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Obstacles to Economic Progress in Ethiopia's Red Sea Coast and Gulf of Aden

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Obstacles to Economic Progress in Ethiopia's Red Sea Coast
and Gulf of Aden

MASTER OF MARINE AFFAIRS
UNIV. OF RHODE ISLAND

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Student Marine Affairs Program 1972/73
Imperial Ethiopian Navy

Abraham Alemayehu

Date ________________
Abstract

Ethiopia is a coastal state whose overall economic progress has been and still is being affected by a number of coastal and related obstacles. This paper will attempt to discuss each and every one of these obstacles and other relevant aspects in order to justify as much as possible Ethiopia's lack of progress in economic development. By no means these are not the only obstacles responsible for affecting the country's entire economic progress. The obstacles that I would like to present here are only those which are more or less directly related to maritime, geographical and geopolitical problems on the coastal area, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, plus Ethiopia's religious difference with the littoral states. The scope of the paper will therefore be limited to Ethiopia's general economic structure, political problem with the country's coastal province, Eritrea, the economic effect on Ethiopia due to the closure of the Suez Canal, political problem with the French Territory of Afar and Issa and the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, religious problem between Ethiopia and the littoral states (save Israel) and the problem of exploitation of marine resources in the Red Sea, and finally the existence of environmental problems of climate and geologic structure of the Red Sea and the country's coastal area. The findings of the discussions on each obstacle will indicate to what extent Ethiopia's economic progress has been and still is being impeded by these selected obstacles. This will be summarized in the conclusion Chapter and I hope with this presentation the picture of the subject matter of this paper as a whole will be clear and understandable for the reader.
I feel it is educational, a challenge and relevant for me to write on a topic that has something to do with Ethiopia and the Red Sea. **Obstacles to Economic Progress in Ethiopia's Red Sea Coast and Gulf of Aden** is the title which I have chosen for the Marine Affairs Seminar paper. The object of this paper is to present to the reader some of the real reasons why Ethiopia, despite of her advantage of possessing coastal zone and potentially rich land, and considering her long history of independence, has not been able to be one of the developed maritime countries of the world today. The fact that she is still one of the least developed countries which provide one of the least per capita annual incomes has been bothering me for a long time. The phrases of "The Third World", "The Least Developed Countries", "The Under Developed Countries", and "The developing countries" have been used so much by so many with somewhat blaming tones and embarrassing comments in lecture rooms, in books and periodicals which are given and written by lecturers and writers from the developed countries that I have visited.

This situation has stimulated me to think and research at least on some of the reasons why Ethiopia has remained as one of the least developed nations. Unfortunately, I regret I am not an economist. My little experience with resource economics last Semester will not allow me to discuss the economic problem of Ethiopia in a professional manner. Nevertheless, I felt I could try to present my topic in my own simplest layman fashion and general understanding without involving and applying the mechanics of standard economics.

In my research I have found out that there are scarce resources in the library for the subject I have chosen, but somehow I have managed to produce this paper.
whose main significant sources of information list is appended at the end, i.e., a compilation of books and writings related to the subject are listed in the Bibliography section which is attached next to the list of notes which are arranged in sequence and presented as a separate section immediately following the Conclusion Chapter. Explanatory footnotes and cross-reference footnotes are placed at the bottom of the pages containing the material to which they refer. The first footnote on a page is identified by a single asterisk, the second by two asterisk, etc.
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OBSTACLES TO ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN ETHIOPIA'S RED SEA COAST AND GULF OF ADEN

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Resources. Prior to starting with the obstacles to economic progress prevailing in Ethiopia's Red Sea and Gulf of Aden coasts and other relevant area in the Middle East it would be helpful for the reader to know the basic sources and means by which the country's economy is operating. First of all I would like to express that Ethiopia is a farming nation whose wealth comes from the land rather than from manufacturing or commerce. Agricultural and pastoral resources provide over 70% of the national income and engage over 90% of the population. According to the findings of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, land use in Ethiopia is divided as shown hereunder:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Type of Land</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Cultivated land producing crops</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Coffee forests</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Grazing grounds</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Closed forests</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Open woodland</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Open brush and scrub</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Deserts</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Lakes and rivers</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100%. 

From this table we can see only 3.7% of Ethiopia's 457,250 square miles, land is used for producing crops. The grazing grounds, close forests, open woodland, open brush and scrub, and a great part of the desert area could have been utilized to produce more wealth. But for various reasons including the lack of technology and real motivation the greatest part of the land is still idle. What is already being used is used in an old fashioned way. Strange as it may seem the coffee which is grown on 0.6% of the total land is the backbone of Ethiopia's foreign exchange earning. Coffee earns 60% of the country's foreign exchange, most of which is exported to the United States.

Although the country's economy which at present provide a per capita annual income of only $45.0, continues to be based on coffee and other agricultural products there is a need for this agrarian economy to be supplemented by other means of development if the country is to meet the growing expectations of the growing population. With this in mind a strong effort is being made to speed up industrialization to meet the increasing internal demands for manufactured products. Cottage industries which account for about 31% of the national economy, produce consumer goods such as tools, cloth, furniture, shoes, pottery, and many hand made items. However these cottage industries are not able to meet the growing demands of the population for the products of heavy industries.

In recent years there has been steady increase in manufacturing which now accounts for some of 14% of the national economy. For example before 1965 Ethiopia used to import finished products of oil. But when the Soviet Union completed an oil refinery in 1965 in the port of Assab situated on the Red Sea coast about 30 miles of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, the country has been able to refine imported crude oil just enough for domestic consumption. Incidentally Ethiopia has not been

* I was stationed in Assab when it was inaugurated.
able to discover oil which could have made big difference to her standard of economy. However it is being prospected for with the help of U.S. Companies:

An offshore mineral and oil exploration program is under consideration by the Ethiopian Government with the cooperation of Mobil, Gulf, and Baruch Foster oil companies. Both Mobil and Gulf have had one dry hole each so far. Baruch Foster has done no drilling and its plans are unknown.

The mineral resources are not yet greatly developed but offer possibilities for the future. The most imported developed resources are potash and salt from the Red Sea coast, gold from inland and limestone from several places inland. Deposits of gypsum, sulfur, platinum, manganese and some other mineral deposits are also being mined. There are known deposits of lignite and iron ore but they are not yet exploited. Skilled manpower and substantial capital hopefully required in order to fully exploit and exploit potential resources of wealth from the land and along the coastal zone.

At the present time, with the help of foreign experts and foreign subsidy many approaches are being tried to get Ethiopia moving ahead economically. Some of these approaches are training Ethiopian nationals abroad in various fields. For example agricultural specialists are being trained in the United States so that they can grow more crops in a modern way rather than in a primitive method; because potentially, many experts say, "Ethiopia could become the bread basket of Africa" if modern agricultural system could be implemented. "Ethiopia on its fertile land, can produce 95% of crops known to the world". At the moment the ordinary farmers are receiving bonus from the government in return for improvement of work on local projects such as planting trees and building roads in agricultural areas and expanding irrigated regions to provide more crops. And other key programs of the government include malaria control and cattle raising progress.
Since much of Ethiopia is covered by grasslands it is well suited to livestock raising which is an important source of income for practically all the farmers. Ethiopia has about 21 million head cattle, 21 million sheep, 15 million goats and 750,000 camels as well as many donkeys, mules and horses. Thus with more than 70 million farm animals the country has the highest number of animals per capita in Africa and one of the highest in the world. Animal products are important to the country and hides and skins are the third most important export of the Ethiopia.

Trade and Transportation. The relevant feature considered for the products to maneuver are trade and transportation. Most of the trade is within the country as raw materials, food and goods move between farm and city and from one area to another. The markets and shops throughout the country are the trading centers where farmers trade their crops for manufactured goods and workers buy their food, clothes and other needs. The farming areas trade cereals, coffee, hides, vegetables and other products for salt, cloth, tools and all kinds of manufactured articles.

Based on the internal trade Ethiopia conducts her limited external or foreign trade and commerce. Like many other countries Ethiopia sells what we might call surplus agricultural raw materials in exchange for manufactured goods. Also as it happens with many Ethiopia experience trade deficit or her imports and exports are balanced depending on the productivity and the situation of the world market on any given year.

To make internal and external commodities move some sort of transportation system is required. But for Ethiopia it has not been easy to establish efficient system. The geography of the country has made it difficult and costly to build a modern transportation system. Great highlands, river valleys, and heavy rainfall in the rainy season (summer), have been hindrances to the progress of transportation
system. However, slow but steady improvements are being made in developing roads, railways and airlines to connect the country more closely together. Both internal and external trade routes are converging and diverging on and from the capital city of the country which is situated in the center of the land. In other words Addis Ababa is the transportation center of the whole Empire. As shown on figure I, the indicated five major highways connect the capital with the rest of the country. While roads take the first position for internal trade and commerce there are two railway lines that terminate on the sea coast for external trade. The oldest and most important 731 Kilometers line from Addis Ababa to Djibouti (capital of the French Territory of Afar and Issa), and the 305 Kilometers railway from the country's Red Sea main port of Massawa to Asmara (second largest city of Ethiopia) and another town near the Sudan border, Akordat, both in the northern province of Eritrea, carry a large percentage of the external trade.

Air transportation system is considered enough for present day Ethiopia. Internationally, the best known part of the country's passengers transportation is the Ethiopian Airlines which offers modern jet services to other cities in Africa (Cairo, Varthoun, Nairobi, Ka -el- Salan, Acra, Lagos), to Europe (Athens, Rome, Madrid, Frunkfurt, Paris), and to Middle East and Asia (Beirut, Karachi, New Delhi), with linking capability to other cities around the world.

And the newest part of Ethiopia's transportation system is Ethiopian Shipping Lines that operates in and out of the country's two sea ports of Massawa and Assab. At present there are four ships – three cargo vessels (the Queen of Sheba, Lion of Judah, Adolus) and one big tanker (Jalibella). The plan is to increase the size of the Ethiopian merchant ships and reduce the number of foreign ships to be used for carrying commodities.
With this background about Ethiopia's economic structure and trade and transportation system I would now like to turn to the aim of this paper. The aim is to identify and discuss certain major obstacles to the economic progress and development prevailing in the country's coastal zone and other related aspects on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
CHAPTER II
ERITREA AND THE SUEZ CANAL

The Problem With Eritrea. With the exception of foreign interruptions, which will be pointed out later, Ethiopia has been a coastal state since antiquities. Her Red Sea coastal province, Eritrea, with its contiguous zone and islands form the territorial claim of the country along the coast. As shown in figure II Eritrea is located in a strategically sensitive area of the world, close to the Middle East. As a matter of fact it has and still is serving the United States as "...a vital link in the Pentagon's world wide communications net-work" since 1953. The 60 million dollars U.S. military base and intelligence listening post is situated in the provincial capital, Asmara. Vagnen's, the name of the station, is very important for the United States. Although its "mission cannot be divulged publicly for security reasons, there are credible reports here that the station's receivers listen on southern Russian and Middle East Arab communications systems as well as relay official U.S. governmental messages...", all over the world. For example the base's equipments can be used for communicating with the U.S. president's plane (Airforce One) when it is airborne almost anywhere in the world.

For this reason and its strategic importance, diplomats from the U.S. and other western powers think that if Eritrea fell into the Arab camp, the Red Sea along its coast probably would be closed to western shipping and other uses. The reason for this fear is because Eritrea has been seeking separation from Ethiopia since 1962 and insurgency activities within the province have been going on since then, supported by radical Arab governments and other organizations.

* Vagnen was the name given to the Ethiopian expeditionary army contingent which fought in the Korean war. In memory of this force the U.S. gave this name to the station in Asmara.
The trouble with Eritrea and Ethiopia is a domestic problem. The coastal province originally belonged to Ethiopia. But due to Ethiopia's inability to control the coastal zone before and after the spread of Islam along the coast the province has been subjected to various invasions by various powers:

The coastal area of Eritrea with Massawa as its center of trade and other activities has had a long and varied history, and for centuries was part of Ethiopian dominions. Massawa was captured by the Turks in 1557, remained as Turkish possession for two hundred years. At the end of the eighteenth century it passed to Egypt from the Sharif of Mecca, and after the Turks had been reinstated in 1850 it was handed back to Egypt in 1865. In 1885 it was occupied by the Italians, and was the capital of the Italian colony until replaced by Asmara in 1900.

Thus Eritrea remained colonized from 1885 to 1941 by the Italians, and the Eritreans became better educated and more efficient than the rest of the uncolonized Ethiopians of the highlands. After World War II, Britain took over Eritrea as a protectorate, improved on the network of services begun by the Italians and permitted Eritrean groups political expression that was heretofore in the mainland. After years of debate, the United Nations in 1952 awarded supervision of Eritrea to Ethiopia, which was to treat the coastal territory as an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia.

But the Ethiopian government gradually extended its influence and control over the area, and in 1962 the Eritrean parliament voted to join Ethiopia in full union. Eritrean political leaders, charging the vote was fraud, went into exile and launched what is called Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). Since then the province has been in real trouble with insurgency activities and Ethiopia's economy has been hurt because of considerable amount of money and energy being used for counter-insurgency operations in the coastal area, in order to curb the ELF which is thought to have between 2000 and 5000 armed guerrillas inside Eritrea.

* Except for the five years occupation by the Italians during World War II, the mainland has not been colonized.
Radical Arab governments of Syria, Iraq, Libya, Southern Yemen, China, and other political and religious organizations took advantage of this situation and they have and are supporting the pro-Arab secessionist rebellions in this province where its 1.5 million inhabitants consist of 90% Moslem, 10% Christians and 2% Animists. Unfortunately the existence of this real problem has not been publicly disclosed. It has been kept secret. The guerrillas' periodic ambushing of troops, derailing of trains, halting or burning of buses and fuel trucks on main roads within the province, hijacking planes of Ethiopian Airlines on international flights and other harassments have been blamed on bandits acting without political motives. Apparently this has been the policy of the Ethiopian government in order to keep the insurgency and counter-insurgency problems secret for reasons which I cannot explain. All I can say is that as part of their persistent policy Ethiopian officials refused to disclose to the public and foreign journalists officially the existence of the Eritrean war until the control of the insurgency situation got out of hand in 1970.

The existence of the insurgency was made obvious when suddenly marshall law was declared in late 1970 over most of the province following a climax of guerrilla activities in which the commanding general of the Army's Second Division stationed in the province was ambushed and assassinated by the guerrillas and attacks on army posts were stepped up. The state of emergency remains in effect in much of the province under a new military governor who replaced a civilian one, and luckily the counter-insurgency operation has been somewhat successful in the last two years, 1971 and 1972. The main reason for the success is not because the new governor has brought some miracles with him, but that there has been a bitter split within the ranks of the ELF over guerrilla strategy, and Arab countries are now divided in their support of the two groups. The primary cause of the split of the ELF into the Peoples Liberation Forces (PLF) of Eritrea and the General Command (GC)
was the latter's fanaticism and insistence of violence to force Eritreans to support the revolt. The SC is composed of overwhelmingly Moslem factions and they are rural based. On the other hand the PIF tried to include both Christians and Moslems at all levels and had support in Eritrea's urban areas. But now the situation has changed drastically and the effectiveness of the insurgency has been reduced and the Ethiopian government has obviously profited from this split.

Beside Ethiopia has been cooperating with neighboring Sudan and Chad which had similar experience in their respective areas. The three countries have began to suppress insurgency rather than encourage it within or outside their territories. Chad had a problem with rebellious Arab nomads in the northeast with whom the government forces, with the help of French troops, fought many skirmishes. "The Moslem rebels, armed by Libya, resents domination by the more educated animists and Christian southerners who control the regime of President Francois Tombelhaye. The population is just over half-moslem". Sudan which has been frustrated with the guerrilla warfare which has beset her southern part for 17 years—"seeking freedom from rulers from the Moslem north"—has now moved to curb guerrillas infiltration to Ethiopia and Chad from her territory, in return for similar help from the two countries. But there is little optimism about long range prospects for effective control on regional basis, because each of the three countries is "crippled by a lack of money, skilled manpower and in Ethiopia at least any real commitment to change". In any case Ethiopia's cooperation with Chad and particularly with her close neighbor, Sudan, in regional approach has greatly reduced, at least temporarily, the insurgency activities in Eritrea.

Furthermore, Emperor Haile Selassie has been trying other alternatives beyond regional cooperation as far as Eritrea's problem is concerned. His diplomatic contacts and special agreements with moderate Arabs, including pro-Arab Sudan and
His trip to China in 1971 has reduced Arab and Chinese aids to the Eritrean guerrillas. Even South-Yemen which has been one of the supporters of the guerrillas has responded to Ethiopia's wooings and warnings by cooling its active role in shipping guerrillas and supplies across the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb from Aden.

Nevertheless, despite the temporary counter insurgency success and regional and diplomatic cooperation, Eritrea remains a deeply troubled and insecure province of Ethiopia. One of the main reasons is because the Ethiopian highest officials appear to reject any long range, serious attempt to win the loyalties of the Eritreans away from the Arab-backed guerrillas to the mother country. In part the temporary military and diplomatic successes achieved in recent years seemed to have reinforced the attitude of the concerned officials. As I pointed out earlier the state of emergency is still enforced and the counter-insurgency is in constant operation. Because "sweeping over the wild and mountainous country side in an army helicopter, you can still see the scars of the Eritrean war". Obviously this is hurting the economy of the country. Substantial amount of Ethiopia's budget in addition to the military and economic aids received from the the United States, Israel, and West Germany is being spent on counter insurgency and pacification programs in the troubled province.

The Problem with the Suez Canal. The ports of Eritrea, Massaw and Assab, have had their busiest and happiest period in handling Ethiopia's imports and exports to and from Europe and the Americas via the shortest route of the Suez Canal. But now with the Canal closed things have changed very much. Imports and exports have to travel around the Cape of Good Hope incurring considerable additional expenses to the Ethiopian Economy. In other words the closure of the Suez Canal has sharply increased costs of both imports and exports and Ethiopia has been hit hard economically.
The Suez Canal is of course an international problem. But I just want to
narrow the scope to a point where it really affects Ethiopian economy. Last year
when I was at the Naval War College, New Port Rhode Island, I listened to lectures,
attended several seminars, and read various articles on the advantages and disadvan-
tages of reopening the Suez Canal. And the conclusion reached on most of these
presentations and writings were very discouraging to Ethiopia's hope to have the
Canal opened. Because for western naval strategy particularly for the United States
the closure of the Canal was found advantageous. The main reason given was that
the Soviets would not be able to use the Canal for their naval and merchant ships
operating from the Black Sea ports in their build up of seamover, which is already
considered formidable threat in the Mediterranean, and in their utilization of
their merchant fleet for economic and military supplies to countries in the Middle
East. In other word if the Canal was opened under the control of Egypt the Russians
would have a great advantage in using the Canal for spreading their ideology and
influence in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Persian Gulf, and most of all the
Indian Ocean, where they could be able to support a long range policy of future
intervention capability in the event of crisis in the under-developed littoral
states of these regions.

The conclusion drawn by western and Israeli sources is that Moscow
is capable of supporting political interests, perhaps in the form of
Communist-led insurrections, at great distances from the Soviet Union
and of assisting Communist governments overseas threatened by non-
Communist enemies.20

Even with the Suez Canal closed, already the Russians have demonstrated their
potential and real threat to the west. One example was that as a result of the
Indo-Pakistani war in 1971 "Russia gained immense leverage at minimum cost of risk
to itself" in the Indian Ocean by supporting India's cause. Because of this rein-
forcement to her previous friendship agreement with the Soviets, India, the largest
democratic country in the world, is now a good friend of Russia. It is also understood Egypt and Sudan, on the western side of the Red Sea, and Somalia in the Gulf of Aden, and on the opposite side the two Yemens are clients of the Soviet Union. Russia's support for the Arab cause against Israel and her success in winning India's friendship at the expense of Pakistan have already put the west at an undesirable position which has spilled over to Ethiopia's door steps. That is considered as a strategic advantage for the west (by having the Canal closed) indefinitely) has really hurt Ethiopia's economy, and she has found herself completely isolated in the region.

Although it is true, lacking a colonial past, Ethiopia has no deep relationship with any major power, her system of government and her general policy reflects towards the west, and considering her relation and religious difference with the Arabs she obviously has a greater need for help from the west particularly from the United States. The help is of course with regard to the opening of the Canal or some sort of compensation for her failing economy. As a matter of fact all the littoral states of the Red Sea Ethiopia is the only Christian state which greatly supports U.S. and Israeli policies in the Middle East. Her reason is, understandably simple. Because if Israel had lost the war in 1967 Christian Ethiopia would have been the next target of the Arabs and she would have lost her identity and the west would not have liked that to happen. Luckily Israel won and Ethiopia is surviving as a sovereign Christian state. But her problem is far from being settled. It is still a fact that Ethiopia is surrounded by hostile Arab neighbors which are sympathizing and compensating one another morally and materially before and since the closure of the Suez Canal. Egypt for example is receiving $125 million annual subsidy from Libya alone. But Ethiopia is not getting any real sympathy or compensation from any country, she has been thinking very hard to solve her economi
problem and she really needs to do something. And because of this the recent statement given with regard to the U.S. is that "the Americans were fully aware of the possibility that Ethiopia might be driven to seek Soviet aid, but Washington continued, and continues to turn a deaf ear to Ethiopia's requests for economic and military aid". Therefore, it should not be surprising for the U.S. or any other western country if Ethiopia, sooner or later, starts to look for other alternatives for compensation if those whom she expected to do something about her economic problem are not doing anything. The following view has also been reported under a title of "another nation loosening U.S. ties":

Major changes are taking place here in Ethiopia-unnoticed by most Americans but of vital importance to the U.S. all the same. Ethiopia is working hard to shed its appearance as a country largely dependent on policies shaped in Washington. Instead it wants to take a more "independent" stance in the world, particularly in African affairs. This dream of independent leadership, however, is running into trouble. Something entirely unexpected is happening. For one thing Ethiopia's geographical position is thrusting it into unwanted role in the conflict between Israel and the Arab world. For another, Ethiopia is also being caught up in the power struggle between Communist China and the Soviet Union for pre-eminent position in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas.

Thus it seems that Ethiopia's apparent changing roles have been noticed by the United States which, in any case, is not in hurry to take necessary action to heal Ethiopia's economic trouble. Instead, surprisingly enough, what is happening is the reverse. "Direct American aid to this country of 25 million people is being cut back. American advisers are being phased out of sensitive spots in the Addis Ababa government. The U.S. Peace Corps is at a third of its peak strength!"

Among other things the justifications given by U.S. reporters for such actions by the U.S. government were because "Emperor Haile Selassie's regime...often is joining-some times leading-African movements critical of Washington...it has voted against the U.S. at the United Nations, recognized Red China and accepted develop-
ment assistance from Peiking". In any case the U.S. government knows that Ethiopia is really pro-west and that it, as I said earlier, supports American interests in general, and because of this the U.S. has not completely cut off its aid.

"Even though the U.S. is reducing its presence in Ethiopia, some strong ties remain. Ethiopia still gets about $30 million dollars a year in U.S. aid; 40% of its exports go to the U.S. and numerous Ethiopian students are educated at American expense in American universities", which incidentally this includes myself if I have to consider my education last year at the War College and last Semester's partial payment of tuition fee by the Marine Affairs Program, University of Rhode Island.

Nevertheless, these type of aids are not considered by Ethiopian and American officials, to compensate Ethiopia's major economic problem caused mainly by the Suez Canal. A former U.S. Ambassador, a predecessor to the present one in Ethiopia, said that "the $160 million spent on Ethiopia... is a drop in the bucket, compared to our program in Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Turkey or Korea". This statement alone by a U.S. official is considered enough as supporting evidence for Ethiopia's need for more economic aid.

With the U.S. being indifferent on the problem of the Suez Canal and at the same time cutting aid from Ethiopia, and the hostile Arabs giving her enough trouble in Eritrea and along the Red Sea coast, economically "watching Ethiopia is like watching a case of creeping paralysis", as one foreign resident in Addis Ababa put it.
The Problem With the Territory of Afars and Issas. Ethiopia's economic obstacles do not end with the situation in Eritrea and the Suez Canal. On Ethiopia's southern and eastern flanks the country is feeling additional pressure from an old foe, the Republic of Somalia which still has unsatisfied territorial claims against Ethiopia. This situation is hinging on the future status of the French Territory of Afar and Issas which lies next to Eritrea along the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb Strait as shown on figure III. The capital city of this territory is Djibouti which is the terminus of Ethiopia's outlet from Addis Ababa to the sea by rail. The problem is that both Ethiopia and Somalia are claiming this territory on the basis that at one time or another the 8880 square miles land belonged to both countries. As far as history is concerned it is said that France took control of the area in gradual steps, beginning in 1862, under agreements with local Afar and Issa chiefs:

Although France had gained Obock as early as 1862, it was not until 1889 that the Cote Francaise des Somalis was established and its frontier with the British Somaliland Protectorate defined. In 1897, by treaty with Ethiopia, the territory was somewhat reduced in extent. Djibouti had become the official capital in 1892, and shortly after work began on the construction of the railway to the Ethiopian hinterland which reached Dire Dawa (third largest city in Ethiopia) in 1903 and connected with Addis Ababa in 1917.

Since then this territory served France as a stepping stone to her colonies in the Far East (Southeast Asia) and her Indian Ocean territories including the big island of Madagascar (now Malagasy Republic). Being on the shortest sea route from Europe to the Middle East oil fields and more recently—before the closure of
the Suez Canal to France's South Pacific nuclear weapons testing areas, the territory was of strategic importance. But now after the loss of Southeast Asia and the achievement of independence of her other territories East of Suez and the closure of the Canal itself the strategic importance of the remaining colony of Afar and Issas territory is obviously considered unimportant for France. Militarily speaking, at present two minesweepers, at times only one, are stationed in Djibouti besides peace keeping army and police forces.

France has no economic interest either, because most of the territory's area consists of volcanic terrain marked by irregular plateau and sunken plains. About 90% of the land is desert. Rainfall is erratic, amounting annually to less than 5 inches on the coast and somewhat over 20 inches in small upland slopes towards the border of the Ethiopian highlands. The territory has one of the world's hottest climates. Temperatures in the capital city, Djibouti, range from 85 to over 125 deg. F. which is associated with very high humidity. As a matter of fact if it were not for the Ethiopian cool highlands to which French residents and other well to do merchants of Djibouti retreat for vacation during the hottest period (summer) life in the French territory would have been unbearable. Besides Ethiopia is the only life line for supplying Djibouti with almost every thing necessary for existence. Because of the aridity of the territory practically nothing is produced except salt and fish for export and for supporting domestic needs. Fresh vegetables, fruits, meat, milk, butter etc. are imported from the highlands of Ethiopia. The population of 125,000 (1970). really depends on what is coming from Ethiopia, and if the railway from Ethiopia was not available and her relations with Ethiopia was not good perhaps France would not have liked to stay in the territory for so long. It must also be admitted that Ethiopia would not have been able to import and export her commodities during the Italian occupation of Eritrea if the Ethio-Franco
railway was not constructed with the help of France. Therefore, as Ethiopia and France are concerned the advantage or interest in the territory has been mutual since the construction of the railway.

Economically Djibouti has been of vital importance to Ethiopia. Despite it being desert and unproductive, the French territory, is more or less indispensable to Ethiopia rather than to Somalia, especially if the Eritrean problem becomes unmanageable and threatens Ethiopia's trade through the ports of Massawa and Assab on the Red Sea. To Somalia the territory is not really important. She does not conduct trade through Djibouti nor does she have any link of economic business or interest except for extension of territory for political reasons. But unfortunately this territory is still a bone of contention between Ethiopia and Somalia. They already have had armed clashes over other sections of their boundary line. Because of these clashes the U.S. and the Soviet Union were involved in aiding Ethiopia and Somalia respectively during their armed conflict. Ethiopia's concern of aggression by Somalia in 1960 stimulated a series of executive agreements which committed the United States to such measures as training and equipping a fourth division in the country's 40,000 arm army; and providing aid to the Ethiopian police and reaffirming America's "continuing interest in the security of Ethiopia and its opposition to any activities threatening the territorial integrity of Ethiopia".

Somalia is pro-Arab even though it is clearly a black state. The reason for her alignment with the Arabs is simply because of her Islamic religion. Besides Somalia is a client of Russia and has been receiving shipments of Soviet arms and economic aid:

On the west coast of the Red Sea, in 1962 the Soviet Union, unable to gain a foothold in Ethiopia, signed military and technical aid agreements with the Somalia Republic. These were accompanied by a loan which with later additions,
has been estimated at $55 million. The Soviet Union undertook to equip, train and help maintain the Somali Armed Forces, and to build a naval base at Berbera (suitable for ships up to 10,000 tons total draught weight) with radar installations, communication systems and airfield in the interland and SAM-2 missile sites around it.\textsuperscript{15}

And Ethiopia was and still is concerned about the progress and developments in Somalia with Soviet and Arab aids. Regarding the territory of Afar and Issas the two countries are now waiting for for France to leave her colony over which Ethiopia and Somalia are anticipating a showdown some day. In a 1967 referendum held in Djibouti Ethiopian and Somali Armed Forces were at first degree alert ready to occupy the territory from their respective borders. However, the people of the territory chose to remain with France and the confrontation was settled temporarily.\textsuperscript{16}

At the moment both countries are busy making strategic study and contingency plans for future occupation. In the mean time their armed forces are stationed in areas along their respective borders. A huge Ethiopian Army and police forces assigned for this mission is incurring tremendous amount of expense. The reason behind this is that Ethiopia could not afford to have the terminus of her only rail line from Addis Ababa to the Sea be controlled by Somalia. Because control of Djibouti by Somalia will seriously affect the port's strategic and economic importance to Ethiopia. It is envisaged that a hostile Somalia and a hostile South Yemen could easily take steps to control the Strait of Bab-al-Mandab, and so long as the Suez remains closed to the international maritime community at large might not get very excited about the issue; just like what happened when Egypt took what she thought was necessary action in 1956 over the other end of the Red Sea i.e. Suez.

Israel is highly interested about the developments of Ethiopia's problem with Somalia. Although Israel has hurt Ethiopia inadvertently by being the cause for for the closure the Suez Canal, both countries are in good terms and have more
or less common interest about the fate of the Strait. Israel considers Ethiopia as strategically important in the Middle East equation, since the latter is the only power on the western shore of the Red Sea friendly to Israel. Because of her real problem with the Arabs and her concern about the insecure situation of the Strait, Israel at one time, soon after the 1967 war, secretly requested Ethiopia for airfields and bases for commandos near the port of Assab which is only 30 nautical miles from the Strait. But the Ethiopian government declined to comply with the Israeli request; understandably, Ethiopia did not want to aggravate her already delicate and shaky relations with the Arabs by actively involving herself with Israel. Surprisingly enough, Israel's anticipated fear about the vulnerability of the Strait and safety of her oil supply line from the Persian Gulf to her Red Sea port of Elat was justified much too early when Palestinian guerrillas stationed in South Yemen attacked a tanker on the high seas from a gunboat near the Strait.

That was demonstrated in 1971, when a small group of Fedayeen armed with bazookas attacked the Israeli-bound Liberian tanker Coral Sea as it passed through the ten-mile-wide Strait of the Bab-el-Mandab (gate of tears). The attack prompted an audacious-and-secret-Israeli countermove.17

As shown on the map some time later (date unknown):

Israel sent elite commando units more than 1200 miles beyond its borders to occupy several uninhabited islands within 95 miles of Bab-el-Mandab. It has set up a radio and radar base on one of them (Zukar) a 70-sq-mi. waterless chunk of rock and sand in the Hanish group only 20 miles off the coast of Yemen. (Yemen claims sovereignty over Great Hanish, but the other ten islands in the group are officially unowned).18

As a matter of fact Ethiopia and Yemen claim 12 N.M. of territorial sea and when both countries measure 12 miles from their outermost islands the now occupied islands by Israel commonly belong to both
Ethiopia and Yemen because of the overlapping nature of measurement. But since the entire route has been international and neither Ethiopia nor Yemen has the power to exercise control over the area, and since relations between the two countries have never been genuinely good because of religion difference, the islands were left neutral. But now it seems Israel is taking over these islands where she could now establish the airfield and other facilities (which she previously requested from Ethiopia) to protect her interest and Ethiopia may be having mixed feelings about the whole affair. Because after all the action taken by Israel not only did it give a serious blow to Yemen and the rest of the Arab world but it is also somewhat embarrassing for Ethiopia for not being able to possess the necessary power to control an area at her door steps. On the other hand Israel's share of Ethiopia's responsibility to keep the Strait safe and secure might have been welcomed by Ethiopian officials.

Anyway apart from the coastal and border and Suez Canal problems another necessary but uncomfortable relations with Israel Ethiopia has another obstacle which is unique in nature with the Arab and pro-Arab states in the area. This particular problem has never been and will never be solved for the sake of improvement of Ethiopia's relations with these countries. This obstacle is religious problem which would be discussed next.
CHAPTER III

RELIGIOUS HISTORY AND ETHIOPIA'S RELATIONS WITH HER MUSLIM NEIGHBORS

General. Long before Islam was created Ethiopia was a Christian country. The rest of Africa, by and large, received Christianity from European and American missionaries within the last 100 years. Ethiopia first came into contact with Christianity when it began to penetrate in the fourth century on both sides of the Red Sea. Since then Christianity penetrated its route so deep in the country and Ethiopians view their religion as part of their lives and national existence. What became the Ethiopian Coptic church or Greek orthodox has been one of the strongest forces in the country ever since. This religion has been the base of culture with regard to worship, baptism, circumcision, superstitious beliefs, marriage, divorce, fasting, choice of food, feasts, and holidays. The Christian Ethiopian people are fanatic about these things, it is impossible to change their way of life into a different system.

The religion also reflects their ancient Jewish traditions and rituals, and above all the ruling family of Ethiopia, defendent of the religion, claims descent from King Solomon of Israel through his legendary romance with the Ethiopian Queen of Sheba. The following is the most acceptable version of the story:

When Solomon was building the temple he sent messengers to all the merchants of the four quarters of the world to bring him which he required and he would pay them in gold and silver. Among the merchants who responded to the call was Tarnin, the merchant of Makada, the Queen of Ethiopia...he was struck with amazement at the splendor of Solomon's kingdom and the wisdom of Solomon himself and brought back such marvelous report of him to the Queen that she determined to visit him herself...she stayed many months marvelling at the wisdom with which Solomon directed the artificers and communing with him on matters of religion, and before long she abandoned the worship of the sun and moon and stars and worshiped the God of Israel.

From this story and other sources Judaism was the first and original religion to be

* Original Name of Queen of Sheba.
practiced in Ethiopia as a result of the queen's visit; and as it was pointed out
Christianity followed in the fourth century, and it was amalgamated with Judaism
in form of the Old Testament and New Testament, also this was not the case with
other states in the area, i.e., Christianity and Judaism were rivals as will be
indicated later in passing by.

Besides changing her religion the Queen of Sheba returned to Ethiopia with
a conceived child of Solomon. A son by the name of Menelik was born who later
became the First Emperor (Menelik I) of Ethiopia. When Menelik grew up he visited
his father in Jerusalem and came back accompanied by many Israelites, the sons of
the Levites (Falasha Tribe), and bringing with him the Ark of Covenant, which he
had obtained by subterfuge. It is said by some Ethiopian authorities that the
Falasha of northern Ethiopia who still practice a form of Judaism to this day, are
descendants of Israelites. To make long story short and to confirm the reality of
the origin of the royal dynasty, the predecessor of the present Emperor of Ethiopia
was crowned as Menelik II and he reigned from 1867 to 1930, first as king of Sheba
and, after 1889, as Emperor of Ethiopia; and Emperor Haile Selassie himself is now
the 225th Monarch of the Solomonic dynasty which is officially declared by Article
II of the present Ethiopian Constitution as:

The Imperial dignity shall remain perpetually attached to the line of
Haile Selassie I, descendant of King Sahle Selassie, whose line descends
without interruption from the dynasty of Menelik I, son of the Queen of
Sheba, and King Solomon of Jerusalem.

Thus the kingdom of Ethiopia was affiliated to the kingdom of Israel and the desire
of the royal families of Ethiopia was to assert their divine right to the throne
and this tie to the royal house of Judah has given a remarkable stability and
continuity to the Ethiopian kingdom and has maintained the unity of the country
which is from its geographical structure difficult to hold together.

* The province surrounding Addis Ababa.
The adoption of a strong kingdom and the acceptance of Christianity had brought Ethiopia into contact with the Byzantine (Constantinople, capital of the Eastern Roman) Empire, which expected a Christian ruler to take on certain obligations for the protection of Christians in areas contiguous to his dominion. In the neighboring South Arabia both Christianity and Judaism had been spreading rapidly, but rival between them developed with equal speed. Most of the Jews who settled in South Arabia after the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 and embraced the Judaism, the last of their leaders wired out Christianity by a massacre of the Christians in South Arabia in A.D. 523. Justin I, the Byzantine Emperor, is said to have written to the Negus (Emperor) Kaleb of Ethiopia and to have requested him, as the nearest and only Christian ruler, to come to the aid and intervention in South Arabia.

This was accepted and it led to an invasion by an Ethiopian army under Aryat, sent by Emperor Kaleb to avenge the murdered Christians. Following the victory of the Ethiopian army a Christian government was set up, but it was overthrown by a revolt in the Ethiopian army of occupation, led by Abraha (Abrahamus), previously a Christian slave of a Roman merchant in Adulis, the main port of Ethiopia at the time (south of Massawa). The way it was dealt with is described as follows:

Abraha defeated Aryat, but was not recognized as viceroy of the Yemen till the Negus had sent several unsuccessful expeditions against him. Afterwards Abraha, wishing Sana to rival Mecca as a center of pilgrimage, built there a magnificent church, at Kalis (eclesia), remnants of may still be incorporated into the great Mosque. Local tradition holds that, after this church was defiled by pagan Arabs associated with the cult of the Ka'ba at Mecca, accompanied by elephants, about A.D. 570, but that the Abyssinians (Ethiopians) were destroyed by small-axes within sight of the holy city, their defeat, from whatever cause, in the "year of the elephant" weakened Abyssinian power in Arabia, which was not, however, finally overthrown till the invasion of the Persians in the reign of Vusirran (Choroses I).
With such set-back the Christian rule by Ethiopia in South Arabia came to an end at the close of the six century. The Persians had disrupted the sea and trade routes in the Red Sea; and the Moslem conquest soon enveloped the whole of Arabia on the Red Sea and north Africa. And now Islam had reached at the north and east coast of the Ethiopian Christian kingdom. It had spread over the islands and along the coast and the isolation of Ethiopia, which was to last for many centuries, had now began. Thus the rise of Islam, which was so decisive an event for the history of the world, had also a most marked effect on developments in Ethiopia. "Trade and conquest were things of the past, and in the face of the great Islamic expansion and influence there was nothing left to the Christian Ethiopians but to retire within their impregnable mountain fastnesses". Repulsed from South Arabia, from the Red Sea, from the neighboring Nile Atbara region (Southern and Eastern Sudan), and the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia began to assume much more the physical as well as spiritual contours with which we are familiar today.

Thus the spread of Islam across the Red Sea effectively cut off the Ethiopians for thousands of years, producing an inward-looking attitude that still persists. "Ethiopians are permanently obsessed with the fear that they will be exterminated by their neighbors", said an Israeli resident in Ethiopia. To a certain extent this is true because Ethiopia's relations with the Arabs has never been and may never be genuinely good as long as the religious difference persists and her relation with Israel continues to be smooth and interdependent in many ways. And this situation will continue to be an obstacle to Ethiopia's economic progress on the Red Sea area; particularly when it is thought of regional cooperation for the exploration, research, and exploitation of the sea and its seabed and subsoil with the Arab states. First of all Eritrea's future seems to be at stake, and if the Arabs continue to give moral support and accelerate material supply
to the guerrillas in Eritrea not only will Ethiopia lose hope in sharing the resources of the Red Sea but she might also - the worst that could happen - lose Eritrea and become a land-locked country once more, and live with constant worry as to what the Arabs might do next.

Red Sea Resource Potentiality. At this time it seems appropriate to look into the Red Sea itself and attempt to discuss its resource potentiality and Ethiopia's present relations with the littoral states in order to show the future importance of the sea as a wealth reservoir and the problems that might be on the way to deny peaceful sharing of this wealth. With regard to economic significance of mineral deposits in the Red Sea deeps here is what has been said:

Chemical analysis of samples from cores recovered from the Red Sea show a high content of metals. Using current market prices for the metals, a high in situ gross value can be calculated. In making an economic analysis to determine whether a deposit represents an ore body it is not normal industry practice to equate such a calculation with the economic worth of the deposit. An economic evaluation must necessarily consider only those constituents which hold reasonable expectation of commercial recovery; how the deposit can be mined and how the metals of interest can be extracted, as well as the capital and operating costs involved in the operation.20

Thus today the Red Sea is considered as one of the potential seas for offshore resources. Regarding Ethiopia, for example, potash is being mined in small quantities along her coast in a place called Versa Fatma, south of Massawa. More deposits of potash have been found in other parts of the coast. But this resource is not yet fully developed due to the fact world demand is being provided by other countries such as Canada in the western hemisphere, where there is in great quantity to be supplied to the U.S. for example. In Canada production of potash began in central Saskatchewan, in late 1958 from deeply buried deposits believed to be the largest and the richest in the world. It is said that by 1966 over 2,000,000 tons were

* I visited this place 3 times with my ship and I saw it how it is being exploited.
being rapidly developed which would place Canada in first position among world producers of this fertilizer ingredient. Therefore there is very little chance for the Ethiopian potash to be developed for maximum export purposes.

Again regarding Ethiopia, gas was found in 1960 by Gulf Oil Company north of Massawa within Ethiopian territorial waters. But it was quickly closed for political reasons due to the Eritrean problem. Drills for oil were also made by the same company and Mobil Oil Company inside the Ethiopian territorial waters. The result of their efforts was, as mentioned earlier, dry holes.

In other parts of the Red Sea, as already indicated metalliferous and muds in the deeps of the sea have been discovered. It is said that hot holes in the Red Sea contain brines with zinc from 1000 to 25,000 times that of normal sea water, and the muds at the bottom of these holes are rich in copper and zinc. Specifically speaking, during Indian Ocean and Red Sea expedition, 1965, discovery was made by Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution of mineral rich brines and muds in the depression in the floor of the Red Sea somewhere off-shore of Sudan - termed as Atlantis II deep. It is said that copper, lead and zinc, tin, silver, and gold were found to occur in significant quantities. "Within the top 10 m of sediment in Atlantis II deep alone the quantity and value at the smelter of the chief economic metals total about 82.5 billion... at 1967 quotes". But no techniques have yet been developed for their recovery. If more exploration and research could be made it is believed that great amount of various marine resources-including oil and gas- could be discovered as well. Unfortunately the coastal states are underdeveloped and it will be a long time before anything worthwhile could be achieved by the adjacent nations themselves.

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* It was reported on the Ethiopian radio network when it was discovered.
In the mean time, foreign companies from developed countries have shown their interest of the potential resources of the Red Sea. But they seemed to be waiting for the unsolved international legal political aspects with regard to the seabed exploration, research, exploitation and jurisdiction of the resources. Already "at least one group of entrepreneurs has applied to Sudan for mining rights, while two others consider the hot brine areas to be international territory, one of them has applied to the United Nations and the other has incorporated in Liechtenstein on the theory that no one owns these areas". Whether or not these deposits in the Red Sea can be mined, processed and marketed at the profit is yet an open question. The legal concern or the seriousness in finding solutions is evidenced when it is said that "where all of this maneuvering will end is unknown but there is distinct possibility that lawyers will profit more from the Red Sea deposits than will scientists or the metal industry".

The potential in biological resources in the Red Sea is not yet fully assessed. Complete exploration and research of the Red Sea for measuring the richness and diversity of plant and animal life in the sea may not be possible in the foreseeable future. Detailed information on the classification of marine animals and plants by mode of life, as bentos, nekton, and plankton can only be performed by the developed nations. For the littoral states this is something beyond their capabilities. Therefore to consider the nekton alone can make sense at this stage, i.e. mainly about fish whose potentiality is unknown in the Red Sea.

Fishing activity in the Red Sea is very low and primitive in the method of catch. Except for some Israeli big fishing vessels the great majority of other fishing craft consist of small rowing boats or sailing and/or motorized boats belonging to Ethiopia, Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and both Iemens. Both Egypt and Israel make
use of marine fisheries mainly in the Mediterranean. In accordance with FAO's "Fishery Profile" report for both countries it is said that the weather and bottom conditions in the Red Sea are unsuitable for trawling operations. Almost all the Egyptian trawling fleet is concentrated in the Mediterranean Sea. Also the greater part of Israeli's marine fish species result from the Mediterranean and distant waters, with small scale coastal activities in the Red Sea accounting for no more than 15% of the total national catch.

Some examples of the Red Sea coastal states past gross values of fisheries are given as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1967/68</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,000,000 (15% of total catch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar data information for Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have not been available.

However, with regard to development prospects in the Red Sea and Ethiopia "opinions differ widely as to the potential yield and few surveys of over all resources and possible productivity has so far been carried. There are some evidence that the Ethiopian inshore sardine and anchovy fishery would be capable of expansion significantly above its recent level, say, 50,000 tons p.a. The resources of demersal fish also might make a considerably expanded trawl fishery. Other investigations have suggested that the potential additionally exists for establishment of important shrimp and lobster fisheries".
In any case, besides the necessity of more independent surveys by foreign institutions through the Red Sea for mineral and fishery potentiality, it is felt that the sooner the international regimes on fishery and seabed and sub-soil are solved the better will be the prospects for legalized further exploration within and outside national jurisdictions in order to exploit the potential resources of the Red Sea for the use of the littoral states themselves and other interested international organisations.

**Ethiopia's Relations With the Littoral States.** But first it is necessary for the bordering states to resolve their differences in politics, security, and religious matters in order to make the Red Sea a free and secured zone for common interest and benefit. But this has not been and is not going to be easy. As long as Ethiopia's religious difference with the Arabs persists and Israel opposes Arab policy for domination of the region peaceful cooperation for common benefit of the Red Sea resources will be remote. Obviously the Arab-Israeli problem is getting complicated by Palestinian terrorist acts all over the world aimed against Israel and Israel's reprisals on her neighboring Arabs particularly aimed at Lebanon and Syria and other instants such as the downing of a Libyan Air-lines in which 106 people lost their lives in February 1973, the killing of diplomats by Palestinian commandos in Harthoum in March 1973, and the killing of Palestinian leaders on April 10, 1973, by Israeli commandos.

Ethiopia's position in the Middle East situation is somewhat confusing. It appears that she is trapped in a dilemma. She cannot support the Arabs because of her religion and her pro-west posture. She cannot support Israel actively because her economy has already been shatered by the closure of the Suez Canal and also her problem with Eritrea will be difficult to cop with if the Arabs decide to
fully support the Eritrean guerrillas.

Even Saudi Arabia which is considered as the most conservative state in the region which follows similar hereditary Monarchy government system as Ethiopia, is difficult to cooperate with to do something worthwhile in the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia occupies the largest coast on the east side of the Red Sea than any other littoral state on either side of the entire Red Sea. Even though she is inclined towards the west in her general attitude and basic principles, being the center of a great mosque sheltering the sacred Islam religion shrine and to which more than 200,000 moslem pilgrims from 60 nations visit Mecca annually, it is obliged to support the Arab cause against Israel. She has given to both Jordan and Palestinian groups to fight against Israel. Understandably, she supported and supplied arms and other aid to the royalists side when the Yemen Arab Republic experienced civil war from 1962 to 1970. Saudi Arabia is also a sympathizer of the 40% Moslems in Eritrea and supports the actions of the guerrillas and her relations with Ethiopia has remained obscure since 1950 when Saudi Arabia strongly supported the idea that Eritrea should be independent rather than reuniting with Ethiopia when the former's future was discussed at the United Nations following its liberation from the Italians.

As a matter of fact there has never been cordial relations between the two countries despite their similar system of conservative government. During my service in the Ethiopian Navy operating in the Red Sea I myself have witnessed this somewhat strange relation between them. For example, their diplomatic contact is very weak with regard to naval activities in the Red Sea.

It is customary in navy tradition to make courtesy calls on foreign ports following clearance through diplomatic channels. Off the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden,
and the Persian Gulf states to whose ports Ethiopian Naval ships wish to visit once or twice a year during training and operational cruises, the most difficult country to get permission from to enter its ports is Saudi Arabia. In 1962, when I was one of the Commanding officers of five Ethiopian ships which were scheduled to visit the Saudi Arabian port of Jidah we were told to go away after we reached outside the harbor and we were not even allowed to take water which we desperately needed after a long cruise from Aden on the way back to home port, Massawa, via port Sudan which was the next and the last port of call. Under the circumstances we had to request the Sudanese Navy by telegram to allow us three days ahead of scheduled time to arrive at Port Sudan. Fortunately our request was approved. The three days were supposed to have been spent in Jidah according to original program. We also tried in 1963 and we did not succeed. Again in 1969, when I was assigned at the Naval headquarters, Addis Ababa, an attempt was made to get permission for the flag ship of the Ethiopian Navy to visit the same port but all was in vain. After that the Ethiopian Navy was discouraged and to my knowledge there has not been further request since then.

Beside Saudi Arabia the Red Sea is bordered by another six countries (Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Jordan, and Israel), and the Gulf of Aden by three states (The French Territory of Afar and Issa, Somalia, and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen-South Yemen). Ethiopia’s relations with Sudan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia have already been discussed at length and there is no more to add except perhaps it is possible for Ethiopia to hope that her relation with the Sudan may be further improved because Sudan’s relation with the Soviet Union has become somewhat cool after the abortive Communist coup of July 1971 which was followed soon after by the reestablishment of diplomatic relation with the United States. As we know Sudan was one of the Arab-countries which severed her relations with the U.S. as a result of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and became heavily dependent upon the
Soviet Union for military and economic aids and Ethiopia was worried about this situation. Prior to that the pressures from Sudan and Somalia were too much for Ethiopia. The remaining littoral states whose relations with Ethiopia are not discussed so far are the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen, Yemen Arab Republic, Jordan and Egypt.

The Peoples Democratic Republic of South Yemen is one of the radical Arab states. She has given enough trouble to Ethiopia by aiding the Eritrean guerrillas, by allowing her territory to be a staging area for the guerrillas and for hijacking planes from the Ethiopian Air Lines and Ethiopian Air Force by the guerrillas and at one time by a deserter Air Force pilot. In the latter case "an Ethiopian Air Force officer has defected in a T-28 aircraft and asked for political asylum in South Yemen".

After the split of the LE Aden became very active as a staging area and one of the headquarters of the guerrillas and Ethiopia was and still is much concerned about the behaviour of South Yemen which is so close to the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, its capital, Aden, is very convenient for staging guerilla activities and its island of Perim is suitable for controlling the movements of ships passing through the Strait. For the British Aden was very important as strategic control point. From 1939 to 1967 it provided Britain with a controlling position at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. When the British finally left the colony became independent in 1967 as the Peoples Republic of Southern Yemen, and in the 1969 the left wing seized power. This new government broke off relations in 1967 with the U.S. because of the Arab Israeli war. Since then aid has been furnished by the USSR and China and Ethiopia is disturbed because of this situation and the continuing assistance to the Eritrean guerrillas by the state.
Next to be discussed is the other Yemen - Yemen Arab Republic. When the Monarchy regime was replaced by a revolutionary group in 1962 declaring the country to be the Yemen Arab Republic and when Egypt sent 70,000 troops to aid the new government against the royalists who fled to the mountains and country side supported by Saudi Arabia, the new regime was hostile to Ethiopia the same as South Yemen. But when agreement was reached between Egypt and Saudi Arabia for cease-fire in 1965 and Egypt suffered defeat in 1967 by the Israeli and as a consequence withdrew her troops from Yemen where in the same year a coup took place in favor of the royalists and Saudi Arabia and the settlement was made between Yemen and Saudi Arabia in 1970 the present government relaxed tension with Ethiopia. To make relations more friendly Emperor Haile Selassie invited the new head of State of Yemen to Ethiopia for a state visit in 1970 where the two heads of states made bilateral agreement. But as long as religious difference exists and Yemen is in the Arab block there will not be lasting and genuine relations between the two countries.

Jordan is considered as a littoral state of the Red Sea because of her 9 miles coast line on the Gulf of Aqaba where her only port of Aqaba is situated. Except for religious difference which is still important factor Jordan has not been hostile and a threat to Ethiopia. As a matter of fact she is now in a difficult situation herself with radical Arab states and particularly with the Palestinian guerrillas breathing on her neck besides her deep problem with Israel which took control of the Old City of Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan territory in the 6-day war. Fighting between Jordanian troops and Palestinian commandos in 1970 included a 10-day civil war in September. In renewed fighting in July 1971 Jordanian troops crashed and dispersed thousands of commandos from their bases in Jordan, where they were considered as potential threat to King Hussein. Because of this action by Jordan - Syria, Libya and later Egypt suspended relations with Jordan and Iraq.

* I was in Addis Ababa where he made three days state visit. I was assigned as liaison officer to the Deputy Chief of Staff who came with the head of the State.
closed its border. Since then Jordan has been getting full aid from the U.S. to maintain her security for existance, but it has not been easy for her. The commands supported by radical Arab states particularly by Libya have been trying hard to overthrow the government of King Hussein and threatening his life. They succeeded in killing Jordan's Prime Minister Wasfi Tell in November 1971 in Cairo and the Jordanian Charge D'affaires Adly Al Naser narrowly escaped death in Farthous in March 1973 when two American and one Belgian diplomats were killed by the Black Septemberists.

Ethiopia's relation with Egypt is cautious and diplomatic. There has not been serious differences between the two countries except once again the religious difference. Ironically the hierarchy of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church is traced to the Coptic Church of Alexandria.

St. Frumentius, a Christian from Syria, as the first missionary to Ethiopia and as closely attached to the Aksumite court during the middle of the fourth century, was consecrated by Patriarch Athanasius of Alexandria as the first Bishop... of the Ethiopian Church. Thereafter hierarchical head of this church was always sent from Egypt until recent times.

In the years following the Moslem invasion and persecution, at the beginning of the seventeen century, the Ethiopian Church had to pass through a period of crisis which seriously affected the hierarchy with Egypt becoming almost entirely a Moslem state. But fortunately the Church in Alexandria remained unaffected and continued to consecrate Ethiopian nationals as Bishops and Arc-Bishops until 1951 after which it was sealed by the installation of the late Abuna Basilios as the Patriarch of Ethiopia in 1959 by the Patriarch of Alexandria. The present Patriarch, Abuna Theophilos, the Second Patriarch of Ethiopia, was consecrated in 1970 by the Emperor and the Council of the Ethiopian Churches. Even though it is

"The oldest center of government in northern Ethiopia."
now independent of Egypt, the Ethiopian Church still has historical ties with the Church of Alexandria. Because of this sacred tie Ethiopia's political relations with Egypt have been smooth. Also Emperor Haile Selassie and President Nasser were good friends even though the latter was a radical and strong Arab leader. The Emperor was of course cautious at the same time about the development and motives of Egypt under President Nasser until the outcome of the 1967 war. Ethiopia was worried about the popularity and strength of Egypt before the war because if the Arabs had won the leadership of Egypt it was obvious Ethiopia would have been at a disadvantage with her problems of Eritrea and Somalia.

Egypt was and perhaps still is by far the predominant naval power, at least as far as size is concerned, in the Middle East. Her dominating posture in the Red Sea would have been an additional obstacle to Ethiopia's progress and development. But now with the Suez Canal closed there is very little Egypt can do to balance her forces between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, even if she wished. Therefore with her present situation Egypt is not really able to control the Red Sea. Israel appears to have taken Egypt's place as evidenced by the occupation of the islands near the strait of Bab-el-Mandeb and controlling the route. But what is important is that Egypt has not tried to give trouble to Ethiopia so far intentionally, while the more distant radical Arab states of Syria and Iraq did their best and still are trying to hurt Ethiopia by harboring and training Eritrean guerrillas in their territories and allowing them to use their radio stations to broadcast anti-Ethiopia propaganda messages.
CHAPTER IV
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

Climate. In the last three chapters I have attempted to present Ethiopia's meager resources, trade and transportation, problems with Eritrea and Suez Canal, Somalia and the French Territory of Afar and Issa, and finally religious history and political relations with the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden littoral states. Now the time has come for me to tell something about the last but not the least obstacles to Ethiopia's economic progress in the coastal area. These are environmental obstacles which are responsible for the lack of developments of what is called Ethiopia's wasteland where I spent most of my seventeen years of service in the Ethiopian Navy. Specifically speaking these are the climate in the area and the geographical structure of the Red Sea and the lowlands. First the climate. Except for the best two months (December and January) of the year the climate of the Eritrean coast particularly in the southern region—what is called the Danakil Depression or the northeastern corner of Ethiopia is unbearable. The Danakil Depression is:

One of the forbidding places in the world...the Danakil Depression a terrifying land of fantastic volcanic ruins, rock, lava, dried salt lakes of violent colors and merciless desert. Much of the depression lies more than 200 feet below sea level. By day it is blindingly hot, with temperatures higher than 120 deg.F. the tribesmen who roam here are not always likely to be friendly to strangers— for one more stranger means less water for everyone. And water, in these searing wastes, is a thing to fight and kill for.1

This is all true. Water is a precious thing for the Danakils and I know how desperately it is needed. When I was in charge of a naval station, in Assab for 2 ½ years I had to cooperate with the governor of this area in transporting and distributing barrels of water to some of the roaming nomads known as Danakil or Afar tribes - a hamitic people (linked by legend to the biblical sons of Ham) who
have lived here for thousands of years with the blistering temperature day after day. If I had not joined the navy and seen the way of life of these people I would not have believed the statement "a landscape of terror, of hardship, of death" which was written by explorer I.M. Nesbitt, who penetrated the region of the Danakil in 1928. I was born and grown up in the Ethiopian highlands where nature and life is completely different and present when compared to the way of life in the Danakil Depression where the aggressiveness of nature is merciless. In other words the Depression "swelters in a corner of Africa and where nature contrives some of the planets sternest adversaries".

Because of this extreme difference of climate along the Ethiopian coast the population of the highlands has never been attracted towards the coastal sea area. The only people that live along the coast are the Danakil who over the centuries have grown used to the fearful heat and have learned to survive in a cruel realm of salt and sun. Their number is about 200,000. The highland civil servants that are assigned in the sea ports of Massawa and Assab as customs and port office officials and other government agencies representatives receive 40% (as climatic allowance) more than what they are entitled to get when they are serving in the highlands of Addis Ababa or Asmara. This bonus is meant to compensate extra expenses for air-conditioning, and refrigeration units and high cost of food. The rest of the people living in the ports are merchants, import and export company agents, service personnel for whom the government is paying for the same requirement, and laborers that are used to live in hot climate and do not have alternative ways for living.

There is no tourist attraction except during the two nice months. Even then the tourists who are coming to the sea are limited foreigners and some rich Ethiopians living in Asmara. The great majority and rich people of Addis Ababa
and other places in the highlands do not need to come to the sea because there are many less expensive fresh water lakes in the cool highlands for fishing, swimming, sailing and other water born activities. Therefore the cost is virtually unused and unproductive as far as recreation and settlement are concerned.

Geological Structure of the Red Sea and the Danakil Depression. According to the geological history the Red Sea has been considered by geologists to be either (1) a graben, with down dropped center block, resulting from compressive forces or, (2) a Faar, a depression caused by the moving apart of two crustal blocks, and thus essentially a tensional feature. Whichever is the right theory the result was that the Red Sea was created millions of years ago. Thus forming the greatest rift valley systems that extend "from the bible lands in the north" up to the deepest part of Africa. The East Africa Rift alone extends south through Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania for 3,500 km.

Except at the Danakil Depression the Red Sea is surrounded by the highlands of the Arabian - Nubian Shield. Along both coasts mountains parallel the sea, each with a steep face seaward and a gentler slope away from the trough. However, as shown on the map the Danakil Depression lies through where the rift valleys sytem passes. This is best described as follows:

In the southwest the volcanic region of Ethiopia is crossed by a northeast-ward tending rift which leads into a low triangular flat land bordering the Red Sea opposite the southwestern corner of Yemen. The flat land is a unique feature in the region, and because of its physiographic expression has been called the "funnel". It ranges in elevation from 300 feet below sea level to 1000 feet above. It is covered by lava flows and contains numerous craters; near the coast a band of Jurassic hills rises through the lava.
One can travel by car from the sea port of Assab towards the Ethiopian mainland for 500km through what we call the surface of the moon where practically nothing can be produced. Most of the whole area is a scene of volcanic fields. It is low and flat hot and empty until the display of alluring mirages come to an end and the real rise of the Ethiopian highlands of Dossie began to show up. This area embraces the lion share of the 31% of Ethiopia's desert and wasteland. Except for cotton fields in the barren plain near a place called Tandaho where irrigation is possible from the Assab river originating from central highlands, the rest of the land is a waste. The result of geological process has made this region of Ethiopia difficult to develop for economic progress.

1. Arriovincial capital on the highlands on the way to Addis Ababa.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Ethiopia's economy depends on farm products and livestock raising and the
method used for producing crops and animal products is not technologically
advanced. Therefore, the total amount produced in both cases is not equal to
what Ethiopia can, according to her potential capacity, present to the world
market and to herself, for domestic use. Ethiopia's industries are not adequate
to produce enough manufactured goods for domestic demand. But improvements in
farming and industries are in progress to at least satisfy her population
with the basic needs and increase her commodities for export in order to get
sufficient foreign exchange to keep her balance of trade more or less equalized.

However this effort has been disturbed by other factors or obstacles. These
are mainly concentrated on the country's coastal areas and the Red Sea and the
Gulf of Aden region. First the problem between Ethiopia and her coastal province
of Eritrea has been and still is a big burden for Ethiopia's meagre economy.
The amount of money and material spent from the country's budget and foreign aid
from the United States, Israel and West Germany in order to suppress the Eritrean
insurgency movement is really hurting the country. The existence of the insurgency
and Ethiopia's deep involvement in counter-insurgency with the assistance of
foreign aid is stated in the following manner:

In Ethiopia, Emperor Haile Selassie government is using American
weapons and training, along with Israeli military advisers and
West German police equipment to suppress a rebellion that has been
simmering in Ethiopia's Red Sea province of Eritrea since 1962.
The Ethiopian public knows little of this and even the highest
ranking U.S. officials in Addis Ababa do not appear to be fully
aware of the American involvement of the Eritrean insurgency.
A calculated policy of secrecy has, in fact, surrounded a series of commitments which now provide Ethiopia with $12 million a year—80 per cent of all American aid to Africa.1

Another factor which has retarded the progress of Ethiopia’s economy is, understandably, the closure of the Suez Canal, which has sharply increased the cost of both imports and exports. Because of this Ethiopia is very anxious to see the Canal opened as soon as practicable. The opening of the Canal is as important to her as it is to Egypt and many other states. In the mean time Egypt at least is being compensated by her Arab friends and the Soviet Union to make up her loss of revenue from the Canal, while Ethiopia is getting nothing from anybody.

Ethiopia’s border dispute with Somalia during the early 1960’s sucked the United States and the Soviet Union into what U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, Mr. Adair, called a “miniature arms race” in the horn of Africa. U.S. Commitments to Ethiopia were expanded in agreements signed at executive level in 1962, 1963 and 1964. The 1964 agreement, for example, gave the country a squadron of F-5 jet fighters for the Ethiopian Air Force at which year armed clashes between the two neighboring countries reached its climax. The conflict was terminated temporarily by a truce which was arranged by the Organization of African Unity and the foreign ministers of the two countries which agreed to withdraw troops from their border. Three years later, in 1967, the situation of the French Territory of Afar and Issa brought the two nations into alert and tense confrontation which was relaxed after the referendum indicated the peoples decision to remain with France. This problem will be outstanding until France decides to leave the territory for good. Until then Ethiopia’s huge army and police forces will remain along the border incurring tremendous expense.
The chronic problem which lasted for thousands of years between Ethiopia and the neighboring Moslem states and which still is the real issue in Eritrea and Somalia today is religion difference. Ethiopia is virtually surrounded by Arab and pro-Arab states and there is no way for her to avoid this undesirable situation which has in general been the cause for the slow down and depreciation in her economic development. As long as religious problem persists her political relations with her neighboring states may never be genuine and lasting. The only way of solving this problem is perhaps, for Ethiopia to be militarily strong on all fronts like Israel has been. But this is like a vicious circle because if she cannot be strong economically and technologically she cannot be strong militarily.

Finally, on top of her political and religious difficulties with her coastal areas and the states that influence them to persist, nature has not been kind enough to give Ethiopia cool and fertile coastal area in which work of economic development can be conducted under normal environmental conditions. The extremely hot climate and the geographical structure of the coastal areas have made it hard for people to live and work along the coast.
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