OFF THE HIP: A THERMODYNAMICS OF THE COOL

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OFF THE HIP: A THERMODYNAMICS OF THE COOL

BY

REBECCA KANOST

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation asserts that the cool’s significance in 20th-century American culture exceeds that assigned to it by current critiques. It assays a rhetorical model which describes coolness as stillness in behavior that surprises witnesses, given the assumptions they make about the still person and context for his or her behavior. Such stillness agitates witnesses’ normative assumptions about all those in the rhetorical situation, including assumptions about affect, gender, race, class and sexuality. Agitation may also lead to conjecture about what mindset could produce cool behavior. To test this model I investigate representations of coolness in James Baldwin’s short story, “Going to Meet the Man” (1965), Andy Warhol’s film The Chelsea Girls (1966), Shirley Clarke’s film Portrait of Jason (1967) and contemporaneous projects, William S. Burroughs’ novel Naked Lunch (1959), and Sam Greenlee’s novel The Spook Who Sat by the Door (1969). Baldwin invests a Civil Rights activist’s cool behavior with power to agitate the fetishizing racist psyche of a white policeman and associates cool with ethical authority to call others into being. In his public image and films, Warhol uses shame to produce an unexpectedly still position of shamelessness. Clarke’s Portrait of Jason features similar shamelessness and locates a locus of stillness in unexpected and unseen knowledge a con artist deploys and in unexpected performance of queerly mobile affect. Asking why Clarke filmed Jason Holliday rather than herself to contest cinéma verité’s assumptions leads this inquiry to consider her attempts to film females with coolly “kaleidoscopic” effects like those of Portrait. Secret agency emerges as a still locus of being in Naked Lunch and The Spook Who Sat By The Door that stresses how individuals have been imagined in Postwar America.
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CHAPTER 1

COOL AND ITS POWER TO AGITATE

The Oxford English Dictionary (2011) demonstrates that cool was used as an adjective to metaphorically describe human behavior in texts as early as Beowulf. I find that this array of usage for the most part depends on cool behavior’s recognition within a rhetorical situation: in most cases, witnesses describe an individual’s behavior as cool precisely because it defies their expectations of how that person should act in the specific circumstances at hand. For example, one is “cool under fire” because we expect someone who is under fire to display fear and anxiety, and yet the cool person does not. Cool most often refers to how much affect or emotion we imagine a person feels: one seems unmoved, shows no agitation when cool. But within the rhetorical context that constitutes behavior as cool, witnesses observe behavior rather than any actual feeling, and they measure it against their expectations. Cool’s stillness can also characterize more than affect: to audaciously stand one’s ground can be read as cool without considering the affect, if any, displayed. Witnesses may make assumptions about what a cool person feels or about what mindset or personal history enables that person to behave coolly, but access or clues to that person’s consciousness are most often obscured precisely by the fixity and unmoving nature of his or her behavior. Cool’s stillness thus agitates by disrupting the expectations and assumptions that shape witnesses’ mindsets, and that in turn can provoke conjecture about why and how
a person behaves thus so unexpectedly cool. A paradoxical reaction occurs in that stillness begets its opposite--agitation. Sometimes that agitation leads to further cool as the person agitated seeks ways to decrease that agitation.

For example, the epitome of cool in the 1950s, jazz artists Charlie Parker and Dizzy Gillespie displayed intellectual and creative mastery in their art while improvising at speed. Lesser musicians’ foolish attempts to jam with the pair (MacAdams 44-45) suggest how effortless that mastery seemed, and how exceptional their state while producing it must have been. That apparent lack of effort--its stillness, its lack of agitation--contributes to their cool. Gillespie’s and Parker’s genius, especially marked by the spontaneity required of improvisation, suggested to observers that an exceptional state of mind or being produced it. Other kinds of rhetorical situations may produce behavior that is cool as I define it, although such behavior has less often been construed as such: In a rhetorical situation where a non-violent Civil Rights activist faces violence, yet neither ceases campaigning nor responds with violence, such behavior--by virtue of its fixed continuation and the stillness of its non-violence--disrupts witnesses’ expectations—that anyone in the situation would fight back, or flee, or—in order to protect the self—stop campaigning. Construing cool behavior in this way requires that someone recognize it as such, and that this recognition includes the disruption—the agitation--of normative expectations, whether or not such a witness is fully conscious of that agitation or responds to it consciously.

Although I focus on recognition between individuals, recognizing one’s own behavior as cool can also agitate one’s norm-driven expectations for that behavior. Thus, witnessing the cool can occur at intra-subjective interfaces between behavior
and the consciousness that reads them. For example, in her essay “Audacity,” dream hampton describes the fearlessness with which, as a young teen, she successfully fought off three rapists for over 15 minutes (8). Through her lack of fear and the actions it enabled, she discovered an audacious form of cool in her own behavior (9).

This rhetorical model I describe does not contradict current theorization of the cool as a feature of African and African-American cultural productions and aesthetics, as white appropriation of those productions, as an advertising ploy that commodifies rebellion, or reification of heteronormative sex roles. Its rhetorical focus, however, illuminates the cool’s operation and significance in American imaginaries of the 1950s and 1960s in ways that exceed those formulations. To develop these ideas, I will read five works from the 1950s and 1960s: James Baldwin’s story, “Going To Meet The Man” (1965), Andy Warhol’s film The Chelsea Girls (1966), Shirley Clarke’s film Portrait of Jason (1967), William S. Burroughs’ novel Naked Lunch (1958), and Sam Greenlee’s novel The Spook Who Sat By The Door (1969).

Etymology

In English, words signifying temperature have functioned metaphorically to describe affective displays and states for hundreds of years. The Oxford English Dictionary provides instances from Beowulf and Chaucer of the figurative use of cool as adjective to describe calm behavior. The 1500s provide similar figurative uses, some of which focus on a lack of affective display under circumstances that would seem to dictate that emotion be visibly shown: coolness is demonstrated in a situation that norm-driven expectations dictate should provoke a “hot” or visibly impassioned response. First used in 1723, a related sense emphasizes defiance of behavioral norms
that earlier usage only implied: “assured and unabashed where diffidence and hesitation would be expected; composedly and deliberately audacious or impudent in making a proposal, demand, or assumption.” The uncertain (1884 or 1918) first use that the OED notes as specifically originating in the U.S. also includes performance driven by an assured sensibility: “Attractively shrewd or clever; sophisticated, stylish, classy; fashionable, up to date; sexually attractive.” Cool’s American use as a noun that signifies “Composure, relaxedness; poise, self-control. Esp. in to keep (also blow, lose) one's cool” (from 1964) is related to an 1823 British use that signifies the “cool customer [...] a person who is calm and composed, esp. where alarm, dismay, or diffidence would be expected.” Other American senses, which the OED cites as first used in 1933 (“admirable, excellent”) and 1942 (“cool cat”) are both associated with jazz.

Thinking About the Cool

In 20th-century America, behavior marked as cool received increasing attention that arose out of African-American jazz and blues cultures’ burgeoning popularity and influence. As Beat writers and mass culture, with its focus on middle-class whites, appropriated, adapted, commodified and marketed their perceptions of the African-American urban hipster’s language and mannerisms, cool came to characterize youthful male rebellion against conformity to bourgeois norms. Marlon Brando as rebel biker in The Wild One (Laslo Benedek, 1953), Jack Kerouac’s Dean Moriarty in On the Road (1955), and Allen Ginsberg’s hipster geniuses in “Howl” (1956) formed in the wake of brilliant masters of jazz art and style, especially Lester Young, Charlie Parker, and Miles Davis. In The Birth of the Cool (2001), Lewis MacAdams describes coolness as, at root, defiance (20): defiance of racist stereotypes (24), defiance of fear,
of class prejudice, and defiance of white middle-class culture’s lack of style and passion (20)—a defiance which Norman Mailer (1959) famously articulated in his essay “The White Negro.” MacAdams cites scholars who trace cool American styles of behavior to the African American man who maintains an affectless demeanor while subjected to racist denigration and torture (20), either to protect himself or a loved one from further, possibly lethal attack that a show of rage might elicit, or to deny his tormentor-audience the satisfaction of witnessing an effect that the tormentor could then read as intersubjectively confirming the terms of his mastery. A display of agitation would signify that the tormentor has exercised power over the victim’s “interior,” invasively controlling private zones of subjectivity. Cool self-possession demonstrates that the tormentor lacks that power. This example points to a racialized America’s focus on control over black men’s bodies (and sexual relations) (Mercer, 1991, 1993; Tate 2003), a focus that also permeates white appropriations of the hip and cool that, like Mailer’s, had no conscious racist intent— that in fact assumed they evinced an anti-racist stance.

In the interval between 20th-century world wars, Joel Dinerstein finds two major representations of the cool developing, one beginning with jazz saxophonist Lester Young and the other rooted in film noir’s male protagonists. For Dinerstein, “the mask of cool” evinced by the latter’s “Euro-American male protagonists became an emblem of lost ideologies and the quest for meaning” to a white working-class audience whose work ethic and sense of stability had been deeply undermined by the Depression (“Postwar” n.pag.). He notes how Humphrey Bogart’s breakout role in High Sierra (Raoul Walsh, 1941) was that of a criminal who would have been assigned the role of
simple villain in earlier films, but in 1941 is the tough survivor haunted by bitter past disappointments ("Postwar" n.pag.). In keeping with Ralph Ellison’s assertion that “a musician created ‘a definition of his identity: as individual, as member of the collectivity and as a link in the chain of [artistic and ethnic] tradition’” with “‘each solo flight, or improvisation’” (qtd. in Dinerstein “Postwar” n.pag.), Dinerstein says that “in postwar jazz, the mask of cool allowed the individual musician to create an identity in the midst of deep emotional excavation manifested in extensive improvisational creativity” (“Postwar” n.pag.). While he makes extensive claims about the subjectivity of the jazz artist and film noir leading man, “the mask” and its surrounds shape witnesses’ reading of those “interior” conditions. He cites how the protagonist of Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952) observes a trio of zoot-suiters walking in Harlem and “going forward, their black faces secret [...] outside of historical time...men of transition whose faces were immobile (qtd. in Dinerstein “Postwar” n.pag.). Dinerstein associates their cool-as-mask with the fact that “until the late 1970s” they figure masculinity in transition away from “a coherent narrative of Western civilization,” “[attracting] audiences drawn to an edgier, complex vision of post-Christian, post-Western individuality” (“Postwar” n.pag.). Coolness becomes a strategic withdrawal during periods of instability as much as a rebellion against authority.

Cultural critics have tended to problematize popular notions of the cool because they have often emerged out of appropriating African-American art and style without adequately crediting and paying the artists who originated them (Davis, 2003, 2012; Tate 2003). Moreover, representations of African Americans as hip and cool designed for mass audiences tend to sexualize them (Mercer 1993; Tate 2003), as
Mailer’s essay does so famously in describing the “Negro hipster,” ostensibly the object of admiration. Mailer’s conception of this hipster is one whom racism has confined in the margins of economic, intellectual and social spaces and who has compensated for that confinement by developing “animal,” irrational qualities Mailer associates with jazz and orgasm, and by further ridding himself of inhibition with drugs (339-341). That popular culture has continued to represent African Americans as sexualized objects is evident in how many hip hop artists choose to present and market themselves, encouraged by profits that speak of a large white audience’s desire for such representations (West 181; Tate 2003).

Robert Farris Thompson traces the trans-Atlantic development of an aesthetic rooted in West-African cultures’ notions of the cool in Aesthetic of the Cool: Afro-Atlantic Art and Music (2011). He describes complex ways that West African dancers balance the contrapuntally interacting movements of their different body parts and the similarly complex rhythms to which they dance, while those dances offer moral and cultural commentary: “The time resistant dances of the cool form a kind of prayer: May humanity be shielded from the consequences of arrogance and the penalties of impatience” (6-7). Thompson finds that such dances enact and articulate a “basic West African/Afro-American metaphor of moral aesthetic accomplishment, the concept of cool” as most often considered “control, having the value of composure in the individual context, social stability in the context of the group. These concepts are often linked to the sacred usage of water and chalk […] as powers which purify…by return to freshness, to immaculate concentration of mind, to the artistic shaping of matter and societal happening” (16). Unlike the image of an adolescent in black leather who re-
bels against societal pressures to conform, this notion speaks of rejuvenating and improving the individual and group and is consonant with Ellison’s notion of the jazz musician “as individual, as member of the collectivity and as a link in the chain of [artistic and ethnic] tradition”’ (qtd. in Dinerstein “Postwar” n.pag.). Thompson traces aesthetic cool into the 21st century in visual art, dance and music by artists such as Jean-Michel Basquiat (78) and Capoeirista dancers in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and Newark, NJ.

In keeping with Thompson’s work, Rebecca Walker introduces Black Cool: A Thousand Streams of Blackness (2012), by arguing for a new conception of “Black Cool” (xv) as a source of power unmarred by racist stereotypes and associated with west African modes that predate American cool and do not form around reactions against oppressive power. She presents President Obama as an exemplar of such cool (xiv), marked by “audacity” and “propelled by an unstoppable force,” but also possessing a “reserve [that] is mesmerizing” (xv). Because many of the essays collected in the book are autobiographical, they represent coolness as characterizing individuals’ behavior in specific situations or environments, or as occurring at the interface between specific individuals and mass culture. While some essays consider familiar problems related to coolness as a component at play in mass culture, like Michaela Angela Davis’ “Resistance,” which criticizes whites’ appropriation and analysis of African-American art and style, others provide unexpected versions of individuals’ cool, such as Mat Johnson’s description of himself as a “geek” with “an overwhelming passion for the idiosyncratic intellectual crush” (11).
In their book *Cool Pose* (1992), Richard Majors and Janet Mancini Billson also ascribe west African antecedents to “a repertoire of black styles, including cool pose [that] has sprung from a unique fusion of African heritage with the legacy of a ruthless slave system” (55) in the US. They note that the titles of fifteenth-century rulers from what are now Benin and Nigeria included terms signifying cool temperature to metaphorically describe those leaders’ behavior and being; they also cite a similar sixteenth-century Yoruba use of words signifying cool. Similar to the notions Thompson traces, these examples provide insight into an “idea of cool” which “bears a spiritual meaning: sense of control, symmetry, correct presentation of self, and sophistication,” and “a part of character—*ashe*” (Majors & Mancini 57). They describe *ashe* as “a noble confidence and mystic coolness of character [...that] reveals an inner spirituality and peace that marks the strongest of men” (Majors & Mancini 58). They focus their book, however, on contemporary African American men’s cool behavior as an adaptive assertion of power and self-possession in the face of racist economic and social institutions and conditions structured to subjugate them (38-39). This urban “cool pose” of the 1980s and 1990s is multi-faceted but rooted in displaying the ability to remain in control during conflict and other social situations, rather than sincerely displaying emotion. Such a display of feeling would defeat its own purpose by opening the cool person to authoritarian surveillance (39) or to the condescension of an anthropologizing gaze (40). Majors and Mancini say that coolness, however, can also be maladaptive when it becomes habitual and prevents young men from articulating the full range of their feelings to themselves or others (40, 43).
Thomas Frank (1997) maintains that from the early 1950s on, corporate marketers recognized and used the appeal of rebellion against conformity to sell products as they themselves rebelled against a business “culture that envisioned a world of scarcity…, hard work, self-denial…, sacrifice, and character” which they sought to replace with an approach that stressed “‘pleasure, self fulfillment, and play’” (Warren Susman qtd. in Frank 19). The middle-class consumers who believed the myth that they were pressured to conform to mind-numbing bourgeois values—what Frank calls “the Mailer thesis—that hip constitutes some kind of fundamental adversary to a joyless, conformist consumer capitalism” (17) failed to recognize how their consumerism was guided by advertising that stressed “accelerated obsolescence and[…]change” as figured by the overarching concept of “youthfulness” (Frank 27). Frank therefore focuses on how marketers figured products as “hot” because they are hip—and “cool” only in the sense that they are fashionable in a hip way. Even so, I find Frank’s criticism of cultural studies useful; he describes its practitioners as “[tending] to limit their inquiries so rigorously to the consumption of culture-products that the equally important process of cultural production is virtually ignored” (18-19), while they also ascribe to updated versions of “the Mailer thesis,” which leads them to “overlook the trends, changes, and intricacies of corporate culture, regarding it as a monolithic, unchanging system” that is the source of oppression (Frank 18). These views encourage me to consider the motley array of means by which avant-garde films were funded and produced and the impact of The Chelsea Girl’s anomalous commercial success. More particularly, it suggests ways to consider how Sam Greenlee’s The Spook Who Sat By
The Door depicts revolution in relation to job training, competent work performance, and effective organizational structure.

Poet David Meltzer also explores the commodification and popularization of Beat culture (392-396, 399-400), which, in his youth when he was a “bebop true believer” (398), he conceived of very differently. Nilgin Yusuf, in analyzing a shirt sporting the image of Robert DeNiro’s character in Taxi Driver (Martin Scorsese 1976), asserts how the cool rebel—the outcast risk-taker—has become an image on a product whose purchase belies any authentic claim to outsider status. Jim MacGuigan (2009) notes how its cool has contributed to African-American popular art’s influential “cultural capital” around the world (92), but without sufficiently altering the economic conditions for most urban African Americans whose culture produces that art (98-99). For MacGuigan, coolness has ultimately come to characterize “the almighty brand” (199). He claims that “brands may be cool by definition, but ‘cool’ itself is almost impossible to define....To try to say exactly what it is, is uncool. The allure of brand, then, is a kind of psychological magic, hard to explain, yet effective” (199).

In Cool Men and the Second Sex, Susan Fraiman describes how ostensibly progressive cultural figures such as Quentin Tarantino and theorists like Judith Butler privilege a version of the cool male—albeit unintentionally, in ways that reify normative constructions of women. Fraiman conceives of coolness as “a ‘male’ individualism whose model is the teen rebel, defined above all by his strenuous alienation from the mother” (xii). Growing out of ways that heteronormative family structures constitute gender, this formation not only links individuality with maleness, but also conflates women with mothers and precludes linking individuality or rebellion with either.
Fraiman finds that even queer theory figures the anti-normative as male, thus discounting both female and mother rather than queerly imagining them (134). She also notes how theorist Judith Halberstam “argues that attributes such as athleticism—rather than being degendered and made available to women on that basis—should be extended to women specifically and only ‘as masculinity’” (142). Fraiman concludes the book with a reading of Leslie Feinberg’s *Stone Butch Blues*, through which she develops the notion of “butch maternity” (148), demonstrating how one might subvert gender’s binary logic in recognizing butchness as cool in ways that subordinate it to neither masculinity nor femininity (155).

In the catalogue for the exhibit *American Cool* (2014) at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Portrait Gallery, as one of its curators, Joel Dinerstein describes a “historical rubric for cool” (15) by which he and fellow-curator Frank H. Goodyear III chose the photographic portraits that comprise the exhibit. Thus writing for a more general audience, Dinerstein says that to qualify as cool, every figure whose portrait was chosen had to have exhibited at least three of these qualities: “(1) originality of artistic vision and especially of a signature style; (2) cultural rebellion or transgression in a given historical moment; (3) iconicity, or a certain level of high-profile recognition; and (4) recognized cultural legacy” (Dinerstein 15). While the exhibit’s focus on “high-profile recognition” limits it to the famous and precludes treatment of cool behavior by most people, Dinerstein does discuss how ordinary people employ their individual taste in choosing which iconic figures are cool and how those choices enable them to negotiate the terms of their own specific identity: “Often enough, for an individual to focus on a new cultural figure reflects a personal desire for change, for a new
image or emotional mode. Suddenly you can imagine how it might be to enjoy being in your own body, to confront your fears, to express passion and joy, to be overtly sexual, to be comfortable in your own skin” (16). Dinerstein’s construction of cool here is general, so it applies to the taste of any historical place and time. It is also general and capacious enough to encompasses cool as commodity, as rebellion, as newness and change, style and behavior, operating through projection from multiple sources to produce a sense of the great polymorphic holograph that is American cool in all its significance and indeterminacy.

While Dinerstein locates cool’s complex network of significance in specific rhetorical situations, those situations occur between an individual and an individual-as-commodity. The difference between contact by which individuals meet, and contact between consumers and commodified, iconic images pinpoints a point of contention over what cool signifies. While Thomas Frank figures 1950s and 1960s consumers as so unwitting and passive that they imagine they rebel against bourgeois conformity even as they are led to purchase it, Dinerstein gives us a more autonomous consumer who exercises agency as s/he explores what cool icons offer. Does that consumer, who develops an identity partly in response to music, narratives, and images of Lester Young or Patti Smith (whose images hang in the exhibit), wonder as much or in the same way about those artists’ “interiority” as James Baldwin wonders about the interiority of Civil Rights activist Fred Shuttlesworth or the fictional racist policeman Jesse (in texts I discuss below)? How people imagine the self subtends how they read coolness and what constitutes it. I am interested in roles cool has had and may continue to play in parsing the mysteries of the autonomy/determination binary and what
Alan Liu calls the “indeterminacy” (24) of the subject, imagined between systems that construct it and the prospect of choice.

Models of Subjectivity

My focus on the interplay between cool behavior and someone’s witnessing it relies on inter- or intra-personal recognition and models that constitute the individual through its interfaces with social forces, including other individuals. Interaction at such interfaces may include both conscious and unconscious activity. I have selected specific models to discuss specific texts based on assumptions apparent in each text. For example, in Baldwin’s story “Going To Meet The Man,” its main character’s psychic operations adhere to Freudian notions and so I employ notions of fetishization to read it. For reading Andy Warhol’s The Chelsea Girls and Shirley Clarke’s Portrait of Jason, I will employ Michel Foucault’s construction of the individual as forming at narrative, confessional interfaces with disciplinary institutions such as psychiatry (History of Sexuality 58-65) and in reading Sam Greenlee’s The Spook Who Sat By The Door, I will use Foucault’s notion that the individual forms at interfaces with physical disciplinary processes (Discipline and Punish 29). Employing Hegel, Freud and Lacan, Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks traces how subjects develop at interfaces with social constructions of race and gender which can also impel their movement through series of recognitions of the self and others; this image of the veteran of a series of recognitions will inform how I read all of the five texts I treat. Eve Sedgwick’s work on shame, using Sylvan Tompkins’ less Freudian notions of how individuals are shaped at interfaces with others will also contribute a framework for reading The Chelsea Girls. Finally, I will employ Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of the individual as
shaped through instantiating the habits and practices of those who occupy a particular *habitus* within greater networks of fields, formed through configurations of social groupings like economic and social class.

**Recognition**

In *The Phenomenology of the Spirit* (1841), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel describes how a person’s awareness of the self as a distinct, individual consciousness (what he calls “self-consciousness”) develops through recognizing “another self-consciousness” (229) as such. This act requires the person to mentally “come outside of” the self to conceive of another individual’s having the same kind of self-consciousness it does (129). Through this process, “it has lost its own self, since it finds its self as an *other* being; secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other” (229). This momentary lostness—separation from the sense of one’s own self-consciousness—thus includes incorporating that temporarily-adopted self-consciousness into oneself. In a further, more complex sublation, it must “cancel this its other” by incorporating into its sense of self that temporarily “lost” and “other” self as, indeed, itself. Through this sublation, it “gets back itself, because it becomes one with itself again through the canceling of *its* otherness” (Hegel 229-230). This process thus requires “movement” across the conceptual interface forming the distinction between individuals, even as it constitutes that interface. Such movement is doubled, given the notion that it occurs between two individuals, each engaged in recognizing its self-consciousness through recognizing the other (230 Hegel). Hegel develops this intersubjective movement—a sort of agitation at the interface between individuals—to include recognition of specif-
ics characterizing self and other, the most famous of these being the extent to which one exerts mastery over others or allows oneself to be subjugated. We can also read the master/slave dynamic as occurring intra-subjectively, wherein one aspect of the self masters or enslaves another, and recognition of these relations can develop into self-mastery (Aching 914). The process of recognition can thus be adapted to figure various ways individuals constitute themselves and others at the interfaces that join and divide them. Thus, according to Sigmund Freud’s essay “Fetishism” (1927), the process of fetishization features a series of recognitions which begin with small boys’ expectation that their mothers, their chief objects of desire, have penises like them; they expect an anatomical sameness. When they see female genitals and their expectation is not met, they assume the mother once did have a penis and then was castrated. The boy further assumes that he might be castrated too, again expecting sameness and giving rise to fear of castration. Because the boy still wants to see the mother as like him, he represses the upsetting memory of her genitals’ appearance (Freud 953). Because the mother also remains his object of desire, he wants an intimacy that has become too threatening, so he replaces her “missing” penis with another object of desire. That object is a fetish, and having it evokes pleasure because it reminds the boy of his mother and the pleasure he desired from her, but it is also unconsciously linked to terror that has been repressed, because it reminds him of the mother’s lack of a penis and the fears that has generated (Freud 954).

Variations on Hegel’s basic notion of recognition thus also describe how unmet norm-driven expectations agitate individuals in ways that further configure them. The mother’s lack of a penis in Freud’s formulation disappoints the boy’s expectation
that all humans have penises, the possession of a penis being the implied norm for humans. The mother’s anatomical failure to meet that expectation produces agitation in the form of conjecture about its cause. Then, in Hegelian fashion, the boy must come to recognize himself in terms that sublate that mental jaunt “outside of”’ the self, through which he conceives of himself as facing the same anatomical fate as his mother. The resulting agitation—fear of castration—incites a defensive response we might consider cool, in that it stills that agitation. Freud’s example, more particular than Hegel’s in its focus on specific sexed differences and relationships, exemplifies how recognition may include agitating normative expectations related to individuals’ specific features. It also represents movement occurring at the rhetorical interfaces where subjects read each other--interfaces in this case between boy and mother’s body, and between the boy’s apprehension of self, sex, sexuality, and gender. When the conceptual fixity of the norm is brought to bear on a specific instance that fails to instantiate it, conceptual movement, or agitation, occurs. The boy identifies with his mother--assumes they both fit a norm, as his “self-consciousness” approaches the interface between them, but her body, as he uses it to identify himself and return across that interface, does not fit the expected norm. Recognition, through such proximity with another, produces agitation, or dissonance, among the terms of the subjectivity reading it. In response to this agitation, that subjectivity may reform to reproduce the relative comfort of a new normative state--a new fixity, or coolness. In Freud’s example, fetishization produces this relative comfort through redirected desire. Movement at these interfaces produces the cool of fixity and the heat of agitation, one in response to the other, both of which metaphors apply to affective and conceptual states.
Although Freud discussed fetishism in terms of boys’ and mothers’ specific sexes, Emily Apter (1993) notes how the term has come to signify different kinds of “displacing of a reference [which] occurs, paradoxically, as a result of so much fixing,”—of assigning fixity to people or events to make them serve as objects (3). She cites William Pietz’s definition, more general than Freud’s, of the fetish as “always a meaningful fixation of a singular event; it is above all a ‘historical’ object, the enduring material form and force of an unrepeatable event” (Apter 3). In his essay “Nigs R Us, or How Blackfolk Became Fetish Objects” (2003), Greg Tate summarizes ways that African Americans’ art, style, and images have been appropriated without adequate payment or recognition, and been made into fetish objects and commodity fetishes by a “white America fiending for Blackness” (2). In his essay “Reading Racial Fetishism: The Photographs of Robert Mapplethorpe” (1993), Kobena Mercer analyses a specific instance of such fetishization.

Racial Fetishism

Mercer’s readings of photographs Robert Mapplethorpe published in Black Males and The Black Book trace white fetishization of black men and analyze how rhetorical context inflects what such fetishization can signify. Although not focused on Mapplethorpe’s work as representing cool, his treatment of how fetishization objectifies and commodifies black men outlines dynamics that inhere in white appropriation of black cool styles and how fetishization attempts to “cool” whites’ fears about their own inadequacy. Mercer begins his 1993 essay by reiterating earlier readings of the photographs which he published in 1986 and 1989, the first of which focuses on how Mapplethorpe’s images of partially or fully-nude African-American men are posed to
clearly evoke sexualized racist stereotypes. Moreover, he finds that the manner in which the photographs represent black men as objects of a masterful white male gaze most importantly references white male subjectivity. Mercer cites Foucault’s notion of the author as “a ‘projection, in terms more or less psychological, of our way of handling texts’” (qtd. in Mercer 308), to describe how Mapplethorpe’s “[texts facilitate] the imaginary projection of certain racial and sexual fantasies about the ‘difference’ of the black man’s body” (308). The photographs’ “ambiguous imagery opens an aperture onto the fetishistic structure of stereotypical representations of black masculinity”—structured by that projected white “author”/viewer’s subjectivity—“that circulate across a range of everyday surfaces, from newspapers, cinema, and televisions to advertising, sport, and pornography” (308). This field of signification disseminated “across a range of everyday surfaces” to market commodities and disseminate culture does so in ways that project a white fetishization of black men. In other words, what organizes these representations of black men is a white psychic structure based in “a masculine fantasy of mastery and control over the ‘objects’ represented and depicted in the visual field” (311). Because Mapplethorpe’s images represent males under a projected male gaze, Mercer says that they “[transfer] erotic investment in the fantasy of mastery from gender to racial difference” (311).

Mercer also notes how such images reproduce the kind of fixity Homi Bhabha ascribes to “the ideological construction of otherness” in “colonial discourse” (qtd. in Mercer 311) in that they reiterate the limiting “mass-media stereotypes of black men” (311). This fixity instantiates the kind of rigidity in white racialized subjectivities that—in certain rhetorical situations—cool behavior might agitate. But Mercer ex-
plains how “the logic of such colonial fantasy, [permits] black male subjects to become publicly visible only through a rigid and limited grid of representations that therefore reproduce certain idées fixes” (312). The black man as hipster—denizen of “the street,” “the corner,” and jazz culture has been made into one such limited role. For example, Robin D. G. Kelley reads the hipster clothing and behavior that the young Malcolm X evinces in his autobiography as representing significant individual rebellion through style and gesture—rebellion against both white culture’s widespread racism and more specific pressure to conform to middle-class African American mores (Kelley 168-169). But that role was already being codified into an idée fixe when Anatole Broyard published his essay “A Portrait of a Hipster” in a 1948 Partisan Review, ten years before Norman Mailer famously proffered his reading of the black hipster, in the process of appropriating it to concoct a white hipster persona. More recently, in his essay “Thuggods: Spiritual Darkness and Hip Hop” (2003), Melvin Gibbs describes how the black hipster image, restyled as “gangster” by Hip Hop and Rap, similarly perpetuates stereotypes that limit the roles young black men can play in the American imaginary, while whites still perceive it as something to appropriate as a means to defy the limits of their white bourgeois construction. Hipster cool has thus been rendered a fixed object and that fixity now enables its movement, through appropriation, across interfaces between black and white masculinities.

Mercer also marks how fetishistic representation merges into commodification. The artist’s controlling, masterful “I/eye” petrifies, not only by rendering the individual as stereotype, but also by fixing it in the stillness of the photograph. Made literal object, “fixed and frozen in space and time[…] immobilized and made silent[...]the
creative labor invested in the intersubjective relation between artist and model is alienated and effaced by the commodity value of the object produced” (312). Representation and reproduction into objects thus produces a fixity that removes the viewed from the same diegetic plane as the viewer, thereby removing the possibility of Hegelian intersubjective recognition between them, dependent as it is on seeing the other as an individual self-consciousness like oneself. Commodification thus produces a coolness much less likely to agitate because it forms rhetorical situations that do not rest in contact between individuals.

In his later rereading of Mapplethorpe’s photographs, Mercer asserts the importance of reading them within specific rhetorical situations because those situations alter their meaning. The fact that Mapplethorpe shared his subjects’ position as gay men in a pre-AIDS urban community and was friends with them shifts the meaning of the white gaze that the images “project,” differentiating it from contemporary images of gay, black men produced by overtly heterosexual white male artists which Mercer finds denote an exploitative position that Mapplethorpe at least does not fully share. Moreover, Mercer asserts that Mapplethorpe’s death from AIDS reconstitutes the images as historical archives of types of relationships between gay men specific to their period. In 1989, Mercer also does not want his critique of the photographs to be appropriated by the likes of right-wing Senator Jesse Helms to bolster his undemocratic project to prevent the production and display of queer art—a use facilitated by Helms’ appropriation of liberal democratic reasoning (325). Moreover, Mercer explains his earlier reading of the images as shaped by his subjectivity as a black person angered by how they objectify blacks, while he also viewed the images as objects of his own
sexual desire, given his queer subject position (320). The variation in these rhetorical contexts alters what the photographs signify.

In his later reading, Mercer also focuses on how the photographs deploy sexualized racial stereotype and high art conventions in tandem, so that viewers can note how those constituent signifiers agitate each other’s meaning; they reverberate with ironic movement that can draw viewer’s attention to how their racialized significance is constructed, thereby deconstructing it. Mapplethorpe constitutes those black male figures as exaggerated representations of racial stereotypes, but because he also represents them using ‘high art’ formal conventions traditionally used to represent white female nudes or ancient Greek male bodies, their locus of significance shifts, resisting fixity and problematizing the meaning of all constituent signifiers. Mercer thus concludes that “Contextualized again in art-historical terms, in relation to similar aesthetic strategies in Pop Art in the 1960s, Mapplethorpe’s ironic intermixing of the canonical, high-culture nude with the filthy and degraded form of the common stereotype does not reproduce either term of the binary relationship between high and low culture as it is....” (323). In this way, Mercer’s reading proposes “a revision of racial fetishism that challenges the view that fetishization necessarily indicates a conservative cultural politics” (322), because “instead of falling back on the stabilizing and fixative function of the stereotype, what is experienced in the reception of Mapplethorpe’s text as its characteristic ‘shock’ effect betrays a radical unfixing that upsets and disrupts the spectator’s horizon of expectations” (322-323). Through both irony and shock value, the photos produce a shimmering between values and form.
But even as Mercer concludes that Mapplethorpe’s images may, for some viewers, be read as “unfixing” stereotypes through ironic deployment, whether they “reinforce or undermine racist stereotypes” remains “strictly undecidable or unresolvable as such, because it is thrown back from the author into the field of the spectator, where it is experienced precisely as that ambiguity which lures the eye and sets a trap for the gaze” (323). Fetishization, through reiteration, thus might render visible the notion that what it objectifies has been objectified—if the viewing subjectivity can and will allow the requisite disturbance of fixed notions into consciousness. Mercer’s reading of Mapplethorpe as author remains ambivalent, his queer position and the historical significance of his death not obviating the differential power that his white position endowed his gaze. This problematic will arise in Chapter 4 where I consider how Shirley Clarke’s position as both white and a woman inflect readings of her representation of Jason Holliday’s gay, black cool.

Three facets of Mercer’s successive analyses draw elements into play that mark American cool: how popular representations and appropriations of black male cool are imbued with fetishistic elements that imply objectification by a white male gaze shaped by fear of that white masculinity’s own lack; how the specific features of a rhetorical context—author, text, and audience—shape significance—and its power to agitate—by virtue of each one’s specific social construction and its relations to other salient rhetorical features; and how a text’s formal layering of significance, through juxtaposed reiterations, produces irony in ways that undermine fixity and refract meaning. As Mercer demonstrates, the resultant multiplicity can provide means to destabilize unequal power relations that fetishizing produces and reproduces when it
constitutes some people as objects and others, subjects. As I will outline below, James Baldwin’s story “Going to Meet the Man” represents how recognizing cool behavior can similarly destabilize racial fetishization.

**Thermodynamics of the Cool**

To figure recognition of the cool, I will also extend metaphorical use of temperature to thermodynamic operations within systems. Agitated molecules produce heat, while molecules held still in solid formations produce less heat— are cool, as are those so dispersed in gases that collision rarely agitates them. At the interface between relatively cool and hot zones like the surface between hot water and air, the agitation of heated water molecules facilitates their movement into the cooler zone, as, also, the cooler zone’s lower density enables that transition. This movement away from the hot zone lowers a molecule’s temperature, even as it heats the cool zone. Such dynamics can produce states of equilibrium or produce cycles of cooling and heating, as in mechanical cooling systems driven by changes in temperature produced across interfaces, where evaporation and condensation alternately reverse the other’s effects. This process can figure how witnessing cool behavior produces agitation for a witness that may in turn lead to his or her own cooling off.

Such movement produced across a thermodynamic difference also characterizes Marshall McLuhan’s use of temperature in *Understanding Media* (1964) to figure what occurs at the interface between individuals and media:

There is a basic principle that distinguishes a hot medium […] from a cool one[...]. A hot medium is one that extends one single sense in ‘high definition.’ High definition is the state of being well filled with data […] A cartoon is
‘low definition,’ simply because very little visual information is provided. Telephone is a cool medium, or one of low definition, because the ear is given a meager amount of information. And speech is a cool medium of low definition, because so little is given and so much has to be filled in by the listener [...] hot media do not leave so much to be filled in or completed by the audience. Hot media are, therefore, low in participation, and cool media are high in participation or completion by the audience. (22-23)

A “cool medium” for McLuhan thus elicits greater audience agitation in that it requires more mental activity in order to “read” what it signifies, while a hot medium produces a greater influx of information and so requires less activity, making its audience more passive. For example, McLuhan notes that “Dark glasses[...]create the inscrutable and inaccessible image that invites a great deal of participation and completion” (31)--an example in which the medium is individuals’ appearance, and reading it hinges on the belief that a critical interface between individuals forms with eye contact, where they can read signs of each other’s subjectivity. Cool media are analogous to cool behavior as I define it, in that witnesses note cool behavior’s unexpected because non-normative nature, and therefore participate more in reading it than they would if the behavior seemed normal to them. The parallel with McLuhan’s notion of cool media also extends to definitions of cool behavior as displaying specifically little to no emotion--a characterization that implies deviance from a “normal” level of affective display and a paucity of affective information produced by the medium which is human behavior.
McLuhan also says that “intensity or high definition,” which “hot” media produce, leads to “specialism and fragmentation in living,” thereby creating conditions in which “any intense experience must be ‘forgotten,’ ‘censored,’ and reduced to a very cool state before it can be ‘learned’ or assimilated” (23-24). He links such cooling to “The Freudian ‘censor’” which is less of a moral function than an indispensable condition of learning. Were we to accept fully and directly every shock to our various structures of awareness, we would soon be nervous wrecks, doing double-takes and pressing panic buttons every minute. The ‘censor’ protects our central system of values, as it does our physical nervous system by simply cooling off the onset of experience a great deal. For many people, this cooling system brings on a lifelong state of psychic rigor mortis, or of somnambulism, particularly observable in periods of new technology. (McLuhan 24)

The passage suggests that the quantity of “[shocks]” contributes to “[intensity’s]” effect on “our physical nervous system,” in that it emphasizes an inability to absorb “every shock” produced by the great amount of information that hot media expose us to. But “intensity” also results from shocks to “our central system of values,” such as the norms that inflect subjectivity. The ‘censor’s’ “simply cooling off the onset of experience” represents not only reducing sensory input but also repressing that which would “shock[....]our central system of values,” or agitate their norm-driven expectations. The dynamic by which hot media agitate, which in turn elicits responses designed to “cool” down subjective states, parallels that “thermodynamic” through which fetishization represses a fear of one’s own lack: one comes to desire a “cooler”
or less agitating object of desire associated with, but not overtly similar to, that which causes the fear. I juxtapose Freud’s and Mercer’s notions of fetishization with McLuhan’s characterization of media to explore how cool as a stillness that begets “heat” can apply to more than one type of rhetorical field.

In “Alienated Labor,” Karl Marx describes how factory workers, alienated from their labor and its products, feel that the only time they can be themselves is when they leave work: “The worker, therefore, feels himself at home only during his leisure time, whereas at work he feels homeless[….feeling] himself to be freely active only in his animal functions—eating, drinking and procreating, or at most also in his dwelling and in personal adornment” (Marx 382). The worker’s existence entails movement between deadening work and more enlivening, “freely active”—albeit “only in his animal functions”—leisure. Alan Liu traces a similar difference between work and leisure in The Laws of Cool: Knowledge Work and the Culture of Information (2004), finding that difference also invested with a “thermodynamic” quality. He notes how early 20th-century factory owners like Henry Ford required factory workers to be cool—undemonstrative and sober—both at work and in their private lives in order to better perform—and to keep—their jobs (Liu 92-95). The need to manage their workplace demeanor also required that foremen and managers display cool behavior, an expectation that was extended to clerical workers as their occupations were subjected to disciplinary strategies developed by the new field of office management (Liu 83, 95-96). The middle class thus learned a form of cool professional behavior from which they sought respite in leisure consumption and activities that were “hot” (99). Drawing on work by Paul Stearns, Liu concludes that “twentieth-
century emotional life dominated by the middle class was all about[….]managing the allowable range and intensity of productive affect, displacing excess affect into indirectly productive acts of consumption, and thus establishing the modern paradox of deadpan professionalism and binge leisure”(88). Thus we can figure the 20th-century middle class as propelled “thermodynamically” back and forth between workplace cool and hot leisure. In relation to Sam Greenlee’s The Spook Who Sat By The Door and William S. Burroughs’ Naked Lunch, I will discuss cool professionalism in workers and in cultural products ranging from film images to musical performances that were consumed by the middle class and produced by what Liu calls “subcultures”—groups who were excluded from mainstream forms of productivity (100).

Thirteen years before Baldwin published “Going to Meet the Man,” in Black Skin, White Masks (1952), psychiatrist Frantz Fanon explored how people labeled black by a racialized, colonial world were psychologically affected by that designation, and how they could release themselves from those effects. Fanon drew on both psychoanalytic discourse and Hegel’s theory of recognition to represent how black people tended to internalize racism when living where whites enjoyed more freedom and privilege, at blacks’ expense. Such a black person, who “came into this world anxious to uncover the meaning of things, [with a] soul desirous to be at the origin of the world,” finds that the idea of race constitutes him or her as “an object among other objects” (Fanon 89), rather than an independent self-consciousness, or subject, who enjoys the freedom to act upon objects. Hegel’s explanation of how inequality develops between those who demonstrate a willingness to die in struggles with others, and those who are unwilling to risk their lives in such struggles (Hegel 233-236), does not
end there; further acts of recognition can lead the “slave” to conceive ways in which he enjoys agency through productive work, and can lead the “master” to recognize ways in which his position subjugates him (236-239). Similarly, Fanon describes a complex series of reactions to being recognized and recognizing oneself as black. Then, drawing on Hegel, he proposes that the way for people to fully free themselves of such internalized racism is to demonstrate a willingness to die for the purpose of claiming their status as subjects. He quotes Hegel’s idea that “It is solely by risking life that freedom is obtained; only thus is it tried and proved that the essential nature of self-consciousness is not bare existence” (cited in Fanon 192). For Fanon, taking “this risk [that] implies that I go beyond life toward an ideal which is the transformation of subjective certainty of my own worth into a universally valid objective truth” (Fanon 193). Risking one’s life forces all others to recognize that the claim to having worth is true on a conceptual plane, where one clearly “pursues something other than life,” because one risks life, and “insofar as [one is] fighting for the birth of a human world, in other words, a world of reciprocal recognitions” (Fanon 193). To account for how notions of race shape human psyches, Fanon thus joins and extends a psychology of internalized racism and Hegel’s concept of how series of recognitions lead to particular kinds of “self-consciousness.”

In thinking about the kinds of work slaves have performed and the historical significance of their perspectives, Gerard Aching (2012) notes that little “critical attention has been paid to reading the slave’s work ontogenetically, as an internal struggle for the freedom of self-mastery,” in keeping with Continental theorists’ intra-subjective location of the Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, rather than in historical rela-
tions between individuals (912). Drawing on work by Paul Gilroy that examines Hegel’s dialectic in relation to narratives by Frederick Douglass and Margaret Garner (on whose narrative Toni Morrison bases her novel *Beloved*), he calls for more scholarly focus on those who transformed through series of recognitions that led them beyond enslavement not only in their legal and social relations with other people, but also in the relations between elements of their own psyches (914)—in other words, on intrapersonal terrain where Fanon also argues that a person must achieve recognition. Achieving suggests that further scrutiny of such texts would provide a fuller history of modernity, which has hitherto been limited by dominant cultures’ perspectives. He also stresses self-mastery and productively adapting in order to maintain that condition once one is free of overt oppression (915).

**Quiet’s Balanced Interiority**

In *The Sovereignty of Quiet: Beyond Resistance in Black Culture* (2012), Kevin Quashie examines a “quiet” evinced by African American art and literature that he sees as the product of “the full range of one’s inner life […] a dynamic and ravishing […] stay against the dominance of the social world” (6) born of an individual’s having navigated and explored his or her own interiority, “letting the unexpected be possible” and ultimately producing “a balance between the social or public meaning of a person or object, and its intimacy, its human relevance” (Quashie 7). He contrasts this to more common ways of seeing African American culture as shaped by struggles against oppression, so that “blackness serves as an emblem of social ailment and progress” (3-4). While Quashie sees quiet as more than stillness and does not link it with the cool, in his reading of *The Fire Next Time* he finds its representation of Baldwin-
as-narrator as an “authority[…]figured on self-questioning and vulnerability” (87) whose long essay, ostensibly about a meeting with Elijah Muhammad, centers on an “interior” process. Quashie cites passages in which Baldwin focuses on his fear and explores “the tension in me between love and power, between pain and rage, and the curious, grinding way I remained extended between those poles” (qtd. in Quashie 86). What Baldwin privileges and Quashie finds indicative of quiet is a process of recognition within the interiority of Baldwin-as-narrator. Although not describing necessarily cool behavior, these elements suggest how we might understand coolness as more than African-American resistance within intersubjective rhetorical situations, expanding the notion to include a rhetorical situation between the terms of an individual subjectivity which gives rise to cool behavior as a manifestation of quiet.

Discussing an image of athletes John Carlos and Peter Norman with fists raised in a Black Power salute at the 1968 Olympics, Quashie sees quiet in the generally overlooked “balance between their intentional political gesture and [a] sense of inwardness, a sublimity” and “intimacy” in how they seem “as vulnerable as they are aggressive, as pensive as they are solidly righteous” (Quashie 3). I am interested in how Baldwin’s description of Civil Rights activist Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth links cool behavior to an interior quiet. Baldwin’s representation informs my thinking on witnesses’ conjectures about the self-consciousness, or mindset, that produces cool behavior as having formed through a series of recognitions. Baldwin also represents those processes as having shifted the individual self-consciousness to a vantage point that exceeds the limitations of societal designations like race, even as those labels initially may shape the recognition process.
Reverend Shuttlesworth

In *No Name in the Street* (1972), Baldwin describes a visit to the South to write about the Civil Rights Movement, which includes his account of meeting Civil Rights activist Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth: “The first time I saw Reverend Shuttlesworth...he came strolling across the parking lot of the motel where I was staying, his hat perched precariously between the back of his skull and the nape of his neck, alone” (*No Name* 66). With his stroll and his hat at such an angle, Shuttlesworth’s figure evokes the hipster’s cool style. Moreover, Baldwin notes that the reverend evinces this self-possession in the face of danger: “Shuttlesworth was a marked man in Birmingham” (*No Name* 66) due to his activism. This danger makes his cool behavior exceptional, which Baldwin emphasizes by juxtaposing it with the description of the stroll and hat. Then he says that “while we talked,” Shuttlesworth “kept walking back and forth to the window. I finally realized that he was keeping an eye on his car--making sure that no one put a bomb in it, perhaps. As he said nothing about this, however, naturally I could not” (66). Here Baldwin not only increases our sense of Shuttlesworth’s danger and cool, but also emphasizes his own hesitation about getting him to discuss the circumstances that make it so, though he finally does express concern.

In representing Shuttlesworth’s response, Baldwin interprets the mindset--the subjectivity--that produces such cool:

And he smiled--smiled as though I were a novice, with much to learn, which was true, and as though he would be glad to give me a few pointers, which, indeed, not much later on, he did--and told me he’d be all right and went downstairs and got into his car, switched on the motor and drove off into the soft
Alabama night. There was no hint of defiance or bravado in his manner. Only, when I made my halting observation concerning his safety, a shade of sorrow crossed his face, deep, impatient, dark; then it was gone. It was the most impersonal anguish I had ever seen on a man’s face. It was as though he were wrestling with the mighty fact that the danger in which he stood was as nothing compared to the spiritual horror which drove those who were trying to destroy him. They endangered him, but they doomed themselves. (66-67)

Baldwin reads in Shuttlesworth’s face signs of a stable “interior” space that generates his cool: the “shade of sorrow” traverses without shaping it, and unlike “defiance or bravado,” what it reacts against doesn’t shape it. The description of his smile implies that, in recognizing Baldwin’s ignorance, long learning has produced his perspective. Baldwin also reads what the other man has come to recognize. In that “sorrow”--although “deep, impatient, dark”--Baldwin sees “anguish” that is “impersonal” and so does not directly react to--is not itself directly shaped by--how white racism harms African Americans or specifically threatens his very life; instead, Shuttlesworth recognizes “the spiritual horror” of white racists’ subjectivity--that which “[drives]” them. Baldwin sees a perspective well removed from self-recognition in simple response to a more powerful Other or racial designation. Moreover, Shuttlesworth “[wrestles]” with a contrast between his physical, interpersonal “danger” and the intra-personal “spiritual horror” driving white racists. Through this contrast he does not recognize any master/slave relationship between himself and whites, but rather the master/slave relation within white racist subjectivity. Through its dynamics, the “spiritual horror” is a master that “[drives]” another part of the psyche enslaved to it. Contrasted with the dan-
gers of that psycho-spiritual terrain, Shuttlesworth recognizes the threat to his life “as nothing.” He eschews the decisions of Hegel’s slave who accepts subjugation to stay alive, asserting his worth in terms that produce Fanon’s “reciprocal recognitions.”

This figurative interior that Baldwin glimpses provides Shuttlesworth with a position of greater psycho-spiritual safety, knowledge, and power from which he recognizes the racist “interior.” The representation also suggests that his cool derives from this position. Moreover, his ability to perceive in psycho-spiritual terms enables his recognition of racism’s psycho-spiritual interior—an ability producing the impersonal cool authority with which he resists it. That the threat to his own life is “as nothing” implies that these abilities surpass the reach of material power, whether bodily or economic, and derive authority from ethical virtue and knowledge more reminiscent of West African notions that center on spiritual balance and recognition of ethical priorities on a large social scale.

“Going To Meet The Man”

In “Going to Meet the Man” (1965), Baldwin conversely refuses to represent an African-American Civil Rights activist’s “interior,” instead rendering that of a white racist. Although the story makes no overt references to psychology, since its publication critics consistently note ways in which Freudian notions shape the repressed memories, gradually-recalled, that reveal how its protagonist’s racism formed. The year after its publication, Beau Fly Jones (1966) finds that the story represents “Whites [as] 'innocent' in the Freudian sense that they know not what they do because they have subconsciously blinded themselves to the horrible deprivation they have caused the Negro” (108). He adds that fears “that the individual Negro will challenge
the power and masculinity of the white” play out in the tale (109). More recently, Paul Griffith (2002) and Matt Brim (2006) (183) also note how the story lays out foundations for white racist masculinity as dependent on sexualized notions of black men. Brim asserts that those foundations include homoerotic dynamics “without being traditionally homosexual” (185), which Tiffany Gilbert (2011) also argues (242).

Steven Weisenberger (2002) stresses that readings of lynching narratives within their historical contexts are more apt and accurate than the “transhistorical readings” psychoanalytic notions provide “of white terror’s origins and logics” (3). However, “Going to Meet the Man” is fiction published at a historical moment when Freudian ideas and Fanon’s adjustment of them were current, and it portrays an attack on Civil Rights activists in that moment, linking it to a much earlier lynching in multiple ways, one of which relies on psychoanalytic assumptions about how repression and fetishization work. Moreover, the story lays out a psychological foundation that aligns with the now-commonplace characterization of how whites objectify African American men as fetishizing. Because my interest lies in how cool behavior may exceed rather than only reiterate such objectification, I offer a psychoanalytic reading of “Going to Meet the Man.”

Set during the 1960s, when non-violent Civil Rights activists attracted widespread support but Southern police might still attack them without immediate legal censure, the story excavates repressed memories that represent the genesis of the racist psyche of a white policeman named Jesse. Jesse’s witnessing the pronounced cool of a Civil Rights activist agitates him in ways that force repressed memories to emerge into consciousness. Through that emergence, we discern how Jesse came to fetishize black
men, their bodies becoming eroticized objects that obscure an erotically-charged interaction with and fear of castration by his own father. Because Jesse cannot make black men an object of overt desire in the heteronormative small southern town of the 1960s, that fetish is in turn repressed and replaced by fetishizing women--most readily black women whom he can rape, unpunished, but also his white wife. The story presents these objects of desire in a metonymic succession, each of which obscures the object more closely related to a primary experience of erotic contact with his father, linked inextricably to fear of his castrating power and white masculinity, which Jesse has repressed.

It opens with Jesse’s “not getting it up” in bed with his wife, a condition that “had [not] ever bothered him before” (230). His white wife’s insufficiency as object of desire immediately reminds Jesse how “he could not ask her to do just a little thing, just to help him out [...] the way he could ask a nigger girl to do it” (229). Here we see not only how blackness in a woman would be more likely to excite him, for “The image of a black girl caused a distant excitement in him” (229), but also that his wife won’t perform the sex act that would “help him out.” Whether fellatio or anal sex, the act is not limited to heterosexual coupling, which implies that the object of desire who might stimulate him--in addition to being black, need not be female. And for some as yet unexplained reason, he does feel desire, regardless of his impotence: “excitement filled him like a toothache, but [...] refused to enter his flesh” (229).

Jesse’s thoughts as he lies awake turn to the Civil Rights activists he encountered earlier that day and come to focus on how he hopes never again to see “their sealed eyes struggle open” (231). He conjures racist characterizations of them until
recollection settles on encountering their leader. The police have “had trouble with him before,” which marks his activism as unswervingly fixed, even with repeated police opposition. The protestors had blocked a street, and the police think “the others would move if this nigger would move, him being the ring-leader, but he wouldn’t move and he wouldn’t let the others move” (232). This fixity of body and purpose, and their refusal to stop singing when arrested and beaten, marks the activists as cool. Jesse focuses on coercing the leader to stop the singing, but the man remains unmoving except for involuntary physical responses to Jesse’s torturing him with a cattle prod.

In significant contrast, Jesse not only “[shakes] worse than the boy had been shaking,” but also is “glad no one could see him” and “[feels] very close to a very peculiar, particular joy” (233) that clearly relates to the “distant excitement” (229) aroused by erotic thoughts of black women--except the feelings resulting from torturing the activist make Jesse feel “very close” to, rather than “distant” from, their still-elusive source in his mind. This closeness suggests that the source is a repressed memory that relates more to a black man than woman, and to sadistically attacking him. Then the activist arrests Jesse’s attention by hailing him with the label, “white man,” at which Jesse “for some reason, [grabs] his privates” (233), implying that a black man’s recognizing him as “white man” forms part of the repressed memory.

The activist tells Jesse they’ve met before, when he was “[not] more than ten” (234) and Jesse was a bill-collector. Similarly unmoving as a boy, the activist refused to converse with a “white man” who didn’t call his grandmother “Mrs.” (235). The boy responded to Jesse’s trivializing offer of chewing gum with, “I don’t want nothing
you got, white man” (235), asserting a cool refusal to be moved by this manipulative attempt to make him the recipient of Jesse’s largesse. Even as a child, the activist demonstrated multiple forms of stillness that mark him as cool: he remained silent in response to a question; when Jesse “watched the boy[,] the boy watched him[,] the expression on the boy’s face” unchanging (234). This sustained eye contact could perhaps evoke some form of recognition between them, except that in Jesse’s mind, something intervenes: his perceptions suddenly assume a “nightmare” quality: “everything familiar, without undergoing any other change” was “subtly and hideously displaced,” diverting him from articulating what or whom he recognized in the boy, even as, “white man” repeated itself in his mind (234). That interpellation itself points toward the cause of his agitation, which repetition underscores.

Louis Althusser (1969) illustrates his concept of interpellation with the figure of a policeman hailing an individual—an act representing ideology’s power (and the power of social systems it maintains) to call individuals into being and give them identity (118). Baldwin shows us Jesse’s consciousness resist recognizing the boy as a figure with the power to interpellate him—to call him into being within a network of historical power relationships that form Jesse—even as repetition of “white man” in his mind demonstrates that the boy has exercised that power; this is precisely what agitates Jesse. Here, Baldwin links observable forms of cool to the power and agency inhering in the boy’s interpellation of Jesse as “white man,” which in turn provokes Jesse to recognize the boy’s power—a recognition that his psyche simultaneously stymies through incomprehension, while nevertheless agitated enough to “subtly and hideously [displace]” his perceptions of “everything familiar.”
On recognizing the activist as that child, grown, Jesse responds with excitement that doesn’t give pleasure: “he[...trembles] with what he [believes is] rage, sweat, both cold and hot, [racing] down his body” and “he [feels...] icy fear rise in him and raise him up” (235). He cannot ascribe a cause to the emotional or physical agitation which he discovers “to his bewilderment, his horror” includes an erection “beneath his own fingers” (235).

Unable to comprehend his responses, Jesse’s psyche again diverts his attention, this time to thinking how Civil Rights activists “fight against God and go against the rules laid down in the Bible for everyone to read!” (235). He invokes his world’s ultimate source of order--what Althusser calls the Subject, from which concept individuals derive the ability to conceive of themselves as subjects endowed with self-consciousness and agency (121). By invoking that Subject, Jesse tries to counter the activist’s interpellation of him and so discount the authority--and status as subject--from which the activist dares to hail Jesse. The thought also diverts attention from his sexual arousal. In that sudden shift and the thoughts it juxtaposes, Baldwin links Jesse’s position in societal systems of power inextricably to his psychological formation as white and male, and represents how consciousness and unconsciousness regulate it. And as a policeman, not only does Jesse ironically exemplify Althusser’s functionary of ideology’s power, but he also acts as agent for stasis at the interface between white racist law and Civil Rights agitation against it. Baldwin places a white racist’s invocation of the divine Subject’s authority in tension with an activist’s cool assertion of the power to hail Jesse into being, as if the activist had the constitutive authority of some
more encompassing system of knowledge than that which Jesse would uphold or could detect.

In his cool, the activist doesn’t reveal that knowledge, but through his interpellation, Baldwin implies a sphere with greater perspective and authority, from which he polices Jesse. The story points to an epistemological position which lies beyond Jesse’s ken because he has been created as white in a racialized system. We can read the activist in Aching’s terms as one who has apparently negotiated a series of recognitions between himself and others, and between the terms of his own psyche, to achieve a self-mastery Jesse’s psyche cannot afford to see. Moreover, his nonviolence detaches his assertion of authority--of power to interpellate, to recognize himself as subject--from material sources. However, although the activist occupies a rhetorical position that we cannot misread as subjected, and although we may conjecture about the source of the authority from which he hails Jesse as “white man,” Baldwin provides no access to its precise nature because he gives no access to his thoughts. Readers cannot make the activist’s psyche into an object of analysis, but can only witness how his behavior’s cool authority undoes Jesse.

Through its structure, the story clearly asserts that his encounter with the cool activist arrests Jesse’s sexual potency and agitates his psyche enough to dislodge a series of memories from their repressed state. Those memories trace how events in his childhood that reiterated violent and sexualized racism structured his masculinity. The final memory of an event so disturbing that it requires the successive obfuscations provided through fetishizing white women, black women, and black men, is a lynching to which his parents take him as a child. Without having explained beforehand
what he will see, at the lynching his father lifts Jesse onto his shoulders to ensure his unimpeded view of the victim’s torture by fire, then castration. The white men who perform these acts are friends of Jesse’s father, an association that connects them metonymically with the father, through that connection imbuing him with the same power and eroticized desire to castrate, especially given the father’s excitement about the lynching, evidenced by a “strange cruel curve” to his lips, while he “wet his lips from time to time, and swallowed” as the family approaches the site (244).

Baldwin takes care to establish that, until the lynching, Jesse has a black friend named Otis, with whom he “wrestled together in the dirt” (240) and to whom he turns for explanations of phenomena Jesse can’t comprehend (243). This friendship implies that Jesse does not arrive at the lynching with the sadistic, sexualized racism he encounters there. Moreover, when his father’s friend holds the victim’s genitals and a knife, “the dying man’s eyes [look] straight into Jesse’s eyes--it could not have been as long as a second, but it seemed longer than a year” (248). At the moment of castration, the crowd and Jesse simultaneously scream (248), which Paul Griffith (2002) reads quite plausibly as orgasmic. However, that reading does not account for how the scream immediately follows Jesse’s sustained eye contact with the lynched man. Only with Jesse does he share that mutual gaze, and it occurs at the last moment when Jesse can still psychologically afford to recognize a black male as evincing a “self-consciousness” like his own--recognition untainted by a fully racialized power dynamic, of which Jesse’s friendship with Otis implies he has been capable.

The gaze sustained between boy and man reminds readers of the one which the adult Jesse and activist share and provides a key for reading it. Both instances agitate
Jesse, not only through sadistic sexual associations established in his mind by witnessing the lynching, but also because the gaze of recognition directly precedes Jesse’s fully racist formation as a white man, a point at which his tendencies toward identifying with or objectifying the man conflict. The mutuality of their gaze suggests that Jesse identifies with the victim until he comes to fully objectify him and derive pleasure from the fact that he--rather than Jesse--is castrated. Jesse finds the victim “the most beautiful and terrible object he had seen until then” (247), in keeping with Freud’s notion that a fetish object evokes fear as well as desire. By virtue of his identification with the tortured man, Jesse’s crying out with the crowd, then slumping forward immediately after the man is castrated, signifies relief at escaping a fate he expected to share because until that moment he identified with him, while it also signifies how objectifying the man cools his fears while simultaneously piquing then releasing his desires. As a white man in this time and situation, Jesse’s ability to recognize black men as self-conscious subjects like himself thus becomes repressed, obscured by his greater desire to see them as fetish objects.

That desire comes from a need to obscure something more terrifying: for Jesse, the lynched man as fetish object obscures from consciousness Jesse’s fear of castration by and erotic associations with his father. While watching a white man metonymically associated with his father perform the castration, Jesse sits on his father’s shoulders—a position that emblematizes how one generation of white racists forms out of its contact with the previous one. This position also must entail Jesse’s feeling, with legs spread, his penis rest against the back of his father’s neck—erotic contact ensured by his father’s first having placed him there, his “hands [holding Jesse] firmly by the ankles”
and then, when his father’s friend displays the knife with which he will castrate, “Jesse [feels] his father’s hands on his ankles slip and tighten” (247). Jesse forms erotic associations with the lynching’s sadism and castration of a black man while simultaneously forming erotic associations through genital contact with his father that are linked to terror that he too may be castrated, given his identification with the victim that their eye contact suggests. This is the terror and desire that his erotic arousal from torturing the activist and his memory of the lynched man both evokes and obscures; it is the ultimate source of his earlier, inexplicable agitation. Baldwin represents a racist system by which white, father-son homoerotic contact and the threat of castration form inextricably with whites’ sadistic, erotic objectification and castration of black men.

By the story’s end, the repressed memories that have emerged in Jesse’s consciousness could produce an understanding of how Jesse’s sadistic, eroticized racism have configured his psyche. The pieces by which he might recognize what puzzles him about his reaction to the activist are consciously available. But instead, still in bed with the memories of the activist and lynching in mind, Jesse finds himself released from impotence and whispers to his wife that he will “do [her] like a nigger” and urges her to “come on, sugar, and love [him] just like [she’d] love a nigger” (249). His remembering has enabled him to identify with a black man only in racist parody and re-instate white and black women as fetish objects that obscure the homoerotic foundations of his racism and masculinity. Similarly, recognition of the activist’s cool and the ensuing agitation that loosed Jesse’s memories—that threatened how his psyche is configured, by threatening to make him aware of that configuration—subside from his awareness.
Most readings of “Going to Meet the Man” focus on its assertions about the psycho-sexual foundations of white racist masculinity and the horrific treatment of African American men on which they depended, which clearly form the story’s main thrust. Sara Taylor (2008) aptly notes that, in “Going to Meet the Man” and the other stories published with it, “[Baldwin] creates a holistic portrait of the relationship between black and white masculinities, an endeavor in race and gender identity studies far ahead of his time” (45). Jones (1966) does mention that the story suggests that “perhaps the greatest fear of all is that, somehow, the Negro will force the white to look at himself and admit the ugly realities of his being in this relationship” (109), but he does not say how such self-recognition is forced. Tiffany Gilbert (2011) finds that what sets the story’s recollections in motion is how “the image of the boy's writhing body thrills Jesse and excites a long-suppressed memory out of his consciousness” (242), while Benoît Depardieu (2002) says “the confrontation with the young black activist is but the repetition of the lynching” (4). The sexual horror of both torture scenes distracts readers from the radical power of the activist’s cool to disturb Jesse, thereby setting the plot in motion. While Baldwin places a cool African American man under the fetishizing gaze of a white man, that gaze is returned. And because the cool represented is not limited to the activist’s style or to a simple, reactive defiance, but asserts an ethical authority beyond the scope of white power structures and knowledge, it defies objectification. Moreover, this cool agitates through a person-to-person rhetorical situation. A representation of such contact could be commodified, but it would always refer to a situation that cannot be. Baldwin thus provides us with an extraordinary portrait of cool’s significance.
The June 17, 2013 protest of “Standing Man” Erdem Gunduz entailed his standing still and silently gazing at one building for eight hours in Istanbul’s Taksim Square, even when searched and prodded by police. His behavior not only attracted their attention; it also inspired a movement to emulate him (Carvin, 2013) and earned international notice, including the German M100 Media Award “for his ‘courageous commitment to freedom of expression and human rights’” (Al Jazeera). In the wake of political protests in Turkey that had developed into violent conflict with police, Gunduz’ nonviolent cool thus defied witnesses’ expectations and incited agitation, underscoring how cool operates through the rhetorical dynamics of specific situations. This instance of nonviolent activism and the notice it provoked shares qualities with Baldwin’s representation of the activist and the power he exercises, marking how “Going to Meet the Man” represents significant aspects of the cool that both address and exceed the racialized psychodynamics of its American context.
CHAPTER 2

COOL SHAMELESSNESS IN *THE CHELSEA GIRLS*

As fiction, Baldwin’s “Going To Meet The Man” takes a conventional form by positing a diegetic world meant to reflect the historical world, yet existing whole and entire within its fictive boundaries, drawing no overt attention to its readers, its creator, or the larger rhetorical situation in which the story operates as only one part. Baldwin represents the activist as cool and Jesse as agitated by that cool completely within the fictive situation the tale provides. In contrast, most of Andy Warhol’s films, including *The Chelsea Girls*, refuse to produce a similarly self-contained diegesis of the sort that Hollywood has trained its viewers to expect. Primarily classified as art, Warhol’s cinematic works range from an eight-hour shot of the Empire State Building taken from a stationary camera, to revisions of *Dracula* and *Frankenstein*. Yet even when his films feature fiction, Warhol forces viewers to notice their constructedness in ways that prevent full absorption into the diegetic world. His first fiction, *My Hustler* (1964), provides dialogue between unseen speakers for so long—while the camera remains fixed on the distant person they discuss—that it forces viewers to consciously note that in films, disparate sources may fabricate the illusion of a unified reality wherein what one sees is organically related to the sounds one hears. This awareness prevents viewers from becoming fully absorbed in the diegesis. As preparation for filming *Vinyl* (1965), his rendition of Anthony Burgess’ novel *A Clockwork Orange* (1962), Warhol actively prevented its star, Gerard Melanga, from learning his lines.
and rehearsing (Koch 70, Murphy 77); as a result of such “preparation,” the film’s acting reminds one of a bad school play and gives a special tone to the irony with which it represents juvenile delinquents and the sadists who discipline them. In addition to the self-reflexive quality of Warhol’s films, features of their production shape how they constitute a thermodynamic of cool, such as Warhol’s directorial and interpersonal style and the fact that he employed amateur actors who also populated his social world. I will therefore begin by discussing Warhol and the social and artistic contexts in which he made films before discussing The Chelsea Girls, this chapter’s primary focus.

In a 1963 interview titled “What Is Pop Art?” Warhol said, “The reason I’m painting this way is that I want to be a machine, and I feel that whatever I do and do machine-like is what I want to do” (I’ll Be Your Mirror 18). Three years later he told another interviewer, “If you want to know all about Andy Warhol, just look at the surface: of my paintings and films and me, and there I am. There’s nothing behind it” (I’ll Be Your Mirror 90). Warhol’s demeanor and behavior supported this image of him as a mechanism whose surface contained no “interior” subjectivity—no source of agitation, just a still, cool surface. His face famously displayed fewer signs of affect than most people’s; Stephen Koch describes it as “the very visage of dissociation, dehumanization” (i).

Warhol also tended to talk less than others, and when he did, he spoke in simple phrases, using what Koch characterizes as a “vocabulary [that] is precisely that of
a very well-behaved, very intelligent, and uncommonly corrupt, eight year old” (ix).

In interviews, Warhol drew attention to the simple form and content of his utterances; in 1962, when his work and Pop Art were first receiving serious attention, he “[introduced] many of the strategies that he would use with remarkable consistency over the following 25 years: elusiveness, passivity, and mirroring” (Goldsmith 3). For that interview, he agreed to say only “yes” or “no” to all questions asked (Goldsmith 4), although he relented during the actual process, adding “I don’t know” and then even more specific replies, like this final one: “QUESTION: What does Coca Cola mean to you? ANSWER: Pop” (I’ll Be Your Mirror 5). That he did not take the content of his public utterances seriously also manifests in his agreeing that Gerard Malanga might write the questions and answers for two interviews (I’ll Be Your Mirror 53, 59) and that Allen Midgette might lecture as Warhol on college campuses; having sprayed his hair silver, Midgette sat silent while other members of the Factory ménage spoke (Goldsmith 53, POPism 312). That practice continued briefly, but then universities realized they were paying someone other than Warhol to not-speak (Goldsmith 53, POPism 313). Warhol’s behavior thus evinced the stillness of cool through his silence, his physical passivity, and the conceptual simplicity he projected. He deployed cool’s stillness in ways that forced others to scrutinize him attentively, a dynamic that marked how he directed his social entourage and his films.

In the 1980 autobiographical account, POPism: The Warhol Sixties, Warhol recalls a conversation with Mark Lancaster (Butt 106-108, POPism 92), a denizen of

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1 For now, I will set aside Koch’s judgement of Warhol as “corrupt” and return later to ways in which Warhol was evaluated by art-world critics.
his famous workplace, the Factory, who outlines social dynamics at play in Warhol’s entourage. Lancaster quotes Warhol chief assistant Gerard Melanga as saying that “when you’re in a group, Andy creates competition between people so he can watch problems being played out. He loves to see people fighting and getting jealous of each other, and he encourages people to gossip about each other” (92). In this conversation, Warhol’s responses to Lancaster are minimal; they thus not only fit the characterization of Warhol as they discuss that characterization, but they also fit the image of him as mere surface: “What did he mean?” Warhol asks, then, after Lancaster’s explanation he replies, “Oh, really?” which elicits further verbiage from the other man. Expanding on Melanga’s ideas, Lancaster says to Warhol, “you’ll be going on somewhere, but you’ll never say who else is invited—you’ll just contrive in an elegant fashion to make sure the people you don’t want to be there aren’t….And you’ll do it all without saying a word, or by saying something very oblique—some people will realize they have to fall away, and some people will just know they can come along” (POPism 92). This image of direction through cool’s stillness is one that assumes Warhol uses his stillness to force attention to his visage and speech in search of “something very oblique” with which to discern what course their behavior should take; it has also been associated with Warhol’s film direction.

Recent critics have problematized the extent and manner in which Warhol’s direction was passive. J.J. Murphy asserts that “the idea that Warhol was completely passive in creating his films is one of the many myths perpetrated about his work” (230), citing how Warhol “adamantly resisted” an attempt by Jack Kerouac to essentially direct the film Couch and quoting Reva Wolf, a witness to the argument, as stat-
ing that their “exchange […] demonstrates concretely how very mistaken is the commonly held assumption that Warhol’s role as a director consisted of simply turning on the camera and walking away (even though he may have on occasion done just that)” (qtd. in Murphy 230). While these examples suggest his direction was not cool—not still, there is an important distinction to be made here between passivity and lack of control, which Donald Crimp clarifies when he cites Ronald Tavel’s insights into working with Warhol. Tavel wrote scenarios for some Warhol films and directed several, sometimes also providing offscreen directorial dialogue, as in Screen Test # 2 (1965) (Murphy 59-62, Crimp 26-29), or playing the role of director onscreen, as in The Life of Juanita Castro (1965) (Murphy 63-67). Crimp quotes Tavel as saying that, regardless of whether Warhol directed a film himself or through another, he continually contrived ways that the director be “incapacitated” while working, in order to produce the kind of film he wanted. Crimp adds

Warhol would have us believe that he effected his own self-removal not only by using surrogates--like having Tavel act as director of his films--but also by simply switching the camera on and walking away. But the camera’s complex mobility in many films belies this claim; Warhol forced himself, too, to rely on his on-the-spot instincts; he subjected himself, too, to incapacitation. Warhol famously wielded power by abjuring power. (Crimp 53)

Tavel also describes how, in order to produce the kind of effects Warhol seemed to want from him, he cultivated an “intentional effect of unexpectedness,” (qtd. in Crimp 53) producing a kind of agitation in his directing and in the actors he directed that was ultimately produced by Warhol’s cool exercise-of-power-through-abjuring-it. Thus,
though Warhol’s camera did not always remain fixed, though he or someone else in many ways directed his films, Warhol’s role was still—cool—in ways designed to agitate actors and, through their agitation, to produce “unexpected” effects onscreen.

Warhol also did notably little editing, thereby “incapacitating” one avenue through which he might have exerted more overt control over his films, and he used the duration of a film reel to determine the duration of scene or short movie, rather than making a specific decision that determined its length. For example, the portraits of visitors to the Factory, eventually called “screen tests,” were the three-minute length of the film reels used; for a fixed duration, while under the camera’s fixed “eye,” subjects were required to “face forward, hold as still as possible, refrain from talking or smiling, and try not to blink” under direct lights (Angell 14). As a result, they manifested various kinds of agitation and they worked to sustain control over their faces (Angell 12-14, Murphy 2-3). The cool implacability of mechanism and duration thus challenged subjects to appear cool and avoid displaying agitation. We still watch these tests to see how well the famous—Lou Reed, Bob Dylan, Salvador Dali, Susan Sontag—maintained their cool in the face of the machine (RISD Museum). In a longer and more complex film like The Chelsea Girls, which featured two films projected side-by-side on one large screen, each scene the length of a 33-minute film reel (Murphy 170), the challenges to actors’ ability to keep cool—to perform in ways that worked—multiplied. In discussing that film, Stephen Koch says

Warhol’s refusal to edit and the use of the stationary camera[...]result in a kind of performance otherwise almost never seen on the screen. Each one swims in a shoreless little half-hour ocean of time. Both actors and audience in The
*Chelsea Girls* confront the problem of what to do with the length of that inexorable reel. But Warhol’s almost flawless personal taste stands him in good stead; there is virtually nobody in *The Chelsea Girls* who fails to have a relation to the camera that works. Everybody is a good talker, except for those like Nico who never talk (93-4).

We might say that Warhol’s use of cool mechanisms was completed or complemented by his casting. Of course, Warhol does not provide any of these insights into his direction; the conjecture of witnesses does that, further emphasizing the cool of his silence on the subject of this work.

Gavin Butt explores the series of recognitions by which he believes Warhol developed that “silence […] which enables [him] to direct those around him, to manipulate them as he pleases, without resorting to more conventional, vocal means of control” (*Between You and Me* 109). The turning point that effected Warhol’s transformation into the cool and “now familiar Warholian persona of postmodern lore” (*Between You and Me* 109) was a conversation with filmmaker Emile De Antonio about why the art world—especially Jasper Johns and Robert Rauschenberg—shunned him. Because Warhol asked for this explanation, De Antonio explained that his “swish”—gesture that seemed fey or “feminine” and thereby markedly homosexual—kept the closeted pair of Abstract Expressionists from accepting him or his work. Butt lays out how prejudice related to class and ethnicity as well as homophobia figured in Warhol’s exclusion. His too-bourgeois commercial art success precluded access to Abstract Expressionist circles because it lacked “the ‘authenticity’ of autonomous creative acts” and instead was “yoked to the realization of capitalist profit” (*Between You
and Me 111). But there was more than an anti-bourgeois ethos at work; Truman Capote said of Warhol, “As far as I knew he was a window decorator…Let’s say a window decorator type,” suggesting that his sensibilities verged on the petit bourgeois or working class. Thus, a combination of class-related aesthetics and Warhol’s overtly homosexual demeanor led “bohemian society” to shun him. Art critics and socialites of the New York City art world also sneered at him. Butt quotes Frederick Eberstadt’s’s summary of “how Warhol was seen by the majority of the one hundred or so people who dominated the New York art world”: “He was this weird cooley little faggot with his impossible wig […] and he was sitting there telling me that he wanted to be as famous as the Queen of England! […] I thought that Andy was lucky that anybody would talk to him” (Between You and Me 115). As Butt notes, the use of “cooley” links Warhol’s working-class and Slavic origins to a derogatory attitude toward “immigrant Indian or Chinese [laborers]” (Between You and Me 115), in addition to the homophobic distinctions Beberstadt makes and those rooted in social class and taste.

On hearing the homophobic basis of such derision clearly articulated by De Antonio, Butt notes that “Warhol was stunned into silence”; the revelation was not that no one in art circles spoke to him (he already knew this), but rather that they spoke about him—and what they said (Between You and Me 114). Butt assumes that when DeAntonio’s explanation “embarrassed” (POPism 14) Warhol, “this registered affectively in Warhol’s body[…]and may have served to reinforce his isolation and fuel his anxieties about how he was being seen by others” (Between You and Me 114): he felt shame. Butt sees the effects of interpersonal speech—of being spoken to, spo-
ken about, and being struck dumb—as parallel to the effects of interpersonal looking: of how one is seen, whether two people reciprocate each other’s gaze, and whether one person breaks the circuit formed by such reciprocity by turning the eyes away from the other. Taken metaphorically, such visual acts expand the same notions into social realms: Johns and Rauschenberg chose not to “see” Warhol socially; critics did not recognize, or look at, his work. Butt asserts that we might take this image of the “stunned, almost mute” Warhol as “[clueing] us in to how his mature artistic persona of the 1960s could be viewed as constructed through just such an injurious scene of gossip and homosexuality” (*Between You and Me* 114). There is a cool stillness in Warhol’s state of stunned shame that Butt finds reiterated in the cool of his Pop persona.

He also thinks that Warhol’s placement of his account of the conversation with De Antonio in *POPism*’s opening chapter “suggests that [he] might have viewed this as some kind of primal scene out of which he emerges as the properly ‘Warholian’ prince of pop in the 1960s” (*Between You and Me* 114). As a result of the conversation, Warhol both changes and refuses to change, for he determines that he will not give up “the ‘swish’ thing, [with which he’d] always had a lot of fun”: he neither wants to nor thinks he should change his demeanor (*POPism* 15). But he does change in that he resolves that he “just wasn’t going to care” (*POPism* 15) how others reacted to his swish, and with this decision he shifts from agitation to a cooler state. Butt notes how he is hurt and then “[decides] not to care, which presages the self-construction of the cool and detached Warhol” (*Between You and Me* 114). Here Butt conjectures about how successive acts of recognition shift the terms of Warhol’s subjectivity, such
that they give rise to his cool behavior. Initially, Warhol sees he is shunned but not why, until De Antonio helps him to see himself as others do. Then in a return to his own perspective, he feels hurt, after which he comes to recognize how he values his own mannerisms. Rather than attempt to subjugate himself to others’ tastes, he consciously chooses to abide by his own. Warhol’s cool inspires conjecture by Butt, its witness, about the series of recognitions that have comprised the subjectivity that produces that cool, just as Baldwin imputes a similar kind of history to Reverend Shuttlesworth.

I am also interested in how Butt further characterizes the dynamics of Warhol’s “self-construction of the cool” and how I might relate that to shame. He draws on work by Kenneth Silver when he says that Warhol’s “parading of effeminacy” is a parading of “its gender inappropriateness” (Between You and Me 114)—a display of what has led others to shun him—to not “look at” or “speak to” him, to not form a mutually-sustaining circuit of recognition with him, and this shunning has led to his embarrassment on De Antonio’s articulating its causes in homophobia, racism and class snobbery. To that Butt adds that Warhol’s parading of “his swishness [...] replays an injurious interpellation the better to recast it and wrestle back some degree of agency over and through it” (Between You and Me 114). Baldwin’s cool activist, even at age 10, does not display evidence of such a struggle to “recast” an “injurious interpellation”—to recast past feelings of shame; “Going To Meet The Man” coolly refuses to let the man’s psyche and personal history become the site of an intra-subjective struggle which readers can make the object of their scrutiny. Instead, Baldwin takes the narrative into Jesse’s psychological terrain, because racism is a problem produced
by whiteness (*The Fire Next Time* 8, 22). In contrast, Butt invites us to consider intra-subjective struggles against felt shame as the site that generates cool, and asks us to find in Warhol’s cool public image an active deployment of the “swish” that led to his shame. Butt says that “Warhol’s response may be understood as a queer reiteration of hurtful and shaming acts of naming” (118), drawing on Judith Butler’s ideas about how the culturally-determined significance of one’s gestures and behavior—which have been constituted performatively beyond conscious control—can, through their reiteration, produce fissures or reverberations within them that subvert their received meanings (*Butler Bodies That Matter* 2-3). By consciously reiterating his swish and the “fun” it provides him, while also transforming the shame associated with it, Warhol altered what that swish might signify. Butt describes how Warhol’s first successful one-person show at a significant New York gallery in 1962 included a pair of how-to dance diagrams laid out on the gallery floor (*Between You and Me* 119). They evoked associations with dancers as homosexual and with the petit-bourgeoisie’s use of such mail-order keys to culture. They also seem to comment on the macho Jackson Pollock, bent over his canvases “dancing,” according to Rosalind Krauss (cited in *Between You and Me* 119-120), so that the show forced viewers to associate Warhol with his homosexuality and class origins even as it “culturally recast” the role of the avant-garde artist (*Between You and Me* 120).

Both Butt and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick note how, although Warhol says in *POPism* that he chose to stop caring about others’ reactions to his swish, that move did not mean that he simply jettisoned shame from his persona and had no truck with it. “One might,” says Butt, “[…] see his display of excessively effeminate gestures—
his limp wrists, his dancer’s walk, his ‘shyness’ as a speaking subject—as a hyperbolized performance of shame, of his ‘neurotic’ condition as a homosexual swish” (Between You and Me 119). Sedgwick examines how he reproduces characterizations of his body and demeanor in ways that demonstrate “how the dysphoric affect shame functions as a nexus of production: production, that is, of meaning, of personal presence, of politics, of performative and critical efficacy” (“Queer Performativity” 135). She begins the essay “Queer Performativity: Warhol’s Shyness/Warhol’s Whiteness” by describing how the singer Odetta wandered offstage at a club while performing, so that one could hear her voice from the kitchens and “the excruciated and rapt audience” could witness her “presence: presence like the withdrawal of a god” (“Queer Performativity” 134). This notion of an absent and excruciating presence is one Sedgwick associates with “the poetics, politics, semiotics, and somatics of shame” and with Warhol’s use of shame “as crystallized in a bodily discipline of florid shyness” (“Queer Performativity” 134), all of which I find applies to Warhol’s film direction.

Sedgwick quotes passages from POPism and the earlier The Philosophy of Andy Warhol (From A to B and Back Again) (1975) in which Warhol foregrounds descriptions from the press and from a friend about the “rigid” way he moves (“Queer Performativity” 136), his “slightly faggy air,” “very nice hands” (“Queer Performativity” 135) “albino-chalk skin. Parchmentlike. Reptilian. Almost blue…” (“Queer Performativity” 137). These lists highlight not only markers of homosexuality but also how his stiffness and skin texture distance his appearance from normative standards for beauty and physical coordination; in their contributing details, his gestures and looks do not cohere into a culturally-prized attractiveness. Sedgwick ascribes a “comic
sublimity [to] these passages,” describing their dynamics as that of “an uncanny and unmistakable presence [willing] itself into existence in the flickering, holographic space of Warhol’s hunger to own the rage of other people to describe him—to describe him as if impersonally, not to say sadistically”—a form of “shy exhibitionism” (“Queer Performativity” 137). To this I add that Warhol forms this holographic projection of an “uncanny and unmistakable presence” with a sense of its distance from any shame actually felt about his appearance or from any shame actually produced by the quoted descriptions of his appearance. Through that sense of distance, those verbal exhibitions, along with Warhol’s appearance and the rhetorical situations that generate them, become further reified as objects. The distance between those objects and the Warhol who has shaped and republished them evokes a sense of him—like Odetta singing from an unseen distance—as absent, while at the same time it evokes a sense of him as excruciating presence through the ways it foregrounds and solidifies the dynamics of shame. Warhol’s ability to thus alter how shame attaches to his “presence” suggests he is someone “whose sense of identity is for some reason tuned most to the note of shame”—an attribute that Sedgwick associates with queer individuals, while noting that this association is historically constructed. (“Queer Performativity” 137). It is also important to note that in the examples she provides, the shame and shaming don’t cease; nothing is eliminated or completely overthrown through resistance to oppressive norms. Sedgwick claims that “the forms taken by shame are not distinct ‘toxic’ parts of an identity that can be excised; they are instead integral to and residual in the processes by which identity is formed” (“Queer Performativity” 142). Warhol has reconfigured his relationship to shame, not eliminated it.
Sedgwick bases her ideas about how shame operates on the work of psychologist Sylvan Tompkins, although she also cites more recent research that “locates the protoform (eyes down, head averted)” of shame in the behavior of infants between three and six months old (Touching Feeling 36). During this period, the infant has become able to distinguish and recognize the face of its caregiver—at a particular moment in a particular repeated narrative. That is the moment when the circuit of mirroring expressions between the child’s face and the caregiver’s recognized face […] is broken: the moment when the adult face fails or refuses to play its part in the continuation of mutual gaze; when, for any one of many reasons, it fails to be recognizable to, or recognizing of, the infant who has been, so to speak, ‘giving face’ based on a faith in the continuity of this circuit. (Touching Feeling 36)

When the caregiver breaks the mutual gaze—breaks the “repeated narrative” that has come to provide the child with “feedback from [the] others” on which it depends (Franz Basch qtd. in Touching Feeling 36) and with which it shares “identificatory communication” through the “circuit of mirroring expressions” (Touching Feeling 36), the child reacts by also turning its head and gazing down. Through disruption of the circuit through which the child has been a part of a larger unit, it first considers itself instead as individual. Sedgwick notes that “shame floods into being as a moment” and “a form of communication” that signals “trouble and at the same time […] a desire to reconstitute the interpersonal bridge” (Touching Feeling 36). It also “attaches to and sharpens the sense of what one is, whereas [a feeling like] guilt attaches to what one does” (Touching Feeling 37). In the moment Butt discusses, when Warhol
learns from De Antonio that his “swish” has led the art world to shun him, he first feels a flush of embarrassment: shame’s initial “[flooding] into being as a moment” (Touching Feeling 36). Ultimately, however, that recognition of his isolation—of how and why others have turned away from him—leads Warhol to both recognize himself (he likes his swish) and to respond to the art world in ways motivated by a “desire to reconstitute the interpersonal bridge,” albeit in a “postmodern” (Between You and Me 109), “cool and detached” (Between You and Me 114) mode of his own crafting.

Donald Crimp uses Sedgwick’s notions about shame to read Screen Test #2 (Andy Warhol, 1965), outlining how Warhol “incapacitated” its star, Mario Montez, a drag queen who had appeared in Jack Smith’s films and several by Warhol. Tavel plays the offscreen voice that directs Montez in a fictional screen test for the role of Esmeralda in The Hunchback of Notre Dame. The camera remains fixed throughout on her face as Tavel directs her to perform various bizarre and humiliating acts, such as repeatedly “[mouthing] ‘diarrhea’ exactly as if it tasted of nectar” (qtd. in Crimp 27). Amidst these embarrassing tasks, Tavel provides encouraging feedback and Montez continues to gamely attempt anything until Tavel’s voice asks her to lift her skirt, unzip her fly, and “look down at” and describe her penis (Crimp 27-28). Crimp reminds us “that Warhol writes in POPism of Mario’s embarrassment about doing drag” and belief that it was a sin, although “‘if [God] really hated him, He would have struck him dead’” (29). With that, Crimp reveals that Tavel’s final direction is for Montez to “take a supplicating pose, with eyes and hands turned heavenward” and repeat “‘Oh Lord, I commend this spirit into thy hands’” (29). In this we see Warhol’s hand, although he does not play the director’s role. Warhol’s films feature other, “similar
scenes of cruelty” that agitate viewers, one of which I will discuss in depth below. But Crimp would have us “square these scenes of violation and shaming with […] an ethical project of giving visibility to a queer world of differences and singularities in the 1960s” (32), paying special attention to “what […] the viewer’s discomfiture at Warhol’s techniques of exposure [does] to the usual processes of spectator identification” (32). In other words, how does Warhol’s production of shame agitate the otherwise norm-driven process of identifying with the characters onscreen? “Shame appears to construct the singularity and isolation of one’s identity through an affective connection to the shaming of another” (33-34) Crimp says, because, according to Sedgwick, witnessing

bad treatment of someone else, bad treatment by someone else, someone else’s embarrassment, stigma, debility, blame or pain, [which] seemingly [have] nothing to do with me, can so readily flood me—assuming that I’m a shame-prone person—with this sensation whose very suffusiveness seems to delineate my precise, individual outlines in the most isolating way possible. (qtd. in Crimp 34)

By witnessing and thereby identifying with another’s shame, viewers become more isolated—more singular, ultimately feeling their own shame, rather than that of the person they witness. Crimp puts it thus: “my shame is taken on in lieu of the other’s shame” (34). What he calls “the capacity for articulating collectivities of the shamed” focuses nevertheless on individuals’ “singularity”—rather than on how respectably they resemble hetero norms—and he asserts that this “is why the queer culture of the 1960s, made visible in Warhol’s films, is so necessary a reminder” (Crimp 35).
In addition to producing a sense for viewers of their own and characters’ singularity, Crimp finds that Warhol’s films bring us the “performer in the moment of being exposed such that he becomes, as Warhol said, ‘so for real’” (35) such that “we remain there with our disquiet” that is peculiarly the performer’s, yet also peculiarly only our own, making us, “too, feel exposed” (36). But even while they provide such notable exposure which agitates witnesses through its attendant “disquiet,” Warhol’s films also feature a cool, shameless production of shame, to which I will turn now in discussing The Chelsea Girls. Depending on how it is projected, the film is about three hours and 22 minutes long and is comprised of twelve 33-minute scenes which are projected in pairs, side by side on the screen, though sound from only one scene is played at any given time (Murphy 170). The film was designed to be shown in no necessary order, although subsequent screenings and recordings of the film tend to follow the order Warhol used when he directed its projection (Murphy 170). I will follow that structure here and use scene titles provided in instructions from the Museum of Modern Art’s Circulating Film and Video Library (Murphy 170). The first scene begins five minutes before the other one that shares the screen with it. Subsequently, the screen features two simultaneous segments until the film’s final five minutes. Four of the segments are in color, and eight are in black and white.

We see shame and shamelessness enacted in many but not all of those scenes. Neither the first nor last scene, both featuring the beautiful platinum-blonde German singer Nico, depicts shaming or shamelessness, nor does a segment called “Lights on Cast” in which the cast hangs out under colored lights. While Tavel wrote scripts for the two “Hanoi Hannah” reels and other scenes enact loosely-conceived scenarios
(Brigid Polk plays the Duchess, another Factory personality; Ondine as Pope hears confessions), all the scenes’ amateur actors are expected to be themselves: “Warhol claimed: ‘I only wanted to find great people and let them be themselves and talk about what they usually talked about and I’d film them for a certain length of time and that would be the movie’” (qtd. in Murphy 110).

The scenes that feature shame include the “Boys In Bed,” where Ed Hood, wearing a bathrobe, and Patrick Fleming, in just his undershorts, lie in bed where eventually visitors Mary Woronov and International Velvet (Susan Bottomly) conspire with Hood to pull Fleming’s shorts down, exposing his buttocks and, briefly, his penis, while he struggles against them. In “Mario Sings Two Songs” we find Hood and Fleming in the same bed while Mario Montez, playing the housewife next door who drops by, serenades them—until Hood ridicules her singing so much that she leaves. In POPism Warhol describes trying to coax Montez back to no avail, indicating how the shame produced was not an act (POPism 227-228).

Among scenes of shamelessness, “Hanoi Hannah” and “Hanoi Hannah and Guests” feature Mary Woronov playing a North Vietnamese radio propagandist who bullies captured American GIs played by female actors International Velvet, Ingrid Superstar, and Pepper Davis. The overarching frame for Woronov’s 1995 memoir Swimming Underground: my years in the warhol factory reaches back to the childhood origins of her sadism, how she came to recognize and deploy it in her acting and dancing in Warhol productions, and then how she came to address it as a problem for her. Her chapter on making The Chelsea Girls describes how the scene drew her sadism into play (57-65) and claims that Warhol cast Davis in the scene because he knew
she was a masochist whose behavior would provoke Woronov’s tendencies (61). The sadistic acts Woronov cites include preventing International Velvet from taking a phone call about a real-world job offer (the scene is shot in Velvet’s actual room at the Chelsea Hotel), tying up Ingrid Superstar and confining her in the knee hole of a desk, and pushing International Velvet and messing her hair in a way that leaves her visibly discomfited, but the scene does not feature the stereotypical black leather and play with whips associated with displays of sadism. The shaming thus involves forcing small indignities on others, while Woronov’s facial expression remains coolly fixed in a cross between deadpan and self-confident meanness. The dynamic between cool and agitation is visible and straightforward: Woronov shows no signs of agitation while she makes others cry, look embarrassed or display other feelings. The aplomb that invests her viciousness makes it shameless because it conveys no disquiet at her unethical treatment of others. In a different register, Eric Emerson, on acid, shamelessly takes off his clothes and talks about how he uses others in intimate relationships. Like Woronov, he performs acts that violate the dictates of conventional morality, and in the “face” of that morality—in its abstracted “gaze”—he does not display the shame conventional morality would demand. In “Brigid Holds Court,” Brigid Berlin plays the Duchess, a drug dealer and addict who frequented the Factory. She verbally humiliates Ingrid Superstar, says later she would like to piss on her, pulls down her pants to inject her with speed and later gives herself an injection through the seat of her own jeans. She also phones people to make drug deals in a casually brash manner, making outrageous asides about a variety of topics that demonstrate how little she feels
shame—how little she cares about others’ feelings except perhaps those that signal her dominance over them.

The scenes that feature shamelessness—and shame—on which I will focus are the two that feature Ondine, the actor Robert Olivo, playing the role of Pope and taking confession. The first of these is also the first scene projected on one side of the screen; it is staggered to begin five minutes after “Nico in Kitchen,” in which Nico trims her bangs and talks in her kitchen with Emerson and her small son Ari. Ondine’s second confession scene comes at the film’s end, also juxtaposed with a scene featuring Nico, this time as she sits alone, sometimes crying, under colored lights that shift and occasionally cast the shadow of a latticed screen over her features, as if from the grillwork separating priest from sinner in a confessional. Ondine’s second confession scene ends first, so that the film ends, as it began, with Nico. In contrast to the light in Nico’s kitchen scene (shot in black and white) and the colored lights of her second scene, Ondine appears both times against darkness, in black and white. With low-key lighting, its source placed to the camera’s left, only the characters and couches on which they kneel or sit are lit.

Before Warhol asked him to play the Pope and hear confession for the film, Ondine had made the role his own in other contexts. Whitney Museum curator Callie Angell says that by the time he met Warhol in the early 1960s, “Ondine had become what would now be recognized as a performance artist, reading comics on stage at the Caffe Cino or hanging out at the San Remo coffee shop on MacDougal Street, where he would assume the role of the ‘Pope of Greenwich Village,’ hearing confessions and handing out advice to other customers” (149). Ondine formed part of a group of queer
men noted for its use of amphetamines who were friends of Billy Name (Billy Linich) and frequented Name’s living space in the back of the Factory (POPism 79).

Stephen Koch reports that when Ondine first met Warhol, he “was so unnerved by his unbroken staring […] he threw a fit and insisted Warhol be thrown out of the party” (vii)—witness to the agitating power of the artist’s cool that gestures metaphorically to how his fixed camera incited performance. A productive relationship blossomed between the two men: a transcript of Ondine talking forms the text of Warhol’s novel, *a novel*, and “he appears in more Warhol footage than any other individual” (Angell 149). Mary Woronov, who was smitten by Ondine, writes of him: “Rooms grew old when he left and after talking to him I couldn’t bear normal conversation” (91). Responding to a Factory newcomer’s awe of Warhol, Woronov says, “Little did she know the real anaconda was Ondine” (84). Warhol notes that “Ondine was known in our crowd as ‘the Pope,’ and one of his most famous routines was ‘giving the papal bull’” (POPism 170), while Koch describes him as the “most brilliant and vituperative of the superstars, his irrepressibly flammable temperament modified by a peculiarly impressive ethic of honesty and intensity” (9). These accounts indicate that Ondine was a seasoned, verbally adept performer who enjoyed a dominant place amongst Warhol’s superstars and in front of his camera.

We can glean some insight into how Warhol used “intentional [effects] of un-expectedness” in relation to Ondine, from J.J. Murphy’s explanation of the casting of *Restaurant* (1965) “to create dramatic tension by inserting an explosive personality, Ondine” (102) from working-class New York (7), “into a situation involving the Cambridge crowd” (102)—a group which formed around Edie Sedgwick, comprised
of people associated with Harvard and, like Edie, from wealthy families (7). Warhol thus placed Ondine’s personality, his economic class and other kinds of educational and cultural capital—those of a drug addict, a performance artist, of an Italian-American, someone raised a Catholic—in tension with a group markedly different in order to produce dramatic tension as they all were “being themselves.”

I will focus on the rhetorical situation of filming the confession scenes in *The Chelsea Girls* so that I may consider Warhol as a cool influence in addition to the amateur actors’ thermodynamic effects on each other as they perform “themselves.” The first confessional scene features Ingrid Superstar (Ingrid Von Scheven) confessing to Pope Ondine. Carrie Angell notes that “according to several accounts, Ingrid was initially promoted as a kind of low-rent parody of the most famous Warhol superstar of that year, Edie Sedgwick, who had become difficult to work with” (197). Warhol describes her as “just an ordinarily nice-looking girl from Jersey [...] posing as a glamour figure and a party girl” (*POPism* 154). He relates how she would imitate “exactly” how “glamour [figures]” like Sedgwick, Nico and International Velvet applied makeup and talked beauty tips but even so, “It was like watching Judy Holliday, say, with Verushka” (154). While Ingrid seemed incapable of performing a sense of taste beyond her social class, Warhol adds that “In the middle of all her airs, she’d suddenly come from behind [...] with total honesty that cut right to the point. Deep down, Ingrid was totally unpretentious” and “somehow” the way she was “worked” (*POPism* 154). Her film performances and poetry, which she read publicly, were

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2 Holliday was “the comedienne star of *Born Yesterday,*” while “Verushka was one of the top fashion models of the late 1960s to early 1970s” (Angell 307, note 350).
marked by a gift for comedy (Angell 197) and Warhol describes her enthusiasm and amusing lack of savoir faire by saying that she was “the type of girl who would jump up and do the pony no matter what year it was” (*POPism* 154-155).

While Ondine, unlike Ingrid, was known for his well-read yet street-smart brilliance, their performances nevertheless complement each other’s in the first confession scene, so that they form an adult version of the “circuit of mirroring expressions” (*Touching Feeling* 36) on which infants depend, as Sedgwick describes it. Moreover, they perform an ironic version of such an adult relationship for Warhol’s camera by improvising “themselves” acting out a confession. The mutual circuit Ondine and Ingrid form is complex, consisting of cultural references, humor, irony, and affect in the rarified registers that “work” at the Factory. Through voice and gesture, diction and topics of conversation, they each deploy their specific educational and cultural capital in tandem with the other’s. Their simpatico interactions demonstrate that they are “able to distinguish and recognize” each other’s style and improvise in sync with it. For either to stop doing so—to “look away” from the other and thereby produce shame in him or her—would require one of them to “[fail] or [refuse] to play its part in the continuation of [their] mutual” performance—a performers’ equivalent to the sustaining gaze between parent and child (*Touching Feeling* 36).

Ondine kneels on the righthand couch, resting his arms on its back and facing Ingrid, who sits on the seat of another couch, facing the other way but sometimes turning to face him. Although the dominant conceit is that she confesses to a priest, the scene also evokes a psychotherapeutic session, given the use of couches and how Ondine asks Ingrid to recount such experiences as her first sexual encounter (Crimp
99). He later recommends therapy for her mother—and for Ingrid, that she “should be tied up, put in a bathtub, and pissed on”—“because [she] should be wet” (The Chelsea Girls). They also disrupt the diegetic conceit when Ingrid asks Ondine “What are you a chiropractor or something?” and he replies, “No no no, I’m a yogist” (The Chelsea Girls). Her questions mark her as ostensibly ignorant of the counterculture dabbling with Eastern philosophy in which Ondine is steeped, as she ignores “yogist,” and asks, “Did you finish high school?” When he replies, “Art school,” Ingrid says, “Then what are you doing as a priest?” “Posing,” is his answer (The Chelsea Girls). They thus locate their performance in its own self-reflexive zone where they are neither “being themselves” nor not doing so.

What emerges is dialogue in which Ingrid plays straight man to Ondine’s shamelessness—a shamelessness that is cool in its unmoving refusal to find topics shameful that convention designates as such. For example, after he has made a few shocking remarks, Ingrid probes the limits of his shamelessness by asking, “Did you ever have sex with the dog?” (The Chelsea Girls). Ondine smoothly and immediately replies, “My mother and father too” (The Chelsea Girls). In this, Ondine’s pope reminds us of Warhol’s decision to not care how others react to his swish, and how Butt finds that choice integral to Warhol’s cool. Moreover, Ondine’s shamelessness forms a still, fixed position from which he operates, suggesting that he is a veteran of recognizing shame, and that this enables him to make use of it, rather than be its object.

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3 I distinguish between the process through which individuals constitute shame through their interactions with each other, and topics that have been deemed “shameful” through large-scale social processes. Performing shameful acts or speaking of shameful topics might enter into shame-producing dynamics between individuals if they constitute the reason why one person breaks the mutual circuit they form between them.
This is conjecture, though, because what he “confesses” about himself does not include feeling shame. Nevertheless we can assume that not only has he experienced a “normal” amount of shame, but also that—as a man attracted to men who was born in 1939 (Angell 149)—attempts were made to shame him for “being himself.” We see that he chooses to foreground shameful topics and that—through the very shamelessness with which he speaks of them—he makes those topics objects of consideration, as Warhol similarly made his unattractive pallor and stiffness into a cool object that he could deploy with some sense of distance between it and his self. But Ondine requires greater distance than does Warhol: he evinces no willingness to deploy what actually might have disturbed him about himself, while Warhol was willing to publicly toy with that which had perturbed him: we know he was self-conscious enough about his appearance to try cosmetic surgery and hide his thinning hair under wigs (Warhol Museum). Ondine and Ingrid banter jointly, sometimes shouting, trading insults (“You pig.” “Don’t breathe in my direction. You’re particularly offensive.”), but also sharing a beer and a towel to blot sweat, plus at one point Ondine helps Ingrid put an earring on (The Chelsea Girls). They remain focused on each other, both willing to be confrontative and expostulate loudly without breaking the connective circuit on which both their performances depend, although at a few points they do look into the camera and once, Ingrid waves at it.

As they improvise before Warhol’s camera to conjure “an intentional effect of unexpectedness,” Ingrid responds to more than one of Ondine’s remarks with “You should be ashamed!” and “You should be ashamed of yourself” at one point, after he claims that he had his first sexual experience at age 11 (The Chelsea Girls). Her ex-
clamation is not quite the performative “Shame on you” that Sedgwick examines because she finds it provides an example of performativity more fitting for queer subjects than J. L. Austin’s example of the wedding vows’ “I do.” At the same time, however, “You should be ashamed of yourself” does attempt to mark its subject as being a certain way—almost. Ondine “should be” yet is not ashamed. This does not assert that he should feel shame, but rather that his being should be marked as “ashamed”: it should form part of his identity, at least temporarily. The joke, the source of delight that Ingrid’s exclamations underscore is, of course, that Ondine is not ashamed and apparently no one can force that condition on him.

_The Chelsea Girls_’ most famous scene is Ondine’s second turn as the pope hearing confession. Projecting the reels in the order that Warhol did provides a conventionally-placed dramatic climax, in which an attempt to shame Ondine does in some ways make him lose his cool. Brigid Berlin, who was supposed to perform in the scene with him, did not show and a last-minute replacement was used (Murphy 186). The scene therefore begins with only Ondine onscreen, talking to “Paul” (probably Paul Morrissey, who directed with Warhol after Tavel shifted to playwriting) and whoever else was there, which included Warhol operating the camera. We first watch Ondine shoot up some speed, then say, “Paul shut up. I don’t think I’m going to say a word. I don’t think I can,” but after some disjointed, unclear conversation with the crew, he says, “Alright. Let’s talk about me” (_The Chelsea Girls_). They try to get him to talk about “the war”—no doubt meaning Vietnam, since this is 1966, but Ondine insists on a less common topic, responding as if they must mean “the war between the
Vatican states” (The Chelsea Girls). He then talks about his pose as “the Pope of Greenwich Village”:

Being pope isn’t easy. It’s like—. It’s just something you are. It’s hard you know I mean… But… I’m not even going to think about my philosophy as pope… Suffice it to say that it’s been a horrible—gruel all the way. I haven’t had one moment’s good time […] I wasn’t elected pope […] The Catholic church has disappeared and Greenwich Village is in its place […] I’m no different than any other man. I have more free choice. I exercise it as a literal discipline… as I possibly can […] As a man I have hopes fears […] I just want to be true to my flock, whoever they may be. My flock consists of homosexuals… perverts of any kind […] Thieves, criminals of any sort, the rejected by society OK? That’s who I’m pope for…. I’m pope for the few who really care. I’m here to anyone’s confession, Paul. What kind of cigarette are you smoking young man? (The Chelsea Girls)

Here, Ondine relates his pose as pope, with its unmoving shamelessness, to a Greenwich Village which has taken the place of a vanished Catholic Church, suggesting that New York City’s haven for the queer and generative center for avant-garde creativity now provides the kinds of intangible yet divine and life-giving sustenance that the church once did. The Village and Ondine serve “the rejected by society,” whom Sedgwick might call “shame-prone” (Touching Feeling 37) because of how “perverts of any kind” have been “rejected by society.” This is the place where Ondine comes closest to aligning himself with a history of having been shamed and of having negotiated a series of recognitions whereby he has become shameless. Although it would be
a mistake to think he takes his pose as pope seriously (it is, after all, a pose), it would also be a mistake to ignore how he links his “popage” (*The Chelsea Girls*) in multiple, tangential ways to “the rejected […] who really care.”

After some minutes, his confessant Ronna Page arrives. Unlike all of *The Chelsea Girls*’ other characters, Page was not a regular at the Factory, although she did make other films with Warhol in 1966 (when *The Chelsea Girls* was released) and 1967 (Angell 150). She lived for a while in Jonas Mekas’ loft (Angell 150) and she appears being filmed at his home in his film diary *Walden*; she also appeared in other New York City avant-garde films of the late 1960s (Angell 152). Angell also tells us that “Page was connected with the Lyman Family or Fort Hill Community, a messianic Boston-based commune centered around the musician Mel Lyman, who was a member of the Jim Kweskin Jug Band” (150). Warhol describes how one expedition to California with the Velvet Underground and others in tow underscored many differences between his entourage—pale urban speed freaks dressed in black—and the flower children of the west coast (*POPism* 212-213). Page’s history in the commune and her outfit may evince a similar difference: unlike the jeans, mini-dresses, or trousers with men’s shirt and tie which we see other females wear in the film, Page wears a dress with long, full sleeves, some embroidery or ribbons decorating it, and a scoop neck which taken together suggest a “folk” aesthetic. As we watch, other differences accrue: for example, that between Ondine’s working-class New York accent and hers, which seems denuded of regional markers in a way that might point to a middle-class background.
Page’s first lines indicate that she knows that her role is to confess to Ondine. With telling detail, when she arrives on the set but is not yet visible on camera, she sits first on Ondine’s couch, rather than the vacant one where Ingrid had sat to confess, and we hear him say, “Sit down—not on my hypodermic needle,” which we earlier have seen him stash in a paper bag (The Chelsea Girls). Their conversation begins with Ondine’s offering her water from his glass, which she accepts. He compliments her: “You smell nice, what’re you wearing?” and her reply suggests how she expects to play her confession by exaggerating details in a theatrical but still conventional sense of the religious: “The sacred oil that was in the—” But Ondine interrupts her in plain speech, saying, “What’s the name of it? It’s beautiful,” to which she says, “I think it’s called patchouli,” then asks if she can sit on the vacant couch, moving into camera range (The Chelsea Girls). When he tells her “the cameras are rolling,” in her response she continues to establish a kind of theatrical religiosity—“O my god. Cameras in a church? That’s kind of scary”—and she makes no effort to play off of Ondine’s reaction: “No—It's the American way” (The Chelsea Girls).

Page confesses to Ondine that she feels a “low” kind of love for Jesus Christ and he immediately demystifies her statement, saying “A low kind of love? You mean sexual” (The Chelsea Girls). When she replies with, “Yes. I don’t know—“ Ondine interrupts with “Blow him” while she continues: “—what to do about it, because…” (The Chelsea Girls). In the way the scene plays out, we see that Page expects her one confession to produce such a degree of intrigued shock that it will be sufficient to sustain the scene’s focus. However, Ondine has quickly addressed her shocking topic, adding that she should “Go down on an image” (The Chelsea Girls). She tries to draw
out the discussion of her “problem” by insisting that it’s rooted in Jesus’ not being “a real man,” but Ondine answers, “Go up to the nearest image of Christ. Particularly the ones on the cross, because he’s groovier there, and kneel down and peel away the loin cloth in your mind. And go about your business. Whatever you have to do. You’ll have a wonderful time my child” (The Chelsea Girls). His shamelessness will not give way in order to help her play out her confession as outrageous. “I’m telling you to use your mind. The mind is all after all,” he says, then “The soul is the mind,” to which she tries to respond with gentle horror (The Chelsea Girls).

Finally, he tells her to leave, to which she says, “But I’m not finished” and he replies, “Your time is up. All right. Go on”—a quick change perhaps because he recalls Warhol’s insistence that actors perform until their entire 30-minute reel of film has been shot (The Chelsea Girls). When Page answers, “Thank you. Can I have some water?” she takes the water glass and turns toward the camera to sip from it with graceful care (The Chelsea Girls). Both of them have used the water glass to interrupt the other in the scene. As they ask for, then take it and drink from it in this ostensibly innocuous act, their focus on the object and on drinking visibly demonstrates how the other’s performance has become secondary to their thirst. Courtesy enables this breaking of their (barely) mutual circuit of attention: neither can be so impolite as to refuse the other water. And although Ondine is used to interrupting and being interrupted, the tenor of interruptions in this scene lacks the chaotic camaraderie that interrupting and being interrupted by Ingrid produce in the scene with her. As they try to proceed with the scene, both look at the camera instead of each other, and Ondine looks down,
though it appears to be from impatience rather than shame as he waits for Page to finish a line.

There are also two instances when Page very overtly looks away from Ondine. Once, when he is advising her to mentally fellate Jesus and has just said, “You’ll be freed,” she turns 180 degrees and looks upward. The light shines on her such that the image evokes someone praying to a divine light that shines from above, and her smirk completes the moralistic picture. At another moment, while he talks, she turns and gazes into the camera, looking dubious about what he’s saying, establishing a circuit of knowing with the camera that excludes Ondine. While Ingrid argues with him during the first confession scene, the two of them remain in the same register and her contestations never work to supplant that register with one that excludes Ondine, but that is what Page’s gestures do. Of course, Ondine has set a tone that communicates his expectation that Page cooperate or be his stooge, and when he turns from her to look at the camera, he also works a well-established mutual circuit with Warhol and the crew that excludes her. Still, Page will not acquiesce to his dominance.

To continue the scene, her one clever concept wrung dry, she turns to clumsy aggression and accuses Ondine of being “a phony” (The Chelsea Girls)—a charge which in itself could not faze him, as Koch notes (96). Given all his other demonstrations of shamelessness, we would expect him to smoothly turn the label into a complement or in some way turn it back on Page. Moreover, he has told Ingrid that he is “posing,” although that is not quite the same thing as being phony. While phoniness connotes fraudulently pretending to be what one is not, posing suggests that one pretends to be something and is performing. But if Page’s jibe is not what enrages Ondine
enough to first throw the water in her face and then violently slap her repeatedly, shocking all those present (Warhol says Ondine’s rage was so upsetting he had to leave the room—but he left the camera running) (227 POPism), then what does make him lose his cool?

Ondine is frustrated by Page long before his outburst, and before they discount each other by breaking the circuit of attention and interest between them, we can see that attempting to form such a circuit challenges them. Koch says of Page, she was ill-equipped for her job. Trying to be ironic, trying to be authentic, she could do neither, and she found herself in big trouble instead. For that particular game, she had sat down at a table with pros. And it was exactly her incapacity for the task, subtly evident in her presence from the beginning, that provoked Ondine into his rage. (96)

Koch’s reading of the scene brilliantly articulates a number of its dynamics, but I differ with some ways he conceives of it overall. He ascribes both irony and authenticity to Ondine’s style, and while I find the dynamic of posing does align his performance with a sense of irony, and speaks to an overriding focus on producing performances, that very emphasis on posing diminishes authenticity’s value. In keeping with that devotion to pose and performance, I agree with Koch when he says, “It was the way she was there that set him off” (96), in that her “way” or style was “the violation of a style, a style of life” (97) so that she, “disastrously for her, […] tried to divert attention—ours, Ondine’s, the camera’s—from the mode of consciousness in which Ondine and the other important people in the film locate their capacity to live and act” (97). I do not see all the “important people in the film” necessarily invested in the
same “mode of consciousness” that Ondine is. Some are prone to shame or invested in humiliating or making others feel shame, while Warhol’s direction seems to find in shame one important source of fascination among many. Crimp takes the title for his essay on the film from a remark Warhol made about the Factory as a place where its regulars were all “somehow misfitting together,” stressing the singularity of their performances and how the doubled, side-by-side projection produces that misfitting formally (109). What Koch calls a “mode of consciousness” I would instead call an aesthetic that Ondine’s performance of shamelessness declares, and which his description of his role of pope as ministering to “the rejected by society” links to those who are normally shamed. I agree, however, with Koch’s assessment that Ondine’s aesthetic (which I associate with shamelessness) seems integral to how he both “[lives and acts],” given how posing and “being himself” are inextricable. What Page affronts to produce his rage is precisely Ondine’s performance of shamelessness, for she breaks the circuit between them in gestures, large and small, that evince an assumption that she can shame him.

Once she has called him a phony and he retorts, “So are you. Even worse than me. Because you’re a real phony,” he grabs the water glass out of her hand and throws what’s left in it in her face (The Chelsea Girls). She responds, “Do the other side too,” as she spreads the water over her face as if it were a cream, looking at the camera, playing to it rather than to him (The Chelsea Girls). He insults her, tells her to leave, and then she exclaims, “Look at you!” After his subsequent retort, she repeats it again and again: “Look at you! Look at you! Look at you!” (The Chelsea Girls). Her exhortation, rather than forming a sustaining circuit with him, demands that he see himself
as shamed rather than shameless, and also seems to posit onlookers who share her view of him as an object of shame.

This is when he attacks her, exclaiming, “Who are you supposed to be, little Miss Wonder? You’re a bore my dear.” He hits her, repeating, “A bore! A bore!” slaps her three times and then goes around to her side of the couches, where he says, “You filthy horror,” hits her twice, then grabs her arm and shakes her. “Admit it! Admit it, you! Admit you’re a phony, you creep!” (The Chelsea Girls). While Ondine has lost his cool in a conventional sense—he seems to have lost control over his own affect and thereby, over his actions—we cannot tell if he has lost touch with his shamelessness, though his sense of irony does seem to have been replaced with intense earnestness. In accusing her of being “a bore,” he deploys an aesthetic stance by critiquing her ability to retain others’ interest, an ability that helps sustain the circuit between individuals, according to Sedgwick (Touching Feeling 36). “A bore” would lose the interest of the other in that circuit, so that when he loses his cool he also seems to abruptly invest in efforts to shame Page. As he hits her, Page puts her hands over her head protectively, looking down, but eventually turns to him, holding up her forefinger and saying “Get your hands off me. Get your hands off me,” though still apprehensively cringing (The Chelsea Girls). Then he leads her offscreen and returns, alone for the rest of the scene wherein he debriefs at length, given Warhol’s requirement that he perform until the reel is finished (Koch 93). His talk meanders, justifying his violence and then again claiming he doesn’t like violence, and we see him work to reconstitute his shamelessness and its aesthetic authority.
Koch notes that, while Ondine is hitting her, at the moment when Page’s “face comes to the realization that this is not, after all, just a movie […] then], understandably enough, the presence of the camera ceases to have any importance to her and she reasserts herself, eyes closed: ‘Stop it. Stop it. Don’t touch me’” (96). She thus stops “acting” within the diegesis, such as it is, just at the point when the viewer sees her shame in her cringing, when Ondine’s physical attack most graphically sunders the circuit between them. While Page then seems to lose a sense that she is performing, viewers also witness her shame and isolation in earnest, such that it agitates and isolates them in their knowledge of shame in reactions like those Crimp assigns to viewers of Screen Test #2 (34-36). She cannot manage to emulate Ondine’s cool shamelessness, especially since she has, through most of the scene, instead displayed something like a bourgeois or folksy—perhaps “feminine”—earnestness. As viewers we experience some dissonance as her shame-in-earnest jettisons us from the plane of performance Ondine had established. By responding with sympathetic shame, the ease of appreciating Ondine’s shamelessness opens up our conjecture about how he can be so shameless while she cannot. Moreover, her failure serves as a cautionary tale to those who would attempt cool.
CHAPTER 3

“PUT THROUGH SOME CHANGES”: JASON HOLLIDAY’S PERFORMANCE OF COOL

In both this chapter and in Chapter 4, I argue that Shirley Clarke’s avant garde film *Portrait of Jason* (1967) produces cool in ways bound to agitate viewers. I will start by discussing in this chapter how viewers may recognize those modes of cool through Jason Holliday’s performance on screen and in Carl Lee’s performance as an offscreen, directorial voice. Chapter 4 will discuss how viewers may recognize coolness through Shirley Clarke’s performance as an offscreen directorial voice; through Clarke’s editing and subsequent characterization of the film; and through the stillness—the inert nature of the film itself. Ultimately, the interplay between effects of these loci of cool render viewer response to the film difficult to describe or characterize as emerging from particular perspectives. Through a certain cool inertia, they produce a kaleidoscopic effect.

Irene Gustafson finds that the film operates through multiple senses of the concept of the test: Its subject, Jason Holliday, sees it as a screen test—an audition and means to bigger roles (4). It’s maker, Shirley Clarke, sees the film as testing tenets of cinéma vérité, so that it is kind of experiment that toys with empirical notions of testing (Gustafson 4). How viewers, in turn, read the gay African-American Jason—and his drug use, reported life of prostitution and con artistry, underscores the “the larger political or cultural stakes” which the film invokes (3). While those stakes have
changed with viewers’ historical moment since the film was released in 1967, they have continued to point to how the film has tested us through challenging our readings and “[testing] our mettle and patience, queried us to describe what we have seen, questioned our faith in cherished categories of the fake and the authentic, and incited passionate assessments of positive and negative imagery” (Gustafson 4). In all these ways of testing viewers, the film agitates various expectations and assumptions. Gustafson also points out that, since its release, an important variation has marked what “curators and programers” have considered the film to be and as a result, what sort of event forms around any given screening (4). Given this variety, Gustafson asserts, “the designation of screen test engenders an identity for the film that situates its indeterminacy as its most critical feature” (5). She concludes that this indeterminacy produces two basic questions for viewers: who is Jason, and what kind of film is this? (Gustafson 3). Because the film allows for no simple answer to either question, it agitates its viewers. Moreover, it does so as an ostensibly simple film: it is just one man talking about himself to the camera for 90 minutes, with some occasional prodding from offscreen. That the film evinces so little variation, with no change in its form, its scene, or its subject, gives it a stillness, or cool fixity.

**Clarke’s Work Before Portrait of Jason**

As a contributing member of New York City’s avant garde filmmaking community, Clarke had chosen to explore and challenge conventional, genre-bound notions of film. She had been producing experimental works for ten years when “Warhol turned his genius for parody and reduction against the American avant-garde film itself” by “[exploding] the myth of compression and the myth of the film-maker […]

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and […] advertising] his indifference to direction, photography, and lighting” (P. Adam Sitney 349) to produce films that are “about the hypnotic nature of the gaze itself” (Koch 55), such as Eat (1963), Sleep (1963), and Empire (1964). While Clarke’s first films explored cine dance, they also slipped routinely into and out of other modes: *Bullfight* (1955) features dance and documentary-type footage of bullfighting shot by a friend (Rabinovitz Points of Resistance 98), *Paris Parks* (1954) films the daily activity of visitors to a park in what Clarke called “a dance film without dancers” (Bermel 78) and *Bridges Go Round* (1958) films bridges as if they were dancing and then superimposes such images to form more complex dance (Kowalski 160). The 1960 *A Scary Time*, featuring D.A. Pennebaker’s son, by juxtaposing footage of starving children with an American child’s skeleton mask, combines stark critique of transnational economic differences with a UNICEF appeal to contribute to its child fundraisers on Halloween. Her subsequent work on Willard Van Dyke's documentary *Skyscraper* (1959) added music and worker’s voiceover comments about constructing the Tishman Building in Manhattan as they—and the film’s audience—watch footage of its construction (Rabinovitz Points of Resistance 109). D. A. Pennebaker, who had also worked on the project, later said in response to the film, in light of Clarke’s contributions to it, “That’s a dumb, dumb picture. It’s a bullshit documentary. It’s just pretty pictures” (qtd. in Kowalski 168).

Clarke’s first feature-length film, *The Connection* (1961), not only represents on film Jack Gelber’s play of the same name, but also transposes its self-reflexive toying with distinctions between audience and cast, authenticity and acting (Banes 117-118), into self-reflexive play with the notion of authenticity in making documentary.
In a move that speaks to the sex and race of most contemporary filmmakers, Clarke turns the play into a film whose director—a white man who lacks the cultural and educational capital to successfully interact with and direct the junkies he is filming—becomes a character, as does his African-American cameraman who ostensibly shoots most of the film, appearing onscreen only rarely. With this move, Clarke used fiction to critique documentary in ways that comment on how race, sex, addiction and inebriation inflect notions of authenticity and their representation. Completely offscreen herself, Clarke directed a cast of African-American and white males—and one female: a white woman in middle age who, while as clueless about her surrounds as the white male “director,” is treated in her ignorant and charitable femininity (she is a Salvation Army type) as someone with whom the drug dealer Cowboy briefly amuses himself and then kindly sends on her way.

Actor Carl Lee played Cowboy in both the play and film (which for the most part shared the same cast) and became Clarke’s lover, apparently while making the film. In her autobiography, Clarke’s sister, writer Elaine Dundy, says that Clarke described Lee as the love of her life (240). The son of Canada Lee—an actor who, with Paul Robeson, was among the first African-Americans to earn significant success on Broadway—Carl Lee collaborated with Clarke on her next feature-length film, The Cool World (1964), as well as on Portrait of Jason. With The Cool World, Clarke continued to bend gender conventions. An adaptation of Warren Miller’s 1959 novel of the same name, the film was shot on location in Harlem—a rarity at the time (“About Shirley Clarke,” Rotha 66)—and featured amateur actors recruited from the kind of teenage gangs the film depicts and who were consulted about the authenticity of their
lines in the script (Rabinovitz Points of Resistance 123, American Film Institute 4).

However, the film also features performances from professionals Gloria Foster, Georgia Burke, Clarence Williams III and Carl Lee. Lauren Rabinovitz notes that the film “[incorporates] Clarke’s filmmaking style of gritty black-and-white realism marked as such because of its location shooting, improvisation, and rambling narratives” that evoke cinéma vérité (Points of Resistance 123). That “gritty […] realism” is augmented by extensive footage of the streets of Harlem, shot by Leroy Lucas, whose race enabled him to film street scenes less obtrusively than white crew members (American Film Institute 4-5). Its use of elements from Italian Neorealist film, such as “montage sequences, a first-person voice-over narration, and nondiegetic jazz soundtrack” disrupt the film’s “gritty […] realism,” according to Rabinovitz, as does Clarke’s editing of its montages in the style of Dziga Vertov “to recreate an essence of reality” (Points of Resistance 125-126) Overall, she claims, “The Cool World’s discourse of cinéma vérité counterpoints its interpolations of a cinema-eye, Vertov-styled documentary about Harlem” so that it “plays one style against the other, synthesizing them in a superstructure that is an atmospheric story of social realism” (126). After its release, Clarke described the film as an attempt to alert the ignorant to the plight of African Americans trapped in inner city slums (“Comments by Miss Shirley Clarke” 2, American Film Institute 3). Rabinovitz notes how the film has been received as offering a liberal humanist perspective (Points of Resistance 128), which Clarke’s public statements seem to encourage. But Rabinovitz also reports that “Clarke and her producer Fred Wiseman privately agreed that their public statements about The Cool World should offer a positive point of view so as to avoid some of the negative public reac-
tions to *The Connection*” (*Points of Resistance* 128). An adept publicist, Clarke’s statements to the press should not be read as articulating the full extent of her views, especially given the complex tension the film produces between a sense of realism and fiction. Soon after *The Cool World’s* release, Clarke reports learning that the film was “two different movies”: in art house theaters with primarily white audiences, it inspired concern as a tragedy, but in African-American “neighborhood” theaters, it inspired amusement (*American Film Institute* 18-19). Such screenings contributed to her sensitivity about how specific audiences help construct a film’s significance—any truth to which it might lay claim.

From 1964 to 1967, Clarke hoped for but did not acquire more work directing feature-length films (*Village Voice*). She tried to get backing to complete her film on jazz musician Ornette Coleman and she also sought support to film *Googs*, for which she wrote the script. In 1965 she sought treatment for depression at Connecticut’s New Life Center (“New Life Center Notebook”), although her sister Elaine suggests she really—or also—was treated for drug addiction (Dundy 242-243). There she became friends with Robert Lowell and grieved at the news of Malcolm X’s assassination (“New Life Center Notebook”). Then Clarke chose to fund *Portrait of Jason* herself, using black and white film in ten-minute reels that were given to her by someone at NBC (Rabinovitz *Points of Resistance* 136). Her reports of its cost vary: in a 1983 interview she said that she spent $10,000 (Rabinovitz “Choreography” 10), but claims in a 1968 letter to Holliday’s lawyer that she spent $21,500 (“Correspondence”). She finally completed *Ornette: Made In America* in 1985, a film begun in the 1960s but delayed by lack of funding (“Correspondence”). It and *Portrait of Jason* are her final fea-
ture-length films, after which she explored making use of the cheaper and more versatile video technology becoming available. Her Chelsea Hotel rooftop video studio became the scene of her video work and classes she taught (“Videotape” 2); in the 1970s she became a professor at UCLA where she taught film and video making (“About Shirley Clarke” 2). Clarke thus did not confine her work to a specific genre and questioned claims underpinning genre through her various projects over time.

*Portrait of Jason* represents Jason Holliday “being himself”: talking about himself, airing his views, telling anecdotes from his life, and performing excerpts from a cabaret act he plans to present in New York City. Clarke—well-to-do, white, Jewish, heterosexual, and one of few female avant garde filmmakers at the time—fashioned the film’s 90 minutes out of four hours of footage in the form of 10-minute reels which were shot over twelve consecutive hours in December of 1966 (qtd. in Kowalski 190), editing to create the sense that we view an unedited and therefore chronological experience, beginning the film with the first moments shot and ending it with the final ten-minute reel that concludes with Clarke’s voice repeating “the end, the end” (*Portrait of Jason*). Set in Clarke’s living room at the Chelsea Hotel, the black-and-white film produces a sense of spending time with Jason Holliday that progresses from overt introductions (“My name is Jason Holliday….I’m a stone cold whore”) to anecdotes that expand on those introductions to describe his experiences as an African American houseboy and gay hustler, followed by samples from his cabaret act, after which there is a movement to more personal anecdotes of Holliday’s childhood, relationships with his parents and how his sex life developed, mixed with recollections of living down and out (*Portrait of Jason*). The film resembles an interview, although
Holliday tells anecdotes on his own or in response to prompts, rather than to the kind of questions that drive interviews. It resembles documentary in that it does not place Holliday in a fictive, scripted situation, yet it is staged in Clarke’s living room rather than a site from Holliday’s everyday life. As Gustafson notes, it resembles a screen test in that its subject sees himself as offering a performance that will lead to further performance opportunities (4). She also notes its similarities to Warhol’s “screen tests,” pointing out how they all “unmoor the specific tropes of the Hollywood actor or personality screen test […] and resituate these tropes […], exploring the notion of being right for the part in relation to the day-to-day realities of enacting and embodying socially and historically constructed identity categories” (10), thus transposing the screen test, as “utilitarian” genre, into art object (10). I would add that, like Warhol’s films that included “screen test” in their titles and in the short films he shot of visitors to The Factory, which were later dubbed “screen tests” (Angell 15), Portrait of Jason tests its subject’s ability to control how film represents the surfaces of his body and the kinds of agitation they do—or do not—display.

In the film’s last section we also hear actor Carl Lee’s offscreen voice press Jason about their shared experience, in contrast with Lee’s earlier requests for specific anecdotes (“tell me the cop story”; “tell us about Big Tough”) and directorial coaching (Portrait of Jason). Like Ronald Tavel playing “the director” who pressures Mario Montez to discuss his genitals in Warhol’s Screen Test #2 (Crimp 27-28), Lee pressures Jason. In one of the final reels, Lee reminds Holliday of lies he “wrote…just because I wouldn’t lend you a few lousy dollars….dirty rotten letters […]saying] that I was a dirty rotten bum….Just cause I wouldn’t lend you a few dollars you had to pull
your usual rotten shit” (Portrait of Jason). Here, Lee uses their common personal history as the source of his accusations. While Clarke adds general comments (“You should be lonely”; “You’re not suffering”), Lee’s attack, rooted in his relationship with him, pushes Holliday from self-possession to displaying unwanted emotion: chagrined at being confronted, he covers his eyes and eventually cries while Lee persists (Portrait of Jason). The film ends after a few more exchanges, including one in which Lee taunts Holliday for not having taken sufficient advantage of the one chance making the film offers him. Although Holliday seems deeply upset in response to Lee, the fact that he recovers by rapidly signifying a different affective register has led some, like Lauren Rabinovitz, to assert that the authenticity of any affect Holliday displays is at least suspect (Points of Resistance 136)—a point with which Clarke agreed (“Choreography” 11). Jason calmly and casually says at the end that the film is “beautiful—I’m really happy about it,” followed by Clarke’s voice repeating “the end” in a stiltedly light tone (Portrait of Jason).

Holliday’s Cool

In Portrait of Jason, Holliday displays cool behavior in multiple ways. He makes references that mark him as a hip African-American familiar of the jazz scene and thereby someone who performs cool behaviors associated with that rhetorical situation. Referring to his friend Miles Davis, he provides imitations of Davis’ speech with the cool of its slow, still gravitas. Holliday also discusses how he cons and hustles other men, describing how “you run it down to them” and “beat them for their frame” (Portrait of Jason). He represents the streetwise hustler’s duplicitous manipulation of others as operating from a knowledge of how they will react to stimuli to
which he doesn’t react, his stillness being rooted in his greater manipulative knowledge. Through manipulation, he controls the stimuli that moves, or agitates, others. The people he targets are unaware his manipulations produce those stimuli, while from a locus of knowledge they don’t expect or discern, he moves but is not moved by them. Holliday describes as “cool” the manipulative ways he responds to legal harassment when hustling:

When the heat gets to you there’s one good escape from being gay. I was grabbed one time—they were going to search me—and as soon as the cop touched me I went ‘Officer!’ [in a fay tone and as if surprised by being groped] and he went ‘Ah get the hell out of here!’ [in a growl] and I was cool, you know: I tipped away with my ‘thing,’ you know and I found out not to hang out around there anymore. But that’s a good thing; sometimes […] it really can save you: go into a ‘thing.’ (Portrait of Jason)

Here, to be cool is to display the presence of mind to perform in a specific way—to “go into a ‘thing’” when under threat and therefore stress, which one might expect to destroy presence of mind. To be wildly demonstrative can thus be cool when the display of affect is a coolly-directed performance. In this case, Holliday both performs cool behavior and provides its constitutive witness in retrospect, as he narrates for Clarke’s camera.

In the film, Jason performs many affective states and personas, including those of film characters, so that his behavior fluidly changes throughout. What we see in his behavior is not fixed or still, though the very range of its variety suggests a manipulative center of control that performs affect, rather than being directed by it. At mo-
ments, he does appear to earnestly feel the affect he performs, yet this earnestness becomes apparent through contrast with ways that he frames the performance with a laugh or other signifier that undermines its sincerity. In describing a night spent in jail after an undercover policeman follows, solicits, then arrests him (Holliday notes, “this cat insists; he should have been busted”), he describes deep outrage: “Oh I flipped out to the nuthouse, they put me in a jail cell and I just screamed and carried on like it was New Year’s Eve and I took my eyeglasses and hit them against the cell and sawed my wrists and then I screamed all night” (Portrait of Jason). As he speaks, his eyes seem to watch the experience replay. Then Holliday partially undermines the effect of that description by next uttering, in a stagey tone, with laughter: “So they took me to Bellevue” (Portrait of Jason). Delivered like a punchline, the remark nevertheless cannot quite make a joke of his having screamed all night, destroying his eyeglasses—on which, given their thickness, he must depend—in order to slit his wrists. Such details, taken in conjunction with Holliday’s punchline and laughter, split or refract viewers’ impressions of his performance, so that the comedic takes a slight, deforming bend into tragedy while viewers try to gauge how much Holliday feels—or once felt—any affect he performs or recalls. This effect also evokes a sense that Holliday operates from a point of view that understands and manipulates “normal” ways of reading and using affect but is not itself limited to the “normal.”

Reading the film in relation to Clarke’s subsequent statements about why she made it, which I will discuss further in Chapter 4, Lauren Rabinovitz writes that “Portrait of Jason begins as its sole character’s intimate revelations but turns upon the horror of their absolute falsity” (Points of Resistance 136). She refers both to the turn
which the film as a whole takes when Lee presses Holliday near the end and to the cumulative effect of the individual anecdotes and performances that make up the whole. The “falsity” she mentions refers to affective authenticity—to how authentically he performs himself—more than whether Holliday’s anecdotes are factual. Because one expects a con artist to lie, one does not find “horror” in those lies’ “absolute falsity.” Holliday’s description of the night in jail provides an instance of what Rabinovitz would characterize as “false” because viewers cannot ascertain with surety what affect to assign his “intimate revelations”; that uncertainty eliminates the prospect of assigning “authenticity” to any affect he displays. His punchlines and laughter dislodge viewers’ sense of their authenticity as they also evoke his point of view as one that does not apply normative ways of reading and using affect to itself.

Holliday frames that tale of his night in jail with another wherein he describes recently being treated by—and eluding—a pair of psychiatrists. He says, “Couple of head-shrinkers been bothering me […] lately and now I think I’m bothering them. I didn’t show up the other day and I’ve gotten six calls” (Portrait of Jason). At this point he laughs for 40 seconds, unable to stop, and we eventually hear Clarke, Lee and crew all succumb to contagion and laugh themselves. He holds a lit, half-smoked joint, which suggests that the drug may be responsible for that much merriment, but nowhere else when smoking a joint in the film does he seem so lost in uncontrolled affect. Viewers may just as aptly read his mirth as delight in thwarting his psychiatrists’ persistent pursuit of him and their desire to elicit confession from him, especially in light of Holliday’s construction of himself as one who cleverly discerns and sidesteps such normative efforts. “These headshrinkers,” he says, are “very interesting guys”
whose questions revolve around his sexual behavior: with whom he has sex, how well he performs it, and how big “it” is (Portrait of Jason). He burlesques their interest in ways that imply it originates in white male fetishization of African-American masculinity as well as homosexuality. The psychiatric pair consists of “one little fat chubby one,” and “one [who] looks like you Untouchables”—no doubt a reference to television’s The Untouchables, a show about Prohibition agents, which ran from 1959 to 1963 (Portrait of Jason). The reference also plays on how sexually and socially “untouchable” representatives of psychiatric and law enforcement disciplines are to Holliday. Moreover, his saying “you Untouchables,” [emphasis added] may constitute a slip that includes Clarke and Lee, each of whom inhabit a nexus of status—what Pierre Bourdieu calls a habitus (170)—making them seem “untouchable” to Holliday through the heterosexuality, professional success, class and related benefits and immunities that accrue to their status, but not to his. Then he continues to play with the fact that it takes a pair of doctors to treat him, especially given that one looks like an undercover law enforcement agent: “I told him the other day, I think you’re a cop. I’ve been busted by you cats” (Portrait of Jason). He gives this conflation of psychiatry and law enforcement further dimension by adding that “This screwy doctor of mine tells me some story about, ‘Don’t tell them the truth.’ He says, ‘You’re a colored boy, you’re in there with two enemies, telling them all about your life.’ He says, ‘Don’t tell them everything. You can be sued.’”—advice he says he in turn related to the psychiatrists (Portrait of Jason). It is within this story, to illustrate his suspicions of them as he talks to the “headshrinkers,” that he tells the story about the night spent screaming in jail, beginning with his first impressions of the undercover policeman as he first fol-
lows Holliday, describing him as “One of you cats, you know, that look like you: one of them little Ivy-League-looking blue-eyed boys with the blazer jacket” (Portrait of Jason). He concludes the story by saying that the next morning, the “blue-eyed boy” undercover officer who had entrapped him said, “You told me you were crazy,” after which Holliday laughs and says “I tried to warn him” (Portrait of Jason). He smoothly and playfully conflates law enforcement and psychiatric disciplines in moves that underscore how race, sexuality, class, cultural and educational capital intersect in ways that make him the object of surveillance and treatment. He also represents himself as one who ultimately surveys the foibles of those authorized to exert disciplinary power over him; from a position of greater recognition, he makes them the object of his view: the view of someone who does claim to be “crazy”—but from a vantage point beyond the ken of their “blue-eyed Ivy-League” perspective.

A man in his forties in 1967 and long familiar with the hip zones of New York City and San Francisco, Holliday demonstrates familiarity with the cultural cachet insanity enjoyed as the mark of an enlightened outsider. In such works as Allen Ginsberg’s “Howl” and Norman Mailer’s “The White Negro,” the outsider is inspired in part by just such a one as Holliday who walks “the negro streets” (Ginsberg 9). He establishes himself as observing and manipulating psychiatrists and policemen (among others) from a cool knowledge of how they will react to stimuli that does not similarly move him (though he is moved by other things), knowledge that gives him an authority born of recognizing his placement outside the “normal” and of recognizing how many mechanisms operate to keep him there.
But not all of the identity markers used as bases for this exclusion seem as beyond his control as do his race, sex, and sexuality. He claims the title of “stone cold whore” who will do anything to avoid punching a time clock for pay. He touts his work as a con artist and prostitute—and his manipulative cool itself—in ways that claim volition, making his exclusion from normalcy on their count a matter not only of choice but also, thereby, marking him as variously amoral, immoral, or unethical, depending on how specific viewers receive and value those roles and ascribe an outlaw cachet to them. Jason’s apparent addiction to alcohol and other drugs provides further unstable grounds for viewers’ moral assessment of him, depending on how much choice a viewer believes that addicts can exercise over drug use, and then also how much control and choice someone who is inebriated has—and how authentic inebriated choices, actions, and affects are. Because viewers see reasons for Holliday’s exclusion from normalcy that vary from oppression to his willful choice, and because that variation leaves itself open to a wide range of viewer evaluations and biases, how viewers understand and value the kinds of authority he claims will likewise vary. All of these factors shape the degree to which viewers will associate Holliday’s behavior with cool’s stillness and any kind of authority. Given the fault lines in his performance, what viewers see in it may split prismatically. The extent to which viewers may conjecture that his authority results from a series of Hegelian recognitions of the sort Fanon describes will vary based on how different viewers assess the degree to which Holliday’s performance demonstrates a veteran self-mastery (as a prerequisite for choice, especially ethical choice).
His authority does in some ways resemble that exercised by Baldwin’s activist in “Going To Meet The Man,” though Holliday lacks that character’s pronounced ethical authority and serious purpose. The activist engages in the Civil Rights Movement’s slow, long-term struggle for justice (from which Holliday might have been excluded, as Marlon Riggs notes in his 1994 film, *Black Is, Black Ain’t*), while Holliday’s performance slips from one account to another, each of which either entails minute victories, as when he “[goes] into a thing” and eludes arrest, or becomes a victory when told onscreen, as when he utters the wish [“that bitch were dead”] about a former, racist employer (*Portrait of Jason*). His topics include forms of oppression whose unethical characteristics qualify them as serious, but he insists on maintaining an amoral tone, devoid of seriousness and always turning away from any briefly earnest affect. The authority associated with his cool is thus mutable and cannot be unified in a continuous register.

**Control and Inebriation**

In the beginning of the film Holliday seems to control representation of himself as he delivers one-liners and chats about show biz in the tone and diction of a talk-show interviewee (Johnny Carson was enjoying his first decade of success with *The Tonight Show* at the time). When he performs segments from his cabaret act, he similarly controls the presentation, pausing infinitesimally to dwell in carefully-crafted moments, his movements shapely within that control. This command apparently fades through the film; along with constant shots of Jason drinking booze and smoking reefer, the trajectory away from control allows viewers to ascertain how chronologically Clarke has arranged the footage. Signs of inebriation
thereby shape the film temporally and provide means to judge the degree to which Holliday’s performance remains under his control. Viewers might thereby assess his performance as more or less authentic, depending on how they believe inebriation affects the “truth” of a person’s behavior. His inebriation introduces an element of uncertainty that not only depends on viewers’ notions, but also on their inability to know how much inebriation is affecting or determining how he behaves at any point. He himself describes a period during which small amounts of alcohol produced intoxication and much greater loss of control than was habitual for him; he laughingly acts out the problem of walking home during that time, falling onto his knees twice, but clearly in control of the performance. He accompanies it with this monologue:

When you drink, you better learn how to handle it. I went through some changes in my life, where I don’t know what the fuck was happening but I was getting so drunk I mean so drunk that I couldn’t get home, on my way home I’d find myself on my knees you know and then I'm on my knees on the street you know me, as grand as I am. And I kept Jesus Christ and I mean it’s an effort to get up you know and you get up and you start to walk and you feel you’re going to make it and the next thing you know you’re on your knees again and it’s like ‘Oh Jesus Christ if I ever, ever do get up you know and you fall back down again and it’s wet and you start and oh my goodness and then you finally, you know, start walking you make it home and you say ‘Oh Lord if I ever do get together I’ll never get that drunk again.’ Boy, you don’t do that no more. Sheww. What a trip. (Portrait of Jason)
Because he acts it—apparently without prodding (the shot begins with his monologue), we have a sense of Jason’s interest in both control and its lack—over himself and, in other scenes, over others. The kind of inexplicable change in tolerance for alcohol that he describes marks him as alcoholic (National Institute on Alcohol), while in another anecdote he describes choosing to hang out with the drug addicts in San Francisco’s “Neurotic Park” rather than with other groups, including gay men, that staked out areas in that public space (Portrait of Jason). Holliday deploys the cultural capital that figures of the addict accrued in 20th-century American culture through its association with Charlie Parker’s genius, the sometimes mystical appeal Beat writers like Ginsberg (9) and Jack Kerouac (128, 284-285) assigned it, and the multiple layers of savvy through which William S. Burroughs represents addiction in Naked Lunch.

Holliday repeatedly uses some variation on an idiomatic phrase about a person being “put through some changes,” sometimes by another person. About the undercover policeman who arrested him for hustling, he says “I put him through some changes” (Portrait of Jason). He also introduces his period of low tolerance for alcohol by saying “I went through some changes in my life” (Portrait of Jason). The cultural capital on which Holliday trades—his particular authority—is rooted in having gone “through some changes” in relation to drugs, sexual experience, and hustling. In relation to the range of sex acts he’s willing to perform, he says, “If I were a ranch, it would be the Bar None,” at another point declaring, “I’m just bona fide freaksville” (Portrait of Jason). He describes hustling itself as addictive: knowing that it’s dangerous, he nevertheless can’t stop himself from coming on to a likely-looking mark. Viewers thus find in Holliday someone whose authority rests on his being a veteran of
many kinds of “changes” but, because of how Clarke and Lee prod him, we are not left entirely clear about how to value that basis for his authority. Holliday makes some of the claims that Baldwin’s Reverend Shuttlesworth or Fanon’s revolutionary might make—his recognition of himself as “black” and “homosexual” has “gone through some changes” away from simple constructions American mass culture would assign those identity markers and—like Baldwin’s Shuttlesworth and the fictional activist—he recognizes how whites and heterosexuals who populate his anecdotes are in thrall to their psychic formations as white and “straight.” In hustling and being openly gay, he has also risked his life (like Fanon’s Hegelian figure who achieves self-mastery), given the combination of American homophobic and racist violence in his day. Holliday emerges through his performances as a figure who speaks from an authority produced by recognizing himself and others through multiple “changes.” That authority, however, does not stabilize in a single position viewers can recognize as they can recognize Shuttlesworth’s ethical stance.

Gavin Butt notes how the film deploys racialized hipster cachet in concert with Jason’s queerness in “ways in which Mailer, and other white hipsters, idealized the black man’s supposed ‘existential’ condition—a life brought about by the deleterious effects of racism—by celebrating it as a life of vital experiences, as life on the edge [….] This primitivising perspective can be seen as analogous to the valorization of queer sexuality and culture in 1950s bohemia” (37). At the same time that he casts the filmmakers as capitalizing on those cultural constructions, Butt finds that despite how they frame his performance, the film’s form and format provide Holliday with significant artistic agency. The primitive existential authority their vision assigns him does
not limit the authority he exercises on camera. They do not occlude his rendition of himself, with all his savvy as to its audience appeal: “The effect of [the film’s] largely ‘face-to-face’ encounter with the film’s subject--one between Jason and filmmaker, and, by extension, between Jason and the spectator--is to grant him a rather large degree of agency in authoring his own representation in Portrait, as well as determining what kind of a spectacle we might behold within avant-garde cinema” (Butt 44). Butt also notes that the film’s “[ironies…] may not have been fully intentional on the part of the filmmaker and may point to the degree to which Jason’s performance to camera is competing with Clarke’s directorial strategies such that the question of who controls the apparatus of cinematic representation is rendered --interestingly--ambiguous and unclear” (45). The authority Holliday exercises over his own, constantly changing representation provides one locus of cool in the film. Through its ostensible lack of direction—a still inertia, a cool paucity of overt control that extends from the stationary camera’s focus on only him, unscripted, to the ironic self-consciousness with which we hear Clarke give rare directives (“Sit over by the chair”)—the film splits into further competing components.

Carl Lee’s Role

Forty-seven minutes into the film—about halfway, Jason says “I mean this is my moment…I’m here on the throne you know. And I can say whatever I goddamn please but it’s got to be righteous. This is my chance to really feel myself…and say, yeah, I’m the bitch, believe it. You amateur cunts, take notice: I’m the bitch” (Portrait of Jason). While sitting back in an easy chair, in three-quarter profile, chortling, Jason thus casts the opportunity the film provides him as a chance to feel himself, as if being
filmed—having a film audience—enables him to feel himself in ways he otherwise could not, providing an affect otherwise unavailable: a notion which subverts the common belief that feeling emanates from “the heart” or some other authentic locus of an individual’s true self. The phrase “to really feel myself” may also equate feeling with being: when filmed, he can be himself in a way not otherwise possible, implying that his self cannot fully exist without the kind of witness filming provides—and that he has therefore not fully existed prior to shooting. In thus articulating what making the film means to him, Holliday invokes a hierarchical contrast between himself and “amateur cunts”—those who have not been chosen to “really feel [themselves]” on film (presumably because their performances are “amateur”), and who should “take notice” of his greater ability to “really feel [himself]” and be “the bitch.” His statements here imply that to really feel (perhaps be) himself is to perform the female role of bitch before a camera—on reels of film—projected on a screen: a single performance that is immediately multiple and scattered, both through its disassociation of heteronormative sex/gender pairings and through its physical locations as performance “on film.”

As if in response to those claims and beliefs, Clarke follows that shot with one that opens on a strikingly different image of Holliday: his face initially out of focus, he stares at the camera or at some thing or one right beside it. For 38 seconds he says nothing: this is the only time in the film that he remains pointedly silent. First, the camera slowly brings him into focus, a process that momentarily gives him the look of a minstrel in blackface, given how his large, round eyeglasses and the light reflected off his lips blur. Once he’s in focus, we see that he smokes and stares, his eyes flitting
very slightly up and down, producing the impression that he looks at the features of
someone’s face right next to the camera. His gaze remains there while his face dis-
plays no clear signs of affect, lips very slightly parted. The first four or five times I
saw this segment, I assumed that it showed Holliday staring at space because he was
stoned. That reading results partly from how the abrupt cut to this shot eliminates any
backstory for his staring, so that to interpret it, we must rely primarily on his silence
and staring. It also exemplifies how watching Holliday routinely drink alcohol and
smoke marijuana through the film can variously inflect how viewers read his perform-
ance at any moment. Closer, repeated viewing led me to reread the image in terms of
what immediately follows it, since that provides some meager clues about what proba-
bly occurred prior to the shot. Finally, Jason blinks, draws on his cigarette, then as the
camera again blurs his features, says, “Carl—“ at which point the screen goes black,
indicating that a 10-minute reel is over, though the sound recording continues as we
hear Clarke say “Keep the tape running.” Then we hear the complete exchange that
begins at the end of that long look, while visually the screen’s blackness creates the
impression that there has been a cut.

That dark screen also focuses attention on Holliday’s audible exchange with
Lee, which begins with his saying, “Carl, please turn around and smile at me” (Por-
trait of Jason). This line implies that Holliday has been staring at Lee’s back after he
has turned away from him—after Lee has made that shame-inducing gesture of break-
ing a mutually-sustaining “circuit of mirroring expressions” by turning away, which
Sedgwick describes (Touching Feeling 36). Because camera and crew focus on Hol-
liday’s words and actions, the fact that Lee has turned away also suggests that Hol-
Holliday has done something to cause Lee’s action, though we cannot know that because Clarke has edited it out.

“Come back in and smile at me. I mean, give me that credit,” Holliday continues, suggesting that Lee has not only turned away, but also walked out of the room while remaining in earshot and Holliday’s line of vision (Portrait of Jason). His words also imply that Lee’s attention provides him with some kind of “credit” that has been withdrawn. His voice’s inflection rises and dips coyly as he says “Carl” and “smile” and seems gauged to elicit emotionally-sensitive attention without disrupting the moment’s surface calm. The maneuver is so evident that it makes Holliday seem both manipulative and earnestly intent on engaging Lee. Lee does not reply in the same register, but says,

“Alright, you know, so we all know that you’re a great actress. And you play all the parts and it’s fine. And we all know you’re a big con artist and we all know you don’t really give a shit about nothing or nobody but you. But uh you still are not coming down front. And that’s the only thing that makes this thing work—” (Portrait of Jason)

“So truth,” Holliday interjects as Lee continues, “—if you come down front.” “Solid,” Holliday responds, but Lee isn’t finished: “It’s different from what you’ve said than any other thing that I can go out on the street and find and say the same goddamn thing. Kitty Cunt [a drag queen Holliday has described] could say it ten times better I imagine.” Holliday’s voice noticeably lacks inflective play and uses a casual, lower tone while he quickly interjects with “So truth” and “Solid,” giving the impression that he seeks to signal understanding so Lee will stop speaking. This suggests a slight
undercurrent of contained anger at being so critiqued which in turn points to a defensive or competitive edge to Holliday’s relationship with Lee. He does not want to be spoken down to as if he doesn’t know what he’s doing.

Lee’s remarks clearly make the claim that his character speaks with greater authority and knowledge of the sort of acting Holliday should be doing in the film, implying that Holliday has either not “really [felt himself]” or that in doing so—in “[being] the bitch,” he doesn’t meet Lee’s expectations. Lee—as an offscreen voice and body whose movements matter to Holliday—plays more than a directorial character, but the film does not provide viewers with sufficient cues to determine precisely the shape and limits of that “more.” Until this scene, his voice has only prompted Holliday to tell specific stories. We have heard the cool style with which he deploys that voice—a soft, controlled drawl with urban hipster accents that we also hear when he plays Cowboy, the drug dealer in Clarke’s film The Connection, and Priest in The Cool World, a collaboration between Lee and Clarke. But now, Lee’s character critiques Holliday’s performance not only as an actor, but also as a person when he says, “we all know you don’t really give a shit about nothing or nobody but you.” Viewers cannot discern the extent to which this refers to the content of Holliday’s anecdotes or to Lee’s extra-diegetic knowledge and opinion of him—which would make the comments a personal attack and Lee’s character not simply that of director. The film itself remains still—remains cool on this point, providing no guide by which viewers might choose to interpret this facet of Lee’s performance.

As a directorial character, in this scene Lee does demand a more authentic performance from Holliday. He marks “[coming] down front” as “different” not only
“from what you’ve said,” but also from “any other thing that I can go out on the street and find,” implying that performances “on the street” also do not “come down front.” He eschews the acting that con artists and drag queens perform on the stage that is “the street” because it lacks this “down front” quality. To “come down front” evokes the spatial use of theatrical stages, where to be in front is to get close to viewers, and make that closeness central to one’s performance. The image of closeness he employs connotes affective intimacy with viewers that enables them to see a performance with more than usual clarity and detail. Lee’s comments also imply a contrast between the cultural capital associated with acting on a theatrical stage and acting “on the street”—a contrast that indicates Holliday has not yet produced a performance that is worthy as art. Not only is his performance characteristic of the street’s con artistry and drag with their criminal associations, but it also doesn’t even measure up to the best street actors: Holliday is an “amateur cunt” whose work Kitty Cunt could best. Lee seeks a performance that is “different from what you’ve said” and that is different “than any other thing that I can go out on the street and find”—that is unique to Holliday.

In his response, Holliday focuses on those others—the competition Lee has invoked—referring to how Kitty Cunt “wasn’t given the opportunity. And I should be grateful” (*Portrait of Jason*). Here, in response to Lee’s belittling his performance as common—both in the sense that it’s common to many and in the sense that it is a kind characteristically performed by street people who lack opportunity because of their “low” social positions—Holliday pushes back, through a reference to the power dynamic that allows him to make the film. Clarke is *giving* him an opportunity he wouldn’t otherwise have, so in saying “I should be grateful,” Holliday passive-
aggressively refers to power relations that include Clarke, silent at this point. Lee side-steps that topic by evoking his personal knowledge of Holliday, passing judgement on his character while refusing to sympathize with Holliday’s dependent position, saying: “Jason you haven’t been grateful in your life so stop that bullshit. There’s only one role that you can do Jason and that’s you” (Portrait of Jason). The unique and authentic Jason Holliday is what Lee insists should “come down front” to be filmed.

Gavin Butt reads Lee’s (and Clarke’s) voiced direction as seeking an authenticity valued by 1960s New York avant-garde artists. In response to their desire, he asks, “But what lies behind Jason’s performance? What tragedy resides there? Is that what keeps the viewer watching? That we might see something ‘real’ and that we might see the artifice of his performance crack as we catch a glimpse of the ‘authentic’ life—the ugly truth of his minoritarian existence—that we secretly believe to be there and which the viewer desires to see?” (Butt 45-47). The viewers Butt postulates lack at least some characteristics that place Holliday in a cluster of minorities, and their expectations rest on voyeuristic desires to see what really lies inside his performance. Those expectations assume a notion of the self implicit in what Michel Foucault calls “the repressive hypothesis,” a Western belief that “truth, lodged in our most secret nature, ‘demands’ only to surface; that if it fails to do so, this is because a constraint holds it in place, the violence of a power weighs it down, and it can finally be articulated only at the price of a kind of liberation” (Foucault 60).

Writing in 1976 in The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, Foucault reconfigures this model of the individual, current in 1967 when Portrait of Jason was released and which the film both represents and problematizes. In tracing the development of insti-
tutionalized confession, which had “[become] one of the West’s most highly valued techniques for producing truth” (59), Foucault formulates a different relationship between truth, utterance, power and repression. Institutional use and valuation of confession produced “a metamorphosis in western literature […] culminating in] a literature ordered according to the infinite task of extracting from the depths of oneself […] a truth which the very form of the confession holds out like a shimmering mirage” (58). Instead of harboring an internal authentic core that can be exposed or released from bondage, the individual, says Foucault, “was authenticated by the discourse of truth he was able or obliged to pronounce concerning himself. The truthful confession was inscribed at the heart of the procedures of individualization by power” (58-59). Through confession, power formed individuals, rather than confining their authentic urges. Lee’s demand that he “come down front” to perform the only role he can—that of himself—seems to urge Holliday toward “individualization” through “[authentication] by the discourse of truth” in response to Lee’s own directorial power, that of Clarke, and in response to the camera’s power to make Holliday’s performance into film.

Although Holliday continually performs at the interface between himself and Lee, Clarke, and the camera, he defies Lee’s directive to represent the sort of unified and authentic self being requested. As if to provoke him into a display of genuine feeling, Lee next says “Tell me about love,” but in short order Holliday’s response twists and turns through a varied array of tales and roles (Portrait of Jason). Does he skillfully resist exposing his authentic feelings-as-self or resist attempts to constitute it there? Judith Butler asserts that the symbolic provides no means for signifying the queer subject except in terms that constitute subjectivity through a heterosexual binary that ne-
gates the female (Bodies 50) and requires the queer to form the margin of sexuality: a threshold that cannot be glimpsed. What would the “authentic” and queer subjectivity that Holliday might perform look like? Could it be anything other than a piecework of racialized heterosexual gestures—those of female film stars, drag queens, hipster con artists—which Lee discounts? In a 1999 essay, Melissa Anderson notes how the film variously troubles notions of genuine identity (58), exploits Jason, and “reanimates the voice of the previously silenced” (59). In the face of such inconsistency, Anderson ultimately concludes that, “if one considers Jason as a player within the ‘politics of performance,’ Portrait of Jason becomes a crystallization of what Peggy Phelan, in her discussion of Paris is Burning, has called ‘the endless theater of everyday life, [one] that determines the real: and this theatricality is soaked through with racial, sexual, and class bias’” (qtd. in Anderson 59). Using subsequent theory, Anderson reverses the notions of cause and effect in production of “the real” that Lee’s character assumes, and re-conceives Holliday’s performance as generative rather than lacking.

Neil Bartlett, in exploring his own and Oscar Wilde’s historically-constituted “identities” as “homosexual,” finds that Wilde “could not, even in 1895, after concealment had failed, reveal his true nature. There was no real Oscar Wilde, if by real we mean homosexual. He did not, like [late-20th-century gay men], have the alibi of ‘being like that’” (Bartlett 163) because at the time, “homosexuality” did not exist as a category of human identity. Bartlett associates this lack of an essentializing designation with modes of being that have been historically adapted by men who desire men, and he generalizes across historical moments, using the notion of Wilde to spark his reflections. He points out that “Wilde was an artist” who “was entirely uninterested in
authenticity” (164). When Wilde changed his name on release from Reading Gaol, Bartlett says of that change, “What had in fact been imposed […] was made to appear chosen, a chosen role” (165), thereby linking the action of oppressive social forces to the creativity with which Wilde-as-representing-men-marked—"gay"—have crafted performances of themselves⁴. Even after his trial and imprisonment, Bartlett notes that Wilde “wasn’t destroyed, denuded or stripped down to his ‘real’ personality. He was nothing if not inconsistent” (Bartlett 166). A similar inconsistency characterizes Holliday’s performances in multiple ways: he employs a casually hip masculine pose at moments, while at others he speaks with a pronounced upper-class inflection and precision or swings into a more fay tone, when he’s not performing drag or some other mode. Such inconsistency implies that a real or authentic self is lacking.

In probing for origins of “camp’s” usage to describe behavior, Bartlett finds it initially associated with “posing” (168), which in turn leads him to consider forgery, both as an act of shaping something and the act of

“[making] a copy, a fake which, when detected, alarmingly reveals that a fake has just as much life, as much validity as the real thing—until detected. It is then revealed as something that has no right to exist. It puts into question authenticity. It even has the power to damage, specifically and effectively, certain specific forms of authentication” (169).

Held in contrast to heteronormative assumptions that understand the individual as authentic because identifiable as a unified and continuous—because naturally—

⁴ Bartlett’s work is published in 1988 and therefore written before Judith Butler’s work on gender and sexuality as performative was widely known. He focuses on consciously directed performance where I would describe some of those behaviors as performative.
heterosexual man or woman, queer males such as Bartlett have no choice but to perform multiple versions of their “inauthentic” selves—to continually “forge” themselves, he says. As a result, the existence of these “forgeries” calls into question that heterosexual authenticity by which they are invalidated, as Butler also notes in her analysis of how drag performance unhinges the logic of viewers’ heteronormative assumptions about gender as natural (Gender Trouble 186-187).

This process of forgery also entails constant change: Bartlett says “we […] must compose ourselves […] we still rephrase everything, we give new meanings to things […] refuse to have any but the most provisional form of integrity. Could you possibly summarize the daily fluctuations in your physical appearance with a single name?” (170). This constant change leads also to a lack of conclusions—it produces no final truth:

We never arrive. There is no single story in this city, where your (his) narrative may be punctuated by, but never quite conclude with, friendship, or independence, with several loves, or few or none. Nobody I know cares to remain constant. Who wants to be consistent? What kind of integrity is that? We are all fakes, all inventions. We are making this all up as we go along. (Bartlett 171)

The forgery’s constant change and inconsistency paradoxically fashions an integrity out of its continually challenging the authentication which viewers attempt. With frustration and disdain, Carl Lee critiques Jason Holliday’s performance because Holliday similarly “never [arrives]” “down front.” In Bartlett’s terms, Holliday is a “fake” who represents himself as not “[caring] to remain constant,” thereby producing the sense of an agency whose integrity comes from this overall inconsistency—the composite ef-
fect of multiple facets that form a kaleidoscopic whole. That integrity presents viewers with a form of cool through Holliday’s consistent refusal to be consistent. Butt notes how this kaleidoscopic multiplicity causes Lee’s and Clarke’s directorial characters to react in ways which in turn produce multifaceted responses from viewers, so that the “viewer is never allowed to dwell in one frame of reference or the other for very long” (51).

**Shirley Clarke’s Roles**

Based on how they hear and see them affecting Holliday’s performance, viewers must read the roles that not only Lee’s voice but also that Shirley Clarke’s voice play. In public statements released in 1967 with the film and in later years, through interviews, Clarke described her artistic motives and their conceptual framework. A discussion of the ways her voice and Lee’s shape the film’s final 15 minutes will benefit from reading how Clarke variously described her intentions over time—variation that, like Holliday’s inconsistencies, should be taken into account.

With *Portrait of Jason*, Clarke invokes yet also challenges cinéma vérité methods and notions about truth. While her stationary camera films only Jason Holliday “being himself” for a camera in her living room, describing his life, telling anecdotes and performing bits from the cabaret act he hopes to stage, she also draws attention to the film’s artifice by including footage from the beginning of reels as the camera is brought into focus and by including the prodding she and Carl Lee give Holliday from off-screen—footage she said that, until she saw the rushes of the film, she did not intend to include (“1967 Typescript” 3), which points to how the film’s adventurously self-reflexive form developed through editing as much as during filming. In a note-
book she kept while editing the film, Clarke drafts a written statement about the experience of shooting it, which she subsequently used for publicity. In this draft, Clarke focuses on how, for “the first time shooting was both exciting and relaxing” because “[she] was able to give up [her] intense control and allow Jason and the camera to react to each other” (“Beardsley Notebook” 1). She says,

Suddenly it was as if a great weight was lifted and I could relax and more important respond to the emotions spinning around the room I finally became part of the situation myself not deux ex machina [sic] but one with Jason and the camera, no preconcieved [sic] judgements but at last I found the ability to swing along with what was happening spontaneously. I started to trust Jason and the camera and not insist on being the ‘one’ in control. (“Beardsley Notebook” 1)

This relinquishing “control” implies that her direction became more like Warhol’s, notorious for its passivity and thereby for a kind of still cool. Clarke’s focus on becoming part of the situation, responding to emotions and “[swinging] along with” them also suggests her participation was improvisational, though she doesn’t articulate in precisely what ways. Her statement also suggests that filming Portrait of Jason entailed little more than leaving an amateur actor in front of the camera to react to it for a duration determined by the amount of film to be shot, again like some of Warhol’s films. In an interview from the 1970s, she claims that the film does consist of unmediated footage of Jason (“Image and Images” 21). What provokes the most controversy in relation to Portrait of Jason, while also establishing it as self-reflexively complex, are the dynamics Clarke set in motion before filming, which then manifest in how she
and Lee prod Holliday toward an emotionally climactic moment. Given that she edited four hours of footage down to 90-minutes, she also recouped a certain amount of the control she relinquished while shooting, although many of the shots are sufficiently long to still represent the spontaneity she describes.

Under the heading “Why I chose Jason as a subject,” she writes in her notebook that “The underground has been exploring poetic cinema and vision and the cinéma verité has called to our attention that people are the most interesting people, yet we have rarely allowed anyone to really speak for themselves [sic] for more than a few minutes at a time” (“Beardsley Notebook” 2). Here, Clarke seems to accept assumptions underlying cinéma verité’s method, although she had made them the object of irony in The Connection and in a 1983 interview said she made Portrait of Jason to test cinéma verité’s notions about producing truth. At that later date, she describes her motive for making the film:

I had the idea for many years of doing a film like Portrait of Jason because I was very curious about the whole discussion of documentary and dramatic films and what was truly true. I had a lot of ideas about what was cinéma vérité, what was real, what was documentary, and what was fiction. I wanted to find out if I could find a way to find the truth. (Rabinovitz “Choreography” 10)

The notion of cinéma vérité to which Clarke refers was embraced by documentary makers D.A. Pennebaker and Richard Leacock (Rabinovitz Points of Resistance 112), with whom Clarke had worked on short films for the 1958 Brussels Worlds Fair and then with whom she formed Filmmakers, Inc. to create a shared studio space in the late 1950s. Rabinovitz describes the particular cinéma vérité practice they embraced
and that Clarke puts to the test in Portrait of Jason as the practice of “[aiming] a camera at a subject to reveal some psychological insight not apparent to the cinematographic object. They believed that this revelation occurred when a subject trying to maintain her or his dignity before the camera had to struggle with a psychological defeat” (Points of Resistance 113).

The cinéma verité method locates and reads “truth” in how bodily surfaces (including gesture and voice) display psychological information/activity; truth is a manifestation of psychological dynamics amongst the terms of a subjectivity. Such truth reveals itself not only through a “struggle with a psychological defeat” but also through simultaneous struggle to consciously control the bodily surfaces that signify affect in order to obscure signs of the first struggle. Rabinovitz says that it is “[aiming] a camera at a subject” that leads to this revelation, so that the camera should be taken as a constitutive rather than passive witness. The significance of “the camera” as constitutive witness cannot be clearly differentiated from the director and crew or other features of the rhetorical situation. The whole cinéma verité operation therefore functions to make a subject lose his or her cool—to control signs of agitation produced through a rhetorical situation. The “dignity” for which a subject struggles on camera is cool in its underlying stillness produced by control—so that its lack of agitation comes less from how much it moves visibly than from how much any movement associated with it results from control. Underlying cinéma verité’s assumptions we find the belief that affective display constitutes psychological truth, produced by impulses beyond conscious control. Perhaps they emerge from more authentic because more “internal” or less conscious regions of the self than the conscious mind, but what is more perti-
nent is that cinéma verité measures psychological truth’s authenticity via signs of struggle over affective display, as display is what the camera films. Moreover, cinéma verité filmmakers must define a “psychological defeat” in order to know whether their subjects encounter one, and in doing so must employ their own psychologically and socially-determined values. The “cool” their subjects “lose” onscreen is constituted through their witness—through the terms of their own subjectivities and through their conjectures about the sources and limits of their subject’s cool. That cool is assumed to be false, as it obscures the truth they hope to film.

In the shots where we witness Holliday’s face and voice pressed into “[struggle] with a psychological defeat,” Lee’s prodding—not Clarke’s—brings him there. Butt ascribes Lee’s “sadism” to the sort of homophobic masculinity then found in the Black Power and Black Arts movements. Butt quotes Lee’s calling Holliday a “rotten queen” but, just as Koch notes how simply calling Ondine a “phony” could not faze him—a certainty established by his unswerving shamelessness—slinging homophobic epithets at Holliday could not produce “a psychological defeat.” It seems apparent that no one else in the film could have brought Holliday to the crisis Lee does; only their extra-diegetic relationship enables that. What Holliday says as he “[tries] to maintain his […] dignity before the camera” suggests what elements in that relationship can undo him—make him lose his cool. Lee launches his attack by referring to how Holliday spread lies about him “just because I wouldn’t lend you a few lousy dollars” (Portrait of Jason). This assertion attempts to shame Holliday on moral grounds. It assumes that a refusal to lend money to someone else is morally justifiable and that Holliday’s lying about Lee in retaliation was not. Holliday makes a comment that
acknowledges the memory, noting “Oh that’s where you’re coming from,” as if Lee’s attack fits into a plan and he now sees how it will be played out (Portrait of Jason). The moral outrage that Lee evinces in describing Holliday’s betrayal does not seem to upset Holliday. Later, as his face is wet with tears, he cites his “love” for Lee—an unspecified kind of love, though viewers would most probably assume it is an unrequited sexual and/or romantic attraction for the heterosexual Lee, given the extent to which Holliday foregrounds his sexuality and given its “abnormal” status. But he actually cries and seems most upset, speaking with less control over his voice, when he talks to Lee about “Why it always had to be you, and never me” (Portrait of Jason). What seems to distress him the most—that which constitutes his “psychological defeat” is having had to watch Lee enjoy the attention of audiences to which Holliday has no access, and perhaps never could. Moreover, the other strong feeling Holliday displays is frustration after Lee has taunted him about how the film—whose shooting now approaches an end—is Holliday’s one chance to make it in show business. Lee implies that Holliday, by not having “come down front” has failed. “Then teach me,” Holliday replies (Portrait of Jason). Again, Lee’s claim that Holliday’s acting is substandard, and the power differential out of which Lee speaks—inflected by the greater privilege and cultural capital he enjoys—are what make Holliday lose his cool. The truth revealed, as cinéma vérité would see it, is Holliday’s jealousy of Lee’s ability to command an audience. However, Holliday recoups his cool so quickly—shifts from jealousy to slick comments and retorts at such a speed that it defies viewer assumptions about how long it would take a normal person, authentically upset, to change moods or assume mask-like control over the face. Rabinovitz concludes that Holliday lies
throughout the film, that his performance produces no certifiable “truth” as he manipulates the object position into which the film places him (Points of Resistance 137). Butt sees Holliday exercising agency in that manipulation. I find that the “truth” thus implied by both his quick shifts away from distress and by the fact that such distress revolves around acquiring audience attention—is an unswervingly cool insistence that his act be seen, rather than any particular affect. His truth is about performance, not affect or any attendant notions of authenticity as affect. What we see in the film is ultimately what cannot be seen in any specific facial display.
CHAPTER 4

SHIRLEY CLARKE AND THE DIRECTION TRUTH TAKES

*Portrait of Jason* exceeds Holliday’s performance, especially given the direction that placed Lee off-camera and knew of the two men’s shared history. Ironically, in the film’s concluding, emotional scenes, Lee’s voice would upstage Holliday, were we not intent on seeing how its remarks upset him. As a character within the diegesis, he acts out anger and exacts revenge for a past experience whose provenance seems diegetic even as it advances Clarke’s extra-diegetic intention to test cinéma vérité’s assumptions. Lee’s directorial goal is not to get Holliday to act authentically—to display good acting—but to break down his emotional self-control in ways that seem exploitative and cruel. Viewers cannot but acknowledge the greater power and agency that inhere in Clarke’s role as the filmmaker, and Holliday’s vulnerability to that through his eager desire to succeed in show business. The power differential attendant on how their identities were constituted in mid-20th century America also shapes the degree to which viewers consider the film exploitative: she is a well-to-do white, heterosexual Jewish woman; he is an African-American gay man who has supported himself through prostitution and work as a houseboy, and he appears to be an addict and therefore less able. Moreover, she uses Lee to push Jason into emotional terrain she cannot—terrain consisting of their extra-diegetic history. In a later interview, Clarke notes she was aware of the implications of her role as a “white lady director” who could not or should not press Holliday in the way that Lee, as an African American
himself “could” (Rabinovitz “Choreography” 11). Such awareness of the racialized implications of who pushes Holliday to a “struggle with psychological defeat” seems to conflict with her “swinging along with” improvisational spontaneity while shooting, although it does suggest why she felt such relief then. Her comments in the 1983 interview also intimate other dynamics at play and how she read them. In explaining his character she tells how, when he visited and “we would be sitting around […] he’d suddenly take amyl nitrate and pop it under your nose. I thought I was having a heart attack” (Rabinovitz “Choreography” 10). This anecdote focuses on his behavior rather than race, gender, or sexuality, as if she wants to demonstrate that her response to him is based in individual character rather than roles determined by societal forces.

Clarke also notes that when he needed money, she sometimes hired Holliday to clean for her although her home didn’t need cleaning, a fact that gives additional resonance to his anecdotes about working for the well-to-do as a houseboy while he relates them in her living room (Rabinovitz “Choreography” 10). In response to a question from Rabinovitz, she says she did not think that she exploited Holliday and that no one had ever suggested she had (“Choreography” 11). She explains that when she began filming, she “hated” him but came to feel love for Holliday while editing the footage (Rabinovitz “Choreography” 11), although she also claimed she could not have chosen someone for the film whom she intensely liked or disliked (Rabinovitz “Choreography” 10). Clarke’s openness about disliking him can be read as distinguishing her from a white liberal with a knee-jerk positive response to African Americans. She also asserts that, regardless of her like or dislike for him, that she knew Holliday would ultimately “win” in the film, which he apparently does (Rabinovitz “Choreography” 11).
He does always shift away from any distress that the emotional violence of their abuse seems to cause, reasserting his self-possession yet also further conforming to Clarke’s definition of him as a winner because he can process and “survive” violent confrontation. Although she clearly relinquishes to Lee the role of deeply provoking Holliday, keeping herself free of that agitation, the scene in which she is most provocative is strangely telling and serves to demonstrate how the film overall constitutes its own cool.

With only about 15 minutes left in the film, long after Holliday’s lively, well-crafted and controlled cabaret routines and anecdotes have been performed and his relationships with his parents have been plumbed at Clarke’s and Lee’s request, we hear Lee’s voice say, “Tell that story you told me about the old man in Frisco” (Portrait of Jason). On a daybed couch, Jason leans back, almost horizontal, his head against the wall, gazing upward absently, looking tired—perhaps also stoned, although he speaks with clarity and self-possession. Without moving to even lift his head, he tells the story, beginning with a preface: “Sure, yeah. Sometimes you stand back and think of the things you’ve done—how ridiculous […] or it was the hip thing to do at the time, like when I was really making a scene with cats like for bread and you were always looking to give as less as as you possibly could and get as much as you could. It’s the only way to play the game” (Portrait of Jason). He thus distances the story from himself by relegating it to the past and by framing it as “ridiculous” or “hip” only within its specific context. At the same time, the story entails getting money in ways that were dictated by rules of “the game,” suggesting there was no choice but to follow them. Then Holliday explains how he also lacked knowledge of the game: “I didn't
have too much experience about where to go. I met a friend and he kind of hipped me to what was happening. I did something *fantastic* (Portrait of Jason). His tone as he emphasizes “fantastic” suggests some kind of artistic accomplishment. What he did was allow “This man [to take] me way across the Golden Gate Bridge and [move] me into a groovy, groovy place [ …which] was loaded with antiques and […] shit that I didn’t understand but my little friend knew what it was and I soon learned” (Portrait of Jason). Holliday learned not only the value of antiques from his “nice little friend,” but also how to steal and sell them while the lover who owned them was away on business. As he relates hiring a moving van, Holliday laughs slightly and when he recounts leaving a note for his lover, saying he’d be back, he laughs again. To tell the story, he has adopted a sort of generic upper-class American accent, enunciating all syllables without regional inflection and with a languid drawl through some vowel sounds. When he reports that, after discovering the theft, the “poor old man”—meaning his lover or at least the man who “kept” him—“had a heart attack,” Holliday knits his brows and blinks (Portrait of Jason). But the punchline is “You know, I don’t miss him at all” (Portrait of Jason). This speaks not only of a lack of remorse for stealing a houseful of antiques, but also a lack of remorse for betraying a relationship. It seems to have been clearly rooted in sex and extreme economic difference and dependence. Even without the emotional implications of the theft and lack of remorse, we could assume that any emotional significance Holliday and the “poor old man” found in the relationship would have differed greatly. That Holliday doesn’t “miss” the man “at all” seems to serve as code for a lack of remorse and a refusal to construe his act as wrong, as well as suggesting that he felt no attraction for him: he was “old”
and the relationship had been strictly economic. That he is also “poor” at the end of the tale gestures to how Holliday’s act leveled the economic difference between them, as it also voices pity with deep irony.

Then, with his brows still knit, Holliday looks off toward someone to the right of the camera and smiles subtly as if checking out that person’s reaction while also asserting his amusement. After a few seconds, he sits up, no longer leaning back, as if he knows that his tale is provocative. He seems to almost expect appreciation for the story, and as he smiles, the look in his eyes suggests that either his audience smiles or evinces a response that Holliday cannot read—or just that he’s stoned or tired. As he rights himself fully he gazes further to the side, which makes him look less sure of the reaction he’s reading. He knits his brows and frowns slightly then purses his lips—all within the smile, while also touching his glasses to pull them down slightly, implying that he wants to get a better look. These simple facial actions keep pointing to different possible readings of the situation, as if his face performs the turns of a kaleidoscope focused on the scene. Then he looks off to the camera’s left—and as he does so, in a sweet voice Clarke says, “Nice doggie,” suggesting that he now looks at her. Directed at her, his smile changes, then goes through a few more changes in tone, including two fleeting moments when he looks serious. As the shot blurs out of focus and into darkness we hear a slight, shortened laughing sound from Lee—a sound that is not secure in its merriment. Then we cut to another scene.

In relation to other moments in the film, when we hear Lee criticize Holliday’s performance and launch into a vengeful recounting of wrongs he did him, calling him “evil” and “rotten queen,” the insulting nature of Clarke’s brief comment here stands
out in part because her attacks are so few. In two other places she contradicts Holliday, telling him he’s not lonely and that he is not suffering. There she challenges his veracity. But in this instance, she insults him. Her remark reduces him not just to an animal but to a domesticated animal and therefore one that is more childlike, less autonomous, and is owned; with her characterization she evokes the economic dependence that his story clearly demonstrates he deeply resented. To call him the diminutive “doggie” rather than a “dog” further reduces him and counters the image of the savvy hustler he presented earlier. It also evokes the negative connotations associated with promiscuity through the word “bitch,” which Holliday much earlier applies to himself in a register that conjures the hip drag queen. But Clarke’s diminutive “doggie” erases all traces of those connotations.

Clarke makes this insult in response to a story about a poor person stealing from a wealthy person who has taken him in. In relation to Holliday, Clarke was wealthy, although she did not devote herself to earning or maintaining the kind of wealth to which she was born. Holliday doesn’t say the “poor old man” is white, but systemically racialized economic disparities of the time make that likely. The unusually insulting nature of Clarke’s comment calls for an explanation, which turns viewer’s attention to elements in Holliday’s story that might have outraged her, thereby underscoring without confirming any reasons for her reaction, which remains unknown. The story coalesces not in attacking racialized economic privilege per se, but instead coheres in a victory over privilege whose multiple facets create a prismatic mosaic of effects that split off from each other. The notion of an older white man “keeping” a younger African-American man suggests possible discrepancies in sexual and emo-
tional attraction, taste, style, trust, income, and the power differentials associated with them as well as ability to read those differences and what those differences signify.

Holliday can be read as the victim and villain in the story, as can the “poor old man.” Holliday betrayed his trust in some way, though we cannot know if this trust involved heartfelt romantic love or condescending use of his body. Clarke’s reaction adds another level of prismatic possibility: she might be outraged by the notion that personal intimacy was used to violate someone’s generosity—or their property rights.

At the same time, we might read Clarke’s sweet tone of voice as irony: the insult is not directed at Holliday, but brings one kind of response to his story into play. Her “character” says it. My point here is not what the story and comment mean, but the number of facets—some contradictory—to which it gives rise, and the extent to which the direction and shifting quality of Holliday’s gaze and expression contribute to that kaleidoscopic effect. The scene, like the overall film, is extremely simple: it is just Holliday talking. Even Clarke’s use of blurred focus and inclusion of offscreen voices is simple. Her and Lee’s prodding doesn’t do much, except at the end. In this simplicity—and given the degree of agitation it produces—the film is strangely inert and still, its cool forcing a high degree of viewer involvement.

Clarke’s comments about the film vary in ways reminiscent of Holliday’s performance: she made no authorial statement that unifies her intent and its product into a stable whole. She said in 1983, “[my] first thought was to do a movie about myself. In other words, I would try to be truthful. But the truth was I knew I couldn't do it. I didn't want to tell the truth at that time. I couldn't even try” (Rabinovitz “Choreography” 10). Clarke therefore chose Holliday in whom to produce a “struggle with psychologi-
cal defeat” while he tried “to maintain[…]his dignity.” Her comment raises the question of why she “didn’t want to tell the truth at that time” and “couldn’t even try,” which directs attention to her personal history and its historical context.

**Discourse About Cool (Not Women)**

Norman Mailer’s discourse on being a hipster famously produced a knowledge (339) by which white heterosexual males could recognize some modes of African-American cool—and its concomitant authority—as evinced by Baldwin’s activist or Charlie Parker in all his artistic mastery (340-341), and through that white male recognition, ostensibly recoup their sense of having the phallus—the discursive authority—lost through recognizing the alienating effects of the Holocaust, the nuclear arms race, and of bourgeois existence (338). For Mailer, this recognition does not include a white male fetishization of African American men, although his essay has subsequently been cited as a classic example of just that. It seems apt to read this appropriation psychoanalytically, given the purchase that psychoanalytic knowledge production maintained in public spheres where cool behavior and discourse about it met and coalesced into widespread self-consciousness in the 1950s and 1960s, as Baldwin’s “Going to Meet the Man” indicates.

Within that same milieu where cool enjoyed significance, the heteronormative surface of this discourse was disrupted by openly queer texts such as Frank O’Hara’s poetry, Allen Ginsberg’s Howl, and William S. Burroughs’ Naked Lunch. Gavin Butt points out that 1950s New York City’s “straight white avant-garde” displayed a “fascination with both blackness and queerness […]that] continued into the mid-1960s” (39). Works by the Beat writers especially intermingle heterosexual and homosexual
figures in a homosocial bond where a promiscuous masculinity contributes to their cool. They represent that cool as unmoving in its resistance to the requirements of a bourgeois life that includes working at a full-time, permanent job and reproducing heteronormative, nuclear family structures. In “A Supermarket in California,” Ginsberg’s narrator walks the streets of suburbia at night with Walt Whitman’s ghostly figure, both excluded from family structures and the homes that house them (30). “Howl” describes a wide assortment of sexual practices, reserving for the primarily heterosexual Neal Cassidy its celebration of his countless female sexual partners (14), while Jack Kerouac’s On the Road details Dean Moriarty’s appeal to multiple women and the domestic dramas this produces, as well as relishing his escapes therefrom. Susan Fraiman finds that in these and subsequent works, including queer theoretical texts, cool is constituted not only as adolescent male rebellion but also as specifically not-female, especially not-maternal (xii). Cassidy’s figure is cool in part because he continually leaves his wife, has many other lovers, and doesn’t keep a job to support his children. In Robert Frank and Albert Leslie’s film Pull My Daisy (1959), a wife and mother invites a bishop—representative of conventional belief in all its absurdity—to the home from which her husband, with his Beat poet friends, finally escapes. In his poem “Ave Maria,” Frank O’Hara addresses a mother who should let her son leave the house to visit movie theaters where he can form liaisons with older men, those being more rewarding than any sustenance the family home can offer him (52). Even as it claimed moral high ground for its anti-racist and anti-homophobic stance, the avant-garde cultural context in which Clarke worked was structured to disallow the cool she, constituted as a woman, might evince.
Bonnie Bremser, wife of Beat poet Ray Bremser, is considered a Beat writer on the basis of her autobiographical novel *Troia*, which describes how she, her husband and their infant daughter fled to Mexico to avoid Ray’s further incarceration in the U.S. and lived on her earnings as a prostitute. While she describes her resistance to her husband’s insistence that she do this work (32), she also describes sex work in less negative ways (194-197) and notes that she initiated unpaid sex outside of marriage for her own pleasure (15)—behavior that mirrors her husband’s and other Beat writers’ resistance to inhabiting normative familial structures. Ultimately the book expresses regret about the overall experience, although it coolly refuses conventional morality in that Bremser does not evince shame about her work. In its introduction, Bremser claims the “countenance” of a sphinx that “expresses itself inwardly, and that pretty much excludes you” (5). By locating herself behind an unmoving facade she claims a subjectivity beyond readers’ comprehension and therefore not one of simply a victim—not one that meets conventional expectations. The face of a woman with her cool resists representation.

Jennifer Doyle claims that, in his films, Warhol created a queer space in which women could perform differently than they could in other films (72). She focuses on films in which Warhol’s camera holds self-aware and confident women who, “framed by a gay male context, [get] to be something other than the straight sex object” (72). Doyle does not discuss *The Chelsea Girls*, in which we see Mary Woronov play an expressionless sadist, while Brigid Polk dominates Ingrid Superstar and dominates the screen as she shoots up with a casual jab of a hypodermic needle through her jeans, makes drug deals on the phone, and generally threatens, jeers and connives with a de-
lighted gleam in her eyes. Marie Mencken sits on Gerard Malanga’s bed and beats on it with his whip while she delivers an angry diatribe, while Nico quietly trims her bangs and later sits in silent isolation with tears running down her face. Ingrid Super-star gamely flings herself into more scenes and roles than the others, most notably confessing to Ondine and helpfully telling him he “should be ashamed of [himself]” (The Chelsea Girls). All of these performances, like Ondine’s, evince a still substratum of shamelessness, except, of course for that of Ronna Paige, whom Ondine attacks. She dares entry into the improvisational aesthetic of Warhol’s queer Factory where, as Stephen Koch notes, she is out of her depth, where she does not know how to perform with the shamelessness of these veterans of shaming. She serves as an example to those who would venture before a camera without sufficient cool.

As she began her career, Clarke did not focus on cool figures or forms. I will examine her personal history and her career’s trajectory not only to provide a historical context for the film, but also because the film’s diegetic significance depends on references beyond that diegesis. Apparently, Carl Lee can only push Jason Holliday “to struggle with a psychological defeat” while “trying to maintain her or his dignity before the camera” (Rabinovitz Points of Resistance 113) by calling up his own anger at Holliday’s past betrayal of him, while Holliday’s response seems dependent on established feelings toward Lee that range from love to jealousy. They relate to each other through a sense of Lee’s having and Holliday’s lacking professional expertise and success in acting—of his having phallic power Holliday lacks and wants, although Holliday’s performances imply that he hopes to achieve comparable but different authority through worldly, streetwise authenticity. It is worth noting here that Lewis
MacAdams recounts that Lee, when first playing Cowboy in *The Connection* on the stage, invited a Harlem drug dealer to review his performance for its authenticity. This speaks of Lee’s interest in and perhaps anxiety about being able to perform streetwise hip with sufficient cool, so that he might find Holliday’s performance somewhat threatening. Because Lee was Clarke’s collaborator and sometime lover through whom she had met Holliday, her casting them both in *Portrait of Jason* results from her personal knowledge of them and the relationships between all three. While Butt notes that the film shares qualities of the home movie for these reasons and the fact it is shot in Clarke’s home, with its emphasis also on Holliday’s cabaret act, anecdotes of hustling and working as a domestic servant, it exceeds the home movie’s focus on amateur representation of family members. Irene Gustafson’s reading of the film as a test in that it asks viewers to decide what it is points to the ways it plays with referential boundaries. Vivian Sobchack employs psychologist Jean-Pierre Meunier’s phenomenological categorizations of film as fiction, documentary, or home movie (242). Images in a home movie refer to personally-known objects, while documentary relies on belief that its images refer to historically knowable objects, and fiction’s images refer to objects knowable within the diegetic world it constitutes (Sobchack 243). Sobchack notes how these categories may overlap to some extent and vary with viewers (252); in this way, *Portrait of Jason* would have been a home movie of sorts for Clarke and Lee. Because Clarke framed it as a test of cinéma vérité, it exceeds the limits of that form. One can label it “avant-garde” because its fluctuating boundaries and form defy genre. Features such as its status as “the first film to feature a sole gay male subject” (Bronski 65), and its status as a film in which its “white lady director” could
not feature herself and “tell the truth” also call for its historical context to be examined in multiple ways. Moreover, the fact that Clarke’s career had developed around filming cool men while she was not one also asks that we consider why, given the import that race, gender and the cool received at the time.

**Clarke’s Career and Gender Relations**

After high school, when her father—a wealthy manufacturer—refused to send her to dance school, Clarke enrolled in a series of liberal arts colleges that offered dance classes; once she had taken all the dance courses one school offered, she transferred to another, attending four colleges before marrying Bert Clarke, who encouraged her dancing and made enough money to support Clarke’s focus on it (Rabinovitz *Points of Resistance* 95). But unfavorable reviews of her first significant performance made Clarke feel that “she was not good enough to become really famous” according to Rabinovitz (*Points of Resistance* 96), so that she stopped dancing and began to film dance, in 1953 releasing her first film, *Dance in the Sun*. This development entailed ceasing to render her body as the object of a viewer’s gaze, and instead holding under her own gaze objects she would craft into further objects by manipulating networks of power relationships. Clarke’s papers include an extensive business correspondence that underscores her awareness of legal, financial, and public relations requirements for making films independently of the established film industry. An interview for a New York City CBS television show, *Eye On New York*, in 1957 drew attention to the fact her film *A Moment In Love* “was shot entirely by a New York house-wife” (WCBS-TV 6) and subsequently asked Clarke “where […] the housewife part [comes] in [to her filmmaking] and how […her] family [felt] about all this,” in addition to ask-
ing if she would “call [her] films a hobby or a profession” (WCBS-TV 7). In an interview with fellow female avant-garde director Storm de Hirsch, Clarke notes how in making films she manipulated heterosexist tendencies around her to get what she wanted:

Since it happens to be an attitude that they have, then women should use it, because actually, it’s better if people don’t take you completely seriously. Strangely enough, they are more agreeable and more willing to do things for you than if they are afraid of you. And if your goal is a certain goal, you go right ahead getting it, and let them think whatever they want. (54)

But Clarke also openly asserted discursive agency in her relations with male filmmakers; she refers with relish to how “the independent filmmakers [of New York City] first came together” because they received a grant to make a catalogue “and spent […] almost two years arguing […] in] the mid-50s” (Ward 1) at “meetings [that] were just wonderful, full of horrendous fights and lots of talk about each other’s films” followed by screenings of their work (Ward 2). Such meetings eventually led Clarke, Jonas Mekas and others to the form the Filmmakers Cooperative. As I note above, she later linked her motive for making Portrait of Jason to arguments with Pennebaker and Leacock, casting those disagreements in a positive light because they were productive. In the interview with de Hirsch, however, she also claims that her films never received the critical attention that work by male directors did (‘A Conversation’ 52).

By the late 1950s Clarke had explored both cine dance and documentary, then her work changed. In a bio she wrote for press release in the mid-1960s, she says of the documentary she directed about Robert Frost that “she felt the movie belonged to
[...] Frost” (“About Shirley Clarke”). She has crossed out the subsequent lines which say: “and it was not hers. However, she was now sure of herself technically, was ready to find something of her own to do, something she herself wanted to say. She found it the following year with THE CONNECTION” (“About Shirley Clarke”). Her deletions imply an unwillingness to admit that she had not felt sure of herself before she made this shift from making documentaries to making films that query assumptions about the kinds of truth they can produce. Concomitant with that shift, which she associates with being “sure of herself” and “[finding] something of her own to do” that “she herself wanted to say,” Clarke’s subject becomes “cool” men, especially African Americans. This change seems to echo patterns that Toni Morrison finds in American literature, through which white artists deploy images of people of color as “an Africanist field in which [a] drama [between whites] is played out” (88) or which is used to represent “an internal devastation” (ix) too threatening for straightforward attribution to the white subject. We might thus see Clarke’s work with African-American male cool as a way to assert her artistic agency as equal to that of white male filmmakers like Pennebaker and Leacock or as a challenge to her oppressively critical father without putting her own image directly into play. Moreover, the greater “masculinity” which stereotype awards African-American men may have produced a sense that her cool work endowed her with a kind of meta-masculinity that trumped that of her white male competitors.

In a 1985 interview with Dee Dee Halleck, when, as a rare early female director, she had become accustomed to feminist attention, Clarke says that she made films about African Americans because she identified with them, having herself “always felt
alone, and on the outside of the culture [she] was in.” Reading disparate details can shape conjecture about what made her feel that way. She was the oldest daughter of a wealthy, “self-made” Jewish manufacturer and a mother she describes in one notebook as an “Asbury Park beauty” (1967 Notebook 1). A 1962 letter from her sister Elaine refers to how Shirley was the one who stood up to their father and “got slapped” for it (Dundy Letter). Conflict with her father apparently continued into adulthood: one 1982 interview with Clarke tells how her parents walked out of the premier of The Connection, her father stopping in the lobby “where the frightened director sat” to tell her that “she had disgraced the family” (Bebb 4). It continues to focus on that relationship, noting that “Twenty-two years later […] Clarke laughs about disappointing her parents, especially that man who ‘never went past the seventh grade in school, just made a lot of money’” (Bebb 4). In the notebook where she wrote notes about editing Portrait of Jason, she also describes asking her mother “how she could have married such a vulgar screaming maniac” (1967 Notebook 1). This characterization suggests that Clarke distinguished herself from her father by assuming superior taste, in avant-garde film accruing cultural capital markedly distinct from any he would claim. She also said that she married Bert Clarke to get away from her father, and while her husband supported her dancing and filmmaking, providing sufficient income so that she could pursue them rather than keep house (Rabinovitz Points of Resistance 95), she left him around the time she met and fell in love with Carl Lee, while making The Connection (Rabinovitz Points of Resistance 123). In that film, she combines filming cool men with parodying the white male documentary-maker’s attempts to represent the “reality” of hipster masculinity and heroin addiction. Through this parody she in-
terrogates how filmmaking can produce any kind of authenticity (Rabinovitz Points of Resistance 112). If we consider her biography, we see Clarke successively removing herself from familial relationships with white men, while professionally she contests white male peers’ artistic assumptions and finds “something she herself wanted to say,”—“something of her own to do” in representing cool men. While Pennebaker filmed Bob Dylan in 1965 (but didn’t release Don’t Look Back until 1967), Clarke filmed equally cool men in roles at least as politically freighted and controversial in that time. It is as if in filming cool African-American men, she sought out a phallic power just beyond the scope of the white men in relation to whom she had found herself defined.

In her major work of the 1960s, she chooses to problematize the truth claims it makes in representing male characters. In addition to men, The Cool World does feature African-American women confined by the societal roles available to them in Harlem (we see the mother and grandmother of the protagonist Duke, and a young prostitute with whom he shares sex and friendship) and one white woman, also confined, but differently, by her relationship with an African-American gangster. However, the film focuses on Duke’s struggles to establish dominance in relation to other males. Yet inspection of her papers indicates that although Clarke’s best-known work of this period thus focuses on cool men, she also devoted attention to representing women—including herself—not withstanding her remarks about being unwilling to film herself trying to “tell the truth.” An undated, typed list from a folder of biographical material in Clarke’s papers shows she consciously and playfully considered her own cool: “FILMS VERY DESIRABLE TO MAKE”
Her business correspondence and notebooks also show that Clarke attempted to film *Googs*, a script she wrote, but could not find backing for the project. Its title character, Googs, is a young white man who works for IBM. Rather than “squander” his annual “God-given week” of vacation “chasing pussy” (Clarke *Googs* 1), he decides to take his best friend Alfred on safari with him through Central Park—which he calls “*our* jungle” (Clarke *Googs* 3). Their mission is “to join the human race and stop running away from [their] responsibilities” (Clarke *Googs* 1), instead helping those in need, inspired by the likes of Albert Schweitzer (Clarke *Googs* 2).

Just before they enter the park, they pass 21-year-old Dany, “the new wave American girl [who] might appear in *Vogue* […] or in underground cinema films” and is “good looking because she is a la mode 1965. In fact it’s her assured self image that makes her stunning” (Clarke *Googs* 6a). She carries a bag full of cameras and eye make-up, and “affects a sophisticated montone [sic] but when touched reveals underneath a little eager if frightened girl” (Clarke *Googs* 6a). She represents cool in that she presents an observable surface, ostensibly unmoved by affect. From this description, which Clarke wrote by hand and inserted in the script, we also see that Dany represents someone like Warhol film star Edie Sedgwick, the perfect object of his filmic
gaze with her stunning self-confident looks and elaborate eye makeup, while simultaneously Dany represents a woman who makes everything else the object of her gaze—like Clarke, but with significant differences. Unlike Clarke, Dany is close to her father, who “means a lot to [her]” and vice versa, noting that he “believes in independence” and that she is “on [her] own of course so [she doesn’t] have to marry.” Moreover, Dany is “on [her] way for a P.H.D. in Sociology” at Sarah Lawrence College and is spending the summer “doing a photographic essay on ‘An Investigation on the Modern Cultural Manifestation of the Socio-Economic Lower Class in an Underdeveloped Metropolitan Community: I.E. Central Park’” (Clarke Googs 11). Her project’s lengthy title indicates that her approach to Central Park is as problematic as Googs’ altruistic one, but rooted in affectless, academic abstraction. Her approach is cool because in its abstraction it cannot be moved via affect or physicality.

We first see her photographing a “drunken bum lying in a doorway [where] she is trying to place the bum’s leg in an artistic position” (Clarke Googs 6). As Googs and Alfred pass, she shoots a photo of them and then returns to arranging the bum, in this evincing the ability to remain focused on a primary task while not missing a fleeting opportunity, suggesting a cool rooted in imperturbability. The scene also associates Dany with Clarke in that she uses art to enhance realism—a practice Clarke favored and one point of contention in her arguments with Pennebaker and Leacock, who refused to use any scripting or acting to produce cinéma vérité.

Dany follows Googs and Alfred into Central Park, snapping photos constantly. They come upon a disorganized baseball game between black and white youths, at the sight of which, Googs says, “The main chance, black vs white. A great twentieth cen-

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tury match-up” (Clarke Googs 7). As she does in *The Connection*, here Clarke uses irony to represent a white male attempt to make contact with other men across borders constituted by notions of race and class. Apparently written in 1965, a year after she released *The Cool World* with its claim to represent African-American urban realities in relatively transparent ways, *Googs* interrogates white perspectives, including some on American race relations, but they are subsumed within a broader critique of white approaches to a wide spectrum of inequalities. Googs tells the ball players they “need a arbiter. Someone to turn to. Give the game purpose” (Clarke Googs 8). On the other hand, Dany describes baseball as “a curious modern cultural phenomena” and critiques the fascination it holds for men and not women (Clarke Googs 9), seeing gender in the game where Googs sees race, which is again different from how the players see what they are doing. In keeping with Clarke’s observation that *The Cool World* was two different films to two different audiences, the baseball game in *Googs* is multiple, depending on which witness contributes to its constitution.

Googs’ attempts to mediate the ball game ultimately enrage the players, so Alfred must rescue him from attack, and the two move on, accumulating an odd group of male followers, with Dany trailing them, taking pictures. A troubled attraction develops between her and Googs. He tries to leave her behind at night, but can’t shake her and they argue about the value of their respective perspectives. Googs claims that she violates people’s privacy with her photography (Clarke Googs 32), while she calls him “a phony do-gooder” who is “scared” of her because she “[threatens his] masculinity” (Clarke Googs 33). Ultimately, Googs rejects her and she leaves. He and Alfred barely find their way out of Central Park, which has become a nearly inescapable twilight
zone, but at dawn they follow a light to 59th Street, where they find as artist chalking pornographic pictures on the sidewalk. Googs’ missionary zeal re-asserts itself and the film ends as the artist, who will have none of Googs, heads into Central Park and Googs disappears after him. Something of a picaresque, parodic allegory, the script interrogates white liberal perspectives rather than hip modes of cool. Although it suggests she was more comfortable critiquing white male positions, in that Googs is the film’s main character, the script also shows that Clarke was seriously working with ways to represent white female characters confronting contexts and problems within the zones she inhabited.

Clarke did film herself as herself in the short film *Butterfly* (1967), which she made with her daughter Wendy Clarke, who was then beginning a career in video art. The 2014 restoration of *Portrait of Jason* by The Academy Film Archive and Milestone Films on dvd includes the film and explains that “*Butterfly* was created in 1967[…]for a screening at the New York University Loeb Student Center as part of an anti-war program of short films. It only screened the one time.” The three-and-a-half-minute film features animation achieved through drawing on and bleaching or painting the film itself. It opens with x’s appearing as if sprayed onto the screen while we hear machine gun fire. These x-shaped bullet holes then operate as butterflies that also seem to signify x chromosomes as we see Clarke onscreen, at first cradling the air as if holding a baby, and manically rocking to a lullaby. We then cut to Clarke with her grown daughter sitting on her lap, still rocking to the lullaby. Then we see Clarke facing forward, her body filling most of the screen as she dances in place to rock and roll in her hip black jeans, boots, and jacket. Wendy Clarke’s body is superimposed on her
mother’s, in profile, so that with their overlap we see a multi-faced entity which finally cuts to just Wendy dancing. During this dance, they enact a metamorphosis that suggests a transition from one set of chromosomes to another set that overlaps the first. The film ends with a head shot of Wendy and more machine gun sounds, returning us to the anti-war theme.

While the film’s anti-war message clearly points to how war destroys families, the way that it depicts mother and child problematizes conventional ways to represent that relationship. Just as *Pull My Daisy* and Beat writings represent maternal roles as cloying and uncool, *Butterfly* parodies a sentimental view of motherhood. The shift from the silly lullaby and baby-rocking to dancing with rock and roll underscores a contrast between the sentimental and a more hip and adult way of conceiving of maternity, perhaps even a scientific one, if we read the x’s as chromosomes. The film also seems to parody transmission of genetic material from the phallic gun. It does not allow the father entry into the visible diegesis, but instead limits his position to one beside the camera, from which he can make his violent contribution—or to a position on the far side of the screen. That positioning excludes and disembodies him, but also may suggest that he enjoys a powerfully omniscient view of the scene—or that he only exists to provide the x’s which translate mother into daughter. The film’s cool rests in its refusal of traditional representations of maternity as sentimental, and like *Googs*, it shows Clarke working with representations of her self that did not receive widespread public attention.

In the same period that she made *Portrait of Jason*, Clarke made the film *Kaleidoscope* (1966) with musicologist, painter and avant-garde filmmaker Harry Smith.
Funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity, the film is about women in Job Corps. The file related to the film in her archives at the University of Wisconsin contains a note in her handwriting:

I “gave” this film to Harry--and he shows it as part of his repertoire at the Anthology Film Archives. I helped him to make the film in order to get him back on his feet creatively--it was conceived one nite when stoned at Tadlock’s where Harry took me to show me a TV sculpture [...] I had brought along my Telidescope to look at the images with and asked Harry why film could never give you what I was looking at. He said he could build a special lens and do it.

So I said I’d help him and I did and he did.

The file also contains a call for proposals from Job Corps addressed to Clarke, no doubt sent because of her work on The Cool World. Her comment that she “gave’ the film to Harry” no doubt indicates that she included him in this project to which he would otherwise have had no access. I have yet to locate a copy of the film if one exists. Harry Smith’s online archive does not list it, nor does that of Anthology Film Archives. When Jonas Mekas, Stan Brakhage, P. Adams Sitney and others formed Anthology Film Archives, they did not tell Clarke, nor did they list her films (Rabinovitz Points of Resistance 140), so that Smith’s listing Kaleidoscope there, as his alone, has special resonance—as does the fact that this film seems to have been discarded.

Clarke’s script for the project, dated “ca 1966” is titled “KALIDASCOPE: Treatment for Women’s Job Corps Film, 28 minutes—color, by Shirley Clarke.” It begins with a group of Job Corps women in their dorm, arguing about how to make a film about themselves, because it’s so hard to do. One adds that “we’re always com-
plaining that nobody appreciates us--how nobody knows...how wonderful we are, and right away [in attempting the film] we botch it up” (Clarke Kaleidoscope 1). Different women suggest different approaches, and then this scene is followed by ones that show how they imagine filming each of their suggestions. There is a “musical comedy,” featuring songs “that will be composed in New York” “and should sound as if some talented girls had written them” (Clarke Kaleidoscope 2). They also imagine making conventional short narratives and a documentary, which are in turn followed by “a real story...something dramatic like on TV” (Clarke Kaleidoscope 4). Finally, they also imagine something “more jivey...like one of those great TV commercials or a Beatle movie” which the screen directions subsequently describe as a “wing-ding of cinematic poetry and high spirits...a crashing finale. A montage in true ‘Shirley Clarke’ style” (Clarke Kaleidoscope 5). Then the film returns to the women still sitting in their dorm room, “staring off into space, transfixed” (Clarke Kaleidoscope 5), their imaginings over. They all sigh and then one says, “You see, we can make a movie,” after which the credits roll as they sing a song from one of their imagined films, titled “A Second Chance—A Ladder to Success” (Clarke Kaleidoscope 5). Of course, they have not made a movie, but have imagined several. Rather than parody the truth claims made by one representational mode, Clarke juxtaposes many, so that each refracts what the others provide and the whole is, of course, kaleidoscopic in ways that draw attention to filmic representation itself.

Like Portrait of Jason the film deploys multiple genres, with the same characters performing themselves in different ways, their joinings prismatic and suggesting

5 Clarke spoke favorably of a Beatles film—probably Help—in more than one interview.
that to examine these subjects is always for the gaze to be refracted and part of other patterns of refraction. But because Kaleidoscope is busy—already agitated, it lacks the cool that Portrait of Jason produces. In the latter film, even as Holliday’s performance shifts from one mode to another, it is rooted in his unmoving, cool insistence on being filmed. At the same time that viewers respond to his performance, they must also respond to the film itself, ostensibly so simple, with its obvious, almost clumsy manipulations, but as soon as viewers must decide whether they are viewing exploitation and/or self-reflexive irony, they must choose how to value them, and the cool film begins to agitate.

To conjecture that Holliday’s overall performance results only from how “minoritarian” identities—or their intersection—have shaped his subjectivity would be to overlook an important aspect of that performance’s inconsistency and the sort of integrity it implies. Lee’s voice would have him act a single self authentically—what Lionell Trilling in Sincerity and Authenticity (1970) describes as “unmediated exhibition of the self” (9). Originally a series of lectures, Trilling’s book provides a genealogy for the 20th-century’s focus on authenticity. Extending back to Early Modern notions, the book most fully develops and relies on Hegel’s reading of the titular figure from Diderot’s Rameau’s Nephew (1805) as a touchstone for exploring its topic. Trilling says that Hegel made this dialogue between Diderot and “the scapegrace nephew of the composer Rameau [….] the paradigm of the modern cultural and spiritual situation” (27). Marx called the dialogue a “‘unique masterpiece’” (quoted in Trilling 28) and Trilling reports that three times Freud quoted these lines spoken by the character of the nephew: “If your little savage [that is to say, any boy] were left to himself and
to his native blindness, he would in time join the infant’s reasoning to the grown
man’s passions—he would strangle his father and sleep with his mother” (quoted in
Trilling 28). We can not only see why Freud would appreciate those lines, but also get
a sense of the nephew’s shameless conversation which, like Holliday’s, aims to casu-
ally shock at times. The nephew’s character is, Trilling says, difficult to “describe […]
in a way that will be both summary and accurate. The significance of his character
lies, of course, exactly in its contradictions” (28), while the ambiguity of the text as a
whole also makes it noteworthy (31). A failed artist, the nephew survives through flat-
tery, depending parasitically on high society with a cynical lack of illusions about this.
The “great climax of the dialogue” between Diderot as character/narrator and the
youth is

Rameau’s astonishing operatic performance, his momentous abandonment of
individuated selfhood to become all the voices of human existence, of all exist-
ence. ‘He jumbled together thirty different airs […] comic, tragic—in every
style […] imitating the while the stance, walk and gestures of the several char-
acters; being in succession furious, mollified, lordly, sneering […] Now he is
a slave, he obeys, [camps] down, is heartbroken, complains, laughs. (Trilling
44)

In that his “identity” is an “abandonment of individuated selfhood” through his per-
formance of multiple bodies and voices, the nephew resembles Holliday’s constant
shift from houseboy to hustler to film star to YMCA evictee to connoisseur of the
most tasteful neighborhoods in New York City. Holliday does not claim to perform an
array of others, but in “being himself” he shifts between accents and styles that mark
demographics ranging from upper-crust New York (He drawls, “Mother says we need another lamp”) to rural southern African-Americans (“Po’ me some mo’ co’n [liq-uor]”) (Portrait of Jason). Moreover, the film begins with his declaration that his name is “Jason Holliday”—and then that it is “Aaron Payne” (Portrait of Jason). In this he seems to claim greater authenticity for his earlier, given name, because he replaces the other with it, as if correcting himself. But then he explains how he renamed himself in San Francisco, a change ultimately authorized by Miles Davis’ being “hip enough” to accept it (Portrait of Jason). This opening for the film reflects how, in concert with Holliday, Clarke brings an ironic attitude to notions of an authentic, core self given that she chose to make his introduction of multiple selves the film’s beginning.

According to Trilling, Diderot’s dialogue has two intentions, the first of which is to “[pass…an] adverse moral judgment upon society” (31), but “the entrancing power of Rameau’s Nephew is [...] to be explained by its second intention, which is to suggest that [...] man’s nature and destiny are not wholly comprehended within the narrow space between vice and virtue” (32)—the narrow space into which Lee presses Holliday when he accuses him of spreading lies about him and Clarke presses him when he tells the anecdote about stealing from a lover and she comments, “Nice doggie.” That narrow space is also what the film overall challenges viewers to fit themselves into, as they weigh Lee’s and Clarke’s exploitative treatment of Holliday against his casual celebration of hustling others, and their apparent irony against his ability to shift so quickly away from his own distress.
Trilling points out that “it is the Nephew himself who invokes the moral categories at the same time that he negates them—the moral judgement is grounded upon the cogency of Rameau’s observation of social behavior and the shamelessness with which he exhibits his own shame” (33). Similarly, Holliday invokes progressive moral categories when he describes his being entrapped and jailed for his sexual practices and when he re-enacts the racist innuendo with which employers shaped his working conditions when a houseboy. He shamelessly “exhibits his own shame” when he describes stealing from one lover, ostensibly causing a heart attack, all without remorse. By allowing Lee to prod him to tears and chagrin, Holliday also exhibits shame through gesture and the surfaces of his face. Trilling tells us that Hegel praises Rameau’s performance because, through its abdication of integral selfhood, it advances Spirit to a ‘higher level of conscious life.’ ‘To be conscious of its own distraught and torn existence’, he says, ‘and to express itself accordingly—this is to pour scornful laughter on existence, on the confusion pervading the whole and on itself as well. (46)

Trilling says that, ultimately, Rameau’s nephew represents the individual who has undergone a series of dialectical processes—is the veteran of a series of recognitions that have shifted his sense of self beyond the unified order social forces would impose. His “abdication of integral selfhood” enables him to represent the more authentic “confusion pervading the whole.” We see such “abdication of integral selfhood” both in Holliday’s performance and in how Clarke as director and editor chooses to represent it. Viewers develop a sense of Holliday’s cool insistence that he be filmed, next to which any specific feeling or demonstration of shame has much less consequence. Equally
cool is Clarke’s less palpable yet similarly insistent direction—insistent in its stillness—in the way that she has created a sense that nothing has been excluded from the film: neither the exploitative prodding nor Holliday’s betrayals of Lee and the “poor old man.” It is inert and still in that it requires viewer participation, as Marshal McLuhan defines cool media, and the more viewers participate in constructing its significance, the more it agitates them.
CHAPTER 5

SECRET AGENTS AND MISSING GROUND

“Thermodynamics has won at a crawl...Orgone balked at the post...Christ bled...Time ran out...” (Burroughs 187).

One aspect of Jason Holliday’s cool entails conning others: a duplicitous manipulation he performs by deploying knowledge about how they will react to given stimuli in given situations. The people he cons neither possess this knowledge nor realize he possesses it, so that we might call his use of it a covert operation—one he makes overt in Portrait of Jason by describing it. Put another way, because the people he hustles don’t expect him to possess the savvy to manipulate them, his cool-as-con succeeds, though it only moves or consciously agitates his witness-targets when and if they espy how they’ve been conned. Holliday’s cool in this process derives from how he is manipulator and not manipulated, operating from a surety of knowledge that remains a fixed vantage for him, while he uses it to move others. When “on the street,” what Holliday manipulates ranges from a policeman’s homophobia to a mark’s sexual tastes, while in well-to-do homes where he works as domestic servant, he manipulates employers’ racist assumptions and other self-aggrandizing foibles. Much of what Holliday knows—and his knowledge of how to manipulate that—are features of what Pierre Bourdieu calls habitus in Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (1979).
Habitus is "the relationship between...the capacity to produce classifiable practices and works, and the capacity to differentiate and appreciate these practices and products" (Bourdieu 170). Holliday demonstrates not only a clear ability "to differentiate and appreciate the practices and products" he can produce, but also an ability to differentiate and appreciate what others can do and produce. His ability to manipulate them by using the terms of their social construction constitute part of the "classifiable practices and works" that help shape his habitus. Bourdieu’s concept stresses that individuals inhabit relationships between their abilities to produce and abilities to discern and "appreciate." Habitus occur within larger "fields" where networks of intersecting social forces and continuums (such as gender and class but also more particular forces like ethnicity as formed in a specific place, or types of higher education that produce managers as distinct from sculptors as distinct from doctors) constitute the person in relation to others (Bourdieu 94, 101-107). Holliday’s sense of how to work such placements and the relationships they create between individuals is core to his cool manipulation of others. Bourdieu tells us that social placement may be enabled not only by financial capital, but also by cultural and educational capital, all of which can be deployed, being “capacities,” but—as capacities distinct from practices—may also lie dormant and not necessarily visible, so that at least parts of one’s actual habitus may—like the locus of knowledge on which Holliday bases a con—be covert. Bourdieu notes that individuals may move from one position to another in one or more fields of influence; they might, for example, increase their income—their “capacity to produce [...] works” and thereby their economic class, but they may bring with them in this trajectory “[capacities] to differentiate and appreciate [their] practices and
products” that mark them as neophyte members of their new class (163-165)—or that lead them to critique their new position, bringing patterns of discernment to bear that are alien to it (453-455). With such movement in habitus, individuals may bring new doxa—beliefs about what is self-evident, “natural,” or “common sense”—that were engendered by the larger fields where their initial habitus occurred, into a new field of play, where they seem heterodox (qtd. in Liu 37). Alternately, an individual might develop heterodox views without shifting habitus, by developing an awareness of the field of social forces that shape his or her habitus and how other beliefs exist and vary from its doxa (Liu 37).

Although Holliday deploys knowledge that enables his cool manipulation of others and demonstrates a heterodox awareness of various habitus, he does not clearly evince awareness of forces that shape thehipster field he also inhabits. As MacAdams notes, cool behavior was associated with defiance of social forces (racism, bourgeois conformism) by those who inhabited—or admired—a 1950s and 1960s hipster habitus (19-20). That configuration assumes that the cool individual not only sees the larger culture from a heterodox view, but also can choose to detach him or herself from the systems that comprise it; in other words, cool as defiance implies a liberal humanist model of the individual as acting autonomously in relation to the systems that constitute society. That individual has a self from which it can resist physical and social oppression or the kind of repression Foucault discounts (History 60). Alan Liu examines how cultural studies have negotiated movement away from liberal humanist notions of the self during the 1970s and 1980s as they addressed the arguments Foucault and Althusser, among others, laid out about how historical forces, through disciplinary sys-
tems, construct individuals as inextricable from those forces and systems and incapable of forming a point of view detached from them (24). Liu claims that such “social constructionist” approaches “ran the risk of being intolerably reductive and totalizing,” so that they

found it crucial to introduce within social determination at least the thought of indeterminacy, by foregrounding the mediating role of ‘ideological state apparatuses,’ ‘representations,’ ‘mentalities’ and other dream-states of imaginary constructionism supervised by such ‘relatively autonomous’ institutions of identity formation as the church, school, or media.’ (Liu 24)

Because such thinking featured “a body subordinated to a head,” its “ultimate aim […] was the point-singularity or black hole of the imaginary named ‘the subject,’ for which identity groups (gender, ethnicity, race) were the social event horizon” (Liu 24). To avoid essentialism, “all the grounds of human ‘nature’ were removed from identity, and the relation between ‘me and my group’ and the world was thus radically destabilized” (Liu 25). Liu assesses subsequent attempts to address “the radical instability of constructed identity” and the “problem of [its] missing ground” (26), none of which has successfully resolved that problem.

Liu finds that Bourdieu’s sociological approach emphasizes systems via the “fields” wherein habitus form, rather than notions of subjectivities with their individual fields of interiority where social forces also operate. He underscores this difference by quoting Bourdieu’s An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology:

The notion of field reminds us that the true object of social science is not [a] the individual, even though one cannot construct a field if not through indi-
viduals, since the information necessary for statistical analysis is generally attached to individuals or institutions. [b] It is the field which is primary…. [a] This does not imply that individuals are mere ‘illusions,’ that they do not exist: [b] they exist as agents—and not as biological individuals, actors, or subjects—who are socially constituted as active and acting in the field. (qtd. in Liu 29)

Individuals act as agents of and within the fields that constitute them. This privileging of field and system over individuals places “the radical instability of constructed identity” in a different register, but does not ultimately resolve that instability, according to Liu. He cites a study in which Bourdieu’s researchers aid subjects in understanding that [a] the most personal is [b] the most impersonal, that many of [a] the most intimate dramas, the deepest malaises, the most singular suffering that women and men can experience find their roots in [b] the objective contractions, constraints and double binds inscribed in the structures of the labor and housing markets, in the merciless scansions of the school system, or in mechanisms of economic and social inheritance. (qtd. in Liu 30)

The researchers thus help subjects “discover and state […] the hidden principle of their […] extreme tragedies or ordinary misfortunes” (qtd. in Liu 30) as completely external to them. This revelation “[allows] them to rid themselves of this external reality that inhabits and haunts them, possesses them from the inside, and dispossesses them of initiative in their own existence in the manner of the monster in Alien” (qtd. in Liu 30). In this paradoxical construction of internal and external, self and system, Liu says that “Local being bonds to general being […] on the grounds of a common es-
sense (we are all food for the monster) that is an alien essence,” (30) noting how Bourdieu’s approach, while it may seem rooted in empirically-observable, tangible practices and it may avoid the vagaries of parsing subjectivity, nevertheless ultimately constructs identity on “missing ground.”

In the two novels I will discuss here—William S. Burroughs’ Naked Lunch (1959) and Sam Greenlee’s The Spook Who Sat By The Door (1969)—we see cool manipulation of cultural knowledges on large, systemic scales that are congruent with Bourdieu’s sense of the vast complex of interacting fields that constitute each habitus as a relationship within networks of relationships. While Burroughs’ novel features a cool narrator that only sometimes takes a first-person form as a character, Greenlee’s third-person narrative features a protagonist who coolly manipulates individuals and systems. Burroughs’ narrator and Greenlee’s protagonist both also deploy the notion of the agent and of secret agency that ultimately lead them to figurations of the self or individual identity as troubled by “missing ground.”

**Naked Lunch**

**Addiction’s cultural cachet** William S. Burroughs begins Naked Lunch by drawing attention to how its first-person narrator speaks with the authority of a 1950s habitué of New York City drug culture, with its attendant derision toward behavior, expression, style and work conforming to bourgeois normative expectations. The novel’s first sentence focuses on the narrator’s outlaw knowledge of the agents operating against him: “I can feel the heat closing in, feel them out there making their moves, setting up their devil doll stool pigeons, crooning over my spoon and dropper I throw away at Washington Square Station, vault a turnstile and two flights down the iron
stairs, catch an uptown A train…” (Burroughs 3). With a few deft metaphors which speak to his verbal ability, the narrator establishes himself as able to discern and de-
ride from a position of radically different values—a different habitus—from those of narcotics agents and of stool pigeons who have relinquished the kind of agency he enjoys to become dummies—voodoo “devil dolls” who give up secret knowledge of him that is based in their shared position as drug users.

In the rest of the paragraph the narrator, in describing the next two characters he encounters, assesses them in terms that mark aspects of each one’s *habitus*: not only in terms of class, profession, and sexuality, but also how they deploy their utterances in order to shape perceptions of themselves. Reaching the subway, he says a Young, good looking, crew cut, Ivy League, advertising exec type fruit holds the door back for me. I am evidently his idea of a character. You know the type: comes on with bartenders and cab drivers, talking about right hooks and the Dodgers, calls the counterman at Nedick’s by his first name. A real ass-
hole. And right on time this narcotics dick in a white trench coat (imagine tail-
ing somebody in a white trench coat. Trying to pass as a fag, I guess) hit the platform. I can hear the way he would say it holding my outfit in his left hand, right hand on his piece: “I think you dropped something, fella.” (Burroughs 3) The “exec type fruit” ostensibly chats up those who serve him in terms meant to create a butch image to cover up his nature as “fruit”—unless the narrator means to simply denigrate rather than characterize him with that label—while the narcotics agent “[tries] to pass as a fag” as part of his cover. They are both in disguise. The narrator reads both of them through their physical appearance, from that predicting their
speech, its style and intent. The “exec type fruit” establishes his “cover” through speech, while the “narcotics dick” uses clothing, although his speech would attempt to establish a kind of cool through smooth understatement.

Given that Burroughs’ narrator pads his descriptions with how he “knows” these characters would speak and act, he draws attention to himself as possessor and wielder of such knowledge about how class, profession, sexuality, etc. manifest themselves through clothing, utterance, and the taste with which one deploys them. Once on the train and safe from the law, he performs by “giving the fruit his B production” of a hip outlaw out of low-budget films and playing up to his hopes and expectations as he “[takes] in the white teeth, the Florida tan, the two hundred dollar sharkskin suit, the button-down Brooks Brothers shirt, and […] The News as a prop” (3). The detail in which the narrator discerns the other’s conformity to ideal bourgeois dress code and leisure habits leads him to sneer at the differences between them and conclude, “A square wants to come on hip” (Burroughs 3) even as he reveals his own sensitivity to such markers of financial and cultural capital and taste and how he relies on knowledge of them to manipulate and navigate his way free of the clutches of the law. He agrees to sell the “fruit” what he in his squareness calls “pod” and which the narrator decides will actually be catnip. He follows this revelation with an encyclopedic parenthetical explanation: “(Note: Catnip smells like marijuana when it burns. Frequently passed on the incautious or uninstructed.)” (Burroughs 5). Such notes run throughout the novel, adding to its hip savvy an investment in stores of information that mark the narrator as possessing knowledge in large amounts and multiple forms—the encyclopedic form marking that information as information. Although it does not
quite professionalize the narrator, it gives him a specialist’s air even as it also disrupts the narration’s fluidly hip tone.

The narrator deploys utterance himself in the course of “giving the fruit his B production,” regaling him with a stream of anecdotes about kinds of violence and con artistry that accompany addiction and drug dealing, with details about such things as the “hot shot”—a dose of strychnine sold to a junky who has informed on others (Burroughs 4)—and a descent “‘into the East River, down through condoms and orange peels, mosaic of floating newspapers, down into the silent black ooze with gangsters in concrete, and pistols pounded flat to avoid the probing finger of prurient ballistic experts’” (Burroughs 5). He thus deploys the tone of the noir, private-eye tough-guy genre: the cynical detective who can parse and navigate dangerous and seedy zones—arenas marked off by criminality and class from “normal” worlds—to discover some truth in exchange for payment that sustains him as a cynically-knowing denizen of those zones. At the outset, then, Burroughs’ narrator associates himself with a specifically hip habitus and a version of hip as knowing. This knowledge encompasses abject zones as well as detailed cognizance of various other habitus. Like Holliday, the narrator deploys this cognizance to manipulate the “fruit,” without revealing the layers of awareness that concoct this production: the operation is covert.

**Images of Addiction**

Use of addictive drugs (mostly a range of opiates) which he calls “junk” forms a critical component of the narrator’s hip habitus, their use making him both outlaw and knowledgable in specialized ways, to which his encyclopedic asides draw attention. After the opening encounter with the “fruit” and flight from the “narcotics dick,”
the narrator meets and describes fellow junkies, some of them dealers, in terms not
designed for an upscale audience like the “fruit”—at least not within the novel’s die-
gesis. There is “Old Bart, shabby and inconspicuous, dunking pound cake with his
dirty fingers, shiny over the dirt” who sells junk to “a few old relics from hop smoking
times, spectral janitors, grey as ashes, phantom porters sweeping out dusty halls with a
slow old man’s hand, coughing and spitting in the junk-sick dawn” (Burroughs 5).
These geriatric addicts are more than ashen and “spectral” dry shadows. The narrator
compares “old people[’s]” eating to old junkies’ drug use, noting “how old people lose
all shame about eating, and it makes you puke to watch them,” while old junkies simi-
larly “gibber and squeal at the sight of [junk …] while they cook up, dissolving the
body’s decent skin [while] you expect any moment a great blob of protoplasm will
flop right out and surround the junk” (6). This image of the drug addict as spineless
amoeba filled with protoplasm (viscous, slimy matter that fills living cells), absorbing
narcotics by extending a pseudopod to engulf them, recurs through the novel, stressing
how the narrator’s knowledge of the junky’s habitus entails more than recognizing
himself as hip in relation to squares. He does quip, after describing the gibbering old
addicts, “‘Well, my boys will be like that one day,’ […]thinking] philosophically. ‘Isn’t
life peculiar?’” (Burroughs 6), thus retaining the private-eye’s wise-guy bravado and
distancing his state from extremes of desire that manifest as so decrepit and disgust-
ing, while also implying that addicts proceed through stages of subjection, the earliest
of which do not appear like subjection at all.

**Willy the Disk and Agency**
The opening section, with its first-person narrator as character, ends with his flight from the city because narcotics agents “had [set] Willy the Disk on [his trail],” Willy being a “blind [stool] pigeon” addict, “blind from shooting in the eye-ball, his nose and palate eaten away sniffing H,” who can therefore only ingest junk through “a round, disk mouth lined with sensitive, erectile black hairs” (Burroughs 7), which “sometimes sways out on a long tube of ectoplasm, feeling for the silent frequency of junk” (Burroughs 8). This portrait of addiction testifies to the addict’s complete subjection to craving’s imperative, devoid of any semblance of agency: addiction destroys body parts and, with them, senses—Willy has sacrificed sight and taste to continue feeling junk. On busts, the police employ Willy’s ability to “[feel] for the silent frequency of junk,” although at times he “goes all out of control […] his mouth [eating] a hole right through the door,” requiring the police to “restrain him with a stock probe” (Burroughs 8). With such a junky double-agent-turned-bloodhound on his tail, the narrator concludes that his own younger, hipper “kid customers” would betray him in court and claim “he [had forced them] to commit all kinda awful sex acts in return for junk” (Burroughs 8). That his “kid customers” would try to protect themselves in court by manipulating homophobic laws and sentiment also evokes 1950s popular conflations of the communist secret agent and homosexual, and how government agencies used the threat of publicly denouncing such agents. Yet the narrator still maintains a hip bravado as he buys a stash of heroin and a used car so he can “start west” (Burroughs 8), ostensibly exercising and maintaining his agency in the face of the legal system. At the same time, his clear sense of the horror that is Willy the Disk implies his recognition that addiction includes stages where overwhelming craving,
blind to anything else and so strong that only a cattle prod could divert him from satisfying that need, trumps any sense of agency. The narrator represents the addict at this later stage as retaining only the shape of subjection to that craving, “all out of control.”

**Addiction’s Cool**

Through the character of Dr. Benway, the narrator provides the novel’s one description of advanced addiction from an addict’s view. Here, the addict prizes and subsists in extreme cool that can only be moved thermodynamically into action by the withdrawal of that cool. Benway describes the “eventual result of junk use [...] as permanent back-brain depression [...] complete lack of affect, autism, virtual absence of cerebral event” (Burroughs 30). The addict evinces no mental agitation of the sort that constitutes individual subjectivity and distinguishes humans from other species; his cognitive stillness makes him cool. Eventually, the description drops scientific discourse to represent a junky’s point of view:

The addict can spend eight hours looking at a wall. He is conscious of his surroundings, but they have no emotional connotation and in consequence no interest. Remembering a period of heavy addiction is like playing back a tape recording of events experienced by the front brain alone. Flat statements of external events. ‘I went to the store and bought some brown sugar. I came home and ate half the box. I took a three grain shot,’ etc. Complete absence of nostalgia in these memories. However, as soon as junk intake falls below par, the withdrawal substance floods the body. (Burroughs 30)

Addiction here is witnessed by the junky as very cool because no affect or interest moves him; unless “intake falls below par” his cognitive movement is that of a sen-
tient machine—a tape recorder whose sentience serves only to provide awareness de-
void of “interest.” Dr. Benway adds that, “If all pleasure is relief from tension, junk
affords relief from the whole life process” (Burroughs 30), implying a continuum of
stillness on which the junky’s inebriation borders, if not death, at least the absence of
subjectivity’s mechanics. The individual becomes no more than corporeal tape record-
er—and an intense need to preserve this cool state, but only if its lack agitates him:
“Boredom, which always indicates an undischarged tension, never troubles the addict.
He can look at his shoe for eight hours. He is only roused to action when the hourglass
of junk runs out” (Burroughs 31). Burroughs’ narrator most often represents addicts at
this grotesquely subjected stage and from a point of view exterior to them, using the
body to metaphorically represent that subjection with features like “lamprey” mouths
that fasten on sources of junk and suck it out.

The novel does not lay out in order a successive series of recognitions particu-
lar to addicts, and although it features some of the stages commonly ascribed to addic-
tion, it doesn’t present others. Burroughs does not represent a new drug user’s recogni-
tion of the euphoria junk offers initially, instead beginning with the competent and hip
user/dealer who clearly sees his future in the disgusting practices of older junkies, but
does not describe his own experience of junk use. He does present images of an addict
quitting junk, but does not base the decision to quit on recognition of the self as in
thrall to addiction or as reclaiming self-mastery through an act of volition. We see “the
Vigilante” immediately after he has entered an insanity plea in court. Having been ten
days in jail without drugs, “He [stands] there…his face torn like a broken film by lusts
and hungers of larval organs stirring in the tentative ectoplasmic flesh of junk kick”
For an addict, to be newly withdrawn off drugs is to re-develop a “tentative” body, its organs only at the “larval” stage. Moreover, to feel those organs is to be “torn like a broken film by lusts and hungers” they force on the junky, as if they represent a system of desires he had eluded through addiction, that in the Vigilante’s case has only been forced on him by his time in jail. Only through implication do we glimpse why or how a junky might recognize the self as subjected to drugs—or freed by them. The image also implies that junk use dissolves the body—or the junky’s experience of it, which is underscored by a description of how the newly-clean addict’s fledgling “flesh […] fades at the first silent touch of junk” (Burroughs 8-9). The narrator has witnessed this, claiming “I saw it happen. Ten pounds lost in ten minutes standing with the syringe in one hand […] his abdicated flesh burning in a cold yellow halo, there in the New York hotel room” after having spent a “mosaic of sleepless nights […] as a] kicking addict nursing his baby flesh” (Burroughs 8-9). The contrast between the images of the “addict nursing his baby flesh” and “his abdicated flesh burning in a cold yellow halo” provides the only sense that the junky has chosen a difficult process to escape addiction and that, in undoing that process, he has forsaken a state he values. While organizations that promote recovery from addiction, like Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous, place great importance on moments when an addict recognizes him or herself as subjected to addiction, Burroughs barely includes such moments: his narrator repeatedly notes extremely grotesque addiction in others but barely implies in passing any kind of recognition that could serve as the impetus to voluntarily relinquishing subjection to drugs in exchange for self-mastery. While he represents different stages of addiction, they do not appear in chronological order or as
happening to a single character. *Naked Lunch* is not the sort of salvation narrative that texts like *Alcoholics Anonymous: The Story of How Many Thousands of Men and Women Have Recovered from Alcoholism* provide. Neither, however, does *Naked Lunch* produce a tale of its narrator’s having been helplessly and tragically lost to and destroyed by addiction, although he bears witness to others meeting this fate.

**The Mark Within**

In his discussion of a con artist known as “the Rube,” the narrator introduces the notion of a secret agent that threatens con artistry and the cool, manipulative knowledge it deploys—its secret agency—while also incorporating notions of taste and culture: “The Rube [has become] a social liability” because he has begun having “attacks” which the narrator explains as produced by “The Mark Inside […] coming up on him” (Burroughs 9). This Mark that exists within a hustler is “a rumble nobody can cool” (Burroughs 9); the narrator declares, “Hustlers of the world, there is one Mark you cannot beat: The Mark Inside…” (Burroughs 11). This claim implies that hustlers contain a gullible soft spot or state that can be conned, given that it is a “Mark,” while also claiming that they cannot apprehend or control it themselves. That the Rube cannot “cool” this “rumble” when it “[comes] up on him” suggests that when it surfaces and becomes apparent to the narrator, the Rube loses the cool, secret knowledge of how to read and manipulate others. As evidence, the narrator describes how, while they travel together, the Rube “jumps out [of a car] to con a prowl car and the fuzz takes one looks at his face and bust all of us” (Burroughs 9). His attempt to hustle has become visible—he has lost his cool, his *secret* agency. The narrator describes this condition, more terminal than addiction: “Con men don’t change, they
break, shatter—explosions of matter in cold interstellar space, drift away in cosmic dust, leave the empty body behind” (Burroughs 11). To lose his cool when “The Mark Inside” emerges, entails shattering and dispelling all components of the individual except the body—shattering and dispelling the discernment with which the hustler produces the “practices and works” distinctive to his *habitus* (Bourdieu 170). Paradoxically, the hustler’s cool, secret agency is lost when, from his interior, there emerges a manipulable “mark” which dispels the notion that he enjoys an interior, secret agency. With that notion’s dissolution, he loses the ability to practice con artistry, dependent as it is on deploying that secret agency. Like Bourdieu’s paradoxical example of the alien that erupts destructively from the ostensible interior of an individual, when the Mark Inside emerges into visibility it proves a blind spot—a kind of “missing ground” (Liu 26) on which the hustler’s identity as such has been constituted. As soon as that missing ground becomes apparent, all but the hustler’s body shatters. Burroughs’ notion of how an inescapable manipulability—susceptibility to manipulation by external forces—forms the hustler at core, produces a model of the individual as lacking any independent subjectivity. The hustler’s ability to behave coolly, to ostensibly act with secret agency is secretly not agency at all. Nevertheless, the range of his voice and the cultural and educational capital that imbue that voice with its savvy imply that he occupies a still, cool place of knowing and self-mastery. Willy the Disk could not have narrated *Naked Lunch*. Its narrator must have moved into and out of stages of addiction, recognizing not only different stages in its process, but also other systems about which he displays his cool knowledge.
This narrator enjoys a position of having been through and seen through characters and kinds of experience that include much more than drug use in a disjointed picaresque journey around the world where he witnesses extremes of depravity and also sees through the machinations of politics and culture, marking how they deploy markers of taste through his rapid-fire tales of undermining and subverting good taste. Nothing is sacred and all are subjected to extremes of decadence. His journey out of New York City begins with bravado as he describes himself, an outlaw with narcotics agents on his trail: “I knew they were out there powwowing and making their evil fuzz magic, putting dolls of me in Leavenworth. ‘No use sticking needles in that one, Mike’” (Burroughs 6). While his cleverly exoticizing voodoo reference remains within the cultural range of the noir detective, the narrator begins to demonstrate a more widely-ranging sensibility.

**Anthropological Voice**

When The Mark begins to show on the Rube, “Cops, doormen, dogs, secretaries snarl at his approach” (Burroughs 11) so he can no longer slip by guardians of property and propriety. Ultimately, the narrator decides “The Rube is a drag on the industry” so that he might “[decide] to lop him off [even] if it meant a smother party”— “(‘a rural English custom designed to eliminate aged and bedfast dependents’)” or that he might decide the Rube “should be ‘led out’ into the skid rows of the world. (This is an African practice. Official known as the ‘Leader Out’ has the function of taking old characters out into the jungle, and leaving them there.)” (Burroughs 10).

This anthropological knowledge of practices from diverse times and places provides ironic humor while displaying the narrator’s educational capital, in that he knows
enough of anthropology to deploy it in this way. The narrator also uses anthropological jargon to describe American suburbs: in “the Interior…with its miasma of mound-building peoples, groveling worship of the Food Source, cruel and ugly festivals, dead-end horror of the Centipede God reaches from Moundville to the lunar deserts of coastal Peru” (Burroughs 11). Here he adapts the anthropological descriptive style to assert that mid-American suburban life is as primitive as those conventionally considered primitive. In doing so, he combines hip critique of the bourgeoisie with an educated ease in deploying academic style. With his flight “west,” across the U.S. and then into other lands, his subject matter expands and his international erudition blossoms as he similarly employs various verbal styles with hip critique and biting satire. Ultimately, he demonstrates wide-ranging educational and cultural capital born of schooling coupled with traveling internationally and traveling into zones of abjection through drug use, sexual practices, and crime.

Secret Agents

The Mark Inside is not the only secret agent we encounter; the novel is seeded with references to cover stories and agents. Dr. Benway is an “advisor to the Freeland Republic” whose services the narrator has been “assigned to engage…for Islam Inc.”; he also “is a manipulator and coordinator of symbol systems, an expert on all phases of interrogation, brainwashing and control” (Burroughs 19). He implants (through “brainwashing”) and extracts (through “interrogation”) all the “symbol systems” that enable “control” over individuals—that allow one to exert a secret agency over them. Dr. Benway cheerfully plies his trade in “Annexia,” guided by precepts such as this: “The naked need of the control addicts must be decently covered by an arbitrary and
intricate bureaucracy so that the subject cannot contact his enemy direct” (Burroughs 19). With Dr. Benway’s assistance, Annexia employs “[Examiners], who might be in plain clothes, in various uniforms, often in a bathing suit or pajamas, sometimes stark naked except for a badge” (Burroughs 20) to interrogate citizens, while “the Annexia police processed suspected agents, saboteurs and political deviants on an assembly line basis,” employing several elaborate forms of torture designed by Benway. Here, agents are secret because obscured by bureaucracy or because they attempt to rebel against an overwhelmingly comprehensive disciplinary system. They are all constituted by intersecting networks of disciplinary control.

There are other kinds of agents, such as “A.J., the notorious Merchant of Sex, who scandalized international society” by appearing at a ball as a large penis wearing a condom, to which the duke his host responded, “Rather bad taste, old boy” (Burroughs 121). The narrator explains that “A.J. is an agent like me, but for whom or for what no one has even been able to discover” (Burroughs 122-123). His “cover story” is that he is “an international playboy and harmless practical joker” or that he is “an ‘independent’”—a cover story “no one believes” (Burroughs 130). Like the narrator, A.J. crosses borders that demarcate nations and multiple habitus with ease, his pranks tending to target habitus of the ruling classes and the markers of taste and propriety that distinguish them. He wreaks havoc at their social events, although he also disrupts hipper venues, such as a New York City nightclub. Another pair of “agents have identified themselves each to each” (like mermaids in T.S.Eliot’s “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock”)

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“by choice of sex practice foiling alien microphones, fuck atomic secrets back and forth in code so complex only two physicists in the world pretend to understand it and each categorically denies the other. Later the receiving agent will be hanged, convict of the guilty possession of a nervous system, and play back the message in orgasmal spasms transmitted from electrodes attached to the penis” (Burroughs 173).

Here, Burroughs toys with 1950s Cold War American practices of conflating the threat posed by different kinds of secret agents: the communist, the homosexual, and the possessor of “high” cultural and educational capital. Historian Stephen Whitfield (1991) quotes Republican Senator Kenneth Wherry’s statement in 1943 that “you can’t...separate homosexuals from subversives [...] a man of low morality is a menace in the government, whatever he is, and they are tied up together” (43). Burroughs’ description of the two agents who “by choice of sex practice [can foil] alien microphones” employs such beliefs while satirizing them. With the secrecy that their “choice of sex practice” provides, the novel invokes attitudes toward homosexuals that developed in the wake of the Kinsey Report of 1948. It found that “37 percent” of American men had had at least one homoerotic experience, or, as Kinsey phrased it, “nearly 2 males out of every 5 that one may meet” (qtd. in Butt 32, Butt’s italics). Although the report did not constitute those men as essentially “homosexual,” its publication led to what Gavin Butt calls a “culture of suspicion” (34) in which homosexual men were no longer deemed identifiable by stereotypically “effeminate” features and in which there was “widespread concern for identifying or recognizing ‘homosexuals’...in everyday social life” (32). Similar notions that communists were undetectable
because they did not fit stereotypical images were advanced when State Department
employee Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs were determined to be communist spies
(Whitfield 28, 31).

Whitfield also quotes the 1950 Senate Report “Employment of Homosexuals
and Other Sex Perverts in Government” as stating that “one homosexual can pollute a
Government office” (44), its use of “pollute” connoting not only a routine yet unrec-
ognized influx of toxicity, but also a sense that this contamination by its nature tends
to spread. Such threats posed more danger because the agents by which they spread
were indistinguishable from heterosexual, anti-communist Americans: the normal and
moral. With the image of the dying spy’s “[playing] back the message in orgasmal
spasms transmitted from electrodes attached to the penis,” Burroughs’ narrator pro-
vides what would be to a sensibility like Senator Wherry’s the ultimate image of pol-
lution and contamination, with state secrets reproduced orgasmically and government
electronic recording equipment being attached to the homosexual penis which no
doubt sprayed it with semen, though Burroughs’ image only implies that detail.

In Naked Lunch Burroughs clearly plays with the nexus of associations accru-
ing around the image of the secret agent in American 1950s culture, though he does so
without employing a heteronormative binary. The narrator sometimes seems to use
terms like “fruits,” “pansies,” and “fags” (113) derisively and, at others, only descript-
vively. The novel displays a decided homosocial focus, and represents sex with fe-
males as less than attractive, as in the case of a “charming old Venetian anecdote”
wherein conversation between sailors, who have become attracted to men in their trav-
els, casts women’s genitals in Medusa’s role with a quick gloss of Freud’s essay “Me-
dusa’s Head”: “Oh Gertie it’s true. It’s all true. They’ve got a horrid gash instead of a thrilling thing,” to which another replies “I can’t face it,” and a third concludes, “Enough to turn a body to stone.”6 (Burroughs 126). The anecdote then turns to A.J. in Venice where his “Nubians,” instead of serving him, are “chasing cunt” (Burroughs 127) and he wrecks his gondola. Another episode follows that ends with A.J.’s “[breaking] a champagne bottle across the […] taut buttocks” of a just-unveiled statue of “a naked boy bending over a sleeping comrade with evident intention to waken him with a flute” at the dedication of “a school for delinquent boys of Latin American origin, endowed by A.J.” (Burroughs 128)—an event A.J. attends swathed in American flags. By christening the statue, A.J. celebrates verboten homoeroticism between boys (and by extension, between himself and boys) while a priest exclaims “Mother of God!” (Burroughs 128). Moreover, given that he wears the US flag and the school is for “delinquent boys of Latin American origin,” the scene outrageously commingles American displays of patriotism with homosexuality, linking both with imperialism and ethnic oppression. This series of episodes conveys the cacophony of sexual behaviors the novel juxtaposes and links to more overtly political themes in ways that mock and critique the formula for patriotism the likes of Senator Wherry promoted at the time.

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6 Freud equates the sight of adult female genitals and surrounding hair with the sight of Medusa’s head, the hair of which is made of snakes and signifies multiple penises. The male viewer sees castration because there is no penis, but also reads the snakes as replacement penises meant to address that lack. The sight of castration makes the male viewer “stiff with terror, turns him to stone” (qtd. in Garber and Vickers 85) and also arouses him, making him stiff with an erection—unless this terror leads him to desire men instead (qtd. in Garber and Vickers 85).
There is the tale of a man whose asshole begins to speak, then eat, and eventually develops sentience while the sentience generated by the organs of his head atrophies, but—because the asshole cannot see—the brain becomes “trapped in the skull, sealed off” without a connection to sight and eventually dies. The tale draws attention to anal sensitivity and thereby modes of sex related to it. Dr. Benway comments on the story, “There’s the sex that passes the censor, squeezes through between bureaus, because there’s always a space between, in popular songs and Grade B movies, giving away the basic American rottenness […] to fall anywhere and grow into some degenerate cancerous life-form” (Burroughs 112). Ultimately, the novel features varieties of sexual practice, filling as they do “space between” the terms of heteronormative binaries—and “related” binaries that oppose communism to capitalism, freedom, or Christianity. They do so both through “[bypassing] the censor” and by slipping past censorship so myopic that the practice “passes” as “normal.” After the tale of the sentient asshole, Dr. Benway concludes that “The end result of complete cellular representation is cancer. Democracy is cancerous” (Burroughs 112). Here Burroughs braids together notions of infiltration by uncontrollably-spreading, life-threatening growth, varieties of anal-centric practices, and the “American” freedom “to fall anywhere and grow” into whatever form one takes, and weds them to American reverence for its democracy, thereby undermining the kind of claims about freedom and democracy American mass culture employed at the time. Democracy, not communism, is the secret agent that “gives away [the presence of…] rottenness” that is “American.” The narrator asserts an ability to see through and thereby satirize interdependent associations and conflations popular at the time and how they are used to mark individual
*habitus* and relations between them. He takes notions of contagion, communism, sexuality, addiction, outlawry and uses them to describe and comment on the institutions that would control and contain them—ostensibly from a distance. His *habitus* is thus marked by such wide-ranging cultural and educational capital as that produced by entering into and ceasing addictive drug use, by familiarity with sexual practices that exceed the heteronormative in multiple ways, by outlaw flight, as well as by an education that enables him to parody sociological texts and deploy such markers of erudition as glancing references to a poem by Eliot and an essay by Freud.

The narrator begins the last episode of the novel, where he again acts as a character, by saying that when two policemen walked in on him “that morning […] I knew it was my last chance, me only chance” (175). He is about to shoot up when they surprise him, having been directed to arrest him and take care to also “bring in all books, letters, manuscripts. *Anything* printed, typed or written” (175). His writings are thus marked as presenting some special significance or danger, from the police’s perspective. In the ensuing scene, the narrator gets the cops’ permission to shoot up in exchange for turning stool pigeon, but he in those few moments when they look away from his “probing for a vein” because “it’s a wildly un-pretty spectacle,” he tricks them, ultimately shooting and killing them both and escaping with his “notebooks […] works, junk, and a box of shells” (Burroughs 178). Although he expects to be caught and killed (having resolved not to suffer arrest), first he locates a dealer and some junk, without which he “would be immobilized” (179). The next morning, when newspapers don’t report the shootings, he phones the narcotics squad and asks for the men he killed, only to be told they don’t work there. Then, he says
I realized what had happened...I had been occluded from space-time [...] Locked out...Never again would I have a Key, a Point of Intersection...The Heat was off me from here on out...relegated with [the dead policemen] to a landlocked junk past where heroin is always twenty-eight dollars an ounce [...] Far side of the world’s mirror, moving into the past...clawing at a not-yet of Telepathic Bureaucracies, Time Monopolies, Control Drugs, Heavy Fluid Addicts. (Burroughs 181)

The novel ends there, with the narrator unstuck in time and detached from the systems that he inhabited, traversed, fled, and satirized. Without that relation to such systems, he can write the story’s end, but is “locked out” of any “Point of Intersection” and limited to his past, though he still might “[claw] at a not-yet.” He is using junk, so we can assume that his sense of embodiment is in a state of dissolution, along with his connection to space and time. But this ending is followed by an “Atrophied Preface” titled “WOULDN’T YOU?” (182).

The preface begins by discussing writing, justifying the novel’s lack of linear form and connective explanation—how it might jump from a scene of New York in one sentence and in the next be with other characters in Timbuktu. The narrator links this form to his own form and functions: “There is only one thing a writer can write about: what is in front of his senses at the moment of writing...I am a recording instrument...I do not presume to impose ‘story’ ‘plot’ ‘continuity’...Insofar as I succeed in Direct recording of certain areas of psychic process I may have limited function...I am not an entertainer...” (184). This image of the writing self as “recording instrument” resonates with Dr. Benway’s description of the junky in the full throes of addic-
tion, when individual sentience serves no other function than providing facts to a recording machine. Both cases figure a character as cool because of the still receptivity of his means to produce: a mechanism that to function must be fed things exterior to it, if not exterior to the individual, given that the narrator-writer’s self includes generative “psychic processes” that his recorder-self observes as “what is in front of his senses” and thereby as separate from and exterior to the recorder.

This sense of the cool as mechanical and productive or re-productive clashes with notions of the liberal humanist subject as coolly defying oppressive forces that demand conformity from him or her. But Liu also links cool from the 1950s to the productivity of machines and the behavioral conformity factory management required of workers:

Though style is most often studied in terms of consumption culture, in our context it must be understood to fuse consumer fashion with producer sensibility to create the ubiquitous feeling that in every instance—in the way one dresses, walks, talks, or drives—there is an exact adjustment to be made between technology and technique. All the most influential subcultural styles of the twentieth century, we may thus say, were variants of techno-style. They were how subculture ritualized the sense that the particular adjustment defining one’s identity […] was secondary to a fundamental adjustment between technology and technique. There was only one cool way to grease one’s hair, just as there was only one right way to oil a drill press. Style was the delinquency, but also the mimicry, of Taylorism.” (Liu 102)
Where Liu sees the influence of mechanical production on the cool style individuals manifested, I find Burroughs using mechanical cool to characterize productive and other cognitive operations “within” a subjectivity that is developing a sense that it is “missing ground.” His narrator takes pains to establish the “fundamental adjustment between [the] technology” of a writing consciousness and his specific “technique” of only recording what he “sees” while writing, including abrupt cuts from scene to scene.

The narrator also states that “Lee [a name for himself when a character] The Agent […] is taking the junk cure” and that “cures past and future shuttle pictures through his spectral substance vibrating in silent winds of accelerated Time…Pick a shot…Any shot…” (Burroughs 182). Ultimately, the narrator has chosen to renew his sense of embodiment by “taking the junk cure,” while as a “spectral substance vibrating in silent winds of accelerated Time” he watches “pictures” or photographic “shots” that the “past and future shuttle […] through” that ghostly “substance” that is his cognizance. What retain productive activity are the mechanisms of memory (and prescience, given that the “future” also provides images) and the ability to see and record those images. The narrator has become a sort of theater where images are projected and recorded. He refers to others’ characterization of his writing: “‘Possession’ they call it,” and he admits it seems that in viewing what he records “Sometimes an entity jumps in the body […] As if I was usually there but subject to goof now and again…Wrong! I am never here”” and although he feels he “[patrols]” his fictive worlds, “I am always somewhere Outside giving orders and Inside this straightjacket of jelly that gives and stretches but always reforms ahead of every movement, thought,
impulse, stamped with the seal of alien inspection…” (184-185). The narrator’s cool that resulted from his ability to hustle a mark, with its concomitant and vast stores of cultural and educational capital with which he appraised, manipulated and critiqued individuals and systems has receded, to be replaced with this sparser cool of the individual alone, both outside the fiction he “watches” mentally and only “Inside this straightjacket of jelly”—the restrictive body. Without the network of *habitus* and their relations to each other, the subject is confined within a body, working to return memories of the exterior to the exterior through writing. These last pages include scenes characteristic of the novel, but interspersed with them, the narrator finds

Perhaps I have opened the wrong door and at any moment The Man In Possession, The Owner Who Got There First will rush in and scream: ‘*What Are You Doing Here? Who Are You?*’ And I don’t know what I am doing there nor who I am. I decide to play it cool and maybe I will get the orientation before the Owner shows…So instead of yelling ‘*Where Am I?*’ cool it and look around and you will find out approximately…You were not there for *The Beginning*. You will not be there for *The End*…Your knowledge of what is going on can only be superficial and relative. (184)

The narrator’s cool as a stillness out of which to secretly manipulate knowledge has come and gone, having served in providing “orientation” that has turned out to be approximate. Cool has become instead the stillness in accepting the “missing ground” where one finds oneself, amongst fields of knowledge that constitute one “approximately.”

*The Spook Who Sat By The Door*
Like *Portrait of Jason*, *Naked Lunch* is kaleidoscopic, but more so in that its narrative structure fractures readers’ sense of it through its fragmented form. Its multiple facets nevertheless produce a layered sense of what comprises its narrator’s cool that is ultimately grounded in the “Atrophied Preface.” In *The Spook Who Sat By The Door* (1969), Sam Greenlee provides another version of the secret agent in protagonist Dan Freeman, whose agency also includes discerning the markers of taste and profession that bespeak the kinds of cultural, educational and financial capital that constitute any *habitus*. However, Greenlee employs a clearly linear narrative structure and does not diverge from norms that shape representational fiction. Dan Freeman’s manipulations of those markers of taste and habit are more masterful than the casual mastery displayed by the passing remark or con artistry’s fleeting use that Burroughs’ narrator manifests. Freeman organizes and controls their deployment for the single purpose of setting a revolution in motion by which African American men will fight for freedom from oppression by racist white power structures. His mastery—his expertise, his excellent planning, management, and ability to discern and to align his plans with extant structures in order to disrupt them—succeeds: at the novel’s end, the revolution is occurring but it cannot carry Freeman with it as he, like Burroughs’ narrator, emerges as “missing ground.”

Although the novel was published in 1969, Greenlee says that he wrote it in 1966 (“One on One”), a year that saw Stokely Carmichael draw the term “Black Power” into the national lexicon through a speech at a Civil Rights rally in Greenwood, Mississippi (Tuck 328). The Students for a Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) that Carmichael led had been shifting its practice from nonviolent activism to
what he described at the rally as a “determination to meet fire with fire” (Tuck 329)—a philosophical shift accompanied by practices like authorizing the use of armed guards to protect activists (Tuck 328). Stephen Tuck emphasizes how gradual this shift in activist philosophy was for some, while other groups had never embraced nonviolence as a tenet of their Civil Rights activism (302-303, 312-316). The Nation of Islam, and Malcolm X during and after his membership in that group, also promoted African-American independence from white-dominated culture, economies, and histories, and championed African-Americans’ right to defend themselves from racist violence (Foner 283, Tuck 315). Tuck describes Malcolm X’s attempts to organize activist groups after leaving the Nation of Islam as pre-figuring “major Black Power organizations [that] would only emerge later in the 1960s, when a critical mass at the grassroots rejected the promises of liberalism” (315). That “critical mass” was accruing as Greenlee wrote his novel that imagines successful guerrilla warfare opening a path to freedom.

Artists like poet/author/playwright LeRoi Jones, with his name change to Amiri Baraka, his book *Blues People*’s (1963) focus on the importance to the U.S. of African-American art with roots independent of white culture, worked to disengage popular notions of African-American history and identity from those produced by white mass culture, directing attention instead to Africa as a primary source of their heritage (Van Deburg 176-177). Black Nationalist groups like US, begun by Ron Karenga in Los Angeles, also focused on links to African culture to produce a sense of group identity unmarred by racist notions and white culture (Van Deburg 171-173). These movements reiterated goals and methods of earlier movements like those led by
Marcus Garvey, but in the mid-1960s they gained more sustained nationwide attention. Also in 1966, The Black Panther Party for Self Defense formed in Oakland, California. With its dramatic protest at the California statehouse in May of 1967, the group received national media attention (Rhodes 70, Tuck 331). Thomas Wolfe’s extended essay “Radical Chic” famously describes ways that the Black Panthers accrued cultural capital in the public eye with his critique of how some white liberal circles marked by wealth and cultural influence sought to enhance that influence by publicly associating with the Black Panthers. James Brown’s hit song “Say It Loud: I’m Black and I’m Proud” (1968), emphasizes the open assertion of African-American identity as positive and powerful, in keeping with these cultural and political movements.

Cold War attitudes encouraged associating Civil Rights activism with communism in the 1950s (Rhodes 184, Whitfield 20-23) and the FBI kept Martin Luther King Jr. under surveillance (Tuck 290). Black Power activism drew even more negative attention from that agency (Rhodes 47, 79, 292-293). Most famously, FBI agents killed Black Panther leader Fred Hampton in his Chicago apartment (Rhodes 279) and J. Edgar Hoover declared that the Black Panthers were “without question […] the greatest threat to internal security of the country” (Rhodes 276). Publicly targeted by law enforcement and the media, while themselves making use of publicity when feasible, Black Power groups were in some ways markedly visible (Rhodes 116-133). The imprisonment of George Jackson, Angela Davis, and Huey P. Newton physically hid them from public view and curtailed their public activism, but their supporters’ campaigns to free them countered that effect. The work of some Black Power activists did include going “underground”: in her autobiography Angela Davis describes going un-
derground to elude capture in the wake of Jonathan Jackson’s shooting of a judge in the Marin County Courthouse with a gun registered in her name (3-7). The Black Power movement was thus associated in different ways with hiding as much as with openness and public assertion. But going underground entails a life of hiding to elude capture, unlike the covert agency exercised through espionage. While Elaine Brown (1992) describes how some Black Panthers in Los Angeles operated covertly while they lived undercover as middle-class suburbanites (307), associations between spying and the Black Power movement come through a lineage from earlier decades of Cold War associations with communism⁷ and the surveillance to which the FBI subjected it.

It is therefore somewhat striking that protagonist Dan Freeman’s revolutionary project in The Spook Who Sat By The Door operates under cover, and the novel’s central conceit revolves around how his secret agency deploys white racism to overthrow it through moves that resemble the judo in which Freeman is expert. His cool thus lies partly in that stillness with which the judo practitioner uses both knowledge of an opponent and an elegant economy of motion to produce greater movement in others. Ironically, the change that sets the plot in motion has been produced by Civil Rights activism: a white senator needs the African-American vote to retain his seat, so to garner black approval he publicly criticizes the CIA for not employing any African-American agents. The CIA therefore recruits a class of only African-American prospective agents, expecting that none can complete the course. Results nearly bear this

⁷ While many Black Power activists associated themselves with communism—or like Davis were openly members of the Communist Party, they made a point of being open, rather than covert about those connections. I invoke communism only to note its associations with covert operations in American culture.
out: all the trainees but Freeman are “black bourgeoisie” elitists who lack either serious motivation or stamina to deploy and adapt their abilities to the demands of the course, even though they don’t want to “[return] to the jobs they had left: civil-rights bureaucracies, social welfare agencies, selling insurance, heading a playground in the ghetto, teaching school—all of the grinding little jobs open to a nonprofessional, middle-class Negro with a college degree” (Greenlee 22). When some students are first eliminated from the class, others unsuccessfully try to call on political and social connections to ensure they won’t share that fate. Two with “grades among the highest” are sent away for homosexuality, while others are intellectually successful but can’t meet the course’s physical demands (Greenlee 19). Their concern for social status leads them to ignore or shun Freeman because he “was not middle class, and the others knew it. Even had he not dressed as he did, not used the speech patterns and mannerisms of the Chicago ghetto slums, they would have known. His presence made them uneasy and insecure; they were members of the black elite, and a product of the ghetto streets did not belong among them” (Greenlee 12). Like Bourdieu, Greenlee employs a sense of large networks of habitus, each particular to historically-specific intersections of features like education, profession, “speech patterns and mannerisms” in addition to broader categories like race, class, and sexuality. That Freeman makes his bourgeois classmates uneasy also speaks to how relationships between different habitus contribute to their constitution.

But Freeman is more than a “product” of his original environment, although “No one at the training camp, white or colored, thought it strange that Freeman, a product of the Chicago ghetto, where Negroes spend more time, money and care in the
selection of their wardrobe than even in Harlem, should be so badly dressed” (Greenlee 18). That inability of both whites and middle-class blacks to accurately read him as not just a ghetto “product,” but also from a particular city is compounded by their inability to read him as the product of a trajectory out of the ghetto through education and ability, for they don’t question why “although he had attended two first-rate educational institutions, he should speak with so limited a vocabulary, so pronounced an accent and such Uncle Tom humor” (Greenlee 18). That they cannot see that he plays a role establishes how Freeman can successfully manipulate habitus to work under cover, while it also marks his classmates and the white CIA establishment as similarly unable to discern beyond what Bourdieu calls their doxa, beliefs engendered by the “field” where their habitus lies, which seem based in self-evident logic and appear as “natural” or “common sense.” (qtd. in Liu 37). In contrast, Freeman’s beliefs are a sophisticated version of the heterodox, born of a consciousness of multiple fields he has inhabited and how other beliefs exist and vary from them. (Liu 37). This consciousness informs Freeman’s secret agency: the capacity and willingness to pass as a black ghetto “product,” his abilities invisible to his classmates and to the CIA, until his test scores force his trainers to notice that he has in fact qualified as a CIA agent. That is all the CIA does notice, giving no thought to the content of what they have taught him: in learning how to fight guerrilla warfare, he has learned the principles on which it operates and the techniques it uses.

The CIA initially allows its first African-American agent to only copy documents—an insult he doesn’t protest, instead acting out the racialized role his white employers expect to see: that of a docile “Negro” who appreciates the distinction they
think a menial white collar job confers on him. Through his sojourn at the CIA, we see him occupy two *habitus*: one the CIA expects to see, a sort of lower middle-class position for which he wears badly-cut, cheap suits and a “gold-edged tooth cap” (Greenlee 30). The other *habitus* is one we first see him occupy when he visits Harlem and replaces the cap on his tooth with “a plain one,” sporting “black-rimmed glasses of plain glass, cordovan bluchers, a button-down shirt of English oxford and a dark sharkskin suit from J. Press” (Greenlee 30). The detailed specificity of these markers of taste and how Freeman uses them to distinguish himself from that of his “cover” emphasize how critical taste and its racialized associations are to Freeman’s ability to advance his mission—one that the novel does not yet unveil. Moreover, only in Harlem do we see Freeman as “himself”—a self we learn through his taste: he goes to hear Thelonius Monk and Charlie Mingus, he sees “*Threepenny Opera* in the Village” (Greenlee 30) and plays such as “*I Can Get It for You Wholesale* on Broadway”; he also visits “the newly-opened Guggenheim and [decides] that Wright had goofed, but he [enjoys] the Kandinskys” and then the Museum of Modern Art (Greenlee 31). These specifics convey that not only is he hip, but also hip to the “highest” reaches of hip culture. In terms of cultural capital, he is very well-to-do and takes care to manage that wealth, keeping a storage unit where all signs of that capital “that had no business in his new existence” are safely compartmentalized where he can access them, having “pondered the danger of leading a double life and [deciding] that the strain of squaredom would have to be eased somehow from time to time,” so that “he would have to become Freeman again,” (Greenlee 31) if only temporarily. We thus learn something of what comprises his true and secret identity.
Folded in with those signs of his taste that reveal his true identity is the fact that “he finds a six-foot, compatible whore” to spend nights with in Harlem. He seeks similar compatibility with another prostitute in Washington whom he regularly employs while evincing a respectful and friendly attitude toward her. At the same time, his college sweetheart Joy periodically visits from Chicago until she informs him that she is marrying an African-American Chicago doctor because, as she says, she’s “not getting any younger” (Greenlee 54). Although Freeman is willing to move into another job because he feels he “[has] to try and keep her, keep them both,” Joy has already made other plans, knowing that he “[hates] all the Negro middle class because […] they don’t do enough to help other Negroes” (Greenlee 53) and that he will never actually rest within the kind of upwardly-mobile *habitus* she desires. With Joy’s marriage, Freeman divests his life of any intimacy that resembles familial relationships and thus might shape his true identity—any intimacy that does not further his revolutionary plans. Instead, he relies on prostitutes for sexual pleasure or uses girlfriends purely as part of his cover. Because we also never see him return to the objects stored in Harlem, through which he can enact his true self, his authentic *habitus* becomes an increasingly nebulous entity in the novel, while his cover story takes center stage.

That cover story entails finally returning to the Chicago ghettos where he grew up and once belonged to a gang, before a university athletic scholarship removed him from that *habitus*. Back in Chicago, Freeman becomes a social worker for a foundation run by a former advertising executive who employs PR and a gift for fund-raising (Greenlee 78) that makes social work so profitable that Freeman can afford to drive a Lotus convertible (Greenlee 137) and eventually “is named as an eligible bachelor in
Ebony’s annual listing” (Greenlee 103). He crafts his habitus-cum-cover with precision and care from markers of high-bourgeois taste: he has the latest stereo equipment, the best liquor, and “His glasses [are] of crystal, his beer mugs pewter, his salad bowl Dansk and his women phony” (Greenlee 81). He wears his cover “like a tailored suit, adjusting here, taking in there until it [is] perfect and every part of him, except a part of his mind which would not be touched, was in it and of it” (Greenlee 81). Paradoxically, as he advances his secret agency, it must diminish in relation to his cover. In addition to the completeness of his cover, most people want to see him as the “white-type, uptight Negro of ‘rising aspirations’ and desperate upward mobility” (Greenlee 81), and in meeting their desires, he makes his cover that much stronger. Freeman’s social work itself begins by targeting the King Cobras, Chicago’s best-organized and “potentially the most dangerous” (Greenlee 80) gang—to which he once belonged—and whose members sneer at the foundation that employs Freeman, calling the African-Americans who work for it “‘whitey’s flunkies’” (Greenlee 79). It is no accident that Freeman chooses to work with the Cobras, because working with them is critical to both his cover story as bourgeois social worker and his undercover mission: to secretly start a revolution in the Black Power mold.

Alan Liu identifies two kinds of popular cool that emerged in 20th-century America, both born of the different relations to work encountered by white collar workers and members of “subculture”: “that part of culture excluded by definition from normal work” (Liu 100), groups that include varieties of the working class, some racialized or marked ethnically. Liu traces cool as a lack of affective display constituted in workers by capitalist disciplinary systems, rather than locating cool in products
like artistic performance and commodities. He turns first to early 20th-century factory
workers, whom the likes of Henry Ford and proto-industrial engineer Frederick Wins-
low Taylor pressured into evincing “the only legitimate personality of labor in the
Taylor/Ford era: the so-called ‘robot’ or ‘automaton.’” (Liu 95). However, the mid-
level managers and foremen responsible for ensuring that workers display that de-
meanor became “the real robots” (Liu 95) as they “internalized […] the friendship of
systemic alignment between technology and technique […] in their own identity” (Liu
96)—a “friendship” that was impersonal, rooted as it was in a “privative […] freedom
from” feeling (Liu 98) in a “professional” demeanor. White collar workers thus
emerged as “cold in their subject life at work,” which led them to pursue the “hot” in
an “object life of compensatory leisure” and consumer consumption that left them
“feeling enslaved to the ‘insidious cycle of work-and-spend’” (Liu 99). Liu credits
Hollywood with “[creating] for fantasy a whole breed of characters able to bring that
oscillation to a perfect point of convergence: steely-eyed heroes of the Western, gang-
ster, noir, war, biker, and other film genres who had ice in their veins, who were so
‘cool’ they were ‘hot,’ and who thus imaged even in the high-affect mode of popular
leisure the low affect of work life” (Liu 100). He cites work by Bruce Robbins on pro-
fessionalism and culture that features the 1966 film (released while Greenlee wrote
The Spook Who Sat By The Door) The Professionals, a western with “coldly profes-
sional […] technically proficient, mercenary ‘experts’” (Liu 100).

We see such proficiency in Freeman, beginning with his course at the CIA, alt-
ough—given his “cover”—it goes unnoticed except by a few teachers who, being
experts, can discern his expertise. A blurb on the back cover of my copy of the novel
compares Freeman to James Bond, in keeping with this image of cool professionalism and secret agency. But in addition to displaying proficiency with technologies of war, spy craft, and guerrilla fighting, Freeman masterminds the revolution he begins, organizing it and managing that organization, to which he also subordinates his identity, as his ability to subsist undercover demonstrates. All other members, organized into “cells,” also become subordinate to the organization: he establishes a hierarchy based on ability that is trained to shift and fill any gaps created by a member’s death, even Freeman’s, for his plan can afford to be dependent on no individual. While this organization is meant to embody “the characteristics of an underground revolutionary movement,” (96) it also demonstrates modes of cool that Liu traces through 20th-century industrial and corporate development. It is no accident that he chooses to work with the Cobras, whom he studies extensively before contacting them, “to confirm that [they are] the best organization for his plans” (italics added, Greenlee 84), while at the same time, he says the gang “[has] always been an underground” (Greenlee 96). Like a good spy or manager, he builds “dossiers of each key gang member […] gradually working] out their chain of command and […] pleased to find it efficient and effective” (Greenlee 84-85), but he is most taken by their “rigid discipline” (Greenlee 85). This organization thus also exemplifies military structure—a source of one kind of “professional” cool. The group’s virtues also include encouraging discussion amongst members—a mark of effective management—until a “commander” decides an issue. It also provides members with a sense of family, affection, and protection “from the unremitting hostility of the outside world” (Greenlee 85). While Freeman’s first meeting with Cobra leaders begins with violence at which he bests them, he immediately
critiques methods they’ve recently used and the results they produced as inefficient “punk games” played with poorly-selected equipment; thus, he appeals to their desire for greater professionalism. Although his speech lacks a managerial diction and tone, his ultimate appeal states a goal that secures their interest: “You really want to fuck with whitey, I’ll show you how!” (Greenlee 88).

In training the Cobras and planning the revolution, Freeman “[passes] along his CIA-bred knowledge” (Greenlee 93). Like Freeman, his lieutenants display expertise: Sugar is “their resident mathematician” (94), Dean has “a sharp, methodical mind and [is] temperamentally opposed to making hasty decisions” (95), “Pretty Willie can write” and is made their “propagandist” (121). In addition to teaching the Cobras about African-American music, history, and fine art, Freeman analyzes the dynamics of racialized and racist oppression for them. While his teachings reflect the approaches of Black Arts and Black Power movements (Greenlee 110-112), Freeman also trains the young men in not only how to use weapons, but also how to use them under specific circumstances—“it’s firepower, not marksmanship in a firefight”—and to fit their use into specific environments—“ain’t nothing to figurin’ range in a city. The length of a block, distance between lamppoles and telephone poles is all standard” (Greenlee 93). This techno-military training, with the expertise and sense of organization it provides, will enable the Cobras to be cool under fire when riots erupt—the time at which Freeman determines they will launch their revolution.

It also teaches them how to fit their organization and systems it employs into an effective interface with other systems, such as the physical features of the urban street—and how urban police think about and treat African-American gang members.
For example, to divert police attention from the Cobras, Freeman directs them to pretend to use heroin, knowing that the police, in their racist and classist unconcern, will not try to stop dealers from selling to gang members or to curtail addiction amongst them (Greenlee 105-106). The Cobras thus control police activity through manipulating prejudices that guide it. They also manipulate how racialized thinking blinds the police: to fund their organization, Freeman has light-skinned Cobras who can pass as white rob a bank; because they are seen as white and the white/black binary insists on only two racial categories, they elude capture. The police seek white robbers and so, when the responsible Cobras mix with their darker-skinned cohorts, the police cannot see them as suspects because they are black. While Greenlee thus plays on white blindness and black invisibility in ways reminiscent of Ralph Ellison’s *Invisible Man*, the use of that systemic blindness to enable a secret mission also smacks of a technical nicety, an elegant efficiency that evokes adept use of machinery as much as it reminds us of Robin Hood. The Cobras as an organization thus manifest the “coldly professional […] technically proficient” skill Liu associates with “mercenary ‘experts’” (100), more than the more general sense of cool as produced by “*subculture*” as style (Liu 102). Because they work in secret, Freeman and the Cobras evince little style, except as cover. With training, “the discipline, always good, tightened and the pride increased, no longer flamboyant, but quieter, cooler. The Cobras walk tall and ready, afraid of nothing” (Greenlee 102). But style does manifest in their relationships with the larger machinery, the systems with which they must interact precisely and smoothly to accomplish their goals. That style must be silent, invisible, detectable only as op-
ervative success. Their cool bases itself in their unseen knowledge and how it manipulates without itself being manipulated.

Freeman specifically must evince the cool of the professional, of the manager, the military officer, and of the secret agent, all of which entail putting his “true” habitus on long-term hold in ways he does not ask of the Cobras. He also displays a con artist’s cool, although at a much larger level of magnitude, with his manipulation of not just individuals, and the “network of safe houses, arms caches and message drops” (Greenlee 103) he has established, but also of entire bureaucracies, cities, and networks of belief. Although the white liberals at the foundation that employs him applaud his successful “social work” with the Cobras, he must continually navigate a complex of reactions from them because, while his success makes them look good, they want him to need their help and charity, and they fear his competence (Greenlee 89-91). His ultimate aim, however, is not mercenary; his goal is not to create an organization and he doesn’t con for the love of conning or to support himself; he subjects himself to the needs of the system he sets in motion, but with a goal that is not that system. Once the Cobras are trained, he recruits from other gangs, creating a fighting force that will be able to “turn [Chicago] inside out” (97). Its “recruitment and training cell” will then be dispersed to “every city with a ghetto” so that eventually they will “turn this country upside down” (Greenlee 97). This notion of turning a city or nation “inside out” or “upside down” suggests denaturing, making the normal abnormal, defying gravity, all of which point to how Freeman’s goals have no political specificity. A master at planning, he has no plan for a post-revolution future. Although to “fuck with whitey” is a means to his goal, Freeman tells the Cobras “We got no time for
hate; it’s a luxury we can’t afford. Whitey just stands in the way of freedom and he has to be moved any damn way we can; he doesn’t mean any more than that” (Greenlee 109). Freedom, then, is Freeman’s goal, and a system that cannot afford to be fueled by individuals’ feelings—a system that is affectively cool—is what can produce it.

While he designs a system that should work, Freeman harbors no delusions, saying “we could all get wasted, every one of us [....] Nobody knows what whitey might do when the deal goes down” (Greenlee 99). He admits to fearing such an end, but adds, “that ain’t nothing new. I been scared all my life. There ain’t a nigger living who doesn’t know fear; we live in it all our lives, like a fish in water. We just have to learn how to use it” (Greenlee 99). Some feelings, thus, cannot—as hate can—be excluded. Although he tells Cobra leader Dean that he feels all “spades” are his “family,” that “I got a family of twenty-five million people” and so “Ain’t no way I can ever be lonely,” Freeman is lonely (Greenlee 100) because “his cover, his plans had forced him into himself and his loneliness ate at him like a cancer. Always the iron control, even when drunk, the cover everything, himself nothing, afraid even when he cried out in orgasm that he might give something away” (Greenlee 100). Even though he can “be open” with the Cobras, “[he knows] he [uses] them as well” (Greenlee 100). He thinks about how they might be killed following his plan, but also “had no future otherwise” (Greenlee 100). He also is “aware of the inconsistencies in his arguments, the humor and horror in what they intended, the hell they would create for their people in the struggle for their freedom” (Greenlee 109).
There is an extreme form of cool we see in his character: his secret awareness of how to move and manipulate not just individuals and markers of *habitus* but technology and institutions is compounded by the degree to which he divests himself of all practices and relationships that constitute his “own” *habitus*. Much has been written about the cool of African American men as style, demeanor, and self-possession and Freeman’s cool develops because he is an African American man who wants freedom, but ultimately his cool derives from his having chosen a *habitus* marked by as little as possible, other than his cover and his relation to revolutionary activity and organization. Bereft of cover, he is his revolutionary system’s grand factotum. His love for African Americans leads him to allow himself only a bourgeois act and the position of organizational master planner, to produce a freedom he seems unable to describe except as absence. He begins to “[wonder...] how long before he began believing each word as if the word of God? Would it be when he finally had the power of life and death, when the resources of the city and perhaps the nation were devoted to finding and destroying him? How long before he saw himself as a black Messiah?” (Greenlee 109). Here, he tries to imagine a future for his identity, vacillating between the physical object of a physical search that can “[destroy]” him physically, to a metaphysical arbiter of reality or a metaphysical savior of others’ more tangible lives. With these thoughts, he recalls pertinent CIA lore:

an agent became burned-out when he no longer had an identity as a distinct personality; after the erosion of the years of cover, constantly becoming someone different, finally wore away what he actually was, until he no longer knew what he was. Freeman had been playing roles for whites and finally for
everyone. How long before the edges of his cover and those of his personality would blur, merge, and he could no longer tell where one began and the other ended? (Greenlee 109)

In his quest for freedom from the oppression brought to bear on the *habitus* African-Americans occupy in American ghettos, Freeman also uncovers the “missing ground” of which Liu speaks—“the radical instability of constructed identity” (Liu 26). To coolly manipulate the “external” systems that constitute and position individuals in relation to each other—to do so from a still and unseen position of knowledge, has forced him to a position from which “he no longer knew what he was.” In exerting pressure on the disciplinary systems that have both constituted him and deprived him of well-being, he has not simply moved from one *habitus* to another, but become alien to individuality and become habitually rooted in thinking and being as a system. After his reverie quoted above, Freeman does conclude that an African American is “the only natural agent in the United States” because he or she is “the only person whose life might depend, from childhood, on becoming what whites demanded, yet somehow remaining what he was as an individual human being” (Greenlee 109-110). This life-long training “might save” (Greenlee 110) his individuality from dissolution, he thinks, but he nevertheless decides that it is “important [that] he establish an organization which would survive him,” as if he is already more organization than individual. When Dean, a Cobra leader, asks him, “But do you really think we got a chance of winning?” Freeman replies “Who said anything about winning?” (Greenlee 112). He explains how, instead of “winning,” they stand to expose white racist practices and institutions, making “the American white man […] look] like a fool” (Greenlee 112).
Moreover, in asserting their own pride in themselves, “nothing is going to stop us until we’re free….They’ll have to kill us or free us” (Greenlee 113). In the course of their discussion, which turns to Hollywood depictions of plantation slaves, they describe scenes in which African-American displays of strength, of “singing and swinging” in positions others hadn’t been able to survive, have scared whites, evoking in fleeting ways the kinds of cool power to agitate that Baldwin’s activist displays.

Ultimately, Freeman’s revolutionary organization succeeds, coolly deploying their expertise in urban guerrilla and cultural warfare when riots break out. When the national guard is sent to replace the Chicago police, they continue victorious, and when the army replaces the national guard, they bring advisors from the CIA who are sure that such a well-designed, organized and well-implemented group could only be directed by Soviet agents (Greenlee 242), displaying their inability to imagine African Americans capable of doing so. White racism continues to provide Freeman and company with the cover they require.

But while the novel ends with the revolution spreading throughout the nation according to plan, Freeman’s individual fate follows a different course. He is betrayed through the personal relationships he has retained. Joy, his former girlfriend-turned-doctor’s-wife has become his lover and comes to suspect that he leads the group that is wreaking havoc for white Chicago and its middle-class African Americans like herself. She tips off Dawson, the one boyhood friend with whom Freeman has remained close, who is a police detective. On confronting him alone in his home, Dawson admires “Cool Dan Freeman” and his “beautiful cover,” but he also steadfastly insists on arresting Freeman. A struggle ensues and both men fatally wound each other. Dawson
dies immediately and although Freeman “[calls] a doctor he had recruited” to treat his own wound, he ultimately thinks “[he] wouldn’t be of much help” and we hear no more about his seeking medical help (247). He arranges for his lieutenants to come remove Dawson’s body, and at their surprise that he has killed his friend, he tells them “maybe one day” they’ll have to kill each other for the sake of their cause and the organization that drives it, explaining “anybody who gets in the way has to go—nobody counts until we’re free” (Greenlee 246), espousing the common attitude that individuals must be sacrificed for a larger cause. He continues, expounding on the seriousness of what they do: “Did you think we were playing games? Killing people we don’t know and don’t dig? Forty percent of those paratroopers out there are black; it’s a badge of honor for a black man to wear those wings. They soldier and fight to earn what no man can earn: freedom” (Greenlee 246). Here at the end—just before he exclaims that they are fighting for “Freedom now!”—Freeman says that they cannot earn freedom. Perhaps he means that because the soldiers receive pay, they seek to “earn” a freedom that must be fought for through no mercenary means. But the paradox of his claiming freedom is impossible to attain harmonizes with the rest of the novel’s conclusion.

After the young men take Dawson’s body away, Freeman sits alone in the dark while he hears gunfire grow outside in the night—in accordance with his plans—and listens to Billie Holliday sing “God Bless the Child.” He addresses her: “sing it like it is: ‘God bless the child that’s got his own….’ Go on, you black-ass Cobras, go get your own” (Greenlee 248). His hopes that the Cobras can “get [their] own” contrast sharply with the notion that he has not “got his own,” having sacrificed most of his
identity for the well-organized system in play throughout the city surrounding him. What he had retained—contact with Joy and Dawson: the remnants of personal relationships—are what have damaged him too much for him to continue in that system. But he remains cool, feeling less and less as he dies, and the novel ends with these lines: “Freeman smiled and the pain didn’t matter anymore. In fact, for the first time in many years, he hardly hurt at all.” In a sense, he continues through the organization he has set in motion, and with the end of his bodily and emotional pain, relinquishes individuality. Yet he still occupies the “missing ground”—or has become it—missing ground that his cool efforts to redress the systems of relationships through which American identities form—have exposed. The narrative of Freeman’s work toward righting the injustice those systems propagate is driven both by inequities between the habitus available for forming white and black men and by the inaccuracy of essentializing beliefs about race that underlie how those habitus formed. Neither “external” system nor “internal” essence remains a locus for grounding Freeman’s cause or his being: the novel does not leave us with a sense of individuals’ essential equality but instead ends with the imperative for the young Cobras to “[get their] own,” this act of acquisition implying that some external source supplies it.

I pair these novels in this chapter because both present cool as a still, unseen knowledge of the habitus that constitute others. Moreover, those who possess this cool entertain no delusions about their own ability to escape how they also are constituted by and limited to habitus and the intersecting systems that form them. The cool characters—Greenlee’s protagonist Freeman and Burroughs’ narrator and sometime character—are themselves aware of their own constitution through habitus and do not en-
tertain the notion that they can separate themselves from that constructedness in order to independently resist injustice, the pressure to conform under disciplinary systems, or the absurdities to be found in much of what those disciplinary systems produce. They find their only means to resist entails their ongoing containment by constitutive systems and their reiterating the terms of that containment, because without those terms they cannot seem to exist. This configuration parallels the role Judith Butler assigns to reiteration. She figures identity as constructed performatively, such that individuals cannot consciously apprehend or alter what seems to be their “nature”—the terms of their subjectivity, how it has formed, and how they have been socially conditioned to receive it (Butler Bodies That Matter 2-3). Only through reiterating those received terms do individuals open up the possibility of altering their social significance: through reiteration some terms of their constructedness may be exposed (Butler Bodies That Matter 2). Burroughs and Greenlee conceive of their characters as systematically more than individually constructed; through reiterating the terms of the habitus they occupy and abut, they reproduce them as dissonant in ways that expose not a resistant self but missing ground. That exposure ultimately forms the resistance both texts offer. In these works, the notion of cool behavior as resistance leads its practitioners through a series of recognitions—of their mastery and subjugation—that culminate in a dissolution. For Burroughs’ narrator, what remains is recalling and recording—writing, as reiteration.

Greenlee’s Freeman does not try to characterize the freedom he works toward and describes as “what no man can earn.” Although to “fuck with whitey” is a means to his goal, Freeman tells the Cobras “Whitey just stands in the way of freedom and he
has to be moved any damn way we can; he doesn’t mean any more than that” (Green-lee 109). Freedom, then, is Freeman’s goal, and the creation of a system that cannot afford to be fueled by individuals’ feelings—a system that is affectively cool—is what can produce it. To coolly agitate the system—to “fuck with whitey,” whose definition as such depends on Freeman’s being defined as black—is to stress the terms and conditions of such definitions but not eliminate or escape them while continuing as a living subject. With heavy irony requiring a deeply cool stillness, Freeman performs an urban bumpkin devoid of style, a grateful bureaucratic underling, an upwardly-mobile professional determined to replicate the white bourgeoisie. These performances enable larger systemic performances: a highly-organized revolutionary group performs a gang of juvenile delinquents. While Freeman’s revolution succeeds and spreads, Greenlee does not allow his representation as an individual to morph beyond the relationships that kill him—love and friendship that are ruined by their double placement within bourgeois power structures and alongside his revolutionary project. If Greenlee were to continue the novel with a successful, living Freeman, he would have to figure his revolutionary success by continuing to focus on his “Taylorizing” guidance of well-organized systems while increasingly bereft of subjective concerns, or he would have to conceive of new and improved terms of subjectivity—ones devoid of the class- and race-based foibles Freeman frees himself from through diminishing his own subjectivity until it disassembles into death.

I also pair these novels because both—written during the 1950s and 1960s—exemplify how cool’s significance exceeds modes through which it was being conceptualized at the time. Burroughs’ narrator initially deploys a hipster cool that associates
the drug addict’s cultural savvy with that of the world-weary *film noir* detective. But that image cannot cohere as he renders addiction’s later stages that turn the individual into a grotesque single-celled organism or a recording machine. Any cool that inheres to them is not the stuff of which Norman Mailer dreams. The cool associated with jazz culture and that of rhythm and blues entailed an aesthetic and style that included refusals to support norms for bourgeois propriety and—because these aesthetics were produced by African Americans—they were also racialized when considered in the context of mass culture. Angela Davis describes how Billie Holliday was forced to sing sentimental popular songs at the beginning of her career in order to get work. Refusal to sing such songs meant not working. However, Davis argues, Holliday subverted the ideological content of their lyrics through the cool way she sang them, that style being one avenue for critical commentary open to her (*Blues Legacies* 163-169).

Through “reiterating” the songs, she subverted their overt content. The ways that Dan Freeman establishes his ability to launch a revolution by playing an upwardly-mobile professional is similarly subtle, in contrast to how the Black Panthers represented themselves and were represented by others.

Liu notes how “subcultural” (102) production of cool commodities such as jazz and blues were consumed during their leisure by a bourgeoisie that “glamorized subculture (or at least its photogenic aspects) for having found a work-around for routinization that challenged the entire system of production/consumption from the outside,” given than this subculture was “chronically excluded from meaningful work […]having] style instead, the defamiliarization of normal lifestyle” (102). Ultimately, Liu concludes that middle-class leisure performance of that “defamiliarization” –
ostensibly “identification with […] someone who could see the entire structure of modern cold and hot from the outside”—was actually, “[identification…] with the empty position rather than […] the outsider” (102-103). He describes the “most iconic, ‘cool’ film stars” of the 1950s and 1960s as “inscrutable faces signifying either nothing or the blankness of the middle class itself at work: such faces mark the place of the Outsider, but there is no one actually there in that place” (Liu 103). In the 21st century Liu finds individuals operating within inexorable corporate systems that have shaped and been shaped by developments in information technology: “The continuum of work is ever more supervised and monitored by information technology (to the extreme, for example, of keystroke-monitoring programs and ceiling cameras” (298-299). Within such systems, he finds “slack,” as conceived by Gene I. Rochlin, to enable a kind of cool that remains possible within contemporary constraints (298). Slack is “that sometimes small but always important excess margin of unconsumed resources and time through which an operator can buy a little breathing room to think about the decision that needs to be made, and in which the mental map can be adjusted and trimmed” (Rochlin qtd. in Liu 298). Within the corporate environment, Liu says that “the spaces and times where slack can legitimately collect itself are being aggressively colonized by the whole regime of official informality: team meetings, team-building exercises, company retreats,” etc. (299). Because it therefore “has nowhere to go to be itself,” “the only recourse” of “contemporary slack” is to disguise itself within the processes, procedures, and techniques of information technology so as to be able to fly in under the radar of that same technology, there to appear in the guise of the informal qualities the corporations
now purport to value: collaboration creativity, ‘thinking outside the box,’ and so on. (Liu 299)

Liu offers “the incalculable inefficiency and irrationality involved in creating very cool Web pages” as the “New Economy paradigm” through which slack operates to produce coolness. Although he does not locate the cool in the stillness that extreme constraint produces, I find that his 21st-century model does posit cool behavior in a way that fits the model I have been using. Within constraint, the slack with which one reiterates the terms of systems wherein one produces can lead to unexpectedly “cool” products. Using the workplace rather than subjectivity, Liu’s model parallels how Butler envisions reiteration producing fissures in what systemic, normalizing forces create. In 1959, two years after Norman Mailer had first codified how a white man could rebel by escaping into a hipster mode of being, Burroughs provided a narrator whose cool lay in how he reiterated the ways such a role could not constitute escape. Ten years later, in 1969, Greenlee published his novel at a time when revolutionary groups like the Black Panthers used guerrilla techniques that resemble those Freeman uses. Huey P. Newton’s 1973 collection of essays is titled Revolutionary Suicide, which evokes the willingness to sacrifice self for a cause. But such notions of self-sacrifice do not stress the systematic, methodical detachment and adoption of multiple undercover roles—the conscious disassembly of his own being that Greenlee represents in his novel. With that use of cover and the concept of secretly using the systems that constrain him to produce “freedom,” Greenlee’s protagonist acknowledges the extent of the constraints on individuals and enacts a cool use of reiteration or slack in response to it.
Both novels thus ultimately meditate on the nature of the individual, pressing against notions of the liberal humanist self capable of choosing its relationship with social systems. They reach those meditations in part because their characters behave coolly—are still in ways their witnesses do not expect and which thereby prove agitating.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

My goal has been to test a model for coolness derived from examining different senses in which the word has been used metaphorically in English to characterize human behavior. This model does not provide a definition of the word, but instead makes claims about rhetorical dynamics implied by those metaphorical uses. They imply situations wherein a person’s behavior impresses a witness as unexpectedly—and thereby notably—still. A majority of senses of cool that characterize human behavior make claims about affect: they assume that observable behavior can accurately be ascribed to feelings that are themselves not observable to witnesses, but only to one who experiences them. Given these terms, to be cool is to not feel as much as others or not as much as expected, or it entails not showing affect that is being felt. Normative logic underlies these assumptions: a person who does not display expected behavior that normally results from emotions that form natural responses to circumstances must then be producing that unexpected result by controlling or detaching from his or her feelings—or by being so abnormal and/or cold that s/he doesn’t feel them (an abnormality which may imply extant yet repressed normal feelings). Ultimately, such logic

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8 If observer and observed share a *habitus* we might assume that they would also share patterns of reactions to situations: a situation might produce similar emotive-behavioral signs that they would in turn read similarly. We might therefore assume that a witness to cool behavior by someone from her own *habitus* might conjecture accurately about any feelings being suppressed, controlled, etc. in the witnessed behavior. But this depends on how unexpected the stillness is, and whether it is unexpected precisely because it does not adhere to patterns of reaction typical of a *habitus*. 
implies that feelings must be “there” in some capacity, if only as a way to define abnormality.

In contrast, I have not made claims about affect integral to my model because such claims would require knowledge of what observed individuals feel. Such “knowledge” relies heavily on normative notions of what “one” would “naturally” and “normally” feel in a given situation: precisely the kind of normative assumption that cool behavior may disrupt and contest through its dearth of emotive display—through a refusal to provide witnesses with material to read in terms of those assumptions. Moreover, to make claims about others’ unobservable experience of thoughts and feelings based on observing their behavior can at best entail only a correlation between observation and norms or—worse—entail asserting that one knows better than those others what they feel: an act of condescension if not objectification. In The Politics of Emotion (2004), Sara Ahmed analyzes multiple ways in which affect’s significance is discursively constructed and manipulated like other kinds of knowledge to reproduce extant power structures and relationships, demonstrating how malleable and how constructed experiences of affect—and knowledge about it—are.

I have tried to devise a model of coolness that acknowledges this constructedness and that traces how representations of coolness acknowledge it. For example, in order to combat a racist system, we see Greenlee’s Dan Freeman distance himself from feelings of intimacy and romantic love while using the normative assumptions that racialized systems produce as cover for his secret agency—for his attempt to free himself and others from the deleterious effects of racialized norms. The remnants of intimate emotion that he retains in his life—his relationships with his old lover Joy
and old friend Dawson—ultimately lead to his betrayal and end his life, while liaisons with prostitutes imbued with simple friendship are the relationships that help sustain him and his cause, suggesting that the play of normative affect is imbricated in racism’s fabric and that one must get free of one to get free of the other. Freeman’s betrayal robs him of time and opportunity to develop a sense of self that has been fully freed from normative assumptions about feeling and relationships—suggesting that such freedom may not be possible. Freeman has developed a sense of self through a series of recognitions that distance him from the dialectics of racialized identity, enabling him to discern and detach from racialized master/slave dynamics, such that in some respects he reminds us of Baldwin’s description of Reverend Shuttlesworth. While the series of recognitions he has undergone have led him to extraordinary self-mastery and secret agency, those qualities also paradoxically produce an increasing lack of “self.” This representation of Freeman thus probes the role affect plays in both constituting and constraining the self and the kinds of agency possible for it. The way I distance coolness from normative assumptions about affect aids in tracing these elements in the novel.

My rhetorical model, with its focus on behavior rather than affect—and how that behavior leads witnesses to conjecture about the mindset accompanying it, also enables readings that detect cool’s stillness in nonphysical loci: Baldwin locates his activist’s cool in an unmoving persistence in his activism. That stillness also manifests physically in the gaze with which he repeatedly meets Jesse’s, but the story ultimately links it with an authority that the activist’s behavior implies. By juxtaposing that implied authority with the divine authority that orders Jesse’s beliefs, the story implies
that the activist’s cool originates from unspecified sources of ethical knowledge and authority beyond Jesse’s ken. Given that the nonviolent Civil Rights Movement was deeply connected with Christianity, readers may also associate a spiritual knowledge and authority with the activist’s cool. Baldwin’s story thus represents a distinctly non-physical locus for cool behavior—in unmoving persistence itself rather than the particular acts that manifest it. It also places cool’s significance in a register related to but which exceeds those which most constructions of cool posit: rebellion against conformity through the style or newness of art, commodities, and their brands, or resistance to oppression rooted in affect or its display. Ondine produces a cool stillness in The Chelsea Girls through dialogue and behavior that is in constant motion as it plays with the terms by which 1960s dominant American culture produced shame. That his performance lacks manifestations of shame forms the still locus of his cool: in the midst of physical display through dialogue and gesture, the ways that shame does not signify asserts a conceptual, rather than physical locus of cool.

Particularly in Portrait of Jason, I find stillness in Holliday’s knowledge of affect and its attendant norms and how he uses that knowledge to toy with others. In the speed with which he shifts from display of one feeling to another, I also find the lack of a “normal” affective core; the cool stillness located at his “core,” more invested in performance than in “authentic” feeling, operates like the stationary axes around which worlds spin. His cool’s primary locus forms in knowledge and how he deploys it, rather than in the nature of any behavior in and of itself. Clarke’s knowledge of herself and Holliday also figure in the stillness she occupies as director. Moreover, the stillness that characterizes her representation of him through the film’s inert yet kalei-
doscopic effect and how that effect agitates viewers also locates coolness in representation of behavior rather than in behavior itself. Similarly, the narrator of *Naked Lunch* provides a kaleidoscopic display of different kinds of knowledge. As a con artist like Holliday, he knows and manipulates the terms that constitute his “marks” and others: those terms are manifestations of interacting systems rather than individual subjectivities. He finally represents his self as similarly lacking a unique and generative interior, so that his knowledge that enables the text’s parody of systemic, normative beliefs about communists and homosexuals as “secret agents” comes from sources “external” to him—from experiences remembered. As a machine that records in words what memory projects for consciousness-as-viewer to observe, he does not evince the agency associated with individuals as subjects. This representation moves the operation of cool stillness to that “relationship between…[capacities] to produce classifiable practices and works, and […] to differentiate and appreciate” amongst them (Bourdieu 170) lying at the core of the individual as *habitus*. It is devoid of any guiding rebel or secret agent, consisting, as Bourdieu has it, of a relationship between capacities to discern and produce, rather than an agent that discerns and produces. Like Clarke’s *Portrait of Jason*, the narrator of *Naked Lunch* insists on his own inertness—on an “internal” stillness or absence rather than locus of agency. As such, his cool has no physical manifestation, no rebel that acts against oppression. It deploys knowledge, including knowledge of style, but that knowledge is itself a shuttling between discerning and reproducing “classifiable practices and works” with origins that are external to it.

In keeping with other conceptions of coolness, *The Spook Who Sat By The Door* does posit the possibility of individual agency, but the process of asserting that
agency, loosening it from the constraints of the systems that produce it, requires loosening it from a locus within the singular individual. Freeman asserts his agency to advance toward freedom; that advance requires relinquishing all individually-distinctive markers, so that he can manipulate systems without drawing their constraints more tightly around him. He too emerges as a nexus of relationships between capacities to discern and produce. This requires that he enact a “cool pose” that manifests in physical, material ways, but his agency operates independently of those manifestations and survives them only through the organized systems he has insinuated into the fabric of extant systems. The cool that ultimately distinguishes the novel is reminiscent of the “cool pose” that Majors and Billson ascribe to urban, African-American men as a way to assert and protect their personal power in the face of systems that would undermine those individual assertions. But Greenlee’s protagonist develops his individual ability and personal power through understanding and manipulating systemic forms of power, investing in organizing his efforts to procure freedom by deploying the terms of those forms to undermine how they constrain him, which Greenlee compares to how, in judo, one uses an opponent’s force and movements to subvert attack. The cool of Freeman’s individual pose masks the extent to which his cool operates through organizing relationships between systems. His physical presence and individual subjectivity diminish in relation to the systemic success he effects. In a sense, his particularity dissipates into the systems he works with, and the knowledge that drives that work forms the locus of his cool. In my examination of all these texts, we thus see how conceptualizing coolness as stillness that a given witness deems unexpected, enables us to find loci for cool’s operation that extend its significance as physical and affective manifes-
tations of style, rebellion, and their commodification, and that also may extend its significance beyond those loci.

In the works by Clarke, Burroughs and Greenlee, we also see literature and film that, in representing cool behavior’s rhetorical operations, interrogate assumptions about what comprises and normalizes an individual. Within the rhetorical contexts in which Clarke places him, Holliday demonstrates relationships to shame and other kinds of affect that provoke questions about what he should feel and the normalizing beliefs that ground such questions. In her direction, we also see Clarke not only challenging the tenets of cinéma verité, but also—perhaps inadvertently—challenging assumptions about the psyche that underlie them. Greenlee’s protagonist similarly raises questions about what relationship to intimacy and feeling a free person—or a person who works toward freedom as a means to get away from unfair oppression—can or should have, if individuals are constituted as manifestations of intersecting systems, so that they cannot exist free of them. Freeman seeks freedom through a cool rooted in organization and repurposing and recombining extant systems as cover, as tools, and as conduits for his work. While this submersion of individuality in revolutionary work is not unique to the novel, Greenlee refracts and complicates beliefs about what that submersion signifies through interacting notions of the spy, the manager, the professional, taste, class, and a race-based America to produce complex questions about how Americans can and should imagine their selves. Burroughs and Greenlee conceive of their characters as systemically more than individually constructed; through reiterating the terms of the *habitus* they occupy and abut, they reproduce them as dissonant in ways that expose missing ground rather than the rebellious
self. That exposure ultimately forms the resistance to normative thinking that both
texts offer. Cool emerges as a strategy for using the constraints against which one re-
bels without the possibility of detachment or escape, and through this, such configura-
tions of coolness replace liberal humanist notions of the self with one that is always
only imbricated in its constitution. Cool’s relationship to the “missing ground” of se-
cret agency offers a promising direction for thinking further about how 1950s and
1960s representations prefigured 21st-century notions; Liu’s reading of cyberpunk fic-
tions about hackers, such as William Gibson’s *Neuromancer*, suggests ways to read
Burroughs’ and Greenlee’s novels in tandem with recent 21st-century works and how
they feature secret agency, as well as the spy genre generally.

Burroughs’ narrator reiterates cultural codes with the cool stillness of irony—
with an unexpected stillness rather than a demonstrative, overtly accusatory and rebel-
lious claim to separation from them. While maintaining that ironic tone, his narrator
recounts a continuous stream of “shameful” acts that range from drug use and dealing,
to wild sadomasochistic sex, to grotesquely parasitic relationships. In this, he employs
a kind of cool we see Ondine use when he claims to have sex with the family dog and
suggests that Page imagine fellatio with Jesus in *The Chelsea Girls*, and which we see
Warhol use to establish and craft his public image, although the sources of shame he
embraces are more factual and less outrageous, such as his pasty-pale skin and
“swish.” Like Greenlee’s Dan Freeman and Burroughs’ narrator, when read in terms
of Bourdieu’s *habitus*, these examples draw attention to a notion of the self as occur-
ring at intersections of “external” forces, where the conception of an individual “inte-
rior” plays out like a mobius strip as having only one, exterior, “side.” Ondine’s
Shamelessness depends on deploying the stuff of shame: materials culturally-concocted to signify “shameful,” such as having sex with the family dog or with Jesus. Sedgwick cites the origin of shame and a sense of identity as a moment that Tompkins describes, when a child first notes the removal of a care-giver’s sustaining gaze and in turn looks away. She implies that the sense of singleness produced through this dynamic is that by which the child comes to identify the self. It may subsequently learn to explain those feelings by drawing on cultural norms (“I don’t sustain that gaze because I am in some way abnormal”). Before that, there is a circuit of contact that does not bear specific significance other than that this contact is mutually sustaining and associated originally with receiving physical care. In these terms, Ondine must use contact with Ingrid, with Page, with Warhol’s camera to perform his shamelessness by using the terms of shame—and this contact clearly sustains him, given his strong negative reaction when Page tries to interfere with it. He does not perform an escape from cultural forces, only their cool reiteration. That Warhol, in concert with Ondine, formed a reiteration of the mutually-sustaining gaze—that always includes the threat of its being averted—enables Ondine to coolly reiterate the shameful as shameless. Ondine’s cool points toward Butler’s notion of the self as the performative reiteration of history’s inscriptions—of the “external” terms of the habitus. While he performs a rebellion against the terms of shame, to do so he is completely dependent on them.

Greenlee’s stress on Freeman’s expertise with judo—his skill with using the mass of racist systems to weaken their opposition to his being free—emphasizes that he does not escape from or abolish those systems; he uses them, and remains surrounded by them when he dies. Alan Liu examines coolness because he finds the ways
that Information Technology limits the humanities, and particularly literary studies, problematic. He describes 21st-century corporate employees’ plight: while office work and information systems confine and restrict workers’ behavior to an un-emotive, “professional” coolness, the internet also provides systems whereby such individuals can find the “slack” to articulate their individual and different mode of cool (299). The terms of their constraint thus also provide the means by which they can—without escaping those constraints—produce a sense of distinction from them. Liu also proposes the hacker as a model for how one might resist Information Technology’s hold (7-8): a kind of rebellion against the system by using its own code to inhabit and disrupt it—a technique not unlike judo’s use of the forces with which one is in contact in order to undermine them. Hacking and judo both require their practitioners’ unobtrusive stillness in order to produce agitation in their objects. Similarly, in *Naked Lunch*, Burroughs’ narration of rebellious acts and inescapable systems uses the codes of polite society, of anthropology, of the noir-style hipster who depends on standards of taste to discern and navigate his netherworlds; he uses these codes to parody them without escaping their limits.

To consider coolness as constituted rhetorically makes my model general, so that the concept of cool is not limited by the popular or dominant notions of a particular time. This enables consideration of why coolness remains a potent concept even when specific meanings fade or alter as successive paradigms re-read historical instances, as when critics Thomas Frank, Jim McGuigan and Alan Liu reexamine the cultural cachet cool enjoyed as marking rebellion against authority and conformity during the 1950s and 1960s, pointing to how cool’s commodification in the service of
conformity helped to perpetuate class-based divisions and the power relations that configured the fields of *habitus* to which Bourdieu refers. As my reading of Baldwin’s representation of cool in “Going to Meet the Man” demonstrates, my model’s generality has enabled me to read an instance of cool from the 1960s that is not related to popular notions of coolness that were recognized by mass culture at that time.

The model also enables consideration of how cool behavior is not limited to any particular content or context. That the very racialized, sexualized and gendered situation in Baldwin’s story, in all its Americanness, provides a clear parallel with that of Turkey’s “Standing Man” points to general rhetorical dynamics that make coolness significant to how we imagine and represent person-to-person situations. Baldwin’s story represents such a face-to-face encounter and contributes to readers’ beliefs about how such dynamics operate. The model of cool I use provides a way to conceptually pull back from historical specificity while also always pointing toward and returning to it. This practice has enabled me to embellish my understanding of coolness as I have re-calibrated it in relation to the specific instances provided by “Going to Meet the Man,” Warhol’s productions of his image and *The Chelsea Girls, Portrait of Jason* and Clarke’s contemporary works, *Naked Lunch* and *The Spook Who Sat By The Door*.

The slight remove between this model of the cool and historical specificity also distances it from racializing or gendering cool behavior in essentialist ways. Rebecca Walker has described the anthology she edited, *Black Cool: A Thousand Streams of Blackness*, as perhaps an instance of “strategically essentializing” coolness as inherently black (“Black Cool”). Her introduction to that collection cites the origins of cool in West African usages that predate African-American resistance to slavery and racism
(Walker xv)—an important move, in that it represents cool as positive and productive, in ways similar to Kevin Quashie’s claims for “quiet” as not constricted by thinking that can only find reactions against oppression in African-American cultural productions. Similarly, Robert Farris Thompson’s *Aesthetic of the Cool: Afro-Atlantic Art and Music* provides a larger arena than racism’s dialectic in which to consider African-American cultural productions. At the same time, to consider the cool as only produced by Africans and their descendants around the world is to revisit the dangers of essentializing and to ignore a long history of British metaphorical usage. The model I have devised, because it provides for a slight agitation—for conceptual movement between historical specificity and a general concept of coolness—enables continual recognition of cool as both historically produced and sharing significance amongst radically different manifestations. Such “thermodynamic” movement directs the process of reading cool away from itself fetishizing the phenomenon, even as it enables locating cool’s role in fetishization’s production and agitation.

This rhetorical model also offers ways to examine how representations of cool influence beliefs about person-to-person encounters, especially for populations whose members have limited contact with those outside their own *habitus*. Shirley Clarke comments that she thought Jason Holliday could handle and emerge victorious from her and Carl Lee’s provocations in *Portrait of Jason* (Rabinovitz “Choreography” 11). In his anecdotes, Holliday makes a show of his ability to manage confrontations across class and race with cool aplomb. Clarke places pressure on those claims, leaving us to wonder which of his characteristics—that which made him Other than her and thereby more qualified to withstand cinéma verité’s testing—allowed her to feel comfortable
pushing him so; was he qualified to withstand that pressure because he was a veteran con artist, a hustler, an addict, gay, and/or African-American? More recently, white middle-class teen audiences’ relish of some hip hop artists’ urban “street cred”—which includes their well-vaunted experience with and ability to handle verbal and physical confrontation—speaks of cool’s ongoing significance in imagining and representing the array of person-to-person interactions, including—and perhaps especially—situations particular to one’s own habitus or excluded from it. It also stresses how representations of cool in confrontation may be commodified in ways that perpetuate extant relationships between who purchases those representations and whose bodies and behavior those representations feature. Electronic media and the internet continue to reduce the amount of person-to-person contact some people experience. The significance of cool behavior in face-to-face contact may develop differently in groups whose experiences negotiating such contact vary.

The model of cool I present here may prove useful pedagogically. In an article on teaching literature, “In Defense of Reading Badly: the Politics of Identification in “Benito Cereno,” Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Our Classrooms,” Faye Halpern favors using Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin over Herman Melville’s story “Benito Cereno” because the latter’s complex ironies don’t allow inexperienced readers to identify with characters in ways that lead to the kind of clear, unequivocal ethical position that identifying with Stowe’s characters, with all their sentimentalism, does. Halpern’s purpose is inciting students new to critical reading to discern ethical problems in fiction and develop progressive positions in relation to them. Like those of Portrait of Jason, the multiple layers or facets of Melville’s tale prevent readers from
identifying with characters in ways that would enable them to form a unitary, stable reading and response. In fact, the story’s narrative structure leads readers to first identify with its narrator and then dissociate from his perspective as they gradually discern how his racialized assumptions have led him to misunderstand events and other characters. The story makes readers play roles as multifaceted as its surface. Halpern’s article, with its focus on choosing texts that enable first-year students to begin reading critically, raises questions about the pedagogical choice of topics and texts. Is there no room in first-year classes for texts deemed cool because they appeal to young people, and which are also cool because of how their inert, multi-faceted qualities produce a kaleidoscopic effect that precludes a straightforward, unitary response—like Melville’s “Benito Cereno”? I have recently taught Sophocles’ Antigone, which allows students to admire and to identify with Antigone and the simple—although emotionally difficult—clear moral choices she makes. I find that students resist considering the greater complexity of Creon’s character, when they can happily focus on Antigone’s justified rebellion against authority. I have also taught the novel Fight Club, which is structured to emphasize the shifting, multiple forces that constitute its narrator, who cannot apprehend and react to those forces from a single subject position. This representation is much more consonant with contemporary ideas about individuals and the forces they find themselves negotiating. It also presents students with a challenge similar to that of its narrator: how can they parse and articulate a stance, moral or otherwise, in relation to the multiple, conflicting facets that comprise him? The model of coolness I present here may facilitate both critical reading and student interest in approaching such cool texts, in their kaleidoscopic complexity.
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