

2006

Gender and Negotiations: When Does Gender Play a Role in Negotiating?

Karen Harrington
University of Rhode Island

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/lrc_paper_series

Recommended Citation

Harrington, Karen, "Gender and Negotiations: When Does Gender Play a Role in Negotiating?" (2006). *Seminar Research Paper Series*. Paper 3.
http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/lrc_paper_series/3http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/lrc_paper_series/3

This Seminar Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Schmidt Labor Research Center at DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seminar Research Paper Series by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.

GENDER AND NEGOTIATIONS: WHEN DOES GENDER PLAY A ROLE IN NEGOTIATING?

KAREN HARRINGTON
University of Rhode Island

The fable takes place during the holidays, involving two sisters. One sister is planning to bake a chiffon cake for Christmas dinner; the other, a fruitcake. Both recipes each call for one orange. When the sisters check the pantry, they find only one orange, not the two they need. An argument immediately erupts over who gets the orange. One sister complains that the chiffon cake is wrong for the season. The other retorts the fruitcake may be traditional but nobody likes it. Obvious solutions are out of the question. It being a holiday, they cannot borrow from the very neighbors who will later be their guests, and the stores are closed. The sisters, unwilling to compromise and bake only half a recipe, become more and more entrenched in defending their rights. After a fair amount of bickering, the mother cuts the orange in half. A fair solution? The needs of the sisters remained ambiguous throughout the argument. How would have the solution differed if the sisters were to explain their needs; while one sister needed orange peel, the other needed orange juice. If chiffon cake was intended for solely one sister and the fruitcake was to be donated to another family, would the end result change? Would the sister making the fruitcake, on behalf of others, be more assertive in negotiating for the orange? Would the situation change if this fable was written as an argument between a sister and brother? Some say “yes” (Kolb, 2000)

Catalyst, a research and advisory organization committed to advancing women in business, tracked the representation of women in *Fortune* 500 companies throughout the past decade. According to the annual census, in 1995 women held 8.7 percent of *Fortune* 500 corporate officer positions. With an increase of nearly 7 percent by 2002, the percentage of female representation had increased to 15.7 percent, but still capped, however, at a very small percentage as it relates to the nearly 85 percent male representation in the remaining upper-level corporate workforce (Wellington 2003). Research suggests obstacles to advancement may include lack of mentoring, commitment to personal or family responsibilities, limited opportunity for visibility and disparaging proportions in aggressively progressive career choices. Although the stereotypical “glass ceiling” may indeed also play a role in impeding advancement, some may additionally cite a “glass wall”, building lateral barriers that limit women’s career potential almost from the beginning of their careers. Evidence suggests these barriers may not be necessarily constructed by formulized

regulations or standards, but by women themselves and predicted patterns of behavior.¹

Pradel, Bowles, and McGinn (2005) describe this scenario. Maureen Park, the managing director of a small portfolio management firm, reports to a parent company. The parent company has been repeatedly performing below forecasts and morale among Park’s understaffed, overworked team of research analysts was low. To make matters worse, Park’s two best analysts both requested significant raises after their annual reviews. Both women expressed their belief that they were earning substantially less than analysts at comparable firms and probably less than lower-achieving members of their firm – including male colleagues who had been lured away from a competitor.

Park went to bat for her star performers, though management had instructed her to offer only cost-of-living raises. To her surprise, her superiors agreed to offer better incentives to both analysts. Reflecting on her triumph, Park

¹ Not in any way, should this statement be construed as placement of blame but merely a suggestive notion that some barriers as they relate to gender are results of habitual gender socialization repeated by women and their own perceived roles that narrow progression.

realized with bitter irony that three of her seven direct reports would make more the she would in the coming year; she herself had accepted a small cost-of-living raise without question. If getting a raise was so easy, why hadn't she made a case for herself? Is it possible that her gender somehow influenced how Park negotiated for herself and others (Pradel, 2005)?

Babcock and Laschever (2003) describe an analogous study conducted by Jennifer Halpern and Judi McLean Parks utilizing undergraduates in a negotiations class at Carnegie Mellon University. The class was separated into same-sex groups of two and instructed to negotiate about allocating public money to build a children's playground (establishing an undoubtedly competitive environment). One member in each group was appointed to play the role of representative of the Parks Department; the other the representative of a community volunteer organization.

Dramatic differences in negotiation behavior were exhibited between male and female teams. Males were more likely than females to talk about their positions (how much they wanted to see allocated to the project), with all of the male pairs discussing their positions but only 17 percent of the female pairs doing so. Males also used confrontational bargaining techniques (making threats or posing ultimatums) more, with men using confrontational tactics nine times as much as women did. (Only two of the 12 female pairs became confrontational at all.)

In comparison, the female pairs talked about personal information far more than the males (92 percent of the females compared to 23 percent of the males introduced information about themselves into the negotiation). The personal information the women discussed was directly relevant to what each side wanted, and introducing this information into their negotiations helped expand their shared understanding of the goal on both sides. In addition, when the women discussed personal information, they did so within the first five minutes of the negotiation (negotiating on behalf of others) but the men who introduced personal information did so only after 20 minutes of

negotiation, and only when they were having difficulty reaching an agreement.

Another remarkable finding from this study involved different ways in which the male and female negotiating teams dealt with the ambiguity in the case information provided to them. Whereas 50 percent of the female pairs discussed how the playground would affect a senior citizen's home nearby (falling in line with the women's prescribed role as caretakers who look out for the interests of others), none of the male pairs took notice of this factor. On the other hand, 58 percent of the males, but only 8 percent of the females discussed legal liability issues. This was particularly noteworthy because legal issues were not mentioned in the case materials – the men introduced them on their own.

The results of Halpern and Park's playground study strongly suggest that men typically focus more on the competitive elements of a negotiation (discussing their position from the outset, resorting to confrontational behavior, talking about each side's legal responsibilities) while women focus more on the relational aspects – the needs of both sides and how the outcome of the negotiation will affect other people. While men focused on the interests at hand, women focused on the relationship and the vested interest of the beneficiaries. Maureen initially believed her negotiation to be successful, gaining a significant increase for her subordinates, yet later attaining a realization of personal neglect.

RESEARCH QUESTION

Some researchers and businesspeople may suggest studies to ask whether men or women are better negotiators, yet according to the research of Pradel, Bowles, and McGinn (2005), gender is not a reliable predictor of negotiation performance, but certain types of negotiation can "set the stage" for differences in processes and outcomes negotiated by men and women (Pradel, 2005). In the example of Maureen Parks, Maureen found not only easier to negotiate on behalf of her employees, but failed to recognize the opportunity to negotiate a salary increase for herself. In the playground study,

the competitive atmosphere and ambiguous details conveyed in the scenario directed gender-stereotypical behaviors; while men negotiated with a confrontational style aiming for personal gain, women were more passive, with a personalized negotiation style and an aim for mutual gain. Documenting specific cues which trigger such differences in behavior, this research review will theoretically answer when does gender play a role in negotiations?

RESEARCH APPROACH

The question of if and when gender plays a role in negotiations will be examined by reviewing the literature pertaining to negotiation styles. As a basis of organization, the literature review will be divided into ten sections with each section based on an aspect of the negotiation process. These ten negotiation variables are initiation, ambiguity, styles, interests versus relationships, value system differences, level of competition, beneficiary, power differences, collective bargaining and definition of success.

Initiation of the negotiation process or lack thereof will be first discussed as it differs across gender. Ambiguity and relating gender socialization stereotypes will be investigated and exemplified with both gathered literature and empirical research. Kolb's Theory of Shadow Negotiations assists in the source of ambiguity-driven behaviors, while empirical studies completed by Kray and Galinsky (2002) and Babcock and Laschever (2003) place specific values on constraints, triggers or cues which provoke gender stereotypical behaviors and normally have an adverse effect on the negotiated outcomes. As levels of competition undulate, levels of stereotypical gender-profiled characteristics are revealed, reviewed in Volkema's (2004) nine-country study. In addition, the beneficiary or receiver of the negotiation outcomes have an impact on the extent of gender differentiation. Intrinsically captured, the notion of perceived power will have a direct effect on the projected amount of stereotypical gender-related behaviors displayed. This concept of perceived power will also include discussion of the Rotter's Locus of Control Theory. The presence of gender

differentiations at the bargaining table will also be examined, reviewing Kolb's research and theories and analytical data gathered by Walters' 62 study meta-analysis, comparing bargaining styles and approaches to collective bargaining. Concluding, discussion of advancements and theorized practices for alleviations of gender differentiations in negotiations will be reviewed and offered as new insights for further research.

Initiation

What is negotiable, and when should an individual attempt to negotiate, rather than accept, an outcome. While there are a host of authors claiming, *everything is negotiable* (Coehn, 1982; Covic, 2003; Kennedy, 1997), research tells us there are individual differences as to topics and situations that are appropriate for negotiation.

Linda Babcock, a Carnegie Mellon professor and well-known lecturer within the field of women studies, conducted a study differences in starting salaries across genders (Babcock, 2002). Reviewing first year Carnegie Mellon master degree students, Babcock looked exclusively at gender, lending unsettling results. Starting salaries of the male graduates was on average 6.7 percent or \$4000 higher than their female counterparts. To discern the difference, Babcock then reviewed who had negotiated the starting salary and who had simply accepted the initial offer. While 57 percent of the male graduates negotiated beyond the initial offer, only 7 percent of female students did the same. Most noteworthy, the students who had negotiated their starting salaries were able to increase their initial earnings by 7.4 percent on average, or \$4053 – mirroring the difference between the male and female starting rate, suggesting such gender discrepancies could have been reduced if the women had negotiated.

Assessing when the ability to negotiate is feasible differs for men and women. Before the negotiation process even begins, different perceptions of the opportunity to negotiate occur. To further delineate, examination of the cues to initiate the process needed to be investigated. Babcock (2002) developed a theory he calls "Turnip or Oyster." This theory based on a spectrum of individual beliefs about

surrounding opportunities, simplifying the parameters based on popular clichés. While some individuals believe “you can’t get blood from a turnip”, others tend to depict their surroundings in the view that “the world is your oyster”. People with the first perspective view challenges in life as unchangeable and fundamentally “what you see is what you get”, while the other end of the spectrum tend to believe life is bursting with opportunities, challenging situations can be successful conquered and there is much to gain through negotiating for a more desirable outcome. To test the theory, Babcock and several colleagues at Carnegie Mellon University developed a systematic scale for what they call a “turnip to oyster” spectrum, which measures the degree to which an individual recognizes the opportunity to negotiate. Conducted as a web survey, participants in a study using this scale were presented with a series of statements such as:

- I think a person has to ask for what he or she wants rather than wait for someone to provide it.
- There are many things available to people, if only people ask for them.
- Many interactions I have during the day can be opportunities to improve my situation.

Respondents were instructed to rate along a seven-point Likert-scale the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each of the statements. Low scorers were individuals who viewed little benefit to negotiating and interpreted fewer cues for opportunities to negotiate, while high scorers were those individuals who perceived most situations as negotiable and adamantly searched for opportunities to negotiate. Confirming the hypothesis of the research group, women were 45 percent more likely than men to score low on the scale. Further intensifying the difference, 10 percent in the score difference equated to 30 percent more attempts to negotiate (as depicted in an additional part of the web survey) (Babcock & Laschever 2003).

Although the survey generated results which reinforce the gender differences in detecting situational cues for negotiating, Babcock’s experiment does suggest gender differences in confidence levels and a notion of underlying

sense of pessimism among females. Should this part of the results be acknowledged as simply a socially-reinforced behavior from recurring exposure to gender discrimination or is there any link between differentiating gender cues and the confidence placed on the negotiated results?

Deborah Kolb, renowned author and speaker in fields of women studies and negotiations, developed a theory of Three A’s (attitudes) which trigger differentiation during negotiations (Kolb, 2000). The first “A”, awfulizing, occurs for many women before a negotiations gets underway. Without confidence in the capability, the ability to detect a negotiable opportunity is clouded. The more evident the weakness, the more progressively impossible it becomes to recognize not only the opportunity but awareness of skills to be utilized to initiate the negotiation.

When individuals are instructed to conduct a negotiation and are given explicit instructions with respect to negotiation, the gender gap is lessened, however, when the negotiability of the situation is less pronounced, men and women rely on their situational cues tell them when an opportunity for negotiation exists. Small, Gelfand, Babcock, and Gettman (2004), conducted a study to determine how the strength of cues affected the initiation of negotiation. The results of the study demonstrate the consequences of what is referred to as differential frames or environments with varying levels of situational triggers. The prediction was gender differences in negotiation depends on the situational cues detectable in the environmental. Research participants (74; 35 males, 39 females) were instructed to play a word game (pilot testing showed no gender advantage in exchange for cash) and were offered the minimum payment possible. Participants were measured as to whether they negotiated for a higher payment from the experimenter, (analogous to many career advancement opportunities). The first study centered on whether the participants would ask for money in a situation where they were not explicitly told that the payment was negotiable. Instructed they would receive a minimum payment of \$3 from the experimenter, the participants in the study were not given any

information on the how the payment was determined nor given any performance feedback. Unknowingly, if the participants initiated a negotiation, they could receive more money (up to \$10). The participants were given four rounds of the word game, “Boggle”, played in a private cubicle. Each round the participant was instructed to shake the container, let the cubes drop exposing a letter on each section of the grid, and was timed as they were to create as many words as possible from the letters until the time expired. Following the completion, instructions were presented as a reminder to the participants: *you have now completed the four rounds and will be compensated between \$3 - \$10. Please indicate to the experimenter that you are finished, so that they can score your rounds – then you will be paid.* Again, if the participant did not initiate a payment negotiation, the experimenter paid them \$3. If the participant asked for more, they were paid \$10. Although the results revealed a small proportion negotiated the payment without any cues, 23% of the male participants initiated, while only 3% of females participants initiated negotiation of the payment.

In a second Small et al. (2004) study, cues were addressed under three conditions 1) control, 2) negotiating cue, 3) asking cue. Hypothesized, cueing to ask will increase the rates of the initiation of negotiation for a greater payment among the female participants, thereby reducing the gender gap. Eighty-one male participants and 72 female participants participated in an exchange for cash payment, once again from \$3 to \$10. The first condition was the control which replicated the previous study. The second condition, participants read a negotiating cue: *You will be compensated between \$3 and \$10. The exact payment is not fixed, and you can negotiate for more if you want. Many participants negotiate for a higher payment.* In the third condition, participants read an asking cue: *You will be compensated between \$3 and \$10. The exact payment is not fixed, and you can ask for more if you want. Many participants ask for a higher payment* (Small et al., 2004).

The resulting data reinforced Small’s hypothesis that gender differences would depend

on the situational cues. Male participants asked significantly more frequently than females within each condition and even more so in the second condition. The third condition reduced the gender gap by strengthening the situational cue, however eliminated ambiguous language. Whereby “negotiate” leaves room for ambiguity and suggests a competitive process for most women, the term “ask” required less confidence or preparation and a lower expectation for results. Although the opportunity existed, the cue for negotiating was given along with a notion of challenge, uncertain parameters and ambiguity. As Babcock (1999) stated, “women often do less well in negotiating environments not simply because they adopt inferior tactics, but rather because they do not recognize when they are (or should be) negotiating and what they are negotiating about.”

Results of these studies provide support for the hypothesis that men and women differ as to when to negotiate and as to what topics or issues are appropriate for negotiation. It appears that, in general, men are more likely than women to view an exchange as an opportunity to negotiate while women seem more likely to accept an *initial offer* in an exchange.

Ambiguity

When individuals understand little about the limits of the bargaining range and appropriate standards for agreement, the ambiguity of a negotiation increases. The more ambiguous the situation with respect to the appropriateness of negotiation, the more likely gender triggers (situation cues that prompt male-female differences in preferences, expectation, and behaviors) will influence negotiation outcomes. Referring back to the previous story of Maureen Park in the introduction, many ambiguous factors surrounded the scenario. The outcomes of Maureen’s negotiation for higher salaries for her employees leads one to speculate that there were many inconsistencies in the firm that were causing a bit of unrest – a clash between skill level, experience and responsibilities were coupled with needs for retention allowing for an environment to exist where both the opportunities to negotiate and the content of what was negotiable was blurred. While

Maureen negotiated greater salaries for her employees to retain her key performers, she failed to recognize the situational cues for herself and the need and parameters for negotiating her own salary and promotion. When opportunities and limits are unclear, there becomes an attraction to situational cues which trigger different behaviors in men and women. In contrast, low ambiguity may succumb a greater understanding of the range of negotiated payoffs and standard resulting values, whereby the outcomes are less likely to reflect gender triggers.

Bowles, Riley, Babcock, and McGinn (2005) explored the concept of ambiguity as it relates to negotiation and gender differences. Based upon the psychological theories of Mischel (1977) and his notion of strong versus weak situations² as well as the research of Snyder and Ickes’ (1985) concept of precipitation situations, Bowles and her colleagues adapted these concepts to study gender in negotiation in terms of “situational ambiguity” and “gender triggers.” They hypothesized that the degree of ambiguity within a negotiation situation moderates the influence of individual difference, such as gender, on negotiation performance. Specifically, the more ambiguity there is in the negotiation situation, the more potential there is for the individual difference to affect performance. Structural ambiguity refers to the degree of uncertainty in individual’s understanding of the economic structure of negotiation (Bowles, et al. 2005). The less that individuals understand about the limits of the bargaining range and appropriate standards for agreement, the more ambiguity there is in the negotiation situation. Gender triggers are the situational factors which “precipitate” gender effects by prompting gender-related behavioral responses (Bowels, et al., 2005).

In the first study, the participants were MBA students who responded to an online job

placement survey administered by the career offices of a major American business school. There were 525 cases (358 men, 176 women). The log of self-reported base salary offer accepted acted as the dependent measure, while lists of industry categories were constructed to rate structural ambiguity. Structural ambiguity in this construct was measured by the perceived expectation of salary discussions with prospective employers. As the predicted expectation narrowed, the level of ambiguity lessened. The average salary accepted by male MBAs in the sample was \$5,941 higher than the average salary accepted by female MBAs. Controlling for pre-MBA work experience, job market activity, geographic location and job preferences, the salaries accepted by women were 5% lower on average than those accepted by male MBAs. Finally, a significant gender – structural ambiguity interaction, indicates a 3% gender difference in low ambiguity industries as compared to a 10% gender difference in high ambiguity industries (Bowles, et al. 2005). See Figure 1 below.

FIGURE 1
Industry Structural Ambiguity

Industry in Descending Order of Ambiguity
High Ambiguity Industries: 31% of sample; M=4.50, Max=5.33, Min = 3.33
Entertainment/media
Retail
Advertising/marketing
Other services (computer, transportation)
Manufacturing
Health/Human services
Financial services
Telecommunications
Low Ambiguity Industries: 69% of sample; M=6.20, Max=6.67, Min = 5.67
High Technology
Venture capital/private equity
Consumer products
Venture capital/private equity
Consumer products

² A strong situation is indicated by highly valued outcomes, strong likelihood of outcome occurring, and high specificity of requirements associated with a behavior or set of behaviors.

In high structural ambiguity scenarios, the gender gap in starting salaries approached \$10,000, even after controlling for the wide array of salary predictors. What Bowles' study illustrates is a demonstration that the effect of gender on MBA salary negotiations is contingent on the degree of uncertainty about the potential range and appropriate standards for the agreement (structural ambiguity).

Deborah Kolb developed a constructed "self-help" theory for women in negotiations called the Theory of Shadow Negotiations based entirely on the premise that during negotiations women need to discern all of the ambiguous triggers; how to recognize the unspoken attitudes, hidden assumptions, and conflicting agendas that play out in the bargaining process (Kolb, 2000). In ambiguity, unfortunately, lies a trend for women to perceive they deserve less than men. Two Social Psychologists at the State University of New York at Buffalo, Brenda Major and Ellen Konar, conducted a mail survey of students in management programs at the University. The survey asked students to indicate their expected earnings during their projected career peak (a quite ambiguous question with uncertain parameters and varying expectations). In the study, they ruled out several potential explanations such as gender differences in pay importance or importance of doing interesting work, gender differences in perception of skills and gender difference in supervisors' assessments. It was found that men expected to earn about 13 percent more than the women during their first year of working full-time and expected to earn 32 percent more at their career peaks. (Babcock & Laschever 2003). Disturbing as they may be, the results indicate a much greater scope of divergence. The more ambiguous the negotiating environment and parameters, the greater the likelihood gender will play a role in negotiating, further segregating the two sexes in their negotiating style and behaviors.

DIFFERENCES IN STYLES


It is generally recognized that there are five styles of conflict resolution. A *forcing* or *competing* style is based on the use of one party's relative power over the other as one

party attempts to achieve its goals without concern for the interests of the other party. *Withdrawal* or *accommodating* involves acquiescence of one party's goals and interests to the other party. When the parties act to suppress the conflict and not deal with it openly, *smoothing* or *avoidance* is being used. *Compromise* is used when each party gives up something in order to get part of what it wants. Finally, *collaboration* or *problem solving* is the style characterized by an attempt to arrive at a win-win solution (Thomas, 1992). Furthermore, individuals are believed to have a dominant style of conflict resolution which they are more likely to use across conflict situations.

With respect to the focal question, this section examines the relationship between gender and the frequency of use of the various conflict resolution styles and the factors that influence these styles.

Assertiveness

Research of gender stereotypical behavior suggests that men act aggressively, independently, and rationally whereas women act emotionally, passively, and socially-motivated. Research of negotiation stereotypes propose women must adopt stereotypically masculine bargaining style to "succeed" in negotiating. Figure 2 below depicts this argument.




Source: Thomas, 1991

Regardless of whether an individual supports this point of view, simple awareness of the connection can exert an influence on bargaining behavior. Bem's Gender Schema

theory in 1981 laid the groundwork for much this concept. Bem suggested people interpret the world through the lens of stable schemas developed at an early age that speak to what it means to be a man versus a woman. A basic assumption of this perspective is that self-construals dictate people's understandings of appropriate behavior, such that women see themselves in relation to others whereas men see themselves as independent from others (Kray & Thompson, 2004). Applying this assumption to negotiations, the research suggests women tend to view negotiations as including the relationship component. Likewise, to the extent women perceive negotiations as a masculine task; they are likely to have lower self-confidence in the realm than men.

Interests versus Relationships

Another way to view the choice of styles is to examine the effects of the various styles on building and maintaining interpersonal relationships. This relationship can be seen in figure 3.



Substantive, or issue based conflict, often leads to some level of emotive, or emotional, conflict. Individuals placing high importance on the maintenance of a relationship work to avoid increasing the level of emotive conflict and thus tend to avoidance, accommodation and, to some extent, collaboration.

Deborah Tannen in the 1990's discussed the differences in conversational styles between

women and men which is quite relevant to the self-construal theoretical perspective. Tannen argues men seek independence through their conversational interactions whereas women seek intimacy and consensus, paralleling the self-construal concepts (Tannen, 1999). To attain such conversational goals, men may take on a more aggressive, self-gain approach while women will attempt to establish closeness and confidence in order to build a partnership with whomever they are speaking. As it relates to negotiations, men will tend to take on a confrontational style during the negotiation process while women will focus on the relationship at hand and mutual outcomes.

In writing about women and negotiation, Miller and Miller (2002) point out that men tend to use more aggressive styles of negotiation, while women tend to favor more relational styles. The specific behaviors associated with these styles are found in figure 4.

Figure 4

Gender-Stereotyped Negotiating Styles

COMPETITIVE NEGOTIATING STYLE (Stereotypically Male)

- You want to get down to the business at hand as quickly as possible.
- Small talk is kept to a minimum except where it facilitates the negotiation.
- Before you begin to negotiate you want to find out about your counterpart's status and make them aware of yours.
- You give weight to what people say because of the position they hold.
- A discussion is not considered successful unless you have made progress toward reaching a favorable agreement.
- Satisfying the other parties' interests is significant only to the extent that furthers your own interests.
- You want to reach an agreement as quickly and as efficiently as possible.
- The outcome of this negotiation takes priority, although you take into consideration the impact your actions might have on future dealings.

RELATIONAL NEGOTIATING STYLE (Stereotypically Female)

- You want to get to know the other person first, before you begin to negotiate.
- You would consider it rude not to talk about family and personal matters before getting down to business.
- You do not feel comfortable talking about your status and achievements because you do not want to appear to be boastful.
- The positions people occupy means less than the positions they take when negotiating and your relationship with them.
- You consider time spent establishing a better relationship to be time well spent.
- You want the other parties to feel good when the negotiations are concluded.
- You are willing to take the time necessary to satisfy everyone's needs.
- Considerations of the long-term relationship are as important as the outcome of any single negotiation.

Value System Differences

Another aspect of this theoretical perspective proposes gender differences in moral reasoning. Suggesting that men and women differ in their value systems, Gilligan disputed that women are distinct from men in their preferences for resolving moral conflicts: justice-based versus care-based. Research by Gilligan supports that women are more likely to express an ethic of care whereas men exhibit a greater tendency to understand moral dilemmas from a justice perspective (Kray & Thompsen 2004). In recalling the earlier research from Jennifer Halpern and Judi McLean Parks, 58 percent of the males in the study created legal support for the argument as playground department representative, while women were 50 percent more likely to take on the role of care-giver and argue for the effects on the senior citizen home.

In Kray and Thompson's research, contextual cues or triggers in the environment determine whether individual variables like gender emerge to account for variation in behavior. The underlying belief in this theory is that variables are expected to be more pronounced in weak situations, which allow for more personal interpretations, than strong situations, which have clear guidelines for appropriate behaviors. Recalling from previous ambiguity discussion, when individuals are instructed to conduct a negotiation and are possibly given explicit instructions and details, the gender gap is lessened.

Roger Volkema, Professor at American University in Washington D.C., further expands on the notions of Kray and Thompsen, in his depiction of Bem's Gender Socialization Theory. According to theory, "boys are socialized at a young age to respect rules, justice and individual rights, while girls are taught to consider issues in terms of relationships, compassion and inclusion. Oriented more towards self than others, males are generally inclined to pursue competitive success at the expense of interpersonal relationships, believing that a successful outcome (end) will justify the means" (Volkema, 2004).

In comparison, according to Psychologist Patricia Farrell, women are socially reinforced

with the notion of a certain etiquette that is required in order to maintain relationships. More importantly, this relationship etiquette is carried over to negotiations (Miller and Miller, 2002). Indirect and socially-motivated in their negotiating style, women tend to "work out" solutions while maintaining the relationship rather than drive for the greater gain. Varying styles are characterized in figure 4 above.

The different negotiating styles of men and women have a propensity to be displayed in a corresponding manner with the communication styles, as expressed earlier through the conversational studies of Deborah Tannen. Evidence would suggest gender displays itself during the negotiating process in preferred styles and sources of motivation or direction.

Level of Competition

Competitive negotiations can act as triggers, analogous with societal expectations that men are more likely than women to be competitive and to "succeed" in competitive environments. The question of whether men and women differ in their degree of competitiveness was addressed in the research of Walters, Stulhmacher and Meyer in 1998 in a meta-analysis of 62 experiments. Consistent with what gender research suggests men were more competitive than women, as measured by their offers and verbal exchanges. Kray and Thompsen reiterated this earlier evaluation. In 1996, Martell, Lane and Emrich demonstrated in a computer simulation that gender differences that explain only 1% of variance in performance evaluations led to large differences in the rate of career advancement for men and women climbing a hypothetical corporate ladder. Comparable results in the areas of competition and for example, starting salaries, can leave compounding effects years later (Kray & Thompsen 2004).

In 2002, Professor Roger Volkema conducted extensive research, a nine-country analysis, of how demographics, culture and economic predictors affect negotiation behavior (as they relate to perceived ethicality). Volkema centered much his research on Hofstede's four primary dimensions of national culture: power distance, individualism-collectivism, uncertainty

avoidance, and masculinity-femininity (later a fifth was added, long-term orientation). Masculine cultures value assertiveness, competition, justice and performance, whereas feminine cultures – the opposite – are oriented more towards nurturance, compassion, and quality of life (Volkema 2002).

Volkema hypothesized male respondents in his study would find competitive and questionable negotiating behaviors to be more appropriate and would indicate a greater likelihood of using those behaviors than would female respondents. In addition, masculinity would be directly related to the perceived appropriateness and the likelihood of using competitive and questionable negotiation behaviors. The participants in the study were 652 individuals attending graduate business and managerial/executive training programs in their home countries and 74 percent of the group were males. Each of Hofstede's four dimensions was examined independently and the data was collected over a 4-year period. Respondents were asked to complete the "Incidents in Negotiation Questionnaire" which was developed by Lewicki et al in 1997. The questionnaire focused on 18 competitive or questionable negotiation behaviors. These behaviors represent a continuum of tactics (from generally accepted behaviors to unaccepted tactics) which have been found to factor into five categories; traditional competitive bargaining, misrepresentation of information, bluffing, influencing an opponent's professional network, and inappropriate information collection (Volkema, 2002). For each of the 18 behaviors, respondents indicated on a seven-point Likert scale the appropriateness of the behavior and their likelihood of using the behavior.

The results of factor analysis generally coincided with the theories of Lewicki and hypotheses of Volkema. In terms of predictors of perceived appropriateness, gender was statistically significant for all five categories of negotiation behavior, (while age was significant for bluffing and information collection). For gender, males found the behaviors to be more appropriate than did female respondents in each

case, consistent with original hypothesis. In addition, masculinity was directly related to information collection (extent of preparation).

Beneficiary

Earlier review referenced Deborah Kolb's Three A theory of gender in negotiations. The second "A" refers to accommodation; "trapped in a desire to satisfy everyone, research suggests women tend to forget about being fair to themselves" (Kolb 2000). Labeled as "nurturers" and "peacekeepers", women are typecast into the caregiver role fixated with an "intuitive aptitude for collaboration". Similarly, as previously discussed, women in the Halpern and Parks study, adapted the caregiver role without any explicit cues.

Evidence would suggest women tend to negotiate with greater tenacity when the negotiation will benefit others for mutual gain rather than personal gain. Just as with Maureen Parks in the introduction, there is a tendency to adjust the negotiation in response to the other person's needs, and a failure to reckon the end cost of the concessions. In another Babcock study, a large group of executives were asked to negotiate compensation for an internal candidate for a new management position. Half negotiated as the candidate; the other half as the candidate's mentor. The negotiators were given no reference points or standards for the agreement, creating a highly ambiguous scenario. Female executives negotiating as the mentor secured compensation that was 18 percent higher than the compensation female executives negotiated when they were playing the candidate. (The male executives negotiated on a consistent basis across roles) (Pradel et al., 2006).

Representation role (negotiating for oneself or someone else) is a potential gender trigger in negotiation, according to Bowles, Babcock and McGinn. Three areas of psychological theory were discussed in relation. Entitlement suggests women (as compared to men) have a tendency to take on a relative lack of deservedness that they do not extend to others. If this sense of entitlement occurs and the woman is negotiating on behalf of others, that advocacy may lead them to have higher negotiation expectations.

Another area of psychological research which supports the advocate/agent theory in negotiating is that women (as compared to men) are “more constrained by gender roles and stereotypes from advocating freely” (Bowles, 2005). Bowles cites the research of Rudman and Glick whose findings in 1999 indicated women (as compared to men) who self-promote run a greater risk of social backlash. Finally, a third explanation of the representation (advocacy) role is an adoption of the research of Cross and Madson in 1997 who theorized that women tend to develop more interpersonally interdependent self-construals than do men. For these individuals who identify themselves interdependently, the motivation during negotiations and the motivation in social behavior is the obligation to others and a need to respond to social needs. “The core implication of Cross and Madson’s studies for gender and negotiation is that women may be especially motivated in negotiations in which they are responsible for representing the interests of another person’s compared to situations in which they are representing only their own self-interest. As illustrated, the one trigger that favors women over men is playing the role of the advocate or agent as opposed to playing the role of principal or self-promoter” (Bowles 2005).

Power Differences

Power, the ability to control resources, evident during the negotiation process is rarely distributed evenly. It is hypothesized that if there were to be equal power and equal perceived power, the outcome would hold a greater likelihood of also being equal, following a more integrative approach³. The extent of power or perceived power has a tendency to be directly related to the extent that gender typical behaviors will be exhibited during negotiations. The greater the power an individual brings to the table, the more likely the other individual will recognize the cue to revert to gender-typical behavior. The greater an individual perceives

the other to have such power; again, the more likely that individual is to respond with gender-typical behavior.

Related to power is status, which refers to the legitimate authority, vested in certain organizational or societal roles (Kray and Thompsen, 2004). Status impacts what behavior is expected from a given individual, an influence on the relationship and negotiation outcomes. In a field study, conducted by Kanter in the late 1970s, examiners reviewed the sociological processes of women in a large industrial corporation. Women’s status affected the level of attention bequeathed on them and how they were perceived by others. Findings also indicated a numerical minority of women rendered them disproportionately visible in the corporation, perceptions of differences between women and men were polarized and exaggerated, and perceptions of women were distorted to fit the gender stereotype about their social group (Kray and Thompsen 2004). One could assertively hypothesize the relationship between status and gender stereotype activation in Kanter’s study indicates a strong cue for gender-typical negotiation behaviors.

Based on the research of Julian Rotter, the Social Learning Theory and Locus of Control Theory are important backdrops in the power concept. The main idea in Julian Rotter’s Social Learning Theory is that personality represents an interaction of the individual with his or her environment. Rotter has four main components to his social learning theory model predicting behavior: behavior potential, expectancy, reinforcement value, and the psychological situation. Behavior potential is the likelihood of engaging in a particular behavior in a specific situation. Expectancy is the subjective probability that a given behavior will lead to a particular outcome, or reinforcer; expectancies are formed based on past experience. The more often a behavior has led to reinforcement in the past, the stronger the individual’s expectancy that the behavior will achieve that outcome now. Reinforcement is another name for the outcomes of our behavior. Reinforcement value refers to the desirability of these outcomes. Things we want to happen, that we are attracted to, have a high reinforcement value. Things we don’t want

³ Perceived power is referred to as the extent to which individuals are *perceived* to have power in directing results during negotiations, which trigger a difference in behavior

to happen, that we wish to avoid, have a low reinforcement value. Although the psychological situation does not figure directly into Rotter's formula for predicting behavior, Rotter believed it's always important to keep in mind that different individuals interpret the same situation differently.

Locus of control refers to individuals' general, cross-situational beliefs about what determines whether or not they get reinforced in life. Individuals can be classified along a continuum from very internal to very external. Individuals with a strong internal locus of control believe that the responsibility for whether or not they get reinforced ultimately lies with them; these are what Babcock would refer to as the "oyster" individuals. Internalists believe that success or failure is due to their own efforts. In contrast, externalists believe that the reinforcers in life are controlled by luck, chance, or powerful others; what Babcock would refer to as the "turnip" individuals. External locus of control individuals see little impact of their own efforts on the amount of reinforcement they receive.

In terms of negotiations, researchers have measured the extent to which individuals believe that their behavior influences their circumstances. Evidence has shown that individuals with an internal locus of control spontaneously undertake activities to advance their own interests more than individuals with an external locus of control. Internal individuals are more likely to seek out additional information in terms of goal attainment, are more likely to be assertive and are less vulnerable to negative feedback. According to Linda Babcock, the average scores for women are significantly higher on the locus of control scale than men; indicating a greater likelihood to divert causation to external forces, rather personal influence (Babcock 2003).

Power during negotiations refers to level of influence and ability to control resources. Perceived power is the level of influence an individual is believed to possess during the process. Status is what one brings to the table which equates a certain level of perceived power. Research reveals a direct relationship

between power and the extent gender exhibits differentiating behaviors; the more power perceived at the table, the greater the likelihood gender typical behavior patterns will be cued. How much power one has at the table may also be correlated in negotiations with the availability of alternatives or BATNA, as it relates to collective bargaining.

Collective Bargaining

In a study conducted by Kray, Reb, Galinsky, and Thompson, negotiators in the study who had a strong alternative to the current negotiation (BATNA⁴) were predicted to have larger payout than the negotiators with a weak alternative. The effect of power, measured by the strength of the BATNA, was analyzed along with gender stereotypes which were explicitly activated in relation to higher levels of power. In other words, the prediction tested was the level of the BATNA would be directly related to the level of power, which would be displayed during the negotiations through gender-typical behaviors. Two examinations were tested; one, how the relative strength of each negotiator's best alternative to the current negotiation, or BATNA, affects the division of resources, and two, how the manner in which gender stereotypes are activated in the mind of the negotiators affects bargaining agreements (Kray, et al 2002). One factor the researchers pointed out to consider in a study concerning the relationship between power and gender during negotiations is "whether societal expectations regarding power differ according to gender" (Kray, et al 2002).

The design of the experiment was a 2x2 factorial with gender stereotype activation and negotiator power as between-dyad factors. The participant sample was comprised of 50 undergraduate students in a business school at a large southwestern university (and informed they had a chance to win a monetary prize based on negotiation performance). In the first group participants were told that effective negotiators

⁴ BATNA is the *Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement* or a worst acceptable outcome (Fisher & Ury, 1981)

displayed a listing of traits, all of which were stereotypically masculine, but in another group participants were told that traits associated with effective negotiators tend to vary across gender, whereas no association was made between effective negotiator traits and gender. Negotiator power was manipulated on the basis of the negotiator's best alternative to the negotiated agreement (BATNA). Instructions given to each participant indicated that the goal of each negotiator was to earn as many points as possible in the negotiation. Each participant was given private role information that indicated their preferences in negotiation. After reviewing the role instructions, negotiators completed a pre-negotiation questionnaire that included the measure of the negotiator's goal and reservation price. On a five-point scale, participants also indicated their perceived power and perceived diagnosticity of the negotiation. Upon completion, participants began negotiating, videotaped.

The negotiation was centered on what the researchers call, the New Recruit simulation, or negotiation between a job candidate and a recruiter. Eight issues were addressed and given points with a possible 8,400 to 13,200 points available. While gender-stereotype activation was manipulated through the letter of the "effective negotiator", power was manipulated through the implementation of an urgent message. High power negotiator received a message stating another party was willing to settle on a contract worth 4,500 points (described as quite favorable), while the lower negotiator was told that another party was willing to settle on a contract worth 2,200 points (described as not favorable). Both negotiators were informed that the average agreement was worth 3,000.

Consistent with the original hypothesis, high power negotiators regarded their BATNA as more attractive than low power negotiators. High power negotiators believed they derived more power from their BATNA and perceived a greater advantage through their role. Having an attractive alternative to the current negotiation exerted a clear influence on one's ability to demand resources in the current negotiation. The activation of stereotypes impacted the

division of resources in integrative negotiations, but did not influence the creation of resources. The effect of stereotype activation depended on the relative strength of the BATNA; explicitly activating stereotypes about gender differences led to a greater use of power in the negotiation. This result suggests if the power position of the stereotyped individual is weak, an explicit confrontation with the stereotype results in performance that is even worse than under implicit activation of the stereotype.

Keeping in my mind figure two, many women equate negotiation with confrontation. Associating the process with a battle, not only does that connotation act as a deterrent to the negotiating process, but allows for a viewpoint that the conflict inherent in negotiating also jeopardizes the relationship at hand. In most negotiations, substantive and relationship issues are largely independent. This notion relates to collective bargaining in the gender differences in bargaining style preferences.

Applying earlier moral perspectives to negotiations suggests that men and women differ in how they resolve disputes, while also possibly playing a role in the determination of fairness in the division of resources. If men place a higher premium on justice-based morality than do women, then it lends itself to a preference of rights-based arguments. In contrast, women's tendency to view morality through a care-based perspective, the might prefer a collaborative interest-based approach to negotiating. Theoretically, however, the more "traditional" the approach, the greater the likelihood gender triggered behaviors will manifest themselves (Kray & Thompsen, 2004).

To address the question of whether gender truly impacts bargaining style, refer back to the Walters, et al meta-analysis. During the extensive study, Walters and researchers examined negotiation patterns and trends of mixed-gender interaction. In one study utilizing an abstract prisoner's dilemma type-games (PDGs) and face-to-face behavioral negotiation tasks, (in a cooperative environment) men acted in a manner that would suggest a concern with the relationship by asking questions, engaging in more self-disclosures and the using the "we" pronoun more frequently. On the other hand, in

a more competitive environment, most findings suggested that women demonstrated greater concern for the relationship than men. For example, according to Kray, men used more self-helpful information and mentioned money earlier suggesting a lack of concern for the relationship. “Whereas men centered their discussion around positions, women discussed more personal information than men did” (Kray and Thompsen, 2004). Overall, women reported a greater belief that the cooperative choice (analogous to Interest-Based Bargaining) was a better one for maximizing their own score than men did.

Successful Results

Gender plays a role in negotiating also in the perception of the successful outcomes; while men may tend to perceive success as the level of personal gain, women may perceive it as conflict avoidance, working towards mutually beneficial results. Recall the story of the orange – preoccupied with the individual needs, possibly negotiating on behalf of the beneficiaries of the holiday desserts, each overlooked the actual ingredients, the problem, in order to incorporate a mutually-beneficial solution. While one sister grates the orange, the other sister can then use it for squeezing the juice out. Focusing on the problem without acknowledging the personal interests and needs can push the results further into a win-lose conflict. Exemplified repeatedly, women tend to favor an avoidance of confrontation. The final “A” of Deborah Kolb’s Three A theory is avoidance; when negotiation equates with confrontation, distaste leads to avoidance (Kolb, 2000). In the care-taker role or an advocate for another individual, negotiating with higher expectations is palatable. When the situation is reversed towards personal gains, however, many women adapt an avoidance approach rather than engaging in a situation which could be deemed combative or confrontational. In essence, success could be considered as reaching one’s BATNA while avoiding confrontation and maintaining the current relationship. “Economic payoff is generally considered the most important measure of success in negotiation. But when

talks take place between people with ongoing social or professional ties, implementation of the agreement becomes another critical factor. After all, a single deal is of limited value; but strong, stable relationships provide rewards across years of negotiations” (McGinn, 2004).

Hannah Riley, a doctoral candidate at Harvard Business School, was recently quoted in Harvard’s online journal, *Working Knowledge*: “In a recent survey, where there was potential to expand the pie, what we found was that men were better at claiming the pie. On the other hand, woman-woman dyads were the best at expanding the pie” (Lagace, 2000). Men were not better negotiators; the women had a different set of expectations.

CONCLUSION: NEW MILLENNIUM

The findings become increasingly important when the differences are potentially damaging to the opposite sex. According to the research of Linda Babcock, men are 8 times more likely to negotiate starting salaries following college graduation. A career progression started at different salary points will act as a foundation for what some call the “escalator principle” or continued differentiation at a proportional rate, if the behavioral patterns persist. In the Bowles study of structural ambiguity across industries, assuming that the MBAs graduate at the age of 30 and work until they retire at 65, assuming they receive 3% raises every year – the value of the gender gap which began at a \$10,000 starting salary difference in earnings will project to a \$600,000 gap over the course of their careers (Bowles, et al., 2005). Reflecting back to Maureen Parks – had she been aware of the equivalent or even greater importance in negotiating for herself as she deemed important for her employees, she would not have suffered a financial and professional disconnect. Had the female graduates in the Carnegie Mellon study detected an opportunity to negotiate the starting salaries with prospective employers, the wage gap would have lessened. Erasing the ambiguous parameters in the salary negotiation further deteriorates the difference. Offering equal fortitude in negotiating for oneself as for another suggest an advantage. The cues, rather

than acting as triggers for differentiating behaviors, need to be redirected into tools of awareness and sources for behavioral change. Becoming more aware of the situational triggers which cue an initiation of the negotiation process is a monumental step in a positive direction.

Gender does not always play a role in negotiating. People differ in their personalities, in their interests, in every aspect which defines an individual. Decades of research suggests men and women diverge in what is described as gender-typical behaviors; patterns of behavior which are more prevalent with one gender. The negotiating process tends to set the stage for a pronounced interaction which may exemplify these gender-typical behaviors. Not all individuals display the magnitude of behaviors discussed, nor are most individuals extremists in gender-typical behaviors, however trends depict a majority demonstrate varying patterns associated with males and females. Presented research and evidence illustrate how gender plays a role in negotiating in the initiation of the process, the context of the situation, the prevalence of cues which generate behavioral patterns, and the perception of success.

REFERENCES

- Babcock, Linda. (1999). *Negotiation Advice for Women: How Not to Lose Your Skirt*. *Electronic Reference* Retrieved Oct. 17, 2005 from <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AEA/CSWEP/babcock.html>
- Babcock, Linda and Sara Laschever. (2003). *Women Don't Ask: Negotiations and Gender Divide*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bowles, Hannah Riley, Linda Babcock and Kathleen McGinn. (2005). "Constraints and Triggers: Situational Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation". *Harvard Business School: Faculty Research Working Papers Series*.
- Brunner, Borgna. (2006). "The Wage Gap: A History of Pay Inequity and the Equal Pay Act". *Women's History Month. Electronic Reference* Retrieved Mar. 4, 2006 from <http://www.infoplease.com/spot/equalpayact1.html>
- Business Editors. (2000). "Women Must Master Shadow Negotiations". *Business Wire. Electronic Reference* Retrieved Oct. 17, 2005 from <http://www.highbeam.com/library/docfreeprint.asp>
- Cohen, Herb (1982). "You Can Negotiate Anything." New York: Bantam Books
- Covic, Bobby (2003). "Everything's Negotiable: Bargaining Better to Get What You Want," (3rd Ed.). Incline Village, NV: Pendulum Publishing
- Craver, Charles B. (2004). "The Impact of Gender on Bargaining Interactions". *The Negotiator Magazine. Electronic Reference* Retrieved Mar. 4, 2006 from <http://www.negotiator magazine.com/NEGM AGGENDER.doc>
- Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Joel and Thomas Kochan. (2004). "Taking Stock: Collective Bargaining at the Turn of the Century". *Industrial and Labor Relations Review: Cornell University*.
- Fisher, Roger and Ury, William (1981). *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (2nd ed)*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Fullerton University. "The Social Learning Theory of Julian B. Rotter". *Electronic Reference* Retrieved Mar. 4, 2006 at <http://psych.fullerton.edu/jmearns/rotter.htm>
- Hoffman, Jan. (2000). "Behind the Wheel, an Organizer in Pearls". *The New York Times*. pp B 2.
- Joy, Lois. (2003). "Salaries of Recent Male and Female College Graduates: Educational and Labor Market Effects. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*. Cornell University (56) 4.
- Kennedy, Gavin (1997) "Everything is Negotiable." New York: Random House Business.

- Kolb, Deborah. (2000). *Shadow Negotiations*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Kolb, D., C. Frohlinger, & J. Williams. (2003). "The Elephant at the Bargaining Table". *Financial Women Today, Electronic Reference* Retrieved Jan. 22, 2006 from <http://www.fwi.org/financialwomantoday/elephant.htm>
- Kolb, D., C. Frohlinger, & J. Williams. (2000). "Women at the Bargaining Table: Three Barriers to Greater Effectiveness". *Financial Woman Today. Electronic Reference* Retrieved Oct. 17, 2005 from <http://www.fwi.org/financialwomantoday/baggage.htm>
- Kray, Laura and Adam Galinsky. (2002). "Gender Stereotypes Activation and Power in Mixed-Gender Negotiations". University of Arizona.
- Kray, Laura and Leigh Thompson. (2004). "Gender Stereotypes and Negotiation Performance: An Examination of Theory and Research". Los Angeles: University of California.
- Lagace, Martha. (2003). "Negotiating Challenges for Women Leaders". *Working Knowledge: Harvard Business School*.
- Lagace, Martha. (2000). "Women Negotiating in the New Millennium". *Working Knowledge: Harvard Business School*.
- McGinn, Kathleen. (2004). "For Better or Worse: How Relationships Affect Negotiations". *Harvard Business School*.
- Miller, Lee and Jessica Miller. (2002). *A Women's Guide to Successful Negotiation*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Pradel, Dina W., Hannah Riley Bowles and Kathleen McGinn. (2006). "When Gender Changes the Negotiation". *Working Knowledge: Harvard Business School*.
- Small, D., M. Gelfand, L. Babcock, & H. Gettman. (2004). "Who Goes to the Bargaining Table: Understanding Gender Variation in the Initiation of Negotiations". University of Pennsylvania.
- Stark, Mallory. (2005). "What Perceived Power Brings to Negotiations". *Working Knowledge: Harvard Business School*.
- Tannen, Deborah. (1994). *Talking From 9 to 5: Women and Men in the Workplace*. New York: Avon Books.
- Tannen, Deborah. (1990). *You Just Don't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation*. New York: Ballentine Books
- Thomas, Kenneth W. (1991). "Conflict and negotiation processes in organizations," In Dunnette, M.D. and Hough, L.M. (eds.) *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology (2nd ed)*. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologist Press.
- Troy, Leo. (1999). "New Labor Relations in a New Millennium". *Journal of Commerce (Sep. 3)* 8.
- Volkema, Roger J. (2004). "Demographic, Cultural, and Economic Predictors of Perceived Ethicality of Negotiation Behavior: A Nine-Country Analysis. *Kogod School of Business: American University*.
- Wellington, Sheila, Marcia Brumit Kropf, and Paulette R. Gerkovish. (2003). "What's Holding Women Back". *Harvard Business School*.
- Whitaker, Leslie and Elizabeth Austin. (2001). *The Good Girl's Guide to Negotiating*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company