Limited Entry in Rhode Island Tracing an Idea from Open Access to License Limitation to Catch Shares

For centuries fisheries institutions have shaped Rhode Island’s storied fishing tradition, a hallmark of which has been access to marine resources by the residents of the state. In 2001, after a series of moratoriums on commercial fishing licenses, Rhode Island embarked on an extensive public process through the Coastal Institute at the University of Rhode Island to identify fishery management options based on the input of stakeholders. The outcome of that process was the passage of Senate Bill 2771 sub A – otherwise known as Rhode Island Gen. Law 20.2-1 (2002). The legislation ended a moratorium on the issuance of new commercial fishing licenses in the state, and called for the establishment of license limitation programs that accommodate new entry into state waters fisheries. In 2009, the state approved a catch share pilot program, effectively changing how access to the resource is constructed. This research seeks to better understand the impetus for preserving access to the fishery in 2002, and determine if the catch share pilot program is consistent with the original intent of the Act. A Grounded Theory methodology is employed to illustrate the entire management situation leading up to the passage of Rhode Island Gen. Law 20.2-1 (2002). The results of this research indicate that while access has not been functionally compromised for new entrants through the enactment of a sector pilot program, a normative and cognitive disconnect exists between the intent of the legislation and the catch share pilot program. Moreover, the values and worldviews of fisheries stakeholders in Rhode Island are influenced by a range of regional and international institutions that did not inform the 2002 legislation.


Introduction
This chapter begins with a review of the bio-economic rational for managing fisheries as explained by Gordon (1953Gordon ( , 1954 and Schaefer (1959). Later, Ginter and Rettig's (1978) definition of limited entry is examined as it relates to fisheries utilization, thereby framing a discussion on the common-pool nature of fisheries (Berkes et al., 1989;Ostrom, 1990;Feeny et al., 1990). Bromley and Cernea's (1989) definitions of resource regimes are discussed and then applied to the regulations governing fisheries in Rhode Island. Next, I discuss fisheries management literature around catch shares. Finally, this thesis looks at dichotomy of state and federal fisheries management established through federalism.

The Bio-economic Rational For Managing Fisheries
Fisheries resources were once thought to be inexhaustible (Grotius, 1608). The depletion of inland fisheries did little to deter British biologist Thomas Huxley, who was still, "espousing the effective inexhaustibility of oceanic resources," as late as 1860 (Nielsen, 1976, p.15). Huxley's notion of the inexhaustibility of fisheries has been extinguished by the documented decline of fish populations around the world (Mullon et al., 2005;Myers and Worm, 2003;Pauly et al., 2005;Worm, 2006;Costello et al., 2008), and noted regionally in New England's groundfish fishery (Hennessey and Healey, 2000;Holland and McGuire, 2003;Acheson and Gardner, 2011).
Though fishing wields the power to greatly decrease the abundance and biomass of fisheries, "populations of marine fishes are continuously renewed, and the rate of renewal depends on the size of the populations which is left unharvested to produce new generations." (Schaefer, 1959, p.100). The utilization of fishery resources unleashes growth of the fish population. Therefore, the amount of fish that are harvested -versus the amount that are left in the sea to reproduce -is a policy question of what society deems most desirable. This situation lends itself to a suite of policy and management options that achieve the long-term sustainability of the resource with varying outcomes for society.
One management choice is maximum sustainable yield (MSY), which is the level of harvest "at which the greatest poundage will be produced, on the average, in perpetuity" (Schaefer, 1959, p.101). While MSY theoretically allows for the maximum amount of removals from the fishery that can be renewed without jeopardizing the health of the resource, the Magnuson-Stevens Act prescribes that we manage toward optimum yield, or OY. Optimum yield is defined in the Act as the level of harvest that: (A) will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect to food production and recreational opportunities, and taking into account the protection of marine ecosystems; (B) is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield from the fishery, as reduced by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor; and (C) in the case of an overfished fishery, provides for rebuilding to a level consistent with producing the maximum sustainable yield in such fishery. (16 U.S.C. 1892, Sec. 3(33)).
National Standard 1 states that "Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United States fishing industry" (16 U.S.C. 1892, Sec. 301(a)(1)).
Another level of harvest -which could be characterized as OY -is MEY, or maximum economic yield. This is the level of harvest below MSY that yields the largest difference between total revenue and total cost (industry profits). In other terms, this is the highest level of sustainable harvest that can be achieved with the least amount of fishing effort or cost (Iudicello et al., 1999). Still another policy option is open access, which theoretically results in OAY, or open-access yield. Gordon (1954) argues that entry into an open access fishery will increase as long as there is an opportunity for net economic gain. The nature of marine fisheries lends itself to the following situation: In the sea fisheries the natural resource is not private property; hence the rent it may yield is not capable of being appropriated by anyone. The individual fisherman has no legal title to a section of ocean bottom. Each fisherman is more or less free to fish wherever he pleases. The result is a pattern of competition among fisherman which culminates in the dissipation of the rent of the intramarginal grounds (Gordon, 1954, p.131) The fishery "will tend to come to natural stability where the total value of harvest is equal to the cost of taking it, and the average return is equal to the average cost" (Schaefer, 1959, p.102). This level of harvest is referred to as OAY, where total cost equals total revenue. While this approach results in harvests greater than MSY on an annual basis, the yield is theoretically sustainable. This is a policy option that will theoretically maximize employment in the fishery.

Limited Entry
Fishery resources are not inexhaustible. Rather, under certain conditions, the unfettered harvest of fish stocks may ultimately lead to severe declines in the abundance of species (Iudicello et al. 41). While the traditional fisheries tool kit of seasonal and area closures, and size and sex restrictions on catch were initially successful in curtailing the exploitation of fisheries, economists argued for management regimes that would promote efficiencies (Copes, 1986). Limited entry management schemes are intended to constrain harvests to sustainable levels, and to reduce economic waste in the fishery by "curtail [ing] and restrict[ing] the addition of fishermen, fishing vessels, or gear into the fishery. Hence, limited entry is an alternative way of limiting effort" (Rettig and Ginter, 1978, p.158) The goals of limited entry programs may vary considerably, and the structure of these programs can take the form of license limitation, taxes and fees, catch shares, or any combination of the three. License limitation refers to, "direct limitations on the number of licenses or permits to harvest" (Rettig and Ginter, 1978, p.158). The tiered licensing system employed by the DEM in Rhode Island's state fisheries and discusses later in this chapter is an example of a license limitation program. Another option, such as a tax and fee approach can refer to cost recovery programs or royalty collection schedules run by the state or federal government. The Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife limit entry into their geoduck fishery where "a competitive bid process is used to sell harvest contracts to the highest responsible bidder" (Washington State Department of Fish and Game website, accessed on 12/16/12). Finally, the third distinct form of limited entry is catch shares.

Catch Shares
As noted above, catch share management is a form of limited entry. This management approach receives additional consideration in this chapter because the state's sector pilot program is a form of catch share management. Catch shares have been defined as, "a general term for several fishery management strategies that It is a commonplace to observe that for natural resources -as for other types of wealth -"everybody's property is nobody's property." No on will take the trouble to husband and maintain a resource unless he has a reasonable certainty of receiving some portion of the product of his management; that is, unless he has some property right to the yield (116). Costello et al. (2008) argue that resource management by the state aimed at maximizing profits may be ineffective in preventing overfishing: Even when management sets harvest quotas that could maximize profits, the incentives of the individual harvester are typically inconsistent with profit maximization for the fleet. Because individuals lack secure rights to part of the quota, they have a perverse motivation to "race to fish" to outcompete others. This race can lead to poor stewardship and lobbying for ever-larger harvest quotas, creating a spiral of reduced stocks, excessive harvests, and eventual collapse. (Costello et al., 2008(Costello et al., , p.1679 This logic forms the foundation of rights-based management: ownership promotes stewardship.

Common-Pool Resource: The Fishery
Rhode Island's marine fisheries are common-pool resources. The term "common-pool resources" (CPR) refers to, "a class of resources for which exclusion is difficult and joint use involves subtractability" (Berkes et al., 1989, p. 91). The control of access -or excludability -is difficult because CPR systems are "sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use" (Ostrom, 1990, p. 30). Subtractability refers to the idea that "each user is capable of subtracting from the welfare of other users" (Feeny et al. 1990, 78). In fisheries, this means that, "if one user harvests fish, the catch per unit of fishing effort of other fishermen declines" (Feeny et al., 1990, 78).
References to the perceived 'problem' of open access abound in natural resource literature (Hardin, 1968; see also Gordon, 1954;Scott, 1955). In his 1968 article that appeared in the journal Science, Hardin describes a, "pasture that is open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons" (1968, p. 1244). Hardin goes on to say that, "Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit -in a world that is limited...Freedom of the commons brings ruin to all" (Hardin, 1969(Hardin, , p. 1244).
However, Hanna points out that Hardin's (1968) reference to "freedom of the commons," never really existed: "The commons was community property subject to community control" (Hanna, 1990, p.159). Rather than the "free-for-all…rights to the common fields, pasture, or woodland took many forms and were associated with both ownership of land and with the person" (Hanna, 1990, p. 159-160). Feeny et al. write that "Hardin has been widely cited as having said resource degradation was inevitable unless common property was converted into private property, or government regulation of uses and user was instituted" (1990, p.77). Despite the emergence of a body of literature that effectively counters Hardin's claims (Dietz et al., 2002;Hanna, 1990), his argument continues to be upheld into the 21 st century by prominent fisheries scientists: Hardin (1968) described a system of governance, the commons, in which individuals maximize their own welfare by a series of decisions that result in overexploitation (the 'tragedy of the commons'), a societally undesirable result.
It is now well established that a similar pattern has been repeated in the majority of unregulated fisheries around the world. (Hilborn et al., 2005, p.47) Indeed, fifteen years after Elinor Ostrom argued in Governing the Commons (1990) that natural resources can be successfully managed through collective action without private property or government regulation, fisheries literature continues to suggest that a lack property in the 'commons' results in 'tragedy'.
Members of the academic community have noted that the terms "commonproperty" and "common-pool resources" and "open access" have been used interchangeably (Bromley, 1989;Feeny et al. 1990, Hanna, 1990. For clarity, this research seeks to differentiate between these terms, and supposes that commonproperty is one of a series of resource regimes that may be used to manage CPRs.

Resource Regimes of Common-Pool Resources
Achieving socially and biologically desirable outcomes through the management of marine fisheries is inextricably linked to the resource regimes society creates. Bromley defines a resource regime as, "a structure of rights and duties characterizing the relationships of individuals to one another with respect to that particular [marine] resource" (Bromley, 1989: 5). That is, the type of property regime that is employed will effectively allow, limit, or block new entry into the fishery based on the characteristics of the structure of the resource regime. In this thesis, four types of resource regimes are considered in Table 1: private property, state property,   common property, and open-access (Bromley and Cernea, 1989): State Property "Ownership and control over use rests in the hands of the state. Individuals and groups may be able to make use of the resources, but only at the forbearance of the state." (11). Private Property "Private property regimes appear to be stable to and adaptive because they have social and legal sanction to exclude excess population, and effectively resist -through the power of the state -unwanted intrusions" (13).  (Gordon, 1953, p.443).
Recognizing that OAY creates economic waste in the fisheries, economists have advocated for varying forms of property rights in fisheries (Gordon, 1954;Scott, 1955;A. Scott, 1989;Costello and Deacon, 2007). While Scott (1955) advocates for sole ownership, Gordon (1954) makes the case for private or state regulation of the ocean commons in the following way: "Common-property 2 natural resources are free goods for the individual and scarce goods for society. Under unregulated private exploitation, they can yield no rent; that can be accomplished only by methods which make them private property or public (government) property, in either case subject to a unified directing power (Gordon, 1954, p.135). Similarly, the rationale for limited entry in fisheries is rooted in the notion that open-access to a CPR will yield economic inefficiencies, the overexploitation of the resource, or both (Gordon 1954, Scott 1955, Schaefer 1957, Hardin 1968 The proposed constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the state governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them direct representation in the senate, and leave in their possession certain exclusive, and very important, portions of the sovereign power. This corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of federal government (Hamilton et al., in Carey and McClellan, 2001, p.41 interest in the fish swimming in their territorial waters" (Kalo et al., 2002, p.621).
Prior to the passing of the Submerged Lands Act, the power of states to regulate fisheries in their jurisdictional waters had been well documented in case law. In Manchester v. Massachusetts (139 U.S. 240 (1891)), the Supreme Court upheld Massachusetts' restrictions on fishing for menhaden with purse seine in Buzzards Bay, stating: The right of control exists in the State in the absence of the affirmative action of Congress taking such control, the fact that Congress has never assumed the control of such fisheries is persuasive evidence that the right to control them still remains in the State (139 U.S. 240 (1891)). The threat of top-down federal control within the jurisdiction of the state raised the stakes for achieving conservation of fisheries resources in state waters in Rhode Island -and up and down the east coast.

CHAPTER 3: FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN RHODE ISLAND
Early History of Rhode Island's fishery For centuries, the people of Rhode Island enjoyed unfettered access to marine fisheries resources. Historians have speculated that a right of fishery in Rhode Island may have been established as early as 1639 by a general assembly of freemen in Newport: "At the expiration of the six weeks from the time the corn was divided, all the sea banks were declared free for fishing, but whether in consequence of the scarcity of provisions, or as a simple matter of public right, is not stated-probably the latter" (Arnold, 1859, p.142-143). The result of the assembly's vote was that, "Equal freedom was thus granted to all inhabitants of the colony to fish in the waters of the bay and this right was perpetuated and extended to include the shores likewise by the King Charles Charter of 1663 (Field, 1902, p. 393). The King Charles Charter of 1663 explicitly recognizes a right of fishery for the King's subjects, stating: Provided also, and our express will and pleasure is, and we do, by these presents, for us, our heirs and successors, ordain and appoint that these presents, shall not, in any manner, hinder any of our loving subjects, whatsoever, from using and exercising the trade of fishing upon the coast of New England, in America; but that they, and every or any of them, shall have full and free power and liberty to continue and use the trade of fishing upon the said coast, in any of the seas thereunto adjoining, or any arms of the seas, or salt water, rivers and creeks, where they have been accustomed to fish; and to build and set upon the waste land belonging to the said Colony and Plantations, such wharves, stages and workhouses as shall be necessary for the salting, drying and keeping of their fish, to be taken or gotten upon that coast (King Charles II, Retrieved April 25 th , 2011 from http://sos.ri.gov/library/history/charter/).
Scholars have aptly noted that the Charter provides for the right of fishery to the king's loving subjects in America -not just Rhode Island, and that the Charter applies to finfish, not shellfish (Nixon, 2001).

Article 17 of the Rhode Island Constitution
For nearly 180 years -from 1663 to 1843 -the people of Rhode Island were governed under the Charter, and enjoyed open access to its marine resources. The "People's Constitution," originally adopted in 1843, codified the right of fishery in Article 1, Section 17, which originally read: The people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all the rights of fishery, and the privileges of the shore to which they have been heretofore entitled under the charter and usages of the State. But no new right is intended to be granted, nor any existing right impaired, by this declaration (quoted in Nixon, 2001, p.3 see also: http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/RiConstitution/).
Later, the section was, "subsequently amended to further define the term 'privileges of the shore,' but the key phrase 'rights of fishery...under the charter and usages of the state' remains unchanged" (Nixon, 2001, p.3). The inclusion of this provision in the Rhode Island Constitution is significant because constitutions generally define: The organic and fundamental law of a nation or state, which may be written or unwritten, establishing the character and conception of Its government, laying the basic principles to which its internal life is to be conformed, organizing the government, and regulating, distributing, and limiting the functions of its different departments, and prescribing the extent and manner of the exercise of sovereign powers. (Black's Online Law Dictionary, retrieved on 12/22/12).
By guaranteeing the right of fishery to the people of Rhode Island, this document represents a regulatory institution in the state's history that has influenced residents' normative and cognitive frameworks. Residents' expectation that they have an inalienable right to access fisheries in the state is the product of socializing hundreds of years of access. Company (31 R.I. 295 (1910)), contesting the liability of the gas company in damages to leased oyster beds again raised the question of the power of the General Assembly in respect to fisheries. In Payne, the Providence Gas Company argued that is was not liable for damages to the plaintiffs oyster beds caused by the company's discharge of waste oil into Narragansett Bay because the General Assembly's lease statute was not constitutional. Acknowledging the power of the General Assembly, the Court wrote: Therefore the whole subject of fisheries, floating and shell-fish, and all kinds of shell-fish, whether oysters, clams, quahaugs, mussels, scallops, lobsters, crabs, or fiddlers, or however they may be known and designated and wherever situate within the public domain of the State of Rhode Island, are under the fostering care of the General Assembly. It is for the legislature to make such laws, regulating and governing the subject of lobster-culture, oyster-culture, clam-culture or any other kind of pisciculture, as they may deem expedient. They may regulate the public or private fisheries. They may even prohibit free fishing for a time and for such times as in their judgment it is for the best interest, of the State so to do. They may withhold from the public use such natural oyster beds, clam beds, scallop beds or other fish beds as they may deem desirable. They may make a close time within which no person may take shellfish or other fish, and generally they have complete dominion over fisheries and fish as well as all kinds of game. We find no limitation, in the constitution, of the power of the General Assembly to legislate in this regard, and they may delegate the administration of their regulations to such officers or boards as they may see In the Opinion to the Senate, the Court concluded that, "the power of the legislature to regulate fisheries in the waters of this state is plenary" (87 R.I. 37 (1958)). As noted by Nixon: "Whether or not the state constitution provides any impediment to the powers of the General Assembly to design whatever type of licensing or management system they deem appropriate is quite clear: it does not" (Nixon, 2001, p.5). With the management of Rhode Island's marine resources held in trust by the General Assembly, understanding the intent of legislation is central to discerning if management plans are inconsistent with provisions of existing statute.
Equally important is the recognition that the will of the General Assembly in regard to a particular means of management is subject to change -that theirs is a dynamic process that builds upon prior experience and reflects on the interest of the people of

Developing a Licensing Program
After the bill was passed, the DEM was charged with implementing the provisions of the Act for the 2003 fishing year. The Coastal Institute process yields a long list of licensing system objectives, which sparked debated over how to "ensure the long term health of the commercial fish stocks" while "ensur[ing] fair access to the industry and resources to everyone now and in the future" and "the economic health of the industry" (August and Parker, 2001, p.6). In regard to new entry, "Maintaining some degree of flexibility for fishermen to move laterally between fishing sectors, and providing opportunity for 'new blood' to move into the fishing industry as other fishermen retire, were identified as commonly held goals" ( Licensing Regulations, 6.1-1).

Entry-Exit Ratio
Entry into the fishery can occur through upgrading of an existing license. First priority in the issuance of new licenses with applicable endorsement(s) shall be given to (i) licensed resident fishers holding Commercial Fishing Licenses, endorsed in the same fishery sector (see section 5.31) for which a new license/ endorsement is being sought, who have been actively fishing that endorsement, (ii) licensed resident fishers holding Principal Effort Licenses who have been actively fishing their license, and (iii) resident crew members who have been actively participating in the same fishery sector for which a new license/endorsement is being sought. One-third of the total number of new licenses with applicable endorsements will be made available to each of the three priority categories. (Commercial and Recreational Saltwater Fishing Licensing Regulations, 6.7-6(a), accessed 12/28/12)) Each year, the state's Industry Advisory Committee (IAC) reviews licensing data for the prior fishing year, and evaluates the state of the resource, and how many fishing licenses were retired (i.e. not renewed). The IAC then determines and entry/exit ratio of how many licenses were retired to how many new PELs with restricted endorsements will be issued. Based on the IAC's decisions, a fishing license lottery is held, and new licenses and endorsements are awarded to active participants in the fishery. In this way, new entry is metered into limited-access fisheries. In recent years, the IAC has recommended that the exit/entry ratio focus on lapsed licenses with fishing activity in the prior year. DEM licensing regulations codified this practice in section 6.1-10 of the RI Commercial and Recreational Saltwater Fishing Licensing Regulations. Table 2 shows the number of retired and new 3 PEL licenses with RFF endorsements issued through the entry-exit process over the last 9 years. A ratio of the total number of retired (MPL and REL with RFF licenses with and without landings history) is shown in the far right column:  .2d 198, 206 (2008)), in which the plaintiff filed suit against DEM for denying a limited-access permit to harvest restricted finfish, arguing that his constitutional right to the fishery had been violated. While the Court found in favor DEM, the case illustrates a prevailing cultural value of commercial access to the fishery in the state.
In Riley, the existence of a constitutional provision for the right of fishery in the state effectively shaped the plaintiffs expectations of what is guaranteed to all Rhode Island residents. In this way, Riley's "shared definition of social reality," (Scott, 1995, p.40) led him to believe that all Rhode Island residents should be treated equally as commercial fishermen fishing in state waters. While the Court in Riley found that some level of access -not necessarily equal access to all species -satisfied constitutional requirements, the prevailing cognitive and normative institutions that legitimize open access to the fishery represent a challenge to the globalized ideals of rights-based management.

Management of the Summer Flounder Fishery
The summer flounder "fishery plan is intended to be the equivalent of the fishery management plans produced by the regional councils for the exclusive economic zone" (Nixon, 2001, p.7) Rhode Island's management plan accounts for total mortality -i.e. natural mortality and fishing mortality -in summer flounder fishery by apportioning the state's share of the coast wide quota across a series of subperiods, assigning trip or aggregate landing limits, and closing the fishery when the total allowable catch had been harvested. With Rhode Island managing for total mortality before the implementation of the sector, the pilot program represents a shift in approach to quota management, within the context of limited entry. Though the Marine Fisheries Council narrowly recommended that the Director postpone the program, after over a month of deliberation, he decided to move forward and pursue the pilot. In a memorandum to DEM Acting Chief Mark Gibson dated January 25 th , 2009, Director Sullivan stated that: I am hereby announcing my decision to move forward with a modified version of the pilot program. I recognize that there was considerable opposition to the proposal expressed at hearing. And I further recognize that on a 4-3 vote, the Council recommended postponing implementation of the program for at least one year. I deeply respect the perspectives and concerns offered by the public and the position taken by the Council. This was, and is, a very challenging issue, and I know that a lot of people put a lot of time and thought into the review process. Indeed, the record furnished many useful insights into how the proposal could be modified to better meet the broad interests of the State's fishermen and the public as a whole. (Sullivan, 2009, p.1) Director Sullivan continued on to provide statutory guidance and support for his decision, which is of particular interest to this research. As part of his rationale in approving the sector program, Sullivan references the legislative process undertaken by the General Assembly that is the focus of this thesis: In 2002, the RI General Assembly took a hard look at RI's programs for marine fisheries management and found that they "need[ed] to be brought up-to-date and made adaptable to changing conditions and circumstances." (RIGL 20-2.1-1(7)) In a clear expression of legislative policy and intent, DEM was charged with "establish[ing] principles, for a system of adaptive management, that shall be used by the department in licensure programs and fisheries management." (RIGL 20-2.1-2(6)) DEM responded by promulgating regulations that included a firstever codification of the term "adaptive management" in state rule: "A formal process for continually improving management policies and practices by learning from their outcomes. As applied to marine fisheries management in Rhode Island, this process will be characterized by rigorous and ongoing analysis of stakeholder values and objectives regarding the fisheries; explicit recognition of uncertainty in the decision-making process; where feasible, modeling of management options and testing of models prior to significant management; and direct feedback between management initiatives or practices and policy development. (RIDEM, Rules and Regulations Governing the Management of Marine Fisheries, Rule 5.3) I view the proposed sector allocation pilot program as a vivid illustration of what the General Assembly had in mind when it called upon DEM to modernize the State's management programs via an adaptive approach. The pilot program is designed to test the viability of a rights-based, catch-share approach to management, an approach that is increasingly being viewed as a promising solution to the vexing problems associated with traditional fisheries governance. (Sullivan, 2009, p.2) While the aim of this research is to more precisely understand what the General Assembly intended in achieve through the Act, Director Sullivan's interpretation is an illustration of institutional linkages at work in Rhode Island in 2008.
In approving the sector pilot program, the DEM also established a control date of December 31, 2009: As previously noted, the intent of the experimental pilot program is to see if it is workable and beneficial to the overall fishery, in whole or part. I am therefore committed to moving forward not only with the pilot program, but also with the simultaneous development of a broader-based sector allocation program for a larger segment of the fishery, if not the fishery in its entirety. If a broader based program does emerge as a viable proposal, it might draw upon the historical landings of individual sector participants as a primary basis for establishing individual sector allocations. In view of the importance of giving all relevant license holders advance notice of such a possibility and, by so doing, to enable all such license holders to engage or increase participation in the summer flounder fishery during 2009 to possibly better position themselves for participation in a sector allocation program in 2010, if one is adopted, I hereby declare my intent to establish a prospective control date of December 31, 2009 for the commercial summer flounder fishery. (Sullivan, 2009, pp.6-7) The control date is relevant to this thesis because it captures the DEM's intent is commonly referred to in the New England groundfish fishery as one's "potential sector contribution." This allocation is to the collective, not any one individual. In practice, the expectation is that individuals will either be able to harvest the amount of summer flounder they bring to the sector, or lease their contribution to other members of the sector. In this system, a license and quota are required to access the summer flounder fishery. Ins$tu$onal*Linkages* (Young,*1996)*and*Nested*Rules* (Ostrom,*1990 The qualitative method of Grounded Theory was used to explore the legislative intent of the 2002 Commercial Fishing Licenses Act (Glaser and Strauss, 1967;Strauss and Corbin, 1998;Charmaz, 2006). With a research objective of discerning the intent of legislation that drew upon an extensive public process convened by the Coastal Institute, this qualitative research design allowed for a full range of perceptions and nuances to emerge from the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In this way, grounded theory facilitated an understanding of the research situation itself, in addition to testing the research hypothesis (Rogge et al., 2011). Primary data was collected through open-ended semi-structured interviews. Peer-reviewed papers, reports, and meeting minutes were complied and reviewed as secondary data sources.
Grounded theory has been applied in peer-reviewed research on salient fisheries issues such as catch-shares and ecosystem-based management (Brewer, 2011).

Data Sampling
The intent of data sampling in grounded theory is to identify a discrete group of participants that will help illuminate the problem posed by the research hypothesis (Creswell, 1998). The specificity of the institutional knowledge sought in this research suggested that a nonprobability sampling technique was appropriate. Snowball sampling was used in the first round of data gathering because of its exploratory nature and usefulness in finding, "members of a special population [that] are difficult to locate" (Babbie, 1998, p.195). Snowball sampling, "refers to the process of accumulation as each located subject suggests other subjects" (Babbie, 1998, p.195).
This approach fosters the emergence of a "whole range of thematically relevant positions in the population" (Rogge et al, 2011, p.335).
The sample began with an inquiry to State Senators who sponsored the Act, and the Rhode Island Senate Policy Office on December 7 th , 2010. While none of the State Senators agreed to participate in the research -the snowball proceeded with individuals who had participated in the Coastal Institute process that ultimately informed the Act. The Senate Policy Office suggested two people for participation in this research (110201_001 and 110204_004). Those individuals suggested a total of four new individuals to interview, with one person being mentioned by each. From there, the snowball began to approach saturation, the juncture in the sampling process when no new individuals are identified (Charmaz, 2006). In total, eight semistructured interviews were derived from this sampling method, each ranging in length from forty minutes to three hours. Figure 3 illustrates the progression of the snowball sample from the Senate Policy Office to saturation. Arrows originate with the respondent, and point to the individuals that they suggested. As the sample became saturated, new respondents mentioned individuals who had already been interviewed. Developing the codebook In person interviews were recorded with the consent of each respondent. These audio recordings were used to generate verbatim transcripts. Transcripts were coded by hand, and then reviewed and recoded into an excel spreadsheet to form the codebook. During this the first-cycle coding process, sections of in vivo text from the transcripts were identified, and recorded wholesale into the codebook in a separate column for potential use as quotations. As a separate process, each code was reviewed and coded for the institutional pillar (regulative, normative, cognitive) that it most closely represented. Once the codebook had been developed, first cycle (in vivo and initial codes) were grouped into categories. Finally, a second tier of grounded theory categories was generated as part of the second-cycle coding process.

Coding
Coding is a core process of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006). For the purposes of this study, "A code is most often a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data" (Saldaña, 2009, p.3). Unlike quantitative analyses that apply preconceived codes and categories to the data, the intent of grounded theory is to allow codes to emerge and develop as the researcher begins defining the data (Charmaz, 2006). In this way, "coding is not a precise science; it's primarily an interpretative act" (Saldaña, 2009, p.4). Coding qualitative data allows the researcher to examine data critically and analytically, as separate from respondents and their worldviews (Charmaz, 2006). For the purposes of this thesis, coding was considered a process that helped to ensure objectivity throughout data collection and analysis.
Coding was conducted in two cycles. In the first cycle, initial and in vivo codes were developed. As will be described in further detail in the following paragraphs, the fundamental difference between these approaches is that in vivo coding uses respondents own language as the code, while initial coding is a method that allows in which the researcher assigns the code. Initial and in vivo coding approaches were employed simultaneously in the first cycle, as initial coding can include elements of in vivo coding (Saldaña, 2009).
Methodologically, the process of initial coding is an essential piece of grounded theory because it represents, "a starting point to provide the researcher with analytic leads for further exploration" (Saldaña, 2009, p.81). Charmaz notes that "during initial coding, the goal is to remain open to all possible theoretical directions indicated by your reading of the data" (2006, p.46).
Similarly, in vivo coding allows the researcher to "keep the data rooted in the participant's own language" (Saldaña, 2009, p.6). This approach, "helps to preserve participants' meanings of their views and actions in the coding itself" (Charmaz, 2006, p.55). For this study, in vivo coding represented a practical way to differentiate between participant's definitions of terms and phrases. By focusing on implicit meanings through respondent's own language, the in vivo coding process proved to be a particularly useful in capturing the breadth of perceptions around fisheries management. In vivo codes are differentiated from the researcher's language in the codebook by using quotation marks are the term or phrase. In some cases, these coding approaches were combined into a single code to capture the context of the response, as well as the respondents own language.
The coding process of grounded theory does not always pertain to individual codes -the second cycle coding process often works with categories that are developed through the first cycle of coding (Salanda, 2009). In this research, the second cycle of coding consisted of focused and axial coding (Charmaz, 2006;Glaser and Strauss, 1967;Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Saldaña notes that "Focused coding, as a second cycle analytic process, is a streamlined adaptation of classic ground theory's Axial Coding" (2009, p.155). Focused coding was chosen as a second cycle coding method because it allows for the comparison of emerging categories with pre-existing categories, and fosters the formation of entirely new categories through continuous analysis (Saldaña, 2009). In practice, this approach allows the researcher to "separate, sort, and synthesize," the data for further analysis (Charmaz, 2006, p.11). In the analysis, focused coding was used to reorganize first cycle coding categories into a streamlined set of second cycle categories that are referred to as grounded theory categories in this thesis.
Axial coding was employed in this research to understand the relationships among and within grounded theory categories that emerged after second-cycle focused coding. Axial coding allowed the researcher to specify the, "properties and dimensions of a [major] category" while analyzing the data (Charmaz, 2006, p.60). Axial and focused coding methods were used to refine categories for analysis, while constructing a "dense texture of relationships around [major] categories" (Strauss, 1987, p.64).

Categories
Categories represent analytic ideas derived from the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).
In this research, categories were developed using analytic memos, as well as in vivo and focused coding. The use of a rigorous coding process proved helpful in identifying properties and dimensions of categories. To develop theory -and answer the research hypothesis -the relationships between categories were diagramed as part of axial coding, and then sorted as "a means of creating and refining theoretical links" (Charmaz, 2006, p.115). This process yielded axial categories within the grounded theory categories as shown in Figure 5 in Chapter 4.

Memos
In addition to coding the transcripts and secondary source data, analytic memos were produced as part of the grounded theory methodology. Analytic memos reflect upon ideas and categories that develop during the coding process, and serve as a comparative method for theory development (Chamaz, 2006). Informal in nature, memos were produced at all stages of data collection, and during subsequent analysis.
As the state of Rhode Island continues to explore catch shares in the state fishery, memo writing proved to be a useful way to apply relevant, real-time information to the development of a grounded theory.

Theory
This research adopts a constructivist approach to grounded theory. With the study's research hypothesis examining the compatibility of catch shares in the fluke fishery as structured within existing state law, a constructivist approach to theory development is employed to learn "how, when, and to what extent the [legislative intent of the 2002 Commercial Fishing Licenses Act] is embedded in larger…networks, situations, and relationships" (Charmaz, 2006, p.130). Recognizing that the grounded theory method allows theory to organically evolve, I felt that the application of an institutional framework to the emerging theory would be a usefuland meaningful -way to understand the evolution of fisheries management in Rhode Island.

Institutional Analysis
Institutions provide stability and meaning to our social behavior. Generally characterized as durable and robust, "institutions are as essential to fisheries as the fish and fishers themselves" (Jentoft, 2004, p.138). While their importance to fisheries in widely acknowledged (Acheson, 2003;Degnbol and McCay, 2007;Holm, 1995;Jentoft, 2004;Ostrom, 1990), the social science literature is effectively devoid of a commonly held definition of institutions (March and Olsen, 1989;Ostrom, 1990;Scott, 1995). In the absence of academic consensus, the intent of the 2002 Commercial Fishing Licensing Act is considered within W. Richard Scott's institutional framework (1995). Additionally, institutional linkages (Young, 1996) are employed to frame discussion around the interplay of fishery institutions.

Analytic Framework: Three Pillars of Institutions
Broadly applied, "Institutional frameworks define the ends and shape the means by which interests are determined and pursued" (Scott, 1987, p.502). In his later work, Scott further defines institutions as, "Cognitive, normative, and regulative structures that provide stability and meaning to social behavior. Institutions are transported by various carriers-cultures, structures, and routines-and they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction" (Scott, 1995, p.33). Scott's analytic framework was applied to this research as a means of understanding individual's perceptions, values, and worldviews as they relate to fisheries management in Rhode Island. Table 3 is adapted from Scott (1995, p.35). Regulative elements of institutions "constrain and regularize behavior" of individuals (Scott, 1995, p.35 they define legitimate means to pursue valued ends" (Scott, 1995, p.37). The cognitive pillar focuses on "shared definitions of social reality," (Scott, 1995, p.40). The cognitive model also stipulates that, "the social construction of actors also defines what they see as their interests" (Scott, 1995, p.43).
Another element of institutional theory considered in this thesis is legitimacy.
Scott defines legitimacy as the, "condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, or consonance with relevant rules or laws" (1995, p.45). Acknowledging that participants may evaluate regulative, normative, and cognitive institutions differently, legitimacy emerged as an important concept to consider in this research.
In addition to applying a grounded theory methodology to Scott's institutional pillars, this thesis explores the means by which institutions are transported in society.
Regulative, normative, and cognitive elements are embedded within carriers -the cultures, social structures, and routines present in society (Scott, 1995). In analyzing the data set, particular attention was paid to which elements of institutions the study's participants emphasized in their responses. Table 4 is adapted from Scott (1995, p. 52). institutions, and the influence that each institution may have on another (Young, 1996). Young writes that, "All institutional linkages involve politically significant connections between or among institutional arrangements that are differentiable in the sense that they have distinct creation stories and ongoing lives of their own" (Young, 1996, p.2). Institutional nesting is defined as: A matter of linkages in which specific arrangements restricted in terms of functional scope, geographical domain, or some other relevant criterion are folded into broader institutional frameworks that deal with the same general issue area but that are less detailed in terms of their application to a specific problem. (Young, 1996, p.4) Of interest to this research is the interplay between regional, and global fisheries institutions, as well as institutions in the Rhode Island state fishery. Analysis of institutional relationships is considered on a continuum, bookended by state fisheries institutions and global fisheries institutions.

Limitations of this Method
As stated earlier in this chapter, the focused nature of the research question and Island. These interviews were conducted in early 2011, and therefore may not capture the respondents thinking at the time of writing.

Application of Institutional Pillars
Scott's institutional pillars were applied as an analytic framework in the second cycle of coding (focused coding) as a means of understanding perceptions of fisheries management in Rhode Island. Institutional pillars were used to categorize the in vivo -or natural language -codes generated from verbatim transcripts. In doing so, codes were categorized as regulative if they related to rules, laws, governing bodies, or pertained to the policy process itself. Similarly, codes were considered normative if they captured opinions, values, norms, or alluded to social obligations. Finally, codes were interpreted as cognitive if they represented how individual's worldviews, or denoted the frames of reference through which meaning is made (Scott, 1995).
Despite being referred to as institutional pillars, this analytic framework is fluid in nature as worldviews may influence values and vice versa, all of which can be constrained by regulations. Moreover, single concepts that emerged from the coding process could be categorized as any one of the pillars, depending on the context. For example, the following table is meant to illustrate how context is used in coding. The examples in Table 5 refer to discussion on "new entry": Cognitive As previously noted in the methodology chapter, coding is an "interpretative process" (Salanda, 2009, 4). In this thesis the grounded theory methodology is employed to illuminate the entire research situation around new entry and catch shares in Rhode Island. Therefore, the written analysis of this thesis will include the full range of perspectives offered on the topic, irrespective of frequency of mention. While grounded theory is a decidedly qualitative approach to social science research, the following descriptive statistics are meant to capture my coding process from interview transcription to second-stage focused coding.
The first cycle coding process of the interview transcripts generated a total of 788 unique codes. To apply the grounded theory methodology to Scott's institutional framework, each in vivo and initial code was categorized as being regulative, normative, or cognitive (n=772). The interview instrument contained two yes/no questions (n=16 responses), which were not coded as part of the institutional framework. This exercise identified 164 codes as regulative, 305 codes as normative, and 303 codes as cognitive (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Distribution of Codes Across Scott's Institutional Pillars
In vivo and initial codes from the first cycle of coding were evaluated to illustrate the number of codes that contained respondent's own language. For this process, a code that combines initial and in vivo codes (researcher's language and respondent's language) is considered to be an in vivo code. Of the 772 codes generated through the first cycle of coding, 716 (93%) are considered in vivo codes as they contain interviewee's natural language captured in verbatim transcripts. As noted in the methodology chapter, these codes were grouped into categories in order to capture issues that emerged from the coding process. Like the new entry example above, several of the categories were crosscutting, emerging within multiple institutional pillars. The categories that emerged during the first cycle of code are listed in Table 6.

Initial (first-cycle) Categories
After reviewing initial categories, it appeared that overlap existed between the twelve categories, as some categories were broader is scope than others. For example, limited entry is an element of access to the fishery. As part of the second-cycle coding process these "first cycle codes [were] reorganized and reconfigured to eventually develop a smaller and more select list of categories" (Saldana, 2009, p.149).
Therefore, the following first cycle categories were condensed: Rights-based management and commodities were brought into fisheries management; job satisfaction, limited-entry and Rhode Island Constitution were folded into the access category (where they previously existed as a second-cycle focused and axial categories); and regulatory process was incorporated into political and regulatory environment ( Figure 5).

Figure 5. Grounded Theory Categories
Using initial categories to inform categories for the second cycle of coding does not truncate the analysis in any way; rather, second cycle coding methods are used to streamline the discussion portion of the analysis, allowing the researcher to bring forward similar issues wholesale rather than piecemeal. The five grounded theory categories form the broad universe in which the research hypothesis is examined, while axial categories capture the essence and dimensions (See earlier discussion in Chapter 3). Figure 6 captures the relationship between grounded theory and intial categories, with institutional pillars. people think the legislature sought to accomplish with the bill itself. Second, the data was analyzed using the grounded theory methodology to understand institutional perspectives around fisheries management and explore the possibility of reconciling the apparent conflict between new entry and catch share management. Finally, coded responses were analyzed using institutional linkages (Young, 1996). Where in vivo and initial codes are used in the analyses, the unique nine-digit identifier for each interview participant (123456_789), and corresponding code number (1-788) is given as a reference.

Analysis One: Determining the intent of the 2002 Commercial Fishing Licensing Act
Respondents were asked a series of questions about the intent of the 2002 Commercial Fishing Licensing Act (Appendix II). To explore the range of intents of the Act, a cross-tabulation of categories and responses to Question 1 of the interview instrument was performed. As categories were developed using in vivo -or natural language codes -this proved to be a useful way to broadly capture intents of the Act that relies on interviewee's own language.
To ensure that these categories were in fact reflected in the interview responses and not created by the researcher in the coding process, each of the categories appearing in the initial cross-tabulation was searched for within the codebook. As the in vivo codebook is populated by the respondent's own words, the filter function of MS Excel was used to search for a keywords within the codebook. This exercise yields all in vivo codes that contain the keyword. A search of the responses to Question 1 in the codebook using focused categories as keywords yielded the following results, also shown in  The results of the keyword search simply captures frequency mention for one question (Question 1), and omit the context in which the phrase or word was used. This exercise is therefore intended to cross-check the work of the research and illustrate the range of responses to Question 1.
The variance in responses to Question 1 demonstrates that the Act intended to accomplish a range of objectives. Of immediate interest to this portion of the analysis, responses revealed that the General Assembly intended to address the moratorium on new commercial fishing licenses and allow new entry into the state fishery. Five interviewees (n=5) mentioned either "ending" or "lifting" the moratorium, and all respondents mentioned new entry as something that the Act sought to address. As one person noted: The constitution doesn't necessarily guarantee everybody the right to exploit the marine resources without control or limitation, but there is a certainly a strong feeling in Rhode Island, as the Ocean State, that access to the resource, the ability to become a fishermen, is something that should be accommodated, and the General Laws should reflect that. State ultimately "constrain and regularize behavior" within Rhode Island's fisheries (Scott, 1995, p.35). The category of the political and regulatory environment is comprised of 132 codes pertaining to catch shares, limited entry, moratoriums, new entry, the Rhode Island Constitution, and the regulatory process (Figure 7).

Figure 7: Dimensions of Political and Regulatory Environment
The earliest regulative institution discussed during the interview process was Other regulative institutions that do not specifically apply to ideas of new entry were also discussed. Six (n=6) interviewees mentioned "DEM" as the regulative agency in the state, while two others spoke to the "Magnuson-Stevens Act" (110209_002:458, 110204_004:85). The "Atlantic State's Marine Fisheries Commission" (110209_002:457) was also included noted. Regulative institutions are not limited to laws or governing bodies, but can also included management regimes.
Interviewees spoke to multiple forms of limited entry, including license limitation (n=7), and catch shares (n=5). Some shared a globalized perspective of fisheries, and spoke to catch share systems in Australia, New Zealand, and Iceland (110204_004:91, 110217_001:757). Another respondent provided the specific example of "Alaskan Limited Entry Program" (110207_002:220). In regulating behavior, these governance systems shape what people perceive to be possible.
In regard to the development of the legislation, one respondent stated that the "Coastal Institute [did] the policy development work" (110204_004:105), while another stated that, "The legislature really doesn't know much about any of this stuff.
It is really a question of did the folks that took part in the license restructuring ever think about it" (110207_002:311). Whether or not the General Assembly is well versed in fisheries management, there was a feeling in 2001 that the licensing program "had to be sorted out legislatively, it couldn't be sorted out by DEM" (110209_002:478). This statement is significant because it indicates that particular issues needed to be settled in law, not regulation.

Access
During the coding process, the access category grew out of four initial categories (access, job satisfaction, limited entry, and Rhode Island constitution).
Through axial coding, several more dimensions of access emerged from the codebook.
One-hundred and ninety-nine (n=199) codes form this category, ranging from open access to catch shares as shown in Figure 8. Among interviewees, it was widely acknowledged that the legislation "Directed DEM to create a licensing system to allow individuals to enter [the fishery]" (110208_001:353). However, responses differed on when access for new entrants was to be allowed in the fishery. One respondent said that: "The act itself is trying to establish a protocol to allow new entry into fisheries that are stressed" (110217_001:747). In 2002, this entailed permitting additional entry into the lobster, summer flounder, black sea bass, yellowtail flounder, monkfish, dogfish, tilefish, and whiting fisheries, all of which were either overfished, and/or overfishing was occurring (Valliere and Murphy, 2001). Another respondent suggested that the Act sought, "To establish new entrants, but it does restrict their ability to, for primary effort, to only one or two species" (110208_001:430).
As noted earlier in this Chapter, responses varied on how the Act intended for the DEM to address access for new entrants after the expiration of the moratorium on new licenses. One interviewee said that the General Assembly "wanted to relax [the moratorium]" (110217_001:736). This speaks to the establishment of a license limitation program which addresses the cognitive perception that: "We are all going to go under if we don't try to control the floodgates of people coming in to be fishermen" (110204_004:123). The idea of "Relaxing" (110217_001:736) the moratorium seems to suggest that the state (the General Assembly) was not ready to fully re-open the doors to entry, and suggests the intent was to have a gradual shift toward a license limitation program, with provisions for new entry built into a new limited entry management scheme. There also appeared to be some apprehension around speculation in the fishery: "I think the kind of mindset that guided the development of the legislation was to try to keep the fisheries in that kind of access by the individual and not making it attractive to the outside investors and things like that" (110207_002:260). This response evokes preference to owner-operators and small business. Even without an explicit linkage in the language, there appears to be an assumption that closing the system and commodifying licenses through transferability provisions in the management plan. Regulators ultimately addressed this concern, as Rhode Island only permits the sale of an entire fishing business (Commercial and Recreational Saltwater Fishing Licensing Regulations 6.7-8). This kind of thinking has implications for how catch share programs and new entry can be reconciled, which is taken up later in the policy recommendations.
Interviewees also discussed the political tension that existed between recognizing the interests of existing fishermen and allowing for new entry into the state fishery. With Rhode Island operating under a quota-based management regime for summer flounder, the perception existed that new entry into the fishery may compromise the viability of existing interests in the fishery as the new fishermen race to catch the state's total allowable catch. The idea of new entrants racing to fish is more nuanced in the Rhode Island scenario than in "derby" (110204_004:116) fisheries in which harvesters remain in direct competition with one another until the total allowable catch is landed. In actuality, "Priority was given to maintenance of a full-time fishery. So, um, and, it recognized that to maintain that, you couldn't just divide a limited level of total catch among an ever-expanding number of participants" (110209_002:568). Applying the bio-economic rational discussed in Chapter 2, the question becomes who gets to benefit from the resource? Limiting effort could conceivably yield higher economic rent from the "limited level of total catch," for those with fishing limited-access licenses, while the "ever-expanding number of participants" scenario would theoretically stop expanding when total cost equals total revenue, at a theoretically sustainable level of harvest beyond MSY. In the above statement, and RIGL 20.2-1, it is clear that the social decision was made to give priority to the "maintenance of a full-time [commercial] fishery." As DEM explains what it views as the consequence of 'allowing too many people access to the resource' in the 2012 Management Plan for the Finfish Fishery Sector: DEM's interest in limiting participation in the quota-managed fisheries is not based purely on concern for stock dynamics since quotas limit total landings within the State and since these species are migratory, Rhode Island landings account for only a portion of the total. The main concern is with allowing too many people access to the resource, which would impact current license holders through shorter seasons, lower possession limits, and ultimately fewer pounds of fish (Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, 2012, p.2).
In practice, Rhode Island distributes the state's fluke quota across three separate subperiods, and enforces trip limits on vessels (that are not participating in the fluke sector pilot program) to ensure the quota lasts throughout each sub-period and the year. In regard to the perceived impact new entry has on existing interests, this can be calculated by multiplying the daily or weekly trip limit by the number of days or weeks in each sub-period. This represents the top of a harvest range, given limiting factors such as weather, vessel size, distance to fishing grounds, and the size of the daily/trip limit.

Flexibility
Context matters when discussing the notion of flexibility in fisheries management.
Situated within Scott's normative and cognitive pillars, ideas about what constitutes 'flexibility' vary within limited entry between licensing and allocating fish (catch shares). Of the 35 codes comprising this category, 12 were coded as normative and 23 were cognitive (Figure 9). .

Figure 9. Dimensions of Flexibility
In regard to the licensing process in 2002, flexibility is the ability (or inability) to participate in multiple fisheries and closely align with ideas around access. With Ins.tu.onal)) Pillar(s)) catch shares, and the commodification of the resource (fish, not licenses), the concept of flexibility is expanded to encapsulate the trading or sale of quota, and the prosecution of the fishery. For example, flexibility could be the creation of an unrestricted market for trading, leasing, or buying quota, or could be manifested in an ability to operate under fewer input controls such as closures or trip limits.
The flexibility discussion focused on the structure of a new licensing program.
Some respondents talked about flexibility as a fisherman's ability to participate in multiple fisheries. In this sense, the term does not relate to a fisherman's flexibility to harvest an allocation over the course of a fishing year, as is allowed for in the state's existing sector pilot program. In this analysis, regulatory flexibility relates to the structure of management plans -particularly licensing programs, while specialization is meant to define fisherman's behavior in response to management plans.
The idea of flexibility and specialization in the fishery -especially in respect to the normative and cognitive institutional pillars -is closely aligned with perceptions of opportunity. Opportunity can be understood in two ways: the opportunity to simply participate in the fishery and the opportunity to prosecute a range of fisheries. In practice, this is the difference between obtaining a CFL, or upgrading to an MPL with a RFF or other restricted endorsement. In 2001 there was desire to allow new entrants to prosecute multiple fisheries. As one respondent stated: "[You] don't want to create anything that is too rigid, that doesn't create opportunity" (110209_002:532). In this way, opportunity is closely related to specialization and the discussion around access.
The transition from the flexibility to prosecute multiple fisheries to specialization in a fishery is nicely captured in the following remarks: One particular gentleman who was out of Apponaug Cove, in my view he was the consummate waterman on the bay. So, in the summer time, he would take his 40 foot boat and go down to the Point and put out 500 lobster pots and he would work those lobster pots probably until September, then he would pull all of his lobster pots, he'd come up in the bay, store those, put winkle pots onboard, and then he'd throw all winkle pots up in the bay catching conchs for snail salad. And he would work those all fall until the first snow. And in the meantime in the fall while he was doing that he was running eel pots. But that would only be usually a couple of weeks, so then he would put those away and still concentrate on conchs for a couple of months until the first snow fall. Then he'd pull the conch pots out, and then he would be bullraking during the colder winter months and then when the waters warmed up in the spring, and the eels started running again, he would do eel pots, and then after that two week period was over he'd go back to his lobster pots, so he would repeat this cycle every year so he was constantly moving around depending upon which fishery was most abundant. And, to me, that's the ultimate flexibility that the multipurpose license offers. But people ended up concentrating more and more on one species and pretty much do that year round. And so, ultimately, what you have now is a system where those people whose primary effort was in that one fishery are the ones right now that basically have access to those resources. (110208_002:425).
It was noted that the regulations developed by the DEM, "Provided for a methodology for you to get into other fisheries, but it really pushed a lot of restrictions and burdens to enter into another fishery whereas before it had a lot of flexibility" (110208_001:430). The same interviewee continued by saying, "Under the existing rules it is difficult for someone to obtain enough different primary effort endorsements to allow you the flexibility to work on certain species like the classic waterman did decades ago, with one license, a multipurpose license" (110208_001:415). Responses to Question 1 of the survey instrument indicate that flexibility was a core consideration of the 2002 Act, with another interviewee remarking that the Act sought, "to allow flexibility" across fisheries. This is ultimately reflected in the tiered licensing structure designed by the RI DEM in response to the 2002 legislation. While the focus of the CI process and General Assembly may have been on licensing, to reconcile the two, flexibility must be considered in respect to catch share management.
In regard to current norms and worldviews about flexibility in Rhode Island, one person stated: My leanings are more toward the free and common fishery with a more open access and the ability of license holders to move freely amongst the fisheries that they want to concentrate on, given market conditions, and given the level of sustainable resource available. So clearly that has to be regulated carefully by DEM Fish and Wildlife, as well as the other fishing regulation commissions along the Atlantic Coast (110208_001:410).
This statement also recognizes that this view may be constrained by a quilt of fishing regulations enacted by states and the federal government.

Sustainability
The grounded theory category of sustainability emerged from the code book within the normative and cognitive institutional pillars from a total of fifty-nine (n=59) individual codes. Reponses indicate that the Act sought to address sustainability on multiple fronts. Of the fifty nine codes constituting sustainability, twenty-four of the codes (n=24) applied to fisheries, while another twenty-eight (n=28) addressed fishermen, and four (n=4) applied to sustaining the working waterfront. Three codes (n=3) spoke to the balancing the interests of the fishery resource with the needs of fishermen, and were not coded into initial categories. In this analysis, sustainability appears to be closely aligned with the access category, particularly as it relates to fishermen (Figure 10).

Figure 10. Dimensions of Sustainability
As cited in the Chapter 2 discussion of the bio-economic rational for managing fisheries, "fish populations are continuously renewed, and the rate of renewal depends on the size of the population which is left unharvested to produce new generations" (Schaefer, 1959, p.100). In this way the sustainability of fisheries -summer flounder included -hinges on the limiting overall mortality in the stock to a level that allows for the population to renew.
In discussing the intent on the Act, interviewees noted that the bill was issues head on. For example, respondents indicated that, "stocks were being depleted," and that the Act looked to "protect the health of the resource" (110201_001:66) and "end overfishing" (110201_001:67). Others noted that the Act sought to acknowledge that, "Fisheries themselves aren't stable" (110209_002:570), but that a goal was to "maintain stock status in perpetuity" (110208_001:450). With stocks like summer flounder being overfished in 2000 -and with overfishing occurring -achieving longterm sustainability of the resource required limiting overall mortality in the fishery (both natural and fishing). To do so, those close to the CI process suggested that that Act sought to curtail fishing effort as a proxy for mortality. Some believed that there was too much fishing effort "prevent[ing] renewal and regeneration of the fishery" (110216:001:660).
In regard to sustainability of the resource -one interviewee suggested that the managers and industry need to, "Understand the balance between harvest capacity and resource availability in order to be sustainable" (110204_004:208). While harvest capacity is an important measure of the rate at which fisheries can be utilized, I would argue that the sustainability of the resource hinges on limiting the total removals from the population.
In addressing the sustainability of fishermen, it is important to acknowledge "it is biologically possible to have a sustained fishery at any of a wide range of fishing efforts. The problem is to decide which of these is most desirable" (Schaefer, 1959, p.102). In this way, the idea of sustainability in regard to fishermen gets at the heart of the new entry issue, and the challenge presented in the social decision of determining who can access the resource. Data collected through the interview instrument shows that the Act sought to preserve opportunities for existing fishermen while allowing for new entry. One person noted that it aimed to allow "existing licensed fishermen to continue on with the fisheries that they were engaged in" (110208_001:442). More specifically, there was a preference to provide for full-time fishermen, which is covered earlier in this analysis. As an interviewee stated: "Priority was given to maintenance of a full-time fishery. So, it recognized that to maintain that, you couldn't just divide a limited level of total catch among an ever-expanding number of participants" (110209_002:568). This is an important reflection on the intent of the Act, and suggests that the preservation of a full-time commercial fleet hinges on yielding some level of economic rent (total revenue -total cost) from the fishery.
Maintenance of a full-time fishery also implies the continuation of shore-side services and a working waterfront that can support the needs of the fleet (fuel, ice, offloading facilities, dockage). The same person also said there was a desire to: "maintain Point Judith as a full-time port" (110209_002:569). This is a notable goal, given the multitude of federal fisheries that are prosecuted by vessels homeported in Point Judith.
Another key theme that emerged in this category was the perception that the majority of the fishing industry was aging, saying: "We really felt we were getting older" (110217_001:786 properties. This category is more theoretical than practical in nature, as many responses relate to the perceived advantages and disadvantages of commodifying licenses and quota (Figure 11). While the General Assembly elected not to explicitly pursue catch shares in the General Laws, provisions for the transferability of a fishing business were included.

Figure 11. Dimensions of Fisheries Management
However, the sale of a business is limited to active license holders only. The thinking in 2001 around this was that: "Well I think the ability to sell things came out of that.
You could sell your license. I think what they tried to do, was to recognize it as a business. And allow you to be treated as a business, but also with the idea, that you try to keep the free and common as much as you can." For others, the entry elements of the free and common orthodoxy hold less weight: "A crucial factor is being able to cash out" (110209_002). For some, the payout can be significant. As detailed in At the outset of this research I suggest that catch share management may be at odds with the policy goal of preserving new entry into Rhode Island's commercial fisheries because catch share programs divide the total allowable catch among a predetermined set of entities based on a set of qualifying criteria. Part one of the analyses clearly illustrates that providing opportunity for entry into the state fisheries was one intent of the Act. The licensing program that the DEM developed as a result of the Act (described in Chapter 2) provides a mechanism for entry into all state managed fisheries. In practice, the licensing program allows for fishermen with PELs The zero allocation scenario is a situation that the General Assembly did notand could not -contemplate in 2002. While it was their express intent to develop a licensing program, a decision not to pursue one form of management over another does not condemn it from ever being considered. It would be inaccurate to describe the General Assembly's decision to not pursue catch share management in 2002 as a flat and final rejection of that form of limited entry. Interview data suggest that the law was written to address an acute set of issues, and that while a set of prevailing institutions continue to inform Rhode Island's unique approach to fisheries management, these rules, values, and worldviews are now nested within a broader set of global fisheries institutions. Perhaps in future research, a salient policy question to ask and debate in Rhode Island would be, 'who does the Act seek to benefit?'

Recommendations
Preserve the Exit/Entry System into Restricted Fisheries -I noted at the outset of this research that Rhode Island is one of the last states to continue to provide opportunity for entry into commercial fishing. It is clear that Rhode Island continues to value entry into state fisheries through the annual granting of new endorsementsand as illustrated in the uptick in new RFF endorsements this past year. In the case of upgrading to a PEL with a RFF endorsement, "new" simply constitutes "expanded" access for individuals already running their own vessel or who are employed as crew.
These license holders may constitute elements of the full-time fishery that the Act also seeks to protect. As a practical matter, individuals upgrading their licenses to a RFF endorsement constitute a fraction of a percent of active license holders. Even so, these are the same individuals that the Act and the Riley decision seek to protect.
The established control date in the summer flounder could render access granted through the entry/exit process meaningless for endorsements that are issued after December 31 st , 2009. If Rhode Island elects to continue to pursue catch share management -with or without new legislation -the state should work to address the licensing and allocation circumstances of these vested fishermen who have historically migrated from the back deck to the wheelhouse. Rhode Island should expand the criteria for assessing catch shares: While DEM has asked a series of general questions regarding the feasibility of the pilot program, the State elected to evaluate the catch share pilot program on three criteria: safety at sea, resource issues, and economic performance. Each issue is deserving of evaluation, but the sum of these programmatic elements constitute a fraction of the categories individuals raised in responses to the survey instrument. Beyond considering the full range of intents of existing state statute, the state should also reflect on the guiding principles of NOAA's catch share policy guide. Catch share programs are data hungry, and costly to implement and sustain -witness the recent experiences of New England's groundfish sectors.

Conclusion
Prior to the 2002 legislation, Nixon writes that, "The common perception of fisheries law in Rhode Island is that our unique history has somehow frozen us in time and limited our choices for the future…That is simply not the case; the General Assembly has the power to do whatever it thinks is best in the state's interest" (2001, pp.7-8). This research illustrates that fisheries institutions continue to evolve in the Ocean State. Moreover, the Act itself was not imagined or intended to provide a longterm solution for all fisheries management issues in Rhode Island. A possible outcome of this exercise could be that there is no change to the state law -but there is no way of knowing unless we attempt to understand. Tackling these issues will require continued public deliberation, much like the work being led by the DEM under the Direction of current Director. The Coastal Institute, as a neutral entity, successfully shepherded fisheries reform in Rhode Island ten years ago and should be tapped to lead subsequent policy discussions. (1) Preserve, enhance, and allow for any necessary regeneration of the fisheries of the state, for the benefit of the people of the state, as an ecological asset and as a source of food and recreation;

APPENDICES
(2) Provide Rhode Islanders who wish to fish commercially the opportunity to do so and end the moratorium on issuance of new commercial fishing licenses so that new licenses may be issued for the year beginning January 1, 2003, and each year thereafter; (3) Allow residents who have fished commercially to sell their vessels and gear in a manner that first, facilitates up-grading license levels among residents already in the fishery; that second, provides lateral movement among residents who are holders of commercial fishing licenses to other types of fishing; and that third, enables new entrants into new commercial fishing; (4) Respect the interests of residents who fish under licenses issued by the state and wish to continue to fish commercially in a manner that is economically viable: provided, it is specifically not a purpose of this chapter to establish licensing procedures that eliminate the ability to fish commercially of any resident as of the date of enactment who validly holds commercial fishing license and who meets the application renewal requirements set forth herein; (5) Preserve and enhance full-time commercial fishing, with a high degree of participation by owner operated vessels, as a way of life and as a significant industry in Rhode Island; (6) Establish principles, for a system of adaptive management, that shall be used by the department in licensure programs and fisheries management, which principles shall include: (i) The foregoing purposes; and (ii) As appropriate, necessary, and effective, the following measures: (7) Provide a licensure system that facilitates data collection and management so that marine fisheries can be managed more efficiently and effectively. In accordance with this purpose, the system shall include a firm annual renewal deadline, as established herein, for the submittal of applications to renew licenses or obtain new licenses. An annual grace period, as established herein, shall allow fishermen an additional opportunity to renew their licenses from the immediately preceding year, subject to payment of a late fee; however, after the expiration of the grace period, there shall be no opportunity to appeal the denial of a commercial fishing license unless the applicant can show that the failure to apply during the grace period was due to documented medical hardship.