement with the statement
no	=	disagreement with the statement
?	=	neither agreement nor disagreement with the statement
yes	=	agreement with the statement
YES!	=	strong agreement with the statement

For example, if you agree with the following statement, “I dislike the coldness of winter,” then you would circle (“yes”) on your scale.

Some of the items will be similarly stated. But each item has a slightly different orientation. Try to answer each question as though it were the *only* question being asked. Finally, answer each item as it relates to a *general face-to-face* communication situation- namely, the type of communicator you are most often.

NO! no ? yes YES!

1. I am comfortable with all varieties of people.

NO! no ? yes YES!

2. I laugh easily.

NO! no ? yes YES!

3. I readily express admiration for others.

NO! no ? yes YES!

4. *What* I say *usually* leaves an impression on people.
NO! no ? yes YES!
5. I leave people with the impression of me which they definitely want to remember.
NO! no ? yes YES!
6. To be friendly, I habitually acknowledge verbally other's contributions.
NO! no ? yes YES!
7. I am a *very* good communicator.
NO! no ? yes YES!
8. I have some nervous mannerisms in my speech.
NO! no ? yes YES!
9. I am a very relaxed communicator.
NO! no ? yes YES!
10. When I disagree with somebody I am very quick to challenge them.
NO! no ? yes YES!
11. I can always repeat back to a person *exactly* what was meant.
NO! no ? yes YES!
12. The sound of my voice is *very easy* to recognize.
NO! no ? yes YES!
13. I am a very precise communicator.
NO! no ? yes YES!
14. I leave a *definite* impression on people.
NO! no ? yes YES!
15. The rhythm or flow of my speech is sometimes affected by my nervousness.
NO! no ? yes YES!
16. Under pressure I come across as a relaxed speaker.
NO! no ? yes YES!
17. My eyes reflect *exactly* what I am saying.
NO! no ? yes YES!
18. I dramatize a lot.
NO! no ? yes YES!

19. I always find it *very easy* to communicate on a one-to-one basis with strangers.

NO! no ? yes YES!

20. Usually, I *deliberately react* in such a way that people *know* that I am listening to them.

NO! no ? yes YES!

21. Usually I do not tell people much about myself until I get to know them well.

NO! no ? yes YES!

22. *Regularly* I tell jokes, anecdotes and stories when I communicate.

NO! no ? yes YES!

23. I tend to *constantly* gesture when I communicate.

NO! no ? yes YES!

24. I am an *extremely* open communicator.

NO! no ? yes YES!

25. I am vocally a loud communicator.

NO! no ? yes YES!

26. In a small group of strangers I am a *very good* communicator.

NO! no ? yes YES!

27. In arguments I insist upon very precise definitions.

NO! no ? yes YES!

28. In most social situations I generally speak very frequently.

NO! no ? yes YES!

29. I find it extremely easy to maintain a conversation with a member of the opposite sex *whom I have just met*.

NO! no ? yes YES!

30. I like to be strictly accurate when I communicate.

NO! no ? yes YES!

31. Because I have a loud voice I can easily break into a conversation.

NO! no ? yes YES!

32. *Often* I physically and vocally act out what I want to communicate.

NO! no ? yes YES!

33. I have an assertive voice.

NO! no ? yes YES!

34. I readily reveal personal things about myself.
NO! no ? yes YES!
35. I am dominant in social situations.
NO! no ? yes YES!
36. I am very argumentative.
NO! no ? yes YES!
37. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I have a hard time stopping myself.
NO! no ? yes YES!
38. I am always an *extremely* friendly communicator.
NO! no ? yes YES!
39. I really *like* to listen *very carefully* to people.
NO! no ? yes YES!
40. Very often I insist that other people document or present some kind of proof for what they are arguing.
NO! no ? yes YES!
41. I try to take charge of things when I am with people.
NO! no ? yes YES!
42. It bothers me to drop an argument that is not resolved.
NO! no ? yes YES!
43. In most social situations I tend to come on strong.
NO! no ? yes YES!
44. I am very expressive nonverbally in social situations.
NO! no ? yes YES!
45. The *way* I say something *usually* leaves an impression on people.
NO! no ? yes YES!
46. Whenever I communicate, I tend to be very encouraging to people.
NO! no ? yes YES!
47. I actively use *a lot* of facial expressions when I communicate.
NO! no ? yes YES!
48. I am *very frequently* verbally exaggerate to emphasize a point.
NO! no ? yes YES!

49. I am an *extremely attentive* communicator.

NO! no ? yes YES!

50. As a rule, I openly express my feelings and emotions.

NO! no ? yes YES!

51. Out of a random group of six people, including myself, I would probably have a better communicator style than (circle one choice):

5 of
them

4 of
them

3 of
them

2 of
them

1 of
them

None of
them

I. I. Scale

Instructions: This questionnaire is designed to provide information about how people communicate. There are no right or wrong answers to any of the items. You only need to indicate the extent to which you feel each item describes *your behavior*.

In responding to some of the items, you might say, "sometimes I do that and sometimes I don't". You should respond to each item in a way that best describes your typical manner of communication – how you behave in most situations. If you cannot decide how a particular item applies to you, mark the "not sure" alternative. However, please be sure to respond to all of the items, based on the following scale. Circle one choice for each item that best characterizes your communication in general:

Not at all	Not like	Somewhat	Not sure	Somewhat	Like	Very much
like me	me	unlike me		like me	me	like me

1. I am keenly aware of how other perceive me during conversations.

Not at all	Not like	Somewhat	Not sure	Somewhat	Like	Very much
like me	me	unlike me		like me	me	like me

2. My mind wanders during conversations and I often miss parts of what is going on.

Not at all	Not like	Somewhat	Not sure	Somewhat	Like	Very much
like me	me	unlike me		like me	me	like me

3. Often in conversations I'm not sure what to say, I can't seem to find the appropriate lines.

Not at all	Not like	Somewhat	Not sure	Somewhat	Like	Very much
like me	me	unlike me		like me	me	like me

4. I am very observant of others' reactions while I'm speaking.

Not at all	Not like	Somewhat	Not sure	Somewhat	Like	Very much
like me	me	unlike me		like me	me	like me

5. During conversations I listen carefully to others and obtain as much information as I can.

Not at all	Not like	Somewhat	Not sure	Somewhat	Like	Very much
like me	me	unlike me		like me	me	like me

6. Often in conversations I'm not sure what my role is, I'm not sure how I'm expected to relate to others.

Not at all like me	Not like me	Somewhat unlike me	Not sure	Somewhat like me	Like me	Very much like me
-----------------------	----------------	-----------------------	----------	---------------------	------------	----------------------

7. Often in conversations I will pretend to be listening, when in fact I was thinking of something else.

Not at all like me	Not like me	Somewhat unlike me	Not sure	Somewhat like me	Like me	Very much like me
-----------------------	----------------	-----------------------	----------	---------------------	------------	----------------------

8. Often during conversations I feel like I know what should be said (like accepting a compliment, or asking a question), but I hesitate to do so.

Not at all like me	Not like me	Somewhat unlike me	Not sure	Somewhat like me	Like me	Very much like me
-----------------------	----------------	-----------------------	----------	---------------------	------------	----------------------

9. Sometimes during conversations I'm not sure what the other really means or intends by certain comments.

Not at all like me	Not like me	Somewhat unlike me	Not sure	Somewhat like me	Like me	Very much like me
-----------------------	----------------	-----------------------	----------	---------------------	------------	----------------------

10. I carefully observe how the other is responding to me during a conversation.

Not at all like me	Not like me	Somewhat unlike me	Not sure	Somewhat like me	Like me	Very much like me
-----------------------	----------------	-----------------------	----------	---------------------	------------	----------------------

11. Often I feel withdrawn or distant during conversations.

Not at all like me	Not like me	Somewhat unlike me	Not sure	Somewhat like me	Like me	Very much like me
-----------------------	----------------	-----------------------	----------	---------------------	------------	----------------------

12. Often in conversations I'm not sure what other's needs are (e.g., a compliment, reassurance, etc.) until it is too late to respond appropriately.

Not at all like me	Not like me	Somewhat unlike me	Not sure	Somewhat like me	Like me	Very much like me
-----------------------	----------------	-----------------------	----------	---------------------	------------	----------------------

13. I feel confident during my conversations, I am sure of what to say and do.

Not at all like me	Not like me	Somewhat unlike me	Not sure	Somewhat like me	Like me	Very much like me
-----------------------	----------------	-----------------------	----------	---------------------	------------	----------------------

14. Often I'm preoccupied in my conversations and do not pay complete attention to others.

Not at all like me	Not like me	Somewhat unlike me	Not sure	Somewhat like me	Like me	Very much like me
-----------------------	----------------	-----------------------	----------	---------------------	------------	----------------------

15. Often I feel sort of "unplugged" during conversations, I am uncertain of my role, others' motives, and what is happening.

Not at all like me	Not like me	Somewhat unlike me	Not sure	Somewhat like me	Like me	Very much like me
-----------------------	----------------	-----------------------	----------	---------------------	------------	----------------------

16. In my conversations I often do not accurately perceive others' intentions or motivations.

Not at all like me	Not like me	Somewhat unlike me	Not sure	Somewhat like me	Like me	Very much like me
-----------------------	----------------	-----------------------	----------	---------------------	------------	----------------------

17. In conversations I am very perceptive to the meaning of my partners' behavior in relation to myself and the situation.

Not at all like me	Not like me	Somewhat unlike me	Not sure	Somewhat like me	Like me	Very much like me
-----------------------	----------------	-----------------------	----------	---------------------	------------	----------------------

18. Often during my conversation I can't think of what to say, I just don't react quickly enough.

Not at all like me	Not like me	Somewhat unlike me	Not sure	Somewhat like me	Like me	Very much like me
-----------------------	----------------	-----------------------	----------	---------------------	------------	----------------------

S. D. Scale

Instructions: From the scales below, please indicate your feelings about yourself below. Fill in the number between the adjectives which best represents your feelings about yourself. Numbers "1" and "7" indicate a very strong feeling. Numbers "2" and "6" indicate a strong feeling. Numbers "3" and "5" indicate a fairly weak feeling. Number "4" indicates you are undecided or do not understand the adjectives themselves. Please work quickly. There are no right or wrong answers. Circle only ONE choice.

Sociability

Good-natured	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Irritable
Cheerful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Gloomy
Unfriendly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Friendly

Extroversion

Timid	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Bold
Verbal	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Quiet
Talkative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Silent

Competence

Expert	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Inexpert
Unintelligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Intelligent
Intellectual	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Narrow

Composure

Poised	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Nervous
Tense	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Relaxed
Calm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Anxious

Character

Dishonest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Honest
Unsympathetic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Sympathetic
Good	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Bad

Study 2 Questionnaire Materials

Psychology Scales

SM Scale

Instructions: Please read each statement below and then circle a number that best describes how much you agree with each statement in regards to how you see yourself, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree".

1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
 Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
 Neutral

2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
 Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
 Neutral

3. I can only argue for ideas that I already believe.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
 Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
 Neutral

4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
 Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
 Neutral

5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
 Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
 Neutral

6. I would probably make a good actor.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
 Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
 Neutral

7. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

10. I'm not always the person that I appear to be.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

11. I would not change my opinions (or the way that I do things) in order to please someone or win their favor.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

12. I have considered being an entertainer.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

15. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

16. I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

Self Rating

Instructions: Please rate yourself on these 25 traits by circling one number between each pair of adjectives that best reflects how you see yourself.

Argumentative 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Good Natured*

Discourteous 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Courteous*

Creative 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Ordinary*

Insecure 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Secure*

Unambitious 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Ambitious*

Quiet 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Talkative*

Un-cooperative 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Cooperative*

Emotionally Unstable 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Emotionally Stable*

Extraverted 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Introverted*

Agreeable 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Disagreeable*

Lazy 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Hardworking*

Academically Responsible 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Academically Irresponsible*

Not Studious 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Studious*

Unmotivated 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Motivated*

No Sense of Humor 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Sense of Humor*

Sociable 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Unsociable*

Imaginative 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Unimaginative*

Narrow Interests 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Broad Interests*

Timid 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Outspoken*

Nervous 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *At Ease*

Calm 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Anxious*
Inflexible 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Flexible*
Unintelligent 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Intelligent*
Uncultured 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Cultured*
Unconfident 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 *Confident*

Instructions:

Please answer both questions

1. Are you introverted?

☐☐☐☐

Yes

No

Sometimes

It depends

2. In the space provided below, list some examples of your:

❖ past behaviors,

❖ thoughts,

❖ feelings

that came to mind as you considered question #1.

Instructions:
Please answer both questions

1. Are you extraverted? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
- Yes No Sometimes It Depends

2. In the space provided below, list some examples of your:

- ❖ past behaviors,
- ❖ thoughts,
- ❖ feelings

that came to mind as you considered question #1.

If you answered “sometimes” or “it depends” to the open ended question, “Are you extraverted”:

How variable is your extraversion from one situation to another?

Low variability 1----2----3----4----5----6----7-----8-----9---10 *High Variability*

If you answered “sometimes” or “it depends” to the open ended question, “Are you introverted”:

How variable is your introversion from one situation to another?

Low variability 1---2---3---4---5---6---7---8---9---10 *High Variability*

Participant Demographic Information

Instructions: Please read the questions below and then fill in the answer in the blank.

1. What is your age? _____
2. What is your gender? _____
3. What is your race/ethnicity? _____

S. D. Form

Directions: Please circle either "Introvert" or "Extravert" below.

In your personal opinion, do you think that it is more socially desirable to be either an:

❖ **Introvert:**

"Someone who is oriented toward themselves, who prefers to be alone, is reserved, not extremely adventurous, unassertive, and submissive."

❖ **Extravert**

"Someone who is oriented toward the outside world, prefers the company of others, tends to be sociable, impulsive, adventurous, assertive and dominant."

Study 1 Tables

Table 1. 2x2x2x2 ANOVA Change in Extraversion

Effect	F	df	p
Time	1.47	(1,42)	.23
Type of Question	.50	(1,42)	.83
Question Congruency	1.03	(1,42)	.32
Self-Monitoring	5.99	(1,42)	.02
Type of Question*Question Congruency	12.15	(1,42)	.00
Type of Question*Self-Monitoring	.00	(1,42)	.98
Question Congruency*Self-Monitoring	.50	(1,42)	.83
Question Type*Congruence*Self-Monitoring	.59	(1,42)	.45

Table 2. 2x2x2 ANOVA Listed Thoughts

Agreeing Thoughts	F	df	p
Type of Question	1.62	(1,42)	>.05
Question Congruency	1.05	(1,42)	>.05
Self-Monitoring	1.49	(1,42)	>.05
Type of Question*Question Congruency	.05	(1,42)	.83
Type of Question*Self-Monitoring	.00	(1,42)	>.05
Question Congruency*Self-Monitoring	2.83	(1,42)	.10
Question Type*Congruence*Self-Monitoring	1.20	(1,42)	>.05
Disagreeing Thoughts	F	df	p
Type of Question	.01	(1,42)	>.05
Question Congruency	.47	(1,42)	>.05
Self-Monitoring	.59	(1,42)	>.05
Type of Question*Question Congruency	6.78	(1,42)	.01
Type of Question*Self-Monitoring	3.28	(1,42)	.07
Question Congruency*Self-Monitoring	1.43	(1,42)	.24
Question Type*Congruence*Self-Monitoring	.18	(1,42)	>.05
Irrelevant Thoughts	F	df	p
Type of Question	.24	(1,42)	>.05
Question Congruency	.06	(1,42)	>.05
Self-Monitoring	1.28	(1,42)	>.05
Type of Question*Question Congruency	1.91	(1,42)	.17
Type of Question*Self-Monitoring	.37	(1,42)	>.05
Question Congruency*Self-Monitoring	.13	(1,42)	.72
Question Type*Congruence*Self-Monitoring	.60	(1,42)	>.05
Total Thoughts	F	df	p
Type of Question	.77	(1,42)	>.05
Question Congruency	.27	(1,42)	>.05
Self-Monitoring	.00	(1,42)	>.05
Type of Question*Question Congruency	6.79	(1,42)	.01
Type of Question*Self-Monitoring	2.39	(1,42)	>.05
Question Congruency*Self-Monitoring	5.73	(1,42)	.02
Question Type*Congruence*Self-Monitoring	2.50	(1,42)	>.05

Table 3. Mediation Analyses

	Change In Extraversion (r)	p (one-tailed)
Self-Monitoring	.25	.04
Congruence	-.20	.08
Type of Question	-.09	.28
Thoughts Listed		
Agreeing Thoughts	.17	.11
Disagreeing Thoughts	.30	.02
Other Thoughts	.07	.33
Total Thoughts	.37	.00

Study 2 Tables

Table 4.

Means and Standard Deviations of Communication and Psychology Measures
(N=224)

	Mean	SD
Affinity Seeking		
Affinity Seeking Competence	40.89	6.85
Strategic Performance	21.63	5.61
Communication Adaptability		
Social Composure	12.65	4.27
Social Confirmation	12.33	4.67
Articulation	12.62	4.24
Social Experience	12.62	4.72
Appropriate Disclosure	13.24	3.52
Wit	14.66	3.53
Communicator Style		
Friendly	14.97	3.54
Impression Leaving	14.16	3.53
Relaxed	12.77	2.56
Open	11.76	3.37
Contentious	12.84	3.34
Attentive	13.95	2.42
Precise	13.18	2.45
Dramatic	12.96	2.93
Dominant	11.66	3.09
Communicator Image	17.14	2.90
Animated	13.92	2.51
Interaction Involvement		
Perceptiveness	20.12	3.50
Attentiveness	29.52	5.09
Responsiveness	39.44	8.32
Semantic Differential		
Sociability	17.59	2.61
Extroversion	14.57	3.79
Competence	16.29	2.33
Composure	14.84	3.44
Character	17.99	2.65
Self-Monitoring	56.33	7.64

Table 5.

Correlations of Psychology Measures with Self-Monitoring and Communication Measures (N=224)

	Self-Monitoring (r)	p (one-tailed)
Big Five Measures of Personality at Time 1		
Factor 1-Extraversion	.48	.00
Factor 2-Agreeableness	-.07	.14
Factor 3-Conscientiousness	-.06	.20
Factor 4-Emotional Stability	.25	.00
Factor 5-Culture/Intelligence	.29	.00
Factor 1-Extraversion p		
Communicator Style		
Dramatic	.32	.00
Dominant	.45	.00
Animated	.33	.00
Affinity Seeking		
Strategic Performance	.23	.00
Communication Adaptability		
Social Confirmation	-.07	.16
Social Experience	-.31	.00
Semantic Differential		
Sociability	.30	.00
Extroversion	.72	.00
Interaction Involvement		
Responsiveness	.38	.00
Factor 2-Agreeableness p		
Communicator Style		
Friendly	.28	.00
Contentious	-.30	.00
Affinity Seeking		
Affinity Seeking Competence	.19	.00
Factor 3-Conscientiousness p		
Communication Adaptability		
Articulation	-.20	.00
Communicator Style		
Precise	.13	.03

Table 5 (Continued)

Factor 4-Emotional Stability p		
Communicator Style		
Relaxed	.41	.00
Semantic Differential		
Composure	.63	.00
Communicator Adaptability		
Social Composure	-.19	.00
Factor 5-Culture p		
Communicator Style		
Open	.23	.00
Semantic Differential		
Character	.39	.00
Competence	.52	.00
Interaction Involvement		
Perceptiveness	.26	.00

Table 6.

Correlations of Self-Monitoring with Communication Measures

	Self-Monitoring (r)	p (one-tailed)
Affinity Seeking		
Affinity Seeking Competence	.30	.00
Strategic Performance	.40	.00
Communication Adaptability		
Social Composure	-.24	.00
Social Confirmation	-.01	.42
Articulation	-.12	.04
Social Experience	-.26	.00
Appropriate Disclosure	-.01	.45
Wit	-.25	.00
Communicator Style		
Friendly	.15	.01
Impression Leaving	.29	.00
Relaxed	.20	.00
Open	.34	.00
Contentious	.17	.01
Attentive	.04	.28
Precise	.14	.02
Dramatic	.48	.00
Dominant	.50	.00
Animated	.29	.00
Interaction Involvement		
Perceptiveness	.17	.01
Attentiveness	.01	.46
Responsiveness	.29	.00
Semantic Differential		
Sociability	.18	.00
Extroversion	.55	.00
Competence	.19	.00
Composure	.21	.00
Character	-.01	.42

Table 7.

Within Group Comparisons by Condition

Com-First (n=124)	Time 1		Time 2		t	p
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
Big Five Measures of Personality						
Factor 1-Extraversion	35.28	7.36	36.29	7.25	2.42	.01
Factor 2-Agreeableness	38.10	6.25	38.90	6.08	1.69	.05
Factor 3-Conscientiousness	34.00	6.03	38.03	7.27	8.03	.00
Factor 4-Emotional Stability	34.14	7.61	35.21	7.93	2.48	.01
Factor 5-Culture/Intelligence	35.06	5.73	38.34	5.59	7.82	.00
Psych-First (n=106)	Time 1		Time 2		t	p
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
Big Five Measures of Personality						
Factor 1-Extraversion	37.25	8.10	37.11	7.32	-.23	.41
Factor 2-Agreeableness	39.12	5.17	39.28	6.21	.29	.39
Factor 3-Conscientiousness	35.08	6.91	37.88	7.28	5.46	.00
Factor 4-Emotional Stability	34.88	7.32	36.22	7.44	2.04	.02
Factor 5-Culture/Intelligence	38.18	6.50	39.26	5.45	1.85	.03

Table 8.

Between Group Crossed Comparisons of Com-First (n= 148) and Psych First (n = 131) Groups' Self-Ratings

	Com-First Time 1		Psych-First Time 2				
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	t	df	p
Big Five Measures of Personality							
Factor 1-Extraversion	35.61	7.50	37.11	7.32	-1.59	252	.06
Factor 2-Agreeableness	38.16	5.92	39.28	6.21	-1.45	251	.07
Factor 3-Conscientiousness	34.09	5.93	37.88	7.27	-4.41	197*	.00
Factor 4-Emotional Stability	34.72	7.42	36.23	7.44	-1.59	252	.06
Factor 5-Culture/Intelligence	35.33	5.67	39.26	5.45	-5.54	252	.00
	Com-First Time 2		Psych-First Time 1				
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	t	df	p
Big Five Measures of Personality							
Factor 1-Extraversion	36.31	7.23	37.53	7.86	-1.29	254	.10
Factor 2-Agreeableness	38.88	6.06	38.92	5.33	-.06	254	.48
Factor 3-Conscientiousness	38.10	7.28	35.15	6.85	3.34	254	.00
Factor 4-Emotional Stability	35.25	7.91	35.01	6.93	.26	254	.40
Factor 5-Culture/Intelligence	38.34	5.57	38.22	6.26	.16	254	.44

* DF adjusted for inequality of variances; all other DF differences due to missing data.

Table 9.

Within Group Comparisons by Level of Self-Monitoring

Low Self-Monitors (n=83)	Time 1		Time 2		t	p
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
Big Five Measures of Personality						
Factor 1-Extraversion	32.54	7.02	33.02	6.80	.88	.19
Factor 2-Agreeableness	39.61	6.29	39.88	5.81	.42	.34
Factor 3-Conscientiousness	35.01	6.92	38.55	7.06	6.73	.00
Factor 4-Emotional Stability	32.58	7.65	33.87	8.01	2.19	.02
Factor 5-Culture/Intelligence	34.54	5.89	37.30	5.70	4.97	.00

High Self-Monitors (n=144)	Time 1		Time 2		t	p
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
Big Five Measures of Personality						
Factor 1-Extraversion	38.22	7.44	38.74	6.71	1.12	.13
Factor 2-Agreeableness	37.97	5.38	38.64	6.30	1.60	.06
Factor 3-Conscientiousness	34.37	6.15	37.68	7.35	6.92	.00
Factor 4-Emotional Stability	35.56	7.23	36.67	7.43	2.20	.02
Factor 5-Culture/Intelligence	37.64	6.28	39.67	5.25	4.27	.00

Figure 1.

The Interdisciplinary Problem**Psychological Perspective** **Communication Perspective**

Figure 2.
Role of Self-Monitoring

Possible construct that may integrate both perspectives

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bell, R. A., Tremblay, S. W., & Buerkel-Rothfuss, N. L. (1987). Interpersonal attraction as a communication accomplishment: Development of a measure of affinity-seeking competence. *Western Journal of Speech Communication*, 51, 1-18.
- Bem, D. J. Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology*, Vol. 6. New York: Academic Press, 1972.
- Briggs, S.R., & Cheek, J.M. (1988). On the nature of self-monitoring: Problems with assessment, problems with validity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 54, 663-678.
- Briggs, S.R., Cheek, J.M., & Buss, A.H. (1980). An analysis of the Self-Monitoring Scale. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 38, 679-686.
- Caldwell, D. F., & O'Reilly, C. A. (1982). Boundary spanning and individual performance: The impact of self-monitoring. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 67, 124-127.
- Cappella, J. N. (1981). Mutual influence in expressive behavior: Adult-adult and infant-adult dyadic interaction. *Psychological Bulletin*, 89, 101-132.
- Carver, C. S. (1989). How should multifaceted personality constructs be tested? Issues illustrated by self-monitoring, attribution style, and hardiness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56, 577-585.
- Cegala, D. J. (1981). Interaction involvement: A cognitive dimension of communicative competence. *Communication Education*, 30, 109-121.
- Chen, S., Shechter, D. & Chaiken, S. (1996). Getting at the truth or getting along: Accuracy-versus impression-motivated heuristic and systematic processing. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 71, 262-275.
- Cody, M.J. & McLaughlin, M. L. (1985) The situation as a construct in interpersonal communication research. In Knapp & Miller(Eds.), *Handbook of interpersonal communication* (pp. 263-312). Beverly Hills: Sage Publication.
- Cooley, C. H. (1902). *Human nature and the social order*. New York: Scribner.
- Duran, R. L. (1983). Communicative adaptability: A measure of social communicative competence. *Communication Quarterly*, 31, 320-326.
- Duran, R. L. (1992). Communicative adaptability: A review of conceptualization and

- measurement. *Communication Quarterly*, 40, 253-268.
- Elliot, G. C. (1979). Some effects of deception and level of self-monitoring on planning and reacting to self-presentation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37, 1282-1292.
- Fazio, R. H., Effrein, E. A., & Falender, V. J. (1981). Self-perceptions following social interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 41, 232-242.
- Gabrenya, W.K. & Arkin, R.M. (1980). Factor structure and factor correlates of the Self-Monitoring Scale. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 6, 13-22.
- Gangestad, S. & Snyder, M. (1985). "To carve nature at its joints": On the existence of discrete classes in personality. *Psychological Review*, 92, 317-349.
- Gangestad, S. & Snyder, M. (1991). Taxonomic analysis redux: Some statistical considerations for testing a latent class model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 61, 141-146.
- Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books.
- Goffman, E. (1967). *Interaction ritual: Essays on face to face behavior*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Goss, B. *The psychology of human communication*. Illinois: Waveland Press, 1989.
- Graziano, W. G., & Bryant, H.M. (1998). Self-monitoring and the self-attribution of positive emotions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74, 250-261.
- Hull, J. G., Lehn, D. A., & Tedlie, J. C. (1991). A general approach to testing multifaceted personality constructs. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 61, 932-945.
- Ickes, W. J., & Barnes, R. D. (1977). The role of sex and self-monitoring in unstructured dyadic interactions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 35, 315-330.
- Ickes, W., Layden, M.A., & Barnes, R.D. (1978). Objective self-awareness and individuation: An empirical link. *Journal of Personality*, 46, 146-161.
- Jamieson, D. W., Lydon, J. E., & Zanna, M. P. (1987). Attitude and activity preference similarity: Differential bases of interpersonal attraction for low and

- high self-monitors. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 53, 1052-1060.
- John, O. P., Cheek, J. M., & Klohnen, E. C. (1996). On the nature of self-monitoring: Construct explication with Q-sort ratings. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 71, 763-776.
- Jones, E. E., Brenner, K. J., & Knight, J.G. (1990). When failure elevates self-esteem. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 16, 200-209.
- Jones, E. E., Rhodewalt, F., Berglas, S. & Skelton, J. A. (1981). Effects of strategic self-presentation on subsequent self-esteem. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 41, 407-421.
- Klayman, J., & Ha, Young-Won. (1987). Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing. *Psychological Review*, 94, 211-228.
- Krosnick, J. A., & Sedikides, C. (1990). Self-monitoring and self-protective biases in use of consensus information to predict one's own behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58, 718-728.
- Kulik, J. A., & Taylor, S. E. (1981). Self-monitoring and the use of consensus information. *Journal of Personality*, 49, 75-84.
- Kunda, Z., Fong, G. T., Sanitioso, R., & Reber, E. (1993). Directional questions direct self-conceptions. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 29, 63-86.
- Kunda, Z., & Sanitioso, R. (1989). Motivated changes in the self-concept. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 25, 272-285.
- Layder, D. (1981). *Structure, Interaction, and Social Theory*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited.
- Lennox, R. D. & Wolfe, R. N. (1984). Revision of the self-monitoring scale. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 46, 1349-1364.
- Lippa, R. (1976). Expressive control and the leakage of dispositional introversion-extraversion during role-playing teaching. *Journal of Personality*, 44, 541-549.
- Lippa, R., & Donaldson, S. I. (1990). Self-monitoring and idiographic measures of behavioral variability across interpersonal relationships. *Journal of Personality*, 58, 465-479.
- Lord, C.G. (1982). Predicting behavioral consistency from an individual's perception

- so situational similarities. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 42, 1076-1088.
- Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 35, 63-69.
- Markus, H., & Kunda, Z. (1986). Stability and malleability of the self-concept. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 51, 858-866.
- McPhee, R. D. Cognitive perspectives on communication: Interpretive and critical responses. In Hewes, D. E. (Ed.), *The Cognitive base of interpersonal communication*. New Jersey: Hillsdale, 1995.
- McCroskey, J. C., Hamilton, P. R., & Weiner, A. M. (1974). The effect of interaction behavior on source credibility, homophily, and interpersonal attraction. *Human Communication Research*, 1, 42-52.
- Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, self, and society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mellema, A., & Bassili, J. (1995). On the relationship between attitudes and values: Exploring the moderating effects of self-monitoring and self-monitoring schematicity. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 21, 885-892.
- Miell, D. & Le Voi, M. (1985). Self-monitoring and control in dyadic interactions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 49, 1652-1661.
- Miller, M. L., & Thayer, J. F. (1989). On the existence of discrete classes in personality: Is self-monitoring the correct joint to carve? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 57, 143-155.
- Mortimer, J. T. & Lorence, J. (1981). Self-concept stability and change from late adolescence to early adulthood. *Research in Community and Mental Health*, 2, 5-42.
- Nesler, M. S., Tedeschi, J. T., & Storr, D. M. (1995). Context effects, self-presentation, and the Self-Monitoring Scale. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 29, 273-284.
- Norton, R. W. (1978). Foundation of a communicator style construct. *Human Communication Research*, 4, 99-112.
- Norton, R. W. (1983). *Communicator style*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Nowack, W. & Kammer, D. (1987). Experimental studies of self-monitoring: Validation of the two-factor model. *European Journal of Personality*, 1, 61-77.

- Paulhus, D. (1982). Individual differences, self-presentation, and cognitive dissonance: Their concurrent operation in forced compliance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 43, 838-852.
- Richmond, L. D., Craig, S. S., & Ruzicka, M. F. (1991). Self-monitoring and marital satisfaction. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 25, 177-188.
- Rhodewalt, F., & Agustsdottir, S. (1986). Effects of self-presentation on the phenomenal self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 50, 47-55.
- Sanitioso, R., Kunda, Z., & Fong, G. T. (1990). Motivated recruitment of autobiographical memories. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 59, 229-241.
- Schanck, R. C. (1982a). Reminding and memory organization: An introduction to MOPs. In W. G. Lehnert & M. H. Ringle (Eds.), *Strategies for natural language processing*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Sherman, S. J., Skov, R. B., Hervita, E. F., & Stock, C. B. (1981). The effects of explaining hypothetical future events: From possibility to probability to actuality and beyond. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 17, 142-158.
- Snyder, M. (1974). Self-monitoring of expressive behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 30, 526-537.
- Snyder, M., Berscheid, E., & Glick, P. (1985). Focusing on the exterior and the interior: Two investigations of the initiation of personal relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 48, 1427-1439.
- Snyder, M., & Cantor, N. (1980). Thinking about ourselves and others: Self-monitoring and social knowledge. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 39, 222-234.
- Snyder, M., & DeBono, K. G. (1985). Appeals to image claims about quality: Understanding the psychology of advertising. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 49, 586-597.
- Snyder, M., & Gangestad, S. (1982). Choosing social situations: Two investigations of self-monitoring processes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 43, 123-135.
- Snyder, M., & Gangestad, S. (1986). On the nature of self-monitoring: Matters of assessment, matters of validity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 51, 125-129.

- Snyder, M., Gangestad, S., & Simpson, J.A. (1983). Choosing friends as activity partners: The role of self-monitoring. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 45, 1061-1072.
- Snyder, M. & Kendzierski, D. (1982). Acting on one's attitudes: Procedures for liking attitudes and behavior. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 18, 165-183.
- Snyder, M., & Monson, T. C. (1975). Persons, situations, and the control of social behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 32, 637-644.
- Snyder, M. & Simpson, J. A. (1984). Self-monitoring and dating relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 47, 1281-1291.
- Snyder, M. & Tanke, E. D. (1975). Behavior and attitude: Some people are more consistent than others. *Journal of Personality*, 44, 501-517.
- Sullivan, L. A., & Harnish, R. J. (1990). Body image: Differences between high and low self-monitoring males and females. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 24, 291-302.
- Swann, W. B., & Read, S. J. (1980). Self-verification processes: How we sustain our self-conceptions. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 17, 351-372.
- Zanna, M. P., Olson, J. M., & Fazio, R. H. (1980). Attitude-behavior consistency: An individual difference perspective. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 38, 432-440.