TENANT ORGANIZATION AT UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS

The tenants of University Heights, a 350-unit mixedincome, housing development in Providence, Rhode Island, organized in response to the prepayment of Section 221 (d) (3) mortgages on some 48 units, causing the displacement of 35 families. Their overwhelming success was analyzed in terms of its applicability to several frameworks provided by studies of community organization and public participation. This study has identified and explored two key elements of a successful tenant organization--leadership and cohesion. Chapter One sets forth the goals and objectives of the study, which mainly include determining the significance of these elements as part of the organization's formula for success. Chapters Two and Three provide the background for both University Heights and the tenant organization, while Chapters Four and Five apply the two elements two frameworks provided by Wireman's seven conditions for "good participation" and Edelstein and Wandersman's "tenant functions"--the role collectively played by tenants as an organization. Chapter Six will summarize the applicability of these elements to the above described frameworks and draw some general conclusions, provide an overview of lessons learned from the tenants of University Heights, and identify some of the steps that tenants of threatened subsidized rental housing might find of interest.


INTRODUCTION
"We hope our experience will other tenant groups facing threats we faced to take protect their communities" encourage the same action to Harry Platt, President Association of Tenants of University Heights

Statement of the Issue
Any discussion of affordable housing in Rhode Island will document the sharp rise in home prices and simultaneous stagnation of income that has taken place since the 1970s (RIHMFC, 1990) .
This phenomenon has been accompanied by the voting record of the U.S. Congress throughout the 1980s, which voted to double military spending while cutting funds for lowincome housing by 82 percent (Jobs With Peace Campaign, 1990) .
What is equally astounding, however, is the number of nonprofit development activities that have filled the gap left by the federal government's retreat from housing assistance programs. During this period, the number of community-based organizations, especially in the economically depressed Northeast, has increased tenfold. "According to a National

Congress for Community Economic Development survey published
in March, 1989, there are now 1,500 to 2,000 such organizations that have completed at least one housing, commercial industrial, or business enterprise development 1 project--and 35 percent are in New England states, New York, and Pennsylvania" (New England Real Estate Magazine, 1989).
Some, but not many of these CBOs have responded to one of the more troubling dimensions of the nation's housing crisis: the imminent threat to the nation's 1.9 million privatelyowned, federally-assisted, low income rental units under the Section 8, Section 23 6 and Section 221 ( d) ( 3) programs (Chung, 1988). Many of these units were constructed or rehabilitated with subsidized loans provided by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under the condition that, after 20 years, the owner of the development may prepay the mortgage and convert the uni ts within it to market-rate apartments. As these terms approach expiration--between 470,000 and 577,000 units by 1996 nationwide--the present housing crisis will only worsen (Chung, 1988) .
As it is now apparent that CBOs are taking on a central role in the provision of affordable housing, it seems possible that these two trends; the threat to the nation's rental housing stock and the large-scale emergence of CBOs; can be fused together. If CBOs were formed to organize tenants of threatened subsidized housing, two very desirable outcomes could result; first, the alleviation of the nation's affordable housing crisis and second, the empowerment of lower-income tenants of privately-owned subsidized units.
Although not much evidence proves that this alternative has become widespread, there are several indications that tenant 2 organization and empowerment through ownership are possible.
First, the emergence of the "Kennedy Bill" or the "Low Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act of 1990" has provided for assumption of ownership by tenants with a legal basis. The Act provides "tenant organizations, nonprofit sponsors, and public agencies with preemptive purchase rights with respect to any property offered for voluntary or mandatory sale" (Edson, 1990 (Milito, 1991).
Another factor is the recognition of tenant ownership as an alternative at the state level, and its subsequent inclusion as a policy option by the Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corporation (RIHMFC), also referred to as Rhode Island Housing. Rhode Island Housing is a public corporation that provides financial and program support in the development and preservation of affordable housing opportunities for low and moderate income groups (RIHMFC, 1990). The Corporation has acknowledged Rhode Island's share of the crisis--approximately 17,453 units at risk statewide-and has addressed it in a recent report.

Significance of the Study
This study will determine the feasibility of a more widespread application of ATUH's successful methods at the state level.
In light of the previously-discussed crisis facing the nation's subsidized housing stock, the success story of ATUH is certainly worthy of analysis because, if 4 simulated elsewhere, it could serve as a model of tenant empowerment and the mitigation of at least one dimension of affordable housing problems. The analysis contained herein is, therefore, may serve as a practical guide for tenant organizations faced with challenges similar to those faced by the Association of Tenants of University Heights.

Objectives and Organization of the Study
This analysis has been divided into two major sections-tenant leadership and tenant cohesion--each discussing the conditions that have been identified as major elements of a successful tenant organization. Prior to this, a background will be provided for both University Heights and the subsidized rental housing crisis at large. These two element merits consideration in the establishment and development of a successful CBO and their analysis is intended to serve as both an example of, as well as a guide to, the formation of a CBO with the purpose of acquiring funding and purchasing their places of residence from their landlords.
University Heights is unique for a number of reasons; it was made possible by the largest mortgage ever approved by Rhode Island Housing, and is the first nonprofit housing development in Rhode Island that was purchased by its tenants; it provides an excellent example of what conditions make tenant empowerment an attainable goal.
The following objectives serve as a framework around 5 wh±ch this study has been constructed. All analysis contained herein has been structured around them and has been carried out to achieve their fulfillment. They are: 1.
The identification of the major elements behind the successful formation of a tenant organization (or community-based organization) who have won the right to home ownership and the priveledges that come with it.

2.
The utilization of identified elements (i.e. leadership and cohesion) as variables by which to evaluate the emergence, development, and eventual success of ATUH.
3. The drawing of conclusions as to what lessons can be learned from ATUH's success and how this success can be simulated in other identified developments throughout Rhode Island.

4.
The identification of steps useful to potential tenant organizations based on analysis of elements and subsequent conclusions.
Since the number of nonprofit housing organizations have proliferated, they are obviously viewed as an effective tool in softening the blow, to a certain extent, of the economic downturn and housing crisis faced by the nation and, particularly, by New England.
The challenges faced by these entities can therefore be identified and evaluated by an analysis of the conditions necessary for their success.
Their applicability to University Heights varies, but these elements will be assumed to be variables by which University Heights and its success will be compared. Each will be explored comprehensively to determine its place in a . general hierarchy of importance in the context of University Heights. America that people of many backgrounds can live together" (Fawcett, 1964).
Because Lippitt Hill was completely cleared and replaced as a neighborhood by University Heights, the following historical overview will span back only three decades. Any data pertaining to previous events within the study area are irrelevant.
In addition to the origins of University Heights, this chapter will also trace the origins of ATUH and discuss its development and eventual success as a tenant organization.
What is especially significant is the full circle that has taken place in the development's purpose. It's been good for us, we've all learned and benefitted from the experience, and we want it to continue indefinitely" (Dykas, 1990).

The Origins of University Heights
Construction began on October 8, 1964 on the project, at a total of cost of $7.5 million. The 32-acre "Lippitt Hill redevelopment area" would eventually contain 349 housing units and a commercial development (Fawcett, 1964). The overall development was to be built in two phases, with an initial phase of 146 units completed by 1965, and the second phase consisting of the commercial center and additional units completed by 1967 (Fawcett, 1962 way that led us into friendships, and relationships beyond our experience, was slipping away'" (Dykas, 1990 Tigrai was able to Provide advice and assistance to ATUH, guiding them in the publication and distribution of leaflets and coordinating of tenant meetings. When ATUH's first atlarge meeting brought 35 people--a 10 percent turnout--Platt was disappointed. "This kind of turnout was encouraging," Platt was told by Tigrai. A large and cohesive show of unity took time, and a 10 percent was more than adequate for a first attempt (Platt, 1991).

Financing P1ans are Initiated
During the next two years, ATUH endured the arduous task of obtaining and compiling the necesary approvals from HUD and coordinating the complex links that made up the project's financing plan. Two components were particularly difficult to coordinate: the Approval for a Plan of Action and the Application for a Transfer of Physical Assets (TPA) .
The Plan of Action was difficult largely because of HUD's inexperience with at-risk developments. As result, recalls Michael Milito, "the process was far from streamlined" (Milito, 1990) and the HUD central office changed policies governing income eligibility a number of times during this period. For example, there were no clear guidelines set for Section 8 subsidies to tenants earning between 50 and 80 percent of the area median.
"The TPA also presented problems", recalls Milito. "ATUH was originally advised not to submit an application for TPA until a decision had been reached on its Plan of Action, on the theory that ATUH would not be able to identify its financing plan in the TPA until it knew what HUD's participation would be. This proved to be bad advice as ATUH subsequently was told that the Plan of Action could not be approved until the TPA was approved first. The bottom line is that it took HUD nearly 15 months to approve ATUH's Plan of Action" (Milito, 1990).

State and Local Government Involvement Begins
While ATUH's financing plans were being formulated with HUD, Harry Platt began approaching state and local leaders.
"It was a working plan, good enough to go to the owners with," recalls Platt "but we needed a deposit to get a six-month period to show what we could do, to show that we could pull it off, raise the money" (Dykas, 1990 Section 236, and Section 8 jurisdiction. In addition, an inventory of those rental units actually in jeopardy will be provided. This inventory will include those units among the above programs considered "very likely to prepay" and "likely to prepay" as categorized by Rhode Island Housing (RIHMFC, 1988) .

Section 221 (d) (3)
Section 221 (d) (3) was originally created to assist rental housing affordability and production. Under this program, HUD was to pay a portion of mortgage interest payments to allow owners to reduce the amount of rent charged to tenants. In addition, HUD was allowed to provide below-owners of University Heights.

Ownership of University Heights
The development is now "owned by the .. 20 market interest rates to owners in return for an agreement to set aside a number of units for low-income tenants (Chung, 1988).
"This program was criticized", according to Chung," because HUD could only lower the interest rate to one percent.
Thus, the lowest income groups were priced out of the market.
In addition, the program was not popular with the federal government because the entire amount to be loaned was included in the yearly budget" and caused considerable complications.
As a result, the Section 236 subsidy program of the Housing Act of 1968 was created to supersede this program (Chung, 1988).

Section 236
Like Section 221, the interest rate charged on a Section 236 project can be as little as one percent. It differs, however, in that it pays the subsidy to the project owner annually as opposed to buying the mortgage in its entirety at the outset. Thus, at its outset in the late 1960s, the program was initiated to create incentives for developers to construct and manage low and moderate-income housing. In this way, "mortgage interest subsidies under a host of programs and rent supplements were provided either individually or in combination to make it profitable for private intrepreneurs to produce decent housing at below-market rents". According to Chung's anal y sis: "Overall, in the 1960s federal housing assistance was designed primarily to augment the supply of housing available to low and moderate income families" ( 1988) .
This program was evaluated by the Nixon Administration in the early 1970s, and as a result, a moratorium was imposed.
A subsequent 1973 report revealed that the cost of many units subsidized by the program were higher than their actual value.
In addition, it was found that an insufficiently low number of household were being served by the program and that a substantial number of projects assisted under the program were defaulting on their loans. As a result, the moratorium imposed on the program was never lifted.
The following year, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 was enacted. This Act redefined the role that the federal government would play in housing, urban development and many other forms of assistance. It contained a new and flexible approach to housing assistance: the Section 8 subsidy program.

Section 8
This program is comprised of two sub-programs: Existing  (Chung, 1988 (Chung, 1988 (Chung, 1988 An inventory of the "very likely" and "likely to prepay" will now be provided to identify the scope of the problem on the local level.

Potential Impacts of Prepayment on Rhode Island
According to Chung, Providence would be hardest hit of all" Rhode Island communities in the event of increased mortgage prepayment. For the state, the percentage of renteroccupied housing units as of 1988 is 41 percent, while the proportion in Providence is 56.2 percent (Chung, 1988 This proportion of affected tenants further underscores the importance of tenant organization. Provided with the example of ATUH, tenants must recognize the significance of eminent prepayment on the developments in which they reside and act accordingly.
The basis for such action, as illustrated by the events of University Heights, can best be provided by the first of the six elements--strong leadership.
The following chapter will discuss the leadership style of ATUH board members, particularly its president, Harry Platt.
An overview of their leadership will culminate in the identification of what actions can--and must--be replicated in order to achieve social ownership.

STRONG LEADERSHIP
This chapter will discuss the first element--strong leadership. Al though the importance of these elements vary by organization, the leadership provided by ATUH was clearly one of the primary factors in the Association's success. seven general conditions that must exist in fostering the development of "good participation". For the purposes of this study, these will also be assumed to be conditions necessary for a strong tenant association. What is immediately apparent is the fact that these conditions must all stem from one source--the leadership provided by an individual or core group who lead the tenant organization. These conditions are: 1.
Provision of information on an ongoing basis and early in the decision-making process 2.
Availability of trusted technical assistance as an aid to understanding complicated or technical programs 3.

Regular meetings with decision makers during their deliberations
4.
An organization that is perceived by officials and neighborhood residents representative of the area both city as being

5.
An acknowledged right to participate and a clear commitment by bureaucrats to the process of citizen participation 6. Ability to achieve at least some goals on a fairly consistent basis 7. Sufficient ongoing stable financial support to relieve a group from spending most of its energies on fund raising, often on a crisis basis. (Wireman, 1984 As little can be done by associations to change government bureaucracy's perception of them, they must work around this c ondition and concentrate on the third condi tion--regular meetings with decision makers--for it is their perception (and financial support) that really counts. As a result, this will not be discussed. The six th condition, the ability to achieve goals on a regular basis, does not have direct parallels either. By no means, however, does this indicate that the consistent achievement of goals is not essential. In fact, it will be argued that incorporating this strategy can be greatly beneficial to tenant associations--especially as a tool of generating support and boosting morale. This is especially so of CBOs in search of capital.

Dissemination of Information
The leader's role as provider of information for a tenant association can be described as two-dimensional. Both lines of communication within the Association, well as lines to outside players (technical supporters, political leaders, etc.) must be managed by leaders.

A. Managing Intra-group Communications
With to sitting in at the mayor's office in order to have their 31 concerns heard" (Wireman, 1984) . No members of ATUH interact regularly with politicians, nor are they by any means uniformly middle-class. "The members of ATUH are ordinary people," asserts Platt, "not financial wizards or developer types.
We have no Wall Street merger ability, just a willingness to work hard and stay goal" (Platt, 1990 "The peer group must, above all, give life to the individual, and cooperative action directed toward a common end detracts too much from this central purpose. Moreover, West Enders are reluctant to place themselves in a leader-follower, officermember relationship, which would detract from the individuating function of the group and would also require members to assume a subordinate, if not dependent, role towards the leader. Consequently, only a highly charismatic leader seems to be able to attract followers and retain their loyalty for any length of time" (Gans, 1962) .
This situation is completely converse to the experiences of ATUH, who were able to function free of interference from other University Heights tenants. This is largely because of the fact that not all tenants (less than one third) were to be negatively affected by prepayment. As a result, the number of "chiefs" was mitigated to a minimum number, one conducive to productivity.
The reigns were, therefore, taken by ATUH without the tumult and panic that characterized the West Enders' attempts to mobilize.
"In fact," wrote Gans, "one of the reasons for the inability of the Save the West End Committee to function was the desire of most of the participants to be leaders and their unwillingness to carry out the routine tasks required.
The familiar complaint of community organizations everywhere--'too many Chiefs and no Indians'--is perhaps nowhere more true than among people like the West Enders" (Gans, 1962 (Dykas, 1990).

Perception bv Citv Officials and Residents that the Organization is Representative of the Area
Yet another responsibility of tenant association leadership is forming a group with goals and policies that truly represents the interests of the people who reside there.
Wireman's condition, therefore, should go beyond calling for the "perception" of proper representation and mandate actual representation.
In the case of ATUH, the board members were "an ordinary group of tenants with no particular real estate background or expertise. The group was a cross-section of the University Heights community and included a salesman, a printer, broadcaster, several clerical workers and a few retired persons" (Platt, 1990 This chapter will provide an overview and analysis of cohesion as it influenced--and continues to influence-~the dynamics of tenant empowerment as displayed by ATUH. It will be divided into three parts, each of which cover some of the fundamental dimensions of tenant cohesion. The first part will describe centripetal forces that determine the degree of cohesion ultimately achieved by a tenant group. They include conditions identified by Edelstein and Wandersman (1987) in their framework as sparking cohesion, which will be presented to outline some circumstances that facilitate t e nant cohesion. This framework will describe how external threats galvanize tenant or community relations . Incorporating the first two factors, the third part will examine the essential collective role that tenants play in providing support to the organization's leadership. Whatever the causes and characteristics of its formation, a tenant organization's main body plays a vital collective role in its success. As Wireman's seven criterion served as the framework for describing the tasks of tenant leadership, the "unwritten" functions assigned to tenants will be analyzed using a framework provided by Edelstein and Wandersman in their study of Legler, New Jersey residents and their collective response to the contamination of their drinking water.
These functions differ from the specified roles of tenant 41 leadership in that they are more broad and undefined.
They are less tasks or jobs than vague "conditions" that must exist in the collective character of a development's tenants. These functions, as described by Edelstein and Wandersman, are: 1. Social Support 2.
Sources of Information 3.

Sources of Power
Other tenant and neighborhood groups have historically faced such varying threats as urban renewal in Boston (Gans, 1962) and New York City (Davies, 1966) or "neighborhood rehabilitation" in Israel (Churchman, 1984), rent increases in Berkeley (Clavel, 1986) and New York City (Spencer, 1981), and contamination of drinking water, as was described in the article that provided the above framework. Each of these support Edelstein and Wandersman's findings that the above functions have a significant degree of influence on the success (or lack thereof) of a tenant organization.
An overview of these dimensions of tenant cohesion is intended to complement the functions of tenant leadership described in the previous chapter. Before a discussion of tenant cohesion, however, it is important that certain terms used in this chapter be clarified.
Research for this study raised such terms as "community organization", "neighborhood organization", "tenant organization", and "public participation "--all of which were applicable, to a certain extent, to University Heights. It became apparent, however, that the situations described by these terms varied greatly in 42 scope.
For instance, tenant organization as described by Spencer (1981)

A Clarification of Terms
A large number of studies .have documented the importance of the role that public participation and neighborhood cohesion (e.g. Clavel, 1986;Churchman, 1987) have played in bringing about effective change in communities of varying sizes and makeup. In discussing tenant cohesion in the case of University Heights, however, it is important to begin by clarifying definitions.
The terms "neighborhood cohesion" and "tenant cohesion" will be used interchangeably, as the development replaced a neighborhood--Lippitt Hill--and assumed the basic functions 43 that this previous neighborhood served.
These functions include the provision of a place to rear children, housing, a delivery point for a variety of administrative and political services, an economic base, and social relationships (Wireman, 1984 identity as a neighborhood. Additional clarification is necessary in defining such terms as "public participation", as well as determining the difference between "neighborhood organization" and "community organization". As the actions of ATUH display many of the characteristics of organization described by Edelstein and Wandersman (1987); Churchman (1987); Gans (1962);Davies (1966); and Boyte (1981) meetings are held, as a base for support) and "organizing people for power", which Boyte described as motivating people by appealing to "their own directly perceived self-interest on concrete issues". This is apparent in ATUH' s success in forming alliances "across a broad range of opinion", i.e. the ability to appeal to all spectrums of University Heights' racial, cultural, ethnic and class makeup.
"Community organization", therefore, often takes place on a citywide or even regional scale, uniting people with same interests. "Neighborhood organization" (or, in this case, "tenant organization") refers to shared goals for a defined neighborhood and efforts to achieve those goals collectively.
While many of the tactics and principles that apply to community organization also apply to organization on the neighborhood level, it is important to distinguish the potential for wider scope in community organization.
The other principal difference between the two is the wider range of issues that are taken up by community organizations. Neighborhood organizations form in response to issues that have an impact on neighborhoods as geographic locations. ATUH, for instance, formed because of shared concern by University Heights tenants that their "way of life would be forever changed" (Platt, 1990) Therefore, such issues as rent increases, environmental threats (as in the The last clarification necessary is the definition of "public participation''. This is because much of the literature cited in this study (e.g. Clavel, 1986) include discussions of public or "community participation" in terms of progressive governments that encourage such participation.
Thus, while some of the principles of public or "mass" participation are applicable to ATUH, some degree of caution was necessary with the use of terminology. This caution was necessary for precisely the same reason the difference between "neighborhood" and "community organization" had to be clarified--a problem of scope. This is best illustrated in the difficulty finding appropriate literature under "public participation" during a literature review for this study. It became apparent that an incredibly wide variety of scenarios were included under this heading. Such participation could include tenant participation, but could also include the "mass participation" that characterized movements of much larger scale.
Examples of this include the cities of Hartford, Cleveland, and Santa Monica and their inclusion of mass citizen participation as public policy (Clavel, 1986).

Centripeta1 Forces That Determine the Extent of Tenant Cohesion
When a group of tenants are confronted by some form of threat, they do something they might not otherwise do--they form an alliance. As Platt will attest, "we only organized because we were so angry with [the previous owners of University Heights] " (Platt, 1990) . Al though some superficial signs of friendship based on proximity often exist, as described by Fischer (Wireman,1987), tenants or neighbors are often not drawn together until faced by a shared threat.
The dynamics of this phenomenon are best illustrated by Edelstein and Wandersman's overview of community response to toxic Gontamination in the case of Legler. "As the result of the announcement of toxic exposure, the affected community is thrown into turbulence.
In their attempts to cope with this turbulence, residents of affected areas turn naturally to key components of their social environments: a.) the 'social network' or e x isting group of friends or relatives who can normally be expected to offer assistance or support in the face of crisis; and b.) the 'institutional network' of government agencies that is believed to be responsible for citizens in need" (1983).
The following are elements of the framework which makes up Edelstein and Wandersman's study of community organization in Legler. These elements have been applied on a point-bypoint basis to University Heights and the formation of ATUH.
As will be seen, some elements conform more than others.
Overall, however, there are considerable similarities between the mobilization patterns of the residents of Legler and the tenants of University Heights.

ENVIRONMENTAL TURBULENCE LEGLER RESIDENTS
Problem Characterized By:

1.
Disruption of everyday life from anticipatory fears and the complexities of the situation.

PREPAYMENT OF MORTGAGES -UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS (ATUH)
Displacement occurs, causing panic among tenants. Unfamiliarity with complexities of mortgage payments compounds this.

2.
Outsiders who are expected to help may display contradictory interests and actions 3.
An overall scarcity of resources for solving the problem faced by the affected population.

INITIAL COPING EFFORTS
Seeking of assistance and support from: Social Networks "Support from one's social network is commonly identified as essential to attempts to cope with a variety of stressful situations."

49
Platt's unsuccessful initial attempts to convince City and State leaders that rent control was necessary. Their response indicated a reluctance to interfere with this regard.
This could be interpreted as a conflict of interest on the part of the Mayor and Governor, both of whom have close ties to real estate and development.
Before the forming of ATUH's relationship with RILS, Project Basic, RIHMFC and the Community Builders, they had no financial or technical resources available to them.

(ATUH)
Tenants--especially longtime tenants utilized related networks (e.g. church) as a basis for their organization. This is illustrated by close ties between ATUH and the church.

2.
Institutional Networks People respond to environmental turbulence by seeking information and assistance from those having institutional roles commonly believed to give them e x pertise, power and responsibility to address the situation.

Made up of:
(LEGLER) Environmental Characteristics Noise, density of housing, desirability of the area Ecological Characteristics geographic factors, size, boundaries 50 Ex emplified by ATUH's efforts to seek help from community organizations, lenders, and City and State government-perceived as institutions that could provide them with the expertise and support necessary to preserve security of tenure at University Heights.

(ATUH)
Design features that encourage human interaction (e.g. common courtyards, high quality of grounds and units are all potential contributors to tenant cohesion. The insular design of University Heights (e.g. all units facing common courtyard) , isolation from other neighborhoods (from barriers such as wide roads, fences may also contribute to tenant. "Sarason (1974) suggested that the ingredients of sense of community are: "the perception of similarity to others, an acknowledged interdependence with others, a willingness to maintain this interdependence by giving to or doing for others what one expects from them, the feeling that one is part of a larger dependable and stable structure" (p. 157).

Neighboring and Formal
Organizations "After [the residents of Legler] were notified of the contamination, neighborhood communication became an important element in the residents' coping.

51
Interviews with Platt and Hebert (1991) indicated an interdependence between tenants (such as cooperation with regard to security at the development), satisfaction with the degree of integration achieved (Platt, 1990(Platt, , 1991 and that tenure of stability at the development was of primary importance.
As discussed earlier, centripetal forces, such as the threat of tenure security are an important factor in an organization's formation.

(LEGLER)
Stone and Levine's comparison of activists and nonactivists (1985): "In aggregating the social characteristics of the "activists", we arrive at the generalization of people . with new roots with the community.
They were not the old timers who had lived in the community from the beginning. They were also not the youngest members of the neighborhood, nor those who had lived there the least amount of time. They were "rooted" in the community, having lived there for several years, owning homes and employed. They had moderate incomes, and as income increased, so did the tendency to activism."

(ATUH)
The situation at University Heights differs from Stone and Levine in several respects: Those most involved in the organization of tenants at University Heights were those who had lived there the longest and those who has live in the development for the shortest amount of time.
Income ranges of those involved also differed. Some were working professionals, others were retired seniors on fixed incomes. There was no correlation between higher incomes and higher degrees of tenant activism.

LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
Organizational Structure van Eijndhoven and Nieuwdorp's (1985) findings that community organizations varied in their structure from highly centralized and hierarchical to consensual decentralized structure.
Eg.,Love Canal, run principally by a core of key members yet frequent broad participatory action undertaken by affected residents.

Leaders and Leadership
Eg., Legler, in which its Concerned Citizen's Committee formed around a core of local activists. Edelstein's (1982) findings that the majority of work in community organization in Legler was undertaken by a few key people, namely the executive board. Most other residents attended meetings, but did little else.
Tenant organization at University Heights conformed to the former structure described by van Eijnhoven and Nieuwdorp. The tenant body of University Heights ranged from a small core of dedicated tenants to a substantial group who had little or no involvement with ATUH.
(Adapted from: Edelstein and Wandersman, 1983) "Planned" Organization In Britain: Tenant Acquisition Without the Threat of Prepayment While Edelstein and Wandersman's findings indicate that circumstances dictate a development's potential for tenant organization, an alternative is offered by Colin Ward (1974) in his study of tenant purchases of government-owned subsidized housing in Britain.
In his argument for the transfer of municipal housing from local county councils to tenants, Ward (1974) claims that the tax structure and housing policy of Britain in the late 1960s and early 1970s put home renters at a considerable disadvantage: "A friend of mine who bought a house less than 10 years ago sold it two years ago.
With the untaxed profits he bought himself another house on mortgage, bought a new car, bought a small shop, and even collected rents from a flat above the shop. On top of that he got a better tax subsidy on his new mortgage. I don't know any council tenant who has been able to use his tenancy to g e t a higher subsidy, a new car, shop, and rent income from a flat" (1974).
Ward goes on to describe a carefully contrived plan outlined by the tenants of Monkwick, in Essex, to purchase the council housing in which they live.
Unlike the numerous examples cited previously, the tenants' response was not a "kneejerk" reaction to a shared threat, but a rational approach to what they deemed an unacceptable circumstance.
Their story was recounted in the local paper: "Council tenants have made a 300 million pound off er to Colchester town council to buy the 1000 houses on Monkwick estate. The Tenants' Association ... wants to develop the estate as a housing association run on community lines. "The tenants have worked out that the move would put about 30 shillings a week on the rents, immediately, but payments could be frozen at this figure for five years. They said that the council's fund would gain over 100,000 pounds per year. Instead of receiving a b out 128,000 pounds a year in rents and government subsidy, they would receive 234,000 pounds a year in mortgages on a 40-year contract .... Although private tenants have bought blocks of flats on a co-ownership system, nobody has ever bought an entire council estate" (p. 77).
Thus, the tenants of Monkwick estate purchased their development to empower themselves, yet did so without the sense of urgency that was apparent in ATUH' s purchase of University Heights.
While unforeseen circumstances (e.g. a slumping housing market) were helpful in ATUH' s success, tenants elsewhere may not be as fortunate.
Monkwick, therefore, provides an example of planned tenant organization, of which the principal advantage is an acquisition process unhindered by the hasty mobilization of tenants upon discovering that their tenancy is threatened.

Tenant Functions
As Chapter Four discussed the various responsibilities placed upon a tenant organization's leadership, an outline of the role that tenants collectively play is appropriate.
Whatever the circumstances of their formation and whatever their makeup, each tenant organization consists of a body of residents who form an essential part of the organization.
Providers of Social Support 2.
Sources of Information 3.

Sources of Power
These functions will be discussed in the general sense as well as in the context of University Heights.

Social Support
As Edelstein and Wandersman note of the dynamics of mutual tenant support: "In pulling together to address their common problems, [communities] not only build an organization, but they build relationships as well" (1987). In this sense, the bond shared by those in a similar situation, i.e. the threat of displacement, becomes an essential means of social and psychological support for tenants.
One of the more interesting points raised by this analysis is the conclusion that those least affected are least likely to become actively involved in an organization. This is not so in the case of ATUH, who were made up of a number of tenants from market rate apartments and were not affected by prepayment.
Evidence, therefore, indicates that the social support provided by the tenants--particularly longtime residents--is strong. This conflict with Edelstein and Wandersman's findings only indicates that more research is needed to understand the networks and support structures that evolve from the threat of displacement.
In summary, one of the apparent outcomes of threatened displacement is the development of new sources of social support among tenants. This occurs through a phenomenon described as "neighboring, which accompanies and influences the sense of community and participation in a grass roots effort to address the problem" (1987).

Source of Information
One of the inevitable outcomes of mutual social support is the sharing of information. This sharing of information works largely through informal networks, and subsequent rumors that were generated often had to be clarified by organization leaders. When asked about their sources of information and their opinion of them during their crisis, the residents of Legler responded that the only source that they considered reliable was the organization's leadership (1987).
This indicates that, when faced by a threat such as imminent displacement, tenants tend to close ranks and lend additional support through the provision of information. When the tenants of University Heights approached the development's previous owners after hearing rumors of prepayment, they were told that no such thing would occur (Platt, 1991 One of these reasons is the tradition of the "American Dream", an anachronism carried down in popular culture from a time of economic growth and seemingly unlimited resources.
Unfortunately, the American Dream is now an unattainable one for many. One of the results of this is the innovative nonprofit sector that has emerged to lend support to lower income groups who cannot fend for themselves in the depressed economy of the 1990s.

Goals Addressed by the Study
While the threat of prepayment seems unlikely under current economic conditions, this issue must be addressed to prepare tenants of subsidized rental housing for the next real estate boom. This chapter will address the goals that were laid out in the Introduction and discuss them in the context of University Heights and the achievements of ATUH, the wider scope of subsidized rental housing mortgage prepayment, and the functions and conditions that were provided by Wireman (1984) and Edelstein and Wandersman (1987).

1.
The identification of the major elements behind the successful formation ·of a tenant organization (or community-based organization) who have won the right to home ownership and the privileges that come with it. This is also the case with leadership's regular meetings with decision makers during their deliberations, the third condition discussed by Wireman. Representation--provided by the CBO' s leadership--is again the key element. As the support of political leaders is of the utmost importance in the complex negotiations involved, the syndrome of "too many Chiefs and no Indians" described by Gans (1962), must be avoided.
Leadership's importance relative to cohesion displayed t tenants is again raised when the organization is faced wi the task of proving to both city officials and neighborh 63 \ \ residents that the organization is representative of the area, the fourth condition. In the case of University Heights, this was achieved by a display of unity among residents of market rate and subsidized units alike. ATUH recognized that only by creating an association serving the best interests of all tenants were they to be viewed as legitimate in the eyes of political leaders, lenders and other key allies. It would be considerably more difficult for a less organized group to take these factors into consideration and have the self-perception to address them. What is most significant about each of these conditions is their illustration of leadership's importance relative to a mere cohesion. The lesson provided by University Heights and ATUH is primarily that a small group of tenants with coordination and focus will achieve more than a large group without these attributes. In other words, an organization's size is of secondary importance to the qualities inherent in its leadership.
The dismal failure of West End tenants to organize effectively, as described by Gans, provides  While alternative methods of home ownership are slowly gaining acceptance, the tenants of several hundred thousand subsidized units whose mortgages could be prepaid will more than likely not respond until they face imminent displacement.
This was certainly the case .at University Heights. As Platt indicated, it was anger and resentment toward the previous owners of University Heights that sparked ATUH's actions.

2.
The utilization of identified elements (i.e. leadership and cohesion) as variables by which to evaluate the emergence, development, and eventual success of ATUH.
recourse is available to them. Although ATUH did not follow through with their lawsuit, a new source of tenancy protection was identified. Besides protection from Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as discuss e d in Chapter Two, the Kennedy Bill also provides protection in that it gives tenants of subsidized rental housing first priority at the purchase of the development if it is offered up for sale.
Several additional lessons are worth noting, as provided by ATUH President Harry Platt.
"First, that a group of tenants with drive determination, and organization can succeed, against great odds, in gaining control of their own housing.
Second, important and timely assistance provided by dedicated nonprofit agencies and organizations is available to tenant groups who wish to take on the challenge of gaining control of their own housing.
Finally, and most important, any group of tenants who work hard and stick together can achieve these same results" {Platt, 1990).

The identification of steps useful to potential tenant organizations based on analysis of elements and subsequent conclusions.
First, tenants should evaluate the stability of their tenancy.
By looking at the indicators which would determine the degree of risk to which a deve l opment is exposed, some basic conclusions can be drawn.
Second, tenants should decide whether ownership is worth pursuing even if their development is not threatened. The benefits of social ownership e x ist whether displacement is imminent or not.
Third, potential candidates for tenant organization leadership should be reviewed.
If no one among the tenant body will commit themselves, acquisition is unlikely.
Finally, technical support should be actively sought. Several key areas must be addressed. These include real estate and development assistance, legal assistance and community organization assistance. As Platt noted, these forms of assistance are available, but must be sought.
In conclusion, it should be noted that ATUH' s purchase of University Heights does not mean they lived "happily ever after".
In their first meeting since ATUH's purchase of University Heights, Harry Platt noted that ATUH's ownership had presented a whole new set of problems. Platt refers to these problems, however, as "challenges''. Despite frequent phone calls at odd hours and the newly acquired task of working out democratic agreements on which cable channels University Heights will receive, Platt and other ATUH members are proud of their achievement and all agree that the benefits of social ownership outweigh the sense of helplessness that characterized the previous phase of their tenancy at University Heights. By their purchase, ATUH were able to prove that the American Dream is still attainable, only in a form more adaptive to minimal government intervention and economic instability.